\ 


Irora  a  Muiial.;ire  by  Bla.:,ehard 


LIFE 


OP 


JOHN  C.  CALHOM, 


PRESENTING     A     CONDENSED 


HISTORY  OP  POLITICAL  EVENTS 


FROM    1811    TO    1843. 


TOGETHER    WITH    A    SELECTION 


SPEECHES,  REPORTS,  AND  OTHER  WRITINGS 


SUBSEQUENT   TO    HIS    ELECTION   AS 


VICE-PRESIDENT   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES,  INCLUDING  HIS  LEAD 
ING   SPEECH  ON  THE  LATE  WAR  DELIVERED  IN   1811. 


NEW-YORK: 
HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  82  CLIFF-STREE.T. 

1843. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1843, 

By  HARPER  &  BROTHERS, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  Southern  District  of  New- York. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


SINCE  Mr.  CALHOUN  first  took  a  leading  part  in  the  politics  of  the  coun 
try  and  the  administration  of  its  government,  a  new  generation  of  men 
has  risen  into  life,  who  cannot  appeal  to  their  memories  for  the  his 
tory  of  his  public  services.  It  was  thought  necessary,  therefore,  by  his 
political  friends,  who  desire  to  see  his  great  abilities  and  high  virtues 
placed  in  the  widest  sphere  of  usefulness,  that  a  biographical  sketch 
should  be  published  to  furnish  information  to  the  young,  and  to  revive 
the  recollections  of  those  of  more  mature  age  ;  and  to  attain  their  object 
most  effectually,  it  was  deemed  expedient  that  the  sketch  should  be  ac 
companied  with  a  selection  from  his  speeches,  reports,  and  other  writings, 
which  would  furnish  the  most  authentic  evidence  of  his  opinions  as  well 
on  subjects  of  high  constitutional  law  as  on  the  great  measures  of  policy 
which  divide  and  distinguish  the  two  great  parties  of  the  country.  Such 
a  selection,  to  be  practically  useful  to  the  public,  must  necessarily  be  very 
limited  when  taken  in  comparison  with  the  whole  body  of  Mr.  CALHOUN'S 
very  numerous  speeches,  reports,  and  other  writings,  as  a  complete  col 
lection  of  them  would  be  too  bulky  and  expensive  for  general  circulation. 
This  selection,  therefore,  contains  one  speech  only  delivered  prior  to  his 
becoming  Vice-president,  and,  while  many  delivered  subsequently  have, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  volume  from  being  too  large,  been  unavoidably 
excluded,  it  is  particularly  full  on  the  subject  of  Banks,  Independent  Treas 
ury,  Currency,  Tariff,  Distribution  of  the  Proceeds  of  the  Public  Lands, 
State  Rights,  and  the  principles  and  policy  which  should  control  in  the 
administration  of  the  government,  those  being  the  subjects  which  for  some 
years  past  have  agitated,  and  still  continue  to  agitate,  the  public  mind, 
and  on  which  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  interested  in  having 
exact  and  authentic  information  respecting  Mr.  CALHOUN'S  settled  and 
matured  opinions  after  the  long  experience  of  thirty-two  years  uninter 
ruptedly  devoted  to  their  service. 


LIFE 

OF 

JOHN     C.     CALHOUN. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Including  the  Period  from  his  Infancy  until  he  entered  Congress. 

THE  object  of  the  present  memoir  of  JOHN  CALDWELL  CALHOUN  is  not  to 
present  a  biography  of  the  man,  but  to  describe  him  as  a  statesman  j  to 
draw  and  to  develop  his  character  in  that  capacity,  and  to  trace  his  emi 
nent  public  services  during  a  long  career  in  one  of  the  most  eventful  pe 
riods  of  human  history.  To  dwell  on  a  character  like  his,  distinguished 
by  every  trait  that  should  win  esteem  and  commn^d  admiration,  would  be 
to  the  biographer  a  most  attractive  labour ;  bui  the  pleasure  of  depicting 
a  private  life  elevated  by  spotless  purity  and  integrity,  and  a  severe  sim 
plicity  of  tastes  and  habits,  must  be  relinquished — except  so  far  as  occa 
sional  reference  to  his  early  history  may  become  necessary — for  the  high 
er  duty  of  portraying  his  intellectual  features,  and  of  explaining  his  mo 
tives  and  conduct  as  a  public  man-  It  is  not  our  aim  to  commend  him  to 
public  affection,  or  to  enlist  popular  sympathy  in  his  behalf,  but  rather  to 
show  to  the  world,  not  for  hi-*  sake,  but  for  its  own  instruction,  the  deep 
influence  of  this  master-nv'nd  upon  the  great  political  events  of  his  age. 
A  fair  and  impartial  review  of  the  career  of  this  eminent  statesman  in 
connexion  with  public  affairs,  is  necessary*to  a  thorough  understanding 
of  the  course  of  our  own  government  for  nearly  two  thirds  of  its  existence. 
Such  a  review,  it  is  believed,  would  be  no  unacceptable  offering  at  the 
present  time.  Throughout  the  whole  period  from  1811  up  to  the  pres 
ent  time  he  has  served  the  Union  in  the  various  capacities  of  Represent 
ative,  Secretary  of  War,  Vice-president,  and  Senator.  He  has  taken 
a  prominent  and  influential  part  in  all  the  great  questions  which  have 
arisen  during  that  long  interval;  and,  although  he  has  asked  a  release 
from  farther  public  service,  it  is  not  impossible  that  he  may  be  destined 
to  close  his  career  as  a  statesman  in  another  and  a  higher  station.  With 
faculties  unclouded,  with  physical  powers  unimpaired,  with  a  judgment 
matured  by  observation  and  experience,  with  an  intrepidity  untamed  by 
the  many  trying  vicissitudes  of  his  extraordinary  life,  and  with  an  activity 
whose  energies  are  unabated  by  time,  it  is  probable  that  the  American 
people  will  not  dispense  with  such  services  as  he  might  render  in  the 
highest  sphere  open  to  American  statesmen. 

Mr.  Calhoun  is  a  native  of  South  Carolina,  and  was  born  in  Abbeville 
District  on  the  18th  of  March,  1782.  His  family  is  Irish  on  both  sides. 
His  father,  Patrick  Callioun,  was  born  in  Donegal,  in  Ireland,  but  the  fam 
ily  emigrated  when  Patrick  was  a  child,  first  to  Pennsylvania,  where  they 
remained  some  years,  and  then  to  the  western  part  of  Virginia,  from 
whence  they  were  driven  by  the  Indians  after  Braddock's  defeat.  They 


4  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

removed  finally  to  South  Carolina  in  1756,  when  Patrick  settled  on  the 
place  where  the  subject  of  this  sketch  was  born,  and  which  still  continues 
in  the  family  of  his  younger  brother.  His  mother,  whose  maiden  name 
was  Caldwell,  was  born  in  Charlotte  County,  Virginia.  They  had  five 
children,  one  daughter  and  four  sons,  of  whom  John  was  the  youngest  but 
one.  He  was  called  after  his  maternal  uncle,  Major  John  Caldwell,  whom 
the  Tories  had  murdered  in  cold  blood,  and  in  his  own  yard,  after  destroy 
ing  his  house  by  fire.  If  time  permitted,  it  might  be  interesting  here  to 
trace  the  effect  which  the  traditions  of  the  stirring  scenes  of  a  pioneer's 
life  might  have  had  upon  the  mind  and  character  of  young  Calhoun.  His 
paternal  and  maternal  family  both  being  Whig,  they  were  exposed  not 
only  to  hostile  Indian  incursions,  but  also  to  Tory  outrages.  They  main 
tained  their  foothold  on  the  soil  despite  the  conflicts  of  an  almost  con 
stant  border  warfare,  and  adhered  to  their  country  amid  the  horrors  of 
civil  strife  and  in  the  face  of  foreign  invaders.  But  they  had  need  both 
of  courage  and  constancy  to  bear  them  through  the  severe  trials  to  which 
they  were  exposed.  Of  three  maternal  uncles  able  to  bear  arms,  one  per 
ished  as  we  have  before  described,  another  fell  at  the  battle  of  Cowpens 
with  thirty  sabre  wounds,  and  a  third,  taken  prisoner  by  the  English,  was 
immured  for  nine  months  in  the  dungeons  of  St.  Augustine.  Nor  was 
Patrick  Calhoun,  the  father,  indebted  to  anything  less  than  a  strong  arm 
and  a  stout  heart  for  his  escape  from  the  perils  which  surrounded  him. 
Upon  one  occasion,  with  thirteen  other  whites,  he  maintained  a  desperate 
conflict  for  hours  with  the  Cherokee  Indians,  until,  overwhelmed  by  su 
perior  numbers,  he  was  forced  to  retreat,  leaving  seven  of  his  companions 
dead  upon  the  field.  Three  days  after,  they  returned  to  bury  their  dead, 
and  found  the  bodies  of  twenty-three  Indian  warriors,  who  had  perished 
in  the  same  conflict.  At  another  time,  he  was  singled  out  by  an  Indian 
distinguished  for  his  prowess  as  &  chief  and  for  his  skill  with  the  rifle. 
The  Indian  taking  to  a  tree,  Calhoun  secured  himself  behind  a  log,  from 
whence  he  drew  the  Indian's  fire  four  ti^es  by  holding  his  hat  on  a  stick 
a  little  above  his  hiding-place.  The  Indi^i  at  length  exhibited  a  portion 
of  his  person  in  an  effort  to  ascertain  the  effect  of  his  shot,  when  he  re 
ceived  a  ball  from  his  enemy  in  the  shoulder,  which  forced  him  to  fly. 
But  the  hat  exhibited  the  traces  of  four  balls  by  *rhich  it  had  been  perfo 
rated.  The  effect  of  this  mode  of  life  upon  a  min&  naturally  strong  and 
inquisitive  was  to  create  a  certain  degree  of  contempt  for  the  forms  of 
civilized  life,  and  for  all  that  was  merely  conventional  in  society.  He 
claimed  all  the  rights  which  nature  and  reason  seemed  to  establish,  and 
he  acknowledged  no  obligation  which  was  not  supported  by  the  like  sanc 
tions.  It  was  under  this  conviction  that,  upon  one  occasion,  be  and  his 
neighbours  went  down  within  twenty-three  miles  of  Charleston,  armed 
with  rifles,  to  exercise  a  right  of  suffrage  which  had  been  disputed:  a 
contest  which  ended  in  electing  him  to  the  Legislature  of  the  state,  in 
which  body  he  served  for  thirty  years.  Relying  upon  virtue,  reason, 
and  courage  as  all  that  constituted  the  true  moral  strength  of  man,  he  at 
tached  too  little  importance  to  mere  information,  and  never  feared  to  en 
counter  an  adversary  who,  in  that  respect,  had  the  advantage  over  him :  a 
confidence  which  many  of  the  events  of  his  life  seemed  to  justify.  In 
deed,  he  once  appeared  as  his  own  advocate  in  a  case  in  Virginia,  in 
which  he  recovered  a  tract  of  land  in  despite  of  the  regularly-trained  dispu 
tants  who  sought  to  embarrass  and  defeat  him.  He  opposed  the  Federal 
Constitution,  because,  as  he  said,  it  permitted  other  people  than  those  of 
South  Carolina  to  tax  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  and  thus  allowed  tax 
ation  without  representation,  which  was  a  violation  of  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  Revolutionary  struggle. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  5 

We  have  heard  his  son  say  that  among  his  earliest  recollections  was 
one  of  a  conversation  when  he  was  nine,  years  of  age,  in  which  his  father 
maintained  that  government  to  be  best  which  allowed  the  largest  amount 
of  individual  liberty  compatible  with  social  order  and  tranquillity,  and  in 
sisted  that  the  improvements  in  political  science  would  be  found  to  consist 
in  throwing  off  many  of  the  restraints  then  imposed  by  law,  and  deemed 
necessary  to  an  organized  society.  It  may  well  be  supposed  that  his  son 
John  was  an  attentive  and  eager  auditor,  and  such  lessons  as  these  must 
doubtless  have  served  to  encourage  that  free  spirit  of  inquiry,  and  that 
intrepid  zeal  for  truth  for  which  he  has  been  since  so  much  distinguished. 
The  mode  of  thinking  which  was  thus  encouraged  may,  perhaps,  have 
compensated  in  some  degree  the  want  of  those  early  advantages  which 
are  generally  deemed  indispensable  to  great  intellectual  progress.  Of 
these  he  had  comparatively  few.  But  this  was  compensated  by  those 
natural  gifts  which  give  great  minds  the  mastery  over  difficulties  which 
the  timid  regard  as  insuperable.  Indeed,  we  have  here  another  of  those 
rare  instances  in  which  the  hardiness  of  natural  genius  is  seen  to  defy  all 
obstacles,  and  develops  its  flower  and  matures  its  fruit  under  circum 
stances  apparently  the  most  unpropitious. 

The  section  of  the  country  in  which  his  family  resided  was  then  newly 
settled,  and  in  a  rude  frontier  state.  There  was  not  an  academy  in  all  the 
upper  part  of  the  state,  and  none  within  fifty  miles,  except  one  at  about 
that  distance  in  Columbia  county,  Georgia,  which  was  kept  by  his  broth 
er-in-law,  Mr.  Waddell,  a  Presbyterian  clergyman.  There  were  but  a  few 
scattered  schools  in  the  whole  of  that  region,  and  these  were  such  as  are 
usually  found  on  the  frontier,  in  which  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic 
were  imperfectly  taught.  At  the  age  of  thirteen  he  was  placed  under  the 
charge  of  his  brother-in-law  to  receive  his  education.  Shortly  after,  his 
father  died  ;  this  was  followed  by  the  death  of  his  sister,  Mrs.  Waddell, 
within  a  few  weeks,  and  the  academy  was  then  discontinued,  which  sus 
pended  his  education  before  it  had  fairly  commenced.  His  brother-in- 
law,  with  whom  he  was  still  left,  was  absent  the  greater  part  of  the  time, 
attending  to  his  clerical  duties,  and  his  pupil  thus  found  himself  on  a  se 
cluded  plantation,  without  any  white  companion  during  the  greater  por 
tion  of  the  time.  A  situation  apparently  so  unfavourable  to  improvement 
turned  out,  in  his  case,  to  be  the  reverse.  Fortunately  for  him,  there  was  a 
small  circulating  library  in  the  house,  of  which  his  brother-in-law  was  libra 
rian,  and,  in  the  absence  of  all  company  and  amusements,  that  attracted 
his  attention.  His  taste,  although  undirected,  led  him  to  history,  to  the 
neglect  of  novels  and  other  lighter  reading ;  and  so  deeply  was  he  inter 
ested,  that  in  a  short  time  he  read  the  whole  of  the  small  stock  of  his 
torical  works  contained  in  the  library,  consisting  of  Rollin's  Ancient  His 
tory,  Robertson's  Charles  V.,  his  South  America,  and  Voltaire's  Charles 
XII.  After  despatching  these,  he  turned  with  like  eagerness  to  Cook's 
Voyages  (the  large  edition),  a  small  volume  of  Essays  by  Brown,  and 
Locke  on  the  Understanding,  which  he  read  as  far  as  the  chapter  on  In 
finity.  All  this  was  the  work  of  but  fourteen  weeks.  So  intense  was  his 
application  that  his  eyes  became  seriously  affected,  his  countenance  pal 
lid,  and  his  frame  emaciated.  His  mother,  alarmed  at  the  intelligence  of 
his  health,  sent  for  him  home,  where  exercise  and  amusement  soon  re 
stored  his  strength,  and  he  acquired  a  fondness  for  hunting,  fishing,  and 
other  country  sports.  Four  years  passed  away  in  these  pursuits,  and  in 
attention  to  the  business  of  the  farm  while  his  elder  brothers  were  absent, 
to  the  entire  neglect  of  his  education.  But  the  time  was  not  lost.  Exer 
cise  and  rural  sports  invigorated  his  frame,  while  his  labours  on  the  farm 
gave  him  a  taste  for  agriculture,  which  he  has  always  retained,  and  in  the 


6  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

pursuit  of  which  he  finds  delightful  occupation  for  his  intervals  of  leisure  from 
public  duties. 

About  this  time  an  incident  occurred  upon  which  turned  his  after  life.  His 
second  brother,  James,  who  had  been  placed  at  a  counting-house  in  Charles 
ton,  returned  to  spend  the  summer  of  1800  at  home.  John  had  determined 
to  become  a  planter ;  but  James,  objecting  to  this,  strongly  urged  him  to  ac 
quire  a  good  education,  and  pursue  one  of  the  learned  professions.  He  re 
plied  that  he  was  not  averse  to  the  course  advised,  but  there  were  two  difficul 
ties  in  the  way :  one  was  to  obtain  the  assent  of  his  mother,  without  which  lie 
could  not  think  of  leaving  her,  and  the  other  was  the  want  of  means.  He  said 
his  property  was  small  and  his  resolution  fixed :  he  would  far  rather  be  a 
planter  than  a  half-informed  physician  or  lawyer.  With  this  determination,  he 
could  not  bring  his  mind  to  select  either  without  ample  preparation ;  but  if  the 
consent  of  their  mother  should  be  freely  given,  and  he  (James)  thought  he 
could  so  manage  his  property  as  to  keep  him  in  funds  for  seven  years  of  study 
preparatory  to  entering  his  profession,  he  would  leave  home  and  commence  his 
education  the  next  week.  His  mother  and  brother  agreeing  to  his  conditions,  he 
accordingly  left  home  the  next  week  for  Dr.  Waddell's,  who  had  married  again, 
and  resumed  his  academy  in  Columbia  county,  Georgia.  This  was  in  June, 
1800,  in  the  beginning  of  his  19th  year,  at  which  time  it  may  be  said  he  com 
menced  his  education,  his  tuition  having  been  previously  very  imperfect,  and 
confined  to  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic  in  an  ordinary  country  school.  His 
progress  here  was  so  rapid  that  in  two  years  he  entered  the  junior  class  of  Yale 
College,  and  graduated  with  distinction  in  1804,  just  four  years  from  the  time 
he  commenced  his  Latin  grammar.  He  was  highly  esteemed  by  Dr.  Dwight, 
then  the  president  of  the  college,  although  they  differed  widely  in  politics,  and 
at  a  time  when  political  feelings  were  intensely  bitter.  The  doctor  was  an 
ardent  Federalist,  and  Mr.  Calhoun  was  one  of  a  very  few,  in  a  class  of  more 
than  seventy,  who  had  the  firmness  openly  to  avow  and  maintain  the  opinions 
of  the  Republican  party,  and,  among  others,  that  the  people  were  the  only  le 
gitimate  source  of  political  power.  Dr.  Dwight  entertained  a  different  opinion. 
In  a  recitation  during  the  senior  year,  on  the  chapter  on  Politics  in  Paley's 
Moral  Philosophy,  the  doctor,  with  the  intention  of  eliciting  his  opinion,  pro 
pounded  to  Mr.  Calhoun  the  question,  as  to  the  legitimate  source  of  power.  He 
did  not  decline  an  open  and  direct  avowal  of  his  opinion.  A  discussion  ensued 
between  them,  which  exhausted  the  time  allotted  for  the  recitation,  and  in  which 
the  pupil  maintained  his  opinions  with  such  vigour  of  argument  and  success  as 
to  elicit  from  his  distinguished  teacher  the  declaration,  in  speaking  of  him  to  a 
friend,  that  "  the  young  man  had  talent  enough  to  be  President  of  the  United 
States,"  which  he  accompanied  by  a  prediction  that  he  would  one  day  attain 
that  station. 

An  English  oration  was  assigned  to  Mr.  Calhoun  at  the  Commencement. 
He  selected  for  his  thesis,  "  The  qualifications  necessary  to  constitute  a  perfect 
statesman,"  and  prepared  his  oration,  but  was  prevented  from  delivering  it  by  a 
severe  indisposition.  After  graduating,  he  commenced  the  study  of  the  law,  and 
devoted  three  years  to  that  and  miscellaneous  reading,  eighteen  months  of  which 
were  spent  at  Litchfield,  Connecticut,  where  a  celebrated  law-school  was  kept 
at  that  time  by  Judge  Reeves  and  Mr.  Gould.  He  acquired  great  distinction  at 
the  school.  It  was  there  that  he  successfully  cultivated,  in  a  debating  society, 
his  talents  for  extemporary  speaking.  The  residue  of  the  time  was  spent  in  the 
offices  of  Mr.  De  Saussure,  of  Charleston  (afterward  chancellor),  and  of  Mr. 
George  Bowie,  of  Abbeville.  Having  spent  seven  years  in  preparation,  accord 
ing  to  his  determination  when  he  commenced  his  education,  and  having  passed 
his  examination  for  admission  to  the  bar,  he  began  the  practice  of  law  in  his  na 
tive  district.  He  rose  at  once  into  full  practice,  taking  a  stand  with  the  oldest 
and  ablest  lawyers  on  the  circuit 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  7 

He  continued  but  a  short  time  at  the  bar.  While  he  was  yet  a  student,  after 
iris  return  from  Litchfield  to  Abbeville,  an  incident  occurred  which  agitated  the 
whole  Union,  and  contributed  to  give  to  Mr.  Calhoun's  life,  at  that  early  period, 
the  political  direction  which  it  has  ever  since  kept — the  attack  of  the  English 
frigate  Leopard  on  the  American  frigate  Chesapeake.  It  led  to  public  meetings  all 
over  the  Union,  in  which  resolutions  were  passed  expressive  of  the  indignation 
of  the  people,  and  their  firm  resolve  to  stand  by  the  government  in  whatever 
measure  it  might  think  proper  to  adopt  to  redress  the  outrage.  At  that  called 
in  his  native  district,  he  was  appointed  one  of  the  committee  to  prepare  a  report 
and  resolutions  to  be  presented  to  a  meeting  to  be  convened  to  receive  them  on 
an  appointed  day.  Mr.  Calhoun  was  requested  by  the  committee  to  prepare 
them,  which  he  did  so  much  to  their  satisfaction,  that  he  was  appointed  to  ad 
dress  the  meeting  on  the  occasion  before  the  vote  was  taken  on  the  resolutions. 
The  meeting  was  large,  and  it  was  the  first  time  he  had  ever  appeared  before 
the  public.  He  acquitted  himself  with  such  success  that  his  name  was  pre 
sented  as  a  candidate  for  the  state  Legislature  at  the  next  election.  He  was 
elected  at  the  head  of  the  ticket,  and  at  a  time  when  the  prejudice  against  law 
yers  was  so  strong  in  the  district  that  no  one  of  the  profession  who  had  offered 
for  many  years  previously  had  ever  succeeded.  This  was  the  commencement 
of  his  political  life,  and  the  first  evidence  he  ever  received  of  the  confidence  of 
the  people  of  the  state — a  confidence  which  has  continued  ever  since  constantly 
increasing,  without  interruption  or  reaction,  for  the  third  of  a  century  ;  and  which, 
for  its  duration,  universality,  and  strength,  may  be  said  to  be  without  a  parallel 
in  any  other  state,  or  in  the  case  of  any  other  public  man. 

He  served  tw.o  sessions  in  the  state  Legislature.  It  was  not  long  after  he 
took  his  seat  before  he  distinguished  himself.  Early  in  the  session  an  informal 
meeting  of  the  Republican  portion  of  the  members  was  called  to  nominate  can 
didates  for  the  places  of  President  and  Vice-president  of  the  United  States. 
Mr.  Madison  was  nominated  for  the  presidency  without  opposition.  When, 
the  nomination  for  the  vice-presidency  was  presented,  Mr.  Calhoun  embraced 
the  occasion  to  present  his  opinion  in  reference  to  coming  events,  as  bearing 
on  the  nomination.  He  reviewed  the  state  of  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  two  great  belligerents  which  were 
then  struggling  for  mastery,  and  in  their  struggle  trampling  on  the  rights  of  neu 
trals,  and  especially  ours  ;  he  touched  on  the  restrictive  system  which  had  been 
resorted  to  by  the  government  to  protect  our  rights,  and  expressed  his  doubt  of 
its  efficacy,  and  the  conviction  that  a  war  with  Great  Britain  would  be  una 
voidable.  "  It  was,"  he  said,  "  in  this  state  of  things,  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  the  ranks  of  the  Republican  party  should  be  preserved  undisturbed  and  un 
broken  by  faction  or  discord."  He  then  adverted  to  the  fact,  that  a  discontent 
ed  portion  of  the  party  had  given  unequivocal  evidence  of  rallying  round  the 
name  of  the  venerable  vice-president,  George  Clinton  (whose  re-nomination  was 
proposed),  and  of  whom  he  spoke  highly ;  but  he  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  that  should 
he  be  nominated  and  re-elected,  he  would  become  the  nucleus  of  all  the  dis 
contented  portion  of  the  party,  and  thus  make  a  formidable  division  in  its  ranks 
should  the  country  be  forced  into  war.  These  persons,  he  predicted,  would  ulti 
mately  rally  under  De  Witt  Clinton,  the  nephew,  whom  he  described  as  a  man 
of  distinguished  talents  and  aspiring  disposition.  To  avoid  the  danger,  he  sug 
gested  for  nomination  the  name  of  John  Langdon,  of  New-Hampshire,  of  whom 
he  spoke  highly  both  as  to  talents  and  patriotism. 

It  was  Mr.  Calhoun's  first  effort  in  a  public  capacity.  The  manner  and  mat 
ter  excited  great  applause  ;  and  when  it  is  recollected  that  these  remarks  pre 
ceded  the  declaration  of  war  more  than  three  years,  and  how  events  happened 
according  to  his  anticipations,  it  affords  a  striking  proof  of  that  sagacity,  at  so 
early  a  period,  for  which  he  has  since  been  so  much  distinguished.  It  at  once 
gave  him  a  stand  among  the  most  distinguished  members  of  the  Legislature. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 


During  the  short  period  he  remained  a  member,  he  originated  and  carried 
through  several  measures,  which  proved  in  practice  to  be  salutary,  and  have 
become  a  permanent  portion  of  the  legislation  of  the  state. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Including  the  period  from  his  entering  Congress  until  his  appointment  as  Secretary  of  War. 

IN  the  mean  time,  the  growing  difficulties  in  our  foreign  relations,  especially 
with  Great  Britain,  impressed  the  community  at  large  with  the  belief  that  war 
with  that  formidable  power  was  approaching.  The  impression  naturally  turned 
the  attention  of  the  people,  in  selecting  candidates  for  Congress,  to  those  whom 
they  believed  to  be  the  most  competent  to  serve  them  at  so  trying  a  period. 
The  eyes  of  the  congressional  district  in  which  Mr.  Calhoun  resided  were 
turned  towards  him,  and  he  was  elected  by  an  overwhelming  majority  over  his 
opponent.  This  was  in  the  fall  of  1810,  and  he  took  his  seat  in  the  councils 
of  the  nation,  a  year  afterward,  in  the  first  session  of  the  twelfth  Congress, 
known  as  the  war  session,  with  his  two  distinguished  colleagues,  Mr.  Cheves 
and  Mr.  Lowndes,  who,  like  himself,  had  been  elected  in  reference  to  the  critical 
condition  of  the  country.  His  reputation  had  preceded  him,  and  he  was  placed 
second  on  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations,  which,  in  the  existing  state  of  our 
relations  with  the  two  great  belligerents,  was  regarded  as  the  most  important  of 
the  committees,  and  was,  accordingly,  filled  by  members  selected  in  reference 
to  the  magnitude  of  its  duties.  The  other  distinguished  individuals  who  com 
posed  it  were  Peter  B.  Porter,  the  chairman,  and  Felix  Grundy,  of  Tennessee, 
on  the  Republican  side,  and  John  Randolph  and  Philip  Barton  Key  on  the  other. 
It  was,  indeed,  an  eventful  period  of  our  history,  and  the  duties  which  it  imposed 
on  the  committee  were  of  the  most  difficult  and  responsible  character. 

It  is  not  easy,  at  this  day,  to  estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis.  Our  pres 
ent  government  had  its  origin  just  preceding  the  commencement  of  the  great 
Revolution  in  France,  which,  in  its  progress,  involved  her  in  a  war  without  ex 
ample  or  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world,  taking  into  estimate  its  cause,  ex 
tent,  duration,  the  immensity  of  force  brought  into  conflict,  the  skill  which  di 
rected  it,  the  variety  and  magnitude  of  its  incidents,  and  the  importance  of  the 
stake  at  issue.  England  was  the  great  antagonist  power  to  France  in  this 
mighty  struggle,  whose  shocks  reached  even  our  distant  shores.  From  the  be 
ginning,  our  mutual  rights  were  invaded  by  both  sides,  and  our  peace  endan 
gered  ;  but  so  recently  had  our  government  been  established,  so  hazardous  was 
it  to  jput  it  to  the  test  of  war,  and  especially  in  such  a  struggle,  and  so  advan 
tageous  to  our  commerce  and  prosperity  was  our  position  as  a  neutral  power, 
while  all  Europe  was  at  war,  that  it  became  the  fixed  policy  of  the  government 
to  preserve  peace  and  bear  wrongs,  so  long  as  the  one  could  be  preserved  and 
the  other  endured  without  sacrificing  the  honour  and  independence  of  the  coun 
try.  This  pacific  and  wise  policy  was,  with  some  slight  exceptions,  steadily 
pursued  for  more  than  fifteen  years.  At  length  came  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
Decrees  on  the  part  of  France,  and  the  hostile  orders  in  council  on  the  part  of 
England,  which  forced  on  our  government  the  embargo  and  other  restrictive 
measures,  adopted  from  an  anxious  desire  of  preserving  peace,  and  in  the  hope 
of  obtaining  respect  for  our  rights  from  one  or  other  of  the  two  belligerents. 
Experience  soon  proved  how  impotent  these  measures  were,  and  how  fallacious 
was  our  hope.  The  encroachments  on  our  rights  and  independence  continued 
to  advance,  till  England  at  length  pushed  her  aggressions  so  far  that  our  com 
merce  was  reduced  to  a  state  of  dependance  as  complete  as  when  we  were  her 
colonies,  and  our  ships  were  converted,  at  the  same  time,  into  a  recruiting-ground 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  9       . 

to  man  her  navy.  Not  a  vessel  of  ours  was  permitted  to  reach  Europe  but 
through  her  ports,  and  more  than  3000  of  our  hardy  seamen  were  impressed 
into  her  service,  to  fight  battles  in  which  they  had  no  interest.  Our  independ 
ence,  as  far  as  the  ocean  was  concerned,  had  become  an  empty  name ;  but  so 
hazardous  was  it  to  take  up  arms  in  the  unprepared  state  of  the  country,  and  to 
be  drawn  into  a  struggle  apparently  so  fearful  and  interminable  between  the  two 
first  powers  on  earth,  that  the  stoutest  and  boldest  might  well  have  paused  at 
taking  the  step. 

It  was  in  such  a  crisis  of  our  affairs  that  Mr.  Calhoun  took  his  seat  in  Con 
gress.  To  him  it  was  not  unexpected.  He  had  little  confidence  from  the  be 
ginning  in  the  peaceful  measures  resorted  to  for  the  redress  of  our  wrongs,  and 
saw  beforehand  that  the  final  alternatives  would  be  war  or  submission,  and  had 
deliberately  made  up  his  mind,  that  to  lose  independence,  and  to  sink  down  into 
a  state  of  acknowledged  inferiority,  depending  for  security  on  forbearance,  and 
Dot  on  our  capacity  and  disposition  to  defend  ourselves,  would  be  the  worst 
calamity  which  could  befall  the  country.  According  to  his  opinion,  the  ability 
of  the  government  to  defend  the  country  against  external  danger,  and  to  cause 
its  rights  to  be  respected  from  without,  was  as  essential  as  protection  against 
violence  within,  and  that,  if  i*.  should  prove  incompetent  to  meet  successfully  the 
hazard  of  a  just  and  necessary  war,  it  would  fail  in  one  of  the  two  great  objects 
for  which  it  was  instituted,  and  that  the  sooner  it  was  known  the  better.  With* 
these  fixed  opinions,  his  voice,  on  taking  his  seat,  was  for  the  most  decisive 
course. 

The  President's  Message,  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  was,  in  its  general 
features,  warlike,  and  yet  there  were  expressions  of  an  ambiguous  character, 
which  led  many  to  doubt  what  course  of  policy  was  really  intended  by  the  ad 
ministration.     The  portion  which  related  to  our  affairs  with  other  powers  was 
referred  to  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations.     The  excitement  in  the  coun 
try  was  intense,  and  party  spirit  never  ran  higher.     All  eyes  were  turned  on 
the  proceedings  of  the  committee.     They  reported,  at  an  early  period  of  the 
session,  resolutions  strongly  recommending  immediate  and  extensive  prepara 
tions  to  defend  our  rights  and  redress  our  wrongs  by  an  appeal  to  arms.     The 
debate  was  opened  by  the  chairman,  Mr.  Porter,  and  he  was  followed  on  the 
same  side  by  Mr.  Grundy.     It  was  allotted  to  Mr.  Calhoun  to  follow  Mr.  Ran 
dolph,  who,  on  the  opposite  side,  succeeded  Mr.  Grundy  in  an  able  and  elo 
quent  speech.     The  discussion  from  the  beginning  excited  profound  interest, 
both  in  the  body  and  the  crowded  audience  daily  assembled  in  the  lobby  and 
galleries,  and  this  interest  had  increased  as  the  discussion  advanced.     It  was 
Mr.  Calhoun's  first  speech  in  Congress,  except  a  few  brief  remarks  on  the  Ap 
portionment  Bill.     The  trial  was  a  severe  one ;  expectation  was  high.     The 
question  was  of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  he  to  whom  he  had  to  reply,  a  vet 
eran  statesman  of  unsurpassed  eloquence.     How  he  acquitted  himself,  the  pa 
pers  of  the  day  will  best  attest.    The  remarks  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  then, 
as  now,  a  leading  journal  on  the  Republican  side,  may  be  taken  as  an  example. 
Mr.  Ritchie,  in  his  remarks  on  the  speeches,  after  characterizing  Mr.  Randolph's, 
said  :  "  Mr.  Calhoun  is  clear  and  precise  in  his  reasoning,  marching  up  directly 
to  the  object  of  his  attack,  arid  felling  down  the  errors  of  his  opponent  with  the 
club  of  Hercules  ;  not  eloquent  in  his  tropes  and  figures,  but,  like  Fox,  in  the 
moral  elevation  of  his  sentiments  ;  free  from  personality,  yet  full  of  those  fine 
touches  of  indignation,  which  are  the  severest  cut  to  the  man  of  feeling.     His 
speech,  like  a  fine  drawing,  abounds  in  those  lights  and  shades  which  set  off 
each  other  :  the  cause  of  his  country  is  robed  in  light,  while  her  opponents  are_^- 
wrapped  in  darkness.    It  were  a  contracted  wish  that  Mr.  Calhoun  were  a  Vir 
ginian  ;  though,  after  the  quota  she  has  furnished  with  opposition  talents,  such, 
a  wish  might  be  forgiven  us.     We  beg  leave  to  participate,  as  Americans  and 
friends  of  our  country,  in  the  honours  of  South  Carolina.     We  hail  this  young 

B 


10  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

•Carolinian  as  one  of  the  master-spirits  who  stamp  their  names  upon  the  age  in 
which  they  live." 

When  Mr.  Calhoun  sat  down,  he  was  greeted  by  the  great  body  of  the 
party  for  his  successful  effort,  and  thenceforward  took  rank  with  the  ablest 
and  most  influential  members  of  the  body.  But,  as  clear  as  it  appeared  to  him 
that  the  period  had  arrived  when  a  resort  to  arms  could  no  longer  be  avoided 
without  sacrificing  the  honour  and  interest  of  the  country,  such  was  far  from 
being  the  feeling  of  many,  even  of  the  Republican  members  of  the  body.  Many, 
who  saw  the  necessity,  hesitated ;  some  from  the  great  hazard  of  war,  others 
from  the  want  of  preparation,  or  the  difficulty  of  selecting  between  the  belliger 
ents,  when  both  had  so  grossly  violated  our  rights  ;  arid  not  a  few  from  a  linger 
ing  confidence  in  the  Non-importation  Act,  and  other  restrictive  measures,  as  the 
means  of  redressing  our  wrongs.  Mr.  Calhoun,  although  he  approved  of  the 
motive  which  had  led  to  a  resort  to  those  measures  in  the  first  instance,  and 
regarded  them  as  wise  temporary  expedients,  never  had  any  confidence  in 
them  as  instruments  of  avenging  or  redressing  the  wrongs  of  the  country.  •  Be 
lieving  that  they  had  accomplished  all  they  ever  could,  and  that  a  latent  attach 
ment  to  them  was  one  of  the  principal  impediments  to  a  resort  to  arms,  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  attack  the  whole  system. 

To  realize  the  boldness  and  hazard  of  such  a  step,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
at  the  support  or  opposition  to  the  system  had  been  for  many  years  the  main 
jtest  of  party  fidelity,  and  that  party  spirit  was  never  higher  than  at  the  time. 
But  as  strongly  as  he  was  attached  to  the  administration,  to  the  Republican 
party,  and  their  general  policy,  and  opposed  as  he  was  to  the  Federalists,  he 
did  not  hesitate,  young  as  he  was,  when  he  believed  duty  and  the  interest  of 
the  country  required  it,  to  place  himself  above  all  party  considerations,  and  to 
expose  manfully  the  defects  of  a  system  which  had  been  so  long  cherished  and 
defended  by  the  party  to  which  he  belonged.  The  following  extracts  from  a 
speech  delivered  against  it  will  give  in  his  own  language  some  of  the  most 
prominent  objections  which  he  urged  against  the  system,  and  afford,  at  the 
same  time,  a  fair  specimen  of  his  powers  of  reasoning  and  eloquence  at  that 
early  period,  and  of  the  lofty  and  patriotic  sentiments  which  actuated  him  in  the 
line  of  policy  that  he  advocated. 

"  The  restrictive  system,"  he  said,  "  as  a  mode  of  resistance,  or  as  a  means 
of  obtaining  redress,  has  never  been  a  favourite  one  with  me.  I  wish  not  to 
censure  the  motives  which  dictated  it,  or  attribute  weakness  to  those  who  first 
resorted  to  it  for  a  restoration  of  our  rights.  But,  sir,  I  object  to  the  restrictive 
system  because  it  does  not  suit  the  genius  of  the  people,  or  that  of  our  govern 
ment,  or  the  geographical  character  of  our  country.  We  are  a  people  essen 
tially  active  ;  I  may  say  we  are  pre-eminently  so.  No  passive  system  can 
suit  such  a  people  ;  in  action  superior  to  all  others,  in  patient  endurance  inferior 
to  none.  Nor  does  it  suit  the  genius  of  our  government.  Our  government  is 
founded  on  freedom,  and  hates  coercion.  To  make  the  restrictive  system  ef 
fective,  requires  the  most  arbitrary  laws.  England,  with  the  severest  penal 
statutes,  has  not  been  able  to  exclude  prohibited  articles  ;  and  Napoleon,  with 
all  his  power  and  vigilance,  was  obliged  to  resort  to  the  most  barbarous  laws  to 
enforce  his  Continental  system." 

After  showing  how  the  whole  mercantile  community  must  become  corrupt  by 
the  temptations  and  facilities  for  smuggling,  and  how  the  public  opinion  of  the 
commercial  community  (upon  which  the  system  must  depend  for  its  enforce 
ment)  becomes  opposed  to  it,  and  gives  sanction  to  its  violation,  he  proceeds 

"  But  there  are  other  objections  to  the  system.  It  renders  government  odi 
ous.  The  farmer  inquires  why  he  gets  no  more  for  his  produce,  and  he  is  told 
it  is  owing  to  the  embargo,  or  commercial  restrictions.  In  this  he  sees  only 
the  hand  of  his  own  government,  and  not  the  acts  of  violence  and  injustice 
•which  this  system  is  intended  to  counteract.  His  censures  fall  on  the  govern- 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  11 

ment.  This  is  an  unhappy  state  of  the  public  mind ;  and  even,  I  might  say,  in. 
a  government  resting  essentially  on  public  opinion,  a  dangerous  one.  In  war 
it  is  different.  Its  privation,  it  is  true,  may  be  equal  or  greater ;  but  the  public 
mind,  under  the  strong  impulses  of  that  state  of  things,  becomes  steeled  against 
sufferings.  The  difference  is  almost  infinite  between  the  passive  and  active 
state  of  the  mind.  Tie  down  a  hero,  and  he  feels  the  puncture  of  a  pin :  throw 
him  into  battle,  and  he  is  almost  insensible  to  vital  gashes.  So  in  war.  Im 
pelled  alternately  by  hope  and  fear,  stimulated  by  revenge,  depressed  by  shame, 
or  elevated  by  victory,  the  people  become  invincible.  No  privation  can  shake 
their  fortitude  ;  no  calamity  break  their  spirit.  Even  when  equally  successful, 
the  contrast  between  the  two  systems  is  striking.  War  and  restriction  may 
leave  the  country  equally  exhausted ;  but  the  latter  not  only  leaves  you  poor, 
but,  even  when  successful,  dispirited,  divided,  discontented,  with  diminished 
patriotism,  and  the  morals  of  a  considerable  portion  of  your  people  corrupted. 
Not  so  in  war.  .  In  that  state,  the  common  danger  unites  all,  strengthens  the 
bonds  of  society,  and  feeds  the  flame  of  patriotism.  The  national  character 
mounts  to  energy.  In  exchange  for  the  expenses  and  privations  of  war,  you 
obtain  military  and  naval  skill,  and  a  more  perfect  organization  of  such  parts  of 
your  administration  as  are  connected  with  the  science  of  national  defence.  Sir, 
are  these  advantages  to  be  counted  as  trifles  in  the  present  state  of  the  world  ? 
Can  they  be  measured  by  moneyed  valuation  ?  I  would  prefer  a  single  victory 
over  the  enemy,  by  sea  or  land,  to  all  the  good  we  shall  ever  derive  from  the 
continuation  of  the  Non-importation  Act.  I  know  not  that  a  victory  would  pro 
duce  an  equal  pressure  on  the  enemy ;  but  I  am  certain  of  what  is  of  greater 
consequence,  it  would  be  accompanied  by  more  salutary  effects  on  ourselves. 
The  memory  of  Saratoga,  Princeton,  and  Eutaw  is  immortal.  It  is  there  you 
will  find  the  country's  boast  and  pride — the  inexhaustible  source  of  great  and 
heroic  sentiments.  But  what  will  history  say  of  restriction  ?  What  examples 
worthy  of  imitation  will  it  furnish  to  posterity  1  What  pride,  what  pleasure, 
will  our  children  find  in  the  events  of  such  times  ?  Let  me  not  be  considered 
romantic.  This  nation  ought  to  be  taught  to  rely  on  its  courage,  its  fortitude, 
its  skill  and  virtue,  for  protection.  These  are  the  only  safeguards  in  the  hour 
of  danger.  Man  was  endued  with  these  great  qualities  for  his  defence. 
There  is  nothing  about  him  that  indicates  that  he  is  to  conquer  by  endurance. 
He  is  not  incrusted  in  a  shell ;  he  is  not  taught  to  rely  upon  his  insensibility, 
his  passive  suffering,  for  defence.  No,  sir ;  it  is  on  the  invincible  mind,  on  a 
magnanimous  nature,  he  ought  to  rely.  Here  is  the  superiority  of  our  kind ;  it 
is  these  that  render  man  the  lord  of  the  world.  It  is  the  destiny  of  his  condi 
tion  that  nations  rise  above  nations,  as  they  are  endued  in  a  greater  degree 
with  these  brilliant  qualities." 

But  this  is  not  the  only  instance  in  which  Mr.  Calhoun,  at  this  early  stage 
of  his  public  life,  manifested  a  spirit  above  party  influence  or  control,  that 
spirit  which  he  has  so  often  since  exhibited,  when  duty  and  patriotism  demand 
ed  it.  No  one  appreciates  more  highly  the  value  of  party  ties  within  proper 
limits,  or  adheres  more  firmly  to  his  party  within  them,  than  he  does.  He  never 
permits  them  to  influence  him  beyond  those  necessary  limits.  Acting  accord 
ingly,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  give  his  cordial  and  warm  support  to  a  bill  for  the 
increase  of  the  navy,  reported  by  his  able  and  distinguished  colleague,  who 
was  then  chairman  of  the  Naval  Committee,  although,  at  and  previous  to  that 
time,  the  great  body  of  the  Republican  party  was  and  had  been  opposed  to  it. 
It  was  owing  to  the  decided  support  which  it  received  from  Mr.  Cheeves,  Mr. 
Calhoun,  Mr.  Lowndes,  and  Mr.  Clay,  and  its  brilliant  achievements  afterward 
(even  then  confidently  anticipated  by  them),  that  it  has  since  become  with  the 
whole  Union  the  favourite  arm  of  defence. 

As  prominent  as  was  the  situation  of  Mr.  Calhoun  at  the  commencement  of 
this  eventful  session,  as  the  second  on  the  most  important  committee,  it  became 


12  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

still  more  so  in  its  progress.  The  chairman,  Mr.  Porter,  withdrew  from  Con 
gress,  and  Mr.  C.  found  himself  at  the  head  of  the  committee,  which,  in  addition 
to  its  peculiar  duties,  was  charged,  by  a  vote  of  the  House,  with  a  large  portion 
of  those  properly  belonging  to  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs.  Few  indi 
viduals  with  so  little  parliamentary  experience  have  ever  been  placed  in  so  re 
sponsible  a  situation.  He  had  never  before  served  in  a  deliberative  body  except 
for  two  short  sessions  in  the  Legislature  of  his  own  state,  making  together  but 
nine  weeks.  With  such  limited  experience,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  a  situ 
ation  of  the  kind  more  arduous  than  that  in  which  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
such  a  committee  at  such  a  period,  when  party  spirit  was  at  its  height  and  the 
opposition  under  the  guidance  of  leaders  distinguished  for  their  talents  and  ex 
perience  ;  and  yet,  so  ample  were  his  resources,  and  so  great  his  aptitude  for 
business,  that  he  not  only  sustained  himself,  but  acquired  honour  and  distinc 
tion  for  the  ability  with  which  he  discharged  the  duties  of  his  station. 

It  will  not  be  attempted  to  trace  Mr.  Calhoun's  course  through  this  laborious 
and  long-to-be-remembered  session.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  he  exhibited 
throughout  the  same  zeal  and  ability  with  which  he  commenced  it.  Near  its 
close  he  reported  and  carried  through  the  bill  declaring  war  against  Great 
Britain — a  war  under  all  circumstances  fairly  entitled  to  its  appellation  as  the- 
second  war  of  independence.  The  proceedings  were  in  secret  session,  con 
trary  to  his  opinion  and  wishes. 

Such  was  the  brilliant  career  of  Mr.  Calhoun  during  his  first  session,  and 
that  under  the  most  responsible  and  trying  circumstances.  Much  of  his  suc 
cess  is  to  be  attributed  to  his  early  and  wise  determination  not  to  come  forward 
till  he  had  laid  the  foundation  in  a  solid  education,  and  fully  prepared  himself 
to  act  his  part  in  life.  Without  them,  the  mere  force  of  natural  talents  could 
not  have  carried  him  successfully  through  the  difficulties  he  had  to  encounter 
at  the  outset  of  his  congressional  career. 

The  declaration  of  war  fixed  the  policy  of  the  government  for  the  time,  and 
the  discussions  in  Congress  during  its  continuance  turned,  for  the  most  part,  on 
questions  relating  to  the  finances,  the  army,  the  navy,  the  mode  of  conducting 
the  war,  and  its  success  and  disasters.  These  gave  rise  to  many  warm  and 
animated  debates  of  deep  interest  and  excitement  at  the  time,  and  in  most  of 
which  Mr.  Calhoun  took  a  prominent  part,  and  fully  sustained  the  reputation  he 
had  acquired  for  ability  and  eloquence ;  but  as  the  subjects  were  generally  of  a 
temporary  character,  and  have  long  since  lost  much  of  their  interest,  the  object 
of  this  sketch  does  not  require  that  they  should  be  particularly  noticed.  They 
will,  accordingly,  be  passed  in  silence,  and  the  notice  of  the  events  of  the  pe 
riod  confined  to  those  that  may  be  regarded  as  exceptions  to  the  ordinary  party 
discussions  of  the  day.  This  course  is  the  more  readily  adopted,  because  it  is 
believed  that  the  whole  country  is  disposed  to  do  ample  justice  to  the  patriot 
ism,  the  intelligence,  and  ability  with  which  he  performed  his  part  during  this 
eventful  period  of  our  history. 

The  first  incident  that  will  be  noticed  took  place  at  the  commencement  of 
the  session  immediately  succeeding  the  declaration  of  war.  South  Carolina 
had  in  that  Congress  an  unusual  number  of  men  of  talents  :  General  D.  R.  Wil 
liams,  Langdon  Cheves,  William  Lowndes,  and  the  subject  of  this  sketch,  all 
of  whom  were  entitled  to  prominent  positions  in  the  arrangement  of  commit 
tees.  Mr.  Calhoun  was  the  youngest.  The  speaker  was  embarrassed.  There 
was  a  difficulty  in  placing  so  many  from  one  state,  and  that  a  small  one,  at  tho 
head  of  prominent  committees,  and  Mr.  Calhoun,  with  his  characteristic  disin 
terestedness,  cheerfully  assented  to  be  placed  second  on  that  at  the  head  of 
which  he  had  served  with  so  much  distinction  at  the  preceding  session.  Mr. 
Smilie,  an  old  and  highly-respectable  member  from  Pennsylvania,  was  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  committee.  At  its  first  meeting  the  chairman,  without  pre 
viously  intimating  his  intention,  moved  that  Mr.  Calhoun  should  be  elected 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  13 

chairman.  He  objected,  and  insisted  that  Mr.  Smilie  should  act  as  chairman, 
and  declared  his  perfect  willingness  to  serve  under  him ;  but  he  was,  notwith 
standing,  unanimously  elected,  and  the  strongest  proof  that  could  be  given  of  the 
highly  satisfactory  manner  in  which  he  had  previously  discharged  his  duty  was 
thus  afforded.  In  this  conviction,  and  as  illustrative  of  the  same  disinterested 
character,  when  the  speaker's  chair  became  vacant  by  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Clay  as  one  of  the  commissioners  to  negotiate  for  peace,  Mr.  Calhoun  was  so 
licited  by  many  of  the  most  influential  members  of  the  party  to  become  a  £an- 
didate  for  it;  but  he  peremptorily  refused  to  oppose  his  distinguished  colleague, 
Mr.  Cheves,  who  was  elected. 

At  an  early  period  of  the  same  session,  a  question  out  of  the  ordinary  course, 
and  which  excited  much  interest  at  the  time,  became  the  subject  of  discussion, 
that  of  the  merchants'  bonds.  The  Nori -importation  Act  (one  of  the  restrictive 
measures)  was  in  force  when  war  was  declared.  Under  its  operation  a  large 
amount  of  capital  had  been  accumulated  abroad,  and  especially  in  England,  the 
proceeds  of  exports  that  could  not  be  returned  in  consequence  of  the  prohibition 
of  imports.  The  owners,  when  they  saw  war  was  inevitable,  became  alarmed, 
and  gave  orders  for  the  return  of  their  property.  It  came  back,  for  the  most 
part,  in  merchandise,  which  was  subject  to  forfeiture  under  the  act.  The  own 
ers  petitioned  for  the  remission  of  the  forfeiture,  and  permission  to  enter  the 
goods  on  paying  the  war  duties.  The  secretary  of  the  treasury,  on  the  other 
hand,  proposed  to  remit  the  forfeiture  on  condition  that  the  amount  of  the  value 
of  the  goods  should  be  loaned  to  the  government  by  the  owners.  Mr.  Cheves, 
who  was  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  reported  in  favour  of 
the  petition,  and  supported  his  report  by  an  able  speech.  The  question  had 
assumed  much  of  a  party  character,  but  it  did  not  deter  Mr.  Calhoun  from  an 
independent  exercise  of  his  judgment.  He  believed  that  the  act  never  con 
templated  a  case  of  the  kind,  and  that  to  enforce,  under  such  circumstances,  a 
forfeiture  amounting  to  millions,  which  would  embrace  a  large  class  of  citizens, 
would  be  against  the  spirit  of  the  criminal  code  of  a  free  and  enlightened  peo 
ple.  But  waving  these  more  general  views,  he  thought  the  only  alternative 
was  to  remit  the  forfeiture,  as  prayed  for  by  the  owners,  or  to  enforce  it  accord 
ing  to  the  provisions  of  the  act :  that,  if  the  importation  was  such  a  violation 
as  justly  and  properly  incurred  the  forfeiture,  then  the  act  ought  to  be  enforced  ; 
but  if  not,  the  forfeiture  ought  to  be  remitted  ;  and  that  the  government  had  no 
light,  and  if  it  had,  it  was  unbecoming  its  dignity  to  convert  a  penal  act  into 
the  means  of  making  a  forced  loan.  Thus  thinking,  he  seconded  the  effort 
of  his  distinguished  colleague,  and  enforced  his  views  in  a  very  able  speech. 
The  result  was,  that  the  forfeiture  was  remitted,  and  the  goods  admitted  on 
paying  duties  in  conformity  to  the  course  recommended  by  the  committee. 

There  was  another  case  in  which,  at  this  period,  he  evinced  his  firmness  and 
independence.  The  administration  still  adhered  to  the  restrictive  policy,  and 
even  after  the  war  was  declared  the  President  recommended  the  renewal  of 
the  Embargo.  Mr.  Calhoun,  as  has  been  shown,  opposed,  on  principle,  the 
whole  system  as  a  substitute  for  war,  and  he  was  still  more  opposed  to  it  as  an 
auxiliary  to  it.  He  held  it,  in  that  light,  not  only  as  inefficient  and  delusive, 
but  as  calculated  to  impair  the  means  of  the  country,  and  to  divert  a  greater 
share  of  its  capital  and  industry  to  manufactures  than  could  be,  on  the  return 
of  peace,  sustained  by  the  government  on  any  sound  principles  of  justice  or 
policy.  He  thought  war  itself,  without  restrictions,  would  give  so  great  a  stim 
ulus,  that  no  small  embarrassment  aiad  loss  would  result  on  its  termination,  in. 
despite  of  all  that  could  be  done  for  them,  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  expressed 
his  willingness,  when  peace  came,  to  protect  the  establishments  that  might 
grow  up  during  its  continuance,  as  far  as  it  could  be  fairly  done. 

The  Embargo  failed  on  the  first  recommendation  :  but,  at  the  next  session, 
oeing  recommended  again,  it  succeeded.  Mr.  Calhoun,  at  the  earnest  entreaties 


14  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  friends,  and  to  prevent  division  in  the  party  when  their  union  was  so  neces 
sary  to  the  success  of  the  war,  gave  it  a  reluctant  vote. 

But  the  time  was  approaching  when  an  opportunity  would  be  afforded  him 
to  carry  out  successfully  his  views  in  reference  to  the  restrictive  system,  and 
that  with  the  concurrence  of  the  party.  The  disasters  of  Bonaparte  in  the  Rus 
sian  campaign,  his  consequent  fall  and  dethronement  in  the  early  part  of  1814, 
and  the  triumph  of  Great  Britain,  after  one  of  the  longest,  and,  altogether,  the 
most  remarkable  contests  on  record,  offered  that  opportunity,  which  he  promptly 
seized.  This  great  event,  which  terminated  the  war  in  Europe,  left  Great  Brit 
ain,  flushed  with  victory,  in  full  possession  of  all  the  vast  resources,  in  men, 
money,  and  materials,  by  which  she  had  brought  that  mighty  conflict  to  a  suc 
cessful  termination,  to  be  turned  against  us.  It  was  a  fearful  state  of  things  ; 
but,  as  fearful  as  it  was  of  itself,  it  was  made  doubly  so  by  the  internal  condi 
tion  of  the  country,  and  the  course  of  the  opposition.  Blinded  by  party  zeal, 
they  beheld  with  joy  or  indifference  what  was  calculated  to  appal  the  patriotic. 
Forgetting  the  country,  and  intent  only  on  a  party  triumph,  they  seized  the  op 
portunity  to  embarrass  the  government.  Their  great  effort  was  made  against 
the  Loan  Bill — a  measure  necessary  to  carry  on  the  war.  Instead  of  support 
ing  it,  they  denounced  the  war  itself  as  unjust  and  inexpedient ;  and  they  pro 
claimed  its  farther  prosecution,  in  so  unequal  a  contest,  as  hopeless,  now  that 
the  whole  power  of  the  British  Empire  would  be  brought  to  bear  against  us. 
Mr.  Calhoun  replied  in  a  manner  highly  characteristic  of  the  man,  undaunted, 
able,  and  eloquent.  None  can  read  this  speech,  even  at  this  distance  of  time, 
•without  kindling  under  that  elevated  tone  of  feeling,  which  wisdom,  emanating 
from  a  spirit  lofty  and  self-possessed  under  the  most  trying  circumstances,  only 
can  inspire.  In  order  to  show  the  justice  and  expediency  of  the  war,  he  took 
an  historical  view  of  the  maritime  usurpations  of  Great  Britain,  from  the  cele 
brated  order  in  council  of  1756,  to  the  time  of  the  discussion,  and  demon 
strated  that  her  aggressions  were  not  accidental,  or  dependant  on  peculiar  cir 
cumstances,  but  were  the  result  of  a  fixed  system  of  policy,  intended  to  estab 
lish  her  supremacy  on  the  ocean.  After  giving  a  luminous  view  of  the  origin 
and  character  of  the  wrongs  we  had  suffered  from  her,  he  clearly  showed  the 
flimsiness  of  the  pretext  by  which  she  sought  to  justify  her  conduct,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  opposition  to  excuse  her,  and  dwelt  upon  the  folly  of  hoping  to  ob 
tain  redress  by  sheathing  the  sword  or  throwing  ourselves  on  her  justice.  The 
following  extract,  taken  from  the  conclusion,  will  afford  an  example  of  his  lofty 
and  animating  eloquence  : 

"  This  country  is  left  alone  to  support  the  rights  of  neutrals.  Perilous  is  the 
condition,  and  arduous  the  task.  We  are  not  intimidated.  We  stand  opposed 
to  British  usurpation,  and,  by  our  spirit  and  efforts,  have  done  all  in  our  power 
to  save  the  last  vestiges  of  neutral  rights.  Yes,  our  embargoes,  non-inter 
course,  non-importation,  and.  finally,  war,  are  all  manly  exertions  to  preserve 
the  rights  of  this  and  other  nations  from  the  deadly  grasp  of  British  mari 
time  policy.  But  (say  our  opponents)  these  efforts  are  lost,  and  our  condi 
tion  hopeless.  If  so,  it  only  remains  for  us  to  assume  the  garb  of  our  condition. 
We  must  submit,  humbly  submit,  crave  pardon,  and  hug  our  chains.  It  is  not 
wise  to  provoke  where  we  cannot  resist.  But  first  let  us  be  well  assured  of  the 
hopelessness  of  our  state  before  we  sink  into  submission.  On  what  do  our  op 
ponents  rest  their  despondent  and  slavish  belief.7  On  the  recent  events  in  Eu 
rope  ?  I  admit  they  are  great,  and  well  calculated  to  impose  on  the  imagina 
tion.  Our  enemy  never  presented  a  more  imposing  exterior.  His  fortune  is  at 
the  flood.  But  I  am  admonished  by  universal  experience,  that  such  prosperity 
is  the  most  precarious  of  human  conditions.  From  the  flood  the  tide  dates  its 
ebb.  From  the  meridian  the  sun  commences  his  decline.  Depend  upon  it, 
there  is  more  of  sound  philosophy  than  of  fiction  in  the  fickleness  which  poels 
attribute  to  fortune.  Prosperity  has  its  weakness,  adversity  its  strength.  In 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  15 

many  respects  our  enemy  has  lost  by  those  very  changes  which  seem  so  very 
much  in  his  favour.  He  can  no  more  claim  to  be  struggling  for  existence  ;  no  more 
to  be  fighting  the  battles  of  the  world  in  defence  of  the  liberties  of  mankind. 
The  magic  cry  of  '  French  influence'  is  lost.  In  this  very  hall  we  are  not 
strangers  to  that  sound.  Here,  even  here,  the  cry  of  '  French  influence,'  that 
baseless  fiction,  that  phantom  of  faction  now  banished,  often  resounded.  I  re 
joice  that  the  spell  is  broken  by  which  it  was  attempted  to  bind  the  spirit  of 
this  youthful  nation.  The  minority  can  no  longer  act  under  cover,  but  must 
come  out  and  defend  their  opposition  on  its  own  intrinsic  merits.  Our  example 
can  scarcely  fail  to  produce  its  effects  on  other  nations  interested  in  the  main-* 
tenance  of  maritime  rights.  But  if,  unfortunately,  we  should  be  left  alone  to 
maintain  the  contest,  and  if,  which  may  God  forbid,  necessity  should  compel 
us  to  yield  for  the  present,  yet  our  generous  efforts  will  not  have  been  lost.  A 
mode  of  thinking  and  a  tone  of  sentiment  have  gone  abroad  which  must  stimu 
late  to  future  and  more  successful  struggles.  What  could  not  be  effected  with 
eight  millions  of  people  will  be  done  with  twenty.  The  great  cause  will  never 
be  yielded — no,  never,  never !  Sir,  I  hear  the  future  audibly  announced  in  the 
past — in  the  splendid  victories  over  the  Guerriere,  Java,  and  Macedonian.  We, 
and  all  nations,  by  thes^  victories,  are  taught  a  lesson  never  to  be  forgotten. 
Opinion  is  power.  The  charm  of  British  naval  invincibility  is  gone." 

Such  was  the  animated  strain  by  which  Mr.  Calhoun  roused  the  spirit  of  the 
government  and  country  under  a  complication  of  adverse  circumstances  cal 
culated  to  overwhelm  the  feeble  and  appal  the  stoutest.  Never  faltering,  never 
doubting,  never  despairing  of  the  Republic,  he  was  at  once  the  hope  of  the  party 
and  the  beacon  light  to  the  country. 

But  he  did  not  limit  his  efforts  to  repelling  the  attacks  of  the  opposition,  and 
animating  the  hopes  of  the  government  and  country.  He  saw  that  the  very 
events  \vhich  exposed  us  to  so  much  danger,  made  a  mighty  change  in  the  po 
litical  and  commercial  relations  of  Continental  Europe,  which  had  been  so  long 
closed  against  foreign  commerce,  in  consequence  of  the  long  war  that  grew  out 
of  the  French  Revolution,  and  of  those  hostile  orders  and  decrees  of  the  two 
great  belligerents,  which  had  for  many  years  almost  annihilated  all  lawful  com 
merce  between  the  Continent  of  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  events 
that  dethroned  Bonaparte  put  an  end  to  that  state  of  things,  and  left  all  the  pow 
ers  of  Europe  free  to  resume  their  former  commercial  pursuits.  He  saw  in  all 
this  that  the  time  had  come  to  free  the  government  entirely  from  the  shackles  of 
the  restrictive  system,  to  which  he  had  been  so  long  opposed  ;  and  he,  according 
ly,  followed  up  his  speech  by  a  bill  to  repeal  the  Embargo  and  the  Non-importa 
tion  Act.  He  rested  their  repeal  on  the  ground  that  they  were  a  portion  of  the 
restrictive  policy,  and  showed  that  the  ground  on  which  it  had  been  heretofore 
sustained  was,  that  it  was  a  pacific  policy,  growing  out  of  the  extraordinary 
state  of  the  world  at  the  time  it  was  adopted,  and,  of  course,  dependant  on  the 
continuance  of  that  state.  "It  was  a  time,"  he  said,  "when  every  power  on 
the  Continent  was  arrayed  against  Great  Britain,  under  the  overwhelming  influ  • 
ence  of  Bonaparte,  and  no  country  but  ours  interested  in  maintaining  neutral 
rights.  The  fact  of  all  the  Continental  ports  being  closed  against  her,  gave  to 
our  restrictive  measures  an  efficacy  which  they  no  longer  had,  now  that  they 
were  open  to  her."  He  admitted  that  the  system  had  been  continued  too  long, 
and  been  too  far  extended,  and  that  he  was  opposed  to  it  as  a  substitute  for 
war,  but  contended  that  there  would  be  no  inconsistency  on  the  part  of  the 
government  in  abandoning  a  policy  founded  on  a  state  of  things  which  no 
longer  existed.  "  But  now,"  said  he,  "  the  Continental  powers  are  neutrals,  as 
between  us  and  Great  Britain.  We  are  contending  for  the  freedom  of  trade, 
and  ought  to  use  every  exertion  to  attach  to  our  cause  Russia,  Sweden,  Hol 
land,  Denmark,  and  all  other  nations  which  have  an  interest  in  the  freedom  of 
the  seas.  The  maritime  rights  assumed  by  Great  Britain  infringe  on  the 


16  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

rights  of  all  neutral  powers,  and  if  we  should  now  open  our  ports  and  trade  to 
the  nations  of  the  Continent,  it  would  involve  Great  Britain  in  a  very  awkward 
and  perplexing  dilemma.  She  must  either  permit  us  to  enjoy  a  very  lucrative 
commerce  with  them,  or,  by  attempting  to  exclude  them  from  our  ports  by  her 
system  of  paper  blockades,  she  would  force  them  to  espouse  our  cause.  The 
option  which  would  thus  be  tendered  her  would  so  embarrass  her  as  to  produce 
a  stronger  desire  for  peace  than  ten  years'  continuance  of  the  present  system, 
inoperative  as  it  is  now  rendered  by  a  change  of  circumstances."  These  views 
had  the  desired  effect,  and  the  bill  passed. 

The  subsequent  session  (that  of  1814-15)  was  the  last  of  the  war  sessions. 
It  was  short,  terminating  on  the  4th  of  March.  It  was  one  of  much  excite 
ment,  but  was  principally  distinguished  for  the  project  of  a  bank,  submitted  by 
the  administration,  and  intended  for  the  relief  of  the  financial  difficulties  of  the 
government.  Upon  this  measure  Mr.  Calhoun  differed  from  the  administration 
and  a  large  portion  of  the  party. 

It  so  happened  that  he  was  detained  at  home  by  sickness,  and  did  not  take 
his  seat  for  several  weeks  after  the  commencement  of  the  session,  and  his  place 
as  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations  was  filled  by  the  late  secre 
tary  of  state,  Mr.  Forsyth.  He  found,  on  his  arrival,  the  plan  of  a  bank  agreed 
on,  and  he  was  especially  requested  by  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  with  whom 
he  had  the  kindest  relations,  and  several  members  of  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means,  to  give  it  his  particular  attention,  which  he  promised  to  do.  His 
predisposition  was  strongly  in  favour  of  a  bank  of  some  kind.  It  was  then 
generally  thought  to  be  indispensable  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  With  this 
disposition,  and  a  strong  desire  to  meet  what  were  the  views  of  the  secretary 
and  the  administration,  and  of  his  friends  on  the  Ways  and  Means,  he  took  up 
the  plan  for  examination.  The  whole  subject  of  banking,  theoretically  and 
practically,  was,  in  a  great  measure,  new  to  him.  He  had  never  given  it  a 
serious  and  careful  examination,  and  his  mind,  though  favourably  disposed  to 
the  plan,  was  open  to  the  reception  of  truth. 

The  leading  features  of  the  plan  were  a  bank  of  $50,000,000  of  capital,  to 
consist,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  millions  of  specie,  entirely  of  the  stock  is 
sued  by  the  government  for  loans  made  to  carry  on  the  war.  It  was  not  to  pay 
specie  during  the  war,  nor  till  three  years  after  its  termination,  and  was  to  lend 
the  government,  whenever  required,  $30,000,000,  at  six  per  cent.,  to  carry  on 
the  war.  With  all  his  prepossessions  in  its  favour,  he  was  soon  struck  by  the 
fact,  that  the  great  leading  object  was  to  create  a  machine  for  lending  money, 
not  on  the  means  or  credit  of  the  bank,  or  the  individuals  to  be  incorporated, 
but  of  the  government  itself ;  for  the  bank  would  not  be  bound  to  pay  its  notes, 
and  would  have  little  or  nothing  on  which  to  lend  but  the  stock  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  whole  contrivance  was,  virtually,  under  the  specious  show  of  a 
loan,  for  the  government  to  borrow  back  its  own  credit  at  six  per  cent.,  for 
•which  it  had  already  stipulated  to  pay  a  high  interest — not  less,  on  an  average, 
than  eight  per  cent.  Those  who  had  lent  the  government,  alleging  that  they 
had  loaned  all  they  had,  modestly  proposed  to  lend  it,  on  its  own  credit,  as 
much  as  it  might  need  to  carry  on  the  war,  if  it  would  incorporate  them  under 
the  magic  name  of  "  a  bank,"  exempt  them  from  the  payment  of  their  debts  as 
a  corporation,  give  them  the  use  of  the  public  money,  and  not  only  endorse 
their  notes  by  receiving  them  for  its  dues,  but  also  pay  them  away  as  money  in 
their  disbursements. 

It  was  impossible  for  a  mind  constituted  as  Mr.  Calhoun's  not  to  see  the 
whole  effects  of  the  scheme,  or  to  give  its  assent  to  it,  by  whomsoever  contri 
ved,  or  by  whatever  name  called.  To  him,  no  alternative  was  left  but  to  sac 
rifice  his  judgment,  or  to  differ  from  the  administration  and  many  of  his  friends 
who  were  anxious  to  have  his  snpport ;  but,  as  responsible  and  painful  as  was 
the  alternative,  he  did  not  hesitate. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUJN.  17 

When  the  bill  came  up  he  opposed  it  in  a  speech,  in  which  he  briefly  stated 
his  objections  ;  and  such  was  its  effect  that,  though  the  measure  had  the  support 
of  the  administration,  and  the  whole  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  .and  Means 
but  one,  it  was  struck  out,  and  the  amendment  he  proposed  was  substituted  by 
an  overwhelming  majority.  His  substitute  was,  that  the  government  should 
use  its  own  credit  directly  in  the  shape  of  treasury  notes,  to  be  issued  to  meet 
ts  wants,  and  to  be  funded  in  the  bank  in  the  form  of  stock  at  six  per  cent.  ; 
that  the  bank  should  be  bound  to  pay  its'  notes  at  all  times,  and  should  make 
the  government  no  loans  but  short  ones,  in  anticipation  of  its  current  revenue. 
By  the  issue  of  treasury  notes,  to  be  funded  in  the  bank,  he  proposed  to  obtain 
the  immediate  supplies  to  carry  on  the  government ;  and,  by  establishing  a 
specie-paying  bank,  under  proper  restrictions,  he  hoped  to  sustain  a  strong  po 
sition,  from  which  the  currency,  then  consisting,  south  of  New-England,  exclu 
sively  of  the  notes  of  suspended  banks,  might  be  restored  to  the  specie  standard 
on  the  return  of  peace.  His  substitute  was,  in  its  turn,  defeated.  Two  other 
bills,  differently  modified,  were  successively  introduced,  and  were  both  defeat 
ed — one  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  speaker,  Mr.  Cheeves,  and  the  other  by  the 
"President,  who  vetoed  it  on  the  ground  that,  as  modified,  it  would  not  afford  the 
^relief  required  by  the  treasury.  . 

The  greater  part  of  the  session  had  been  spent  in  these  various  attempts 
to  pass  a  bill,  and  many  who  entirely  agreed  with  Mr.  Calhoun  in  his  view 
of  the  subject,  and  had  stood  fast  by  him  at  first,  now  yielded  to  the 
pressure.     Finally,  a  rally  was  made,  a  short  time  before  the  close  of  the 
session,  to  pass  a  bill,  and  it  was  again  introduced  in  the  Senate  much  im 
proved  in  some  of  its  objectionable  features,  but  still  defective  enough  to 
prevent  him  and  the  friends  who  stood  by  him  from  giving  it  their  sup 
port.     It  speedily  passed  that  body,  and  was  sent  to  the  House,  where  it 
was  pressed  through  to  its  passage  with  all  possible  despatch.     On  the 
question  of  ordering  it  to  the  third  reading,  Mr.  Calhoun  made  a  few  re 
marks,  in  which  he  warned  the  House  against  adopting  a  measure  which 
a  great  majority  decidedly  disapproved,  but  for  which  they  were  prepared 
to  vote  under  a  supposed  necessity,  which  did  not  exist.     He  concluded 
by  saying  that  the  bill  was  so  objectionable  that,  were  it  not  for  the  sup 
posed  necessity,  if,  for  instance,  the  news  of  peace  should  arrive  before  its 
passage,  it  would  not  receive  fifteen  votes,  and  concluded  by  saying  that 
he  would  reserve  a  full  statement  of  his  objections  to  the  bill  for  the  ques 
tion  on  the  passage  to  be  taken  the  next  day,  when  he  intended  to  make 
a  final  stand  against  it,  and  appeal  to  the  public  for  the  vindication  of  his 
course.     At  the  time  there  was  not  the  slightest  rumour  or  indication  of 
peace,  and  no  one  expected  it.     On  the  contrary,  every  indication  was, 
that  the  war  would  be  pushed  with  vigour  in  the  approaching  campaign. 
.    The  attack  had  been  made  on  New-Orleans,  and  by  every  mail  it  was  ex 
pected  to  hear  of  its  fate  ;  and  yet,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  that  very  day. 
subsequent  to  the  adjournment  of  the  House,  a  despatch,  sent  on  by  a  mer 
cantile  house  in  New-York,  to  be  forwarded  by  the  mail  to  the  South  to 
its  agents,  arrived  in  the  city,  with  the  intelligence  that  a  vessel  had  come 
in  after  the  departure   of  the  mail,  bringing  the  treaty  of  peace.     The 
member  to  whom  it  was  sent  was  so  struck  with  the  coincidence,  that  he 
•.  informed  Mr.  Calhoun  of  the  fact  in  confidence.    By  some  means,  a  rumour 
got  out  that  there  was  a  late  arrival  at  New- York  bringing  important  in 
telligence.     Next  day  the  friends  of  the   bill  made  an  effort  to  push  it 
through  before  the  arrival  of  the  mail  in  the  Afternoon.      Mr.  Calhoun 
moved  to  lay  the  bill  on  the  table,  saying-  that  there  was  a  hope  that  the 
mail  from  New-York,  which  would  arrive  in  a  few  hours,  might  bring  in 
telligence  that  would  have  an  important  bearing  on  the  bill.     The  vote  on 
his  motion  verified  his  prediction.     The  mail  arrived  with  the  treaty  of 

C 


18  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

peace.  It  was  then  proposed  to  him  to  modify  the  hill  in  conformity 
with  his  views,  if  he  would  withdraw  his  opposition.  He  refused,  and 
demanded  other  and  severer  restrictions  than  those  which  he  had  hereto 
fore  proposed.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to  take  up  the  bill  and  pass  it, 
which  failed  by  a  large  majority. 

It  was  thus  his  sagacity  and  firmness,  under  the  most  trying  circum 
stances,  against  the  whole  weight  of  the  administration,  defeated  a  meas 
ure,  which,  if  it  had  been  adopted  as  first  proposed,  would  have  been  fol 
lowed  by  consequences  more  disastrous  than  could  well  be  anticipated. 
He  had  the  satisfaction  to  receive  the  thanks  of  many  of  the  members  for 
its  defeat,  who  but  a  short  time  before  were  ready  to  denounce  him  for 
his  resistance  to  it.  It  is  now  to  be  regretted  that  none  of  Mr.  Calhoun's 
speeches  against  the  measure  were  published.  He  declined  publishing  at 
the  time  on  the  ground  that  his  object  was  to  defeat  the  bill,  but  to  do  so 
without  distracting  the  party  or  impairing  confidence  in  the  administra 
tion,  on  which  the  success  of  the  war  so  much  depended.  For  that  rea 
son,  he  not  only  avoided  publishing,  but  bore  patiently  the  denunciations 
daily  levelled  against  him  for  his  opposition  to  the  bill.  On  all  other, 
measures  of  the  session  he  gave  the  administration  an  active  and  hearty 
support.  It  was,  indeed,  a  rule  with  him,  when  compelled  to  differ  from 
his  party  on  an  important  measure,  to  limit  his  opposition  strictly  to  the 
measure  itself,  and  to  avoid,  both  in  manner  and  matter,  all  that  could  by 
possibility  give  offence.  By  a  rigid  observance,  too,  of  this  rule,  he  suc 
ceeded  in  maintaining  his  individual  opinion  in  reference  to  all  important 
questions  on  which  he  differed  from  his  party  without  weakening  his 
standing  with  them. 

The  transition  from  a  state  of  war  to  that  of  peace  gave  rise  to  many 
important  questions,  the  most  prominent  of  which  grew  out  of  the  finances 
and  the  currency.  At  the  succeeding  session,  Mr.  Lowndes  and  Mr.  Cal- 
houn  were  placed  at  the  head  of  the  committees  which  had  charge  of  these 
important  subjects;  Mr.  Lowndes  was  made  chairman  of  the  Ways  and 
Means,  and  Mr.  Calhoun,  from  the  prominence  he  had  acquired  at  the  pre 
ceding  session  on  the  Bank  Question,  was  appointed  chairman  of  that  on 
currency.  The  most  prominent  question  connected  with  the  finances  was 
that  of  the  readjustment  of  the  duties  on  the  imposts.  The  duties  had  been, 
doubled  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  and  the  question  now  presented 
was,  how  much  they  should  be  reduced.  It  was  one  that  took  in  the  whole 
range  of  the  future  policy  of  the  government,  and  involved  the  considera 
tion  of  many  important  subjects  ;  the  military  and  naval  establishments, 
the  debt,  and  the  new  direction  given  to  a  large  amount  of  the  capital  and 
industry  of  the  country  in  consequence  of  the  war,  the  Embargo,  the  Non 
importation,  and  Non-intercourse  Acts,  which  preceded  it.  These,  in  turn, 
involved  the  question  of  our  foreign  relations  in  all  their  bearings.  After 
a  survey  of  the  whole  ground,  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  reported 
the  bill,  \vith  the  full  concurrence  of  the  administration,  which  passed 
with  but  fe\*  changes,  and  has  since  been  called  the  Tariff  of  1816. 

Few  measuies  have  been  less  understood  or  more  misrepresented.  It 
has  been  the  general  impression  that  the  duties  were  adjusted  by  the  bill 
mainly  in  reference  to  the  protection  of  manufactures.  Such  is  far  from 
being  the  fact.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  items,  such  as  the  minimum 
duty  on  coarse  cottons,  the  duties  on  rolled  iron,  and,  perhaps,  one  or  two 
more,  the  duties  would  have  been  arranged  substantially  as  they  were  if 
there  had  not  been  a  manufacturing  establishment  in  the  whole  country. 
It  was  in  other  respects  a  revenue  bill,  proposed  and  reported  by  the 
committee  to  whom  the  subject  of  revenue  properly  belonged,  and  regu 
lated  in  its  details,  with  the  few  exceptions  referred  to,  by  revenue  con 
siderations. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  19 

The  first  great  question  in  the  adjusting  of  the  duties  was,  what  amount 
of  revenue  would  the  future  policy  of  the  country  require  ]  And,  in  de 
ciding  that,  the  leading  question  was,  whether  the  public  debt  should  be 
rapidly  or  slowly  paid!  In  this  decision  were  involved,  not  only  the  ques 
tion  of  the  policy  of  freeing  the  government  as  soon  as  possible  from  debt, 
but  also  the  collateral  effects  of  such  a  process  on  the  country  under  the 
particular  circumstances  of  the  case.  In  that  view,  the  effects  which 
raising  the  duties,  with  a  view  to  the  speedy  discharge  of  the  debt,  would 
have  in  sustaining  the  manufacturing  establishments  which  had  grown  up 
under  the  war,  and  the  restrictive  system  preceding  it,  served  to  create  a 
strong  motive  for  adopting  that  policy,  and  for  fixing  the  duties  as  high 
as  they  stand  in  the  act.  In  conformity  with  this  policy,  an  efficient  sink 
ing  fund  of  $10,000,000  annually  was  provided  for  the  payment  of  the 
principal  and  interest  of  the  debt,  with  the  proviso  that  all  moneys  re 
maining  in  the  treasury  at  the  end  of  each  year  exceeding  $2,000,000 
should  be  carried  to  its  aid.  It  was  in  reference  to  these  views,  and  the 
necessity  of  providing  for  the  military  and  naval  establishments  on  a  scale 
sufficiently  extended  for  the  public  service,  that  the  details  of  the  bill  and 
the  rates  of  the  duties  were  mainly  adjusted,  and  not  solely  or  principally 
for  the  protection  of  manufactures,  as  has  been  erroneously  supposed.  If 
proof  is  required,  conclusive  evidence  will  be  found  in  the  bill  itself,  which 
imposes  a  much  lower  average  rate  of  duties  on  what  are  now  called  the 
protected  articles,  that  is,  articles  similar  to  those  made  at  home,  or  which 
may  come  into  competition  with  them,  than  upon  the  other  descriptions. 

Nor  has  the  course  of  Mr.  Calhoun  in  reference  to  it  been  less  misun 
derstood  or  misrepresented  than  the  measure  itself.     He  has  frequently 
oeen  called  the  author  of  the  protective  system.     Nothing  is  more  untrue. 
He  was  not  on  the  committee,  and  took  no  part  in  the  discussion,  except 
to  make  a  short  off-hand  speech  at  the  request  of  a  friend,  at  a  particular 
stage  of  the  debate.     He  was  engrossed  with  the  duties  of  his  own  com 
mittee,  and  had  bestowed  but  little  attention  to  the  details  of  the  bill.    He 
concurred  in  the  general  views  and  policy  in  which  it  originated,  and  the 
more  readily  because  it  would  sustain  the  manufacturing  establishments 
that  had  grown  up  under  the  war-measures  of  the  government.     Shortly 
after  he  came  into  Congress,  he  had  anticipated,  as  has  been  stated,  the  dif 
ficulty  that  would  be  occasioned  by  the  new  direction  which  so  consider 
able  a  portion  of  the  capital  and  labour  of  the  country  had  taken  ;  and, 
while  he  professed  a  disposition  at  the  time  to  do  what  could  be  legiti 
mately  done  to  support  them  on  the  return  of  peace,  yet  he  used  his  best 
efforts  to  diminish  the  necessity,  as  far  as  practicable,  by  removing  every 
remnant  of  the  restrictive  system  during  the  war.     He  did  not  then,  nor 
do  we  believe  that  he  has  since  doubted  that,  in  deciding  whether  the  debt 
should  be  more  speedily  or  more  tardily  discharged,  the  favourable  effects 
which  the  former  mode  would  have  in  sustaining  the  manufacturing  estab 
lishments  was,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  a  legitimate  and  prop 
er  consideration.     But  truth  and  candour  require  us  to  say,  that,  as  far  as 
the  details  of  the  bill  went  beyond,  and  raised  the  duties  above  the  rev 
enue  point,  with  the  view  to  protection,  as  on  our  coarse  cottons  and 
rolled  iron,  he  has  long  believed  it  to  be  unconstitutional,  unjust,  and  un 
wise.     The  subject  was  new,  and  his  attention  was  drawn  to  other  sub 
jects,  and  he  did  not  take  the  proper  distinction  between  duties  for  revenue 
and  for  protection,  nor  was  it,  as  it  is  believed,  taken  at  the  time  by  any 
one.     He  who  will  examine  Mr.  Calhoun's  remarks  on  the  occasion  will 
not  fail  to  perceive  that  the  support  he  gave  the  bill  looked,  not  to  what 
has  since  been  called  the  protective  policy,  but  almost  wholly  to  consid 
erations  of  a  public  character  connected  y°'th  the  foreign  relations  of  the 


20  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

country,  and  the  danger  resulting  from  war  to  a  country,  as  ours  was  then, 
in  a  great  measure,  dependant  on  agriculture  and  commerce  with  foreign 
nations,  without  the  requisite  naval  power  to  keep  open  in  war  the  chan 
nels  of  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  fact,  it  is  difficult  at  this  time, 
in  the  changed  condition  of  the  country  and  the  world,  to  realize  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  public  men  of  that  day  acted,  and  the  mo 
tives  which  guided  them. 

To  do  so,  we  must  go  back  to  the  history  of  that  period.     A  just  and 
necessary  war  had  been  honourably  terminated  with  the  greatest  power 
in  the  world,  after  a  short  but  perilous  struggle.     The  violent  and  unpat 
riotic  course  of  the  opposition  during  the  war  had  so  discredited  it,  that 
the  name  and  doctrines  of  the  Federal  party,  once  so  respectable,  had  be 
come  odious.     After  the  war,  they  ceased  to  use  their  old  name,  or  to 
avow  their  doctrines  as  a  party ;  and  the  long  struggle  between  them  and 
their  principles  and  policy,  and  the  Republican  party  and  their  principles 
and  policy,  was  supposed  to  have  finally  terminated  in  the  ascendency  of 
the  latter.     The  impression  was  almost  universal,  that  the  danger  to  our 
popular  system  of  government  from  the  Federal  consolidation  doctrines 
was  ended.     The  only  cause  of  danger  to  the  country  and  its  institutions 
was  then  supposed  to  be  from  abroad.     The  overthrow  of  Bonaparte  was 
followed  throughout  Europe  by  a  powerful  reaction  against  the  popular 
principles  on  which  our  government  rests,  and  to  which,  through  the  in 
fluence  of  our  example,  the  French  Revolution  was  traced.     To  counter 
act  their  influence,  and  to  put  down  effectually  their  revival  in  Europe,  a 
league  of  all  the  great  Continental  monarchs  was  formed,  called  the  Holy 
Alliance.     Great  Britain  did  not  expressly  accede  to  it,  but  countenanced 
and  supported  it.     Our  country  of  all  the  world  stood  alone  in  opposi 
tion,  and  became  an  object  of  the  deepest  jealousy.     The  Spanish  prov 
inces    of  South  America,  it  is  true,  were  in  a  revolutionary  state,  and 
struggling  to   form  governments  similar  to   ours.      It  was   known  that 
this  formidable  combination  of  crowned  heads  meditated  hostile  move 
ments  against  them  on  political  grounds,  which  could  not  be  made  with 
out  involving  us.     In  such  a  state  of  the  world,  well  might  the  patriots 
of  that  day  be  roused  to  the  dangers  from  without,  almost  to  the  neg 
lect  of  those  from  within.     Had  events  taken  the  course  which  then  seem 
ed  so  probable,  much  that  was  then  said  and  done,  which  now  seems  to 
require  explanation,  would  have  been  regarded  as  profoundly  wise.     This 
is  pre-eminently  true  of  Mr.  Calhoun's  course.     Always  vigilant  and  soli 
citous  for  the  safety  and  prosperity  of  the   country,  he  kept  his   eyes 
steadily  directed,  at  that  critical  period,  to  the  point  from  which  he  and 
all  then  thought  the  country  was  menaced,  and  was  active  and  zealous  in. 
giving  such  a  direction  to  the  policy  of  the  government,  for  the  time,  as 
was  best  calculated  to  meet  it.     During  this  period,  he  spoke  at  large  on 
the  subject  of  defence  against  external  danger,  in  a  speech  delivered  on 
the  subject  of  the  repeal  of  the  direct  taxes,  and  which,  for  its  eloquence, 
ability,  and  lofty  and  patriotic  sentiments,  gained  him  great  applause.     To 
the  same  cause  may  be  traced  his  course,  and  that  of  the  great  body  of  the 
party  at  the  time,  on  most  of  the  subjects  in  reference  to  which  different 
views  are  now  entertained  by  them,  and,  among  others,  on  that  of  internal 
improvements.     On  that  subject,  as  well  as  upon  the  tariff,  his  views  have 
been  much  misunderstood  as  well  as  misrepresented.     Of  these  views  a 
brief  explanation  may  here  be  important. 

During  the  war,  while  the  coasting  trade  was  interrupted,  the  whole  in 
ternal  commercial  intercourse,  and  the  military  transportations  and  move- 
ments  over  our  widely-extended   country,  had  to  pass  through  internal 
routes,  then  in  a  state  far  less  perfect  than  at  present,  and  the  difficulties 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  21 

were  immense.  Great  delay,  uncertainty,  and  expense  attended  the  con 
centration  of  any  considerable  force  or  supply  on  a  point  where  the  de 
fence  of  the  country  or  an  attack  on  the  enemy  made  it  necessary.  This 
greatly  enfeebled  our  military  operations,  and  contributed  much  to  ex 
haust  the  means  of  the  government.  So  great  were  the  expense  and  dif 
ficulties,  that  it  is  estimated,  for  example,  that  much  of  the  flour  delivered 
at  Detroit  during  the  war  cost  $60  per  barrel,  and  most  of  the  cannon 
and  ball  transported  to  the  lakes  not  less  than  50  cents  per  pound. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  first  session  after  the  war,  while  the  rec 
ollection  of  these  things  was  fresh,  Mr.  Madison,  in  Ms  opening  message, 
among  other  things,  invited  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  subject  of 
internal  improvements,  and  recommended  Congress  to  call  into  exercise 
whatever  constitutional  power  it  might  possess  over  the  subject,  and  if 
that  should  not  prove  adequate,  to  apply  for  an  amendment  to  the  Con 
stitution  granting  such  additional  powers  as  would  be  sufficient.  Mr. 
Calhoun,  acting,  as  he  supposed,  in  strict  conformity  to  this  recommenda 
tion,  reported  a  bill  at  the  next  session,  to  set  apart  and  pledge  the  bonus 
of  the  United  States  Bank  and  their  share  of  its  dividends  as  a  fund  for 
internal  improvement.  It  made  no  appropriation,  nor  did  it  intend  to  af 
firm  that  Congress  had  any  power,  much  less  to  fix  the  limits  of  its  power, 
over  the  subject ;  but  to  leave  both,  as  well  as  the  appropriations  thereaf 
ter  to  be  made,  to  abide  the  decision  of  Congress,  in  conformity  with  the 
President's  views.  Nor  did  Mr.  C.  undertake  to  establish  either  in  his 
speech.  He  declined  both,  and  confined  his  remarks  to  the  general  ben 
efit  of  a  good  system  of  internal  improvements.  When  urged  to  assert 
the  power  of  Congress,  he  refused,  saying  that,  although  he  believed  it 
possessed  the  power  to  a  certain  extent,  he  was  not  prepared  to  say  to 
what  limits  it  extended.  He  had  not  the  least  suspicion,  in  reporting  and 
supporting  the  bill,  that  he  went  beyond  the  President's  recommendation, 
or  that  he  would  have  any  difficulty  in  approving  it,  till  the  bill  had  pass 
ed  both  Houses,  and  was  sent  to  him  for  his  signature. 

It  was  Mr.  Madison's  last  session,  and  only  a  few  days  before  its  termi 
nation,  when  the  bill  was  sent  to  him ;  and  while  it  was  still  before  him, 
Mr.  Calhoun  called  to  take  his  leave  of  him.  After  congratulating  him  on 
the  success  of  his  administration,  and  expressing  the  happiness  he  felt  in 
having  had  the  opportunity  of  co-operating  with  him  in  its  most  difficult 
period,  that  of  the  war,  he  took  his  leave.  When  he  reached  the  door, 
Mr.  Madison  requested  him  to  return.  He  did  so,  and  took  his  seat ;  and 
for  the  first  time  Mr.  M.  disclosed  to  him  his  constitutional  objections  to 
the  bill.  Mr.  Calhoun  expressed  his  deep  regret,  first,  that  he  should  en 
tertain  them,  and,  next,  that  he  had  not  intimated  them  to  him  in  time, 
saying  that,  if  he  had,  he  (Mr.  Calhoun)  would  certainly  not  have  subject 
ed  him  to  the  unpleasant  duty,  at  the  very  close  of  his  administration,  of 
vetoing  a  bill  passed  by  the  votes  of  his  friends,  nor  himself  to  having  the 
weight  of  his  name  and  authority  brought  against  him  on  such  a  subject. 
He  then  stated  that  he  had  introduced  the  bill,  as  he  believed,  in  strict  con 
formity  to  his  recommendation,  and  if  he  had  gone  beyond,  it  was  not  in 
tentional,  and  entreated  him  to  reconsider  the  subject ;  but  it  was  too  late. 

In  this  connexion,  it  is  due  to  candour  to  state,  that  although  Mr.  Cal 
houn  has  never  committed  himself,  in  any  speech  or  report,  as  to  the  ex 
tent  of  the  constitutional  powers  of  Congress  over  internal  improvements, 
yet  his  impression,  like  that  of  most  of  the  young  men  of  the  party  at  the 
time,  was,  that  it  was  comprehended  under  the  money-power  of  the  gov 
ernment.  Experience  and  reflection  soon  taught  him  this  was  an  error — 
one,  in  all  probability,  originating  with  him,  and  others  of  his  own  age,  in 
the  precedent  of  the  Cumberland  Road,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  first 


22  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

departure  by  the  Republican  party  from  the  true  construction  of  the  Con 
stitution  in  reference  to  that  dangerous  power.  Thus  much  it  has  been 
thought  proper  to  state  by  way  of  explanation,  and  as  due  to  that  por 
tion  of  our  political  history,  and  the  part  which  Mr.  Calhoun  acted  in  re- 
laion  to  it. 

The  subject  of  the  currency,  as  has  been  stated,  was  particularly  in 
trusted  to  Mr.  Calhoun.  It  was  regarded  as  the  most  difficult  and  impor 
tant  question  of  the  session.  All  the  banks  of  the  states  south  of  New- 
England  had,  at  an  early  period  of  the  war,  stopped  payment,  and  gold  and 
silver  had  entirely  disappeared,  leaving  within  their  limits  no  other  cur 
rency  than  the  notes  of  banks  that  either  would  not  or  could  not  redeem 
them.  G  overmnent  was  forced  to  submit,  and  not  only  to  collect  its  taxes 
and  dues,  and  make  its  disbursements,  and  negotiate  its  loans  in  their  dis 
credited  and  depreciated  paper,  but  also  to  use  them,  at  the  same  time,  as 
the  agents  of  the  treasury  and  depositories  of  its  funds.  At  first  the  de 
preciation  was  inconsiderable,  but  it  continued  to  increase,  though  une 
qually,  in  the  different  portions  of  the  Union  to  the  end  of  the  war.  It 
was  then  hoped  it  would  stop  ;  but  the  fact  proved  far  otherwise  ;  for  the 
progress  of  depreciation  became  more  rapid  and  unequal  than  ever.  It 
was  greatest  at  the  centre  (the  District  of  Columbia  and  the  adjacent  re 
gion),  where  it  had  reached  20  per  cent.,  as  compared  with  Boston ;  nor 
was  there  the  least  prospect  that  it  would  terminate  of  itself.  It  became 
absolutely  necessary,  in  this  state  of  things,  for  the  government  to  adopt 
the  rule  of  collecting  its  taxes  and  dues  in  the  local  currency  of  the  place, 
to  prevent  that  which  was  most  depreciated  from  flooding  the  whole 
Union  5  for  the  public  debtors,  if  they  had  the  option,  would  be  sure  to 
pay  in  the  most  depreciated.  But  the  necessary  effect  of  this  was  to  turn 
the  whole  import  trade  of  the  country  towards  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  the 
region  where  the  depreciation  was  the  greatest.  By  making  entry  there, 
the  duties  could  be  paid  in  the  local  depreciated  currency,  and  the  goods 
then  shipped  where  they  were  wanted.  The  result  of  the  rule,  though 
unavoidable,  was  to  act  as  a  premium  for  depreciation.  It  was  impossible 
to  tolerate  such  a  state  of  things.  It  was  in  direct  hostility  to  the  Con 
stitution,  which  provides  that  "  all  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be 
uniform  throughout  the  United  States,"  and  that  "  no  preference  shall  be 
given  by  any  regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one  state 
over  another."  Thus  the  only  question  was,  What  shall  be  done  1 

The  administration  was  in* favour  of  a  bank,  and  the  President  (Mr. 
Madison)  recommended  one  in  his  Message  at  the  commencement  of  the 
session.  The  great  body  of  the  Republican  party  in  Congress  concurred 
in  the  views  of  the  administration,  but  there  were  many  of  them  who  had, 
on  constitutional  grounds,  insuperable  objections  to  the  measure.  These, 
added  to  the  Federal  party,  who  had  been  against  the  war,  and  were,  in 
consequence,  against  a  bank,  constituted  a  formidable  opposition. 

Mr.  Calhoun,  whose  first  lesson  on  the  subject  of  banks,  taken  at  the 
preceding  session,  was  not  calculated  to  incline  him  to  such  an  institution, 
was  averse,  in  the  abstract,  to  the  whole  system  ;  but  perceiving  then  no 
other  way  of  relieving  government  from  its  difficulties,  he  yielded  to  the 
opinion  that  a  bank  was  indispensable.  The  separation  of  the  govern 
ment  and  the  banks  was  at  that  time  out  of  the  question.  A  proposition 
of  the  kind  would  have  been  rejected  on  all  sides.  Nor  was  it  possible 
then  to  collect  the  taxes  and  dues  of  the  government  in  specie.  It  had 
been  almost  entirely  expelled  the  country  j  there  appeared  to  be  no  alter 
native  but  to  yield  to  a  state  of  things  to  which  no  radical  remedy  could 
at  that  time  be  applied,  and  to  resort  to  a  bank  to  mitigate  the  evils  of  a 
system  which  in  its  then  state  \vas  intolerable.  This,  at  least,  was  the 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  23 

view  which  Mr.  Calhoun  took,  and  which  he  expressed  in  his  speech  on 
taking  up  the  bill  for  discussion.  It  is  said  to  have  been  one  of  the  most 
elaborate  and  powerful  he  ever  delivered.  Unfortunately,  it  is  lost.  That 
published  at  the  time  is  a  meager  sketch  of  what  took  three  hours  in  the 
delivery,  and  such  as  it  is,  never  passed  under  his  review  and  correction, 
and  omits  almost  entirely  all  that  does  not  immediately  refer  to  the  bank. 

The  passage  of  the  Bank  Bill  was  followed  by  the  joint  resolution  of 
1816,  which  prohibited,  after  a  certain  day,  the  reception  of  the  notes  of 
any  bank  which  did  not  pay  specie.  It  received  the  decided  support  of 
Mr.  Calhoun,  and  was  the  first  step  towards  the  separation  of  the  govern 
ment  from  the  banking  system.  Through  the  joint  agency  of  the  two 
measures,  the  currency  was  brought  to  the  specie  standard,  and  the  evil 
remedied. 

During  the  same  session  a  bill  was  passed  changing  the  per  diem  pay 
of  members  of  Congress  into  an  annual  compensation  of  $1500.  It  proved 
to  be  exceedingly  unpopular  ;  so  much  so,  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
members  who  voted  for  it  declined  offering  for  re-election,  and  those  who 
were  again  candidates,  with  few  exceptions,  were  defeated  at  the  polls. 
Mr.  Calhoun  voted  for  the  bill,  though  he  took  but  little  part  or  interest  in 
its  passage.  When  he  returned  to  his  constituents,  he  found,  for  the  first 
time,  the  tide  of  popular  favour  against  him.  So  strong  was  the  current, 
that  his  two  predecessors,  who  had  retired  in  his  favour,  General  Butler 
and  Colonel  Calhoun,  the  latter  a  near  relative,  were  both  violently  opposed 
to  him,  and  the  former  came  out  as  a  candidate  against  him.  They  were 
Loth  men  of  great  influence,  the  one  residing  at  Edgefield,  the  other  in  Ab 
beville,  and  these  two  formed  the  Congressional  district.  Only  a  few  faith 
ful  friends  ventured  openly  to  vindicate  his  vote.  He  was  advised  to  ap 
peal  to  the  kind  feelings  of  his  constituents,  and  apologize  for  his  course. 
This  he  peremptorily  declined,  declaring  that  he  had  voted  for  the  meas 
ure  because  he  believed  it  was  right,  and  could  not,  as  his  opinion  remain 
ed  unchanged,  apologize  for  that  which  his  judgment  approved.  He  ad 
ded,  at  the  same  time,  that  all  he  asked  was,  that  his  constituents  should 
give  him  a  hearing  in  explanation  of  his  vote.  A  day  was  appointed  in 
each  of  the  districts  for  him  to  address  them  at  the  courthouses.  He 
met  and  addressed  them  accordingly.  In  his  two  speeches  he  confined 
himself  to  the  merits  of  the  question,  without  apology  or  appeal  to  sym 
pathy,  but  with  such  force,  candour,  and  manliness,  that  the  tide  was  com 
pletely  turned,  and  he  was  triumphantly  re-elected. 

At  the  next  session  of  Congress  a  bill  was  introduced  to  repeal  the 
act.  It  gave  rise  to  an  animated  and  interesting  debate,  in  which  Mr. 
Calhoun  took  part,  and  entered  fully  into  the  merits  of  the  measure,  and 
the  reasons  which  governed  him  in  voting  for  it.  An  estimate  may  be 
formed  of  the  ability  of  the  speech  from  the  following  compliment  bestow 
ed  upon  it  by  Mr.  Grosvenor,  of  New-York,  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  dis 
tinguished  members  of  the  House,  on  the  opposite  side  in  politics.  To 
understand  the  allusion  which  he  made,  and  to  appreciate  the  full  force 
of  the  compliment,  it  is  proper  to  premise  that  there  had  been  a  personal 
difference  between  him  and  Mr.  Calhoun  in  one  of  the  secret  sessions 
during  the  war,  since  which  they  had  not  been  on  speaking  terms. 
Mr.  Grosvenor  said,  "  He  had  heard,  with  peculiar  satisfaction,  the  able, 
manly,  and  constitutional  speech  of  the  gentleman  from  South  Carolina." 
[Here  Mr.  Grosvenor,  recurring  in  his  own  mind  to  their  personal  difference 
with  Mr.  Calhoun,  which  arose  out  of  the  warm  party  discussions  during 
the  war,  paused  for  a  moment,  and  then  proceeded] :  "  Mr.  Speaker,  I  will 
not  be  restrained.  No  barrier  shall  exist  which  I  will  not  leap  over  for 
the  purpose  of  offering  to  that  gentleman  my  thanks  for  tbe  judicious,  in- 


24  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

dependent,  and  national  course  which  he  has  pursued  in  this  House  for  the 
last  two  years,  and  particularly  upon  the  subject  now  before  us.  Let  the 
honourable  gentleman  continue  with  the  same  manly  independence,  aloof 
from  party  views  and  local  prejudices,  to  pursue  the  great  interests  of  his 
country,  and  fulfil  the  high  destiny  for  which  it  is  manifest  he  was  born. 
The  buzz  of  popular  applause  may  not  cheer  him  on  his  way,  but  he  will 
inevitably  arrive  at  a  high  and  happy  elevation  in  the  view  of  his  country 
and  the  world." 

He  made  another  effort  about  the  same  time  on  the  treaty-making  pow 
er,  of  which  William  Pinckney,  the  distinguished  advocate,  at  that  time  a 
member  of  the  House  from  Maryland,  and  who  followed  in  the  debate 
said,  "  The  strong  power  of  genius,  from  a  higher  region  than  that  of  ar 
gument,  had  thrown  on  the  subject  all  the  light  with  which  it  is  the  pre 
rogative  of  genius  to  invest  and  illustrate  everything  5"  and  still  more 
directly,  "The  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  (Mr.  Calhoun)  has  exhaust 
ed  the  correct  constitutional  grounds  of  the  question,  and  left  me  nothing 
but  to  recapitulate  his  arguments." 

After  taking  an  active  and  influential  part  in  all  the  great  questions 
which  grew  out  of  the  transition  from  a  state  of  war  to  that  of  peace, 
both  at  this  and  the  preceding  session,  he  began  to  turn  his  attention  to 
wards  correcting  the  abuses  which  existed  in  the  administrative  branches 
of  the  government,  and  more  especially  towards  the  disbursements,  in 
which  great  looseness  and  profusion  had  prevailed  during  the  war.  He 
had  ever  been  the  advocate  of  rigid  economy  and  accountability  in  the 
use  of  the  public  money,  and  had  resolved  thenceforward  to  devote  him 
self  to  their  enforcement  while  he  remained  in  Congress.  The  first  thing 
that  he  struck  at  was  the  dangerous  power  which  had  been  given  to  the 
President,  of  transferring  appropriations,  at  his  discretion,  from  one  branch 
of  service  to  another,  in  the  war  and  navy  departments ;  thereby  con 
verting,  in  effect,  specific  into  general  appropriations,  and  subjecting  them, 
in  a  great  measure,  to  his  control.  The  evil  had  become  so  inveterate 
that  it  could  not  all  at  once  be  extirpated.  The  chairman  of  the  Commit 
tee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  both  opposed 
(he  repeal  of  the  act  which  authorized  such  transfers,  but  he  neverthe 
less  succeeded,  against  their  opposition,  in  imposing  important  limitations 
on  the  power.  This  was  among  his  last  Congressional  acts. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Including  the  Period  during  his  Administration  of  the  War  Department. 

SHORTLY  before  the  meeting  of  Congress  at  the  next  session,  he  re 
ceived  an  invitation  from  Mr.  Monroe  to  take  a  place  in  his  cabinet  as 
Secretary  of  War.  It  was  unsolicited  and  unexpected  His  friends,  with 
some  exceptions,  advised  against  his  acceptance,  on  the  ground  that  Con 
gress  was  the  proper  theatre  for  his  talents ;  Mr.  Lowndes  concurred  in 
this  advice,  and,  among  other  reasons,  urged  that  his  improvement  in 
speaking  had  been  such  that  he  was  desirous  to  see  the  degree  of  emi» 
nence  he  would  reach  by  practice.  Indeed,  the  prevailing  opinion  at  the 
time  was,  that  his  talent  lay  more  in  the  power  of  thought  than  aetloa. 
His  great  powers  of  analysis  and  generalization  were  calculated  to  snake 
the  impression,  which  was  not  uncommon  at  the  time,  that  his  miad  wss 
more  metaphysical  than  practical,  and  that  he  would  lose  reputation 
taking  charge  of  a  department,  especially  one  in  a  state  of  such 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  25 

and  confusion  as  the  war  department  was  then.  The  reasons  assigned' 
by  his  friends  served  hut  to  confirm  Mr.  Calhoun  in  the  opinion  that 
he  ought  to  accept.  He  believed  the  impression  of  his  friends  was 
erroneous  as  to  the  character  of  his  mind  ;  but  if  not,  if  his  powers  lay 
rather  in  thinking  and  speaking  than  in  execution,  it  was  but  the  more 
necessary  he  should  exercise  them  in  the  latter,  and  thereby  strengthen 
them  where  they  were  naturally  the  weakest.  He  also  believed  that  he 
could  render  more  service  to  the  country  in  reforming  the  great  disbur 
sing  department  of  government,  admitted  to  be  in  a  state  of  much  disor 
der,  than  he  could  possibly  do  by  continuing  in  Congress,  where  most  of 
the  great  questions  growing  out  of  a  return  to  a  state  of  peace  had  been 
discussed  and  settled.  Under  the  influence  of  these  motives,  he  accept 
ed  the  proffered  appointment,  and  entered  on  the  duties  of  the  depart 
ment  early  in  December,  1817. 

Thus,  after  six  years  of  distinguished  services  in  Congress,  during  which 
Mr.  Calhoun  bore  a  prominent  and  efficient  part  in  originating  and  sup 
porting  all  the  measures  necessary  to  carry  the  country  through  one  of 
the  most  trying  and  difficult  periods  of  its  existence,  and  had  displayed 
throughout  great  ability  as  a  legislator  and  a  speaker,  we  find  him  in  a 
new  scene,  where  his  talents  for  business  and  administration  for  the  first 
time  are  to  be  tried.  He  took  possession  of  his  department  at  the  most 
unfavourable  period.  Congress  was  in  session,  when  much  of  the  time 
of  the  secretary  is  necessarily  occupied  in  meeting  the  various  calls  for 
information  from  the  two  Houses,  and  attending  to  the  personal  applica 
tion  of  the  members  on  the  business  of  their  constituents.  Mr.  Graham, 
the  chief  clerk,  an  able  and  experienced  officer,  retired  shortly  afterward, 
and  a  new  and  totally  inexperienced  successor  had  to  be  appointed  in  his 
place.  The  department  was  almost  literally  without  organization,  and 
everything  in  a  state  of  confusion.  Mr.  Calhoun  had  paid  but  little  at 
tention  to  military  subjects  in  any  of  their  various  branches.  He  had 
never  read  a  treatise  on  the  subject,  except  a  small  volume  on  the  Staff. 

In  this  absence  of  information,  he  determined  at  once  to  do  as  little  as 
possible  at  first,  and  to  be  a  good  listener  and  a  close  observer  till  he 
could  form  a  just  conception  of  the  actual  state  of  the  department  and 
what  was  necessary  to  be  done.  Acting  on  this  prudent  rule,  he  heard 
all  and  observed  everything,  and  reflected  on  and  digested  all  that  he 
heard  and  saw.  In  less  than  three  months  he  became  so  well  acquainted 
with  the  state  of  the  department,  and  what  was  required  to  be  done,  that 
he  drew  up  himself,  without  consultation,  the  bill  for  organizing  it  on  the 
bureau  principle,  and  succeeded  in  getting  it  through  Congress  against  a 
formidable  opposition,  who  denounced  it  as  wild  and  impracticable.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  this  organization  has  been  proved  to  be  so  perfect,  that 
it  has  remained  unchanged  through  all  the  vicissitudes  and  numerous 
changes  of  parties  till  this  time,  a  period  of  twenty-five  years. 

But  that  was  only  the  first  step.  The  most  perfect  system  is  of  little- 
value  without  able  and  faithful  officers  to  carry  it  into  execution.  The 
President,  under  his  advice,  selected  to  fill  the  several  bureaus  such  offi 
cers  as  had  the  confidence  of  the  army  for  ability  and  integrity,  and  pos 
sessing  an  aptitude  of  talent  for  the  service  of  the  bureau  for  which  they 
were  respectively  selected.  With  each  of  these  Mr.  Calhoun  associated 
a  junior  officer,  having  like  qualifications,  for  his  assistant.  But,  to  give 
effect  to  the  system,  one  thing  was  still  wanting — a  code  of  rules  for  the 
department  and  each  of  its  bureaus,  in  order  to  give  uniformity,  consist 
ency,  efficacy,  and  stability  to  the  whole.  These  he  prepared,  with  the 
assistance  of  the  heads  of  the  respective  bureaus,  under  the  provision  of 
the  bill  for  the  organization  of  the  department,  which  gave  the  secretary 

D 


26  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  power  to  establish  rules  not  inconsistent  with  existing  laws.  They 
form  a  volume  of  considerable  size,  which,  like  the  act  itself,  remains  sub 
stantially  the  same,  though,  it  is  to  be  feared,  too  often  neglected  in  prac 
tice  by  some  of  his  successors.  All  this  was  completed  in  the  course  of 
a  few  months  after  the  passage  of  the  act,  and  the  system  put  into  active 
operation.  It  worked  without  a  jar. 

In  a  short  time  its  fruits  began  to  show  themselves  in  the  increased  ef 
ficiency  of  the  department  and  the  correction  of  abuses,  many  of  which 
were  of  long  standing.  To  trace  his  acts  through  the  period  of  more  than 
seven  years,  during  which  Mr.  Calhoun  remained  in  the  war-office,  would 
be  tedious,  and  occupy  more  space  than  the  object  of  this  sketch  would 
justify.  The  results,  which,  after  all,  are  the  best  tests  of  the  system  and 
the  efficiency  of  an  administration,  must  be  taken  as  a  substitute.  Suffice 
it,  then,  to  say,  that  when  he  came  into  office,  he  found  it  in  a  state  of 
chaos,  and  left  it,  even  in  the  opinion  of  opponents,  in  complete  organiza 
tion  and  order.  An  officer  of  high  standing  and  a  competent  judge  pro 
nounced  it  the  most  perfectly  organized  and  efficient  military  establish 
ment  for  its  size  in  the  world.  He  found  it  with  upward  of  $40,000,000  of 
unsettled  accounts,  many  of  them  of  long  standing,  going  back  almost  to 
the  origin  of  the  government,  and  he  reduced  them  to  less  than  three 
millions,  which  consisted,  for  the  most  part,  of  losses,  and  accounts  that 
never  can  be  settled.  He  prevented  all  current  accumulation,  by  a  prompt 
and  rigid  enforcement  of  accountability  ;  so  much  so,  that  he  was  enabled 
to  report  to  Congress  in  1823,  that  "  of  the  entire  amount  of  money  drawn 
from  the  treasury  in  1822  for  military  service,  including  pensions  amount 
ing  to  $4,571,961  94,  although  it  passed  through  the  hands  of  291  dis 
bursing  officers,  there  has  not  been  a  single  defalcation,  nor  the  loss  of  a 
single  cent  to  the  government."  He  found  the  army  proper,  including  the 
Military  Academy,  costing  annually  more  than  $451  per  man,  including  of 
ficers,  professors,  and  cadets,  and  he  left  the  cost  less  than  $287 ;  or,  to  do 
more  exact  justice  to  his  economy,  he  diminished  such  parts  of  the  cost 
per  man  as  were  susceptible  of  reduction  by  an  efficient  administration, 
excluding  pay  and  such  parts  as  were  fixed  in  moneyed  compensation  by 
law,  from  $299  to  $150.  All  this  was  effected  by  wise  reforms,  and  not 
by  parsimony  (for  he  was  liberal,  as  many  supposed,  to  a  fault)  in  the  qual 
ity  and  quantity  of  the  supplies,  and  not  by  a  fall  of  prices ;  for  in  making 
the  calculation,  allowance  is  made  for  the  fall  or  rise  of  prices  on  every 
article  of  supply.  The  gross  saving  on  the  army  was  $1,300,000  annu 
ally,  in  an  expenditure  which  reached  $4,000,000  when  he  came  into  the 
department.  This  does  not  include  the  other  branches  of  service,  the  ord 
nance,  the  engineer  and  Indian  bureaus,  in  all  of  which  a  like  rigid  econ 
omy  and  accountability  were  introduced,  with  similar  results  in  saving  to 
the  government. 

These  great  improvements  were  made  under  adverse  circumstances. 
Party  excitement  ran  high  during  the  period,  and  Mr.  Calhoun  came  in  for 
his  full  share  of  opposition  and  misrepresentation,  which  maybe  explained 
by  the  fact  that  his  name  had  been  presented  as  a  candidate  for  the  pres 
idency.  He  was  often  thwarted  in  his  views  and  defeated  in  his  meas 
ures,  and  was  made  for  years  the  subject  of  almost  incessant  attacks  in 
Congress,  against  which  he  had  to  defend  himself,  but  with  such  com 
plete  success,  finally,  as  to  silence  his  assailants.  They  had  been  kept 
constantly  informed  of  every  movement  in  his  department  susceptible  of 
misconstruction  or  of  being  turned  against  him.  One  of  the  representa 
tives,  who  boarded  in  the  same  house  with  his  principal  assailant,  offered 
to  disclose  to  Mr.  Calhoun  the  channel  through  which  his  opponents  in 
Congress  derived  the  information  on  which  they  based  their  attacks.  Mr. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  27 

Calhoun  declined  to  receive  it.  He  said  he  did  not  object  that  any  act  of 
the  department  should  be  known  to  his  bitterest  enemies :  that  he  thought 
well  of  all  about  him,  and  did  not  desire  to  change  his  opinion ;  and  all 
that  he  regretted  was,  that  if  there  was  any  one  near  him  who  desired  to 
communicate  anything  to  any  member,  he  did  not  ask  for  his  permission, 
which  he  would  freely  have  given.  He  felt  conscious  he  was  doing  his 
duty,  and  dreaded  no  attack.  In  fact,  he  felt  no  wish  that  these  attacks 
should  be  discontinued.  He  knew  how  difficult  it  was  to  reform  long 
standing  and  inveterate  abuses,  and  he  used  the  assaults  on  the  department 
and  the  army  as  the  means  of  reconciling  the  officers,  who  might  be  profit 
ing  by  them,  to  the  measures  he  had  adopted  for  their  correction,  and  to 
enlist  them  heartily  in  co-operating  with  him  in  their  correction,  as  the  most 
certain  means  of  saving  the  establishment  and  themselves.  To  this  cause, 
and  to  the  strong  sense  of  justice  which  he  exhibited  on  all  occasions,  by 
the  decided  support  he  gave  to  all  who  did  their  duty,  and  his  no  less  de 
cided  discharge  of  his  duty  against  all  who  neglected  or  omitted  it,  is  to 
be  attributed  the  fact  that  he  carried  through  so  thorough  a  reform,  where 
there  was  so  much  disorder  and  abuse,  with  a  popularity  constantly  in 
creasing  with  the  army.  Never  did  a  secretary  leave  a  department  with 
more  popularity  or  a  greater  degree  of  attachment  and  devotion  on  the 
part  of  those  connected  with  it  than  he  did. 

In  addition  to  the  ordinary  duties  of  the  department,  he  made  many  and 
able  reports  on  the  subject  of  our  Indian  affairs,  on  the  reduction  of  the 
army,  on  internal  improvements,  and  others.  He  revived  the  Military 
Academy,  which  he  found  in  a  very  disordered  state,  and  left  it  in  great 
perfection  5  he  caused  a  minute  and  accurate  survey  to  be  made  of  the 
military  frontier,  inland  and  maritime,  and  projected,  through  an  able  board 
of  engineers,  a  plan  for  their  defence.  In  conformity  with  this  plan,  he 
commenced  a  system  of  fortification,  and  made  great  progress  in  its  exe 
cution,  and  he  established  a  cordon  of  military  posts  from  the  lakes 
around  our  northwestern  and  southwestern  frontiers  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Another  measure  remains  to  be  noticed,  which  will  be  regarded  in  after- 
times  as  one  of  the  most  striking  and  useful,  although  it  has  heretofore 
attracted  much  less  attention  than  it  deserves.  In  organizing  the  medical 
department,  Mr.  Calhoun,  with  those  enlarged  views  and  devotion  to  sci 
ence  which  have  ever  characterized  him,  directed  the  surgeons  at  all  the 
military  posts  extending  over  our  vast  country,  to  report  accurately  to  the 
surgeon-general  at  Washington  every  case  of  disease,  its  character,  its 
treatment,  and  the  result,  and  also  to  keep  a  minute  register  of  the 
weather,  the  temperature,  the  moisture,  and  the  winds,  to  be  reported  in 
like  manner  to  the  surgeon-general.  To  enable  them  to  comply  with  the 
order,  he  directed  the  surgeons  at  the  various  posts  to  be  furnished  with 
thermometers,  barometers,  and  hygrometers,  and  the  surgeon-general 
from  time  to  time  to  publish  the  result  of  their  observations  in  condensed 
reports,  which  were  continued  during  the  time  he  remained  in  the  war  de 
partment.  The  result  has  been,  a  vast  mass  of  valuable  facts,  connected 
'with  the  diseases  and  the  climate  of  our  widely-extended  country,  collected 
through  the  long  period  of  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century.  They  have  been 
recently  collected  and  published  in  two  volumes  by  Dr.  Samuel  Forney,  of 
the  United  States  army.  The  one  is  entitled  "  Medical  Statistics,"  and  the 
other  "  The  Climate  of  the  United  States,"  in  which  many  interesting  facts 
are  disclosed  relative  to  the  diseases  and  climate  of  the  different  portion? 
of  our  country.  This  example  has  been  already  followed  by  England,  on  a 
still  more  enlarged  scale,  and  will  doubtless  be  imitated  by  all  civilized  na 
tions,  and  will  in  time  lead  to  most  interesting  discoveries  in  the  sciences 
Qf  medicine  and  meteorology  generally.  The  honour  of  taking  the  first 


28  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

step  in  this  important  matter,  and  the  discoveries  to  which  it  will  lead, 
will,  under  the  enlightened  policy  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  belong  to  our  country. 

During  the  second  term  of  Mr.  Monroe's  administration,  the  names  of' 
six  candidates  were  presented  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  for  the 
presidential  office,  Mr.  Adams,  Mr.  Crawford,  General  Jackson,  Mr.  Clay, 
Mr.  Lowndes,  and  Mr.  Calhoun.  The  names  of  the  two  latter  had  beer, 
brought  forward,  the  former  by  South  Carolina,  and  the  latter  by  Penn 
sylvania,  and  both  nearly  at  the  same  time,  without  its  being  known  tc 
either  that  it  was  intended.  They  were  warm  and  intimate  friends,  and 
had  been  so  almost  from  their  first  acquaintance.  They  had  both  entered 
Congress  at  the  same  time,  and  had  rarely  ever  differed  in  opinion  on  any 
political  subject.  Mr.  Lowndes  was  a  few  years  the  oldest,  and  the  first 
nominated.  Mr.  Calhoun's  nomination  followed  almost  immediately  after. 
As  soon  as  he  heard  of  it.  he  called  on  Mr  L.,  and  stated  that  it  had  been 
made  without  his  knowledge  or  solicitation,  and  that  he  called  to  say  that 
he  hoped  the  position  in  which  they  had  been  placed  by  their  friends  to 
wards  each  other  would  not  affect  their  private  and  friendly  relations. 
That  he  would  regard  it  as  a  great  misfortune  should  such  be  the  effect, 
and  was  determined  on  his  part  to  do  everything  to  avoid  it.  Mr.  Lowndes 
heartily  reciprocated  the  same  sentiment.  It  is  unnecessary  to  state  that 
they  faithfully  adhered  to  their  resolution  ;  and  these  two  distinguished 
citizens  of  the  same  state,  and  nearly  of  the  same  age,  set  the  noble  and 
rare  example  of  being  placed  by  friends  as  rivals  for  the  highest  office  in 
the  gift  of  a  great  people,  without  permitting  their  mutual  esteem  and 
friendship  to  be  impaired. 

But,  unfortunately  for  themselves,  and,  it  may  be  said,  for  the  country, 
the  same  harmony  of  feeling  was  not  preserved  between  Mr.  Calhoun  and 
another  of  the  candidates,  Mr.  Crawford.  They  had  been  long  acquaint 
ed,  and  although  residing  in  different  states,  they  lived  but  a  short  dis 
tance  apart,  and  had  been  long  on  friendly  terms.  It  is  difficult  to  trace 
the  chain  of  causes  by  which  they  and  their  friends  were  brought  into 
collision.  Mr.  Calhoun  supported  decidedly  Mr.  Monroe  in  his  first 
election,  when  Mr.  Crawford's  name  had  been  brought  forward  in  opposi 
tion  to  him.  He  had  acted  as  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Re 
lations,  while  Mr.  Monroe  was  Secretary  of  State,  during  Mr.  Madison's 
time,  and  had,  from  his  frequent  and  intimate  intercourse  with  him,  form 
ed  a  high  estimate  of  his  character  for  honesty,  fidelity,  and  patriotism, 
to  which,  adding  his  sound  judgment,  long  public  service  and  experience, 
his  age,  and  revolutionary  claims,  it  was  natural,  without  disparaging  the 
high  qualifications  of  Mr.  Crawford,  he  should  give  him  the  preference. 
Mr.  Crawford's  friends  relied  on  a  Congressional  caucus  for  a  nomination, 
to  which  Mr.  Calhoun  was  opposed,  and  against  which  he  long  stood  out 
with  the  leading  friends  of  Mr.  Monroe  in  Congress.  They  finally  assent 
ed  reluctantly  to  go  into  one,  to  avoid  a  split  in  the  party.  Mr.  Monroe 
was  nominated  by  a  small  majority,  when,  in  the  opinion  of  his  friends,  the 
majority  of  the  people  was  overwhelming  in  his  favour.  It  is  not  extraor 
dinary  that  he  and  many  of  his  other  friends,  with  this  impression,  should 
have  been  confirmed  in  their  objections  to  a  caucus  nomination,  as  calcu 
lated  to  be  influenced  by  improper  considerations,  and  thus,  instead  cf 
concentrating  the  will  of  the  people,  as  it  was  originally  intended  to  do, 
becoming  capable  of  being  made  the  instrument  of  defeating  it,  and  of 
imposing  on  the  country  a  President  not  of  its  choice. 

When  Mr.  Crawford's  friends  brought  forward  his  name  the  second 
time,  they  again  relied  on  a  caucus;  while  the  friends  of  all  the  6ther 
candidates  were  in  favour  of  leaving  the  election  to  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
sense  of  the  people,  as  they  all  belonged  to  one  party,  and  professed  the- 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  29 

same  political  creed.  With  his  decided  impression  against  a  caucus, 
strengthened,  as  has  been  stated,  by  what  occurred  at  the  first  election  of 
.Mr.  Monroe,  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  Mr.  Calhoun's  friends  should 
take  a  prominent  stand  against  another  appeal  to  a  Congressional  caucus  : 
that,  together  with  the  latent  feelings  on  both  sides  (of  which  both  were 
perhaps  unconscious),  growing  out  of  the  stand  he  made  in  favour  of  Mr. 
Monroe  and  against  Mr.  Crawford,  probably  led  to  the  regretted  division 
between  their  friends,  which  continued,  as  usual,  long  after  the  cause 
had  ceased,  with  such  mischievous  influence  on  the  politics  of  the  country 
and  the  party  to  which  both  belonged. 

Time  and  experience  have  decided  against  a  Congressional  caucus  ;  but 
it  must  be  admitted,  looking  back  to  the  scenes  of  that  day,  that  much 
might  be  said  for  and  against  it.  It  is  certainly  highly  desirable  that  the 
people  should  act  directly  in  voting  for  a  President,  uninfluenced  by  the 
address  and  management  of  powerful  combinations  of  individuals  acting 
through  a  small  body,  and  who,  in  making  a  nomination,  may  respect  their 
own  interest  and  feelings  much  more  than  the  voice  of  the  people,  or 
even  the  party  they  represent.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  without  the  inter 
mediate  agency  of  some  such  body  in  so  large  a  country,  and  with  so 
many  prominent  citizens  from  which  to  make  a  selection,  the  danger  of 
discord  in  the  ranks  of  the  majority,  and,  through  it,  of  the  triumph  of  a 
minority  in  the  election,  is  great.  The  chance  is  between  discord  with 
all  its  consequences,  and  the  dictation  of  party  leaders  with  all  its  effects. 
Each  is  pregnant  with  mischief.  It  is  the  weak  point  of  the  government, 
and  unless  it  be  guarded  with  the  utmost  vigilance,  must  end,  on  the  one 
hand,  in  interminable  confusion,  or,  on  the  other,  in  rendering  the  election 
by  the  people  merely  nominal.  Without  such  vigilance,  the  real  election 
would  degenerate  into  the  dictation  of  caucus.  It  was  on  this  difficult 
point  that  the  friends  of  these  two  distinguished  citizens  split,  and  it  is 
left  to  time  and  experience  yet  to  decide  which  were  right. 

In  the  progress  of  the  canvass  the  talented  and  lamented  Lowndes  died, 
in  the  prime  of  life,  and  Mr.  Calhoun's  friends  in  Pennsylvania,  with  his 
acquiescence,  withdrew  his  name,  rather  than  subject  the  state  to  a  violent 
contest  between  them  and  the  friends  of  General  Jackson.  They  had 
maintained  throughout  the  canvass  the  most  friendly  relations,  and  were 
both  decidedly  opposed  to  the  caucus.  On  his  withdrawal,  he  was  taken 
up  by  the  friends  both  of  General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Adams  for  the  Vice- 
presidency. 

This  memorable  canvass  terminated  in  returning  General  Jackson,  Mr. 
Adams,  and  Mr.  Crawford  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  from  which 
three,  by  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  one  was  to  be  elected.  The 
electoral  votes  received  by  each  stood  in  the  order  in  which  their  names- 
are  placed.  Mr.  Calhoun  was  elected  by  the  people  Vice-president  by  a 
large  majority.  The  House,  voting  by  states,  on  the  first  ballot  elected 
Mr.  Adams.  Mr.  Clay,  who  was  then  a  member  of  the  body,  voted  for 
him,  against,  as  it  was  believed,  the  sense  of  a  majority  of  his  constitu 
ents.  That  impression,  connected  with  his  previous  relations,  personal 
and  political,  with  Mr.  Adams,  caused  much  excitement,  and  a  strong  de 
termination  on  the  part  of  many  to  organize  forthwith  an  opposition  to  the 
new  administration.  Mr.  Calhoun  discountenanced  an  immediate  move, 
on  the  ground  that,  although,  in  his  opinion,  the  vote  belonged  to  the 
state,  and  should  be  given  to  the  candidate  the  state  would  elect  if  left  to 
its  choice,  yet  he  was  not  prepared  to  say  whether  there  might  not  be 
circumstances  under  which  a  member  might  assume  the  high  responsibil 
ity  of  voting  otherwise,  and,  for  the  justification  of  his  conduct,  throw 
himself  on  the  state  j  but  he  thought  it  indispensable  that  the  member  as- 


30  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

suming  it  should  make  out  a  strong  case,  and  that  he  would  owe  it  to 
himself  and  the  country  to  place  his  relations  and  conduct  towards  the  ad 
ministration  of  him  whom  he  had  elected  above  all  suspicion.  His  advice 
induced  his  friends  to  wait  the  development  of  events  ;  but  when  Mr.  Clay 
afterward  took  office,  and  Mr.  Adams  adopted,  in  its  full  extent,  Mr.  Clay's 
American  System,  opposition  to  the  administration  from  himself  and  his 
friends  followed  as  a  matter  of  course. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Including  the  Period  during  which  he  was  Vice-president. 

MR.  CALHOUN  took  his  seat  in  the  Senate  as  Vice-president  on  the  4th  of 
March,  1825,  having  remained  irv  the  war  department  a  few  months  more 
than  seven  years.  There  never  was  a  department  left  in  more  perfect  or 
der.  It  literally  almost  moved  of  itself.  When  he  took  charge  of  the 
department,  it  was  difficult  to  discharge  its  duties  with  less  than  fourteen 
or  fifteen  hours  of  severe  daily  labour  ;  but  when  he  left  it,  the  secretary 
had  little  to  do  beyond  signing  his  name  and  deciding  on  such  cases  as 
were  brought  up  by  the  subordinate  officers,  and  were  not  embraced  in  the 
numerous  and  comprehensive  rules  provided  for  their  government.  He 
had  not,  indeed,  been  long  in  office  before  those  who  doubted  his  execu 
tive  talents  were  disposed  to  place  them  even  above  his  parliamentary, 
great  as  they  were  acknowledged  to  be.  He  united,  in  a  remarkable  de 
gree,  quickness  with  precision,  firmness  with  patience  and  courtesy,  and 
industry  with  the  higher  capacity  for  arrangement  and  organization  j  and 
to  these  he  added  exemption  from  favouritism,  a  high  sense  of  justice  and 
inflexible  devotion  to  duty.  Taken  together,  they  formed  a  combination 
so  fortunate,  that  General  Bernard,  who  had  been  a  favourite  aid-de-camp 
of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and  saw  and  knew  much  of  him,  and  who  was 
chief  of  the  board  of  engineers  while  Mr.  Calhoun  was  secretary,  and  had 
an  equal  opportunity  of  observing  him,  not  unfrequently,  it  is  said,  com 
pared  his  administrative  talents  to  those  of  that  extraordinary  man. 

The  duties  of  the  office  of  Vice-president,  though  it  is  one  of  high  dig 
nity,  are  limited,  except  giving  a  casting  vote  when  the  body  is  equally 
divided,  to  presiding  in  the  Senate,  which,  in  a  body  so  small  and  cour 
teous,  and  having  so  few  and  simple  rules,  affords  but  little  opportunity 
for  the  display  even  of  the  peculiar  talents  necessary  for  Presidency  in  a 
deliberative  body.     The  most  eminent  in  filling  such  an  office  cannot 
leave  much  behind  worth  remembering.      It  is  sufficient  to  say  of  him, 
that,  as  a  presiding  officer,  he  was  impartial,  prompt,  methodical,  and  at 
tentive  to  his  duties.     He  always  appeared  and  took  his  seat  early  in  the 
session,  and  continued  to  preside  till  within  a  short  time   of  its  close ; 
contrary  to  the  practice  of  some  of  his  immediate  predecessors,  who,  by 
their  long  and  frequent  absence  from  their  seat,  had  permitted  the  office 
to  fall  into  some  discredit.     He  was  careful  in  preserving  the  dignity  of 
the  Senate,  and  raising  its  influence  and  weight  in  the  action  of  the  gov 
ernment.      In  putting  questions,  he  changed  the  form  of  address  from 
•'  Gentlemen"  to  the  more  simple  and  dignified  address  of  "  Senators," 
which  has  since  been  preserved,  and  adopted  by  the  senators  themselves 
in  alluding  to  each  other  in  debate.     But  the  most  important  and  mem 
orable  incident  connected  with  the  discharge  of  his  duty  as  the  presiding 
officer,  and  the  most  characteristic  of  the  man,  was  the  stand  he  took  in 
favour  of  the  rights  of  the  body  itself,  and  against  his  own  power.     He 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  31 

decided,  during  a  period  of  great  excitement  on  the  Panama  Question, 
when  party  spirit  ran  high,  and  the  debate  was  very  warm  and  personal, 
that  he  had  no  right  to  call  a  senator  to  order  for  words  spoken  in  debate, 
He  rested  his  decision  on  the  broad  ground  that,  as  the  presiding  officer, 
he  had  no  power  but  to  carry  into  effect  the  rules  adopted  by  the  body, 
either  expressly  or  by  usage,  and  that  there  was  neither  rule  nor  usage 
to  authorize  him  ta  exercise  the  power  in  question.  On  the  contrary, 
the  rules  of  the  Senate,  by  strong  implication,  limited  the  power  of  call 
ing  to  order  for  words  spoken  in  debate  to  the  members  themselves,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  presiding  officer.  And  yet  this  decision,  resting  on  so 
solid  a  foundation,  subjected  Mr.  Calhoun  to  the  fiercest  attacks  and  the 
grossest  abuse ;  and,  what  is  more  extraordinary,  he  was  opposed  by  the 
members  themselves,  whose  rights  he  maintained,  with  the  exception  of 
Mr.  Macon,  Mr.  Tazewell,  and  a  few  others  of  the  elder  and  more  expe 
rienced,  and  his  immediate  personal  friends.  To  understand  how  this 
should  happen,  it  is  necessary  to  advert  to  the  existing  state  of  the  parties, 
and  the  circumstances  under  which  the  decision  was  made. 

The  circumstances  under  which  Mr.  Adams  was  elected,  the  part  which 
Mr.  Clay  took  in  his  election,  and  the  prominent  position  to  which  he  was 
appointed  in  his  cabinet,  laid  the  foundation  of  the  opposition  which 
finally  overthrew  his  administration.  This  opposition  was  greatly  strength 
ened  by  the  bold  Federal  and  consolidation  doctrines  avowed  by  Mr. 
Adams  in  his  inaugural  address,  and  by  the  wild  measures  of  policy  which 
he  recommended.  Among  these  was  the  project  of  sending  commission 
ers  to  the  Congress  proposed  to  be  convened  at  Panama  of  all  the  states 
that  had  grown  up  on  the  overthrow  of  the  Spanish  dominions  on  this 
Continent.  This  was  a  favourite  measure  of  the  administration.  Mr. 
Calhoun  was  understood  to  be  decidedly  opposed  to  it,  both  on  the  ground 
of  unconstitutionality  and  inexpediency  ;  and  it  was  on  that  question  that 
the  first  attack  was  made  on  the  administration.  It  commenced  in  the 
Senate  ;  and,  as  he  had  not  disguised  his  disapprobation,  he  was  regarded 
in  a  great  measure  as  the  adviser  and  author  of  the  attack,  which,  of 
course,  subjected  him  to  the  fierce  and  united  assaults  of  the  administra 
tion  and  its  friends.  At  the  same  time,  the  opposition  in  the  Senate, 
though  united  against  the  administration,  and  its  doctrines  and  policy,  con 
sisted  of  individuals  who  had  but  a  short  time  before  held  political  rela 
tions  with  men  far  from  being  friendly.  They  consisted  of  the  friends  of 
Mr.  Crawford,  General  Jackson,  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  such  portion  of  Mr. 
Clay's  as  disapproved  of  his  connexion  with  Mr.  Adams.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  his  own  friends,  and  those  of  General  Jackson,  there  was  no 
indisposition,  on  the  part  of  a  large  portion  of  the  rest  of  the  opposition, 
to  see  him  sacrificed  by  the  party  in  power.  But  as  difficult  and  critical 
as  was  his  position,  it  could  not  prevent  him  from  a  manly  avowal  of  his 
opinion  on  a  novel,  and  what  he  believed  to  be  an  important  question,  or 
from  exposing  himself  to  hazard  when  principle  and  duty  required  him  to 
assert  the  rights  of  the  body,  though  against  his  own  power.  But  what 
added  greatly  to  the  excitement  and  abuse  was  the  particular  occasion 
upon  which  the  decision  was  made.  Mr.  Randolph  was  then  a  mem- 
"her  of  the  Senate,  and  gave  full  vent  to  his  inimitably  sarcastic  poAver 
against  the  administration,  and  especially  against  the  President  and  the 
3eci«tary  of  State,  and  their  supporters  in  the  body.  It  was  too  keenly 
felt  by  the  last  to  permit  them  to  do  justice  to  the  grounds  on  which  Mr. 
Calhoun  placed  his  decision,  and  the  occasion  was  too  favourable  to  be 
permitted  to  pass  without  a  formal  attack  on  him.  A  writer  of  great  power 
(supposed  to  be  the  President  himself)  attacked  his  decision  with  much 
acrimony,  under  the  signature  of  Patrick  Henry.  Finding  it  impossible 


.32  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUJN. 

to  assail  the  decision  with  effect,  or  through  the  rules  of  the  Senate  or 
its  usage,  he  was  forced  to  assume  the  position  that  the  Vice-president, 
in  virtue  of  his  office,  derived  the  power  of  calling  a  senator  to  order  for 
words  spoken  in  debate,  not  from  the  body  itself,  but  directly  from  the  Con 
stitution,  and  that,  in  exercising  the  power,  he  was  wholly  independent  of 
its  will.  This  gave  the  whole  subject  a  new  and  highly  important  aspect ; 
for  if  it  could  be  successfully  maintained,  it  would  give  the  Vice-president 
supreme  control  over  the  freedom  of  debate  in  the  Senate.  To  this  a  re- 
ply  followed  (supposed  to  be  from  Mr.  Calhoun),  in  two  numbers,  under 
the  signature  of  Onslow,  that  so  completely  demolished  the  argument  of 
Patrick  Henry  as  to  turn  the  tide  in  his  favour.  The  Senate  itself  be 
came  so  well  satisfied  of  the  injustice  done  him,  that  on  the  revisal  of  the 
rules  a  year  or  two  afterward,  they  gave  him  the  power  in  question,  with 
an  almost  unanimous  approval  of  his  decision.  It  was  thus,  by  his  fair 
ness  under  these  trying  circumstances,  that  he  preserved  a  right  of  the 
"body,  which  he  might  have  usurped,  not  only  with  safety,  but  with  in 
creased  popularity  for  the  time ;  but  of  which  the  Senate  could  not  be  di 
vested  without  a  surrender  of  the  freedom  of  debate,  and  the  right  of 
making  their  own  rules,  secured  to  them  by  the  Constitution  itself. 

So  vigorous  was  this  first  onset  of  the  opposition,  that  the  administra 
tion  reeled  under  the  force  of  the  blow,  and  it  became  apparent  that  no 
thing  but  some  bold  step  could  save  them  from  defeat,  by  the  election  of 
General  Jackson,  under  whom  the  opposition,  with  the  hearty  concurrence 
of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  his  friends,  had  unanimously  rallied.  The  great 
strength  of  the  administration  lay  in  the  various  powerful  interests  rallied 
under  the  plausible  name  of  Home  Industry  and  the  American  System,  of 
which  the  Secretary  of  State  was  the  acknowledged  head,  and  to  which 
.the  President  had  given  his  adhesion.  Their  hope  of  holding  power  rested 
on  a  unanimous  and  zealous  rally  of  that  powerful  combination  in  favour 
of  the  administration.  The  tariff  was  the  great  central  interest,  around 
which  all  the  others  revolved.  The  whole  party,  without  schism,  were 
united  in  its  favour,  while  the  opposition  was  greatly  divided  in  reference 
to  it ;  a  great  portion  of  the  party,  North  and  West,  being  in  its  favour, 
while  the  South  and  Southwest  were  united  almost  to  a  man  against  it. 
In  fact,  the  portion  of  the  Union  at  that  time  most  attached  to  a  high  pro 
tective  tariff  was  the  Middle  and  Western  States,  and  yet  its  union  with 
the  South  and  Southwestern  portion  was  indispensable  to  the  election  of 
General  Jackson.  The  advantage  this  state  of  things  afforded  was  per 
ceived  by  those  in  power,  and  was  not  permitted  to  remain  without  an 
attempt  to  turn  it  to  account. 

For  that  purpose,  a  general  convention  was  called  to  meet  at  Harris- 
burg,  the  seat  of  government  in  Pennsylvania,  and  the  friends  of  the 
tariff  everywhere  were  invited  to  take  into  consideration  the  state  of  the 
manufacturing  interest,  and  to  devise  measures  for  its  farther  promotion. 
The  place  was  well  chosen.  Pennsylvania,  though  a  thorough  tariff  state, 
was  favourable  to  General  Jackson's  election,  and  its  support  was  regard, 
ed  as  indispensable  to  his  success.  It  met,  and  attempted  to  rally  the 
•whole  interest  by  an  elaborate  report  in  favour  of  the  protective  system, 
accompanied  by  a  scheme  of  high  duties,  to  be  presented  to  Congress  at 
the  next  session  for  its  action.  It  was  thought,  if  the  friends  of  General 
Jackson  in  the  tariff  states  should  oppose  it,  his  defeat  in  those  states 
would  be  certain ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  should  support  it,  a  schism, 
"between  his  Northern  and  Southern  supporters  would  be  equally  certain, 
and  with  not  less  certainty  would  be  followed  by  his  defeat.  But,  as 
plausible  as  the  calculation  was,  the  tariff  friends  of  General  Jackson  in 
New-York,  Pennsylvania,  New-Jersey,  and  the  West,  succeeded,  as  far  as 
politics  were  concerned,  in  turning  it  against  its  projectors. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  33 

They  succeeded  in  electing-  the  speaker,  and  in  obtaining  the  majority 
of  the  Committee  of  Manufactures  in  the  House.  Instead  of  adopting  the 
Harrisburg  scheme,  this  committee  reported  a  thorough  protective  tariff, 
such  as  suited  the  states  they  represented,  imposing  duties  even  higher 
and  more  indiscriminately  than  those  of  the  Harrisburg  plan.  They  laid 
their  duties  without  the  slightest  regard  to  the  navigating  and  commercial 
interests  of  New-England,  and  so  managed  it  as  to  induce  the  Southern 
members  to  resist  all  the  amendments  offered  to  render  it  acceptable  to 
those  who  represented  that  interest,  in  the  expectation  of  defeating  the 
bill,  either  on  its  passage  through  the  House  or  tn  the  Senate,  by  the  uni 
ted  votes  of  the  members  from  those  states  and  the  South  and  Southwest. 
The  expectation  proved  fallacious.  The  bill  passed  the  House  by  a  small 
majority,  a  large  portion  of  the  New-England  members  voting  against  it ; 
but  when  it  came  to  the  Senate,  where  the  relative  united  strength  of  the 
Southern  and  New-England  States  is  much  greater  than  in  the  House,  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  bill  could  not  pass  unless  it  was  modified  so  as 
to  be  acceptable  to  the  senators  from  New-England  favourable  to  the  ad 
ministration.  It  was  so  modified  by  the  votes  of  the  senators  opposed  to 
the  administration  from  the  Middle  and  Western  States,  contrary  to  the 
expectation  of  the  South ;  for  the  bill,  as  modified,  received  the  votes  of 
the  New-England  senators  in  favour  of  the  administration,  which,  added 
to  those  in  favour  of  General  Jackson  from  New- York,  New-Jersey,  Penn 
sylvania,  and  the  Northwest,  made  a  majority.  It  passed,  accordingly, 
and  became  a  law ;  but  under  such  circumstances  as  not  only  to  deprive 
the  administration  of  the  advantage  they  anticipated  from  the  scheme,  but 
to  turn  it  directly  against  them. 

Unfortunately,  however,  in  this  political  manoeuvring  in  the  presidential  con 
test,  equity,  justice,  the  Constitution,  and  the  public  welfare  were  overlooked. 
The  interests  of  the  great  body  of  the  consumers  and  of  nine  tenths  of  the  pro 
ducing  interests,  including  especially  the  growers  of  the  great  agricultural  sta 
ples,  rice,  cotton,  and  tobacco,  with  those  engaged  in  commerce,  ship-building, 
arid  navigation,  and  all  their  connected  interests,  were  sacrificed  to  promote  the 
prosperity  of  a  single  interest,  and  that  constituting  but  a  small  portion  of  the 
community.     But  the  evil  ended  not  with  their  sacrifice,  as  immense  as  it  was. 
As  bad  as  was  the  effect  in  its  pecuniary  bearing,  it  was  far  worse  in  its  finan 
cial,  political,  and  moral  operation.     Never,  in  that  Aspect,  was  a  measure  of 
the  kind  passed  under  more  ad  verse  %ircumstan^s-     Viewed  in  its  financial 
aspect,  it  was  worse  than  folly — it  was  madnp^  itself.     The  public  debt  was 
nearly  extinguished,  under  the  wise  policr  adopted  after  the  war.     After  its 
final  discharge,  one  half  nearly  of  the  annual  revenue  applied  to  the  payment  of 
its  principal  and  interest  would  be  liberated,  which,  if  a  wise  and  just  policy 
had  been  adopted,  would  have  enab^d  the  government  to  reduce  the  duties  one 
half,  and  still  leave   a  sufficient  revenue  to  provide  amply  for  all  the  public 
wants.     Instead  of  that,  and  i*  the  face  of  these  consequences,  the  duties  were 
greatly  increased,  so  much  -=!O  as  to  be,  on  an  average,  nearly  fifty  per  cent,  on 
the  value  of  the  imports.     This  led  to  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  revenue, 
which,  in  turn,  hastened  proportionally  the  final  discharge  of  the  debt,  when, 
by  necessity,  one  of  three  consequences  must  follow  :  a  vast  increase  of  expend 
itures  ;  a  sudden  reduction  of  the  duties,  to  the  ruin  of  the  manufacturers ;  or 
else  an  immense   surplus  in  the  treasury,  with  all  its   corrupting  influence. 
These  obvious  results  were  either  not  seen  or  disregarded  by  those  who  were 
governed  by  cupidity,  or  too  intensely  engaged  in  the  presidential  contest  to 
look  to  consequences. 

It  is  regarded  as  necessary  to  understand  the  history  of  the  origin  and  pas 
sage  of  that  disastrous  measure,  in  order  to  have  a  just  conception  of  the  events 
which  have  since  occurred,  and  the  motives  which  governed  Mr.  Calhoim's 

E 


34  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

•course  in  reference  to  them.  To  it  may  be  traced  almost  every  important  inci 
dent  in  our  political  history  since  that  time,  as  far  as  our  internal  affairs  are 
concerned.  To  it,  too,  may  be  ascribed  the  division  in  the  Republican  party, 
which  separated  Mr.  Calhoun  and  the  States'  Rights  portion  from  the  other,  and 
the  disasters  which  have  impaired  the  credit  and  standing  of  the  country,  and 
deranged  and  interrupted  its  currency,  finances,  commerce,  and  industrial  oper 
ations.  Mr.  Calhoun,  although  not  an  actor  at  the  time,  was  not  an  inattentive 
observer  of  what  passed.  His  position  as  President  of  the  Senate  afforded 
great  advantages  for  observation  and  reflection,  of  which  he  did  not  fail  to  avail 
himself  from  the  time  he  first  took  his  seat.  Questions  relating  to  the  protect- 
ivft  policy  were  constantly  occurring  in  one  form  or  another,  and  especially  at 
tracted  his  attention  and  excited  reflection.  He  was  not  long  in  making  him 
self  master  of  that  policy  in  all  its  bearings,  economical  and  political,  and  in 
becoming  thoroughly  satisfied  that  it  was  unconstitutional,  unjust,  unequal,  and 
oppressive  in  its  character  and  tendency,  and  that  it  must,  in  the  end,  if  it  be 
came  the  established  and  permanent  policy,  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  our  free 
and  popular  system  of  government.  With  this  impression  of  the  system,  he 
watched  with  vigilance  the  progress  of  the  tariff  of  1828,  from  its  incipient  state 
at  Harrisburg  to  the  passage  of  the  bill  through  the  Senate.  The  results  of  his 
observation  confirmed  him  in  all  his  previous  objections  to  the  system,  and 
strengthened  his  conviction  of  the  dangers  to  which  it  exposed  our  institutions. 
For  the  first  time  he  began  to  fear,  from  the  part  taken  in  the  passage  of  the 
bill  in  the  Senate  by  a  considerable  and  influential  portion  of  the  party,  that  the 
leading  object  which  he  and  his  friends  had  in  view  in  the  presidential  contest 
(a  gradual  and  cautious  reduction  of  the  duties  to  the  revenue  standard  prepar 
atory  to  the  discharge  of  the  debt)  might  not  be  realized  by  a  change  of  admin 
istration.  He  saw  that  the  passage  of  the  bill  opposed  great  and  almost  insu 
perable  difficulties  to  effecting  what  they  desired  ;  but  neither  he  nor  they 
permitted  these  misgivings  to  abate  their  zeal  in  support  of  General  Jackson's 
election.  They  still  hoped  for  the  best  from  him  ;  and  how  strongly  Mr.  C. 
desired  his  election,  an  occurrence  at  the  time  will  best  illustrate. 

The  Senate  was  so  nearly  equally  divided  at  one  time,  that  it  was  believed 
that  the  friends  of  the  administration  would  intentionally  so  arrange  it  as  to 
make  a  tie,  and  throw  the  casting  vote  on  the  Vice-president,  in  order  to  defeat 
General  Jackson's  election.     His  friends  became  alarmed,  and  some  of  them 
intimated  a  desire  that  Mi  Calhoun  should  leave  his  seat  to  avoid  the  effect, 
stating  as  an  inducement  tha\  m  the  ev«nt  of  a  tie,  the  bill  would  be  defeated 
without  his  vote.    He  promptly  lofused,  and  replied  that  no  consideration  could 
prevent  him  from  remaining  and  doW  his  duty  by  voting  against  it ;  but  added, 
it  should  not  hurt  General  Jackson's  eVction,  for  in  that  event  his  name  should 
be  withdrawn  from  the  ticket  as  Vice-present.    Such  was  the  interest  he  took 
in  his  success,  and  so  strong,  and,  at  the  sa^e  time,  so  patriotic,  was  his  oppo 
sition  to  the  bill  of  abominations  ;  and  yet  m^iy  have  been  so  unjust  as  to  at 
tribute  his  after  opposition  to  the  bill  to  disappointed  ambition.     On  the  con 
trary,  he  was  ready  to  sacrifice  every  object  of  ambition,  at  a  time  when  not  a 
cloud  darkened  his  prospects,  to  defeat  a  measure  he  believed  to  be  so  fraught 
with  mischief.     He  was  then  the  second  officer  in  the  government,  and  stood, 
without  opposition,  for  re-election  to  the  same  place,  on  the  ticket  of  General 
Jackson,  whose  success  was  then  certain ;  nor  was  there  any  other  man  in  the 
party  of  equal  prominence  and  popularity,  except  the  general  himself.    Nothing 
was  wanting  on  his  part  but  to  accommodate  himself  to  the  course  of  events, 
v/ithout  regard  to  their  effects  on  the  country,  to  have  attained  the  highest  office, 
which  lay  within  a  single  step  from  the  place  where  he  then  stood.     This  he 
could  not  but  plainly  see  ;  but  his  resisting  temptation  on  this  occasion  is  but 
one  instance  of  self-sacrifice  among  many  in  a  long  life,  the  whole  course  of 
which  abundantly  proves  that  office,  even  the  highest,  has  ever  been  with  him 
subordinate  to  his  sense  of  duty  and  the  public  welfare. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  35 

The  entire  South  was  justly  indignant  at  the  passage  of  so  unjust  and  oppress 
ive  a  measure,  especially  under  the  circumstances  which  attended  it,  and  the 
question  universally  asked  was,  What  is  to  be  done  ?  On  his  return  home  this 
question  was  often  and  emphatically  asked  him.  He  was  not  the  man  to  evade 
it.  He  frankly  replied  that  there  was  no  hope  from  Congress ;  that  in  both 
houses  there  were  fixed  majorities  in  favour  of  the  system,  and  that  there  was 
no  hope  of  any  speedy  change  for  the  better ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  things  must 
grow  worse,  if  no  efficient  remedy  should  be  applied.  He  said  that  he  could 
see  but  two  possible  remedies  within  the  limits  of  the  Constitution ;  one,  the 
election  of  General  Jackson,  who,  by  bringing  to  bear  systematically  and  steadily 
the  patronage  which  the  protective  system  placed  in  his  hands,  might  reduce 
the  duties  down  to  the  revenue  standard ;  and  the  other,  State  Interposition  or 
Veto,  the  high  remedy  pointed  out  in  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions  as 
the  proper  one,  after  all  others  had  failed,  against  oppressive  and  dangerous 
acts  of  the  general  government,  in  palpable  violation  of  the  Constitution.  He 
gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  there  was  no  hope  from  the  judiciary,  and,  as  the 
act  stood,  the  constitutional  question  could  not  be  brought  before  the  courts,  the 
majority  having  refused  to  amend  the  title  of  the  bill  so  as  to  make  it  appear  on 
the  face  of  it  that  the  duties  were  laid  for  protection  and  not  for  revenue,  ex 
pressly  with  the  view  of  preventing  the  courts  from  talcing  jurisdiction,  and  de 
ciding  on  its  constitutionality.  He  also  stated  that,  although  he  regarded  Gen 
eral  Jackson's  election  as  certain,  yet  he  was  constrained  to  say  that  the  cir 
cumstances  under  which  the  act  passed,  and  the  part  which  many  of  his  influ 
ential  supporters  took  in  its  passage,  mado  it  doubtful  whether  the  hopes  enter 
tained  from  his  election  would,  as  it  regarded  the  protective  system,  be  realized, 
and  expressed  his  belief  that  South  Carolina  would  in  the  end  be  obliged  to  re 
sort  to  its  ultimate  constitutional  remedy  by  state  interposition,  and  the  ruinous 
consequences  which  must  inevitably  result  from  the  act  to  itself,  to  the  South, 
and  finally  to  the  whole  Unio*- 

Many  of  the  leading  citizens  of  the  state  visited  Mr.  Calhoun  at  his  residence, 
near  the  mountains  in  S^uth  Carolina,  during  the  summer  and  autumn  after  his 
return  from  Washington,  with  all  of  whom  he  conversed  freely,  and  expressed 
the  same  sentiments.  But  while  he  stated  his  conviction  of  the  necessity  of 
preparing  in  time  for  the  worst,  he  always  advised  that  there  should  be  no  pre 
cipitation,  nor  anything  done  to  endanger  the  election  of  General  Jackson,  nor, 
indeed,  afterward,  till  it  was  ascertained  whether  his  administration  would  cor 
rect  the  evil  before  the  public  debt  was  finally  discharged.  He  fixed  on  that  as 
the  period  for  invoking  the  high  authority  of  the  state,  as  one  of  the  sovereign 
parties  to  the  constitutional  compact,  to  arrest  the  evil,  not  only  because  he 
thought  that  ample  time  ought  to  be  allowed  to  see  if  anything  would  be  done, 
but  because  he  believed  that  so  long  as  the  money,  however  unjustly  and  uncon 
stitutionally  extorted  from  the  people  by  the  act  of  '28,  was  applied  to  the  pay 
ment  of  the  debt,  it  should  be  borne.  But  he  thought,  if  the  operation  of  the  act 
should  not  then  be  arrested  promptly,  the  vast  surplus  revenue  which  it  would 
afterward  pour  into  the  treasury  would  be  converted  into  the  means  of  perpetu 
ating  it,  and  fixing  the  system  on  the  country  permanently  and  beyond  the  reach 
of  any  constitutional  remedy. 

He  was  the  more  deeply  impressed  with  the  danger  from  >vhat  had  already 
occurred.  A  leading  advocate  of  the  measure  in  the  Senate,  Mr.  Dickerson,  of 
New- Jersey,  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Manufactures,  and  since  Sec 
retary  of  the  Navy,  had  already  moved  in  anticipation  of  the  payment  of  the 
debt,  and  with  the  view  of  strengthening  the  protective  system,  that  five  mill 
ions  of  dollars  should  annually  be  taken  from  the  treasury  and  divided  among 
the  states.  Such  a  proposition  could  not  fail  to  arouse  the  attention  and  appre 
hension  of  one  so  sagacious  and  vigilant  as  Mr.  Calhoun.  He  saw  at  once  the 
full  extent  of  the  danger.  No  measure  could  be  devised  more  insidious,  cor- 


36  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

rupting,  or  better  calculated  to  effect  the  object  contemplated.  The  money 
proposed  to  be  so  divided  would  never  return  to  the  pockets  of  the  tax-paying 
people  from  whom  it  was  first  taken.  It  would  go  to  the  State  Legislatures,  to 
be  disposed  of  as  they  should  think  proper,  and  would  constitute  a  fund,  in  the 
management  of  which  there  would  be  no  responsibility,  under  the  control  of 
the  majority  of  the  Legislature,  or,  rather,  of  the  few  leaders  of  the  majority  for  the 
time,  to  be  converted  by  them  into  means  of  power  and  emolument  for  themselves, 
through  their  partisans  and  friends.  The  necessary  effect  would  be,  that  the 
leaders  for  the  time  in  all  the  State  Legislatures,  even  of  those  most  injured 
by  the  system,  would  be  interested  in  its  favour ;  as  they,  and  their  friends  and 
partisans,  would  derive  more  from  the  administration  and  application  of  the  fund 
than  they  had  contributed  to  it,  as  tax-payers,  under  the  duties  from  which  it 
was  derived.  Seeing  these  consequences,  he  could  not  doubt  that,  if  the  meas 
ure  was  once  adopted,  it  would  absorb  in  its  vortex  the  whole  surplus  revenue 
after  the  discharge  of  the  debt,  and  unite  the  General  and  State  Governments 
in  support  of  a  universal  system  of  plunder.  Under  that  state  of  things,  he  be 
lieved  the  evil  would  become  remediless,  and  our  free  and  popular  institutions 
would  sink  into  a  mass  of  corruption.  With  this  impression,  he  used  his  ut 
most  influence  against  this  incipient  move.  It  was  defeated  for  the  time,  but 
not  without  deep  apprehension,  on  his  part,  that  it  would  revive  and  finally  pre 
vail,  unless  the  protective  policy,  from  which  this  monstrous  measure  derived 
its  origin  as  a  legitimate  offspring,  was  effectually  and  forever  destroyed.  It 
was  this  view  of  the  subject  that  so  strongly  impressed  him  with  the  necessity 
of  decisive  action,  should  the  comia^  administration  fail  to  put  it  down,  and 
confirmed  him  in  the  belief  that  the  tin**  for  action  should  by  no  means  be  de 
layed  beyond  the  final  discharge  of  the  public  debt. 

So  deep  was  his  conviction  of  the  danger,  that  when  he  was  requested  by 
one  of  the  members  elected  to  the  Legislatu^  Of  South  Carolina,  with  whom 
lie  had  conversed  freely  when  on  a  visit  to  him,  *pd  who  expected  to  be  on  the 
Committee  of  Federal  Relations,  to  give  him  his  vie>rs  on  the  subject,  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  draw  them  up  in  the  shape  of  a  report,  in  Which  he  fully  expressed 
himself  as  to  the  disease,  the  danger,  and  remedy  ;  and,  regardless  of  popularity, 
he  gave  him  authority  to  state  who  was  its  author,  should  he.  think  it  would  be 
of  any  service.  The  paper  was  reported  by  the  committee  wiib  some,  though 
not  material  alterations.  Five  thousand  copies  were  ordered  by  the  Legisla 
ture  to  be  printed,  under  the  title  of  "  The  South  Carolina  Exposition  and  Pro 
test  on  the  subject  of  the  Tariff." 

But  while  the  Legislature  were  thus  preparing  to  arrest,  in  the  last  resort,  the 
obnoxious  act,  if  it  should  become  necessary,  they  showed,  at  the  same  time, 
their  continued  confidence  in  General  Jackson.  The  presidential  election  came 
on  at  the  same  session,  and  the  electors  who  were  appointed  by  the  Legislature 
gave  their  votes  to  General  Jackson  and  Mr.  Calhoun,  who  were  elected  by  a 
large  majority  of  the  whole  electoral  college. 

His  inaugural  address  was  received  with  enthusiasm  by  the  people  of  the 
state,  and  atrong  hopes  were  entertained  that  their  expectations  upon  his  elec 
tion  would  'he  fully  realized,  and  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  ultimate 
remedy  of  the  Constitution  avoided ;  but  his  first  message,  at  the  commence 
ment  of  the  next  session,  went  far  to  extinguish  their  hopes. 

Here  we  reach  a.  period  of  history  of  which  it  will  be  difficult  to  treat  with 
out  reviving  some  recollection  of  the  unfortunate  difference  which,  for  a  time, 
divided  the  Republican  party,  now  so  happily  united  in  the  defence  of  their 
common  principles  and  of  constitutional  liberty.  But,  referring  to  the  past,  as 
we  shall  for  its  facts,  and  not  for  its  feelings,  we  shall  endeavour  to  give  so 
much  of  this  history  as  is  indispensable  to  an  explanation  of  Mr.  Calhoun's  con 
nexion  with  political  affairs,  as  it  will  hereafter  be  written  by  some  impartial 
hand — an  effort  which,  we  trust,  may  not  be  unacceptable  to  the  great  actors 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  37 

of  that  day,  if  they  should  find  it  but  a  calm  and  dispassionate  review  of  those 
trying  and  eventful  scenes  in  which  they  bore  so  prominent  a  part.  To  sup 
pose  that  any  man  would  recoil  from  the  truth  of  history  is  to  attribute  to  him 
the  meanest  and  most  unmanly  of  fears — an  injustice  which  no  motives  of  false 
delicacy  would  make  us  even  seem  to  offer  to  those  whom  we  respect  as  friends. 
In  discharging  our  duty  as  chroniclers,  we  shall  noUpresume  to  decide  upor. 
the  merits  of  past  disputes,  as  our  immediate  object  may  be  accomplished  with 
out  entering  upon  that  delicate  ground.  In  stating  the  opinions  and  course  of 
Mr.  Calhoun,  it  is  not  always  with  a  view  of  justifying  them,  and  we  may  dis 
approve  some  features  in  the  policy  of  President  Jackson  without  doubting  his  > 
motives,  or  disparaging  his  great  abilities  and  eminent  public  services.  Each 
of  these  great  men  is  too  deservedly  proud  of  the  past  to  wish  to  disguise  or 
conceal  any  portion  of  that  history  upon  which  he  rests  his  pretensions  for  fame  ; 
and  the  highest  evidence  of  a  noble  nature  is  that  candour  which  receives  truth 
without  offence  whenever  it  is  truthfully  told.  Now  that  the  fires  of  old  feuds 
have  burned  out,  and  the  excitement  of  the  time  has  passed  away,  we  doubt  not 
but  that  each  will  look  upon  the  past  without  passion  and  with  impartiality. 

But  to  resume  the  thread  of  our  narrative.  The  first  message  of  the  Presi 
dent,  in  December,  1829,  did  not  remove  the  apprehensions  which  heretofore 
had  weighed  so  heavily  upon  Mr.  Calhoun's  mind — apprehensions  which  then 
seemed  the  more  exaggerated  as  he,  perhaps,  was  the  only  man  of  the  time 
who  measured,  in  their  full  extent,  the  consequences  of  a  system  against  which 
he  was  destined  soon  to  peril  his  all  in  deadly  strife.  One  of  the  paragraphs 
in  this  message  declares  that,  "  After  the  .extinction  of  the  public  debt,  it  is  not 
probable  that  any  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  upon  principles  satisfactory  to  the 
people  of  the  Union,  will,  until  a  remote  period,  if  ever,  leave  the  government 
•without  a  considerable  surplus  in  the  treasury  beyond  what  may  be  required 
for  its  current  service."  After  discussing  various  modes  of  applying  this  sur 
plus,  the  message  thus  again  proceeds  :  "  To  avoid  these  evils,  it  appears  to  me 
that  the  most  safe,  just,  and  federal  disposition  which  could  be  made  of  this  sur 
plus  revenue  would  be  its  apportionment  among  the  several  states,  according 
to  their  ratio  of  representation ;  and,  should  this  measure  not  be  found  warrant 
ed  by  the  Constitution,  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  propose  to  the  states  an 
amendment  authorizing  it."  These  recommendations  were  not  calculated  to 
relieve  the  apprehensions  of  Mr.  Calhoun  as  to  the  danger  of  a  long  continuance 
of  the  protective  system  and  its  union  with  distribution;  a  conjunction  which, 
of  all  others,  he  regarded  as  the  most  formidable  to  the  liberties  of  our  people 
and  the  permanence  of  their  free  institutions  ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  they  con 
tributed  to  make  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  upon  the  people  of  South  Caro 
lina,  and  greatly  increased  their  efforts  to  disseminate  correct  information  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  evil,  and  the  absolute  necessity  of  averting  it  by  the  separate 
action  of  the  state,  if  not  done  by  the  General  Government,  all  hope  of  which 
was  now  wellnigh  gone.  The  next  annual  message  recurred  to  the  same  topics. 
"  In  my  first  message,"  said  President  Jackson,  "  I  stated  it  to  be  my  opinion 
that  '  it  is  not  probable  that  any  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  upon  principles  satis 
factory  to  the  people  of  the  Union,  will,  until  a  remote  period,  if  ever,  leave  the 
government  without  a  considerable  surplus  in  the  treasury  beyond  what  may  be 
required  for  its  current  service.'  I  have  had  no  cause  to  change  that  opinion, 
but  much  to  confirm  it."  In  another  part  of  the  same  message  he  said,  "  Thus 
viewing  the  subject,  I  have  heretofore  felt  it  my  duty  to  recommend  the  adop 
tion  of  some  plan  for  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  funds,  which  may  at  any 
time  remain  in  the  treasury  after  the  national  debt  shall  have  been  paid,  among 
the  states,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  their  representatives,  to  be  applied  by 
them  to  objects  of  internal  improvement.  Although  this  plan  has  met  with  fa 
vour  in  some  portions  of  the  Union,  it  has  also  elicited  objections,  which  merit 
deliberate  consideration."*  These  he  proceeded  to  state  and  answer  at  great 


38  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

length.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  systematic  movements  were  making  in 
the  leading  tariff  states  to  enforce  this  policy  by  the  weight  of  their  influence. 
The  governors  of  New-York  and  Pennsylvania  followed  with  similar  recom 
mendations,  and  their  respective  legislatures  adopted  strong  resolutions  in  fa 
vour  of  the  scheme.  The  door  of  hope  from  without  seemed  to  be  wellnigh 
closed,  j  Unless  the  state  should  interpose  to  avert  this  system  by  her  separate 
action,  it  appeared  inevitable  that  the  tariff  of  1828,  that  "  bill  of  abominations," 
•would  be  perpetuated  in  connexion  with  a  distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue 
after  the  payment  of  the  debt,  with  all  of  its  dangerous  and  corrupting  conse 
quences.  |  South  Carolina  did  not  hesitate  in  her  choice  between  these  alterna 
tives.  Everywhere  the  subject  of  state  remedies  was  agitated,  and  the  elec 
tions  throughout  the  state  turned  upon  that  deeply-exciting  and  important  ques 
tion. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  personal  relations  between  Mr.  Calhoun  and  the  Presi 
dent  had  been  impaired  by  various  causes,  and  in  the  spring  of  1830  the  differ 
ence  became  serious  and  the  rupture  complete.  Separated  as  they  now  were 
upon  great  public  questions,  and  alienated  also  by  private  differences,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  the  President  should  have  directed  the  whole  weight  of 
his  immense  popularity  against  Mr.  Calhoun  ;  nor  had  the  latter  any  resource 
in  the  opposition,  who,  separated  from  him  in  principle  and  policy,  bore  down 
upon  him  with  their  whole  strength  and  influence.  These  things,  of  them 
selves,  seemed  to  constitute  difficulties  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  overpower 
him.  On  the  whole  expanse  of  the  wide  American  Continent,  there  were, 
perhaps,  but  two  spirits  that  could  have  encountered  them ;  and  these,  strangely 
enough,  were  the  two  individuals  who  were  destined  to  conduct  the  two  parties 
in  the  tremendous  contest  that  was  approaching.  But,  undaunted  at  the  pros 
pect,  and  strong  not  only  in  the  consciousness  of  his  intellectual  resources,  but 
also  in  that  high  resolve  which  springs  from  a  deep  sense  of  wrong,  Mr.  Cal 
houn  fearlessly  assumed  the  responsibility  of  the  movement  in  the  great  issue 
which  South  Carolina  was  preparing  to  make  with  the  General  Government ; 
and,  in  obedience  to  the  calls  on  him  from  various  quarters,  he  unhesitatingly 
avowed  his  opinions  on  the  complex  and  difficult  questions  arising  out  of  it.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  situation  of  more  peril,  or  a  greater  example  of 
self-abandonment  and  moral  intrepidity.  He  andvthe  state  now  stood  alone  in 
open,  bold,  and  undaunted  resistance  against  the  scheme  of  a  permanent  distri* 
bution  of  the  surplus  revenue,  sustained  by  a  perpetual  protective  tariff.  They 
were  assailed  with  equal  fierceness  by  the  administration  and  opposition  parties, 
and  they  were  deserted  by  all  the  Southern  states,  though  most  of  them  had 
adopted  the  strongest  resolutions,  declaring  the  tariff  of  '28  to  be  oppressive,  un 
just,  unequal,  and  unconstitutional,  and  pledging  themselves  in  the  most  posi 
tive  manner  to  oppose  it.  Nothing  but  the  deepest  conviction  of  the  truth  and 
justice  of  their  cause,  and  of  the  magnitude  of  the  questions,  could  have  sus 
tained  him  under  such  difficulties,  and  in  the  face  of  so  imposing  a  force. 

He  commenced  the  address  containing  the  avowal  of  his  opinion  with  a  state 
ment  of  his  views  on  the  question  of  the  relation  which  the  states*  bear  to  the 
General  Government.  After  referring  to  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions, 
the  Virginia  report  and  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  in 
the  case  of  Cobbett,  as  containing  a  summary  of  his  opinion,  he  said,  "  As  many 
might  not  have  an  opportunity  to  refer  to  them,  and  as  different  opinions  might 
be  entertained  as  to  their  meaning,  he  would,  to  avoid  all  ambiguity,  and  that 
his  sentiments  might  be  fully  known,  state  his  opinions  of  the  doctrine  which 
he  believed  they  embraced."  With  these  preliminary  remarks,  he  proceeded 
to  give,  in  the  first  place,  a  concise  summary  of  the  doctrines  they  embraced, 
3nd  in  the  next,  his  impression  of  the  character  and  tendency  of  these  doctrines, 
followed  up  by  a  calm,  lucid,  and  able  array  of  reasons  in  support  of  his  opin 
ion  ;  and,  finally,  brought  the  whole  to  bear  on  the  protective  system,  and  the 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  39 

dangers  to  which  it  exposed  our  political  institutions.  He  then  showed  that 
the  period  of  the  final  payment  of  the  debt  was  fast  approaching,  and  that,  if  the 
threatened  danger  was  not  promptly  met,  the  most  disastrous  consequences 
would  follow ;  and,  finally,  if  the  government  itself  should  fail  to  meet  it,  state 
interposition  was  the  only  adequate  and  constitutional  remedy  which  could  ar 
rest  it.  The  following  extract  from  this  manly  and  able  document  contains  the 
doctrines  of  state  interposition  or  nullification,  with  his  impression  of  its  char 
acter  and  tendency  : 

"  The  great  and  leading  principle  is,  that  the  General  Government  emanated 
from  the  people  of  the  several  states,  forming  distinct  political  communities,  and 
acting  in  their  separate  and  sovereign  capacity,  and  not  from  all  of  the  people 
forming  one  aggregate  political  community ;  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  is,  in  fact,  a  compact,  to  which  each  state  is  a  party,  in  the  character  al 
ready  described ;  and  that  the  several  states  or  parties  have  a  right  to  judge 
of  its  infractions,  and,  in  case  of  a  deliberate,  palpable,  and  dangerous  exercise 
of  power  not  delegated,  they  have  the  right,  in  the  last  resort,  to  use  the  lan 
guage  of  the  Virginia  resolutions,  ''to  interpose  for  arresting  the  progress  of  the 
evil,  and  for  maintaining,  within  their  respective  limits,  the  authorities,  rights,  and 
liberties  appertaining  to  them?  This  right  of  interposition,  thus  solemnly  as 
serted  by  the  State  of  Virginia,  be  it  called  what  it  may,  state-right,  veto,  nulli 
fication,  or  by  any  other  name,  I  conceive  to  be  the  fundamental  principle  of 
our  system,  resting  on  facts  historically  as  certain  as  our  Revolution  itself,  and 
deductions  as  simple  and  demonstrative  as  that  of  any  political  or  moral  truth 
whatever ;  and  I  firmly  believe  that  on  its  recognition  depends  the  stability  and 
safety  of  our  political  institutions. 

"  I  am  not  ignorant  that  those  opposed  to  the  doctrine  have  always,  now  and 
formerly,  regarded  it  in  a  very  different  light,  as  anarchical  and  revolutionary. 
Could  I  believe  such  in  fact  to  be  its  tendency,  to  me  it  would  be  no  recom 
mendation.  I  yield  to  none,  I  trust,  in  a  deep  and  sincere  attachment  to  our 
political  institutions,  and  the  union  of  these  states.  I  never  breathed  an  oppo 
site  sentiment ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  have  ever  considered  them  the  great  in 
strument  of  preserving  our  liberty,  and  promoting  the  happiness  of  ourselves  and 
our  posterity ;  and,  next  to  these,  I  have  ever  held  them  most  dear.  Nearly 
half  my  life  has  passed  in  the  service  of  the  Union,  and  whatever  public  reputa 
tion  I  have  acquired  is  indissolubly  identified  with  it.  To  be  too  national  has, 
indeed,  been  considered  by  many,  even  of  my  friends,  to  be  my  greatest  political 
fault.  With  these  strong  feelings  of  attachment,  I  have  examined,  with  the  ut 
most  care,  the  bearing  of  the  doctrine  in  question ;  and  so  far  from  anarchical 
or  revolutionary,  I  solemnly  believe  it  to  be  the  only  solid  foundation  of  our  sys 
tem  and  of  the  Union  itself,  and  that  the  opposite  doctrine,  which  denies  to  the 
states  the  right  of  protecting  their  several  powers, .and  which  would  vest  in  the 
General  Government  (it  matters  not  through  what  department)  the  right  of  de 
termining,  exclusively  and  finally,  the  powers  delegated  to  it,  is  incompatible 
with  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  and  of  the  Constitution  itself,  considered  as 
the  basis  of  a  Federal  Union.  As  strong  as  this  language  is,  it  is  not  stronger 
than  that  used  by  the  illustrious  Jefferson,  who  said,  to  give  to  the  General  Gov 
ernment  the  final  and  exclusive  right  to  judge  of  its  powers,  is  to  make  '  its  dis 
cretion,  and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measure  of  its  powers  ;'  and  that  '  in  all 
cases  of  compact  between  parties  having  no  common  judge,  each  party  has  an  equal 
right  to  judge  for  itself,  as  well  of  the  infraction  as  of  the  mode  and  measure  of 
redress?  Language  cannot  be  more  explicit,  nor  can  higher  authority  be  ad 
duced. 

"  That  different  opinions  are  entertained  on  this  subject,  I  consider  but  as  an 
additional  evidence  of  the  great  diversity  of  the  human  intellect.  Had  not  able, 
experienced,  and  patriotic  individuals,  for  whom  I  have  the  highest  respect,  taken 
different  views,  I  should  have  thought  the  right  too  clear  to  admit  of  doubt ;  but 


40  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

I  am  taught  by  this,  as  well  as  by  many  similar  instances,  to  treat  with  deference 
opinions  differing  from  my  own.  The  error  may  possibly  be  with  me  ;  but,  if 
so,  I  can  only  say,  that  after  the  most  mature  and  conscientious  examination,  I 
have  not  been  able  to  detect  it.  But  with  all  proper  deference,  I  must  think 
that  theirs  is  the  error  who  deny  what  seems  to  be  an  essential  attribute  of  the 
conceded  sovereignty  of  the  states,  and  who  attribute  to  the  General  Govern 
ment  a  right  utterly  incompatible  with  what  all  acknowledge  to  be  its  limited 
and  restricted  character ;  an  error  originating  principally,  as  I  think,  in  not  duly 
reflecting  on  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  and  oa  what  constitutes  the  only  ra 
tional  object  of  all  political  constitutions." 

The  following  are  the  three  concluding  paragraphs,  which  will  exhibit  the 
tone  and  feeling  with  which  the  address  was  written. 

"  In  forming  the  opinions  I  have  expressed,  I  have  not  been  actuated  by  an 
unkind  feeling  to  our  manufacturing  interest.  I  now  am,  and  ever  have  been, 
decidedly  friendly  to  them,  though  I  cannot  concur  in  all  the  measures  which 
have  been  adopted  to  advance  them.  I  believe  considerations  higher  than  any 
question  of  mere  pecuniary  interest  forbid  their  use.  But,  subordinate  to  the 
higher  views  of  policy,  I  regard  the  advancement  of  mechanical  and  chemical 
improvements  in  the  arts  with  feelings  little  short  of  enthusiasm,  not  only  as  the 
prolific  source  of  national  and  individual  wealth,  but  as  the  grea,  mear^  of  en 
larging  the  domain  of  man  over  the  material  world,  and  thereby  of  laying  the 
solid  foundation  of  a  highly-improved  condition  of  society,  morally  and  politi 
cally.  I  fear  not  that  we  shall  extend  our  power  too  far  over  the  great  agents 
of  nature ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  consider  such  enlargement  of  our  power  as 
tending  more  certainly  and  powerfully  to  better  the  condition  of  our  race,  than. 
any  one  of  the  many  powerful  causes  now  operating  to  that  result.  With  these 
impressions,  I  not  only  rejoice  at  the  general  progress  of  the  arts  in  the  world, 
but  on  their  advancement  in  our  own  country ;  and,  as  far  as  protection  may  be 
incidentally  afforded  in  the  fair  and  honest  exercise  of  our  constitutional  powers, 
I  think  now,  as  I  have  always  done,  that  sound  policy,  connected  with  the 
security,  independence,  and  peace  of  the  country,  requires  it  should  be  ;  but  we 
cannot  go  a  single  step  beyond  without  jeopardizing  our  peace,  our  harmony, 
and  our  liberty — considerations  of  infinitely  more  importance  to  us  than  any 
measure  of  mere  policy  can  possibly  be. 

"  In  thus  placing  my  opinion  before  the  public,  I  have  not  been  actuated 
by  the  expectation  of  changing  the  public  sentiment.  Such  a  motive  on  a  ques 
tion  so  long  agitated,  and  so  beset  with  feelings  of  prejudice  and  interest, 
"would  argue,  on  my  part,  an  insufferable  vanity,  and  a  profound  ignorance  of  the 
human  heart.  To  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  the  imputation  of  either,  I  have 
confined  my  statement  on  the  many  and  important  points  on  which  I  have  been 
compelled  to  touch,  to  a  simple  declaration  of  my  opinion,  without  advancing 
any  other  reasons  to  sustain  them  than  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  indispen 
sable  to  the  full  understanding  of  my  views  ;  and  if  they  should,  on  any  point,  be 
thought  to  be  not  clearly  and  explicitly  developed,  it  will,  I  trust,  be  attributed 
to  my  solicitude  to  avoid  the  imputations  to  which  I  have  alluded,  and  not  from 
an^  desire  to  disguise  my  sentiments,  nor  the  want  of  arguments  and  illustra 
tions  to  maintain  positions  which  so  abound  in  both,  that  it  would  require  a 
volume  to  do  them  anything  like  justice.  I  can  only  hope  that  truths  which, 
I  feel  assured  are  essentially  connected  with  all  we  ought  to  hold  most  dear, 
may  not  be  weakened  in  the  public  estimation  by  the  imperfect  manner  in  which 
I  have  been,  by  the  object  in  view,  compelled  to  present  them. 

"  With  every  caution  on  my  part,  I  dare  not  hope,  in  taking  the  step  I  have, 
to  escape  the  imputation  of  improper  motives,  though  I  have,  without  reserve, 
freely  expressed  my  opinions,  not  regarding  whether  they  might  or  might  not 
be  popular.  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  are  such  as  will  conciliate 
public  favour,'  but  the  opposite,  which  I  greatly  regret,  as  I  have  ever  planed  a 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  41 

high  estimate  on  the  good  opinion  of  my  fellow-citizens.  But,  be  that  as  it  may, 
I  shall,  at  least,  be  sustained  by  feelings  of  conscious  rectitude.  I  have  formed 
my  opinions  after  the  most  careful  and  deliberate  examinations,  with  all  the  aids 
which  my  reason  and  experience  could  furnish  ;  I  have  expressed  these  honestly 
and  fearlessly,  regardless  of  their  effects  personally,  which,  however  interesting 
to  me  individually,  are  of  too  little  importance  to  be  taken  into  the  estimate, 
where  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  our  country  are  so  vitally  involved." 

He  followed  up,  the  next  year,  this  statement  of  his  opinion  by  a  letter*  ad 
dressed  to  General  Hamilton,  then  governor  of  the  state,  at  his  request,  in 
which  he  went  into  the  same  subjects  more  fully,  and  with  additional  force  of 
argument  and  illustration.  They  both  did  much  to  enlighten  the  state  on  the 
subject  discussed,  and  to  sustain  her  in  the  arduous  struggle  into  which  she 
was  preparing  to  enter. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  period  selected  for  final  and  decisive  action  was  rapidly 
approaching,  and  the  excitement  in  the  state  became  deeper  and  deeper.  A 
strong  party,  under  able  leaders,  had  risen  in  the  state  against  the  course  pro 
posed  to  be  taken.  They  admitted  the  tariff  to  be  unconstitutional  and  oppress 
ive,  but  disagreed  as  to  the  remedy,  which  they  regarded  as  revolutionary,  and 
not  warranted  by  the  Constitution.  They  assumed  the  popular  name  of  the 
Union  party.  The  whole  weight  of  the  General  Government  was  thrown  in 
their  favour.  The  two  parties  were  drawn  up  in  fierce  array  against  each 
other,  and  every  nerve  was  strained  on  each  side  to  gain  the  ascendency.  The 
whole  energy  and  talents  of  the  state  were  aroused,  and  the  people  were  inces 
santly  addressed  on  both  sides,  through  speeches,  pamphlets,  and  newspapers, 
by  the  ablest  men,  in  manly  and  eloquent  arguments,  making  direct  appeal  to 
their  understandings  and  patriotism,  on  all  the  questions  involved  in  the  issue. 

At  this  stage,  a  gleam  of  light  inspired  the  hope  that  the  necessity  of  resort 
ing  to  the  extreme  remedy  of  the  Constitution  would  be  unnecessary.  President 
Jackson,  in  his  message  to  Congress  at  the  opening  of  the  session  in  Decem 
ber,  1831,  omitting  for  the  first  time  all  allusion  to  the  scheme  of  distribution, 
announced  the  near  approach  of  the  period  when  the  public  debt  would  be 
finally  paid,  and  recommended  that  provision  should  be  made  for  the  reduction, 
of  the  duties  and  the  relief  of  the  people  from  unnecessary  taxation,  after  the 
extinguishment  of  the  debt.  The  message  diffused  general  joy  throughout  the 
state.  It  was  believed  that  the  scheme  of  distribution  was  abandoned,  and 
was  hoped,  ?ate  as  it  was,  that  most  of  the  mischief  anticipated  from  the  surplus 
revenue,  by  a  prompt  and  judicious  reduction  of  the  duties,  might  be  still  avoid 
ed.  The  delegation  in  Congress  prepared  to  co-operate  zealously  with  the 
friends  of  the  administration  in  making  such  a  reduction  as  would  relieve  the 
people  from  unnecessary  taxation,  and  save  the  country  and  government  from 
the  worst  of  all  evils,  an  accumulating  and  corrupting  surplus,  collected  in  bank 
notes,  or,  what  was  the  same  thing,  bank  credit. 

But  this  gleam  of  sunshine  proved  transient  and  illusory.  It  soon  became 
apparent  that  neither  side,  administration  or  opposition,  contemplated  anything 
like  an  adequate  reduction.  In  spite  of  every  effort  made  by  the  delegation,  and 
after  spending  the  greater  portion  of  the  session  on  the  subject,  an  inconsidera 
ble  reduction  of  some  three  or  four  millions  of  dollars  only  was  effected.  This 
still  left  a  revenue  more  than  twice  as  large  as  the  usual  and  necessary  expendi 
ture  of  the  government  would  require  after  the  payment  of  the  debt,  and  the  du 
ties  at  high  protective  rates,  on  what  were  called  the  protected  articles  ;  and  as 
if,  too,  to  extinguish  all  hope,  this  trifling  reduction  was  announced  by  Mr.  Clay 
on  the  part  of  the  opposition,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  on  that  of  the 
administration,  as  the  final  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  and  the  permanent  system 
of  revenue,  after  the  payment  of  the  debt.  In  a  striking  particular,  the  act 
making  the  reduction  was  even  more  unequal  and  worse  than  the  tariff  of  '28. 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  4. 

F 


32  •  LIFE  OF  JOHft  C.  CALHOUN. 

It  exempted  the  manufacturing  portion  of  the  community  almost  literally  from 
all  taxes.  It  gave  them  a  bounty  on  all  they  made  by  imposing  duties  on  all 
similar  articles  imported,  and  all  such  as  could  come  in  competition  with  what 
they  made,  while  it  exempted  them,  as  consumers,  from  paying  taxes  on  almost 
all  others,  by  admitting  them  duty  free  ;  so  that,  instead  of  abandoning  the  prin 
ciple  of  protection,  or  guarding  against  the  danger  of  a  surplus,  the  act  but  per 
petuated  the  protective  policy,  and  left  the  country  and  the  government  exposed 
to  all  the  evils  of  a  large  annual  surplus. 

Such  an  arrangement  could  not  induce  South  Carolina  to  surrender  the  stand 
she  had  taken.  On  the  contrary,  it  only  aroused  her  to  more  active  resistance, 
and  energetic  preparation  to  meet  an  issue,  which  now  seemed  almost  inevi 
table.  At  this  stage  an  incident  occurred  that  tended  greatly  to  confirm  and 
animate  her  in  her  course. 

From  the  commencement,  the  State  Rights  party  had  claimed  the  authority  of 
the  Virginia  Resolutions,  Mr.  Madison's  Report,  and  the  Kentucky  Resolutions, 
which  they  attributed  to  Mr.  Jefferson,  as  sanctioning  the  doctrine  of  nullification 
and  the  course  they  proposed  to  take,  while  those  who  opposed  denied  that  they 
authorized  the  interpretation  put  on  them,  or  that  Mr.  Jefferson  was  the  author 
of  the  Kentucky  Resolutions.  It  became  a  point  of  great  importance  to  estab 
lish  which  of  the  two  were  right.  Both  sides  admitted  the  high  authority  of 
Mr.  Jefferson,  and  that  the  report  and  resolutions  contained  the  true  political 
creed  of  the  party.  Mr.  Ritchie,  the  experienced  editor  of  the  Enquirer  and 
the  associate  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  and  most  of  the  distinguished  men  who  were  his 
contemporaries  in  Virginia,  was  among  the  most  influential  of  those  who  denied 
that  these  documents,  or  the  opinions  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  authorized  the  doctrine 
of  nullification.  But,  fortunately,  the  original  manuscript  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  from 
which  the  Kentucky  Resolutions  were  taken,  was  brought  to  light  at  this  criti 
cal  juncture,  and  left  no  doubt  that  Mr.  Jefferson  was  their  real  author,  and 
that  he  entertained  the  doctrines  of  nullification  to  the  full  extent,  as  interpreted 
by  the  State  Rights  party,  which  Mr.  Ritchie  had  the  candour  to  acknowledge, 
as  the  following  extract  from  the  Enquirer  of  March,  1832,  shows. 

From  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  March  13th. 

MR.   JEFFERSON  THE  AUTHOR  OF  THE  KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS. 

"  Nullification — An  Error  corrected. — We  come  before  the  public  to  correct 
an  error  into  which  we  have  betrayed  them.  Some  of  the  politicians  of  South 
Carolina  had  maintained  the  opinion,  that  Mr.  Jefferson  was  not  only  the  friend, 
but  the  father  of  nullification ;  and  their  principal  argument  was,  that  he  was 
the  author  of  the  Kentucky  Resolutions  of  1799,  as  well  as  those  of  1798  ;  and 
that  in  those  of  1799  is  to  be  found  the  memorable  passage,  *  The  several 
states  which  formed  that  instrument,  being  sovereign  and  independent,  have  the 
unquestionable  right  to  judge  of  its  infraction ;  and  that  a  nullification  by  these 
sovereignties  of  all  unauthorized  acts,  done  under  colour  of  that  instrument,  is  the 
rightful  remedy.' 

"  We  had  a  great  curiosity  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  this  opinion.  We  hunted 
up  all  the  facts  that  were  within  our  reach,  weighed  them  as  impartially  as  we 
could,  and  we  arrived  at  a  different  conclusion  from  that  of  the  State  Rights 
politicians  of  South  Carolina.  We  expressed  our  opinions  in  the  '  Enquirer'  of 
the  13th  of  September  last. 

"  We  have  now  to  state  our  conviction  that  we  were  wrong,  and  the  South 
Carolinians  were  right  as  to  Mr.  Jefferson's  opinions.  A  small  MS.  book  has 
been  found  among  his  papers,  which,  with  other  articles,  contains  two  copies,  in 
his  own  handwriting,  that  appear  to  have  been  the  original  of  the  Kentucky  Reso 
lutions.  The  first  of  these  is  blurred  and  much  corrected,  with  passages  struck 
out  and  others  interlined.  The  other  is  a  fair  and  later  copy,  judging  from  the 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  43 

^colour  of  the  paper  and  of  the  ink,  of  Mr.  J.'s  draught.  We  are  indebted  to  his 
grandson  for  the  permission  to  examine  these  MSS.,  and  compare  them  with  the 
printed  copies  of  the  Kentucky  Resolutions,  and  for  the  opportunity  of  correct 
ing  our  own  mistake,  and  of  laying  the  following  result  before  our  readers." 

Here  follows  Mr.  Jefferson's  original  draught  of  the  Kentucky  Resolutions. 

Never  was  a  document  more  clear  and  explicit  on  any  point  than  this  in  fa 
vour  of  the  principles  on  which  Carolina  had  placed  her  right  to  interpose. 
Words  could  not  make  it  more  so.  It  says  expressly,  "  That  in  all  cases  of  an 
abuse  of  delegated  powers,  the  members  of  the  General  Government  being 
chosen  by  the  people,  a  change  by  the  people  would  be  the  constitutional  rem 
edy  ;  but  where  powers  are  assumed  which  have  not  been  delegated,  a  NULLIFICATION 
of  the  act  is  the  RIGHTFUL  REMEDY  that  every  state  has  a  natural  right  to,  in  cases 
not  in  the  compact  (casus  non  foederis),  to  nullify,  of  their  own  authority,  all  as 
sumptions  of  powers  within  their  limits  ;  that  without  this  right,  they  would  be 
under  the  absolute  and  unlimited  dominion  of  whoever  might  exercise  this  right 
of  judgment  for  them;  that,  nevertheless,  this  Commonwealth  (Kentucky),  from 
motives  of  regard  and  respect  for  its  co-states,  has  wished  to  communicate  with 
them  on  the  subject ;  that  with  them  alone  it  proposes  to  communicate,  they 
alone  being  parties  to  the  compact,  and  solely  authorized  to  judge,  in  the  last 
resort,  of  the  powers  exercised  under  it — Congress  being  not  a  party,  but  merely 
the  creature  of  the  compact,  and  subject,  as  to  its  assumption  of  its  powers,  to 
the  final  judgment  of  those  by  whom,  and  for  whose  use,  itself  and  its  powers 
were  created." 

So  fully  does  the  above  extract,  and  the  whole  draught,  in  fact,  accord  with 
the  views  taken  by  Mr.  Calhoun  in  the  statement  of  his  opinion,  and  letter  to 
General  Hamilton,  that,  had  it  been  possible  for  him  to  have  had  access  to  the 
manuscript,  he  might  well  have  been  suspected  of  plagiarism. 

Supported  by  this  high  and  explicit  authority,  the  State  Rights  party  moved 
-forward  with  renovated  energy  and  confidence  in  preparing  for  the  great  issue  ; 
but  the  difficulties  were  great.  The  Union  party,  thoroughly  organized  under 
able  leaders,  and  animated  by  the  greatest  zeal,  were  supported  not  only  by  the 
whole  influence  of  the  General  Government,  but  sustained  and  cheered  by  the 
concurring  voice  of  both  parties,  and,  it  may  almost  be  literally  said,  of  the 
whole  Union.  Against  this  immense  resistance,  the  State  Rights  party  had  to 
obtain  a  majority  of  two  thirds  of  both  houses  of  the  Legislature  to  carry  out  its 
views,  as,  according  to  their  opinion,  the  right  of  a  state  to  declare  an  act  of 
Congress  unconstitutional,  and  therefore  null  and  void,  is  derived  from  the  fact 
that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact  to  which  the  people  of  the  states,  in  their  sover 
eign  capacity,  are  direct  parties ;  and,  of  course,  the  right  appertains  to  them  in  this 
capacity  only,  and  can  only  be  exercised  by  them,  through  a  convention,  in  the 
same  mode  that  the  instrument  was  adopted,  and  not  by  the  State  Government. 
They  regard  the  General  and  State  Governments  as  co-ordinate  governments,  and 
the  people  of  the  states,  severally,  as  the  paramount  sovereign  authority.  Accord 
ing  to  these  views,  in  order  to  take  the  final  step  it  would  be  necessary  to  call 
a  convention  of  the  people  of  the  state  ;  and  for  this  purpose,  by  a  provision  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  state,  two  thirds  of  the  Legislature  were  necessary ;  with 
out  that  nothing  could  be  done,  and  the  cause  would  have  to  be  abandoned. 
The  election  was  pending,  and  the  great  struggle  between  the  parties  was,  on 
one  side,  to  carry  two  thirds  of  both  houses,  and  on  the  other  to  defeat  it.  The 
magnitude  of  the  issue  was  felt  by  both,  and  never  was  a  political  struggle  more 
ardent ;  and,  let  it  be  added  for  the  honour  of  both  parties  and  the  state,  never 
before,  in  such  a  struggle,  was  the  appeal  more  direct  and  solemn  to  the  intel 
ligence  and  patriotism  of  the  people,  and  so  free  from  all  false  issues,  cant,  or 
appeal  to  pas«ion  or  prejudice. 

It  resulted  in  the  triumph  of  the  State  Rights  party.  They  returned  more 
.than  tl^p  constitutional  number  to  both  houses.  The  Legislature  met  and  called 


44  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

a  Convention,  which  assembled  and  passed  the  Ordinance  of  Nullification,  the 
24th  of  November,  1832,  accompanied  by  two  addresses  ;  one  to  the  people  of 
South  Carolina,  and  the  other  to  the  people  of  their  co-states  of  the  Union,  set 
ting  forth  fully  an  explanation  of  the  motives  and  principles  which  governed 
them  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  constitutional  compact,  in  the  high  and  solemn 
act  of  sovereignty,  which  duty  to  themselves  and  to  the  Union  compelled  them 
to  perform.  They  adjourned  to  meet  in  March,  subsequent  to  the  period  at 
•which,  by  the  Constitution,  the  approaching  session  of  Congress  would  ter 
minate. 

Congress  met  at  the  usual  period,  in  December,  and  the  President,  in  his  Mes 
sage,  announced  the  final  payment  of  the  public  debt,  and  recommended  a  re 
duction  of  the  duties  to  the  standard  required  for  the  revenue  of  the  government 
economically  and  efficiently  administered,  to  take  place  as  soon  as  the  faith  of 
the  government,  and  the  preservation  of  the  large  capital  invested  in  manufac 
turing  establishments,  would  permit. 

The  time  of  Governor  Hamilton  having  expired,  General  Hayne,  then  a  sen 
ator  in  Congress,  was  elected  his  successor,  and  placed  at  the  head  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  state  at  this  momentous  period.  The  proceedings  of  the  Con 
vention  were  reported  to  the  Legislature,  which  met  shortly  after  its  adjournment, 
and  an  act  introduced  and  passed  to  carry  into  effect  the  ordinance,  to  go  into 
operation  in  February.  That  was  followed  by  the  proclamation  of  the  President, 
which  asserted  that  the  ordinance  was  subversive  of  the  Constitution,  and  that 
the  object  of  South  Carolina  was  the  destruction  of  the  Union ;  and  after  giving 
his  views  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  provisions  of  the  existing  laws  applicable 
to  the  case,  and  declaring  the  course  he  would  pursue,  he  warned  all  the  peo 
ple  of  the  state  against  obedience  to  the  ordinance,  under  the  high  penalty  for 
treason  against  the  United  States.  Governor  Hayne  issued  his  counter  procla 
mation,  repelling  the  charges  of  the  President,  and  maintaining  the  grounds  taken, 
by  the  Convention,  and  replying  to  the  reasons  assigned  for  the  grounds  taken 
in  the  President's  proclamation. 


CHAPTER  V. 

j  •  '.<  °i     • 

Including  the  Period  from  his  Resignation  of  the  Vice-presidency  till  the  Admission  of 
Michigan  into  the  Union. 

AT  this  critical  juncture,  the  Legislature  elected  Mr.  Calhoun  to  fill  the  vacancy 
in  the  Senate  occasioned  by  the  election  of  General  Hayne  as  governor.  As 
trying  as  was  the  situation  under  such  circumstances,  he  resigned  without  hesita 
tion  his  place  as  Vice-president,  and  proceeded  to  Washington  to  take  his  seat 
in  the  Senate.  Never  was  there,  since  the  commencement  of  the  government, 
a  moment  of  more  intense  interest  and  anxiety  throughout  the  whole  Union,  and 
never  before  was  any  public  man  placed  in  a  situation  more  difficult  and  re 
sponsible.  The  expectation  was  general  that  he  would  be  arrested  as  soon  as 
he  arrived  in  Washington ;  and  on  his  way  thither,  wherever  he  stopped, 
crowds  collected  to  see  him.  Nor  was  the  excitement  less  when  he  arrived  at 
the  seat  of  government,  where  he  had  been  so  long  and  familiarly  known. 
When  he  appeared  in  the  Senate  to  take  his  seat  as  a  member  in  a  body  over 
which  he  had  so  long  and  recently  presided,  the  gallery  and  chamber  were 
thronged  with  spectators.  He  repeated  the  constitutional  oath  in  a  firm  and 
audible  voice,  and  took  his  seat  on  the  side  and  in  the  midst  of  his  old  political 
friends,  of  whom  a  large  majority  were  now  placed  in  hostile  array  to  him. 
But  as  trying  and  responsible  as  was  the  occasion,  he  stood  erect  and  unap- 
palled,  conscious  of  the  purity  of  his  motives,  and  strong  in  the  depth  of  his 
conviction  of  the  truth,  justice,  constitutionality,  and  magnitude  of  tke 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  45 

which  South  Carolina,  in  her  confidence,  had  selected  him  as  her  chosen  repre 
sentative  to  defend. 

Mr.  Calhoun,  a  few  days  after  he  took  his  seat,  in  order  to  bring  the  whole 
subject  under  the  early  consideration  of  the  Senate,  offered  a  resolution,  calling 
ttpon  the  President  to  lay  before  the  body  the  ordinance  and  other  documents 
connected  with  it,  which  had  been  transmitted  to  him  by  the  executive  of  the 
state ;  but  he  forbore  to  press  its  adoption,  on  the  statement  of  Mr.  Grundy, 
that  there  was  reason  to  believe  the  President  was  preparing  a  message  on  the 
subject,  which  would  be  accompanied  by  the  documents  requested,  and  that  the 
message  would  probably  be  sent  the  day  after  the  next.  Not  expecting  any 
thing  of  importance  the  next  day,  Mr.  Calhoun  delayed  some  time  after  the 
usual  meeting  of  the  body  to  take  his  seat.  When  he  entered  the  chamber,  he 
was  surprised  to  find  it  crowded,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Senate  in  the  midst 
of  reading  the  message,  which  he  did  not  expect  until  the  next  day.  It  took 
strong  ground  against  South  Carolina,  and  recommended  the  adoption  of  the 
most  decisive  measures  to  coerce  her  obedience. 

It  was  a  trying  moment.  He  had  not  the  slightest  anticipation  that  he  would 
be  called  on  to  say  anything  when  he  entered  the  chamber,  and  was  wholly 
unprepared  ;  and,  to  add  to  his  embarrassment,  he  had,  for  the  long  period  of 
fifteen  years  (while  he  filled  the  war  department  and  the  place  of  Vice-presi 
dent),  been,  entirely  out  of  the  habit  of  public  speaking.  Nor  could  he  avoid 
speaking,  as  it  would  look  like  shrinking  not  to  give  an  immediate  reply  to  the 
message.  •  Under  all  these  trying  circumstances,  he  rose  as  soon  as  the  reading 
was  over,  and  replied,  in  a  manly  and  effective  speech,  to  the  ground  taken  in 
the  message.  After  he  concluded,  the  message  and  documents  were  referred 
to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  of  which  Mr.  Grundy  was  chairman  and  Mr. 
Webster  a  prominent  member.  They  reported  a  bill,  extending  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  courts  of  the  United  States  greatly  and  beyond  all  former  acts,  and  cloth 
ing  the  President  with  almost  unlimited  powers,  both  as  to  men  and  money. 

In  order  to  have  a  preliminary  discussion,  and  to  take  the  sense  of  the  Sen 
ate  on  the  principles  involved  in  the  issue,  before  the  bill  was  called  up,  Mr. 
Calhoun  prepared  and  moved  the  three  following  resolutions,  which  affirmed 
the  grounds  on  which  South  Carolina  placed  her  right,  on  the  one  side,  and 
negatived,  on  the  other,  those  assumed  in  the  proclamation  and  message. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  people  of  the  several  states  composing  these  United 
States  are  united  as  parties  to  a  constitutional  compact,  to  which  the  people  of 
each  state  acceded  as  a  separate  and  sovereign  community,  each  binding  itself, 
by  its  own  particular  ratification ;  and  that  the  Union,  of  which  the  said  com 
pact  is  the  bond,  is  a  Union  between  the  states  ratifying  the  same. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  people  of  the  several  states,  thus  united  by  a  constitu 
tional  compact,  in  forming  that  instrument,  in  creating  a  General  Government 
to  carry  into  effect  the  objects  for  which  it  was  formed,  delegated  to  that  gov 
ernment,  for  that  purpose,  certain  definite  powers,  to  be  exercised  jointly,  re 
serving,  at  the  same  time,  each  state  to  itself,  the  residuary  mass  of  powers,  to 
be  exercised  by  its  own  separate  government ;  and  that,  whenever  the  General 
Government  assumes  the  exercise  of  powers  not  delegated  by  the  compact,  its 
acts  are  unauthorized,  void,  and  of  no  effect ;  and  that  the  said  government  is 
not  made  the  final  judge  of  the  powers  delegated  to  it,  since  that  would  make 
its  discretion,  and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measure  of  its  powers  ;  but  that,  as 
in  all  other  cases  of  compact  among  sovereign  parties,  without  any  common 
judge,  each  has  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself,  as  well  of  the  infraction  as  of 
the  mode  and  measure  of  redress. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  assertions,  that  the  people  of  these  United  States,  taken 
collectively  as  individuals,  are  now,  or  ever  have  been,  united  on  the  principle 
of  the  social  compact,  and,  as  such,  are  now  formed  into  one  nation  or  people , 
or  that  they  have  ever  been  so  united  in  any  one  stage  of  their  political  exist- 


46  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ence  ;  or  that  the  people  of  the  several  states  comprising  the  Union  have  not, 
as  members  thereof,  retained  their  sovereignty ;  or  that  the  allegiance  of  their 
citizens  has  been  transferred  to  the  General  Government ;  or  that  they  have 
parted  with  the  right  of  punishing  treason  through  their  respective  state  gov 
ernments  ;  or  that  they  have  not  the  right  of  judging,  in  the  last  resort,  as  to  the 
extent  of  the  powers  reserved,  and,  of  consequence,  of  those  delegated,  are  not 
only  without  foundation  in  truth,  but  are  contrary  to  the  most  certain  and  plain 
historical  facts,  and  the  clearest  deductions  of  reason ;  and  that  all  exercise  of 
power  on  the  part  of  the  General  Government,  or  any  of  its  departments,  de 
riving  authority  from  such  erroneous  assumptions,  must  of  necessity  be  uncon 
stitutional  ;  must  tend  directly  and  inevitably  to  subvert  the  sovereignty  of  the 
states,  to  destroy  the  federal  character  of  the  Union,  and  to  rear  on  its  ruins  a 
consolidated  government,  without  constitutional  check  or  limitation,  and  which 
must  necessarily  terminate  in  the  loss  of  liberty  itself." 

It  is  obvious,  on  the  perusal,  that  if  the  principles  offered  by  the  resolutions 
be  true,  South  Carolina  would  stand  justified ;  and  if  those  negatived  be  false, 
the  bill  could  not  be  rightfully  sustained ;  and  such  being  the  case,  it  was  but 
fair  that  the  principles  should  be  settled  prior  to  the  discussion  and  action  on 
the  bill.  But  as  reasonable  as  was  the  request  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  the  Senate, 
under  the  influence  of  the  committee,  laid  his  resolutions  on  the  table,  and  took 
up  the  bill  for  discussion.  The  debate  was  very  able  on  both  sides.  Many  of 
the  old  and  sound  Republicans,  refusing  to  yield  their  long-cherished  principles 
to  party  feelings  or  considerations,  opposed  the  bill  with  great  ability  and  vigour. 
Mr.  Grundy,  as  chairman,  claimed  the  right  of  closing  the  debate,  and  Mr.  Cal 
houn  reserved  himself  to  reply  to  Mr.  Webster,  who  was  the  great  champion  of 
the  bill ;  but  he  was  informed,  through  one  of  Mr.  Webster's  friends,  that  he 
would  not  speak  before  him.  This  left  him  no  option,  as  he  could  not  avoid 
speaking,  and  had  therefore  to  submit.  He  spoke  late,*  and  conjecturing  that  Mr. 
Webster  intended  to  speak  to  the  principles  involved,  and  not  to  the  provisions 
of  the  bill,  he  spoke  at  large  on  a  variety  of  points,  which  he  thought  required 
explanation  in  connexion  with  the  course  of  South  Carolina,  and  but  slightly 
touched  on  the  principles  which  he  had  affirmed  or  negatived  in  his  resolutions, 
in  order  to  deprive  Mr.  Webster  of  the  advantages  he  aimed  at  in  reserving 
himself  for  the  reply.  He  was  right  in  his  conjecture.  The  moment  he  sat 
down,  Mr.  Webster  rose  to  reply,  but  spoke,  as  he  anticipated,  not  on  the  bill, 
but  to  the  resolutions,  without  assailing  or  controverting  any  of  the  positions 
taken  by  Mr.  C.  in  his  speech.  This  gave  him  a  claim  to  be  heard  on  his 
resolutions  ;  and  the  Senate  accordingly  permitted  him  to  call  them  up,  and  as 
signed  a  day  in  order  to  give  him  an  opportunity  of  replying  to  Mr.  Webster  in 
their  support. 

When  the  day  came  the  senate-chamber  and  gallery  were  crowded,  and  Mr. 
Calhoun  replied  in  a  speechf  which,  for  precision  and  force  of  argument,  has 
rarely,  if  ever,  been  equalled.  The  great  point  at  issue  was,  whether  the  Con 
stitution  is  or  is  not  a  compact  between  the  States.  Mr.  Webster,  with  that 
strength  of  understanding  which  belongs  to  him,  saw  clearly  where  the  real 
issue  lay,  and  had  the  fairness  and  candour  to  concede  that  if,  in  fact,  the  Con 
stitution  is  a  compact  between  the  States,  then  the  doctrines  contended  for  by 
South  Carolina  necessarily  followed,  nullification,  secession,  and  all.  Mr.  Cal 
houn,  accordingly,  mainly  directed  his  efforts  to  establishing  the  fact,  and  with 
such  success,  that  even  the  North  American  Quarterly  Review,  published  in 
Boston,  and  at  all  times  the  champion  of  the  principles  supported  by  Mr.  Web 
ster,  in  an  article  reviewing  the  debate,  admitted  that  Mr.  Calhoun  had  success 
fully  maintained  his  ground  on  that  point.  Mr.  Randolph,  then  in  a  feeble  state 
of  health,  on  his  way  to  Philadelphia,  was  present  in  the  senate-chamber,  it  is 
believed  for  the  last  time,  when  Mr.  Calhoun  spoke.  He  sat  near  the  desk 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  5,  t  See  "  Speeches,"  &c,;  No,  6. 


LIFE  OF  J.OHN  C.  CALHOUN.  47 

where  Mr.  C.  stood  while  addressing  the  Senate,  and  at  the  close  openly  and 
highly  complimented  him  for  the  ability  and  success  of  his  reply,  which  he  re 
garded  as  unanswerable. 

The  bill  passed,  but  while  it  was  in  progress,  efforts  were  made  in  both  Houses 
so  to  modify  the  duties  as  to  terminate  the  controversy  peaceably.  Upon 
faith  in  these  efforts,  South  Carolina  postponed  the  time  for  carrying  into  effect 
her  ordinance,  from  the  first  of  February  till  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress 
on  the  fourth  of  March.  Mr.  Verplanck,  in  the  early  part  of  the  session,  had 
reported  a  bill  in  conformity  with  the  message  of  the  President  at  the  opening 
of  the  session,  proposing  a  very  great  reduction  of  the  duties,  but  without  sur 
rendering  the  principle  of  protection,  or,  in  many  instances,  reducing  the  duties 
to  the  revenue  standard.  Its  progress  was  slow.  It  was  detained  a  long  time 
in  committee  of  the  whole,  where  many  amendments,  increasing  the  duties, 
were  made.  After  it  was  reported  to  the  House,  it  continued  to  drag  along  with 
difficulty.  Many  of  the  objectionable  amendments  made  in  the  committee  of 
the  whole  were  concurred  in,  and  the  fate  of  the  bill  still  continued  doubtful, 
notwithstanding  the  steady  and  united  support  which  it  received  from  the  State 
Rights  party,  objectionable  as  it  was  in  many  particulars.  Their  support  was 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  division  in  the  ranks  of  the  administration 
party. 

In  the  mean  time,  Mr.  Clay  introduced  a  bill  in  the  Senate,  which  received 
the  sanction  of  that  body,  and  was  sent  to  the  House,  where  Mr.  Verplanck's 
bill  still  lingered  near  the  end  of  the  session.  It  was  moved  as  a  substitute  to 
his  bill,  and  carried  by  a  large  majority  ;  Mr.  Verplanck  himself,  and  the  lead 
ing  friends  of  the  administration  who  supported  his  bill,  voting  for  it  in  despair, 
as  it  is  believed,  of  the  passage  of  his  own.  It  received  the  sanction  of  the 
President,  and  has  since  been  called  the  Compromise  Act ;  and  thus  terminated 
this  controversy,  the  most  agitating  and  memorable  that  ever  occurred  under  the 
government. 

It  is  not  deemed  necessary  to  go  into  the  origin  or  history  of  the  act,  or  mi 
nutely  into  its  provisions.  The  former  have  been  given  several  times  by  Mr, 
Clay  and  Mr.  Calhoun  in  their  places  in  the  Senate,  and  are  generally  known. 
It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  Mr.  Calhoun,  from  the  commencement,  refused  to  go 
into  any  arrangement  which  did  not  explicitly  surrender  the  principle  of  pro 
tection,  but  was  willing  to  allow  ample  time  for  the  gradual  reduction  of  the 
duties  on  the  protected  articles,  in  order  to  save  the  manufacturers  from  ruin ; 
but  he  insisted  on  a  tota]  repeal  at  once  on  all  unprotected  articles,  in  order  to 
prevent,  if  possible,  the  great  object  of  his  dread  from  the  first,  a  surplus  rev 
enue.  Mr.  Clay  was,  of  course,  on  his  part,  solicitous,  in  making  the  changes 
necessary  to  a  compromise,  to  give  as  slight  a  shock  as  possible  to  his  long- 
cherished  system.  The  result  was  the  surrender  of  the  protective  principle 
and  the  establishment  of  the  ad  valorem,  and  a  gradual  reduction  of  duties  on 
all  protected  articles,  to  terminate  on  the  thirtieth  of  June,  1842,  when  no  duty 
above  20  per  cent,  ad  valorem  should  be  laid ;  the  immediate  repeal  of  all  du 
ties  on  articles  not  similar  to  those  manufactured  in  the  country,  and  a  moderate 
list  of  articles  to  be  made  permanently  free  of  duty  after  the  thirtieth  of  June, 
1842,  with  provisions  for  cash  duties  and  home  valuation.  Such  are  the  gen 
eral  outlines  of  the  provisions  of  the  act  which  peaceably  closed  the  controver 
sy  ;  and  if  faith  and  pledges  had  been  observed  with  as  much  fidelity  on  the 
side  of  the  tariff  interest  as  it  has  been  on  the  part  of  the  opposite  side,  the  pos 
sibility  of  its  renewal  would  have  forever  been  prevented. 

Whatever  opinion  may  have  been  entertained  at  one  time  of  the  views  and 
motives  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  the  small  but  gallant  party  with  which*  he  acted, 
none  now,  not  even  the  most  prejudiced,  doubts  the  purity  and  patriotism  of  his 
and  their  motives,  however  much  they  may  differ  from  them  as  to  principles  and 
policy.  So  far  from  hostility  to  the  Union,  one  of  the  leading  objects  was  its 


$8  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

preservation.  The  Union  may  be  destroyed  as  well  by  consolidation  as  by  dis 
solution — by  the  centripetal  as  well  as  the  centrifugal  tendency  of  the  bodies  of 
which  it  is  composed.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  patriot  to  resist  both,  and  hold  the 
government  firmly  to  its  allotted  sphere.  Against  the  former,  state  interposition 
is  an  all-sufficient  remedy,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  experience  will 
not  prove  that  it  is  an  indispensable  one.  It  was,  at  least,  so  considered  by  the 
State  of  South  Carolina,  and  that  was  one  of  the  principal  motives  for  resorting  to 
it.  Nor  does  it  admit  of  a  doubt  but  that  her  action  did  much  to  counteract  the 
consolidating  tendency  of  the  Government.  Had  she  not  taken  the  stand  she 
did,  in  all  probability  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  among  the  states 
and  the  protective  policy  would  have  become  the  established  system  of  the  Gov 
ernment.  The  scheme  of  distribution  is  almost  a  necessary  consequence  of  that 
policy.  They  are  most  intimately  connected,  as  the  experience  of  the  last  few 
years  shows,  even  with  an-  empty  treasury.  With  one  full  to  overflowing,  as  was 
the  case  when  the  debt  was  paid  and  the  state  interposed,  it  was  almost,  if  not  al 
together  unavoidable,  without  state  interposition.  That  the  protective  tariff  would 
not  have  been  overthrown  without  it,  the  inconsiderable  reduction  of  1832,  and 
the  fate  of  Mr.  Verplanck's  bill,  notwithstanding  all  the  pressing  circumstances 
under  which  it  was  introduced  and  attempted  to  be  passed,  conclusively  prove  ; 
and  that  it  could  not  have  been  overthrown  if  the  two,  distribution  and  protec 
tion,  had  become  united,  may  be  fairly  inferred.  They  would  then  have  been 
beyond  the  reach  of  all  ordinary  and  constitutional  remedies,  when  either  con 
solidation  or  despotism  would  have  been  the  end  of  our  political  system. 

But  how  different  now  is  the  situation  of  the  government  and  the  country  in 
consequence  of  the  course  pursued.  When  the  state  first  took  its  stand,  the 
very  existence  of  states'  rights  was  almost  forgotten  in  the  Union.  The  party 
had  greatly  departed  from  the  old  standard  of  its  faith  both  in  theory  and  prac 
tice,  and  had  imperceptibly  embraced,  to  a  great  extent,  the  doctrines  and  policy 
of  its  opponents.  If  proof  be  required,  the  proclamation,  the  message  recom 
mending  the  Force  Bill,  the  bill  itself,  and  the  arguments  by  which  it  was  sup 
ported,  afford  conclusive  evidence.  That  a  great  and  cheering  change  has 
since  taken  place,  all  must  admit ;  and  that  it  may  be  attributed,  in  a  great 
measure,  to  say  the  least,  to  the  stand  taken  by  South  Carolina,  cannot  well 
be  doubted. 

It  was  expected  that,  among  its  other  benefits,  it  had  put  an  end  forever  to 
the  protective  policy,  but  the  act  of  the  last  session  has  proved  to  the  contrary. 
It  is,  however,  to  be  hoped  that  the  wound  it  has  received  will  yet  prove  to  be 
its  death-blow,  and  that  the  act  of  the  last  session  will  be  but  a  last  spasmodic 
struggle  preceding  its  final  dissolution.  Great  has  been  the  progress  of  truth 
in  reference  to  this  policy,  both  as  to  its  character  and  operation,  since  the  stand 
taken  by  South  Carolina.  That  it  is  unjust,  unequal,  oppressive,  and  unconstitu 
tional,  the  great  body  of  the  Democratic  party  are  now  agreed,  and,  being  agreed, 
they  can  never  cease  their  determined  resistance  to  it  until  it  is  finally  overthrown, 
without  (what  cannot  be  anticipated)  an  abandonment  of  their  political  faith. 

Such  is  a  sketch  of  this  important  part  of  Mr.  Calhoun's  public  life.  As  long 
as  it  is,  not  a  word  has  been  added  which  was  not  regarded  as  necessary  to  a 
just  understanding  of  his  motives  and  conduct,  in  the  most  trying  scene  through 
which  it  has  been  his  fortune  to  pass. 

Congress  adjourned  on  the  third  of  March,  and  he  proceeded  by  public  con 
veyance  to  Columbia  to  meet  the  Convention,  which  was  to  reassemble  in  a 
few  days.  The  spring  was  unusually  cold  and  backward.  The  snow  lay  sev 
eral  inches  deep  on  the  ground,  and  the  Potomac  was  frozen.  He  took  the 
stage  at  Alexandria,  but  the  roads  were  so  broken  up  in  consequence  of  the 
frost  that  he  had  to  take  open  mail-carts,  in  which  he  rode  night  and  day  with 
out  stopping,  for  a  considerable  portion  of  the  way,  in  order  to  reach  Columbia 
in  time.  He  found  the  members  of  the  Convention  assembled.  Knowing  how 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  49 

firm  and  resolved  the  state  was  to  maintain  its  rights,  lie  anticipated  some  dis 
satisfaction  at  the  compromise,  which  had  induced  him  to  proceed  with  the 
speed  which  he  used.  He  was  not  mistaken ;  but,  on  explaining  fully  what 
had  been  done,  and  the  reasons  on  which  he  and  his  colleague  had  acted,  the 
Convention  readily  acquiesced  in  the  adjustment.  Let  it  be  added,  in  conclu 
sion,  that  the  earliest  opportunity  was  seized  by  both  parties  in  the  state,  at  the 
next  session  of  the  Legislature,  after  the  closing  of  the  controversy  with  the 
General  Government,  to  meet  like  friends,  and  agree  to  disband  their  party  or 
ganization,  and  forget  their  past  differences,  which  both  sides,  to  their  lasting 
honour,  have  faithfully  and  honestly  observed.  The  consequence  of  so  patri 
otic  and  magnanimous  a  course  has  been  a  degree  of  harmony  and  unanimity  in 
the  state  ever  since,  without  example  in  any  other  member  of  the  Confederacy. 

This  great  subject  of  controversy  was  thus  happily  closed  in  the  Union  and  the 
State  of  South  Carolina ;  but  the  recess  between  the  last  and  the  next  session 
was  not  permitted  to  pass  without  giving  birth  to  another  question  of  deep  and 
abiding  excitement :  the  withholding  of  the  deposites  of  the  public  money  from 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  their  transfer,  by  the  authority  of  the  President, 
to  certain  state  banks,  selected  for  the  purpose.  To  effect  his  object,  he  had  re 
moved  Mr.  Duane  for  declining  to  comply  with  2iis  order,  and  appointed  Mr. 
Taney  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  his  pla^e,  in  order  to  have  it  executed. 
The  bank  was  made  by  its  charter  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government  for  the 
collection,  distribution,  and  safe  keeping  °f tne  public  funds,  unless  otherwise 
ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  in  that  case  it  was  provided  he 
should  report  to  Congress,  if  in  session,  immediately,  and  if  not,  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  next  session,  his  reasons  for  so  doing.  For  that  and  other 
privileges,  the  bank  paid  a  bonus  for  the  charter  of  one  million  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars.  The  President  communicated  the  fact  of  the  removal  of  the 
deposites  in  his  message  at  the  opening  of  the  next  session,  with  his  reasons, 
which  were  repeated  and  enlarged  on  by  ,the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  his 
Annual  Report. 

The  subject  gave  rise  to  a  long  and  animated  discussion  between  the  two 
great  parties,  both  as  to  the  right  and  expediency  of  the  measure.  Mr.  Cal- 
houn  was  not  regarded  as  attached  to  either,  and  much  interest  was  felt  in  the 
course  he  might  take.  He  spoke  first,  and  in  a  speech*  distinguished  for  its 
ability,  admitted  the  right  of  the  President  to  remove  his  secretary,  though  he 
regarded  it,  under  the  circumstances,  an  abuse  of  power ;  but  denied  not  only 
the  right  of  the  secretary  to  withhold  the  deposites  so  long  as  the  funds,  were 
safe  and  the  bank  performed  faithfully  its  duties  as  a  fiscal  agent,  but  also  the 
expediency  of  the  act.  But  he  did  not  confine  himself  to  these  points.  He 
saw,  at  that  early  period,  the  radical  defects  of  the  banking  system,  and  he  re 
solved,  though  he  disapproved  of  the  act  of  the  executive,  that  his  position 
should  not  hereafter  be  mistaken  as  that  of  a  partisan  of  the  bank  or  the  bank 
ing  system.  With  that  view,  after  discussing  the  questions  immediately  con 
nected  with  the  withholding  of  the  deposites,  and  some  other  intermediate  ones, 
he  added : 

"  Nor  is  it  more  true  that  the  real  question  is  '  Bank  or  no  Bank.'  Taking 
the  deposite  question  in  the  broadest  sense ;  suppose,  as  it  is  contended  by  the 
friends  of  the  administration,  that  it  involves  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the 
charter,  and,  consequently,  the  existence  of  the  bank  itself,  still  the  banking 
system  would  stand  almost  untouched  and  unimpaired.  Four  hundred  banks 
would  still  remain  scattered  over  this  wide  Republic,  and  on  the  ruins  of  the 
United  States  Bank  many  would  rise  to  be  added  to  the  present  list.  Under 
this  aspect  of  the  subject,  the  only  possible  question  that  would  be  presented 
for  consideration  would  be,  Whether  the  banking  system  was  more  safe,  more 
beneficial,  or  more  constitutional  with  or  without  the  United  States  Bank  ?' 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  7. 

G 


50  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CA.LHOUN. 

"  If,"  said  Mr.  C.,  "  this  was  a  question  of  '  Bank  or  no  Bank' — if  it  involved 
the  existence  of  the  banking  system,  it  would,  indeed,  be  a  great  question — one  * 
of  the  first  magnitude  ;  and,  with  my  -present  impression,  long  entertained  and 
daily  increasing,  I  would  hesitate — long  hesitate — before  I  would  be  found  un 
der  the  banner  of  the  system.  I  have  great  doubts,  if  doubts  they  may  be  call 
ed,  as  to  the  soundness  and  tendency  of  the  whole  system,  in  all  its  modifica 
tions.  I  have  great  fears  that  it  will  be  found  hostile  to  liberty  and  the  advance 
of  civilization — fatally  hostile  to  liberty  in  our  country,  where  the  system  exists 
in  its  worst  and  most  dangerous  form.  Of  all  institutions  affecting  the  great 
question  of  the  distribution  of  wealth — a  question  least  explored,  and  the  most 
important  of  any  in  the  whole  range  of  political  economy — the  banking  institu 
tion  has,  if  not  the  greatest,  one  of  the  greatest,  and,  I  fear,  most  pernicious  in 
fluence  on  the  mode  of  distribution.  Were  the  question  really  before  us,  I 
would  not  shun  the  responsibility,  as  great  as  it  might  be,  of  freely  and  fully 
offering  my  sentiments  on  these  deeply-important  points ;  but  as  it  is,  I  must 
content  myself  with  the  few  remarks  which  I  have  thrown  out." 

u  What,  then,  is  ^  real  question  which  now  agitates  the  country  ?  I  an 
swer,  it  is  a  struggle  between  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the 
government ;  a  struggle,  not  «»  relation  to  the  existence  of  the  Bank,  but  wheth 
er  Congress  or  the  President  bVould  have  the  power  to  create  a  bank,  and, 
through  it,  the  consequent  control  over  the  currency  of  the  country.  This  is 
the  real  question.  Let  us  not  deceive,  ourselves.  This  league,  this  association, 
vivified  and  sustained  by  receiving  the  tioposites  of  the  public  money,  and  hav 
ing  their  notes  converted,  by  being  received  everywhere  by  the  treasury,  into 
the  common  currency  of  the  country,  is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a  bank  of 
the  United  States — the  executive  bank  of  the  United  States,  as  distinguished 
from  that  of  Congress.  However  it  might  fail  to  perform  satisfactorily  the  use 
ful  functions  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  incorporated  by  law,  it  would 
outstrip  it — far  outstrip  it — in  all  its  dangerous  qualities,  in  extending  the  pow 
er,  the  influence,  and  the  corruption  of  the  government.  It  was  impossible  to 
conceive  any  institution  more  admirably  calculated  to  advance  these  objects. 
Not  only  the  selected  banks,  but  the  whole  banking  institutions  of  the  country, 
and  with  it  the  entire  money  power,  for  the  purpose  of  speculation,  peculation, 
and  corruption,  would  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the  executive.  A  system 
of  menaces  and  promises  will  be  established :  of  menace  to  the  banks  in  pos 
session  of  the  deposites,  but  which  might  not  be  entirely  subservient  to  execu 
tive  views,  and  of  promise  of  future  favours  to  those  who  may  not  as  yet  enjoy 
its  favours.  Between  the  two,  the  banks  would  be  left  without  honour  or  hon 
esty,  and  a  system  of  speculation  and  stock-jobbing  would  commence,  unequal 
led  in  the  annals  of  our  country." 

Again  :  "  So  long  as  the  question  is  one  between  a  bank  of  the  United  States 
incorporated  by  Congress,  and  that  system  of  banks  which  has  been  created  by 
the  will  of  the  executive,  it  is  an  insult  to  the  understanding  to  discourse  on  the 
pernicious  tendency  and  unconstitutionality  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
To  bring  up  that  question  fairly  and  legitimately,  you  must  go  one  step  farther : 
you  must  divorce  the  government  and  the  bank.  You  must  refuse  all  connexion 
with  banks.  You  must  neither  receive,  nor  pay  away  bank-notes  ;  you  must  go 
back  to  the  old  system  of  the  strong  box,  and  of  gold  and  silver.  If  you  have  a 
right  to  receive  bank-notes  at  all — to  treat  them  as  money  by  receiving  them  in 
your  dues,  or  paying  them  away  to  creditors,  you  have  a  right  to  create  a  bank. 
Whatever  the  government  receives  and  treats  as  money,  is  money  in  effect ;  and 
if  it  be  money,  then  they  have  the  right,  under  the  Constitution,  to  regulate  it. 
Nay,  they  are  bound  by  high  obligation  to  adopt  the  most  efficient  means,  ac 
cording  to  the  nature  of  that  which  they  have  recognised  as  money,  to  give  it 
the  utmost  stability  and  uniformity  of  value.  And  if  it  be  in  the  shape  of  bank 
notes,  the  most  efficient  means  ol  giving  those  qualities  is  a  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  incorporated  by  Congress.  Unless  you  give  the  highest  practical  uni- 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  51 

formity  to  the  value  of  bank-notes — so  long  as  you  receive  them  in  your  dues, 
and  treat  them  as  money,  you  violate  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  which 
provides  that  taxation  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States.  There  is 
no  other  alternative,  I  repeat;  you  must  divorce  the  government  entirely  from  the 
banking  system,  or,  if  not,  you  are  bound  to  incorporate  a  bank,  as  the  only  safe 
and  efficient  means  of  giving  stability  and  uniformity  to  the  currency.  And 
should  the  deposites  not  be  restored,  and  the  present  illegal  and  unconstitutional 
connexion  between  the  executive  and  the  league  of  banks  continue,  I  shall  feel 
it  my  duty,  if  no  one  else  moves,  to  introduce  a  measure  to  prohibit  government 
from  receiving  or  touching  bank-notes  in  any  shape  whatever,  as  the  only 
means  left  of  giving-  safety  and  stability  to  the  currency,  and  saving  the  country 
from  corruption  and  ruin." 

Again:  "Were  I,"  said  Mr.  C.,  "to  select  the  case  best  calculated  to  illus 
trate  the  necessity  of  resisting  usurpation  at  the  very  commencement,  and  to 
prove  how  difficult  it  is  to  resist  it  in  any  subsequent  stage  if  not  met  at  first,  ] 
would  select  this  very  case.  What,  he  asked,  is  the  cause  of  the  present  usur 
pation  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  executive  ?  what  the  motive  ?  the  temptation 
which  has  induced  it  to  seize  on  the  deposites  ?  What,  but  the  large  surplup 
revenue  1  the  eight  or  ten  millions  in  the  public  treasury  beyond  the  wants  of 
the  government?  And  what  has  put  so  large  an  amount  of  money  in  the  treas 
ury  when  not  needed  ?  I  answer,  the  protective  system :  that  system  which 
graduated  the  duties,  not  in  reference  to  the  wants  of  the  government,  but  ir 
reference  to  the  importunities  and  demands  of  the  manufacturers,  and  which 
poured  millions  of  dollars  into  the  treasury  beyond  the  most  profuse  demands, 
and  even  the  extravagance  of  the  government — taken — unlawfully  taken — from 
the  pockets  of  those  who  honestly  made  it.  I  hold  that  those  who  make  are 
entitled  to  what  they  make  against  all  the  world  except  the  government,  and 
against  it  except  to  the  extent  of  its  legitimate  and  constitutional  wants ;  and 
that  for  the  government  to  take  one  cent  more  is  robbery.  In  violation  of  this 
sacred  principle,  Congress  first  removed  the  money  by  high  duties,  unjustly  and 
unconstitutionally  imposed,  from  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  where  it 
was  rightfully  placed  by  all  laws,  human  and  divine,  into  the  treasury.  The 
executive,  in  his  turn,  following  the  example,  has  taken  them  from  that  depos- 
ite,  and  distributed  them  among  favourite  and  partisan  banks.  The  means 
used  have  been  the  same  in  both  cases.  The  Constitution  gives  to  Congress 
the  power  to  lay  duties,  with  a  view  to  revenue.  This  power,  without  re 
garding  the  object  for  which  it  was  intended,  forgetting  that  it  was  a  great 
trust  power,  necessarily  limited,  by  the  very  nature  of  such  powers,  to  the 
subject  and  the  object  of  the  trust,  was  perverted  to  a  use  never  intended, 
that  of  protecting  the  industry  of  one  portion  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of 
another ;  and,  under  this  false  interpretation,  the  money  was  transferred  from 
its  natural  and  just  deposite,  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  into  the  public 
treasury,  as  I  have  stated.  In  this,  too,  the  executive  followed  the  example 
of  Congress.  By  the  magic  construction  of  a  few  simple  words — *  unless  other 
wise  ordered' — intended  to  confer  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  a  limited 
power — to  give  additional  security  to  the  public  deposites,  he  has,  in  like 
manner,  perverted  this  power,  and  made  it  the  instrument,  by  similar  sophistry, 
of  drawing  the  money  from  the  treasury,  and  bestowing  it,  as  I  have  stated,  on 
favourite  and  partisan  banks.  Would  to  God,  said  Mr.  C.,  would  to  God  I 
could  reverse  the  whole  of  this  nefarious  operation,  and  terminate  the  contro 
versy  by  returning  the  money  to  the  pockets  of  the  honest  and  industrious  citi 
zens,  by  the  sweat  of  whose  brows  it  was  made,  with  whom  only  it  can  be 
rightfully  deposited.  But  as  this  cannot  be  done,  I  must  content  myself  by 
giving  a  vote  to  return  it  to  the  public  treasury,  where  it  was  ordered  to  be 
deposited  by  an  act  of  the  Legislature." 

These  extracts  contain  an  explanation,  not  only  of  Mr.  Calhoun's  views  of 
the  banking  system  at  the  time,  but  also  of  those  which  have  governed  his  after 


<52  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

course  in  reference  to  the  banks,  and  most  of  the  prominent  questions  since 
agitated.  He  believed  that  there  was,  at  the  time,  a  strong  tendency  in  all  the 
departments  of  the  government  to  usurp  power,  and  that  it  originated  with  Con 
gress.  It  is,  indeed,  a  settled  opinion  with  him,  which  he  has  long  entertained, 
and  the  reasons  for  which  he  recently  explained  in  his  speech  on  the  veto,  that 
usurpations  in  the  Federal  Government  almost  necessarily  originate  with  Con 
gress  ;  but  that  the  powers  which  it  gains  by  usurping  those  of  the  states  or 
people,  adds,  not  to  its  strength,  but  to  that  of  the  other  departments,  and  es 
pecially  of  the  executive,  in  whose  hands  it  becomes  the  means  of  usurping  in 
turij  the  powers  of  Congress,  and  controlling  its  proceedings.  He  accordingly 
attributed  the  great  power  and  influence  of  the  executive  at  this  time,  and  its 
tendency  to  encroachment,  to  the  previous  encroachments  of  Congress,  espe 
cially  in  passing  the  tariff  of  '28.  That  having  been  prostrated  by  the  inter 
position  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  and  the  Compromise  Act  at  the  last  ses 
sion,  he  next  turned  his  efforts  to  arresting,  what  he  believed  to  be  its  natural 
consequence,  the  encroachments  of  the  executive  ;  and  was  thus,  and  to  that 
extent,  brought  for  the  time  to  act  with  the  opposition  party,  then  called  National 
Republicans.  But  he  occupied  throughout  his  own  independent  State  Rights 
ground  and  principles,  from  which  he  in  no  instance  departed.  Wherever  they 
led,  he  followed,  without  regarding  whether  they  brought  him  to  co-operate  with 
the  opposition  or  administration,  or  left  him  alone  in  the  Senate  to  maintain  and 
defend  his  own  separate  and  peculiar  position. 

His  course  in  the  very  case  under  consideration  strikingly  illustrates  these 
remarks.  He  essentially  differed  on  this  important  occasion  from  both  of  the 
great  parties,  administration  and  opposition.  The  former  was  in  favour  of  the 
league  of  state  banks  as  the  fiscal  agents  and  depositaries  of  the  Government, 
and  opposed  both  to  a  national  bank  and  the  'divorce  of  government  from  the 
banks.  The  latter,  on  the  contrary,  were  in  favour  of  a  national  bank,  and  op 
posed  to  the  league  of  banks  and  the  divorce  ;  while  Mr.  Calhoun  and  the  State 
Rights  party  were  in  favour  of  the  divorce,  or  what  has  since  been  called  the 
Independent  Treasury,  and  opposed  to  a  national  bank,  and  any  connexion  with 
the  banking  system  in  any  way.  It  was  in  conformity  to  these  views,  and  after 
consulting  Mr.  Calhoun  and  the  prominent  members  of  the  party,  that  General 
Gordon,  then  a  distinguished  representative  from  Virginia,  introduced  at  the 
time  a  bill  to  establish  the  Independent  Treasury.  It  failed.  The  public  mind 
was  not  then  prepared  ;  but  to  him  will  belong  the  lasting  honour  of  introducing 
one  of  the  most  important  measures  of  modern  times. 

The  removal  of  the  deposites  was  not  the  only  question  of  importance  which 
was  agitated  during  the  session.  Among  others,  the  motion  of  Mr.  Webster, 
who  was  then  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Finance,  for  leave  to  bring  in  a 
bill  to  recharter  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  for  six  years,  gave  rise  to  an  in 
teresting  discussion.  Mr.  Calhoun  seized  the  opportunity,  not  to  discuss  the 
question  of  renewal,  but  that  of  the  currency  generally,  which  he  showed,  even 
then,  to  be  deeply  diseased,  and  to  warn  the  Government  and  country  of  the  ap 
proach  of  the  catastrophe  which  has  since  befallen  them.  He  pointed  out  the 
cause  and  character  of  the  disease,  and  the  remedy  that  should  be  adopted  to 
prevent,  if  possible,  the  approaching  shock,  or  at  least  to  lessen  its  violence. 
His  speech*  on  the  occasion  is  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  remarkable  for  its 
forecast  he  ever  made.  It  is  prophetic  throughout,  and  was  pronounced  by  one 
of  the  senators,  himself  a  speaker  of  distinguished  abilities  and  long  experience, 
the  ablest  he  ever  heard.  To  appreciate  its  merits,  it  must  be  read. 

Upon  this  occasion  he  exhibited,  in  a  remarkable  degree,  that  statesmanlike 
faculty  which  has  enabled  him  to  do  so  much  to  direct  events,  by  always  taking 
the  nearest  practicable  step  towards  his  object,  instead  of  refusing  to  do  anything 
unless  he  could  effect  what  was  the  best  in  the  abstract.  The  great  ends  in  his  sys 
tem  of  life,  whether  public  or  private,  he  has  ever  held  to  be  fixed  by  reason  and 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  8. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  53 

general  rules  ;  but  the  time  and  mode  of  attaining  them  he  regarded  as  questions 
of  expediency,  to  be  determined  by  the  circumstances  under  which  he  is  called  to 
act.  If  things  are  now  wrong,  he  who  refuses  to  make  any  change  for  the  better 
because  he  cannot  obtain  at  once  what  he  believes  to  be  best  in  the  abstract, 
is  responsible  for  them  as  they  exist,  and  should  be  classed  rather  with  those 
•who  sustain  the  present  wrongs  than  with  those  who  pursue  the  right ;  for  in  prac 
tice,  the  effects  of  their  action  are  the  same  ;  and  yet  he  who  makes  the  nearest 
attainable  approach  to  the  right  is  too  often  confounded  with  those  who  main 
tain  the  wrong,  and  postponed  for  others  who,  content  to  think  correctly,  are 
yet  too  timid  to  act  if  there  be  danger  of  misconstruction,  and  really  contribute 
to  the  continuance  of  that  which  they  condemn.  This  is  a  species  of  fear 
which  Mr.  Calhoun  has  never  known.  Seeing  cleariy  his  own  ends,  which 
have  been  long  fixed  by  observation  and  reflection,  he  judges,  with  a  rare  saga 
city,  of  the  nearest  practicable  approach  which  can  be  made  to  them  under  the 
circumstances,  and  advances  forward  to  the  boundaries  assigned  by  prudence 
without  fear  of  the  enemy,  and  halts  when  he  has  taken  as  much  ground  as  he 
can  occupy,  without  regard  to  the  remonstrances  of  his  followers,  who  take  their 
counsels  merely  from  zeal,  and  do  not  properly  ascertain  the  limits  upon  human 
power,  and  the  controlling  force  of  events.  It  is  thus  that  he  is  ever  in  prog 
ress  ;  and  although  generally  in  advance  of  his  party  and  the  world,  in  a  long 
life  he  has  never  been  forced  to  abandon  any  forward  movement,  or  recede  from 
his  end.  He  uses  time  to  control  circumstances,  and  directs  them  both  to  his 
great  object,  which  he  is  ever  on  the  march  sooner  or  later  to  attain.  This 
it  is  which  makes  him  the  master-statesman  of  his  age,  and  thus  he  has  been 
able  to  accomplish  so  much  with  such  inconsiderable  means. 

Upon  the  occasion  to  which  we  now  refer,  he  exhibited  this  statesmanlike 
mode  of  thinking  and  acting  in  a  remarkable  degree.  He  sought  no  trial  of  skill  in 
oratory  where  victories  were  to  be  barren  of  results  to  the  country.  He  avoided 
all  those  topics  of  personal  or  party  excitement,  whose  fleeting  interest  belonged  to 
the  time  and  not  to  the  case  ;  but,  looking  to  the  exigencies  of  the  country,  and 
not  to  the  mere  feelings  of  the  day,  he  surveyed  the  whole  ground  with  military 
precision,  and  made  a  masterly  reconnoisance  of  the  field.  As  abstract  ques 
tions,  he  did  not  enter  into  the  nature  of  the  banking  system,  or  its  constitutional 
propriety.  In  discussing  the  disease,  it  was  necessary  to  touch  slightly  upon  the 
tendencies  of  the  banking  system ;  and  these  touches,  like  the  line  of  Apelles, 
showed  the  master's  hand,  and  his  thorough  acquaintance,  with  the"  subject. 
He  traced  clearly  the  deep  seat  of  the  malady,  and  developed  its  probable 
progress  and  consequences  unless  corrected.  He  then  addressed  himself  to 
the  discovery  of  some  remedy,  which  should  be  both  safe  and  efficient.  With 
the  propriety  and  constitutionality  of  the  banking  system  as  abstract  questions 
he  had  nothing  to  do,  and  upon  them  he  only  touched  so  far  as  they  bore  upon 
the  remedy  which  he  had  in  view.  Banks  were  in  existence,  and  through  them 
the  currency  was  indisputably  deeply  diseased.  There  was  not  the  least  proba 
bility  of  any  successful  effort  to  force  the  Government  to  abandon  the  use  of  pa 
per.  He  contented  himself,  therefore,  with  showing  that,  if  the  Government 
could  use  paper,  it  could  also  regulate  its  value  ;  and  the  question  was  to  ascer 
tain  the  best  means  of  reaching  that  object.  He  proposed  a  continuance  of  the 
bank  for  twelve  years,  under  severe  restrictions,  and  upon  conditions  which 
would  gradually  diminish  the  volume  of  paper  currency,  so  as  to  enable  the 
Government,  at  the  end  of  that  period,  to  dispense  with  its  use  altogether,  if 
it  should  choose  to  do  so,  without  any  shock  to  the  community.  In  this  point 
of  view,  it  was  of  no  importance  whether  the  original  charter  was  constitutional 
or  not.  Suppose  it  to  be  unconstitutional,  it  was  a  question  whether  we  would 
rid  ourselves  of  the  evil  gradually,  and  without  injury  to  the  community,  or 
whether  we  should  repeal  it  at  once,  at  the  sacrifice  of  all  of  its  immense  con 
nected  interests,  and  send  the  whole  toppling  down  the  abyss  together.  He 
thought  there  was  a  great  difference  between  doing  and  undoing ;  and  while  he 


54  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

would  never  originate  what  he  believed  to  be  unauthorized  by  the  Constitution, 
he  would  take  his  own  time  for  repairing  the  breaches  already  made  in  it,  and 
so  conduct  the  process  as  to  produce  the  least  possible  amount  of  suffering  in 
the  country.     It  was  thus  that  he  agreed  to  compromise  an  unconstitutional 
lariffby  allowing  time,  so  as  to  save  vast  and  meritorious  interests  which  were 
connected  with  it ;  and  thus,  too,  he  now  sought  (to  use  his  own  words)  to 
"  unbank  the  banks."     Here,  too,  he  exhibited  an  instance  of  that  cautious  pro 
cess  by  which  all  real  statesmen  conduct  their  reforms,  and  proved  his  aversion 
to  hazarding  the  vast  interests  of  a  community  by  any  sudden  change  which 
was  not  justified  by  experience,  but  suggested  only  by  theoretic  opinions.     It 
was  clearly  seen,  both  in  this  and  his  preceding  speeches,  that  he  disapproved 
the  banking  system,  and  *saw,  as  far  as  mere  reason  without  experience  could 
point,  that  its  tendencies  were  evil ;  and  yet  he  forbore  to  strike  at  it  until  there 
was  time  to  verify  his  reflection  by  experience,  and  the  period  should  arrive 
when  an  effectual  blow  might  be  given.    If  the  system  were  good,  it  was  clear 
to  him  that  it  required  severe  restrictions  and  judicious  regulation ;  if  evil,  he 
was  equally  decided  that  it  ought  to  be  removed  gradually,  so  as  to  produce  the 
least  shock  to  the  community.     In  either  point  of  view,  his  course  of  conduct 
would  be  the  same  up  to  a  certain  period,  to  which  he  limited  his  prescription. 
The  question  of  his  future  action  he  reserved  for  the  time  itself,  to  be  deter 
mined  by  the  lights  of  a  more  matured  experience.     It  was  not  his  object  to 
amuse  theorists  or  gratify  a  mere  taste  for  speculation,  but  he  sought  a  practical 
remedy  for  a  disease  under  which  the  community  was  likely  to  suffer  most  in 
tensely.     As  his  suggestions  were  not  taken,  we  can  come  to  no  certain  con 
clusion  as  to  what  they  would  have  led,  but  posterity  will  form  its  opinion  as  to 
their  probable  result.     Of  this,  however,  we  feel  assured,  that  the  speech  will 
always  be  considered  as  most  remarkable  for  its  political  forecast. 

So  deeply  was  he  impressed  with  the  approaching  danger,  that  when  he  un 
derstood  Mr.  Webster  contemplated  making  the  motion  he  afterward  made,  to 
renew  the  charter,  he  sent  word  through  a  friend  of  his,  who  had  called  on 
him,  that  he  feared  he  was  about  to  make  a  false  move,  and  said  that,  although 
he  and  Mr.  Webster  were  scarcely  on  speaking  terms,  in  consequence  of  the 
occurrences  of  the  last  session,  he  would  be  glad  to  have  a  full  conversation 
with  him  before  he  made  his  motion,  if  he  would  give  him  an  opportunity  by 
calling  on  him.  The  next  morning  he  called.  Mr.  Calhoun  stated  his  objection 
to  the  course  he  proposed,  and  what  he  thought  ought  to  be  done.  Mr.  Webster 
took  time  before  he  gave  an  answer,  but  informed  Mr.  Calhoun,  when  he  called 
next  day  to  learn  his  decision,  that  he  concluded  not  to  change  his  course.  Mr. 
Calhoun  expressed  his  regret,  and  on  being  asked  by  Mr.  Webster  whether  he 
would  oppose  his  motion,  he  replied  no  ;  but  added  that  he  believed  the  govern 
ment  and  country  were  approaching  a  period  of  great  peril,  and  that  he  felt  that 
it  would  be  due  both  to  the  public  and  himself  to  embrace  the  occasion  to  state 
at  large  the  opinions  and  views  he  had  expressed  to  him.  He,  in  fact,  regarded 
it  as  the  critical  moment ;  and  when  he  saw  that  it  was  permitted  to  pass  with 
out  doing  anything  to  prevent  the  disorder  into  which  the  currency  was  falling, 
he  made  up  his  mind  that  what  has  since  followed  was  inevitable. 

In  this  connexion,  and  governed  by  the  same  views,  he  gave  a  decided  sup 
port  to  what  is  called  the  Gold  Bill,,  which  raised  the  relative  value  of  gold 
compared  to  silver,  and  the  establishment  of  the  branch  mints,  both  of  which  he 
regarded  as  intimately  connected  with  a  return  to  a  permanent  and  sound  cur 
rency.  The  administration  favoured  both  measures,  and  Mr.  Clay  opposed  them. 
The  discussion  on  both  was  conducted  principally  by  him  and  Mr.  Calhoun. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Senate  on  the  removal  of  the  deposites  was  followed 
by  the  President's  protest,  which  gave  rise  to  a  full  and  animated  discussion  in 
the  Senate.  Mr.  Calhoun  took  decided  ground  against  its  reception.  In  the 
course  of  his  argument,  he  maintained  the  position  that  the  Constitution  vests  all 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  55 

discretionary  powers  in  Congress,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  executive  and  judici 
ary  departments  ;  and  that  neither  of  them,  nor  any  office  under  the  government, 
can  exercise  any  power  not  authorized  by  law,  but  such  as  is  expressly  granted 
by  the  Constitution.  To  sustain  this  important  position,  he  cited  the  provision 
in  the  Constitution  which  gives  to  Congress  the  power  "to  pass  all  laws  ne 
cessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing"  (that  is,  the  pow 
ers  granted  to  Congress),  "  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  office  thereof."  The 
provision  is  express,  and  the  position  incontrovertible  ;  and  yet,  strange  as  it 
may  seem,  it  had  been  theretofore  entirely  overlooked,  although  it  is  one  of  the 
most  important  provisions  in  the  whole  instrument.  It  is  the  provision,  in  fact, 
which  binds  up  all  the  parts  in  one,  making  of  them  one  government,  instead  of 
consisting,  as  they  would  without  it,  of  three  hostile  departments,  each  with  the 
authority  to  assume  whatever  right  it  might  think  proper  to  carry  into  execution 
its  share  of  the  granted  powers.  One  of  the  important  consequences  of  this 
provision  of  the  Constitution  is  to  subject  the  removing  power  to  the  regulation 
of  law.  The  mere  fact  that  the  power  of  removing  from  office  is  not  granted 
by  the  Constitution  to  the  President,  is  conclusive  proof  that  it  can  only  be  ex 
ercised  by  the  authority  of  law,  and,  of  course,  subject  to  such  limitation  as  it 
may  impose.  It  was,  indeed,  an  investigation  into  the  origin  of  that  power 
which  led  Mr.  Calhoun  to  the  examination  of  the  Constitution,  which  ended  in 
making  this  important  disclosure,  as  it  may  fairly  be  termed. 

At  the  next  session  a  special  committee  of  nine  members  was,  on  motion  of 
Mr.  Calhoun,  raised,  in  order  to  inquire  into  the  extent  of  the  executive  patron 
age,  the  cause  of  its  great  increase  of  late,  and  the  expediency  and  practicabil 
ity  of  reducing  the  same,  and  the  means  of  doing  it.  After  a  minute  and  labo 
rious  investigation,  he  made  a  full  and  able  report*  on  all  the  points,  of  which 
10,000  copies  were  ordered  to  be  printed  by  the  Senate. 

One  of  the  leading  objects  which  he  had  in  view  was  to  strike  at  the  surplus 
revenue.  He  anticipated  it  would  be  large,  although  the  Compromise  Act  had 
repealed  the  duties  on  more  than  one  half  of  the  imports.  But  even  that,  aided 
by  the  gradual  reduction  on  all  the  residue,  could  not  prevent  the  accumulation. 
He  dreaded  it,  not  only  because  it  would  add  greatly  to  the  patronage  of  the 
executive  by  extending  its  control  over  the  banks,  and,  through  them,  over  the 
whole  community,  but  still  more  because  it  would  be  the  source  of  boundless 
speculation  and  corruption.  To  ascertain  its  probable  extent,  he  entered  into 
a  minute  examination  of  the  finances,  and  after  exploring  the  whole  ground,  he 
estimated  the  surplus  at  an  average  of  not  less  than  nine  millions  of  dollars  an 
nually  for  the  whole  period  the  Compromise  Act  had  to  run.  As  moderate  as 
bis  estimate  proved  to  be,  it  was  violently  assailed,  at  the  time,  for  its  supposed 
extravagance. 

But  time  rolled  on,  and  at  the  opening  of  the  next  session,  his  estimate,  in 
stead  of  proving  extravagant,  fell  short  of  the  actual  amount  by  millions,  and 
that  with  a  surplus  daily  increasing  with  an  accelerated  velocity,  under  a  new 
impulse,  which  was  swelling  it  beyond  ail  assignable  limits.  Here  a  brief  ex 
planation  is  necessary,  in  order  to  have  a  just  conception  of  the  danger  to  which 
the  government  and  country  were  exposed  at  this  period. 

The  tariff  of  1828  gave  the  first  impulse  to  that  great  expansion  of  the  cur 
rency,  which,  under  the  influence  of  different  causes,  both  foreign  and  domestic, 
was  still  on  the  increase,  and  continued  so  till  just  before  the  final  explosion  ia 
1837.  So  powerful  was  the  first  impulse,  from  the  high  duties  imposed  in  1828, 
that  the  currency  was  doubled,  in  the  manufacturing  portions  of  the  Union,  in 
eighteen  months  from  the  passage  of  the  act.  On  the  accumulation  of  the  surplus 
revenue  from  the  same  cause,  after  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  a  new  im 
pulse  was  given  to  the  expansion.  The  surplus  was  deposited  with  the  banksT 
and  became,  in  fact,  so  much  additional  bank  capital,  in  the  least  responsible  and 
*  Se»  "Speeches."  &c..  No.  10. 


56  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

most  dangerous  form.  This,  with  other  causes,  and  especially  the  withdrawal 
of  the  deposites  from  the  United  States  Bank,  and  the  approaching  termination 
of  its  charter,  gave  a  great  additional  impulse  to  the  whole  system.  State 
banks  were  multiplied  in  all  directions,  with  but  little  capital,  and  charters  less 
guarded  than  ever.  All  these  concurring  causes  tended  greatly  to  increase  the 
expansion,  and,  by  necessary  consequence,  to  produce  a  corresponding  augmen 
tation  of  prices,  to  which,  however,  there  was  an  important  exception.  The 
price  of  all  public  lands  which  had  been  offered  at  public  sales  and  not  sold, 
was  fixed  by  law  at  $1  25  per  acre,  and  could  not,  of  course,  partake  of  the 
general  rise.  The  quantity  of  such  lands-  was  great,  not  less,  probably,  than 
two  hundred  millions  of  acres,  and  thus  a  universal  spirit  of  speculation,  engen 
dered  by  an  inflated  currency  and  high  duties,  was  turned  in  that  direction. 

The  facility  of  purchasing  was  not  less  than  the  quantity  to  be  purchased. 
The  deposites  of  the  government  in  the  state  banks  selected  as  its  fiscal  agents 
was  upward  of  forty  millions  of  dollars,  consisting  almost  exclusively  of  bank 
notes.  From  this  vast  source  speculators  and  political  partisans  drew  their 
funds,-  in  the  form  of  discount  or  loan,  in  exchange  for  which  they  gave  their 
own  promissory  notes,  and  received  the  notes  deposited  by  the  government,  or, 
what  was  the  same,  a  credit  in  bank  founded  on  them.  These,  in  turn,  were 
exchanged  for  the  public  lands,  when  they  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  receiv 
ers,  and  were  by  them  returned  to  the  banks  as  new  deposites,  to  take  the  same 
rapid  round  again  and  again,  and  sweeping  away  from  the  people,  by  means 
of  their  own  funds,  a  corresponding  amount  of  their  land,  and  swelling,  in  the 
same  proportion,  the  amount  brought  to  the  credit  of  the  government  by  the 
banks,  under  the  fallacious  name  of  public  money  in  the  treasury,  but  which,  in 
reality,  was  nothing  more  than  the  notes  in  bank  given  by  speculators  and  par 
tisans  in  exchange  for  the  public  lands. 

In  this  operation  every  revolution  but  increased  the  force  of  the  next,  which, 
if  left  to  operate  unchecked,  must  end,'  as  was  manifest,  in  the  entire  absorp 
tion  of  the  public  domain  and  the  universal  explosion  of  the  banking  system, 
with  the  ultimate  loss  of  what  was  due  to  the  Government.  It  was  about  the 
time  when  these  powerful  causes  began  to  operate  with  such  effect  as  to  be 
seen  and  felt  by  all,  that  the  administration  obtained  a  majority  in  the  Senate, 
where  it  had  for  some  time  been  in  a  minority ;  on  which  Mr.  Calhoun,  who 
had  moved,  as  has  been  stated,  at  the  preceding  session,  in  anticipation  of  the 
danger,  rose  in  his  place  and  said,  that,  as  the  friends  of  the  administration  were 
now  in  a  majority,  he  left  it  to  them  to  take  the  lead  in  providing  a  remedy  for 
this  alarming  state  of  things. 

All  now  felt  that  something  must  be  done,  and  that  promptly,  to  regulate  and 
control  the  deposite  banks,  and  to  save  the  public  funds  and  the  national  do 
main.  Three  remedies  were  proposed.  The  first  was,  to  absorb  the  current 
revenue  and  the  vast  surplus  already  accumulated  by  the  increase  of  the  pub 
lic  expenditures ;  and,  with  that  view,  a  resolution  was  actually  introduced  in 
the  Senate  and  passed,  calling  on  the  executive  to  know  how  much  could  pos 
sibly  be  spent  on  military  defences.  The  next  was  to  vest  what  was  not  need 
ed  to  meet  the  current  expenses  of  the  government  in  state  stocks ;  and  tho 
other,  to  pass  an  act  regulating  and  controlling  the  deposite  banks,  and  to  place 
the  surplus  in  deposite  in  the  treasury  of  the  several  states.  The  first  two 
came  from  the  friends  of  the  administration,  and  the  last  was  proposed  by  Mr. 
Calhoun  as  an  amendment  to  the  second. 

It  was  the  choice  of  evils.  Something  must  be  done.  Anything  was  better 
than  the  continuance  of  the  actual  state  of  things.  This  all  acknowledged. 
The  objection  to  the  first  was  great.  So  sudden  and  great  an  increase  of  ex 
penditures  when  prices  were  so  extravagant,  and  when,  without  a  vast  enlarge 
ment  of  the  disbursing  departments,  there  could  be  no  efficient  accountability, 
could  not  but  end  in  much  waste,  loss,  extravagance,  and  corruption,  to  say  no 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  57 

thing  of  the  great  increase  of  patronage.  But  the  great  and  decisive  objection 
was,  that  expenditures  sufficiently  large  to  absorb  the  surplus  would  necessarily 
destroy,  in  their  effects,  the  Compromise  Act,  and  restore  the  protective  system. 
It  is  easy  to  raise  the  expenditures,  but  very  difficult  to  reduce  them,  of  which 
the  experience  of  the  last  five  or  six  years  affords  abundant  proof.  The  revenue 
at  the  time,  though  far  beyond  the  wants  of  the  government,  was  in  the  regular 
course  of  reduction  under  the  compromise,  which  would,  in  the  course  of  six 
years,  bring  it  down  to  a  sum  only  sufficient  for  the  support  of  the  Government 
with  rigid  economy.  To  have  raised  the  expenditures  sufficiently  high  to  ab 
sorb  the  surplus,  under  such  circumstances,  would  have  required  an  unusual 
disbursement  of  between  thirty  and  forty  millions  of  dollars  for  the  whole  pe 
riod,  as  experience  has  shown  ;  and,  of  course,  a  sudden  reduction  of  nearly 
twenty  millions,  to  bring  down  the  expenditures  to  what,  with  proper  manage 
ment,  would  be  necessary.  So  great  and  sudden  a  reduction  would  prove  im 
practicable,  and  the  certain  result  would  be  loans,  debts,  the  violation  of  the  com 
promise,  and  a  renewal  of  the  protective  system.  All  this  was  urged  against 
the  scheme  by  Mr.  Calhoun  at  the  time.  It  was  defeated,  at  least  in  a  great 
degree ;  and  it  may  well  be  asked,  after  the  experience  of  the  last  two  years, 
what  would  have  been  the  consequences  if  it  had  not  been,  when  even  its  par 
tial  effects  have  brought  on  the  Government  and  country,  to  the  extent  they  have, 
the  very  evils  then  anticipated  by  him. 

The  objection  to  vesting  the  surplus  in  state  stocks  was  not  less  serious. 
Among  so  many  other  mischievous  consequences,  it  would  have  been  grossly 
partial;  but  the  insurmountable  objection  was  the  danger  of  entangling  the 
Government  with  the  state  stocks. 

This  scheme  was  in  substance  as  much  a  deposite  of  the  surplus  revenue  with, 
the  states  as  that  proposed  by  Mr.  Calhoun  as  an  amendment  to  it.  The  latter 
placed  the  money  with  the  states  upon  their  promise  to  return  it,  if  the  General 
Government  should  require  it,  while  the  former  exchanged  the  surplus  for  the 
obligations,  by  which  the  states,  in  another  form,  were  bound  to  repay  it ;  so  that 
each  scheme  proposed  to  exchange  the  surplus  for  state  credit  in  some  form. 
With  state  stocks  depreciating  as  they  have  since  done,  it  would  have  been  as 
unpopular  and  impossible  to  have  used  any  means  to  recover  the  money  by 
selling  them,  as  it  would  have  been  to  have  recalled  it  directly  from  the  states 
themselves.  The  difference  was,  that  Mr.  Calhoun's  scheme  bestowed  upon  the 
states  all  the  patronage  resulting  from  the  use  of  the  money,  while  the  other 
gave  it  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in  whom  it  vested  an  almost  unlimited 
discretion,  and  to  whom  it  gave  the  dangerous  power  of  dealing  in  those  stocks 
to  large  amounts.  That  this  plan  would  have  resulted  in  the  entire  loss  of  the 
money,  with  little  or  no  benefit  to  the  states,  we  may  see  from  our  past  experi 
ence.  The  immense  increase  of  executive  patronage  to  which  it  would  have  led 
may  also  be  estimated.  But  the  endless  train  of  mischiefs  which  would  have 
followed  in  some  of  its  remote  consequences  it  would  be  difficult  to  measure,  as 
we  may  readily  perceive,  when  we  come  to  consider  the  use  which  might  have 
been  made  of  such  a  power  in  the  federal  executive  by  those  who  have  con 
ceived  the  monstrous  scheme  of  assuming  the  state  debts.  Indeed,  the  exist 
ence  of  such  a  power  would  naturally  seem  to  suggest  such  a  use  of  it,  with  the 
ideas  now  prevalent  in  the  minds  of  many  of  our  public  men  on  the  subject  of 
state-indebtedness. 

Nor  was  the  last  of  the  alternatives  free  from  serious  objections  ;  but,  under 
all  circumstances,  it  was  thought  to  be  the  least  so  by  Congress,  and  it  accord 
ingly  passed  through  both  houses  by  a  large  majority.  Mr.  Calhoun  made  a 
very  comprehensive  and  able  speech  against  the  first  two,  and  explained  his 
views  of  the  substitute  he  offered. 

This  was  not  the  only  important  measure  that  claimed  his  attention  during 
the  session.  In  the  preceding  recess  the  Abolitionists  had  for  the  first  time 

H 


68  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

regularly  organized  as  a  party,  with  a  powerful  press,  and  attempted,  by  sys 
tematic  operations,  to  force  its  publications  on  the  South,  with  a  view  of  acting 
on  its  slave  population.  It  carried  deep  excitement  throughout  that  entire  sec 
tion.  Everywhere  meetings  were  held  and  the  attempt  denounced,  and  the 
other  sections  called  upon  to  adopt  measures  to  stay  the  evil.  The  President, 
in  his  message  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  called  the  attention  of  Congress 
to  the  subject,  and  recommended  the  adoption  of  efficient  measures  to  prevent 
the  circulation  of  their  incendiary  publications  through  the  mail.  Mr.  Cal- 
lioun,  although  he  appreciated  and  highly  approved  the  patriotic  motives  of  the 
President,  could  not  agree  with  him  to  the  full  extent  of  his  recommendation. 
He  saw  the  danger  of  permitting  Congress  to  assume  the  right  of  judging  of 
what  constituted  an  incendiary  publication  ;  for  if  it  be  conceded  that  it  has  the 
right  of  determining  what  is  incendiary,  and  to  prevent  its  circulation,  it  would, 
by  necessary  consequence,  carry  with  it  the  right  of  determining  what  was  not, 
and  to  enforce  its  circulation  against  the  laws  of  such  states  as  might  prohibit 
them.  With  this  impression,  and  in  order  to  prevent  the  adoption  of  erroneous 
views,  at  the  outset,  on  a  subject  so  vitally  important  to  the  slave-holding  states, 
lie  moved  the  reference  of  the  portion  of  the  message  containing  the  recom 
mendation  to  a  special  committee,  of  which  he  was  appointed  chairman. 

The  report*  he  made  took  a  very  original  and  able  survey  of  the  whole  ground, 
and  conclusively  proved,  both  by  arguments  drawn  from  the  Constitution  and 
the  practice  of  the  Government,  that  it  belonged  to  the  states  separately  to  de 
termine  what  is  or  is  not  calculated  to  affect  or  disturb  its  internal  police,  in 
cluding  its  peace  and  safety,  and  to  adopt  the  measures  necessary  for  their 
security ;  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  General  Government  not  only  to  con 
form  its  acts,  in  reference  to  the  mail  or  for  the  regulation  of  commerce,  to  the 
legislation  of  the  states  in  such  cases,  but  to  aid  in  the  execution  of  the  laws 
of  the  states,  as  far  as  its  power  would  permit,  when  it  became  necessary. 
The  report  was  accompanied  by  a  bill,  drawn  up  in  conformity  with  these 
views,  and  was  ordered  to  the  third  reading  by  the  casting  vote  Oi  iLe  Vice- 
president,  but  finally  failed. 

This  bill  gave  rise  in  the  Senate  to  a  very  animated  and  interesting  debate, 
principally  between  Mr.  Calhoun  and  Mr.  Davis  of  Massachusetts,  in  which 
the  arguments  for  and  against  are  strongly  presented  on  both  sides.  For  ori 
ginal  views  of  the  Constitution  and  strength  of  argument,  Mr.  Calhoun  *s  speechf 
on  the  occasion  ranks  with  his  ablest,  and  is  worthy  of  the  study  of  all  who  de- 
eire  to  understand  some  of  the  most  important  provisions  of  that  instrument. 

During  the  same  session  he  made  another  speechj  on  the  same  subject,  dis 
tinguished  for  its  foresight  and  knowledge  of  the  Constitution.  For  the  first 
time  there  began  to  pour  in  that  flood  of  petitions  on  the  subject  of  abolition 
which  has  since  deluged  Congress.  The  members  from  the  non-slave-holding 
states  on  both  sides,  though  adverse  to  the  petitions,  were  opposed  to  taking 
strong  and  decided  grounds  against  them ;  and  their  respective  political  friends 
in  the  South  were  naturally  indisposed  to  force  them  to  take  higher  grounds 
iiian  they  were  inclined  to  do.  The  result  was  a  sort  of  compromise,  to  re- 
eeive  the  petitions,  but  not  to  refer  or  act  upon  them.  Mr.  Calhoun,  whose 
£ule  has  ever  been  to  meet  danger  "  on  the  frontier,"  to  use  his  own  expres 
sion,  saw  the  peril  of  receiving  the  petitions,  and  determined  to  take  a  decided 
stand  against  it.  He  expected  to  stand  alone ;  but  with  such  force  did  he 
-maintain  his  objections^  to  receiving,  that  he  was  supported  by  a  large  portion 
-of  the  Southern  senators,  and  the  motion  to  receive  was  laid  on  the  table. 
-Since  then,  no  petition  of  the  kind  has  been  received  by  the  Senate. 

The  prominent  question  at  the  next  session  was  the  Specie  Circular.  The 
President  had  issued  an  order  in  the  recess  prohibiting  the  receipt  of  bank 
notes,  or  anything  but  specie  in  payment  of  the  public  lands.  The  opposition 

*  See  «  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  1 1.  f  Ibid,  No.  12.  }  Ibid,  No.  13.  $  Ibid,  No.  14. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C*  CALHOUN.  59 

was  unanimously  opposed  to  it,  both  on  the  ground  of  expediency,  and  the  want 
of  authority  on  his  part  to  issue  such  an  order,  while  his  friends  and  supporters 
were  greatly  divided,  some  sustaining,  but  the  greater  part  opposing  the  meas 
ure.  Mr.  Calhoun  agreed  with  those  who  denied  the  right  of  the  President 
to  issue  the  order,  on  the  broad  principle  that  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the 
laws  conferred  it,  and  that  the  executive  had  no  power  but  what  was  conferred 
by  the  one  or  the  other.  Nevertheless,  he  declined  voting  for  the  bill  to  super 
sede  the  order,  which  was  passed  by  a  great  majority,  a  large  portion  of  the 
administration  party  voting  for  it.  His  reasons  were,  that  the  diseased  state  of 
the  currency  was  beyond  remedy,  and  whether  the  circular  was  repealed  or 
not,  the  result  would  be  the  same.  He  regarded  the  catastrophe  as  inevitable, 
and  that  the  only  question  was,  at  whose  door  the  responsibility  should  be  laid. 
He  saw  that  if  the  circular  should  be  rescinded,  it  would  be  charged  on  those 
by  whose  vote  it  was  done  ;  and  as  he  felt  conscious  that  he  had  done  all  that 
he  could  to  arrest  the  approaching  calamity,  he  was  determined  to  avoid  all 
responsibility,  and  therefore  declined  voting  for  the  bill.  He  -was  entitled  to 
the  floor,  and  intended  to  offer  his  reasons  at  large  ;  but  when  it  came  up  on  its 
passage,  was  accidentally  prevented  from  speaking.  On  his  return  home  in 
March,  several  of  his  friends  in  Charleston,  interested  in  trade  and  the  banks, 
asked  his  opinion  of  the  prospect  ahead.  His  reply  was,  that  the  storm  was  ap 
proaching,  and  was  just  at  hand,  and  his  advice  was  to  reef — reef — reef — quickly 
and  closely,  to  avoid  being  wrecked.  In  tvfo  months  the  banks  suspended  pay 
ments,  and  the  commerce  and  business  of  the  country  were  prostrated. 

During  the  same  session  an  important  question  arose  in  reference  to  the  ad 
mission  of  Michigan.  She  had  been  admitted  at  the  preceding  session  on  the 
condition  of  agreeing  to  the  boundary  between  her  and  Ohio,  as  presented  by 
the  act  for  her  admission.  The  Legislature  of  the  state,  in  compliance  with 
the  act  of  Congress,  called  a  convention  of  the  people  of  the  state,  in  order  to 
determine  whether  the  conditions  should  be  accepted  or  not.  The  convention 
rejected  the  condition.  Subsequently,  an  informal  meeting  or  caucus  was  called 
by  the  party  in  favour  of  accepting  it,  without  legal  authority,  or  any  other  cere 
mony  than  is  used  for  convening  such  meetings  for  ordinary  political  objects.  It 
met,  and  agreed  to  the  condition,  which  had  been  in  due  form  considered  and 
rejected  by  the  convention  legally  and  regularly  called.  The  Committee  on 
the  Judiciary,  to  whom  the  subject  was  referred,  reported  in  favour  of  admitting 
the  state  on  the  authority  of  the  informal  meeting  or  caucus,  for  it  was,  in  fact, 
nothing  more.  .  Mr.  Calhoun  opposed  the  report  in  two  speeches*  on  the  ground 
of  the  unconstitutionality  and  the  danger  of  the  precedent,  in  which  he  displayed, 
with  great  force  of  argument,  that  thorough  knowledge  of  the  Constitution  for 
which  he  is  remarkable.  But,  as  powerful  as  was  his  resistance,  it  proved  vain. 
The  bill  passed,  and  has  made  a  precedent,  the  danger  of  which  time  only  can 
disclose. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

in  which  the  Narrative  is  continued  until  the  Termination  of  the  Second  Session  of  the 

27th  Congress. 

THE  suspension  of  the  banks  in  the  spring  of  '37  marks  an  important  period 
in  the  life  of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  the  political  history  of  the  country.  Fortunately, 
under  the  operation  of  the  joint  resolution  of  1816,  and  the  Deposite  Act  of  the 
preceding  year,  in  the  passage  of  both  of  which  he  took  a  decided  part,  the  act 
of  suspension  of  itself  entirely  separated  the  Government  and  the  banks.  The 
former  prohibited  the  Government  from  receiving  the  notes  of  suspended  banks 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  Nos.  16  and  17. 


60  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN, 

in  the  public  dues ;  and  the  latter  prohibited  it  from  using  such  banks  as  the 
depositaries  of  the  public  money,  or  as  the  fiscal  agents  of  the  Government. 
Without  these,  the  union  of  the  Government  with  the  banks  would  still  have 
continued,  and  the  former  would  have  found*  itself  reduced  to  the  same  condi 
tion  that  it  was  at  the  end  of  the  war  in  1815,  of  receiving  and  paying  away 
the  notes  of  discredited  banks,  and  using  them  as  its  depositaries  and  agents  in 
the  management  of  its  revenue. 

The  suspension,  as  has  been  stated,  was  not  unexpected  to  Mr.  Calhoun ; 
and  he  was  not  long  in  making  up  his  mind  as  to  the  course  he  would  pursue. 
He  resolved  to  resist  the  reunion  of  the  Government  and  the  banks  in  any 
form,  and  to  oppose  the  establishment  of  a  national  bank.  Indeed,  he  regarded 
it  as  the  first  occasion  that  ever  occurred  which  offered  an  opportunity  for  car 
lying  into  execution  what  he  had  long  believed  to  be  the  true  policy  of  the 
country,  the  divorce  of  the  Government  from  all  connexion  with  banks ;  an 
opinion  which  he  had  first  publicly  and  plainly  indicated  in  1834,  in  his  speech 
on  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  already  cited.  He  made  known  his  determi 
nation  to  a  few  confidential  friends  long  before  the  call  of  the  extraordinary  ses 
sion,  and  resisted  decidedly  all  attempts  to  influence  him  to  support  a  national 
bank. 

With  his  course  thus  fixed,  he  went  to  Washington  at  the  commencement  of 
the  extra  session,  resolved  to  await  the  development  of  the  views  of  the  two 
great  parties  before  he  should  publicly  make  known  his  own,  and  to  act  with 
or  against  them,  according  as  their  course  might  agree  or  disagree  with  his 
own.  He  listened  attentively  to  the  reading  of  the  President's  Message  at  the 
opening  of  the  session,  which  explicitly  opposed  the  establishment  of  a  United 
States  Bank,  and  the  renewal  of  the  union  of  the  Government  and  the  banks, 
and  made  up  his  mind,  as  soon  as  the  reading  was  finished,  that  he  would  give 
it  his  support. 

The  impression  got  out  that  Mr.  Calhoun  would  support  the  message.  It 
caused  much  excitement ;  but  as  it  was  only  a  rumour,  the  development  of  his 
course  in  his  place  in  the  Senate  was  looked  to  with  deep  solicitude.  It  was 
not  long  before  an  occasion  offered.  The  Committee  on  Finances  reported, 
shortly  after  the  message  was  received,  a  bill  for  the  establishment  of  what 
•was  called  a  Sub-treasury,  but  without  any  provision  for  collecting  the  Govern 
ment  dues  in  specie. 

Mr.  Calhoun  rose  in  his  place,  and  declared  himself  in  favour  of  the  entire 
separation  of  the  Government  from  the  banks,  but  denounced  in  strong  Jerms 
the  report  of  the  committee  for  .omitting  what  he  regarded  as  essential  to  a 
separation;  a  provision  for  collecting  the  public  dues  in  the  constitutional 
currency,  without  which  the  measure  they  had  reported  would  prove  a  perfect 
abortion.  He  declared  that  if  that  was  what  was  meant  by  a  sub-treasury,  he 
washed  his  hands  of  all  concern  with  it.  His  remarks  made  a  deep  sensation, 
and  he  was  solicited  by  many  of  the  friends  of  the  administration  to  bring  for 
ward,  in  the  shape  of  an  amendment,  a  proposition  to  collect  the  public  dues  in 
specie.  He  replied  that  he  had  not  intended  to  offer  any  proposition  of  his 
own ;  but,  as  they  requested  it,  he  would  comply  with  their  wishes.  When, 
the  bill  for  the  issue  of  treasury  notes  came  up  a  few  days  after,  he  stated  his 
opinion  at  large  on  the  subject  of  the  separation  of  the  Government  and  the 
banks;  in  a  speech,  which  made  a  permanent  impression  on  the  public  mind, 
in  reference  to  the  whole  banking  system.  He  gave  notice  in  his  speech*  of 
his  intention  of  moving  an  amendment,  at  the  proper  time,  to  the  bill,  for  the 
gradual  but  permanent  separation  of  the  Government  from  the  banks,  but  finally 
agreed  to  postpone  his  motion  till  the  bill  for  the  establishment  of  the  Sub- 
treasury  should  come  under  consideration.  When  that  came  up,  he  moved  his 
amendment,  and  made  a  second  speech,!  *n  which  he  traced  the  rise  and  progress 
of  the  banking  system,  and  marked  the  several  stages  through  which  it  had 
*  See  «  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  18.  t  See  "  Speeches,"  &c..  No.  19. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  61 


passed  ;  he  showed  that  it  contained  within  itself  the  princi£te_tf  J 
struction  ;  and  finally  exposed  the  mischievous  character  and  tendency  of  the 
system,  .economically,  politically,  and  morally.  His  amendment  prevailed,  and 
the  bill  passed  the  Senate  as  amended,  but  failed  in  the  House. 

Such  was  Mr.  Calhoun's  course  on  this  memorable  occasion.  All  things 
considered,  it  has  seldom  been  equalled  for  patriotism,  magnanimity,  sagacity,  V 
and  boldness.  We  have  seen  him,  in  obedience  to  his  principles,  and  what 
seemed  to  be  his  duty,  separate  himself  from  General  Jackson  and  the  party 
when  in  the  plenitude  of  their  power,  and  when  he  held  the  second  office  in 
the  Government,  with  every  prospect  of  reaching  the  highest.  We  have  seen 
him,  after  his  separation,  instead  of  courting  the  opposition  in  order  to  maintain 
himself  against  the  power  and  influence  of  the  executive,  again  pursue  a  course 
in  obedience  to  principle  and  duty,  which  brought  him  into  direct  conflict  with 
both,  and  left  him  with  his  state  alone  to  maintain  the  unequal  struggle  against 
a  course  of  policy  which,  he  believed,  if  not  arrested,  would  prove  ruinous  to  the 
Government  and  country.  We  have  seen  him,  when  the  state,  in  pursuance  of 
his  course,  had  effected  its  object,  availing  himself  of  the  aid  of  the  opposition 
to  bring  down  the  power  and  influence  of  the  executive  department  (origina 
ting  in  the  encroachments  of  the  Congress)  within  proper  constitutional,  legal 
limits.  That  done,  we  next  see  him,  when  the  reaction  of  the  very  system  to 
oppose  which  he  separated  from  the  party  had  prostrated  them,  and  when  the 
opposition  with  which  he  had  for  a  time  acted  were  preparing  to  rush  on  and 
overwhelm  them  in  their  weakness,  and  to  re-establish  their  old  doctrines  and 
principles,  rising  up  promptly,  overcoming  all  personal  feelings,  forgetting  all 
past  differences,  boldly  repelling  the  assaults  of  his  recent  allies,  and  de 
fending  and  protecting  those  from  whom  he  had  been  so  long  separated,  and  by 
whom  he  had  been  much  wronged,  in  stern  obedience  to  his  principles  and  to 
what  he  believed  to  be  his  duty  :  thus  clearly  showing,  by  his  whole  course 
throughout  this  eventful  period,  that  when  they  were  at  stake,  neither  ambition. 
fear,  enmity,  friendship,  nor  popularity  could  bend  him  from  his  course. 

The  stand  which  he  took  drew  down  on  him,  as  might  be  expected,  the  bitter 
denunciation  and  vengeance  of  the  opposition,  who  had  now"  assumed  the  name 
of  Whigs.  Among  other  things,  they  charged  him  with  desertion,  as  if  he  had 
ever  been  of  their  party,  and  when,  in  fact,  he  had  kept  himself  distinct  from 
both  the  great  parties  from  the  time  of  his  separation  from  General  Jackson. 
That  there  might  be  no  mistake  on  that  point,  he  took  the  earliest  opportunity 
in  the  Senate  to  avow  what  his  position  was.  In  his  speech  on  Mr.  Webster's 
motion,  in  1834,  to  renew  the  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank  for  six  years, 
he  said,  "  I  am  the  partisan  of  no  class,  nor,  let  me  add,  of  either  political  party. 
I  am  neither  of  the  opposition  nor  administration.  If  I  act  with  the  former  in 
any  instance,  it  is  because  I  approve  of  their  course  on  the  particular  occasion, 
and  I  shall  always  be  happy  to  act  with  them  when  I  do  approve.  If  I  oppose 
the  administration,  if  I  desire  to  see  power  change  hands,  it  is  because  I  disap 
prove  of  the  general  course  of  those  in  authority." 

To  which  he  added  :  "  But  mine  has  not  been,  nor  will  it  be,  a  systematic 
opposition.  Whatever  measure  of  theirs  I  deem  right  I  shall  cheerfully  sup 
port,  and  I  only  desire  that  they  will  afford  me  more  frequent  occasions  for 
support  and  fewer  for  opposition  than  they  have  heretofore  done."  He  often 
avowed  the  same  sentiments,  and  acted  throughout  in  strict  conformity  to  the 
principles  here  laid  down  ;  and  when  Mr.  Clay,  for  the  first  time  in  the  Senate, 
assumed  the  name  of  Whig  for  himself  and  the  party,  intending  to  comprehend 
under  it  all  that  did  not  support  the  administration,  the  State  Rights  as  well 
as  the  national  parties,  Mr.  Calhoun  rose  in  his  place  and  disavowed  the  name, 
as  applied  to  himself,  and  expressed  himself  contented  with  the  name  he  bore. 
If  to  this  it  is  added,  he  never,  on  any  occasion,  joined  in  their  political  meet 
ings  or  party  consultations,  and  always  kept  himself  free  on  every  question  to 


62  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

follow  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment,  it  must  be  obvious  that  the  charge  of 
desertion  is  wholly  groundless.  In  truth,  he  never  from  the  first  permitted  his 
party  obligations  to  overrule  his  attachment  to  principles  or  duty,  and  through 
out  this  trying  period  he  availed  himself  of  the  aid  of  whatever  party  fell  in 
with  his  course  for  the  time,  to  effect  the  important  objects  he  had  in  view, 
but  without  permitting  them,  in  any  instance,  to  divert  him  from  his  end. 

At  the  next  session,  the  Sub-treasury,  or  the  reorganization  of  the  treasury, 
with  the  view  of  collecting,  safe  keeping,  and  disbursing  the  public  moneys 
through  its  own  officers,  without  the  agency  of  banks,  again  became  the  prom 
inent  question.  The  subject  was  again  referred  in  the  Senate  to  the  Commit 
tee  of  Finance,  which  reported  a  bill  much  fuller  in  its  details,  and  containing 
"what  is  called  the  specie  feature,  that  is,  a  provision  for  the  gradual,  but  entire 
separation  of  the  government  from  the  banks,  similar  to  that  moved  at  the  extra 
session  by  Mr.  Calhoun.  Mr.  Rives  moved,  as  a  substitute,  to  strike  out  the 
whole  bill  after  the  enacting  clause,  and  to  insert  in  lieu  the  use  of  the  state 
banks  as  the  depositaries  and  fiscal  agents  of  the  government,  as  formerly  used, 
but  with  some  additional  modifications.  The  discussion  took  place  on  the 
amendment,  and  the  argument  principally  turned  on  the  respective  merits  of 
the  two  systems.  Both  sides  put  out  their  strength.  The  debate  was  ani 
mated  and  able.  Mr.  Calhoun  took  a  prominent  part,  and  greatly  distinguished 
himself  in  the  speech  he  delivered  on  the  occasion.*  This  drew  down  on 
him  pointed  personal  attacks  from  the  two  great  leaders  of  the  opposition,  Mr. 
Clay  and  Mr.  Webster,  with  whom  he  had  to  contend  single  handed.  The 
conflict  excited  deep  and  universal  interest.!  It  was  called  in  the  journals 
of  the  day  the  war  of  the  giants ;  and  it  is  no  more  than  justice  to  him  to  say, 
that  he  repelled  their  charges  with  signal  success,  and  turned  back  the  war 
with  effect. J 

After  the  defeat  of  the  amendment  offered  by  Mr.  Rives,  and  just  before  the 
question  was  put  on  the  engrossment,  a  motion  was  made  to  strike  out  the  spe 
cie  feature,  which  succeeded  by  the  united  vote  of  the  opposition  and  a  consid 
erable  portion  of  the  friends  of  the  administration.  The  effect  of  the  amend 
ment  would  be  for  the  government  to  collect  the  dues  in  the  notes  of  the  banks, 
and  deposite  them  for  safe  keeping  in  its  own  safes  and  vaults,  to  which  Mr. 
Calhoun  had  from  the  first  avowed  his  hostility.  He  reserved  his  opposition 
until  the  bill  had  been  perfected,  according  to  the  views  of  those  who  had  made 
the  amendment,  and  the  question  put  on  the  engrossment,  when  he  stated  his 
objections  in  a  short,  but  strong  and  decisive  speech,  showing  that  it  was  liable 
to  all  the  dangers  and  objections  for  which  the  pet-bank  system  was  obnoxious, 
attended  by  additional  dangers  and  objections  peculiar  to  itself.  The  bill,  nev 
ertheless,  passed  the  Senate,  but  the  argument  was  not  without  its  effects.  The 
views  of  Mr.  Calhoun  were  almost  unanimously  sustained  by  the  party  in  the 
House  and  the  country.  The  bill  failed,  and  the  session  terminated  in  leaving 
things  as  they  were. 

It  was  during  this  session  that  Mr.  Calhoun  introduced  his  resolutions  on  the 
subject  of  abolition.  He  had  always  regarded  this  as  the  most  mischievous 
species  of  political  fanaticism,  and  the  only  question  which  could  really  en 
danger  the  Union.  He  saw  the  non-slave-holding  states  closely  divided  be 
tween  two  great  parties,  and  a  third  growing  up  and  organizing  upon  a  principle 
which  they  believed  of  a  higher  importance  than  any  involved  in  the  political 
issues  of  the  day.  Should  this  sect  continue  to  increase  without  opposition 
from  either  of  the  great  parties,  its  influence  might  become  strong  enough  to  de 
cide  the  political  contests,  and  so  formidable  that  it  would  be  courted.  As  their 
ends  could  only  be  attained  through  consolidation,  it  was  likely  that  they  would 
join  the  party  whose  principles  had  that  tendency.  The  best  interests  of  the 
tlnion,  and  the  integrity  of  the  Republican  party,  seemed  to  require  the  line  to 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  Nos.  20,  21,  and  22. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  63 

be  drawn  at  once  between  that  party  and  the  Abolitionists.  He  accordingly 
moved  the  following  resolutions,  which  present  so  strongly  his  views  of  the  re 
lations  of  the  General  Government  and  of  the  states  to  this  subject,  that  we 
shall  extract  them. 

"  Mr.  Calhoun  then  submitted  the  following  resolutions  : 

"  Resolved,  That,  in  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  the  states 
adopting  the  same  acted  severally  as  free,  independent,  and  sovereign  states  ; 
and  that  each,  for  itself,  by  its  own  voluntary  assent,  entered  the  Union  with  the 
view  to  its  increased  security  against  all  dangers,  domestic  as  well  as  foreign, 
and  the  more  perfect  and  secure  enjoyment  of  its  advantages,  natural,  political, 
and  social. 

"  Resolved,  That,  in  delegating  a  portion  of  their  powers  to  be  exercised  by 
the  Federal  Government,  the  states  retained  severally  the  exclusive  and  sole 
right  over  their  own  domestic  institutions  and  police,  and  are  alone  responsible 
for  them ;  and  that  any  intermeddling  of  any  one  or  more  states,  or  a  combina 
tion  of  their  citizens,  with  the  domestic  institutions  and  police  of  the  others,  on 
any  ground  or  under  any  pretext  whatever,  political,  moral,  or  religious,  with  a 
view  to  their  alteration  or  subversion,  is  an  assumption  of  superiority  not  war 
ranted  by  the  Constitution,  insulting  to  the  states  interfered  with,  tending  to  en 
danger  their  domestic  peace  and  tranquillity,  subversive  of  the  objects  for  which 
the  Constitution  was  formed,  and,  by  necessary  consequence,  tending  to  weaken 
and  destroy  the  Union  itself. 

"  Resolved,  That  this  Government  was  instituted  and  adopted  by  the  several 
states  of  this  Union  as  a  common  agent,  in  order  to  carry  into  effect  the  powers 
which  they  had  delegated  by  the  Constitution  for  their  mutual  security  and  pros 
perity  ;  and  that,  in  fulfilment  of  this  high  and  sacred  trust,  this  Government  is 
bound  so  to  exercise  its  powers  as  to  give,  as  far  as  may  be  practicable,  in 
creased  stability  and  security  to  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  states  that  com 
pose  the  Union ;  and  that  it  is  the  solemn  duty  of  the  Government  to  resist  all 
attempts  by  one  portion  of  the  Union  to  use  it  as  an  instrument  to  attack  the 
domestic  institutions  of  another,  or  to  weaken  or  destroy  such  institutions,  in 
stead  of  strengthening  and  upholding  them,  as  it  is  in  duty  bound  to  do. 

"  Resolved,  That  domestic  slavery,  as  it  exists  in  the  Southern  and  Western 
States  of  this  Union,  composes  an  important  part  of  their  domestic  institutions, 
inherited  from  their  ancestors,  and  existing  at  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution., 
by  which  it  is  recognised  as  constituting  an  essential  element  in  the  distribu 
tion  of  its  powers  among  the  states ;  and  that  no  change  of  opinion  or  feeling 
on  the  part  of  the  other  states  of  the  Union  in  relation  to  it  can  justify  them  or 
their  citizens  «i  open  and  systematic  attacks  thereon,  with  the  view  to  its  over 
throw  ;  and  that  all  such  attacks  are  in  manifest  violation  of  the  mutual  and 
solemn  pledge  to  protect  and  defend  each  other,  given  by  the  states  respectively 
on  entering  into  the  Constitutional  compact  which  formed  the  Union,  and,  as 
such,  is  a  manifest  breuch  of  faith,  and  a  violation  of  the  most  solemn  obliga 
tions,  moral  and  religious, 

"  Resolved,  That  the  intermeddling  of  any  state  or  states,  or' their  citizens,  to 
abolish  slavery  in  this  district,  or  any  of  the  territories,  on  the  ground  or  under 
the  pretext  that  it  is  immoral  or  sinful,  or  the  passage  of  any  act  or  measure 
of  Congress  with  that  view,  would  be  a  direct  and  dangerous  attack  on  the  in 
stitutions  of  all  the  slave-holding  states. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  union  of  these  states  rests  on  an  equality  of  rights  and 
advantages  among  its  members  ;  and  that  whatever  destroys  that  equality  tends 
to  destroy  the  Union  itself;  and  that  it  is  the  solemn  duty  of  all,  and  more  es 
pecially  of  this  body,  which  represents  the  states  in  their  corporate  capacity,  to 
resist  all  attempts  to  discriminate  between  the  states  in  extending  the  benefits 
of  the  Government  to  the  several  portions  of  the  Union ;  and  that  to  refuse  to 
extend  to  the  Southern  and  Western  States  any  advantage  which  would  tend  to 


64  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

strengthen  or  render  them  more  secure,  or  increase  their  limits  or  population  by 
trie  annexation  of  new  territory  or  states,  on  the  assumption  or  under  the  pre 
text  that  the  institution  of  slavery,  as  it  exists  among  them,  is  immoral  or  sinful, 
or  otherwise  obnoxious,  would  be  contrary  to  that  equality  of  rights  and  advan 
tages  which  the  Constitution  was  intended  to  secure  alike  to  all  the  members 
of  the  Union,  and  would,  in  effect,  disfranchise  the  slave-holding  states,  with 
holding  from  them  the  advantages,  while  it  subjected  them  to  the  burdens  of  the 
Government." 

These,  with  the  exception  of  the  last,  passed  the  Senate  with  some  slight 
modifications.  In  the  course  of  a  long  and  running  debate  on  these  resolutions, 
he  examined  the  relations  of  our  government  to  this  subject.  He  showed  those 
•who  viewed  slavery  only  in  the  abstract,  that  they  could  never  thus  form  a  true 
conception  of  their  duty  in  the  existing  state  of  things.  It  was  not  a  question 
to  be  considered  in  the  abstract,  but  in  the  concrete,  and  with  a  full  view  of  all 
the  circumstances  connected  with  it.  In  a  large  portion  of  our  country,  two 
races  had  been  thrown  together  in  nearly  equal  numbers,  and  separated  into 
castes  by  a  natural  line  too  strongly  drawn  ever  to  be  effaced.  The  question 
was  not  as  to  what  different  state  of  things  could  be  conceived  as  more  desira 
ble,  but  what  was  the  best  relation  to  establish  between  two  such  races  thrown  to 
gether  under  such  circumstances.  Under  the  institution  of  slavery,  both  races 
had  prospered,  and  the  black  especially  had  made  a  more  rapid  advance  in 
civilization  than  it  had  ever  done  before  in  the  same  space  of  time  and  under 
other  circumstances.  These  were  facts  to  induce  those  to  pause  who  were 
tempted,  by  considerations  of  abstract  philanthropy,  to  overstep  the  bounds  which 
were  imposed  on  their  action  not  only  by  the  Constitution,  but  also  by  an  enlighten 
ed  spirit  of  benevolence  itself.  If  other  considerations  were  wanting,  he  pointed 
to  the  incidental  political  benefits  arising  from  an  institution  which  harmonized 
the  relations  between  capital  and  labour,  and  thus  introduced  a  spirit  conserva 
tive  of  both  interests,  so  far  as  Southern  influence  could  be  felt  in  the  action  of 
the  General  Government.  The  passage  of  these  resolutions  placed  the  Aboli 
tionists  in  direct  hostility  to  the  Republican  party,  and  led  to  a  state  of  things 
which  was  far  safer  to  the  party  and  the  Union  than  to  have  permitted  so  dan 
gerous  a  sect  to  grow  up  unopposed.  The  Republicans,  from  all  sections  of 
the  Union,  found  in  these  propositions  a  common  ground  where  they  could  stand, 
without  danger  of  schism  upon  the  question  which  threatened  most  to  divide  them. 

At  the  next  session  the  prominent  subject  of  debate  was  Mr.  Crittenden's 
bill  to  prevent  the  interference  of  certain  Federal  officers  in  elections.  Mr. 
Calhoun  spoke  with  much  power  and  effect  on  the  occasion.*  Aftsr  discussing 
the  subject  fully  against  the  bill  on  its  merits,  both  as  to  its  constitutionality 
and  expediency,  and  showing  that  its  effects  would  be  the  opposite  of  what  was 
intended — that  it  would  increase  instead  of  diminishing  the  influence  of  the  ex 
ecutive — he  declared  himself  the  fixed  and  strenuous  friend  of  reducing  the 
influence  and  patronage  of  that  branch  of  the  government  within  the  narrowest 
limits  consistent  with  the  Constitution  and  the  object  for  which  it  was  created. 
He  then  proceeded  to  show  that  the  legitimate  means  of  effecting  that  was  to 
restrict  the  revenue  and  expenditure  to  the  legitimate  and  constitutional  wants 
of  the  Government,  and  to  hold  the  executive  power  strictly  to  its  appropriate 
sphere.  This  led  him  into  a  very  interesting  account  of  the  two  hostile  sys 
tems  of  policy,  which  had  divided  the  country  from  the  formation  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  of  one  of  which  Mr.  Jefferson  was  the  head  and  General  Hamilton  of 
the  other.  After  tracing  their  rise  and  progress,  he  showed  that  the  present 
struggle  was  but  a  continuation  of  the  original  conflict  between  them,  and  that 
an  opportunity  was  now  afforded  for  the  first  time  since  the  Government  went 
into  operation,  to  put  down  eilectually  that  of  which  Hamilton  was  the  head — 
the  old  Federal  and  consolidation  party;  and  to  give  the  opposite — that  of 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  23. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  65 

which  Jefferson  was  the  head,  the  old  State  Rights  Republican  party — a  per 
manent  ascendency.  In  conclusion  he  said,  "  It  would  be  presumptuous  in  me, 
Mr.  President,  to  advise  those  who  are  charged  with  the  administration  of  the 
Government  what  course  to  adopt ;  but  if  they  would  hear  the  voice  of  one  who 
desires  nothing  for  himself,  and  whose  only  wish  is  to  see  the  country  prosper 
ous,  free,  and  happy,  I  would  say  to  them,  You  are  placed  in  the  most  remark 
able  juncture  that  has  ever  occurred  since  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Government,  and,  by  seizing  the  opportunity,  you  may  bring  the  vessel  of  state 
to  a  position  where  she  may  take  a  new  tack,  and  thereby  escape  all  the  shoals 
and  breakers  into  the  midst  of  which  a  false  steerage  has  run  her,  and  bring  her 
triumphantly  into  her  destined  port,  with  honour  to  yourselves  and  safety  to 
those  on  board.  Take  your  stand  boldly ;  avow  your  object ;  disclose  your 
measures,  and  let  the  people  see  clearly  that  you  intend  to  do  what  Jefferson 
designed,  but,  from  adverse  circumstances,  could  not  accomplish  :  to  reverse  the 
measures  originating  in  principles  and  policy  not  congenial  with  our  political 
system ;  to  divest  the  Government  of  all  undue  patronage  and  influence  ;  to  re 
strict  it  to  the  few  great  objects  intended  by  the  Constitution  ;  in  a  word,  to 
give  a  complete  ascendency  to  the  good  old  Virginia  school  over  -Jts  antagonist, 
which  time  and  experience  have  proved  to  be  foreign  and  dana--rous  to  our  sys 
tem  of  Government,  and  you  may  count  with  confidence  on  *w#  support,  with 
out  looking  to  other  means  of  success.  Should  the  Government  take  such  a 
course  at  this  favourable  moment,  our  free  and  happy  institutions  may  be  perpet 
uated  for  generations,  but,  if  a  different,  short  wa  be  their  duration."  Had 
the  course  advised  been  early  and  openly  avrvVed  and  vigorously  pursued  in 
time,  very  different  might  have  been  the  termination  of  the  last  presidential 
election  ;  and  it  may  be  added,  that  the  af>'lce  *s  not  IGSS  applicable  to  the  com 
ing  than  to  the  past  election,  arid,  if  fie  Federal  consolidation  party  is  ever  to 
be  permanently  put  down,  and  the  State  Rights  Republican  party  to  gain  the 
permanent  ascendency,  it  ca/i  only  oe  effected  by  its  adhering  steadily  and  in 
good  faith  to  the  course  advised 

The  next  session,  ths*  of  i 839-40,  which  immediately  preceded  the  late 
presidential  election,  was  distinguished  for  the  number  and  importance  of  the 
subjects  that  were  agitated  and  discussed,  and,  it  may  be  added,  the  ability  and 
animation  of  the  discussions.  Among  the  more  prominent  of  these  may  be  in 
cluded  the  public  lands ;  the  assumption  of  state  debts ;  Mr.  Calhoun's  resolu 
tions  in  reference  to  the  case  of  the  Enterprise  ;  the  Bankrupt  Bill,  and  the  re 
peal  of  the  salt-tax ;  in  all  of  which  Mr.  Calhoun  took  a  prominent  part.*  His 
speeches  on  his  resolutions  and  on  the  assumption  of  state  debts  arc  among  the 
ablest  he  ever  delivered,  and  are  worthy  of  the  attention  of  all  who  desire  to 
understand  the  subjects  which  they  discuss. 

The  presidential  election  having  terminated  in  favour  of  the  Whigs,  the  next 
session  was  principally  occupied  in  the  discussions  connected  with  the  public 
lands,  preparatory  to  one  of  the  leading  objects  of  policy  contemplated  under 
the  new  administration.  Mr.  Calhoun  made  three  speeches  on  the  subject:! 
one  on  the  prospective  Pre-emption  Bill ;  another  on  an  amendment  to  it  pro 
posed  by  Mr.  Crittenden,  as  a  substitute,  to  distribute  the  revenue  from  the  pub 
lic  lands  among  the  states  ;  and,  finally,  one  in  reply  to  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr. 
Clay.  In  these  the  whole  policy  of  the  public  lands,  and  the  various  plans 
which  were  proposed  in  reference  to  them,  were  discussed.  It  is  a  subject 
which  early  attracted  Mr.  Calhoun's  attention,  and  has  engrossed  much  of  his 
reflection. 

As  far  back  as  February,  1837,  he  offered  a  substitute,  in  the  form  of  an 

amendment  to  the  bill,  to  suspend  the  sales  of  the  public  lands,  in  which  he 

proposed  to  cede  to  the  new  states  the  portion  of  the  public  lands  lying  within 

their  respective  limits,  on  certain  conditions,  which  he  accompanied  by  a  speech 

*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  Nos.  24,  25,  26,  27,  28,  and  29. 


66  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

explanatory  of  his  views  and  reasons.  He  followed  up  the  subject  in  a  speech 
delivered  in  January,  1839,  on  the  Graduation  Bill ;  and  in  May,  1840,  an 
elaborate  and  full  report  was  made  from  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands,  and  a 
bill  introduced  by  him,  containing  substantially  the  same  provisions  Avith  his 
original  proposition.  These,  with  his  three  speeches  already  referred  to,  con 
tain  a  full  view  of  his  objects  and  reasons  for  the  proposed  cession. 

There  have  been  few  measures  ever  presented  for  consideration  so  grossly 
misrepresented,  or  so  much  misconceived,  as  the  one  in  question.  It  has  been, 
represented  as  a  gift — a  surrender — an  abandonment  of  the  public  domain  to 
the  new  states ;  and  having  assumed  that  to  be  its  true  character,  the  most  un 
worthy  motives  have  been  attributed  to  the  author  for  introducing  it.  Nothing 
is  more  untrue.  The  cession  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  conditional  sale, 
not  extended  to  the  whole  of  the  public  domain,  as  represented,  but  to  that  por 
tion  in  the  new  states  respectively  within  whose  limits  they  lie ;  the  greater 
part  of  which  are  mere  remnants,  which  have  long  since  been  offered  for  sale, 
without  being  sold. 

The  conditions  on  which  they  are  proposed  to  be  ceded  or  sold  are  drawn  up 
with  the  greyest  care,  and  with  the  strictest  provisions  to  ensure  their  fulfil 
ment  ;  one  of  w\icn  js>  that  the  state  should  pay  65  per  cent,  of  the  gross  pro 
ceeds  of  the  sale  v>  the  General  Government,  and  retain  only  35  per  cent, 
for  the  trouble,  experi^  and  responsibility  attending  their  administration.  An 
other  is,  that  the  existing  iaws?  as  tney  stands  except  so  far  as  they  may  be  mod 
ified  or  authorized  to  be  moe^ed  by  t^e  act  of  cession,  shall  remain  unchanged, 
unless  altered  by  the  joint  consvQt  of  the  General  Government  and  the  several 
states.  They  are  respectively  auti^nzed,  if  they  should  think  proper,  to  adopt 
a  system  of  graduation  and  pre-empti^  within  well-defined  and  safe  limits  pre 
scribed  in  the  conditions  ;  and  the  Gene^l  Government  is  authorized  to  appoint 
officers  in  the  several  states,  to  whom  its  share,  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  shall 
be  directly  paid,  without  going  into  the  stau  treasury ;  and  these  conditions  are 
put  under  the  guardianship  of  the  courts,  by  providing,  if  they  shall  be  violated, 
that  all  after  rules  by  the  state  shall  be  null  and  void.  So  far  from  this  being  a 
gift,  or  an  abandonment  of  the  public  lands  to  the  i\ew  states  he  has  clearly 
proved,  if  there  be  truth  in  figures,  that  the  Governmem  would  receive  a  o-reat- 
er  amount  of  revenue  from  the  lands  in  the  new  states,  under  the  system  he 
proposes,  than  under  the  present.  These  demonstrations  are  based  on  calcula 
tions  which  neither  have  nor  can  be  impugned. 

But  his  views  extended  far  beyond  dollars  and  cents  in  bringiag  forward  the 
measure.  He  proposed  to  effect  by  it  the  high  political  objects  of  placing  the 
new  states  on  the  same  footing  of  equality  and  independence  with  the  old,  in 
reference  to  their  domain ;  to  cut  off  the  vast  amount  of  patronage  which  the 
public  lands  place  in  the  hand  of  the  executive  ;  to  withdraw  them,  as  one 
of  the  stakes,  from  the  presidential  game ;  to  diminish  by  one  fourth  the  busi 
ness  of  Congress,  and  with  it  the  length  and  expense  of  its  session ;  to  enlist 
the  Government  of  the  new  states  on  the  side  of  the  General  Government ;  to 
aid  in  a  more  careful  administration  of  the  rest  of  the  public  domain,  and 
thereby  prevent  the  whole  of  it  from  becoming  the  property  of  the  occupants 
from  possession ;  and,  finally,  to  prevent  the  too  rapid  extinction  of  Indian 
titles  in  proportion  to  the  demand  for  lands  from  the  increase  of  population, 
which  he  shows  to  be  pregnant  with  great  embarrassment  and  danger.  These 
are  great  objects,  of  high  political  import ;  and  if  they  could  be  effected  by  the 
measure  proposed,  it  is  justly  entitled  to  be  ranked  among  the  wisest  and  most 
politic  ever  brought  forward.  That  they  can  be  effected,  it  is  almost  impossi 
ble  for  any  well-informed  and  dispassionate  mind  deliberately  to  read  the 
speeches  and  documents  referred  to,  and  to  doubt. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  w 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Conclusion. 

ONE  of  the  first  acts  of  the  new  administration  was  to  call  an  extra  session 
in  the  spring  of  1841.  Flushed  with  success,  and  confident  in  their  power  to 
consummate  their  entire  system  of  policy,  the  Whigs  assembled  at  the  commence 
ment  of  this  session  with  overwhelming  majorities  in  each  House  of  Congress. 
The  Republicans  came,  under  circumstances  well  calculated  to  dispirit  them, 
and  too  weak  in  point  of  numbers  to  have  made  an  efficient  opposition  except 
under  the  most  skilful  management.  It  soon  became  manifest,  as  the  pian  of 
the  campaign  was  developed,  that  the  majority  were  determined  to  sweep  every 
thing  by  "  coups-de-main,"  and  would  not  depend  upon  address  at  <he  expense 
of  time  to  take  any  post  which  could  possibly  be  carried  by  storre-  They  com 
menced  in  the  House  of  Representatives  by  wresting  from  t*e  minority  some 
of  the  most  inestimable  of  the  privileges  of  debate  :  privilegepwhich  the  minority- 
had  enjoyed  from  the  institution  of  the  House  of  Repres endives  up  to  that  time, 
and  even  during  the  war,  when  the  opposition,  by  its  &ctirus  course,  seemed 
to  have  justly  forfeited  all  respect,  if  it  had  not  bee*  deemed  the  sacred  right 
of  the  tax-payer  to  be  fully  heard  before  new  burd^s  «ere  imposed  upon  him. 
But  the  minority  were  no  longer  allowed  to  deb^6  Questions  in  the  Committee 
of  the  Whole  until  they  were  satisfied  with  tly  hearing. 

The  majority  seized  the  power  of  arresting  tne  debate  whenever  they  chose, 
.and  thus,  under  the  pretence  of  preventijg  factious  delays,  they  acquired  the 
means  of  terminating  the  discussion  viienever  it  searched  their  purposes  too 
deeply,  or  developed  too  strongly  tb'  consequences  of  their  measures.  Under 
this  state  of  things,  there  was  little  *eft  to  tne  opposition  but  the  mere  vote  ;  and 
the  majority  so  completely  acqu*ed  tb<J  whole  sway  in  the  lower  House  that  it 
was  by  their  grace  only  that  ^eir  opponents  could  even  remonstrate  against 
their  measures.  In  that  bor1/  one  overruling  influence  seemed  to  prevail,  which 
did  not  emanate  from  with-*1,  DlJt  cast  *ts  shadow  from  without.  Nor  could  even 
the  fascinations  of  the  fplendid  genius  that  controlled,  relieve  the  dull,  dreary, 
and  depressing  sensr  of  dependance  under  which  that  House  seemed  to  think 
and  move.  In  the  Senate,  however,  this  tendency  to  the  absolute  power  of  a 
majority  met  wit*  a  severe  and  effective  resistance.  Determined  never  to  yield 
tip  the  arms  w^ich  were  necessary  for  the  contest,  they  repelled  every  attempt 
to  introduce  '  the  gag  v  Foremost  among  the  opposition  stood  Mr.  Calhoun,  and 
the  parliamentary  annals  of  the  world  hardly  afford  an  instance  of  a  more  formi 
dable  a* ay  of  intellectual  force  than  that  opposition  then  presented.  Nothing 
could  oe  more  brilliant  than  its  career  through  the  whole  of  this  short  but  event 
ful  session 

The  majority  boldly  assumed  the  old  Federal  positions  upon  the  bank,  the 
tariff,  and  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands.  Confident  in 
their  strength  to  carry  it,  they  openly  avowed  their  system.  Profusion  in  pub 
lic  expenditure  and  special  legislation  seemed  to  be  the  order  of  the  day.  To 
the  shattered  victims  of  the  war  so  long  waged  by  the  stock  interests,  a  deliver 
ance  from  all  obligation  for  the  past  was  declared  in  the  Bankrupt  Law ;  and 
the  affiliated  system  of  the  bank,  the  tariff,  and  the  distribution  tempted  them 
with  an  almost  boundless  prospect  for  future  indulgence.  The  prodigal,  the 
idle,  the  desperate,  the  visionary  speculator,  and  even  the  cunning  usurer,  were 
each  invited,  by  some  appropriate  hope,  to  join  in  the  general  foray,  when 
the  whole  field  of  productive  industry  was  to  be  given  up  to  plunder.  There 
seemed  to  be  at  last  a  prospect  that  Hamilton's  system  would  prevail.  With 


68  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

revenue  decreasing  daily,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  proposed  an  annual  ex 
penditure  of  about  $27,000,000,  and  recommended  a  distribution  among  the  states 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands.     This  lavish  expenditure  was  to  be  main 
tained  from  customs  alone  ;  and  through  the  influence  of  another  bank  expansion, 
our  people  were  to  be  tempted  to  buy  freely  under  the  ruinous  rates  of  duties 
which  were  proposed.     Entreaty  and  remonstrance  were  alike  unavailing  with 
the  majority,  which  for  a  while  ^pursued  its  course  without  regard  to  the  rights 
of  the  states  or  the  freedom  of  individual  pursuits,  which  were  overwhelmed  in 
their  way.     The  whole  hope  of  an  efficient  resistance  to  these  measures  in 
Congress  now  rested  on  the  Senate,  where  the  necessary  privileges  of  debate 
were  still  retained.     Our  history  does  not  present  us  an  instance  of  an  opposi 
tion  mdre   distinguished  for  its  ability,  or  more  untiring,  in  its   energy.     Its 
searching  gaze  seemed  to  read  the  hidden  purpose  with  almost  as  much  cer 
tainty  as  it  followed  the  open  movements  of  its  adversary.     The  purposes  and 
principles  of  the  system  proposed  by  the  majority  were  so  clearly  exposed  by 
skilful  amendments  or  in  vigorous  debate,  that  the  public  attention  was  fully 
aroused  and  directed  to  the  consequences  :  consequences  which  were  so  pow 
erfully  and  accurately  depicted,  that  even  the  authors  of  the  measures  would 
have  been  appall^  had  they  been  less  reckless  of  the  future.     The  natural  af 
finity  between  the  uriff  and  distribution,  which  Mr.  Calhoun  had  proclaimed  so 
long  before,  was  :apw  clearly  proved  by  the  course  of  the  majority  during  this 
session.     So  essential  i^  j^ey  deem  the  distribution  in  order  to  secure  the 
permanence  of  the  tariff,  v!iat  they  ventured  upon  the  former  measure  at  every 
hazard,  and  at  a  time,  too,  wh^  the  revenue  was  deficient,  and  there  was  scarcely 
a  hope  that  the  customs  would  .ffor(i  money  enough  for  the  current  expenses  of 
the  Government,     This  ominous  ^mbination,  which  Mr.  Calhoun  had  sacrificed 
so  much  to  avert,  was  now  at  hand,  cn(J  he  met  it  in  a  speech,*  which  is  one  of. 
the  finest  specimens  of  his  power  and  >tyie>     There  are  portions  of  that  speech 
in  which  he  traces  the  consequents  v  distribution  with  a  spirit  of  inquiry  so 
eager,  so  searching,  so  keen,  that  he  Sorgeu  himself  and  the  personal  feelings  of 
the  contest  in  the  contemplation  of  the  visio,  of  ruin  before  him,  and  seems  to 
seek  relief  from  his  forebodings  by  unbosomingMmself  to  the  country.    The  ma 
jority  now  faltered,  for  the  first  time,  under  the  i^peals  of  the  opposition,  and 
incorporated  a  provision  for  suspending  the  dibtribttion  when  the  duties  upon 
imports  exceeded  a  certain  rate — a  provision  to  whici.  we  have  since  owed  the 
suspension  of  that  dangerous  act.    The  condition  of  the  ".nances,  which  seemed 
not  to  have  been  fully  appreciated  by  the  majority,  togetht*  with  the  proviso  of 
which  we  have  spoken,  rendered  the  distribution  law  practically  inefficient. 
Their  bank  bills  had  been  vetoed  by  the  President,  from  whon.  they  were  soon 
alienated ;  the  Bankrupt  Law  was  generally  odious,  anl  it  seeded  to  require. 
nothing  more  than  the  absurd  and  extravagant  Tariff  Act  oC  the  suc*eeding  ses 
sion  to  consummate  their  ruin.    Thus  did  the  opposition  come  out  of  he  contest 
with  flying  colours  at  the  close  of  that  eventful  session.     The  part  which  Mr. 
Calhoun  bore  in  this  crisis  is  so  justly  and  so  thoroughly  appreciated  U-  the 
country,  that  no  particular  comment  upon  it  is  necessary. 

Suffice  it  to  say,  that  the  discussions  of  the  extra  session  and  of  that  which 
succeeded  it  were  important  and  exciting.  The  most  prominent  of  the  extra 
session  were  upon  the  M'Leod  case,  the  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  and  the  Bankrupt  Law.f  The  debate  on  the  bank  bills  turned  almost  ex 
clusively  upon  the  details.  At  the  succeeding  session  the  principal  subjects 
were  the  Treasury  Note  Bill,  the  Veto  power,  Mr.  Clay's  resolutions  in  refer 
ence  to  the  revenue  and  expenditures,  the  Loan  Bill,  and  the  Tariff  Bill.  To 
Mr.  Calhoun's  speeches  upon  these  subjects  we  simply  refer,  because  they  are 
so  recent  as  to  be  familiar  to  all,  and  not  because  they  are  less  worthy  of  study 
than  some  others  of  a  more  distant  date,  from  which  we  have  extracted  freely. 
Indeed,  we  have  so  often  found  occasion  to  recommend  the  perusal  of  the  par- 
*  See  "  Speeches,"  &c.,  No.  31.  t  Ibid.,  No.  30,  32,  33,  34,  35,  36. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  <& 

ticular  speech  to  which  we  were  referring,  that  we  were  almost  afraid  of  exci 
ting  the  suspicion  that  our  object  was  more  to  eulogize  the  statesman  than  to 
instruct  the  reader ;  and  yet  we  are  sure  that  all  who  study  these  speeches  will 
acquit  us  of  such  a  motive.  We  have  recommended  their  perusal  because  we 
believed  that  they  gave  the  best  view  of  the  state  of  public  affairs,  and  of  the 
mode  in  which  a  statesman  would  deal  with  such  events,  which  has  yet  been 
furnished  ;  nor  did  we  know  of  any  other  models,  either  of  statesmanship  or 
oratory,  in  our  own  parliamentary  annals,  to  which  we  could  better  invite  the 
attention  of  the  student.  Indeed,  we  could  scarcely  direct  him  amiss  among 
these  speeches  for  specimens  of  luminous  conceptions,  or  of  that  simple  and 
natural  order  of  propositions  which  constitutes  a  peculiar  charm  in  style,  and 
enables  the  orator  to  fascinate  his  audience,  and  carry  them  along  with  him. 
The  English  language  affords  no  finer  examples  than  are  to  be  found  in  these 
speeches  of  the  power  of  analysis  in  eliminating  the  truth  of  a  case  from  cir 
cumstances  which  obscure  and  embarrass  it.  Nor  are  there  any  more  attract 
ive  for  novel  and  profound  speculation,  in  which  he  sometimes  deals  when  such, 
lights  and  shadows  are  necessary  to  complete  the  picture  which  he  is  drawing. 

In  how  many  of  the  unexplored  regions  of  human  thought  will  the  attentive 
reader  be  startled  to  find  the  trace  of  his  footstep,  and  yet  so  rapid  is  he  in  his 
flight  over  his  subject,  that  he  scarcely  takes  time  to  set  up  his  flag  on  the  lands 
which  he  has  found,  or  to  perpetuate  the  evidences  of  his  title  to  the  honours 
of  discovery. 

Here,  perhaps,  we  ought  to  leave  the  reader  to  draw  his  own  conclusions  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  man  and  of  his  public  services  from  the  narrative  which 
we  have  given  ;  and  yet  we  feel  that  it  will  be  impossible  for  him  to  understand 
either  fully,  even  with  the  aids  which  we  have  offered  him,  without  a  careful  study 
of  his  speeches,  reports,  and  other  public  addresses,  in  connexion  with  the  his 
tory  of  the  times  ;  a  study  to  which  we  again  commend  him,  as  well  worthy  of 
the  time  and  labour  which  it  may  cost.  For  ourselves,  we  can  truly  say,  that 
our  estimate  of  his  public  services  has  increased  with  our  opportunities  for  stud 
ying  them,  and  that  our  admiration  of  his  character  has  grown  as  his  private 
and  political  history  became  more  familiar  to  us.  Indeed,  it  would  almost  seem 
to  us,  at  times,  that  it  belonged  to  the  destiny  of  the  American  people  to  have 
reared  up  such  a  man,  and  that  one  of  its  necessities  required  him  to  pursue 
that  long  and  stormy  career,  through  which  he  has  watched  and  helped  to  steer 
the  ship  of  state  with  an  eye  that  never  winked  and  an  energy  that  never  tired. 
It  required  his  indomitable  will,  and  a  nature  thus  rarely  constituted,  to  have 
maintained  this  eager  and  incessant  labour  for  the  happiness  of  the  American 
people,  and  to  have  led,  for  so  long  a  period,  the  triumphal  march  of  our  glori 
ous  institutions.  With  a  turn  of  mind  naturally  philosophical,  his  great  power 
of  analysis  and  his  faculty  of  attentive  observation  early  enabled  him  to  form  a 
system  for  the  conduct  of  life,  both  in  his  private  and  public  relations,  and  to 
determine  within  his  own  mind  upon  the  true  ends  of  human  action ;  ends 
which  he  has  pursued  with  a  matchless  constancy,  while  a  knowledge  of  bis 
ultimate  destination  and  of  the  high  objects  of  his  journey  has  cheered  him 
along  through  the  thorny  paths  of  public  life.  Of  all  the  men  whom  we  have 
ever  seen,  he  seems  to  us  to  have  surveyed  most  completely  the  whole  ground 
of  human  action.  To  these  advantages  he  adds  another,  which  constitutes, 
perhaps,  his  highest  quality  as  a  statesman.  It  is  the  faculty  of  considering 
circumstances  in  their  combinations,  and  of  determining  their  relative  power  in 
propelling  events.  To  analyze  this  combination,  or  "juncture"  (as  he  some 
times  calls  it),  and  to  determine  the  resultant  of  all  these  forces,  is,  in  his  opin 
ion,  the  highest  and  rarest  faculty  of  a  statesman.  If  he  values  this  power 
more  than  most  others,  it  is  because  he  has  derived  more  benefit  from  its  use, 
and  well  may  he  estimate  highly  that  quality  which,  by  affording  him  an  insight 
into  futurity  far  beyond  the  usual  range  of  human  vision,  has  given  him  such 


70  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

control  over  events.  These  were  the  gifts  in  whose  strength  he  presented  him 
self  on  the  stage  of  the  world  in  the  very  commencement  of  his  public  life,  as 
one  fully  grown  and  armed  for  the  trials  which  belonged  to  the  time  and  the 
place.  True  to  those  noble  instincts  which  spring  more  from  a  Divine  source 
than  from  human  reason,  he  ever  leaned  to  liberty  as  against  power,  and  early 
learned  to  resist  those  temptations  which  so  often  lead  man  to  increase  the 
power  of  the  mass,  which  he  is  content  to  share  as  a  member,  at  the  expense 
of  those  separate  and  individual  rights  of  which  nature  constituted  him  the  pe 
culiar  guardian,  and  which  were  only  given  as  the  means  of  self-culture,  and  &.s 
indispensable  to  the  moral  elevation  of  his  being. 

His  public  life  may  be  divided  into  two  grand  epochs  :  the  first,  in  which  he 
put  forth  his  whole  energies  to  enable  his  countrymen  to  maintain  their  inde 
pendence  against  foreign  aggression  ;  and  the  second,  in  which  he  undertook  the 
more  difficult  task. of  freeing  their  domestic  legislation  from  those  devices  by 
which  one  was  enabled  to  prey  upon  another.  In  each  of  these  periods  he  has 
been  emphatically  "  the  man  of  his  time,"  and  he  has  ever  regarded  the  tenets 
of  the  Republican  party  as  indicating  the  best  means  of  attaining  these  ends 
under  our  form  of  government.  Of  all  men  now  living,  he,  perhaps,  has  con 
tributed  most  to  illustrate  and  establish  that  political  creed.  We  are  aware  that 
we  expose  ourselves  here  to  the  sneers  of  some  of  those  literal  expositors  of  the 
law,  who  believe  that  man  was  made  for  the  Sabbath  and  not  the  Sabbath  for 
man.  But  we  repeat  the  assertion,  that  in  all  the  public  exigencies  in  which 
he  was  called  to  act,  he  made  the  nearest  practical  approach  to  the  great  ends 
of  the  Republican  party  which  human  wisdom  or  foresight  could  then  devise. 
In  all  the  great  measures  of  our  government  since  he  first  entered  Congress, 
his  influence  has  been  felt  either  in  their  origination  or  modification,  and  to  this 
influence  more  than  any  other  the  Republican  party  is  indebted  for  its  present 
proud  position  before  the  world. 

Morally  considered,  the  great  objects  of  the  Republican  party  are  simple  and 
few.  Its  first  is  to  preserve,  as  far  as  possible,  the  independence  of  individual 
action  and  pursuit ;  and  it  rejects  all  limitations  upon  this  independence  which 
are  not  essential  to  the  great  ends  of  social  organization.  It  regards  all  of  those 
powers  which  man  wields  in  his  aggregate  or  corporate  capacity  as  so  many 
limitations  upon  his  individual  rights,  and  it  yields  those  which  are  indispensa 
ble  to  the  institution  of  society  as  so  many  concessions  which  necessity  has  ex 
torted  from  liberty.  These  are  the  terms  upon  which  they  would  grant  Govern 
ment  its  powers ;  and  they  would  administer  the  power  thus  limited  with  an 
equal  regard  for  all  who  are  entitled  to  share  the  benefits  of  the  trust.  Tried  by 
these  tests,  Mr.  Calhoun  has  nothing  to  fear,  when  the  circumstances  are  con 
sidered  under  which  he  was  called  to  act. 

In  the  first  epoch  of  his  public  life,  we  were  forced  to  defend  ourselves  in  a 
war  with  the  most  formidable  nation  of  the  globe,  and  with  the  only  power 
whose  arm  was  long  enough  to  reach  us  in  our  distant  position,  and  within  the 
defences  of  so  many  natural  barriers.  In  its  commencement  it  was  a  war  of 
independence,  and  it  might  become  a  contest  for  existence.  In  this  state  of 
things,  it  was  in  our  aggregate  power  alone  that  we  were  to  find  the  strength  to 
resist  foreign  assaults,  and  every  American  patriot  sought  the  means  of  increas 
ing  it  as  far  as  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution  would  permit.  The  war  was 
a  measure  of  the  Republican  party,  and  the  unpatriotic  course  of  the  opposition 
devolved  upon  them  alone  the  duty  of  devising  the  means  to  prosecute  it.  Un 
der  these  circumstances,  the  Republican  party  deflected  from  the  natural  line  of 
their  direction,  and  sought  to  concentrate  as  much  power  in  the  Government  as 
they  then  believed  indispensable  for  the  successful  conduct  of  the  war.  How 
far  they  were  right  or  wrong,  it  is  not  our  province  here  to  determine ;  but  cer 
tain  it  is,  that  there  was  much  in  the  overruling  power  of  circumstances  to  jus 
tify  their  course  and  excuse  their  errors,  if  errors  they  may  be  called.  With 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  71 

how  much  more  justice  may  the  same  apology  be  made  for  Mr.  Calhoun  him 
self.  The  leading  advocate  of  hostilities  and  the  chairman  of  the  committee 
which  reported  the  declaration  of  war,  with  a  deep  responsibility  to  the  country 
for  the  success  of  that  contest,  which  he  was  accused  of  precipitating ;  young, 
ardent,  and  indignant  at  the  course  of  foreign  and  domestic  enemies,  it  is  sur 
prising  that  he  was  not  less  scrupulous  of  the  Constitution  in  calling  forth  the 
means  of  defending  it,  and  our  people  against  foreign  expositions  of  law  and 
justice,  which  ultimately  might  have  overturned  all,  unless  arrested  by  our 
successful  resistance.  And  yet,  upon  how  many  great  occasions  did  he  re 
strain  the  Republican  party  from  aberrations  from  their  principles. 

It  was  he  who  opposed  the  restrictive  system  against  the  majority  of  the  party. 
It  was  he,  too,  who  took  a  prominent  part  in  resisting  the  system  of  forced 
loans  in  the  case  of  the  merchants'  bonds,  and  who  defeated  Mr.  Dallas's  vast 
scheme  of  a  national  bank  to  issue  irredeemable  paper,  which  was  recommend 
ed  by  a  Republican  President  and  supported  by  the  party.  Session  after  ses 
sion  did  he  combat  it,  until  he  succeeded  in  restoring  to  the  country  a  specie- 
paying  paper,  and  something  like  uniformity  in  the  medium  in  which  its  taxes 
were  collected.  And  although  the  opinions  of  that  day,  growing  out  of  the  exi 
gencies  of  the  war,  exaggerated  the  necessity  for  roads  and  canals  as  military 
defences,  and  called  for  the  general  use  of  a  power  which  was  given  by  the 
Constitution  within  the  narrowest  limits,  it  is  remarkable  that  he  has  nowhere 
expressly  affirmed  the  existence  of  such  a  power  in  the  Federal  Government. 

His  views  of  the  proper  use  to  be  made  of  this  power,  if  it  existed,  or 
could  be  obtained,  when  given  in  obedience  to  a  call  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
resentatives,  were  perhaps  the  ablest  ever  taken  of  the  relation  of  this  subject  to 
our  military  defences,  yet  he  cautiously  abstained  from  deciding  the  constitu 
tional  question.  This  was  before  the  Republican  party  had  paused  in  that  ca 
reer  in  which  they  were  concentrating  power  within  to  defend  themselves  against 
attacks  from  without.  In  a  review  of  this  period  of  his  life,  it  may  with  truth 
be  said,  that  all  those  acts  for  which  he  has  been  reproached  as  departures  from 
the  State  Rights  creed,  were  substitutes  for  much  worse  measures,  which,  but 
for  him,  his  party  would  have  adopted ;  and,  although  some  of  them  were  nei 
ther  the  wisest  nor  best,  according  to  the  present  standard  of  information,  they 
were  each  the  nearest  approach  to  the  true  Republican  line  of  action  which 
was  permitted  by  the  state  of  public  knowledge  and  feeling  at  the  time.  But, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  errors  of  the  early  part  of  his  public  life,  he  nobly 
redeemed  them  in  the  second  period,  which  commenced  from  his  election  to 
the  vice-presidency.  It  was  during  the  interval  then  allowed  for  reflection 
that  he  first  examined  thoroughly  the  working  of  the  machinery  of  the  Govern 
ment  in  its  internal  as  well  as  its  external  relations.  He  was  among  the  first 
of  the  Republican  party  to  pause  in  that  career  by  which  power  had  been  con 
solidated  in  the  Federal  Government,  without  due  reflection  upon  its  conse 
quences  to  the  states  and  the  people.  He  saw  that  the  distribution  of  the  polit 
ical  powers  of  our  system,  as  contemplated  by  the  Constitution,  had  been  de 
ranged,  and  that  vast  affiliated  stock  interests  had  been. permitted  to  grow  up 
almost  unconsciously,  which  threatened  to  absorb  the  whole  power  and  influ 
ence  of  the  Confederacy,  and  to  substitute  a  government  of  the  few  for  that  of  the 
many ;  and,  worse  than  all,  he  saw  many  of  the  Republican  party  so  deeply 
entangled  in  the  consequences  of  past  action,  and  so  little  aware  of  the  mis 
chiefs  which  threatened  them,  that  it  was  impossible  to  receive  their  co-oper 
ation  in  the  efforts  which  were  necessary  to  save  the  Government  from  deep 
organic  derangement,  and  the  party  itself  from  utter  annihilation.  His  position 
gave  him  a  deep  interest  in  the  unity  of  the  party,  if  he  had  looked  to  himself 
alone  ;  the  road  to  office  was  open  and  easy ;  but  the  higher  and  more  alluring 
path  to  fame  lay  along  a  steeper  route  and  over  rugged  and  difficult  precipices. 
Between  these  alternatives  he  did  not  hesitate,  but  determined  at  once  to  strike 


72  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  blows  he  believed  to  be  necessary  to  save  the  country  and  restore  the  party 
to  its  pristine  purity  of  faith  and  practice.  We  have  given  the  history  of  the 
memorable  contest  in  which,  with  unexampled  odds  against  him,  he  maintained 
his  foothold  and  accomplished  his  grand  design. 

We  have  seen  the  series  of  skilful  movements  and  masterly  combina 
tions  by  which,  with  comparatively  few  forces,  he  occupied  and  manfully 
contested  every  inch  of  disputed  territory,  until  he  finally  struck  down  the 
protective  system  with  blows  from  which  it  never  can  entirely  recover 
in  the  face  of  the  formidable  array  against  him,  wielding  the  battle-axa 
of  Richard  or  the  cimeter  of  Saladin,  as  strength  or  skill  might  best 
serve  his  turn.  Ever  ready,  cheerful,  and  confident,  he  sometimes  obtain 
ed  concessions  from  mere  respect  to  his  gallantry  and  prowess,  which  no 
force  at  his  disposal  could  then  have  extorted.  Experience  now  proved 
that  he  had  not  been  a  moment  too  soon  in  striking  at  the  protective  sys 
tem.  The  Republican  party  had  been  gradually  wasting  under  the  as 
saults  of  their  open  enemies,  and  the  moral  influences  of  the  stock  in 
terests.  The  banks,  deprived  for  the  time  of  their  natural  ally  the  tariff 
were  forced  to  take  the  field  alone,  and  the  difficulty  which  the  Republi 
cans  experienced  in  coping  with  this  single  interest,  proved  how  impossi 
ble  it  would  ha've  been  for  them  to  have  resisted  the  whole  affiliated  sys 
tem  if  its  strength  had  been  unimpaired,  and  its  united  forces  directed 
against  them.  They  now  saw  that  Mr.  Calhoun  had  been  warring  all  along, 
not  against  them,  but  a  common  enemy,  which,  but  for  him,  might  have 
overwhelmed  all  together.  Mr.  Calhoun,  who  had  left  his  ancient  friends 
in  their  strength  to  reform,  but  not  to  destroy,  now  returned  to  them  in 
their  weakness  to  cheer,  to  animate,  to  rally,  and  defend  them,  and  was 
prouder  of  their  alliance  upon  principle  in  their  period  of  adversity  than 
he  would  have  been  of  all  the  honours  which  they  could  have  heaped 
upon  him  in  their  prosperity.  It  was  not  in  his  nature  to  regard  the  exe 
crations  which  these  stock  interests  poured  out  upon  him.  They  had 
too  often  tried  the  temper  of  his  steel  not  to  know  the  force  of  the  arm 
which  wielded  it,  and  it  was  perhaps  with  as  much  of  despair  as  rage 
that  privilege  saw  its  ancient  and  well-trained  adversary  take  the  field  with 
additional  strength  against  it.  Mr.  Calhoun  did  not  now  direct  his  atten 
tion  so  much  to  mere  affairs  of  outposts  as  to  placing  the  party  upon  that 
solid  platform  of  principle,  in  which  he  well  knew  that  the  whole  batter 
ing  train  of  the  Federal  hosts  could  never  effect  a  breach.  With  a  true 
military  eye,  he  readily  seized  all  the  advantages  of  position,  and  under 
his  advice  mainly,  they  have,  at  every  sacrifice,  directed  column  after  col 
umn  upon  this  elevated  post,  where  they  now  command  the  field,  and  from 
which,  if  not  abandoned  or  lost  by  want  of  vigilance,  they  must  ultimately 
recover  the  country. 

He  is  now  about  to  retire  from  the  theatre  of  public  life,  neither  weari 
ed  nor  worn,  but  because  his  work  is  done,  so  far,  at  least,  as  senatorial 
life  can  afford  him  any  useful  part  to  play.  If  there  be  any  new  field  of 
action  worthy  of  his  powers,  and  as  yet  untrodden  by  him,  it  is  in  that 
highest  executive  sphere,  for  which  the  character  of  his  mind  and  the  ex 
perience  of  his  life  have  so  eminently  fitted  him.  It  is,  perhaps,  only  upon 
this  theatre  that  his  countrymen  would  not  now  exclaim,  "  Superfluous 
lags  the  veteran  on  the  stage,"  and  it  is  there  that  they  will  probably  re 
quire  him  to  consummate,  as  perhaps  he  alone  can  do,  those  great  Repub 
lican  reforms  so  cherished  by  the  party,  as  destined  to  commend  it  to  the 
grateful  regards  of  posterity.  We  cannot  better  close  this  sketch  than  by 
extracting  a  portrait  of  Mr.  Calhoun  as  a  man  and  an  orator,  which  was 
drawn  by  a  friendly  hand,  it  is  true,  but  which  we  recognise  as  being  so 
just  and  well  executed  that  we  gladly  adopt  it  as  our  own. 


LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  73 

In  his  person  Mr.  Calhoun  is  slender  and   tall.     His  countenance,  at 
rest,  is  strikingly  marked  with  decision  and  firmness.     In  conversation  it 
is  highly  animated,  expressive,  and  indicative  of  genius.     His  eyes  are 
large,  dark,  brilliant,  and  penetrating,  and  leave  no  doubt,  at  first  view,  of 
a   high  order  of   intellect.     His  manners  are  easy,  natural,  and  unassu 
ming,  and  as  frank  as  they  are  cordial  and  kind.     In  all  his  domestic  rela 
tions  his  life  is  without  a  blemish.     He  has  none  of  the  cautious  reserve 
and  mystery  of  common  politicians  j   for  he  has  nothing  to  conceal  or 
disguise.     He  is  accessible  to  all,  agreeable,  animated,  instructive,  and 
eloquent  in  conversation,  and  communicates  his  opinions  with  the  utmost 
freedom.     Some   politicians   seek   popularity  by  carefully   avoiding    re 
sponsibility.     Whatever  popularity  Mr.  Calhoun   possesses   has,  on  the 
contrary,  been  acquired  by  bold  and  fearless  assumption  of  responsibility 
on  all  critical  and  trying  occasions.     His  judgment  is  so  clear  and  dis 
criminating,  that  he  seems  to  possess  a  sort  of  prophetic  vision  of  future 
events,  and  on  occasions  when  most  men  doubt  and  hesitate,  he  decides 
with  confidence,  follows  up  his  decision  with  undoubting  firmness,  and 
has  never  failed  in  the  end  to  be  justified  by  time,  the  arbiter  of  all  things. 
Few  men  have  been  called  upon  to  pass  through  scenes  of  higher  polit 
ical  excitement,  and  to  encounter  more  vigorous  and  unrelenting  opposi 
tion  than  Mr.  Calhoun ;  yet,  amid  all  the  prejudices  which  party  feeling 
engenders,  and  all  the  jealousy  of  political  rivals,  and  all  the  animosity* 
of  political  opponents,  no  one  has  yet  ventured  to  hazard  his  own  repu 
tation  for  judgment  or  sincerity  so  far  as  to  doubt  one  moment  his  great 
and  commanding  talents. 

'As  an  orator,  Mr.  Calhoun  stands  in  the  foremost  rank  of  parliamentary 
speakers.  On  first  rising  in  debate,  he  always  felt  the  anxiety  of  diffi 
dence,  arising  from  a  sensibility  which  is  almost  always  the  companion 
of  true  genius.  His  manner  of  speaking  is  energetic,  ardent,  rapid,  and 
marked  by  a  solemn. earnestness,  which  leaves  no  doubt  of  his  sincerity 
and  deep  conviction.  His  style  is  pure,  forcible,  logical,  and  condensed  ; 
often  figurative  for  illustration,  never  for  ornament.  His  mind  is  well 
stored  with  the  fruits  of  learning,  but  still  better  with  those  of  observa 
tion  and  reflection.  Hence  depth,  originality,  and  force  characterize  all 
his  speeches.  He  lays  his  premises  on  a  foundation  too  broad,  solid,  and 
deep  to  be  shaken  ;  his  deductions  are  clear  and  irresistible;  "the  strong 
power  of  genius,"  to  adopt  the  language  of  the  eloquent  Pinkney,  in  re 
ferring  to  Mr.  Calhoun's  splendid  speech  on  the  treaty-making  power, 
"  from  a  higher  region  than  that  of  argument,  throws  on  his  subjects  all 
the  light  with  which  it  is  the  prerogative  of  genius  to  invest  and  illus 
trate  everything."  And  his  speeches,  full  of  the  most  elevated  and  pa 
triotic  sentiments,  after  conquering  the  understanding,  take  the  heart 
entirely  captive,  and  carry  along  his  hearers,  often  unconsciously,  and 
sometimes  against  their  will,  to  the  point  he  desires. 

Mr.  Calhoun  had  attained  so  high  a  reputation  as  a  member  of  Con 
gress,  that  it  was  thought  by  many  that  he  was  leaving  his  appropriate 
field  when  he  accepted  the  appointment  of  Secretary  of  War.  On  the 
contrary,  his  new  situation  only  presented  another  theatre  for  the  exer 
cise  of  his  great  and  diversified  talents.  The  distinguishing  feature  of 
his  mind,  the  power  of  analysis,  was  now  to  be  exercised  in  the  practical 
business  of  Government,  and  at  once,  as  by  enchantment,  order,  efficiency, 
and  perfect  accountability  sprang  from  the  chaos  in  which  he  found  the 
department,  and  demonstrated  that  his  energy  in  execution  was  equal  to  his 
wisdom  in  organizing,  and  left  it  doubtful  whether  his  legislative  talents 
were  not  surpassed  by  his  practical  ability  in  administration. 

As  a  statesman,  in  the  most  enlarged  and  elevated  sense  of  the  term, 

K 


74  LIFE  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

Mr.  Calhoun  has  no  superior.  A  philosophical  observer  of  men  and  of 
their  affairs,  he  analyzes  and  reduces  all  things  to  their  original  elements, 
and  draws  thence  those  general  principles,  which,  with  inconceivable 
rapidity  and  unerring  certainty,  he  applies  on  all  occasions,  and  banishes 
the  perplexity  and  doubt  by  which  ordinary  minds  are  overwhelmed  and 
confounded.  By  this  wonderful  faculty,  he  is  enabled  to  decide  at  once, 
not  only  what  measures  are  at  present  necessary  for  a  government  novel 
in  its  principles,  and  placed  in  circumstances  of  which  there  is  no  pre 
cedent  in  the  history  of  mankind,  but,  by  discerning  results  through  their 
causes,  to  look  into  futurity,  and  to  devise  means  for  carrying  on  our  be 
loved  country  in  a  direct  path  to  the  high  and  glorious  destiny  which, 
under  the  guidance  of  wisdom  and  virtue,  awaits  her. 

To  the  highest  powers  of  mind  Mr.  Calhoun  unites  those  elevated 
moral  qualities,  which  are  equally  essential  with  ability  to  complete  the 
character  of  a  perfect  statesman:  inflexible  integrity,  honour  without  a 
stain,  disinterestedness,  temperance,  and  industry  ;  a  firmness  of  purpose 
which  disdains  to  calculate  the  consequences  of  doing  his  duty ;  pru 
dence  and  energy  in  action,  devotion  to  his  country,  and  inextinguishable 
love  of  liberty  and  justice.  To  these  great  qualities,  perhaps,  we  ought 
to  add  a  lofty  ambition  ;  but  it  is  an  ambition  that  prefers  glory  to  office 
and  power,  which  looks  upon  the  latter  only  as  a  means  for  acquiring  the 
former,  and  which,  by  the  performance  of  great  and  virtuous  actions  for 
the  accomplishment  of  noble  ends,  aims  at  the  establishment  of  a  widely- 
extended  and  ever-during  fame.  This  ingredient,  which  enters  into  the 
composition  of  all  great  and  powerful  minds,  seems  intended  by  Provi 
dence  to  stimulate  them  to  the  highest  pitch  of  exertion  in  the  service 
of  mankind  j  and  if  it  be  a  defect,  it  is  one  which  Mr.  Calhoun  shares,  as 
well  as  all  their  high  qualities,  with  the  most  perfect  models  of  Greek 
and  Roman  excellence. 

To  those  who  have  not  been  attentive  observers  of  the  life,  character, 
and  conduct  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  or  who  may  have  been  alienated  by  political 
conflicts,  the  above  portraiture  may  seem  to  derive  some  of  its  colour 
ing  from  the  partial  pencil  of  friendship.  If  an  intimate  connexion  of 
that  kind  for  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  may  be  supposed  to 
tincture  the  writer's  mind  with  partiality,  it  will  be  allowed,  at  the  same 
time,  that  it  affords  the  best  possible  opportunity  of  forming  an  accurate 
estimate  of  the  moral  and  political  character  of  the  subject  of  this  me 
moir.  His  statements  of  fact  and  opinion  he  knows  to  be  entirely  authentic  ; 
and  after  a  deliberate  review  of  every  sentence  and  word  he  has  written, 
he  finds  nothing  which  a  reverence  for  justice  and  truth  will  allow  him 
to  alter. 


-: 


FROM   THE 


SPEECHES,    REPORTS, 


OTHER  PUBLICATIONS 


JOHN  C.  CALHOUN, 


SUBSEQUENT  TO  HIS 


ELECTION  AS  VICE-PRESIDENT, 


(INCLUDING  ALSO  HIS  FIRST  SPEECH  IN  CONGRESS  IN  1811),  AND 
REFERRED  TO  IN  HIS  "LIFE." 


- 


VJ   i-.'.'AVP 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

I.  Delivered  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  December  19,  1811,  in  the  De 
bate  on  the  Second  Resolution  reported  by  the  Committee  of  Foreign 

Relations       .         .  '  .        .        .         .9 

II.  Onslow  in  Reply  to  Patrick  Henry — No.  1        .       \        ...        .14 

«  «  "  No.  2 22 

x        III.  Mr.  Calhoun's  Address,  stating  his  Opinion  of  the  Relation  which  the 

States  and  General  Government  bear  to  each  other       .         .         .         .27 
IV.  Mr.  Calhoun's  Letter  to  General  Hamilton  on  the  Subject  of  State  Inter 
position        .  .         .         .        *      *'*.'       .  '     ".       ":      •'..'.'".         .     43 
V.  Speech  against  the  Force  Bill 67 

VI.  Speech  on  his  Resolutions,  and  Reply  to  Mr.  Webster,  February  26,  1833    98 

VII.  Speech  on  the  Subject  of  the  Removal  of  the  Deposites  from  the  Bank  of 

the  United  States,  January  13,  1834 122 

s    VIII.  Speech  on  Mr.  Webster's  Proposition  to  Recharter  the  United   States 

Bank,  March  26,  1834 .138 

IX..  Speech  delivered  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  April  9,  1834,  on  the 

Bill  to  Repeal  the  Force  Act 154 

"X..  A  Report  on  the  Extent  of  Executive  Patronage,  February  9,  1835  .         .  168 
-— , — XI.  A  Report  on  that  Portion  of  the  President's  Message  which  related  to  the 
Adoption  of  efficient  Measures  to  prevent  the  Circulation  of  incendiary 
Abolition  Petitions  through  the  Mail,  February  4,  1836          .         .         .  189 

— XII.  Speech  on  the  Abolition  Petitions,  March  9,  1836 197 

XIII.  Speech  on  the  Bill' to  prohibit  Deputy  Postmasters  from  receiving  and 
transmitting  through  the  Mail  certain  Papers  therein  mentioned,  April 

12,  1836 210 

""""XIV.  Speech  on  the  Reception  of  Abolition  Petitions,  February,  1837        .         .  222 

XV.  Speech  on  the  Public  Deposites,  May  28,  1836 226 

XVI.  Speech  on  the  Bill  for  the  Admission  of  Michigan,  January  2,  1837    .         .  243 
XVII.  On  the  same  Subject,  January  5,  1837        .         .         .         .         .         .         .249 

XVIII.  Speech  on  the  Bill  authorizing  an  Issue  of  Treasury  Notes,  September  19, 

1837      .         .       .'.        .    •    ii'---    .'  .  •••'•„'      V 259 

\/XIX.  Speech  on  his  Amendment  to  Separate  the  Government  from  the  Banks, 

October  3,  1837 275 

XX.  Speech  on  the  Sub-treasury  Bill,  February  15,  1838          .         .         .    '     .  290 

XXI.  Speech  in  Reply  to  Mr.  Clay,  on  the  Sub-treasury  Bill,  March  10,  1838     .  309 

XXII.  Speech  in  Reply  to  Mr.  Webster  on  the  Sub-treasury  Bill,  March  22,  1838  329 

XXIII.  Speech  on  the  Bill  to  Prevent  the  Interference  of  certain  Federal  Officers 

in  Elections,  February  22,  1839 352 

XXIV.  Speech  on  the  Report  of  Mr.  Grundy,  of  Tennessee,  in  relation  to  the  As 

sumption  of  the  Debts  of  the  States  by  the  Federal  Government,  Febru 
ary  5,  1840     . 363 

XXV.  Speech  on  his  Resolutions  in  reference  to  the  Case  of  the  Enterprise, 

March  13,  1840 '-.-.>. -^         .         .378 

XXVI.  Speech  on  the  Bankrupt  Bill,  June  2,  1840 390 

i  XXVII.  Speech  on  the  Prospective  Pre-emption  Bill,  January  12,  1841          .         .  403 
^XXVIII.  Speech  on  the  Bill  to  Distribute  the  Proceeds  of  the  Public  Lands,  Janu 
ary  23,  1841 417 

XXIX.  Speech  in  Reply  to  the  Speeches  of  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Clay,  on  Mr. 

Crittenden's  Amendment  to  the  Pre-emption  Bill,  January  30^  1841       .  429 
XXX.  Speech  on  the  Case  of  M'Leod,  June  11,  1841    .  ... 442 

XXXI.  Speech  on  the  Distribution  Bill,  August  24,  1841       .        ...        .447 

XXXII.  Speech  on  the  Treasury  Note  Bill,  January  25,  1842          .        V        .        .462 

XXXIII.  Speech  in  Support  of  the  Veto  Power,  February  28,  1842  .         .         .        .477 

XXXIV.  Speech  on  Mr.  Clay's  Resolutions  in  Relation  to  the  Revenues  and  Expen 

ditures  of  the  Government,  March  16,  1842 489 

XXXV.  Speech  on  the  Loan  Bill,  April  12,  1842     .         .'....        .        .509 

XXXVI.  Speech  on  the  Passage  of  the  Tariff  Bill,  August  5,  1842  .         .        .        .518 

XXXVII.  Speech  on  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  August,  1842 532 

XXXVIII.  Speech  on  the  Oregon  Bill,  January  24,  1843 544 


SPEECHES  OP  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  DECEMBER  19,  1811,  IN  THE 
DEBATE  ON  THE  SECOND  RESOLUTION  REPORTED  BY  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  FOR 
EIGN  RELATIONS. 

MR.  SPEAKER — I  understood  the  opinion  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Rela 
tions  differently  from  what  the  gentleman  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Randolph)  has 
stated  to  be  his  impression.  I  certainly  understood  that  the  committee  recom 
mended  the  measures  now  before  the  house  as  a  preparation  for  war  ;  and 
such,  in  fact,  was  its  express  resolve,  agreed  to,  I  believe,  by  every  member 
except  that  gentleman.  I  do  not  attribute  any  wilful  misstatement  to  him,  but 
consider  it  the  effect  of  inadvertency  or  mistake.  Indeed,  the  report  could  mean 
nothing  but  war  or  empty  menace.  I  hope  no  member  is  in  favour  of  the  lat 
ter.  A  bullying,  menacing  system  has  everything  to  condemn  and  nothing  to 
recommend.it — in  expense  it  almost  rivals  war.  It  excites  contempt  abroad 
and  destroys  confidence  at  home.  Menaces  are  serious  things,  which  ought  to 
be  resorted  to  with  as  much  caution  and  seriousness  as  war  itself;  and  should, 
if  not  successful,  be  invariably  followed  by  war.  It  was  not  the  gentleman 
from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy)  that  made  this  a  war  question.  The  resolve 
contemplates  an  additional  regular  force ;  a  measure  confessedly  improper  but 
as  a  preparation  for  war,  but  undoubtedly  necessary  in  that  event.  Sir,  1  am 
not  insensible  to  the  weighty  importance  of  this  question,  for  the  first  time  sub 
mitted  to  this  house,  to  compel  a  redress  of  our  long  list  of  complaints  against 
one  of  the  belligerants.  According  to  my  mode  of  thinking,  the  more  serious 
the  question,  my  conviction  to  support  it  must  be  the  stronger  and  more  unal 
terable.  War,  in  our  country,  ought  never  to  be  resorted  to  but  when  it  is 
clearly  justifiable  and  necessary ;  so  much  so  as  not  to  require  the  aid  of  logic 
to  convince  our  understanding,  nor  the  ardour  of  eloquence  to  inflame  our  pas 
sions.  There  are  many  reasons  why  this  country  should  never  resort  fc>  it  but 
for  causes  the  most  urgent  and  necessary.  It  is  sufficient  that,  under  a  govern 
ment  like  ours,  none  but  such  will  justify  it  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  ,•  and  were 
I  not  satisfied  that  such  is  the  present  case,  I  certainly  would  be  no  advocate 
of  the  proposition  now  before  the  house. 

Sir,  I  might  prove  the  war,  should  it  follow,  to  be  justifiable,  by  the  express 
admission  of  the  gentleman  from  Virginia ;  and  necessary,  by  /acts  undoubted 
and  universally  admitted,  such  as  he  did  not  attempt  to  controvert.  The  ex 
tent,  duration,  and  character  of  the  injuries  received  ;  the  failure  of  those  peace 
ful  means  heretofore  resorted  to  for  the  redress  of  oar  wrongs,  are  my  proofs 
*  that  it  is  necessary.  Why  should  I  mention  the  impressment  of  our  seamen — 
depredation  on  every  branch  of  our  commerce,  including  the  direct  export  trade, 
continued  for  years,  and  made  under  laws  which  professedly  undertake  to  reg 
ulate  our  trade  with  other  nations  ?  negotiation,  resorted  to  again  and  again, 
till  it  became  hopeless,  and  the  restrictive  system  persisted  in  to  avoid  war,  and 
in  the  vain  expectation  of  returning  justice  ?  The  e.vil  still  continued  to  grow, 
so  that  each  succeeding  year  exceeded  in  enormity  the  preceding.  The  ques 
tion,  even  in  the  opinion  and  admission  of  our  opponents,  is  reduced  to  this  sin- 

B 


10  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

gle  point :  Which  shall  we  do,  abandon  or  defend  our  own  commercial  and  mar 
itime  rights,  and  the  personal  liberties  of  our  citizens  employed  in  exercising 
them  ?  These  rights  are  vitally  attacked,  and  war  is  the  only  means  of  re 
dress.  The  gentleman  from  Virginia  has  suggested  none,  unless  we  consider 
the  whole  of  his  speech  as  recommending  patient  and  resigned  submission  as 
the  best  remedy.  It  is  for  the  house  to  decide  which  of  the  alternatives  ought 
to  be  embraced.  I  hope  the  decision  is  made  already,  by  a  higher  authority 
than  the  voice  of  any  man.  It  is  not  in  the  power  of  speech  to  infuse  the  sense 
of  independence  and  honour.  To  resist  wrong  is  the  instinct  of  nature  ;  a  gen 
erous  nature,  that  disdains  tame  submission. 

This  part  of  the  subject  is  so  imposing  as  to  enforce  silence  even  on  the  gen 
tleman  from  Virginia.  He  dared  not  to  deny  his  country's  wrongs,  or  vindi 
cate  the  conduct  of  her  enemy.  But  one  part  only  of  his  argument  had  any, 
the  most  remote  relation  to  this  point.  He  would  not  say  that  we  had  not  a 
good  cause  for  war,  but  insisted  that  it  was  our  duty  to  define  that  cause.  If 
he  means  that  this  house  ought,  at  this  stage  of  its  proceedings,  or  any  other, 
to  specify  any  particular  violation  of  our  rights  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others, 
he  prescribes  a  course  which  neither  good  sense  nor  the  usage  of  nations  war 
rants.  When  we  contend,  let  us  contend  for  all  our  rights — the  doubtful  and 
the  certain,  the  unimportant  and  essential.  It  is  as  easy  to  contend,  or  even 
more  so,  for  the  whole  as  for  a  part.  At  the  termination  of  the  contest,  secure 
all  that  our  wisdom,  and  valour,  and  the  fortune  of  war  will  permit.  This  is 
the  dictate  of  common  sense,  and  such,  also,  is  the  usage  of  nations.  The  sin 
gle  instance  alluded  to,  the  endeavour  of  Mr.  Fox  to  compel  Mr.  Pitt  to  define 
the  object  of  the  war  against  France,  will  not  support  the  gentleman  from  Vir 
ginia  in  his  position.  That  was  an  extraordinary  war  for  an  extraordinary  pur 
pose,  and  was  not  governed  by  the  usual  rules.  It  was  not  for  conquest  or  for 
redress  of  injury,  but  to  impose  a  government  on  France  which  she  refused  to 
receive — an  object  so  detestable  that  an  avowal  dare  not  be  made. 

I  might  here  rest  the  question.  The  affirmative  of  the  proposition  is  estab 
lished.  I  cannot  but  advert,  however,  to  the  complaint  of  the  gentleman  from 
Virginia  when  he  was  first  up  on  this  question.  He  said  he  found  himself  re 
duced  to  the  necessity  of  supporting  the  negative  side  of  the  question  before  the 
affirmative  was  established.  Let  me  tell  that  gentleman  that  there  is  no  hard 
ship  in  his  case.  It  is  not  every  affirmative  that  ought  to  be  proved.  Were  I 
to  affirm  that  the  house  is  now  in  session,  would  it  be  reasonable  to  ask  for 
proof?  He  who  would  deny  its  truth,  on  him  would  be  the  proof  of  so  extra 
ordinary  a  negative.  How,  then,  could  the  gentleman,  after  his  admissions,  and 
with  tine  facts  before  him  and  the  nation,  complain  ?  The  causes  are  such  as 
to  warrant,  or,  rather,  to  make  it  indispensable  in  any  nation  not  absolutely  de 
pendant  to  defend  its  rights  by  arms.  Let  him,  then,  show  the  reasons  why  we 
ought  not  so  to  defend  ourselves.  On  him,  then,  is  the  burden  of  proof.  This 
he  has  attempted.  He  has  endeavoured  to  support  his  negative.  Before  I  pro 
ceed  to  answer  him  particularly,  let  me  call  the  attention  of  the  house  to  one 
circumstance,  that  almost  the  whole  of  his  arguments  consisted  of  an  enumer 
ation  of  evils  always  incident  to  war,  however  just  and  necessary  ;  and  that,  if 
they  have  any  force,  h  is  calculated  to  produce  unqualified  submission  to  every 
species  of  insult  and  injury.  I  do  not  feel  myself  bound  to  answer  arguments 
of  that  description,  and  if  1  should  allude  to  them,  it  will  be  only  incidentally, 
and  not  for  the  purpose  of  serious  refutation. 

The  first, argument  which  I  shall  notice  is  the  unprepared  state  of  the  coun 
try.  Whatever  weight  this  argument  might  have  in  a  question  of  immediate 
war,  it  surely  has  little  in  that  of  preparation  for  it.  If  our  country  is  unpre 
pared,  let  us  prepare  as  soon  as  possible.  Let  the  gentleman  submit  his  plan, 
and  if  a  reasonable  one,  I  doubt  not  it  will  be  supported  by  the  house.  But, 
sir,  let  us  admit  the  fact  with  the  whole  force  of  the  argument ;  I  ask,  whose  is 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  11 

the  fault?  Who  has  been  a  member  for  many  years  past,  and  has  seen  the 
defenceless  state  of  his  country,  even  near  home,  under  his  own  eyes,  without 
a  single  endeavour  to  remedy  so  serious  an  evil  ?  Let  him  not  say  "  1  have 
acted  in  a  minority."  It  is  no  less  the  duty  of  the  minority  than  a  majority  to 
endeavour  to  defend  the  country.  I7ui  tiia^  puipooe  principally  we  are  sent 
here,  and  not  for  that  of  opposition.  . 

We  are  next  told  of  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  that  the  people  will  not 
pay  taxes.  W^hy  not  ?  Is  it  a  want  of  means  ?  What,  with  1,000,000  tons  of 
shipping;  a  commerce  of  $100,000,000  annually;  manufactures  yielding  a 
yearly  product  of  $150,000,000,  and  agriculture  thrice  that  amount;  shall  we, 
with  such  great  resources,  be  told  that  the  country  wants  ability  to  raise  and 
support  10,000  or  15,000  additional  regulars?  No  :  it  has  the  ability,  that  is 
admitted ;  but  will  it  not  have  the  disposition  ?  Is  not  our  course  just  and  ne 
cessary  ?  Shall  we,  then,  utter  this  libel  on  the  people  ?  Where  will  proof  be 
found  of  a  fact  so  disgraceful  ?  It  is  said,  in  the  history  of  the  country  twelve 
or  fifteen  years  ago.  The  case  is  not  parallel.  The  ability  of  the  country  is 
greatly  increased  since.  The  whiskey  tax  was  unpopular.  But,  as  well  as  my 
memory  serves  me,  the  objection  was  not  so  much  to  the  tax  or  its  amount  as 
the  mode  of  collecting  it.  The  people  were  startled  by  the  host  of  officers,  and 
their  love  of  liberty  shocked  with  the  multiplicity  of  regulations.  We,  in  the 
spirit  of  imitation,  copied  from  the  most  oppressive  part  of  the  European  laws 
on  the  subject  of  taxes,  and  imposed  on  a  young  and  virtuous  people  the  se 
vere  provisions  made  necessary  by  corruption  and  the  long  practice  of  evasion. 
If  taxes  should  become  necessary,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  the  people  will  pay 
cheerfully.  It  is  for  their  government  and  their  cause,  and  it  would  be  their 
interest  and  duty  to  pay.  But  it  may  be,  and  I  believe  was  said,  that  the  peo 
ple  will  not  pay  taxes,  because  the  rights  violated  are  not  worth  defending,  or 
that  the  defence  will  cost  more  than  the  gain.  Sir,  I  here  enter  my  solemn 
protest  against  this  low  and  "  calculating  avarice"  entering  this  hall  of  legisla 
tion.  It  is  only  fit  for  shops  and  counting-houses,  and  ought  not  to  disgrace  the 
seat  of  power  by  its  squalid  aspect.  Whenever  it  touches  sovereign  power,  the 
nation  is  ruined.  It  is  too  short-sighted  to  defend  itself.  It  is  a  compromising 
spirit,  always  ready  to  yield  a  part  to  save  the  residue.  It  is  too  timid  to  have 
in  itself  the  laws  of  self-preservation.  Sovereign  power  is  never  safe  but  under 
the  shield  of  honour.  There  is,  sir,  one  principle  necessary  to  make  us  a  great 
people — to  produce,  not  the  form,  but  real  spirit  of  union,  and  that  is  to  protect 
every  citizen  in  the  lawful  pursuit  of  his  business.  He  will  then  feel  that  he 
is  backed  by  the  government — that  its  arm  is  his  arm.  He  then  will  rejoice  in 
its  increased  strength  and  prosperity.  Protection  and  patriotism  are  reciprocal. 
This  is  the  way  which  has  led  nations  to  greatness.  Sir,  I  am  not  versed  in 
this  calculating  policy,  and  will  not,  therefore,  pretend  to  estimate  in  dollars 
and  cents  the  value  of  national  independence.  I  cannot  measure  in  shillings 
and  pence  the  misery,  the  stripes,  and  the  slavery  of  our  impressed  seamen ; 
nor  even  the  value  of  our  shipping,  commercial  and  agricultural  losses,  under 
the  orders  in  council  and  the  British  system  of  blockade.  In  thus  expressing 
myself,  I  do  not  intend  to  condemn  any  prudent  estimate  of  the  means  of  a 
country  before  it  enters  on  a  war.  That  is  wisdom,  the  other  folly.  The 
gentleman  from  Virginia  has  not  failed  to  touch  on  the  calamity  of  war,  that 
fruitful  source  of  declamation,  by  which  humanity  is  made  the  advocate  of  sub 
mission.  If  he  desires  to  repress  the  gallant  ardour  of  our  countrymen  by  such 
topics,  let  me  inform  him  that  true  courage  regards  only  the  cause;  that  it  is 
just  and  necessary,  and  that  it  contemns  the  sufferings  and  dangers  of  war.  If 
he  really  wishes  well  to  the  cause  of  humanity,  let  his  eloquence  be  addressed 
to  the  British  ministry,  and  not  the  American  Congress.  Tell  them  that,  if 
they  persist  in  such  daring  insult  and  outrages  to  a  neutral  nation,  however  in 
clined  to  peace,  it  will  be  bound  by  honour  and  safety  to  resist ;  that  their  pa- 


12  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

tience  and  endurance,  however  great,  will  be  exhausted ;  that  the  calamity  of 
war  will  ensue,  and  that  they,  and  not  we,  in  the  opinion  of  the  world,  will  be 
answerable  for  all  its  devastation  and  misery.  Let  a  regard  to  the  interest  of 
humanity  stay  the  hand  of  injustice,  and  my  life  on  it,  the  gentleman  will  not 
find  it  difficult  to  dissuade  his  countrymen  from  rushing  into  the  bloody  scenes 
of  war. 

We  are  next  told  of  the  danger  of  war.  We  are  ready  to  acknowledge  its 
hazard  and  misfortune,  but  I  cannot  think  that  we  have  any  extraordinary  dan 
ger  to  apprehend,  at  least  none  to  warrant  an  acquiescence  in  the  injuries  we 
have  received.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  no  war  would  be  less  dangerous  to 
internal  peace  or  the  safety  of  the  country.  But  we  are  told  of  the  black  pop 
ulation  of  the  Southern  States.  As  far  as  the  gentleman  from  Virginia  speaks 
of  his  own  personal  knowledge,  I  shall  not  question  the  correctness  of  his 
statement.  I  only  regret  that  such  is  the  state  of  apprehension  in  his  part  of 
the  country.  Of  the  southern  section,  I  too  have  some  personal  knowledge, 
and  can  say  that  in  South  Carolina  no  such  fears,  in  any  part,  are  felt.  But, 
sir,  admit  the  gentleman's  statement :  will  a  war  with  Great  Britain  increase 
the  danger  ?  Will  the  country  be  less  able  to  suppress  insurrections  ?  Had  we 
anything  to  fear  from  that  quarter — which.  I  do  not  believe — in  my  opinion,  the 
period  of  the  greatest  safety  is  during  a  war,  unless,  indeed,  the  enemy  should 
make  a  lodgment  in  the  country.  It  is  in  war  that  the  country  would  be  most  on 
its  guard,  our  militia  the  best  prepared,  and  the  standing  army  the  greatest.  Even 
in  our  Revolution,  no  attempts  were  made  at  insurrection  by  that  portion  of  our  pop 
ulation  ;  and,  however  the  gentleman  may  alarm  himself  with  the  disorganizing 
effects  of  French  principles,  I  cannot  think  our  ignorant  blacks  have  felt  much 
of  their  baneful  influence.  I  dare  say  more  than  one  half  of  them  never  heard 
of  the  French  Revolution. 

But  as  great  as  he  regards  the  danger  from  our  slaves,  the  gentleman's  fears 
end  not  there — the  standing  army  is  not  less  terrible  to  him.  Sir,  I  think  a 
regular  force,  raised  for  a  period  of  actual  hostilities,  cannot  properly  be  called 
a  standing  army.  There  is  a  just  distinction  between  such  a  force  and  one 
raised  as  a  permanent  peace  establishment.  Whatever  would  be  the  composi 
tion  of  the  latter,  I  hope  the  former  will  consist  of  some  of  the  best  materials  of 
the  country.  The  ardent  patriotism  of  our  young  men,  and  the  liberal  bounty 
in  land  proposed  to  be  given,  will  impel  them  to  join  their  country's  stand 
ard,  and  to  fight  her  battles.  They  will  not  forget  the  citizen  in  the  soldier, 
and,  in  obeying  their  officers,  learn  to  contemn  their  government  and  Con 
stitution.  In  our  officers  and  soldiers  we  will  find  patriotism  no  less  pure  and 
ardent  than  in  the  private  citizen ;  but  if  they  should  be  as  depraved  as  has 
been  represented,  what  have  we  to  fear  from  25,000  or  30,000  regulars  ? 
Where  will  be  the  boasted  militia  of  the  gentleman  ?  Can  1,000,000  of  militia 
be  overpowered  by  30,000  regulars  ?  If  so,  how  can  we  rely  on  them  against 
a  foe  invading  our  country?  Sir,  I. have  no  such  contemptuous  idea  of  our 
militia :  their  untaught  bravery  is  sufficient  to  crush  all  foreign  and  internal  at 
tempts  on  their  country's  liberties. 

But  we  have  not  yet  come  to  the  end  of  the  chapter  of  dangers.  The  gen 
tleman's  imagination,  so  fruitful  on  this  subject,  conceives  that  our  Constitution 
is  not  calculated  for  war,  and  that  it  cannot  stand  its  rude  shock.  Can  that  be 
so?  If  so,  we  must  then  depend  upon  the  commiseration  or  contempt  of  other 
nations  for  our  existence.  The  Constitution,  then,  it  seems,  has  failed  in  an 
essential  object:  "to  provide  for  the  common  defence."  No,  says  the  gentle 
man,  it  is  competent  to  a  defensive,  but  not  an  offensive  war.  It  is  not  neces 
sary  for  me  to  expose  the  fallacy  of  this  argument.  Why  make  the  distinction 
in  this  case  ?  Will  he  pretend  to  say  that  this  is  an  offensive  war — a  war  of 
conquest?  Yes,  the  gentleman  has  ventured  to  make  this  assertion,  and  for 
reasons  no  less  extraordinary  than  the  assertion  itself.  He  says,  our  rights  are 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  13 

violated  on  the  ocean,  and  that  these  violations  affect  our  shipping  and  commer 
cial  rights,  to  which  the  Canadas  have  no  relation.  The  doctrine  of  retaliation 
has  been  much  abused  of  late,  by  an  unreasonable  extension  of  its  meaning. 
We  have  now  to  witness  a  new  abuse  :  the  gentleman  from  Virginia  has  limited 
it  down  to  a  point.  By  his  rule,  if  you  receive  a  blow  on  the  breast,  you  dare 
not  return  it  on  the  head ;  you  are  obliged  to  measure  and  return  it  on  the  pre 
cise  point  on  which  it  was  received.  If  you  dp  not  proceed  with  this  mathe 
matical  accuracy,  it  ceases  to  be  self-defence — it  becomes  an  unprovoked  attack. 

In  speaking  of  Canada,  the  gentleman  from  Virginia  introduced  the  name  of 
Montgomery  with  much  feeling  and  interest.  Sir,  there  is  danger  in  that  name 
to  the  gentleman's  argument.  It  is  sacred  to  heroism !  it  is  indignant  of  sub 
mission  !  It  calls  our  memory  back  to  the  time  of  our  Revolution — to  the  Con 
gress  of  1774  and  1775.  Suppose  a  member  of  that  day  had  rose  and  urged 
all  the  arguments  which  we  have  heard  on  this  occasion — had  told  that  Con 
gress  your  contest  is  about  the  right  of  laying  a  tax — that  the  attempt  on  Cana 
da  had  nothing  to  do  with  it — that  the  war  would  be  expensive — that  danger 
and  devastation  would  overspread  our  country — and  that  the  power  of  Great 
Britain  was  irresistible.  With  what  sentiment,  think  you,  would  such  doctrines 
have  been  then  received  1  Happy  for  us,  they  had  no  force  at  that  period  of  our 
country's  glory.  Had  such  been  acted  on,  this  hall  would  never  have  witnessed 
a  great  people  convened  to  deliberate  for  the  general  good ;  a  mighty  empire, 
with  prouder  prospects  than  any  nation  the  sun  ever  shone  on,  would  not  have 
risen  in  the  West.  No !  we  would  have  been  base,  subjected  colonies,  gov 
erned  by  that  imperious  rod  which  Britain  holds  over  her  distant  provinces. 

The  gentleman  attributes  the  preparation  for  war  to  everything  but  its  true 
cause.  He  endeavoured  to  find  it  in  the  probable  rise  in  the  price  of  hemp. 
He  represents  the  people  of  the  Western  States  as  willing  to  plunge  our  coun 
try  into  war  for  such  interested  and  base  motives.  I  will  not  reason  this  point. 
I  see  the  cause  of  their  ardour,  not  in  such  unworthy  motives,  but  in  their  known 
patriotism  and  disinterestedness. 

No  less  mercenary  is  the  reason  which  he  attributes  to  the  Southern  States. 
He  says  that  the  Non-importation  Act  has  reduced  cotton  to  nothing,  which  has 
produced  a  feverish  impatience.  Sir,  I  acknowledge  the  cotton  of  our  planta 
tions  is  worth  but  little,  but  not  for  the  cause  assigned  by  the  gentleman.  The 
people  of  that  section  do  not  reason  as  he  does  ;  they  do  not  attribute  it  to  the 
efforts  of  their  government  to  maintain  the  peace  and  independence  of  their 
country  :  they  see  in  the  low  price  of  their  produce  the  hand  of  foreign  injustice  ; 
they  know  well,  without  the  market  of  the  Continent,  the  deep  and  steady  cur 
rent  of  our  supply  will  glut  that  of  Great  Britain.  They  are  not  prepared  for 
the  colonial  state,  to  which  again  that  power  is  endeavouring  to  reduce  us. 
The  manly  spirit  of  that  section  will  not  submit  to  be  regulated  by  any  foreign 
power. 

The  love  of  France  and  the  hatred  of  England  have  also  been  assigned  as 
the  cause  of  the  present  measure.  France  has  not  done  us  justice,  says  the 
gentleman  from  Virginia,  and  how  can  we,  without  partiality,  resist  the  aggres 
sions  of  England  ?  I  know,  sir,  we  have  still  cause  of  complaint  against 
France,  but  it  is  of  a  different  character  from  that  against  England.  She 
professes  now  to  respect  our  rights  ;  and  there  cannot  be  a  reasonable  doubt 
but  that  the  most  objectionable  parts  of  her  decrees,  as  far  as  they  respect  us, 
are  repealed.  We  have  already  formally  acknowledged  this  to  be  a  fact.  But 
I  protest  against  the  principle  from  which  his  conclusion  is  drawn.  It  is  a 
novel  doctrine,  and  nowhere  avowed  out  of  this  house,  that  you  cannot  select 
your  antagonist  without  being  guilty  of  partiality.  Sir,  when  two  invade  your 
rights,  you  may  resist  both,  or  either,  at  your  pleasure.  The  selection  is  regu 
lated  by  prudence,  and  not  by  right.  The  stale  imputation  of  partiality  for 
France  is  better  calculated  for  the  columns  of  a  newspaper  than  for  the  walls 
of  this  house. 


14  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

The  gentleman  from  Virginia  is  at  a  loss  to  account  for  what  he  calls  our 
hatred  to  England.  He  asks,  how  can  we  hate  the  country  of  Locke,  of  New 
ton,  Hampden,  and  Chatham  ;  a  country  having  the  same  language  and  customs 
with  ourselves,  and  descended  from  a  common  ancestry  ?  Sir,  the  laws  of  hu 
man  affections  are  steady  and  uniform.  If  we  have  so  much  to  attach  us  to 
that  country,  powerful  indeed  must  be  the  cause  which  has  overpowered  it. 
Yes,  there  is  a  cause  strong  enough ;  not  that  occult,  courtly  affection,  which 
he  has  supposed  to  be  entertained  for  France,  but  continued  and  unprovoked 
insult  and  injury :  a  cause  so  manifest  that  he  had  to  exert  much  ingenuity 
to  overlook  it.  But  the  gentleman,  in  his  eager  admiration  of  England,  has  not 
been  sufficiently  guarded  in  his  argument.  Has  he  reflected  on  the  cause  of 
that  admiration  ?  Has  he  examined  the  reasons  for  our  high  regard  for  her  Chat 
ham  ?  It  is  his  ardent  patriotism — his  heroic  courage,  which  could  not  brook 
the  least  insult  or  injury  offered  to  his  country,  but  thought  that  her  interest  and 
her  honour  ought  to  be  vindicated,  be  the  hazard  and  expense  what  they  might. 
I  hope,  when  we  are  called  on  to  admire,  we  shall  also  be  asked  to  imitate.  I 
hope  the  gentleman  does  not  wish  a  monopoly  of  those  great  virtues  for  England. 

The  balance  of  power  has  also  been  introduced  as  an  argument  for  submis 
sion.  England  is  said  to  be  a  barrier  against  the  military  despotism  of  France. 
There  is,  sir,  one  great  error  in  our  legislation;  we  are  ready,  it  would  seem 
from  this  argument,  to  watch  over  the  interests  of  foreign  nations,  while  we 
grossly  neglect  our  own  immediate  concerns.  This  argument,  drawn  from  the 
balance  of  power,  is  well  calculated  for  the  British  Parliament,  but  is  not  at 
all  suited  to  the  American  Congress.  Tell  the  former  that  they  have  to  con 
tend  with  a  mighty  power,  and  if  they  persist  in  insult  and  injury  to  the  Ameri 
can  people,  they  will  compel  them  to  throw  their  weight  into  the  scale  of  their 
enemy.  Paint  the  danger  to  them,  and  if  they  will  desist  from  injuring  us,  I 
answer  for  it,  we  will  not  disturb  the  balance  of  power.  But  it  is  absurd  for 
us  to  talk  about  it,  while  they,  by  their  conduct,  smile  with  contempt  at  what 
they  regard  as  our  simple,  good-natured  vanity.  If,  however,  in  the  contest,  it 
should  be  found  that  they  underrate  us,  which  I  hope  and  believe,  and  that  we 
can  affect  the  balance  of  power,  it  will  not  be  difficult  for  us  to  obtain  such  terms 
as  our  rights  demand. 

I,  sir,  will  now  conclude,  by  adverting  to  an  argument  of  the  gentleman  used 
in  debate  on  a  preceding  day.  He  asked,  why  not  declare  war  immediately  ? 
The  answer  is  obvious — because  we  are  not  yet  prepared.  But,  says  the  gen 
tleman,  such  language  as  is  held  here  will  provoke  Great  Britain  to  commence 
hostilities.  I  have  no  such  fears.  She  knows  well  that  such  a  course  would 
unite  all  parties  here — a  thing  which,  above  all  others,  she  most  dreads.  Be 
sides,  such  has  been  our  past  conduct,  that  she  will  still  calculate  on  our  pa 
tience  and  submission  till  war  is  actually  commenced. 


ii. 

ONSLOW  IN  REPLY  TO  PATRICK  HENRY. 
No.  1. 

IF  rumour  may  be  credited,  I  may  be  proud  in  having  you  as  an  antagonist 
[Mr.  A.,  the  President  of  the  United  States]  ;  and  if  I  were  actuated  by  a  senti 
ment  of  vanity,  much  of  my  reply  would  be  devoted  to  tracing  the  strong,  but, 
perhaps,  accidental  analogy  between  the  style  of  your  numbers  and  some  of 
our  public  documents.  But  truth,  and  not  the  gratification  of  vanity,  is  my  ob 
ject  ;  and  though  the  pride  of  victory  would  be  swelled  in  proportion  to  the  high 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  15 

standing  of  an  opponent,  I  shall,  witj^but  stopping  to  inquire  into  the  question 
of  authorship,  proceed  directly  to  the  point  at  issue. 

If  you  have  failed  in  your  argument,  you  have,  at  least,  succeeded  in  giving 
the  question  a  new  and  interesting  aspect.  You  have  abandoned  the  rules  and 
usages  of  the  Senate,  as  the  source  of  the  Vice-president's  authority  as  the 
presiding  officer  of  the  Senate.  You  contend  that  the  disputed  right  is  derived 
directly  from  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  Vice-president's  authority  is  wholly 
independent  of  the  will  of  the  Senate,  which  can  neither  give  nor  take  it  away. 
It  is  not  my  wish  to  misstate  your  arguments  in  the  slightest  degree,  and,  to 
avoid  the  possibility  of  misrepresentation,  you  shall  speak  for  yourself.  Spurn 
ing  the  authority  of  the  Senate,  you  scornfully  observe,  "  With  the  easy  assu 
rance  of  a  man  stating  a  conceded  postulate,  he  (Onslow)  says,  '  After  all,  the 
power  of  the  Vice-president  must  depend  upon,  the  rules  and  usages  of  the  Sen 
ate  :'  a  postulate  not  only  false  in  its  principle,  but  which,  if  true,  would  not 
sustain  the  cause  to  whose  aid  it  is  invoked.  Unless  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  was  subjected  to  some  military  construction,  the  power  of  the 
Vice-president,  in  presiding  over  the  Senate,  rests  on  deeper,  holier  founda 
tions  than  any  rules  or  usages  which  that  body  may  adopt.  What  says  the 
Constitution  ?  '  The  Vice-president  of  the  United  States  shall  be  President  of 
the  Senate,  but  shall  have  no  vote  unless  they  be  equally  divided.'  '  The  Sen 
ate  shall  choose  their  own  officers,  and  also  a  president  pro  tempore,  in  the 
absence  of  the  Vice-president,  or  when  he  shall  exercise  the  office  of  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States.' — (Const.  U.  S.,  Art.  1,  Sec.  3.)  It  is  here  made 
the  duty  of  the  Vice-president  to  preside  over  the  Senate,  under  the  sole  re 
striction  of  having  no  vote  except  in  a  given  case  ;  the  right  of  the  Senate  to 
choose  their  president  is  confined  to  two  contingencies  ;  his  powers,  after  be 
ing  so  chosen,  are  identical  with  those  of  the  president  set  over  them  by  the 
Constitution,  and  any  abridgment  of  those  powers  by  the  Senate  would  be  a  pal 
pable  infraction  of  that  Constitution.  Now,  sir,  what  is  the  import  of  the  term 
'  to  preside,'  in  relation  to  a  deliberative  assembly  ?  Can  any  sophistry  devise 
a  plausible  definition  of  it,  which  would  exclude  the  power  of  preserving  or 
der  ?  In  appointing  an  officer  to  preside  over  the  Senate,  the  people  surely  in 
tended  not  to  erect  an  empty  pageant,  but  to  accomplish  some  useful  object : 
and  when,  in  another  part  of  the  Constitution,  they  authorize  each  house  '  to 
determine  the  rules  of  its  proceedings,'  they  do  not  authorize  it  to  adopt  rules 
depriving  any  office  created  by  the  Constitution  of  powers  belonging,  ex  m  ter 
mini,  to  that  office.  If  the  plainest  or  most  profound  man  in  the  community 
were  asked  what  powers  he  'supposed  to  be  inherent  in  the  presiding  officer  of 
either  house  of  Congress,  he  would  instantly  enumerate,  first,  the  power  of 
preserving  order  in  its  deliberations  ;  next,  that  of  collecting  the  sense  of  its 
members  on  any  question  submitted  to  their  decision  ;  and,  thirdly,  that  of  au 
thenticating,  by  his  signature,  their  legislative  acts.  I  have  before  said,  and  I 
regret  that  I  am  obliged  to  repeat  a  truism,  that  '  the  right  to  call  to  order  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  the  power  of  preserving  order  ;'  and  that,  '  unless  a 
deliberative  body,  acting  within  the  sphere  of  its  competence,  expressly  restrict 
this  power  and  this  right,  no  restriction  on  them  can  then  be  supposed.'  In  di 
vesting  the  president  set  over  them  by  the  people,  of  any  power  which  he  had 
received,  either  expressly  or  impliedly,  from  the  people,  the  Senate,  instead  of 
'  acting  within  the  sphere  of  their  competence,'  would  act  usurpingly  and  un 
constitutionally — they  would  nullify  the  connexion  which  the  people  had  es 
tablished  between  themselves  and  their  president;  they  would  reduce  them 
selves  to  the  monstrous  spectacle  of  a  body  without  a  head,  and  their  president 
to  the  equally  monstrous  spectacle  of  a  head  without  a  body  ;  and  their  violent 
act,  while  it  would  be  disobeyed  as  illegal,  would  be  contemned  as  ridiculous. 
But,  in  truth,  the  Senate  have  never  thus  forgotten  their  allegiance  to  the  Con 
stitution." 


16  SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C,    CALHOTJN. 

There  can  be  no  mistake  as  to  the  source  or  the  nature  of  the  power,  ac 
cording  to  your  conception.  You  tell  us  plainly  that  it  rests  "  on  a  deeper, 
holier  foundation"  than  the  rules  of  the  Senate — that  it  is  "  inherent  in  the  "Vice- 
president,  and  that,  as  presiding  officer,  he  possesses  it  ex  vi  termini ;  that  an 
attempt  to  divest,  and,  of  course,  to  modify  the  power  '  by  the  Senate,  would  be 
to  act'  usurpingiy  and  unconstitutionally,"  and  that  "  such  violent  act  would  be 
disobeyed  as  illegal,  and  contemned  as  ridiculous." 

These  are,  at  least,  lofty  grounds,  and  if  they  can  be  maintained,  there  is  an 
end  of  the  controversy.     It  would  be  absurd  to  go  farther.     An  inquiry  into  the 
rules  and  usages  of  the  Senate,  after  such  grounds  are  occupied,  becomes  ri 
diculous,  and  much  more  so  an  inquiry  into  those  of  the  houses  of  Parliament : 
for  surely,  if  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  Senate  to  give  or  withhold  the  right, 
it  must  stand  on  an  elevation  far  above  parliamentary  rules  or  usages  ;  and  I 
was  therefore  not  a  little  surprised  to  find  that,  after  so  bold  an  assertion,  more 
than  four  fifths  of  your  long  and  elaborate  essay  was  devoted  to  a  learned  and 
critical  inquiry  into  these  very  rules  and  usages.     There  can  be  but  one  expla 
nation  of  so  strange  an  inconsistency,  but  that  a  very  satisfactory  one.     You 
lack  confidence  in  your  own  position ;  and  well  might  you  :  for,  surely,  power 
so  despotic  and  dangerous,  so  inconsistent  with  the  first  principles  of  liberty, 
and  every  sound  view  of  the  Constitution,  was  never  attempted  to  be  establish 
ed  on  arguments  so  imbecile  and  absurd,  to  which  no  intellect,  however  badly 
organized,  could  yield  assent,  unless  associated  with  feelings  leaning  strongly 
to  the  side  of  power.     That  such  are  your  feelings,  no  one  who  reads  your  es 
say  can  doubt.     None  of  your  sympathies  are  on  the  Democratic  side  of  our  in 
stitutions.     If  a  question  can  be  made  as  to  where  power  is  lodged,  it  requires 
but  little  sagacity  to  perceive  that  you  will  be  found  on  the  side  which  will 
place  it  in  the  fewest  and  least  responsible  hands.     You  perceive  perfection 
only  in  the  political  arrangement,  which,  with  simplicity  and  energy,  gives  pow 
er  to  a  single  will.     It  is  not,  then,  at  all  surprising,  that  you  should  seize  on 
that  portion  of  the  Constitution  which  appoints  the  Vice-president  to  be  Presi 
dent  of  the  Senate  ;  and  that  you  should  quote  it  at  large,  and  dwell  on  it  at 
length,  as  the  source  of  high  and  uncontrollable  power  in  that  officer  ;  while  you 
have  but  slightly  and  casually  adverted  to  another  section  in  the  same  article, 
which  clothes  the  Senate  with  the  power  "  of  determining  the  rules  of  their  pro 
ceedings,  punishing  its  members  for  disorderly  conduct,  and,  with  the  concur 
rence  of  two  thirds,  of  expelling  a  member." — (See  Art.  1,  Sec.  5.)     Had  your 
predilections  for  the  unity  and  irresponsibility  of  power  been  less  strong,  you 
could  not  have  failed  to  see  that  the  point  of  view  in  which  you  have  thought 
proper  to  place  the  question  made  it  one  of  relative  power  between  the  Senate 
and  its  presiding  officer.    You  place  the  Vice-president  on  one  side  and  the  Sen 
ate  on  the  other  ;  and  the  more  you  augment  the  constitutional  power  of  the  for 
mer  as  the  presiding  officer,  just  in  the  same  proportion  you  diminish  the  pow 
er  of  the  latter.     What  is  gained  to  the  one  is  lost  to  the  other ;  and  in  this  com 
petition  of  power  you  were  bound  to  present  fully  and  fairly  both  sides.     This 
you  have  not  done,  and,  consequently,  you  have  fallen  not  only  into  gross,  but 
dangerous  errors.     You  set  out  by  asserting  that  the  very  object  of  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  Vice-president  as  President  of  the  Senate  was  to  preserve  order, 
and  that  he  has  all  the  powers,  ex  vi  termini,  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  the 
end  for  which  he  was  appointed.     Having  gained  this  point,  you  make  your 
next  step,  that  the  right  of  enforcing  order  involves  that  of  calling  to  order,  and 
that  again  involves  the  very  power  in  question,  which  the  Vice-president  de 
clined  to  exercise.     You  then  draw  two  corollaries  :  that  the  power  held  by 
the  Vice-president  being  derived  direct  from  the  Constitution,  is  held  independ 
ently  of  the  Senate,  and  is,  consequently,  beyond  their  control  or  participation ; 
and  that,  as  the  Vice-president  alone  possesses  it,  he,  and  he  alone,  is  respon 
sible  for  order  and  decorum.     Such  is  your  summary  logic,  which  you  accom 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  17 

pany  with  so  much  abuse  of  Mr.  Calhoun  for  not  calling  the  power,  which  you 
have,  as  you  suppose,  clearly  proven  that  he  possesses  by  the  Constitution,  into 
active  energy,  by  correcting  and  controlling,  at  his  sole  will  and  pleasure,  the 
licentious  and  impertinent  debates  of  the  Senators. 

Let  us  now  turn  the  same  mode  of  reasoning  on  the  side  of  the  Senate,  and 
you  will  perceive  that  it  applies  with  infinite  more  force,  though  you  have  not 
thought  it  deserving  of  notice. 

The  Constitution  has  vested  the  Senate  with  the  right  of  determining  the 
rules  of  its  proceedings,  and  of  punishing  members  for  disorderly  conduct,  which 
may  extend  even  to  expulsion.  The  great  object  of  giving  the  power  to  estab 
lish  rules  is  to  preserve  order.  The  only  effectual  means  of  preserving  order 
is  to  prescribe  by  rules  what  shall  be  a  violation  of  order,  and  to  enforce  the 
same  by  adequate  punishment.  The  Senate  alone  has  these  powers  by  the 
Constitution  :  consequently,  the  Senate  alone  has  the  right  of  enforcing  order ; 
and,  consequently,  whatever  right  the  Vice-president  possesses  over  order, 
must  be  derived  from  the  Senate  ;  and,  therefore,  he  can  exercise  no  power  in 
adopting  rules  or  enforcing  them,  but  what  has  been  delegated  to  him  by  the 
Senate,  and  only  to  the  extent,  both  in  manner  and  matter,  to  which  the  power 
has  been  delegated.  The  particular  power  in  question  no*  having  been  dele 
gated,  cannot  be  exercised  by  the  Vice-president,  and,  consequently,  he  is  not 
responsible.  Do  you  not  perceive  the  irresistible  force  with  which  your  own 
mode  of  reasoning  applies  to  the  substantial  constitutional  powers  of  the  Senate, 
and  how  partial  and  absurd  your  arguments  in  favour  of  the  inferred  constitu 
tional  power  of  its  presiding  officer  must  appear  in  contrast  with  it  ?  As  absurd 
as  it  now  appears,  it  shall  be,  if  possi^e,  infinitely  more  so  before  I  have  closed 
this  part  of  the  investigation. 

With  the  same  predilection,  your  assumptions  are  all  on  the  side  of  uncon 
trolled  and  unlimited  power.  Without  proof,  or  even  an  attempt  at  it,  you  as 
sume  that  the  power  in  controversy  is  inherent  in  the  Vice-president,  and  that 
he  possesses  it  ex  m  termini,  &  presiding  officer  of  the  Senate.  Now  I,  who 
have  certainly  as  much  rigfa  to  assume  as  yourself,  deny  that  he  possesses  any 
such  power ;  and  what  mzy,  perhaps,  startle  a  mind  organized  like  yours,  I  af 
firm  that,  as  a  presiding  officer,  he  has  no  inherent  power  whatever,  unless  that 
of  doing  what  t-'ie  Senate  may  prescribe  by  its  rules  be  such  a  power.  There 
are,  indeed,  inherent  powers,  but  they  are  in  the  body,  and  not  in  the  officer. 
He  is  a  mere  agent  to  execute  the  will  of  the  former.  He  can  exercise  no 
power  wiiich  he  does  not  hold  by  delegation,  either  express  or  implied.  He 
stands  in  the  same  relation  to  the  body,  or  assembly  over  which  he  presides, 
that  a  magistrate  in  a  republic  does  to  the  state,  and  it  would  be  as  absurd  to  at 
tribute  to  the  latter  inherent  powers  as  to  the  former.  This,  in  fact,  was  once 
a  fashionable  doctrine.  There  was  a  time  when  minions  of  power  thought  it 
monstrous  that  all  of  the  powers  of  rulers  should  be  derived  from  so  low  and 
filthy  a  source  as  the  people  whom  they  govern.  "  A  deeper  and  holier  found 
ation"  of  power  was  sought,  and  that  was  proclaimed  to  be  in  the  "  inherent," 
divine  "right  of  rulers;"  and,  as  their  powers  were  thus  shown  to  be  inde 
pendent  of  the  will  of  the  people,  it  followed  that  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 
divest  rulers  of  power  would  be  an  act  of  "  such  violence  as  would  be  disobey 
ed  as  illegal  and  contemned  as  ridiculous."  I  might  trace  the  analogy  between 
your  language  and  principles  and  those  of  the  advocate  of  despotic  power  in  all 
ages  and  countries  much  farther,  but  I  deem  it  not  necessary  either  to  weaken 
or  refute  your  arguments.  A  more  direct  and  decisive  reply  may  be  given. 

An  inherent  power  is  one  that  belongs  essentially  to  the  office,  and  is,  in  its 
nature,  inseparable  from  it.  To  divest  the  office  of  it  would  be  to  change  its 
nature.  It  would  be  no  longer  the  same  office.  It  is,  then,  a  power  wholly 
independent  of  the  circumstances  how  the  office  may  be  created  or  filled,  or  in 
what  particular  manner  its  functions  may  be  exercised.  If.  then,  the  power  be- 


18  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN   C.  CALUOUN. 

longs  to  the  Vice-president  inherently,  as  presiding  officer  of  the- Senate,  it  is 
because  it  is  essentially  attached  to  the  mere  function  of  presiding  in  a  deliber 
ative  assembly,  and,  consequently,  belongs  to  all  presiding  officers  over  such  as 
semblies  ;  for  it  would  be  absurd  to  assert  that  it  is  inherent  in  him  as  President 
of  the  Senate,  and  then  make  it  depend  on  the  circumstance  that  he  holds  his 
appointment  to  preside  in  the  Senate  by  the  Constitution.  The  high  power, 
then,  which  you  attribute  to  the  Vice-president,  must  belong,  if  your  argument 
be  correct,  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons,  to  the  lord-chancellor, 
as  preskling  officer  of  the  House  of  Lords,  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  and  those  of  our  State  Legislatures.  They  must  not  only  possess 
the  power,  but  must  hold  it  independently  of  the  will  of  the  bodies  over  which 
they  preside  ;  which  can  neither  give  nor  take  it  away,  nor  modify  the  mode 
of  exercising  it,  nor  control  its  operation.  These  consequences,  absurd  as 
they  appear  to  be,  are  legitimately  drawn  from  your  premises. 

Now  "  out  of  thine  own  mouth  I  will  condemn  thee  ;"  by  your  own  authori 
ties  you  shall  be  refuted.  To  prove  that  the  Vice-president  possesses  this 
power,  you  have  laboured  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Commons  holds  and  exercises  it,  and  in  proof  of  which  you  have  cited  many 
cases  from  Jefferson's  Manual. 

It  is  true  that  he  has,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent,  but  how  has  he  acquired  it  ? 
This  is  the  important  inquiry  in  the  point  of  view  in  which  we  are  now  con 
sidering  the  question.  Is  it  inherent,  or  is  it  delegated  ?  If  the  former,  1  ac 
knowledge  that  your  argument,  from  analogy,  in.  favour  of  the  inherent  power 
of  the  Vice-president,  would  have  much  force  ;  but,  if  the  latter,  it  must  utterly 
fail ;  for,  if  delegated,  it  clearly  establishes  the  fact  that  the  power  is  in  the 
body,  and  not  in  the  presiding  officer,  and,  consequently,  not  inherent  in  the  Vice- 
president,  as  you  affirm.  The  instances  that  you  have  cited  shall  decide  the 
point.  What  say  the  cases'?  "On  thb  14th  of  April,  1604,  rule  conceived, 
that  if  any  man  speak  impertinently,  or  betide  the  question  in  hand,  it  stands 
with  the  orders  of  the  house  for  the  speaker  u»  interrupt  him,  and  to  show  the 
pleasure  of  the  house,  whether  they  will  farther  hp,ar  km."  "  On  the  17th  of 
April,  1604,  agreed  for  a  general  rule,  if  any  superfluous  motion  or  tedious 
speech  be  offered  in  the  house,  the  party  is  to  be  dn^cted  and  ordered  by  Mr. 
Speaker."  "  On  the  19th  of  May,  1604,  Sir  William  Paddy  ei^ering  into  a  long 
speech,  a  rule  agreed,  that,  if  any  man  speak  not  to  the  matter  In  question,  the 
speaker  is  to  moderate."  So  it  is  said,  on  the  2d  of  May,  1610,  vhen  a  mem 
ber  made  what  seemed  an  impertinent  speech,  and  there  was  much  iiissin"  and 
spitting,  "  that  it  was  conceived  for  a  rule,  that  Mr.  Speaker  n*ay  stay  imperti 
nent  speeches."  "  On  the  10th  of  November,  1640,  it  was  declared  that,  when 
a  business  is  begun  and  in  debate,  if  any  man  rise  to  speak  to  a  new  business, 
any  member  may,  but  Mr.  Speaker  ought  to,  interrupt  him." — See  Hat-sell's 
Precedents,  vol.  ii.,  3d  edition.  . 

Do  you  not  notice,  that  in  every  case  the  power  was  delegated  by  the  house- 
that  the  language  is,  "  rule  conceived,"  "  it  was  agreed  to  as  a  general  rule,'" 
"rule  agreed,"  &c.,  &c. ;  and  this,  too,  in  relation  to  the  very  power  in  question^ 
according  to  your  own  showing?  Thus  it  is  established,  beyond  controversy, 
that  in  the  House  of  Commons  the  power  is  really  in  the  body,  and  not  in  the 
presiding  officer. 

If,  to  this  decisive  proof  that  the  power  has  been  delegated  to  the  Speaker 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  is,  consequently,  not  inherent,  we  add  that  it  is 
conferred  on  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  (see  19th  rule)  by 
an  express  rule  of  the  house,  and  that  the  lord-chancellor,  as  presiding  officer 
in  the  House  of  Lords,  possesses  it  not,  either  ex-officio  or  by  delegation,  as 
shall  be  shown  hereafter,  your  monstrous  and  slavish  doctrine,  that  it  is  an  in 
herent  power,  will  be  completely  overthrown,  and  you  are  left  without  the  pos 
sibility  of  escape. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  19 

Should  you  attempt  to  extricate  yourself  by  endeavouring  to  show  that,  un 
der  our  Constitution,  the  relative  powers  of  the  Vice-president  and  the  Senate 
are  different  from  those  of  the  speaker  and  the  House  of  Commons ;  and  that, 
though  the  latter  may  hold  the  power  by  delegation  from  the  body,  that  the 
Vice-president  may  possess  it  by  a  different  and  higher  tenure,  it  would,  at  least, 
prove  that  you  cede  the  point  that  it  is  not  inherent,  and,  also,  that  it  cannot  be 
deduced  from  analogy  between  the  powers  of  the  two  presiding  officers,  which 
you  have  so  much  relied  on  in  another  part  of  your  essay.  But  this  shall  not 
avail  you.  The  door  is  already  closed  in  that  direction.  It  has  been,  I  trust, 
conclusively  proved  that  the  Constitution,  so  far  from  countenancing  the  idea 
of  the  power  being  inherent  in  the  Vice-president,  gives  it  to  the  Senate,  by  the 
strongest  implication,  in  conferring  the  express  right  of  establishing  its  own 
rules,  and  punishing  for  disorderly  conduct.  If  you  are  not  yet  convinced,  ad 
ditional  arguments  are  not  wanting,  which,  though  they  may  not  extort  an  ac 
knowledgment  of  your  error,  will  thoroughly  convince  you  of  it. 

You  have  overlooked  the  most  obvious  and  best-established  rules  of  construc 
tion.  What  are  the  facts  ?  The  Constitution  has  designated  the  Vice-president 
as  President  of  the  Senate,  and  has  also  clothed  that  body  with  the  right  of  de 
termining  the  rules  of  its  proceedings.  It  is  obvious  that  the  simple  intention  of 
the  framers  of  that  instrument  was  to  annex  to  the  office  of  Vice-president  that 
of  President  of  the  Senate,  without  intending  to  define  the  extent  or  the  limit 
of  his  power  in  that  character  ;  and,  in  like  manner,  it  was  the  intention  to  con 
fer  on  the  Senate  simply  the  power  of  enacting  its  own  rules  of  proceeding, 
without  reference  to  the  powers,  such  as  they  may  be,  that  had  been  conferred  on 
their  presiding  officer.  The  extent  of  power,  as  between  the  two,  becomes  a 
question  of  construction.  Now  the  first  rule  of  construction,  in  such  cases,  is 
the  known  usage  and  practice  of  parliamentary  bodies  ;  and.  as  those  of  the 
British  Parliament  were  the  best  known  to  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that,  in  determining  what  are  the  relative  powers  of  the  Vice- 
president  and  the  Senate,  they  ought  to  prevail.  Under  this  view,  as  between 
the  Vice-president  and  Senate,  the  latter  possesses  the  same  power  in  determin 
ing  its  rules  that  is  possessed  by  the  houses  of  Parliament,  without  being  re 
stricted  in  the  slightest  degree  by  the  fact  that  the  Vice-president,  under  the 
Constitution,  is  president  of  the  body,  saving  only  the  right  of  adopting  such 
rules  as  apply  to  the  appointment  or  election  of  a  presiding  officer,  which  the 
Senate  would  have  possessed,  if  the  Constitution  had  not  provided  a  president 
of  the  body  ;  and,  as  I  have  proved,  from  your  own  cases,  that  the  particular 
power  in  question  incontrovertibly  belongs  to  the  house,  it  follow?  necessarily, 
according  to  established  rules  of  construction,  that  the  Senate  also  possesses  it. 

You  have  overlooked  these  obvious  truths  by  affixing  too  hi^n  an  idea  to  the 
powers  of  the  presiding  officer  in  preserving  order.  According  to  your  concep 
tion,  the  house  is  nothing,  and  the  officer  everything,  on  points  of  order.  No 
thing  can  be  more  erroneous.  The  power  you  attribute  to  him  has  tiever  been 
possessed  by  the  president,  or  speaker,  in  any  deliberative  assembly  ;  no,  noi 
even  by  delegation  from  the  body  itself. 

The  right  of  preserving  order  must  depend  on  the  power  of  enforcing  it,  or 
of  punishing  for  a  breach  of  order— a  right  inherent  in  the  house  alone,  and  nev 
er,  in  any  instance,  delegated  to  the  chair.  Our  Constitution  confines  this  right 
to  each  house  of  Congress,  by  providing-  •'  that  they  may  punish  for  disorderly 
conduct :"  a  power  which  they  neither  nave  delegated,  nor  can  delegate,  to  the 
presiding  officer.  What,  then,  is  the  right  of  preserving  order,  belonging  to  the 
Vice-president,  which  you  have  so  pompously  announced,  and  for  not  enfor 
cing  which,  according  to  your  conception,  you  and.  your  associates  have  de 
nounced  Mr.  Calhoun  almost  as  a  traitor  to  his  country  ? 

It  is  simply  the  right  of  calling  to  order,  tn  the,  strict,  literal  meaning ;  and,  so 
far  from  being  derived  from  the  right  of  preserving  order,  as  you  absurdly  sup- 


20  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

pose,  it  is  not  even  connected  with  it.  The  right  of  preserving  order  depends 
on  the  right  of  enforcing  it,  or  the  right  of  punishment  for  breaches  of  order,  al 
ways  possessed  by  the  body,  but  never,  either  by  delegation  or  otherwise,  by 
the  chair.  It  is  notorious  that  the  chair  cannot  enforce  its  calls  to  order.  The 
body  alone  can,  and  that  only  o-n  its  decisions,  and  not  on  tfyat  of  the  presiding 
officer.  It  is  thus  manifest,  the  high  right  of  preserving  order,  to  which  you 
make  the  right  of  calling  to  order  incidental,  belongs  especially  to  the  Senate, 
and  not  to  the  Vice-president ;  and,  if  your  argument  be  correct,  the  incident 
must  follow  the  right ;  and,  consequently,  it  is  the  right  and  duty  of  a  senator 
to  call  to  order  for  disorderly  conduct.  So  clear  is  the  proposition,  that,  if  the 
member  called  to  order  by  the  chair  for  disorderly  conduct  chooses  to  persist, 
the  presiding  officer  has  no  other  remedy  but  to  repeat  his  call,  or  throw  himself, 
for  the  enforcement  of  it,  on  the  Senate.  This  feebleness  of  the  chair,  in  ques 
tions  of  order,  explains  why  there  has  always  been  such  indisposition  to  call 
to  order,  even  when  it  is  made  the  express  duty  by  rule,  as  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  the  House  of  Commons  in  England.  Thousands  of  in 
stances  might  be  cited  to  establish  the  truth  of  this  remark,  both  there  and  here  : 
instances  in  which  all  that  has  been  said  and  uttered  by  Mr.  Randolph  is  no 
thing,  but  in  which  the  speaker  waited  for  the  interference  of  some  of  the  mem 
bers,  in  order  to  preserve  order.  Such  was  the  case  in  the  recent  occurrence 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  when  Mr.  Hume  made  an  attack  on  the  Bishop  of 
London  and  the  lord-chancellor,  both  of  whom,  as  members  of  the  House  of 
Lords,  were  under  the  protection  of  positive  rules  ;  yet  no  one,  even  there,  had 
the  assurance  to  throw  the  responsibility  on  the  presiding  officer.  The  parti 
sans  of  power  in  our  country  have  the  honour  of  leading  in  these  new  and  dan 
gerous  attacks  on  the  freedom  of  debate. 

Some  men,  of  honest  intention,  have  fallen  into  the  error  about  the  right  of 
the  Vice-president  to  preserve  order  independently  of  the  Senate,  because  the 
judges,  or,  as  they  express  it,  the  presiding  officer  in  the  courts  of  justice  pos 
sess  the  right.  A  moment's  reflection  will  show  the  fallacy.  There  is  not  the 
least  analogy  between  the  rights  and  duties  of  a  judge  and  those  of  a  presiding 
officer  in  a  deliberative  assembly.  The  analogy  is  altogether  the  other  way. 
It  is  between  the  court  and  the  house.  In  fact,  the  latter  is  often  called  a 
court,  and  there  is  a  very  strict  resemblance,  in  the  point  under  consideration, 
between  what  may  be  called  a  parliamentary  court  and  a  court  of  justice.  They 
both  have  the  right  of  causing  their  decision  to  be  respected,  and  order  and  de 
corum  to  be  observed  in  their  presence,  by  punishing  those  who  offend.  But 
who  ever  h^ard  of  the  speaker  or  Vice-president  punishing  for  disorderly  con 
duct  ?  The  utmost  power  they  can  exercise  over  disorderly  conduct,  even  in 
the  lobby  or  g&Uery,  is  to  cause  it  to  be  suppressed,  for  the  time,  by  the  ser- 
geant-at-arms. 

Enough  has  beeu  said,  though  the  subject  is  far  from  being  exhausted,  to  de 
monstrated  that  your  views  of  the  relative  powers  and  duties  of  the  Vice-pres 
ident  and  the  Senate,  in  relation  to  the  point  in  question,  are  wholly  erroneous. 
It  remains  to  be  shown  that  your  opinions  (for  arguments  they  cannot  be  call 
ed)  are  dangerous  to  our  liberty,  and  that  they  are  in  conflict  with  the  first  prin 
ciples  of  our  government.  I  do  not  attribute  to  you,  or  those  with  whom  you 
are  associated,  any  deep-laid  design  against  public  liberty.  Such  an  attempt, 
as  flagitious  as  it  may  be,  requires  a  sagacity  and  boldness  quite  beyond  what 
we  have  now  to  apprehend  from  those  in  power.  But  that  there  exists,  at  the 
present  time,  a  selfish  and  greedy  appetite  to  get,  and  to  hold  office,  and  that, 
to  effect  their  grovelling  objects,  doctrines  slavish  and  dangerous  are  daily  prop 
agated,  cannot  be  doubted  by  even  careless  observers.  The  freedom  of  de 
bate  is  instinctively  dreaded  by  the  whole  corps,  high  and  low,  of  those  who 
make  a  speculation  of  politics;  and  well  they  may:  for  it  is  the  great  and 
only  effectual  means  of  detecting  and  holding  up  to  public  scorn  every  machi- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  21 

nation  against  the  liberty  of  the  country.  It  ranks  first,  even  before  the  liberty 
of  the  press,  the  trial  by  jury,  the  rights  of  conscience,  and  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  in  the  estimation  of  those  who  are  capable  of  forming  a  correct  estimate 
of  the  value  of  freedom,  and  the  best  means  of  preserving  it.  Against  this  pal 
ladium  of  liberty  your  blows  are  aimed  ;  and,  to  do  you  justice,  it  must  be  ac 
knowledged,  if  the  energy  be  not  great,  the  direction  is  not  destitute  of  skill. 
If  you  could  succeed  in  establishing  the  points  which  you  labour,  that  the  Vice- 
president  holds  a  power  over  the  freedom  of  debate,  under  the  right  of  preserv 
ing  order,  beyond  the  will  or  control  of  the  Senate  ;  and  that,  consequently,  he 
alone  is  responsible  for  what  might  be  considered  an  undue  exercise  of  the  free 
dom  of  speech  in  debate,  a  solid  foundation  would  be  laid,  from  which,  in  time, 
this  great  barrier  against  despotic  power  would  be  battered  down.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  the  scheme  takes  the  power  of  protecting  this,  the  first  of  its  rights, 
•wholly  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Senate,  and  places  its  custody  in  the  hands  of  a 
single  individual,  and  he  in  no  degree  responsible  to  the  body  over  which  this 
high  power  is  to  be  exercised  :  thus  efTectu ally  destroying  the  keystone  of  free 
dom,  responsibility,  and  introducing  into  a  vital  part  of  our  system  uncontrolled, 
or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  despotic  power  ;  which,  being  derived,  by  your 
theory,  from  the  Constitution,  and  being  applicable  to  all  points  of  order,  neces 
sarily  would  vest  in  the  Vice-president  alone  an  independent  and  absolute 
power,  that  would  draw'  into  the  vortex  of  his  authority  an  unlimited  control 
over  the  freedom  of  debate. 

Mark  the  consequences !  If  the  Vice-president  should  belong  to  the  sfame 
party  or  interest  which  brought  the  President  into  power,  or  if  he  be  dependant 
on  him  for  his  political  standing  or  advancement,  you  will  virtually  place  the 
control  over  the  freedom  of  debate  in  the  hands  of  the  executive.  fWJ  ' 

You  thus  introduce  the  President,  as  it  were,  into  the  chamber  of  the  Senate, 
and  place  him  virtually  over  the  deliberation  of  the  body,  with  powers  to  restrain 
discussion,  and  shield  his  conduct  from  investigation.  Let  us,  for  instance,  sup 
pose  that  the  present  chief  magistrate  should  be  re-elected,  and  that  the  party 
which  supports  him  should  succeed,  as,  in  all  probability,  they  would  in  that 
event,  in  electing  also  their  Vice-president,  can  it  be  doubted  that  the  rules  for 
the  restraint  of  the  freedom  of  debate  in  the  Senate,  which  have  been  insisted 
on  openly  by  the  party  during  the  last  winter,  would  be  reduced  to  practice, 
through  a  subservient  Vice-president  ?  And  what  are  those  rules  ?  One  of  the 
leading  ones,  to  advert  to  no  other,  is,  that  the  conduct  of  the  executive,  as  a 
co-ordinate  branch  of  that  government,  cannot  be  called  in  question  by  a  sen 
ator  in  debate,  at  least  so  far  as  it  relates  to  impeachable  offences ;  and,  of 
course,  an  attempt  to  discuss  the  conduct  of  the  President,  in  such  cases,  would  be 
disorderly,  and  render  the  senator  liable  to  be  punished,  even  to  expulsion.  What 
would  be  the  consequence  ?  The  Senate  would  speedily  sink  into  a  body  to 
register  the  decrees  of  the  President  and  sing  hosannas  in  his  praise,  and  be  « 
as  degraded  as  the  Roman  Senate  under  Nero. 

But  let  us  suppose  the  opposite  state  of  things,  in  which  the  Vice-president 
chooses  to  pursue  a  course  independent  of  the  will  of  the  executive,  and,  in 
stead  of  assuming  so  dangerous  an  exercise  of  power,  he  should  indulge  (for 
indulgence  it  must  be  called,  if  allowed  by  his  courtesy)  that  freedom  of  debate 
which  exists  in  other  deliberative  assemblies.  What  will  then  follow  1  Pre 
cisely  that  which  occurred  last  winter.  Most  exaggerated  and  false  accounts 
would  everywhere  be  propagated,  by  hirelings  of  power,  of  the  slightest  occur 
rence  in  the  Senate.  The  public  indignation  would  be  roused  at  the  supposed 
disorder  and  indecorum,  and  the  whole  would  be  artfully  directed  against  the 
Vice-president,  in  order  to  prostrate  his  reputation  ;  and  thus  an  officer,  without 
patronage  or  power,  or  even  the  right  of  defending  himself,  would  be  the  target 
against  which  the  whole  force  arid  patronage  of  the  Government  would  be  di 
rected.  Few  men  wbuld  have  the  firmness  to  encounter  danger  so  tremendous  ; 


22  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

and  the  practical  result,  in  the  long  run,  must  be  a  subservient  yielding  to  the 
executive  will. 


No.  2. 

Having  now  established,  I  may  venture  to  say  beyond  the  possibility  of  rea 
sonable  controversy,  that  the  idea  of  an  inherent  right  in  the  Vice-president,  in 
dependent  of,  and  beyond  the  will  of  the  Senate,  to  control  the  freedom  of  de 
bate,  is  neither  sanctioned  by  the  Constitution,  nor  justified  by  the  relation  be 
tween  the  body  and  its  presiding  officer,  and  that  it  is  subversive  of  the  right 
of  free  discussion,  and,  consequently,  dangerous  to  liberty,  I  might  here  fairly 
rest  the  question.  To  you,  at  least,  who  treat  with  scorn  the  rules  and  usages 
of  the  Senate,  as  the  source  of  the  power  of  the  Vice-president,  all  farther  in 
quiry  is  fairly  closed.  But  as  many,  who  may  agree  with  you  in  the  conclu 
sion,  may  treat  with  contempt  your  high-strained  conception  of  the  origin  of  the 
power  under  investigation,  it  will  not  be  improper  to  ascertain  whether  it  has 
been  conferred  on  the  Vice-president  by  any  act  of  the  Senate,  express  or  im 
plied,  the  only  source  whence  the  power  can  be  fairly  derived.  In  this  view 
of  the  subject,  the  simple  inquiry  is,  Has  the  Senate  conferred  the  power  ? 
It  has  been  fully  established  that  they  alone  possess  it,  and,  consequently,  from 
the  Senate  only  can  it  be  derived.  We,  then,  affirm  that  the  Senate  has  not 
conferred  the  power.  The  assertion  of  the  negative,  in  such  cases,  is  sufficient 
to  throw  the  burden  of  proof  on  those  who  hold  the  affirmative.  I  call  on  you, 
then,  or  any  of  your  associates,  to  point  out  the  rule  or  the  usage  of  the  Senate 
by  which  the  power  has  been  conferred.  None  such  has,  or  can  be  designated. 
If  a  similar  question  be  asked  as  to  the  power  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  how  easy  would  be  the  reply  ?  The  19th  rule,  which  express 
ly  gives  the  power  to  him,  would  be  immediately  quoted  ;  and,  if  that  were  sup 
posed  to  be  doubtful,  the  journals  of  the  house  would  be  held  up  as  containing 
innumerable  instances  of  the  actual  exercise  of  the  power.  No  such  answer 
can  be  given  when  we  turn  to  the  power  of  the  Vice-president.  The  rules  are 
mute,  and  the  journals  of  the  Senate  silent.  What  means  this  striking  differ 
ence,  but  that,  on  this  point,  there  is  a  difference,  in  fact,  between  the  power  of 
the  speaker  and  of  the  Vice-president  ?  a  difference  which  has  been  always 
understood  and  acted  on  ;  and  when  to  this  we  add,  that  the  rules  of  the  two 
houses  in  regard  to  the  power  are  strikingly  different ;  that,  while  those  of  the 
Representatives  expressly  delegate  the  power  to  the  speaker,  those  of  the  Sen 
ate,  by  strong  implication,  withhold  it  from  the  Vice-president,  little  room  can 
be  left  for  doubt. '  Compare,  in  this  view,  the  19th  rule  of  the  house  and  the 
7th  of  the  Senate.  The  former  says,  "  If  any  member,  by  speaking  or  other- 
*vise,  transgress  the  rules  of  the  house,  the  speaker  shall,  or  any  member  may, 
call  to  order  :  in  which  case  the  member  so  called  to  order  shall  immediately 
sit  down,  unless  permitted  to  explain  ;  and  the  house  shall,  if  appealed  to,  de 
cide  on  the  case  without  debate ;  if  there  be  no  appeal,  the  decision  of  the 
chair  shall  be  submitted  to.  If  the  decision  be  in  favour  of  the  member  called 
to  order,  he  shall  be  at  liberty  to  proceed ;  if  otherwise,  he  will  not  be  permit 
ted  to  proceed  without  leave  of  the  house  ;  and  if  the  case  require  it,  he  shall 
be  liable  to  the  censure  of  the  house."  The  rule  of  the  Senate,  on  the  contra 
ry,  provides,  "  If  the  member  shall  be  called  to  order  for  words  spoken,  the  ex 
ceptionable  words  shall  immediately  be  taken  down  in  writing,  that  the  presi 
dent  may  be  better  enabled  to  judge  of  the  matter."  These  are  the  corresponding- 
rules  of  the  two  houses  :  and  can  any  impartial  mind  contend  that  similar  pow 
ers  are  intended  to  be  conferred  by  them  on  the  speaker  and  Vice-president ? 
Or  will  it  be  insisted  on  that  the  difference  in  the  phraseology  is  accidental, 
when  it  is  known  that  they  have  often  been  revised  on  the  reports  of  commit- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  23 

tees,  who  would  not  fail  to  compare  the  rules  of  the  two  houses  on  correspond 
ing  subjects  ?  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  impossible  that  it  could  be  in 
tended  to  confer  the  same  power  by  such  difference  of  phraseology,  or  that  the 
withholding  of  the  power  in  question  from  the  Vice-president  was  unintentional. 
This  rational  construction  is  greatly  strengthened,  when  we  advert  to  the  dif 
ferent  relations  which  the  two  officers  bear  to  their  respective  houses.  The 
speaker  is  chosen  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  is,  consequently,  di 
rectly  responsible  to' the  body  ;  and  his  decision,  by  the  rules,  may  be  appealed 
from  to  the  house.  The  Vice-president,  on  the  contrary,  is  placed  in  the  chair 
by  the  Constitution,  is  not  responsible  to  the  Senate,  and  his  decision  is  with 
out  appeal.  Need  we  look  farther  for  the  reason  of  so  essential  a  variation  in 
the  rules  conferring  power  on  their  respective  presiding  officers  ?  It  is  a  re 
markable  fact,  that  the  same  difference  exists  in  the  relation  between  the  pre 
siding  officers  of  the  two  houses  of  the  British  Parliament,  and  the  bodies  over 
which  they  respectively  preside.  In  the  Commons,  the  speaker  is  chosen  as 
in  our  House  of  Representatives,  and  is,  consequently,  in  like  manner  respon 
sible  ;  on  the  contrary,  in  the  House  of  Lords  the  chancellor  presides  ex-officio, 
in  like  manner  as  the  Vice-president  in  the  Senate,  and  is,  in  like  manner,  ir 
responsible  to  the  body.  Now  it  is  no  less  remarkable  that  the  speaker  pos 
sesses  the  power  in  question,  while  it  is  perfectly  certain  that  the  lord-chancel 
lor  does  not.  Like  cause,  like  effect ;  dissimilar  cause,  dissimilar  effect.  You, 
sir,  have,  it  is  true,  made  a  puny  effort  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the  mode 
in  which  the  Vice-president  and  the  lord-chancellor  are  appointed,  and  have 
also  feebly  denied  that  the  latter  has  not  the  power  of  calling  to  order.  Both 
of  these  efforts  show  the  desperation  of  your  cause.  What  does  it  signify  by 
whom  an  ex-officio  officer  is  appointed,  if  not  by  the  body  ?  There  can  be  but 
one  material  point,  and  that  without  reference  to  the  mode  of  appointment — is 
he,  or  is  he  not,  responsible  to  the  house  ?  If  the  former,  there  is  good  cause 
for  the  delegation  of  the  power ;  for  power  exercised  by  responsible  agents  is 
substantially  exercised  by  the  principal ;  while  by  irresponsible  agents  it  is  the 
power  of  him  by  whom  it  is  exercised.  Nor  is  your  effort  to  show  that  the 
chancellor  has  the  power  less  unhappy.  You  have  cited  but  one  instance,  and 
that  really  renders  you  ridiculous.  The  lord-chancellor,  as  is  well  known, 
has  the  right  of  speaking ;  and  you  most  absurdly  cite  the  commencement  of 
a  .speech  of  one  of  the  chancellors,  in  which  he  states  that  he  would  call  back 
the  attention  of  the  Lords  to  the  question  at  issue,  as  an  instance  of  exercising 
the  power  of  calling  to  order  as  presiding  officer,  for  departure  from  the  ques 
tion  !  Though  you  have  signally  failed  to  prove  your  position,  you  have  not  less 
completely  established  the  fact,  that  your  integrity  is  not  above  a  resort  to  trick, 
where  argument  fails.  Nor  is  this  the  only  instance  of  subterfuge.  You  made 
a  similar  effort  to  do  away  the  authority  of  the  venerable  Jefferson.  He  has 
le.ft  on  record,  that  he  considered  his  power  as  presiding  officer  of  the  Senate 
as  the  power  ofumpiragc,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  an  appellate  power.  In 
order  to  break  the  force  of  this  authority,  you  have  denied  the  plain  and  inva 
riable  meaning  of  the  word,  and  attempted  to  affix  one  to  it  which  it  never  bears. 
You  say  that  its  usual  meaning  is  synonymous  with  "  office,"  "  authority,"  or 
"the  act  of  determining,"  and  that  it  is  only  in  its  technical  sense  that  it  con 
veys  the  idea  of  an  appellate  power !  Can  it  be  unknown  to  you  that  no  word  in 
the  language  more  invariably  has  attached  to  it  the  idea  of  decision  by  appeal, 
and  that  there  is  not  an  instance  of  its  being  used  by  any  respectable  authority 
in  the  sense  which  you  state  to  be  its  usual  meaning  ? 

It  only  remains  to  consider  the  cases  that  you  have  cited  from  the  Manual, 
to  prove  that  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  possesses  the  power  in 
question  ;  by  which  you  would  infer  that  it  belongs  also  to  the  Vice-president. 
A  very  strange  deduction  by  one  who  believes  that  the  power  originates  in  the 
Constitution,  and  that  it  neither  can  be  given  or  taken  away  by  the  authority  of  th& 


24  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Senate  itself.  After  asserting  that  it  has  "  deeper  and  holier  foundations  than 
the  rules  and  usages  of  the  Senate,"  there  is  something  more  than  ridiculous, 
that  you  at  last  seek  for  the  power  in  the  rules  and  usages  of  the  House  of  Com 
mons  !  But  let  such  inconsistency  pass.  You  have,  indeed,  established  the 
fact  that  the  speaker  has  the  power,  but  you  have  overlooked  the  material  cir 
cumstance,  as  I  have  shown  from  your  own  cases,  that  he  possesses  it  by  posi 
tive  rules  of  the  house.  You  might  as  well  have  shown  that  the  Speaker  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  possesses  it,  and  then  inferred  that  the  Vice- 
president  does  also  :  for  he,  too,  holds  the  power  by  positive  rules  of  the  body, 
which  makes  the  analogy  as  strong  in  the  one  case  as  the  other. 

But  you  would  have  it  understood  that  the  rules  of  Parliament  have  been 
adopted  by  the  Senate.  No  such  thing.  I  challenge  you  to  cite  a  single  rule 
or  act  of  the  Senate  that  gives  countenance  to  it.  Finally,  you  tell  us  that  Mr. 
Jefferson  has  cited  these  rules  as  being  part  of  the  rules  and  usages  of  the  Sen 
ate.  Admitting,  for  a  moment,  that  Mr.  Jefferson  had  cited  them  as  such,  still 
a  very  important  question  would  arise,  How  came  they  to  be  the  rules  of  the 
Senate  ?  The  Constitution  provides  that  the  Senate  shall  determine  the  rules 
of  its  proceedings  ;  now,  if  that  body  has  not,  by  any  rule,  adopted  the  rules  of 
the  British  Parliament,  by  what  process  of  reason  could  they  be  construed  to  be 
the  rules  of  the  Senate  ?  That  the  Senate  has  not  adopted  the  rules  of  Parlia 
ment,  is  certain ;  and  I  confess  I  am  not  a  little  curious  to  see  the  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  they  are  made  the  rules  of  the  Senate,  without  adoption. 
Is  there  not  a  striking  analogy  between  this  and  the  question,  whether  the  com 
mon  law  is  a  part  of  the  laws  of  the  Union  ?  We  know  that  they  have  been 
decided  by  the  highest  judicial  authority  not  to  be  ;  and,  it  seems  to  me,  the  ar 
guments  which  would  be  applicable  to  the  one  would  be  equally  so  to  the  other 
question.  That  the  rules  and  usages  of  Parliament  may  be  referred  to  to  illus 
trate  the  rules  of  either  house  of  Congress,  is  quite  a  distinct  proposition,  and 
may  be  readily  admitted.  Arguments  may  be  drawn  from  any  source  calcula 
ted  to  illustrate,  but  that  is  wholly  different  from  giving  to  the  rules  of  another 
body  a  binding  force  on  the  Seriate,  without  ever  having  been  recognised  as  its 
rules.  This  is  a  subject  of  deep  and  grave  importance  ;  but  as  it  is  not  neces 
sary  to  my  purpose,  I  decline  entering  on  it.  It  is  sufficient,  at  present,  to  de 
ny  that  Mr.  Jefferson  has  cited  the  rules  of  the  Parliament,  referred  to  by  you, 
as  those  of  the  Senate.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  expressly  cited  as  the  rules 
of  the  British  House  of  Commons,  without  stating  them  to  be  obligatory  on  the 
Senate.  He  has  notoriously  cited  many  of  the  rules  of  that  body  which  are 
wholly  dissimilar  from  the  usages  of  the  Senate.  But  you  cite  Mr.  Jefferson's 
opinion,  in  which  he  says,  "  The  Senate  have,  accordingly,  formed  some  rules 
for  its  government"  (they  have  been  much  enlarged  since) ;  "  but  these  going 
only  to  a  few  cases,  they  have  referred  to  the  decision  of  the  president,  without 
debate  or  appeal,  all  questions  of  order  arising  under  their  own  rules,  or  where, 
there  is  none.  This  places  under  the  discretion  of  the  president  a  very  exten 
sive  field  of  decision."  If  your  object  in  quoting  the  above  passage  was  to  show 
that,  where  the  Senate  has  adopted  no  rules  of  its  own,  the  rules  of  Parliament 
are  those  of  the  Senate,  it  completely  fails.  Not  the  slightest  countenance 
is  given  to  such  an  idea.  Mr.  Jefferson,  on  the  contrary,  says  that,  in  cases  of 
omission,  the  sound  discretion  of  the  president  is  the  rule  ;*  and  such  has  been 
the  practice,  and  from  which  it  has  followed  that  usages  of  the  Senate  are  very 
different  from  the  Parliament,  which  could  not  be,  if  the  latter  were  adopted, 
where  there  were  no  positive  rules  by  the  Senate. 

If  this  view  of  the  subject  be  correct,  which  is  certainly  Mr.  Jefferson's,  the 

*  This  opinion  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  is  probably  founded  on  the  latter  part  of  the  6th  rule,  which 
strongly  supports  it.  The  rule  is  as  follows :  "  When  a  member  shall  be  called  to  order,  he  shall  sit 
down  until  the  president  shall  have  determined  whether  he  is  in  order  or  not ;  and  every  question 
of  order  shall  be  decided  by  the  president,  without  debate ;  but  if  there  be  a  doubt  in  his  mind,  he 
may  call  for  the  sense  of  the  Senate." 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  25 

Vice-president  had  the  right  to  make  the  rule  by  exercising  a  sound  discretion  ; 
and  the  only  question  that  could  arise  in  this  view  is,  whether  he  has  acted  on 
correct  principles  in  referring  the  power  to  the  house,  instead  of  exercising  it 
by  the  chair.  So  long  as  doubtful  and  irresponsible  power  ought  not  to  be  as 
sumed — so  long  as  the  freedom  of  debate  is  essential  to  liberty — and  so  long  as 
it  is  an  axiom  in  politics  that  no  power  can  be  safe  but  what  is  in  the  final  con 
trol  and  custody  of  the  body  over  which  it  is  exercised — so  long  the  rule  (to 
view  it  in  that  light)  adopted  by  the  Vice-president  will  be  considered  in  con 
formity  to  sound  political  principles.  But,  suppose  it  to  be  conceived  that  the 
rules  of  Parliament  are  those  of  the  Senate,  when  not  overruled  by  its  own  posi 
tive  acts,  still,  two  questions  would  remain :  first,  whether  the  7th  rule  of  the 
Senate,  by  a  sound  construction,  does  not  restrain  the  Vice-president  from  exer 
cising  the  power,  by  limiting  it  to  the  members  of  the  Senate  ?  and,  secondly, 
whether  the  practice  of  the  House  of  Lords,  or  that  of  the  Commons,  ought,  in 
this  particular,  to  prevail  ?  Both  of  these  points  have  already  been  incidental 
ly  considered,  and  a  single  remark  will  now  suffice.  Whether  we  regard  the 
nature  of  the  power,  or  the  principles  of  our  system  of  government,  there  can, 
be  no  doubt  that  the  decision  ought  to  be  against  the  practice  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  in  favour  of  that  of  the  House  of  Lords. 

It  may  not  be  improper  to  notice  an  opinion  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  has,  in. 
no  small  degree,  contributed  to  the  error  which  exists  as  to  the  decision  of  the 
Vice-president.  There  are  many  who  are  far  from  agreeing  with  your  absurd 
and  dangerous  positions  as  to  the  inherent  powers  of  the  Vice-president  over 
the  freedom  of  debate,  but  who  have,  I  think,  a  vague  conception  that  he  has 
the  right  in  dispute,  as  presiding  officer,  but  a  right  subordinate  to,  and  depend 
ant  on,  the  Senate.  They  concede  to  the  Senate  the  right  of  determining  their 
rules,  and  thflt  this  right  comprehends  that  of  determining  what  is,  or  what  is 
not,  disorderly  conduct,  and  how  the  same  shall  be  noticed  or  inhibited  ;  but 
they  have  an  idea  that  the  ex-officio  duty  of  the  Vice-president  to  regulate  the 
proceedings  of  the  Senate  according  to  their  own  rules,  extends  to  cases  of  the 
freedom  of  debate.  The  amount  of  the  argument,  as  far  as  I  can  understand  it, 
is,  that,  where  there  is  a  rule  of  the  Senate,  the  Vice-president  has,  ex~officio, 
the  power  of  regulating  the  proceedings  of  the  Senate  by  it,  without  any  express 
authority  in  the  rule  to  that  effect.  All  this  may  be  fairly  conceded,  but  it  decides 
nothing.  It  brings  back  the  question  to  the  inquiry,  Is  there,  or  is  there  not,  such 
a  rule  ?  which  has  been  fully  considered,  and,  I  trust,  satisfactorily  determined 
in  the  negative.  I  will  not  again  repeat  the  arguments  on  this  point :  I  do  not 
deem  it  necessary.  It  is  sufficient  to  remark,  if  there  be  a  rule,  let  it  be  shown, 
and  the  question  is  at  an  end.  There  is  none. 

As  connected  with  this  part  of  the  subject,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to 
meet  the  ridiculous  charge  of  inconsistency  which  you  make  against  the  Vice- 
president  in  the  exercise  of  his  power,  and  which  you  endeavour  to  support  by 
reference  to  the  stale  and  false  accounts  of  his  conduct  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Dick- 
erson.  It  is  sufficient  that  Mr.  D.  has  repelled  the  charge  of  injustice,  and  you 
exhibit  but  a  sorry  and  factious  appearance  in  defending  a  senator  from  oppres 
sion,  who  is  not  conscious  of  any  injustice  having  been  inflicted. 

Having  demonstrated  that  the  powers  which  you  claim  for  the  Vice-presi 
dent  do  not  belong  to  him  as  presiding  officer  of  the  Senate,  and  that  they  are 
not  conferred  on  him  by  the  rules  or  usage  of  the  Senate,  or  those  of  Parlia 
ment,  I  may  safely  affirm  that  it  does  not  exist,  and  that,  so  far  from  censure, 
Mr.  Calhoun  deserves  praise  for  declining  to  exercise  it.  He  has  acted  in  the 
spirit  that  ought  to  actuate  every  virtuous  public  functionary — not  to  assume 
doubtful  powers — a  spirit,  under  our  systems  of  delegated  authority,  essential  to 
the  preservation  of  liberty,  and  for  being  guided  by  which,  he  will  receive  the 
thanks  of  the  country  when  the  excitement  of  the  day  has  passed  away. 

I  have  now  completed  what  may  be  considered  the  investigation  of  the  sub- 

D 


28  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ject ;  but  there  are  still  several  of  your  remarks  that  require  notice.  You  have 
not  only  attacked  the  decision  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  but  you  have  impugned  his  mo 
tives  with  licentious  severity.  The  corrupt  are  the  most  disposed  to  attribute 
corruption,  and  your  unprovoked  and  unjustifiable  attack  on  Mr.  C.'s  motives 
speak  as  little  in  favour  of  your  heart  as  your  arguments  do  of  your  head.  For 
tunately  for  the  Vice-president,  his  general  character  for  virtue  and  patriotism 
shields  him  from  the  imputation  of  such  gross  abuse  of  power,  from  such  impure 
motives  as  you  attribute  to  him.  He  could  not  decide  differently  from  what  he 
did  without  being  at  war  with  the  principles  which  have  ever  governed  him.  It 
is  well  known  to  all  acquainted  with  him,  publically  or  privately,  that  the  maxim 
which  he  holds  in  the  highest  veneration,  and  which  he  regards  as  the  founda 
tion  of  our  whole  system  of  government,  is,  that  power  should  be  controlled  by 
the  body  over  which  it  is  exercised,  and  that,  without  such  responsibility,  all 
delegated  power  would  speedily  become  corrupt.  Whether  he  is  wrong  in  giv 
ing  too  high  an  estimate  to  this  favourite  maxim  is  immaterial.  It  is,  and  long 
has  been,  his,  and  could  not  fail  in  having  great  influence  in  the  decision  which 
you  have  so  seriously  assaulted.  Had  his  principles  been  like  yours,  as  illus 
trated  in  your  essay,  it  is  possible  he  might  have  taken  a  different  view  of  the 
subject ;  but,  as  he  has  decided  in  conformity  to  principles  long  fixed  in  his 
mind,  there  is  something  malignant  in  the  extreme  to  attribute  his  decision  to 
motives  of  personal  enmity.  You  not  only  attack  Mr.  C.'s  motives  for  this  de 
cision,  but  also  his  motive  for  the  constitution  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Re 
lations.  You  think  it  a  crime  in  him  that  the  venerable  and  patriotic  Macon 
should  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  committee.  I  will  neither  defend  him  nor 
the  other  members  of  the  committee.  They  need  no  defence ;  but  I  cannot 
but  remark,  that  the  election  of  Mr.  Macon  president  pro  tern,  of  the  Senate  is 
a  singular  comment  on  your  malignant  attack  on  the  Vice-president. 

It  would  have  been  impossible  that  you  should  steer  clear  of  the  cant  of  your 
party,  and  we  accordingly  have  a  profusion  of  vague  charges  about  Mr.  Cal- 
houn's  ambition.     The  lowest  and  most  mercenary  hireling  can  easily  coin  such 
charges  ;  and  while  they  deal  in  the  general,  without  a  single  specification,  it 
is  utterly  impossible  to  meet  or  refute  them  ;  but,  fortunately,  they  go  for  no 
thing  with  the  wise  and  virtuous,  saving  only  that,  on  the  part  of  those  who  make 
them,  they  evince  an  envious,  morbid  mind,  which,  having  no  real  ground  of 
attack,  indulges  in  vague,  unmeaning  abuse.     It  is  highly  honourable  to  Mr. 
C.  that,  in  the  midst  of  so  much  political  enmity,  his  personal  and  public  char 
acter  stands  free  from  all  but  one  specific  charge — which  is,  that  he  has  incli 
ned,  in  his  present  station,  too  much  against  his  own  power,  and  too  much  in  favour 
of  the  inestimable  right  of  the  freedom  of  debate..    That  he  has  been  indefatiga 
ble  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty ;  that  he  has  been  courteous  to  the  members, 
and  prompt  and  intelligent,  all  acknowledge.     Not  a  moment  was  he  absent 
from  his  post  during  a  long  and  laborious  session,  and  often  remained  in  the 
chair,  without  leaving  it,  from  eight  to  twelve  hours.     He  has,  however,  com 
mitted  one  unpardonable  sin  which  blots  out  all.     He  did  not  stop  Mr.  Ran 
dolph.     This  is  the  head  and  front  of  his  offending.     And  who  is  Mr.  Randolph  ? 
Is  he  or  his  manners  a  stranger  in  our  national  councils  ?     For  more  than  a 
quarter  of  a  century  he  has  been  a  member  of  Congress,  and  during  the  whole 
time  his  character  has  remained  unchanged.     Highly  talented,  eloquent,  se 
vere,  and  eccentric ;  not  unfrequently  wandering  from  the  question,  but  often 
uttering  wisdom  worthy  of  a  Bacon,  and  wit  that  would  not  discredit  a  Sheri 
dan,  every  speaker  had  freely  indulged  him  in  his  peculiar  manner,  and  that 
without  responsibility  or  censure ;  and  none  more  freely  than  the  present  Sec 
retary  of  State,  while  he  presided  in  the  House  of  Representatives.     He  is 
elected,  with  a  knowledge  of  all  this,  by  the  ancient  and  renowned  common 
wealth  of  Virginia,  and  takes  his  seat  in'the  Senate.     An  immediate  outcry  is 
made  against  the  Vice-president  for  permitting  him,  who  has  been  so  long  per- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  27 

jnitted  by  so  many  speakers,  to  exercise  his  usual  freedom  of  discussion, 
though  in  no  respects  were  his  attacks  on  this  administration  freer  than  what 
they  had  been  on  those  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  Mr.  Madison,  and  Mr.  Monroe. 
Who  can  doubt,  if  Mr.  Calhoun  had  yielded  to  this  clamour,  that  the  whole 
current  would  have  turned,  and  that  he  would  then  have  been  more  severely 
denounced  for  what  would  have  been  called  his  tyranny  and  usurpation,  than 
he  has  been  for  refusing  to  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  debate  ?  His  author 
ity  would  have  been  denied,  and  properly  denied :  the  fact  that  Mr.  R.  had  been 
permitted  by  all  other  presiding  officers,  for  so  long  a  time,  to  speak  without  re 
straint,  would  have  been  dwelt  on ;  and  the  injustice  done  to  the  senator,  and 
the  insult  offered  to  the  state  that  sent  him,  would  have  been  painted  in  the 
most  lively  colours.  These  considerations,  we  are  satisfied,  had  no  weight 
with  the  Vice-president.  Those  who  know  him  know  that  no  man  is  more  re 
gardless  of  consequences  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty ;  but  that  the  attack  on 
him  is  personal,  in  order  to  shake  his  political  standing,  and  prostrate  his  char 
acter,  is  clearly  evinced  by  every  circumstance ;  and  with  this  object,  that  he 
would  have  been  assaulted,  act  as  he  might,  is  most  certain.  It  is  for  the 
American  people  to  determine  whether  this  conspiracy  against  a  public  servant, 
whose  only  fault  is  that  he  has  chosen  the  side  of  liberty  rather  than  that  of  pow 
er,  and  whose  highest  crime  consists  in  a  reverential  regard  for  the  freedom  of 
debate,  shall  succeed.  ONSLOW. 


in. 

MR.  CALHOUN'S  ADDRESS,  STATING  HIS  OPINION  OF   THE  RELATION  WHICH   THE 

STATES   AND   GENERAL    GOVERNMENT    BEAR    TO   EACH    OTHER. 

THE  question  of  the  relation  which  the  States  and  General  Government  bear 
to  each  other  is  not  one  of  recent  origin.  From  the  commencement  of  our 
system,  it  has  divided  public  sentiment.  Even  in  the  Convention,  while  the 
Constitution  was  struggling  into  existence,  there  were  two  parties  as  to  what 
this  relation  should  be,  whose  different  sentiments  constituted  no  small  imped 
iment  in  forming  that  instrument.  After  the  General  Government  went  into 
operation,  experience  soon  proved  that  the  question  had  not  terminated  with  the 
labours  of  the  Convention.  The  great  struggle  that  preceded  the  political  rev 
olution  of  1801,  which  brought  Mr.  Jefferson  into  power,  turned  essentially  on 
it,  and  the  doctrines  and  arguments  on  both  sides  were  imbodied  and  ably  sus 
tained  :  on  the  one,  in  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Resolutions,  and  the  Report 
to  the  Virginia  Legislature ;  and  on  the  other,  in  the  replies  of  the  Legislature 
of  Massachusetts  and  some  of  the  other  states.  These  resolutions  and  this 
report,  with  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  about  the 
same  time  (particularly  in  the  case  of  Cobbett,  delivered  by  Chief-justice 
M'Kean,  and  concurred  in  by  the  whole  bench),  contain  what  I  believe  to 
be  the  true  doctrine  on  this  important  subject.  I  refer  to  them  in  order  to  avoid 
the  necessity  of  presenting  my  views,  with  the  reasons  in  support  of  them,  in 
detail. 

As  my  object  is  simply  to  state  my  opinions,  I  might  pause  with  this  refer 
ence  to  documents  that  so  fully  and  ably  state  all  the  points  immediately  con 
nected  with  this  deeply-important  subject ;  but  as  there  are  many  who  may  not 
have  the  opportunity  or  leisure  to  refer  to  them,  and  as  it  is  possible,  however  clear 
they  may  be,  that  different  persons  may  place  different  interpretations  on  their 
meaning,  I  will,  in  order  that  my  sentiments  may  be  fully  known,  and  to  avoid 
all  ambiguity,  proceed  to  state  summarily  the  doctrines  which  I  conceive  they 
embrace. 


28  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

i  ' 

j  The  great  and  leading  principle  is,  that  the  General  Government  emanated 
from  the  people  of  the  several  states,  forming  distinct  political  communities,  and 
acting  in  their  separate  and  sovereign  capacity,  and  not  from  all  of  the  people 
forming  one  aggregate  political  community  ;  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  is,  in  fact,*  a  compact,  to  which  each  state  is  a  party,  in  the  character  al 
ready  described  ;  and  that  the  several  states,  or  parties,  have  a  right  to  judge  of 
its  infractions  ;  and  in  case  of  a  deliberate,  palpable,  and  dangerous  exercise  of 
power  not  delegated,  they  have  the  right,  in  the  last  resort,  to  use  the  language 
of  the  Virginia  Resolutions,  "  to  interpose  for  arresting  the  progress  of  the  evil, 
and  for  maintaining,  within  their  respective  limits,  the  authorities,  rights,  and  lib 
erties  appertaining  to  them"  This  right  of  interposition,  thus  solemnly  assert 
ed  by  the  State  of  Virginia,  be  it  called  what  it  may — State-right,  veto,  nullifi 
cation,  or  by  any  other  name — I  conceive  to  be  the  fundamental  principle  of 
our  system,  resting  on  facts  historically  as  certain  as  our  revolution  itself,  and 
deductions  as  simple  and  demonstrative  as  that  of  any  political  or  moral  truth 
whatever ;  and  I  firmly  believe  that  on  its  recognition  depend  the  stability 
and  safety  of  our  political  institutions.!  j 

I  am  not  ignorant  that  those  opposed  to  the  doctrine  have  always,  now  and 
formerly,  regarded  it  in  a  very  different  light,  as  anarchical  and  revolutionary. 
Could  I  believe  such,  in  fact,  to  be  its  tendency,  to  me  it  would  be  no  recom 
mendation.  I  yield  to  none,  I  trust,  in  a  deep  and  sincere  attachment  to  our 
political  institutions  and  the  union  of  these  states.  I  never  breathed  an  oppo 
site  sentiment ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  'l  have  ever  considered  them  the  great  in 
struments  of  preserving  our  liberty,  &nd  promoting  the  happiness  of  ourselves 
and  our  posterity  ;  and  next  to  these  I  have  ever  held  them  most  dear.  VNearly 
half  my  life  has  been  passed  in  the  service  of  the  Union,  and  whatever  public 
reputation  I  have  acquired  is  indissolubly  identified  with  it.  To  be  too  national 
has,  indeed,  been  considered  by  many,  even  of  my  friends,  to  be  my  greatest 
political  fault.  |  With  these  strong  feelings  of  attachment,  I  have  examined,  with 
the  utmost  care,  the  bearing  of  the  doctrine  in  question ;  and,  so  far  from  anar 
chical  or  revolutionary,  I  solemnly  believe  it  to  be  the  only  solid  foundation  of 
our  system,  and  of  the  Union  itself;  and  that  the  opposite  doctrine,  which  denies 
to  the  states  the  right  of  protecting  their  reserved  powers,  and  which  would 
vest  in  the  General  Government  (it  matters  not  through  what  department)  the 
right  of  determining,  exclusively  and  finally,  the  powers  delegated  to  it,  is  in 
compatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  the  states,  and  of  the  Constitution  itself,  con 
sidered  as  the  basis  of  a  Federal  Union.  If  As  strong  as  this  language  is,  it  is 
not  stronger  than  that  used  by  the  illustrious  Jefferson,  who  said  to  give  to  the 
General  Government  the  final  and  exclusive  right  to  judge  of  its  powers,  is  to 
make  "'-its  discretion,  and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measure  of  its  powers  ;"  and 
that,  "  in  all  cases  of  compact  between  parties  having  no  common  judge,  each  party 
has  an  equal  right  to^iudgefor  itself,  as  well  of  the  infraction  as  of  the  mode  and 
measure  of  re  dress  ^JA  Language  cannot  be  more  explicit,  nor  can  higher  author 
ity  be  adduced. 

That  different  opinions  are  entertained  on  this  subject,  I  consider  but  as  an 
additional  evidence  of  the  great  diversity  of  the  human  intellect.  Had  not  able,, 
experienced,  and  patriotic  individuals,  for  whom  I  have  the  highest  respect, 
taken  different  views,  I  would  have  thought  the  right  too  clear  to  admit  of  doubt ; 
but  I  am  taught  by  this,  as  well  as  by  many  similar  instances,  to  treat  with 
deference  opinions  differing  from  my  own.  The  error  may,  possibly,  be  with 
me ;  but  if  so,  I  can  only  say  that,  after  the  most  mature  and  conscientious  ex 
amination,  I  have  not  been  able  to  detect  it.  But,  with  all  proper  deference,  I 
must  think  that  theirs  is  the  error  who  deny  what  seems  to  be  an  essential  at 
tribute  of  the  conceded  sovereignty  of  the  states,  and  who  attribute  to  the  Gen 
eral  Government  a  right  utterly  incompatible  with  what  all  acknowledge  to  be 
its  limited  and  restricted  character :  an  error  originating  principally,  as  I  must 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C..  &ALHOUN.  29 

think,  in  not  duly  reflecting  on  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  and  on  what  con 
stitutes  the  only  rational  object  of  all  political  constitutions. 

It  has  been  well'  said  by  one  of  the  most  sagacious  men  of  antiquity,  that  the 
object  of  a  constitution  is  to  restrain  the  government,  as  that  of  laws  is  to  restrain 
individuals.  The  remark  is  correct ;  nor  is  it  less  true  where  the  government 
is  vested  in  a  majority  than  where  it  is  in  a^single  or  a  few  individuals — in  a 
republic,  than  a  monarchy  or  aristocracy.  j(_No  one  can  have  a  higher  respect 
for  the  maxim  that  the  majority  ought  to  govern  than  I  have,  taken  in  its  proper 
sense,  subject  to  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Constitution,  and  confined  to 
subjects  in  which  every  portion  of  the  community  have  similar  interests  ;  but  it 
is  a  great  error  to  suppose,  as  many  do,  that  the  right  of  a  majority  to  govern  is 
a  natural  and  not  a  conventional  right,  and  therefore  absolute  and  unlimited. 
By  nature  every  individual  has  the  right  to  govern  himself;  and  governments, 
whether  founded  on  majorities  or  minorities,  must  derive  their  right  from  the 
assent,  .expressed  or  implied,  of  the  governed,  and  be  subject  to  such  limitations 
as  they  may  impose.  Where  the  interests  are  the  same,  that  is,  where  the 
laws  that  may  benefit  one  will  benefit  all,  or  the  reverse,  it  is  just  and  proper  to 
place  them  under  the  control  of  the  majority ;  but  where  they  are  dissimilar,  so 
that  the  law  that  may  benefit  one  portion  may  be  ruinous  to  another,  it  would 
be,  on  the  contrary,  unjust  and  absurd  to  subject  them  to  its  will ;  and  such  I 
conceive  to  be  the  theory  on  which  our  Constitution  restsjj 

That  such  dissimilarity  of  interests  may  exist,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt.  They 
ure  to  be  fouud  in  every  community,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  however  small 
or  homogeneous,  and  they  constitute  everywhere  the  great  difficulty  of  forming 
and  preserving  free  institutions.  To  guard  against  the  unequal  action  of  the 
laws,  when  applied  to  dissimilar  and  opposing  interests,  is,  in  fact,  what  mainly 
renders  a  constitution  indispensable  ;  to  overlook  which,  in  reasoning  on  our 
Constitution,  would  be  to  omit  the  principal  element  by  which  to  determine  its 
character.  Were  there  no  contrariety  of  interests,  nothing  would  be  jnore 
simple  and  easy  than  to  form  and  preserve  free  institutions.  The  right  of  suf 
frage  alone  would  be  a  sufficient  guarantee.  It  is  the  conflict  of  opposing  inter 
ests  which  renders  it  the  most  difficult  work  of  man. 

Where  the  diversity  of  interests  exists  in  separate  and  distinct  classes  of  the 
community,  as  is  the  case  in  England,  and  was  formerly  the  case  in  Sparta, 
Rome,  and  most  of  the  free  states  of  antiquity,  the  rational  constitutional  pro 
vision  is  that  each  should  be  represented  in  the  government,  as  a  separate  es 
tate,  with  a  distinct  voice,  and  a  negative  on  the  acts  of  its  co-estates,  in  order 
to  check  their  encroachments.  In  England  the  Constitution  has  assumed  ex 
pressly  this  form,  while  in  the  governments  of  Sparta  and  Rome  the  same 
thing  was  effected  under  different,  but  not  much  less  efficacious  forms.  The 
perfection  of  their  organization,  in  this  particular,  was  that  which  gave  to  the 
constitutions  of  these  renowned  states  all  their  celebrity,  which  secured  their 
liberty  for  so  many  centuries,  and  raised  them  to  so  great  a  height  of  power 
and  prosperity.  Indeed,  a  constitutional  provision  giving  to  the  great  and  sep 
arate  interests  of  the  community  the  right  of  self-protection,  must  appear,  to 
those  who  will  duly  reflect  on  the  subject,  not  less  essential  to  the  preservation 
of  liberty  than  the  right  of  suffrage  itself.  They,  in  fact,  have  a  common  object, 
to  effect  which  the  one  is  as  necessary  as  the  other  to  secure  responsibility  : 
that  is,  that  those  who  make  and  execute  the  laws  should  be  accountable  to  those  on 
whom  the  laws  in  reality  operate — the  only  solid  and  durable  foundation  of  liberty . 
[If,  without  the  right  of  suffrage,  our  rulers  would  oppress  us,  so,  without  the 
right  of  self-protection,  the  major  would  equally  oppress  the  minor  interests  of 
the  community.  The  absence  of  the  former  would  make  the  governed  the 
slaves  of  the  rulers,  and  of  the  latter,  the  feebler  interests,  the  victim  of  the 
stronger!! 

Happily  for  us,  we  have  no  artificial  and  separate  classes  of  society.     We 


30  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

have  wisely  exploded  all  such  distinctions  ;  but  we  are  not,  on  that  account,  ex 
empt  from  all  contrariety  of  interests,  as  the  present  distracted  and  dangerous 
condition  of  our  country,  unfortunately,  but  too  clearly  proves.  With  us  they 
are  almost  exclusively  geographical,  resulting  mainly  from  difference  of  climate, 
soil,  situation,  industry,  and  production,  but  are  not,  therefore,  less  necessary  to 
be  protected  by  an  adequate  constitutional  provision  than  where  the  distinct  in 
terests  exist  in  separate  classes.  The  necessity  is,  in  truth,  greater,  as  such 
separate  and  dissimilar  geographical  interests  are  more  liable  to  come  into  con 
flict,  and  more  dangerous,  when  in  that  state,  than  those  of  any  other  descrip 
tion  :  so  much  so,  that  ours  is  the  first  instance  on  record  where  they  have  not 
formed,  in  an  extensive  territory,  separate  and  independent  communities,  or  sub 
jected  the  whole  to  despotic  sway.  That  such  may  not  be  our  unhappy  fate  also, 
must  be  the  sincere  prayer  of  every  lover  of  his  country. 

So  numerous  and  diversified  are  the  interests  of  our  country,  that  they  could 
not  be  fairly  represented  in  a  single  government,  organized  so  as  to  give  to  each 
great  and  leading  interest  a  separate  and  distinct  voice,  as  in  governments  to 
which  I  have  referred.  A  plan  was  adopted  better  suited  to  our  situation,  but 
perfectly  novel  in  its  character.  j  The  powers  of  the  government  were  divided, 
not,  as  heretofore,  in  reference  to  classes,  but  geographically.  One  Gener 
al  Government  was  formed  for  the  whole,  to  which  was  delegated  all  the 
powers  supposed  to  be  necessary  to  regulate  the  interests  common  to  all  the 
states,  leaving  others  subject  to  the  separate  control  of  the  states,  being, 
from  their  local  and  peculiar  character,  such  that  they  could  not  be  subject  to 
the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  Union,  without  the  certain  hazard  of  injus 
tice  and  oppression.  It  was  thus  that  the  interests  of  the  whole  were  subject 
ed,  as  they  ought  to  be,  to  the  will  of  the  whole,  while  the  peculiar  and  local 
interests  were  left  under  the  control  of  the  states  separately,  to  whose  custody 
only  they  could  be  safely  confided.  This  distribution  of  power,  settled  solemnly 
by  a  constitutional  compact,  to  which  all  the  states  are^  parties,  constitutes  the 
peculiar  character  and  excellence  of  our  political  systemj  It  is  truly  and  emphat 
ically  American,  without  example  or  parallel. 

To  realize  its  perfection,  we  must  view  the  General  Government  and  those 
of  the  states  as  a  whole,  each  in  its  proper  sphere  independent ;  each  perfectly 
adapted  to  its  respective  objects ;  the  states  acting  separately,  representing  and 
protecting  the  local  and  peculiar  interests  ;  acting  jointly  through  one  General 
Government,  with  the  weight  respectively  assigned  to  each  by  the  Constitu 
tion,  representing  and  protecting  the  interest  of  the  whole,  and  thus  perfecting, 
by  an  admirable  but  simple  arrangement,  the  great  principle  of  representation 
and  responsibility,  without  which  no  government  can  be  free  or  just.  To  pre 
serve  this  sacred  distribution  as  originally  settled,  by  coercing  each  to  move  in 
its  prescribed  orb,  is  the  great  and  difficult  problem,  on  the  solution  of  which 
the  duration  of  our  Constitution,  of  our  Union,  and,  in  all  probability,  our  liberty 
depends.  How  is  this  to  be  effected^ 

The  question  is  new  when  applied  to  our  peculiar  political  organization, 
where  the  separate  and  conflicting  interests  of  society  are  represented  by  dis 
tinct  but  connected  governments  ;  but  itjs,  in  reality,  an  old  question  under  a 
new  form,  long  since  perfectly  solved.  ^Whenever  separate  and  dissimilar  in 
terests  have  been  separately  represented  in  any  government ;  whenever  the 
sovereign  power  has  been  divided  in  its  exercise,  the  experience  and  wisdom 
of  ages  have  devised  but  one  mode  by  which  such  political  organization  can  be 
preserved — the  mode  adopted  in  England,  and  by  all  governments,  ancient 
and  modern,  blessed  with  constitutions  deserving  to  be  called  free — to  give  to 
each  co-estate  the  right  to  judge  of  its  powers,  with  a  negative  or  veto  on  the 
acts  of  the  others,  in  order  to  protect  against  encroachments  the  interests  it  par 
ticularly  representsf:  a  principle  vvhich  all  of  our  Constitutions  recognise  in  the 
distribution  of  power  among  their  respective  departments,  as  essential  to  main- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  31 

tain  the  independence  of  each,  but  which,  to  all  who  will  duly  reflect  on  the 
subject,  must  appear  far  more  essential,  for  the  same  object,  in  that  great  and 
fundamental  distribution  of  powers  between  the  General  and  State  Governments. 
So  essential  is  the  principle,  that  to  withhold  the  right  from  either,  where  the 
sovereign  power  is  divided,  is,  in  fact,  to  annul  the  division  itself,  and  to  con 
solidate  in  the  one  left  in  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  right  all  powers  of 
government ;  for  it  is  not  possible  to  distinguish,  practically,  between  a  govern 
ment  having  all  power,  and  one  having  the  right  to  take  what  powers  it  pleases. 
Nor  does  it  in  the  least  vary  the  principle,  whether  the  distribution  of  power  be 
between  co-estates,  as  in  England,  or  between  distinctly  organized  but  con 
nected  governments,  as  with  us.  The  reason  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  while 
the  necessity  is  greater  in  our  case,  as  the  danger  of  conflict  is  greater  where 
the  interests  of  a  society  are  divided  geographically  than  in  any  other,  as  has 
already  been  shown. 

These  truths  do  seem  to  me  to  be  incontrovertible  ;  and  I  am  at  a  loss  to  un 
derstand  how  any  one,  who  has  maturely  reflected  on  the  nature  of  our  institu 
tions,  or  who  has  read  history  or  studied  the  principles  of  free  government  to 
any  purpose,  can  call  them  in  question.  The  explanation  must,  it  appears  to 
me,  be  sought  in  the  fact  that  in  every  free  state  there  are  those  who  look  more 
to  the  necessity  of  maintaining  power  than  guarding  against  its  abuses.  I  do 
not  intend  reproach,  but  simply  to  state  a  fact  apparently  necessary  to  explain 
the  contrariety  of  opinions  among  the  intelligent,  where  the  abstract  considera 
tion  of  the  subject  would  seem  scarcely  to  admit  of  doubt.  If  such  be  the  true 
cause,  I  must  think  the  fear  of  weakening  the  government  too  muoh  in  this  case 
to  be  in  a  great  measure  unfounded,  or,  at  least,  that  the  danger  is  much  less 
from  that  than  the  opposite  side.  I  do  not  deny  that  a  power  of  so  high  a  na- 
ture^may  be  abused  by  a  state,  but  when  I  reflect  that  the  states  unanimously 
called  the  General  Government  into  existence  with  all  its  powers,  which  they 
freely  delegated  on  their  part,  under  the  conviction  that  their  common  peace, 
safety,  arid  prosperity  required  it ;  that  they  are  bound  together  by  a  common 
origin,  and  the  recollection  of  common  suffering  and  common  triumph  in  the 
great  and  splendid  achievement  of  their  independence  ;  and  that  the  strongest 
feelings  of  our  nature,  and  among  them  the  love  of  national  power  and  distinc 
tion,  are  on  the  side  of  the  Union,  it  does  seem  to  me  'that  the  fear  which 
would  strip  the  states  of  their  sovereignty,  and  degrade  them,  in  fact,  to  mere 
dependant  corporations,  lest  they  should  abuse  a  right  indispensable  to  the  peace 
able  protection  of  those  interests  which  they  reserved  under  their  own  peculiar 
guardianship  when  they  created  the  General  Government,  is  unnatural  and  un 
reasonable.  If  those  who  voluntarily  created  the  system  cannot  be  trusted  to 
preserve  it,  who  can  ? 

So  far  from  extreme  danger,  I  hold  that  there  never  was  a  free  state  in  which 
this  great  conservative  principle,  indispensable  to  all,  was  ever  so  safely  lodged. 
In  others,  when  the  co-estates  representing  the  dissimilar  and  conflicting  inter 
ests  of  the  community  came  into  contac^the  only  alternative  was  compromise, 
submission,  or  force.  Not  so  in  our^£j$hould  the  General  Government  and 
a  state  come  into  conflict,  we  have  a  nigher  remedy:  the  power  which  called 
the  General  Government  into  existence,  which  gave  it  all  its  authority,  arjd  can 
enlarge,  contract,  or  abolish  its  powers  at  its  pleasure,  may  be  invoketfj'  The 
states  themselves  may  be  appealed  to,  three  fourths  of  which,  in  fact,  form  a 
power,  whose  decrees  are  the  Constitution  itself,  arid  whose  voice  can  silence 
all  discontent.  The  utmost  extent,  then,  of  the  power  is,  that  a  state  acting  in  its 
sovereign  capacity,  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  constitutional  compact,  may  com 
pel  the  government,  created  by  that  compact,  to  submit  a  question  touching  its 
infraction  to  the  parties  who  created  it ;  to  avoid  the  supposed  dangers  of  which, 
it  is  proposed  to  resort  to  the  novel,  the  hazardous,  and,  I  must  add,  fatal  proj 
ect  of  giving  to  the  General  Government  the  sole  and  final  right  of  interpret- 


32  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ing  the  Constitution,  thereby  reversing  the  whole  system,  making  that  instru 
ment  the  creature  of  its  will  instead  of  a  rule  of  action  impressed  on  it  at  its 
creation,  and  annihilating,  in  fact,  the  authority,  which  imposed  it,  and  from  which 
the  government  itself  derives  its  existence.Jf ' 

That  such  would  be  the,  result,  were  the  right  in  question  vested  in  the  le 
gislative  or  executive  branch  of  the  government,  is  conceded  by  all.  No  one 
has  been  so  hardy  as  to  assert  that  Congress  or  the  President  ought  to  have  the 
right,  or  deny  that,  if  vested  finally  and  exclusively  in  either,  the  consequences 
which  I  have  stated  would  necessarily  follow  ;  but  its  advocates  have  been  rec 
onciled  to  the  doctrine,  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  one  department  of  the 
General  Government  which,  from  its  peculiar  organization,  affords  an  independ 
ent  tribunal  through  which  the  government  may  exercise  the  high  authority 
which  is  the  subject  of  consideration,  with  perfect  safety  to  all. 

I  yield,  I  trust,  to  few  in  my  attachment  to  the  judiciary  department.  I  am 
fully  sensible  of  its  importance,  and  would  maintain  it  to  the  fullest  extent  in 
its  constitutional  powers  and  independence  ;  but  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  be 
lieve  that  it  was  ever  intended  by  the  Constitution  that  it  should  exercise  the 
power  in  question,  or  that  it  is  competent  to  do  so  ;  and,  if  it  were,  that  it  would 
be  a  safe  depositary  of  the  power. 

Its  powers  are  judicial,  and  not  political,  and  are  expressly  confined  by  the 
Constitution  "  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising  under  this  Constitution,  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  and  the  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  under 
its  authority  ;"  and  which  I  have  high  authority  in  asserting  excludes  political 
questions,  and  comprehends  those  only  where  there  are  parties  amenable  to  the 
process  of  the  court.*  Nor  is  its  incompetency  less  clear  than  its  want  of  con 
stitutional  authority.  There  may  be  many,  and  the  most  dangerous  infractions 
on  the  part  of  Congress,  of  which,  it  is  conceded  by  all,  the  court,  as  a  judicial 
tribunal,  cannot,  from  its  nature,  take  cognizance.  The  tariff  itself  is  a  strong- 
case  in  point ;  and  the  reason  applies  equally  to  all  others  where  Congress  per 
verts  a  power  from  an  object  intended  to  one  not  intended,  the  most  insidious  and 
dangerous  of  all  the  infractions ;  and  which  may  be  extended  to  all  its  powers, 
more  especially  to  the  taxing  and  appropriating.  But,  supposing  it  competent  to 
take  cognizance  of  all  infractions  of  every  description,  the  insuperable  objec 
tion  still  remains,  that  it  would  not  be  a  safe  tribunal  to  exercise  the  power  in 
question. 

It  is  a  universal  and  fundamental  political  principle,  that  the  power  to  pro 
tect  can  safely  be  confided  only  to  those  interested  in  protecting,  or  their  re 
sponsible  agents — a  maxim  not  less  true  in  private  than  in  public  affairs.  The 
danger  in  our  system  is,  that  the  General  Government,  which  represents  the  in 
terests  of  the  whole,  may  encroach  on  the  states,  which  represent  the  peculiar 
and  local  interests,  or  that  the  latter  may  encroach  on  the  former. 

In  examining  this  point,  we  ought  not  to  forget  that  the  government,  through 
all  its  departments,  judicial  as  well  as  others,  is  administered  by  delegated  and 
responsible  agents  ;  and  that  the  power  which  really  controls,  ultimately,  all  the 
movements,  is  not  in  the  agents,  but  those  who  elect  or  appoint  them.  To  under 
stand,  then,  its  real  character,  and  what  would  be  the  action  of  the  system  in 
any  supposable  case,  we  must  raise  our  view  from  the  mere  agents  to  this  high 
controlling  power,  which  finally  impels  every  movement  of  the  machine.  By 
doing  so,  we  shall  find  all  under  the  control  of  the  will  of  a  majority,  compound 
ed  of  the  majority  of  the  states,  taken  as  corporate  bodies,  and  the  majority  of 
the  people  of  the  states,  estimated  in  federal  numbers.  These,  united,  constitute 
the  real  and  final  power  which  impels  and  directs  the  movements  of  the  Gen 
eral  Government.  The  majority  of  the  states  elect  the  majority  of  the  Senate  ; 
of  the  people  of  the  states,  that  of  the  House  of  Representatives  ;  the  two  uni- 

*  I  refer  to  the  authority  of  Chief-justice  Marshall,  in  the  case  of  Jonathan  Robbins.  I 
Shave  not  been  able  to  refer  to  the  speech,  and  speak  from  memory. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  33 

ted,  the  President ;  and  the  President  and  a  majority  of  the  Senate  appoint 
the  judges  :  a  majority  of  whom,  and  a  majority  of  the  Senate  and  ho§se,  with 
the  President,  really  exercise  all  the  powers  of  the  government,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  the  cases  where  the  Constitution  requires  a  greater  number  than  a  ma 
jority.  The  judges  are,  in  fact,  as  truly  the  judicial  representatives  of  this  uni 
ted  majority,  as  the  majority  of  Congress  itself,  or  the  President,  is  its  legisla 
tive  or  executive  representative  ;  and  to  confide  the  power  to  the  judiciary  to 
determine  finally  and  conclusively  what  powers  are  delegated  and  what  reserv 
ed,  would  be,  in  reality,  to  confide  it  to  the  majority,  whose  agents  they  are,  and 
by  whom  they  can  be  controlled  in  various  ways ;  and,  of  course,  to  subject 
(against  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  system  and  all  sound  political  reason 
ing)  the  reserved  powers  of  the  states,  with  all  the  local  and  peculiar  interests 
they  were  intended  to  protect,  to  the  will  of  the  very  majority  against  which  the 
protection  was  intended.  Nor  will  the  tenure  by  which  the  judges  hold  their 
office,  however  valuable  the  provision  in  many  other  respects,  materially  vary 
the  case.  Its  highest  possible  effect  would  be  to  retard,  and  not  finally  to  re 
sist,  the  will  of  a  dominant  majority. 

But  it  is  useless  to  multiply  arguments.  Were  it  possible  that  reason  could 
settle  a  question  where  the  passions  and  interests  of  men  are  concerned,  this 
point  would  have  been  long  since  settled  forever  by  the  State  of  Virginia.  The 
report  of  her  Legislature,  to  which  I  have  already  referred,  has  really,  in  my 
opinion,  placed  it  beyond  controversy.  Speaking  in  reference  to  this  subject, 
it  says  :  "  It  has  been  objected"  (to  the  right  of  a  state  to  interpose  for  the  pro 
tection  of  her  reserved  rights)  "  that  the  judicial  authority  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  sole  expositor  of  the  Constitution.  On  this  objection  it  might  be  observed, 
first,  that  there  may  be  instances  of  usurped  powers  which  the  forms  of  the 
Constitution  could  never  draw  within  the  control  of  the  judicial  department ; 
secondly,  that,  if  the  decision  of  the  judiciary  be  raised  above  the  sovereign 
parties  to  the  Constitution,  the  decisions  of  the  other  departments,  not  carried 
by  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  before  the  judiciary,  must  be  equally  author 
itative  and  final  with  the  decision  of  that  department.  But  the  proper  answer 
to  the  objection  is,  that  the  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  relates  to  those 
great  and  extraordinary  cases  in  which  all  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  may 
prove  ineffectual  against  infractions  dangerous  to  the  essential  rights  of  the  par 
ties  to  it.  The  resolution  supposes  that  dangerous  powers,  not  delegated,  may 
not  only  be  usurped  and  executed  by  the  other  departments,  but  that  the  judi 
cial  department  may  also  exercise  or  sanction  dangerous  powers,  beyond  the 
grant  of  the  Constitution,  and,  consequently,  that  the  ultimate  right  of  the  par 
ties  to  the  Constitution  to  judge  whether  the  compact  has  been  dangerously 
violated,  must  extend  to  violations  by  one  delegated  authority,  as  well  as  by  an 
other — by  the  judiciary,  as  well  as  by  the  executive  or  legislative." 

Against  these  conclusive  arguments,  as  they  seem  to  me,  it  is  objected  that, 
if  one  of  the  parties  has  the  right  to  judge  of  infractions  of  the  Constitution,  so 
has  the  other ;  and  that,  consequently,  in  cases  of  contested  powers  between  a 
state  and  the  General  Government,  each  would  have  a  right  to  maintain  its 
opinion,  as  is  the  case  wlien  sovereign  powers  differ  in  the  construction  of 
treaties  or  compacts,  and  that,  of  course,  it  would  come  to  be  a  mere  question 
of  force,  frhe  error  is  in  the  assumption  that  the  General  Government  is  a 
party  to  the  constitutional  compact.  The  states,  as  has  been  shown,  formed 
the  compact,  acting"  as  sovereign  and  independent  communities.  The  General 
Government  is  but  its  creature  ;  and  though,  in  reality,  a  government,  with  all 
the  rights  and  authority  which  belong  to  any  other  government,  within  the  orbit 
of  its  powers,  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  government  emanating  from  a  compact  be 
tween  sovereigns,  and  partaking,  in  its  nature  and  object,  of  the  character  of  a 
joint  commission,  appointed  to  superintend  and  administer  the  interests  in  which 
all  are  jointly  concerned,  but  having,  beyond  its  proper  sphere,  no  more  power 

E 


34  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

than  if  it  did  not  exist.  |  To  deny  this  would  be  to  deny  the  most  incontestable 
facts  anfl  the  clearest  conclusions  ;  while  to  acknowledge  its  truth  is  to  de 
stroy  utterly  the  objection  that  the  appeal  would  be  to  force,  in  the  case  sup 
posed.  For,  if  each  party  has  a  right  to  judge,  then,  under  our  system  of  gov 
ernment,  the  final  cognizance  of  a  question  of  contested  power  would  be  in  the 
states,  and  not  in  the  General  Government.  It  would  be  the  duty  of  the  latter, 
as  in  all  similar  cases  of  a  contest  between  one  or  more  of  the  principals  and 
a  joint  commission  or  agency,  to  refer  the  contest  to  the  principals  themselves. 
Such  are  the  plain  dictates  of  both  reason  and  analogy.  On  no  sound  principle 
can  the  agents  have  a  right  to  final  cognizance,  as  against  the  principals  much 
less  to  use  force  against  them  to  maintain  their  construction  of  their  powers. 
Such  a  right  would  be  monstrous,  arid  has  never,  heretofore,  been  claimed  in. 
similar  cases. 

That  the  doctrine  is  applicable  to  the  case  of  a  contested  power  between  the 
states  and  the  General  Government,  we  have  the  authority  not  only  of  reason 
and  analogy,  but  of  the  distinguished  statesman  already  referred  to.  Mr.  Jef 
ferson,  at  a  late  period  of  his  life,  after  long  experience  and  mature  reflection, 
says,  "  With  respect  to  our  State  and  Federal  Governments,  I  do  not  think  their 
relations  are  correctly  understood  by  foreigners.  They  suppose  the  former 
are  subordinate  to  the  latter.  This  is  not  the  case.  They  are  co-ordinate  de 
partments  of  one  simple  and  integral  whole.  But  you  may  ask,  If  the  two  de 
partments  should  claim  each  the  same  subject  of  power,  where  is  the  umpire  to 
decide  between  them  ?  In  cases  of  little  urgency  or  importance,  the  prudence 
of  both  parties  will  keep  them  aloof  from  the  questionable  ground  ;  but,  if  it  can 
neither  be  avoided  nor  compromised,  a  convention  of  the  states  must  be  called 
to  ascribe  the  doubtful  power  to  that  department  which  they  may  think  best." 

fit  is  thus  that  our  Constitution,  by  authorizing  amendments,  and  by  prescribing 
the  authority  and  mode  of  making  them,  has,  by  a  simple  contrivance,  with  its 
characteristic  wisdom,  provided  a  power  which,  in  the  last  resort,  supersedes 
effectually  the  necessity,  and  even  the  pretext  for  force  :  a  power  to  which  none 
can  fairly  object  j  with  which  the  interests  of  all  are  safe  ;  which  can  definitive 
ly  close  all  controversies  in  the  only  effectual  mode,  by  freeing  the  compact  of 
every  defect  and  uncertainty,  by  an  amendment  of  the  instrument  itselffj  It  is 
impossible  for  human  wisdom, 'in  a  system  like  ours,  to  devise  another  mode 
which  shall  be  safe  and  effectual,  and,  at  the  same  time,  consistent  with  what 
are  the  relations  and  acknowledged  powers  of  the  two  great  departments  of  our 
government.  It  gives  a  beauty  and  security  peculiar  to  our  system,  which,  if 
duly  appreciated,  will  transmit  its  blessings  to  the  remotest  generations  ;  but,  if 

4  not,  our  splendid  anticipations  of  the  future  will  prove  but  an  empty  dream. 

JfStripped  of  all  its  covering,  the  naked  question  is,  whether  ours  is  a  federal  or 
a  consolidated  government  ;  a  constitutional  or  absolute  one  ;  a  government 
resting  ultimately  on  the  solid  basis  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  or  on  the 
unrestrained  will  of  a  majority  ;  a  form  of  government,  as  in  all  other  unlimited 
ones,  in  which  injustice,  and  violence,  and  force  must  finally  prevail.  Let  it 
never  be  forgotten  that,  where  the  majority  rules  withovJ  restriction,  the  minority 
is  the  subject ;  and  that,  if  we  should  absurdly  attribute  to  the  former  the  exclu 
sive  right  of  construing  the  Constitution,  there  would  be,  in  fact,  between  the 
sovereign  and  subject,  under  such  a  government,  no  constitution,  or,  at  least, 
nothing  deserving  the  name,  or  serving  the  legitimate  object  of  so  sacred  an 
instrument.,]  I 

0Iow  the  states  are  to  exercise  this  high  power  of  interposition,  which  con 
stitutes  so  essential  a  portion  of  their  reserved  rights  that  it  cannot  be  delegated 
without  an  entire  surrender  of  their  sovereignty,  and  converting  our  system  from 
a  federal  into  a  consolidated  government,  is  a  question  that  the  states  only  are 
competent  to  determine.  The  arguments  which  prove  that  they  possess  the 
power,  equally  prove  that  they  are,  in  the  language  of  Jefferson,  fl  the  rightful 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  35 

judges  of  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress"  But  the  spirit  of  forbearance,  as 
well  as  the  nature  of  the  right  itself,  forbids  a  recourse  to  it,  except  in  cases  of 
dangerous  infractions  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  then  only  in  the  last  resort,  when 
all  reasonable  hope  of  relief  from  the  ordinary  action  of  the  government  has 
failed  ;  when,  if  the  right  to  interpose  did  not  exist,  the  alternative  would  be 
submission  and  oppression  on  one  side,  or  resistance  by  force  on  the  other. 
That  our  system  should  afford,  in  such  extreme  cases,  an  intermediate  point  be 
tween  these  dire  alternatives,  by  which  the  government  may  be  brought  to  a 
pause,  and  thereby  an  interval  obtained  to  compromise  differences,  or,  if  im 
practicable,  be  compelled  to  submit  the  question  to  a  constitutional  adjustment, 
through  an  appeal  to  the  states  themselves,  is  an  evidence  of  its  high  wisdom : 
an  element  not,  as  is  supposed  by  some,  of  weakness,  but  of  strength  ;  not  of 
anarchy  or  revolution,  but  of  peace  and  safety.  Its  general  recognition  would 
of  itself,  in  a  great  measure,  if  not  altogether,  supersede  the  necessity  of  its  exer 
cise,  by  impressing  on  the  movements  of  the  government  that  moderation  and  jus 
tice  so  essential  to  harmony  and  peace,  in  a  country  of  such  vast  extent  and  diver 
sity  of  interests  as  ours ;  and  would,  if  controversy  should  come,  turn  the  resent 
ment  of  the  aggrieved  from  the  system  to  those  who  had  abused  its  powers 
(a  point  all-important),  and  cause  them  to  seek  redress,  not  in  revolution  or  over 
throw,  but  in  reformation.^  It  is,  in  fact,  properly  understood,  a  substitute,  where 
the  alternative  would  be  force,  tending  to  prevent,  and,  if  that  fails,  to  correct  peace 
ably  the  aberrations  to  which  all  systems  are  liable,  and  which,  if  permitted  to  ac 
cumulate  without  correction,  must  Jinally  end  in  a  general  catastrophe^] 

I  have  now  said  what  I  intended  in  reference  to  the  abstract  question  of  the- 
relation  of  the  states  to  the  General  Government,  and  would  here  conclude,  did 
I  not  believe  that  a  mere  general  statement  on  an  abstract  question,  without  in 
cluding  that  which  may  have  caused  its  agitation,  would  be  considered  by  many 
imperfect  and  unsatisfactory.  Feeling  that  such  would  be  justly  the  case,  I  am 
compelled,  reluctantly,  to  touch  on  the  tariff,  so  fait,  at  least,  as  may  be  neces 
sary  to  illustrate  the  opinions  which  I  have  already  advanced.  Anxious,  how 
ever,  to  intrude  as  little  as  possible  on  the  public  attention,  I  will  be  as  brief  as 
possibte  ;  and  with  that  view  will,  as  far  as  may  be  consistent  with  my  object, 
avoid  all  debateable  topics. 

Whatever  diversity  of  opinion  may  exist  in  relation  to  the  principle,  or  the 
effect  on  the  productive  industry  of  the  country,  of  the  present,  or  any  other 
tariff  of  protection,  there  are  certain  political  consequences  flowing  from  the 
present  which  none  can  doubt,  and  all  must  deplore.     It  Avould  be  in  vain  to 
attempt  to  conceal,  that  it  has  divided  the  country  into  two  great  geographical 
divisions,  and  arrayed  them  against  each  other,  in  opinion  at  least,  if  not  inter 
ests  also,  on  some  of  the  most  vital  of  political  subjects — on  its  finance,  its  com 
merce,  and  its  industry — subjects  calculated,  above  all  others,  in  time  of  peace, 
to  produce  excitement,  and  in  relation  to  which  the  tariff  has  placed  the  sec-, 
tions  in  question  in  deep  and  dangerous  conflict.  fjf  there  be  any  point  on 
which  the  (I  was  going  to  say,  southern  section,  but  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possi 
ble,  the  painful  feelings  such  discussions  are  calculated  to  excite,  I  shall  say) 
weaker  of  the  two  sections  is  unanimous,  it  is  that  its  prosperity  depends,  in  a 
great  measure,  on  free  trade,  light  taxes,  economical,  and,  as  far  as  possible,, 
equal  disbursements  of  the  public  revenue,  and  unshackled  industry,  leaving^ 
them  to  pursue  whatever  may  appear  most  advantageous  to  their  interestsj 
From  the  Potomac  to  the  Mississippi,  ther^  are  few,  indeed,  however  divided 
on  other  points,  who  would  not,  if  dependant  on  their  volition,  and  if  they  re 
garded  the  interest  of  their  particular  section  only,  remove  from  commerce  and 
industry  every  shackle,  reduce  the  revenue  to  the  lowest  point  that  the  wants  of 
the  government  fairly  required,  and  restrict  the  appropriations  to  the  most  mod 
erate  scale  consistent  with  the  peace,  the  security,  and  the  engagements  of  the 
public ;  and  who  do  not  believe  that  the  opposite  system  is  calculated  to  throw 


36  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

on  them  an  unequal  burden,  to  repress  their  prosperity,  and  to  encroach  on  their 
enjoyment. 

£jOn  all  these  deeply-important  measures,  the  opposite  opinion  prevails,  if  not 
with  equal  unanimity,  with  at  least  a  greatly  preponderating  majority,  in  the  other 
and  stronger  section  ;  so  much  so,  that  no  two  distinct  nations  ever  entertained 
more  opposite  views  of  policy  than  these  two  sections  do  on  all  the  important 
points  to  which  I  have  referred^  Nor  is  it  less  certain  that  this  unhappy  con 
flict,  flowing  directly  from  the  tariff,  has  extended  itself  to  the  halls  of  legislation, 
and  has  converted  the  deliberations  of  Congress  into  an  annual  struggle  between 
the  two  sections ;  the  stronger  to  maintain  and  increase  the  superiority  it  has 
already  acquired,  and  the  other  to  throw  off'  or  diminish  its  burdens  :  a  struggle 
in  which  all  the  noble  arid  generous  feelings  of  patriotism  are  gradually  subsi 
ding  into  sectional  and  selfish  attachments.*  Nor  has  the  effect  of  this  danger 
ous  conflict  ended  here.  It  has  not  only  divided  the  two  sections  on  the  im 
portant  point  already  stated,  but  on  the  deeper  and  more  dangerous  questions, 
the  constitutionality  of  a  protective  tariff,  and  the  general  principles  and  theory 
of  the  Constitution  itself :  the  stronger,  in  order  to  maintain  their  superiority, 
giving  a  construction  to  the  instrument  which  the  other  believes  would  convert 
the  General  Government  into  a  consolidated,  irresponsible  government,  with 
the  total  destruction  of  liberty  ;  and  the  weaker,  seeing  no  hope  of  relief  with 
such  assumption  of  powers,  turning  its  eye  to  the  reserved  sovereignty  of  the 
states,  as  the  only  refuge  from  oppression.  I  shall  not  extend  these  remarks, 
as  I  might,  by  showing  that,  while  the  effect  of  the  system  of  protection  was 
rapidly  alienating  one  section,  it  was  not  less  rapidly,  by  its  necessary  opera 
tion,  distracting  and  corrupting  the  other  ;  and,  between  the  two,  subjecting  the 
administration  to  violent  and  sudden  changes,  totally  inconsistent  with  all  sta 
bility  and  wisdom  in  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  the  nation,  of  which  we 
already  see  fearful  symptoms.  Nor  do  I  deem  it  necessary  to  inquire  whether 
this  unhappy  conflict  grows  out  of  true  or  mistaken  views  of  interest  on  either 
or  both  sides.  Regarded  in  either- light,  it  ought  to  admonish  us  of  the  extreme 
danger  to  which  our  system  is  exposed,  and  the  great  moderation  and  wisdom 
necessary  to  preserve  it.  If  it  comes  from  mistaken  views — if  the  interests  of 
the  two  sections,  as  affected  by  the  tariff,  be  really  the  same,  and  the  system,  in 
stead  of  acting  unequally,  in  reality  diffuses  equal  blessings,  and  imposes  equal 
burdens  on  every  part — it  ought  to  teach  us  how  liable  those  who  are  differently 
situated,  and  who  view  their  interests  under  different  aspects,  are  to  come  to 
different  conclusions,  even  when  their  interests  are  strictly  the  same  ;  and,  con 
sequently,  with  what  extreme  caution  any  system  of  policy  ought  to  be  adopted, 
and  with  what  a  spirit  of  moderation  pursued,  in  a  country  of  such  great  extent 
and  diversity  as  ours.  |J3ut  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  conflict  springs  really  from 
contrariety  of  interests — if  the  burden  be  on  one  side  and  the  benefit  on  the 
other — then  are  we  taught  a  lesson  not  less  important,  how  little  regard  we 
have  for  the  interests  of  others  while  in  pursuit  of  our  own ;  or,  at  least,  how 
apt  we  are  to  consider  our  own  interest  the  interest  of  all  others ;  and,  of 
course,  how  great  the  danger,  in  a  country  of  such  acknowledged  diversity  of 
interests,  of  the  oppression  of  the  feebler  by  the^ronger  interest,  and,  in  con 
sequence  of  it,  of  the  most  fatal  sectional  conflicts^  But  whichever  may  be  the 
cause,  the  real  or  supposed  diversity  of  interest,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
political  consequences  of  the  prohibitory  system,  be  its  effects  in  other  respects 
beneficial  or  otherwise,  are  really  si»ch  as  I  have  stated ;  nor  can  it  be  doubted 
that  a  conflict  between  the  great  sections,  on  questions  so  vitally  important,  in 
dicates  a  condition  of  the  country  so  distempered  and  dangerous,  as  to  demand 

*  The  system,  if  continued,  must  end,  not  only  in  subjecting  the  industry  and  property  of  the 
weaker  section  to  the  control  of  the  stronger,  but  in  proscription  and  political  "disfranchisement.  It. 
must  finally  control  elections  and  appointments  to  office*,  as  well  as  acts  of  legislation,  to  the  great 
increase  oAhe  feelings  of  animosity,  and  of  the  fatal  tendency  to  a  complete  alienation  between  the 
sections.  '-  '•  . 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  37 

the  most  serious  and  prompt  attention.  It  is  only  when  we  come  to  consider 
of  the  remedy,  that,  under  the  aspect  I  am  viewing  the  subject,  there  can  be, 
among  the  informed  and  considerate,  any  diversity  of  opinion. 

Those  who  have  not  duly  reflected  on  its  dangerous  and  inveterate  character, 
suppose  that  the  disease  will  cure  itself;  that  events  ought  to  be  left  to  take 
their  own  course  ;  and  that  experience,  in  a  short  time,  will  prove  that  the  in 
terest  of  the  whole  community  is  the  same  in  reference  to  the  tariff,  or,  at  least, 
whatever  diversity  there  may  now  be,  time  will  assimilate.  Such  has  been 
their  language  from  the  beginning,  but,  unfortunately,  the  progress  of  events  has 
been  the  reverse.  The  country  is  now  more  divided  than  in  1824,  and  then 
more  than  in  1816.  The  majority  may  have  increased,  but  the  opposite  sides 
are,  beyond  dispute,  more  determined  and  excited  than  at  any  preceding  period. 
Formerly,  the  system  was  resisted  mainly  as  inexpedient ;  but  now,  as  uncon 
stitutional,  unequal,  unjust,  and  oppressive.  Then,  relief  was  sought  exclusive 
ly  from  the  General  Government ;  but  now,  many,  driven  to  despair,  are  raising 
their  eyes  to  the  reserved  sovereignty  of  the  states  as  the  only  refuge.  If 
we  turn  from  the  past  and  present  to  the  future,  we  shall  find  nothing  to  lessen, 
but  much  to  aggravate  the  danger.  The  increasing  embarrassment  and  distress 
of  the  staple  states,  the  growing  conviction,  from  experience,  that  they  are 
caused  by  the  prohibitory  system  principally,  and  that,  under  its  continued  oper 
ation,  their  present  pursuits  must  become  profitless,  and  with  a  conviction  that 
their  great  and  peculiar  agricultural  capital  cannot  be  diverted  from  its  ancient 
and  hereditary  channels  without  ruinous  losses,  all  concur  to  increase,  instead 
of  dispelling,  the  gloom  that  hangs  over  the  future.  In  fact,  to  those  who  will 
duly  reflect  on  the  subject,  the  hope  that  the  disease  will  cure  itself  must  ap 
pear  perfectly  illusory.  The  question  is,  in  reality,  one  between  the  exporting 
and  non-exporting  interests  of  the  country.  Were  there  no  exports,  there  would 
be  no  tariff.  It  would  be  perfectly  useless.  On  the  contrary,  so  long  as  there 
are  states  which  raise  the  great  agricultural  staples  with  the  view  of  obtaining 
their  supplies,  and  which  must  depend  on  the  general  market  of  the  world  for 
their  sales,  the  conflict  must  remain  if  the  system  should  continue,  and  the  dis 
ease  become  more  and  more  inveterate.  Their  interest,  and  that  of  those  who, 
by  high  duties,  would  confine  the  purchase  of  their  supplies  to  the  home  mar 
ket,  must,  from  the  nature  of  things,  in  reference  to  the  tariff,  be  in  conflict. 
Till,  then,  we  cease  to  raise  the  great  staples  cotton,  rice,  and  tobacco,  for  the 
general  market,  and  till  we  can  find  some  other  profitable  investment  for  the 
immense  amount  of  capital  and  labour  now  employed  in  their  production,  the 
present  unhappy  and  dangerous  conflict  cannot  terminate,  unless  with  the  pro 
hibitory  system  itself. 

In  the  mean  time,  while  idly  waiting  for  its  termination  through  its  own  ac 
tion,  the  progress  of  events  in  another  quarter  is  rapidly  bringing  the  contest  to 
an  immediate  and  decisive  issue.  We  are  fast  approaching  a  period  very  novel 
in  the  history  of  nations,  and  bearing  directly  and  powerfully  on  the  point  un 
der  consideration — the  final  payment  of  a  long-standing  funded  debt — a  period 
that  cannot  be  greatly  retarded,  or  its  natural  consequences  eluded,  without  pro 
ving  disastrous  to  those  who  attempt  either,  if  not  to  the  country  itself.  When 
it  arrives,  the  government  will  find  itself  in  possession  of  a  surplus  revenue  of 
$10,000,000  or  $12,000,000,  if  not  previously  disposed  of— which  presents  the 
important  question,  What  previous  disposition  ought  to  be  made  ?  a  question, 
which  must  press  urgently  for  decision  at  the  very  next  session  of  Congress. 
It  cannot  be  delayed  longer  without  the  most  distracting  and  dangerous  conse 
quences. 

Elf  he  honest  and  obvious  course  is,  to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  the  surplus 
in  the  treasury  by  a  timely  and  judicious  reduction  of  the  imposts  ;  and  there 
by  to  leave  the  money  in  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  and  from  whom  it 
cannot  be  honestly  nor  constitutionally  taken,  unless  required  by  the  fair  and 


38  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

legitimate  wants  of  the  government.  If,  neglecting  a  disposition  so  obvious 
and  just,  the  government  should  attempt  to  keep  up  the  present  high  duties, 
when  the  money  is  no  longer  wanted,  or  to  dispose  of  this  immense  surplus  by 
enlarging  the  old,  or  devising  new  schemes  of  appropriations  ;  or,  finding  that 
to  be  impossible,  it  should  adopt  the  most  dangerous,  unconstitutional,  and  ab 
surd  project  ever  devised  by  any  government,  of  dividing  the  surplus  among  the 
states — a  project  which,  if  carried  into  execution,  would  not  fail  to  create  an  an 
tagonist  interest  between  the  states  and  General  Government  on  all  questions  of 
appropriations,  which  would  certainly  end  in  reducing  the  latter  to  a  mere  office 
of  collection  and  distribution — either  of  these  modes  would  be  considered  by  the 
section  suffering  under  the  present  high  duties  as  a  fixed  determination  to  per 
petuate  forever  what  it  considers  the  present  unequal,  unconstitutional,  and  op 
pressive  burden  ;  and  from  that  moment  it  would  cease  to  look  to  the  General 
Government  for  reliefjf  This  deeply-interesting  period,  which  must  prove  so 
disastrous  should  a  wrong  direction  be  given,  but  so  fortunate  and  glorious, 
should  a  right  one,  is  just  at  hand.  The  work  must  commence  at  the  next  ses 
sion,  as  I  have  stated,  or  be  left  undone,  or,  at  least,  be  badly  done.  The  suc 
ceeding  session  would  be  too  short,  and  too  much  agitated  by  the  presidential 
contest,  to  afford  the  requisite  leisure  and  calmness ;  and  the  one  succeeding 
would  find  the  country  in  the  midst  of  the  crisis,  when  it  would  be  too  late  to 
prevent  an  accumulation  of  the  surplus ;  which  I  hazard  nothing  in  saying, 
judging  from  the  nature  of  men  and  government,  if  once  permitted  to  accumu 
late,  would  create  an  interest  strong  enough  to  perpetuate  itself,  supported,  as 
it  would  be,  by  others  so  numerous  and  powerful ;  and  thus  would  pass  away  a 
moment,  never  to  be  quietly  recalled,  so  precious,  if  properly  used,  to  lighten 
the  public  burden :  to  equalize  the  action  of  the  government ;  to  restore  har 
mony  and  peace  ;  and  to  present  to  the  world  the  illustrious  example,  which, 
could  not  fail  to  prove  most  favourable  to  the  great  cause  of  liberty  everywhere, 
of  a  nation  the  freest,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  best  and  most  cheaply  govern 
ed  ;  of  the  highest  earthly  blessing  at  the  least  possible  sacrifice. 

As  the  disease  will  not,  then,  heal  itself,  we  are  brought  to  the  question,  Can 
a  remedy  be  applied  ?  and  if  so,  what  ought  it  to  be  ? 

To  answer  in  the  negative  would  be  to  assert  that  our  Union  has  utterly  fail 
ed  ;  and  that  the  opinion,  so  common  before  the  adoption  of  our  Constitution, 
that  a  free  government  could  not  be  practically  extended  over  a  large  country, 
was  correct ;  and  that  ours  had  been  destroyed  by  giving  it  limits  so  great  as  to 
comprehend,  not  only  dissimilar,  but  irreconcilable  interests.  I  am  not  prepared 
to  admit  a  conclusion  that  would  cast  so  deep  a  shade  on  the  future,  and  that 
would  falsify  all  the  glorious  anticipations  of  our  ancestors,  while  it  would  so 
greatly  lessen  their  high  reputation  for  wisdom.  Nothing  but  the  clearest  dem 
onstration,  founded  on  actual'  experience,  will  ever  force  me  to  a  conclusion 
so  abhorrent  to  all  my  feelings.  As  strongly  as  I  am  impressed  with  the  great 
dissimilarity,  and,  as  I  must  add,  as  truth  compels  me  to  do,  contrariety  of  inter 
ests  in  our  country,  resulting  from  the  causes  already  indicated,  and  which  are 
so  great  that  they  cannot  be  subjected  to  the  unchecked  will  of  a  majority  of 
the  whole  without  defeating  the  great  end  of  government,  and  without  which  it 
is  a  curse — justice — yet  I  see  in  the  Union,  as  ordained  by  the  Constitution,  the 
means,  if  wisely  used,  not  only  of  reconciling  all  diversities,  but  also  the  means, 
and  the  only  effectual  one,  of  securing  to  us  justice,  peace,  and  security,  at  home 
and  abroad,  and  with  them  that  national  power  and  renown,  the  love  of  which 
Providence  has  implanted,  for  wise  purposes,  so  deeply  in  the  human  heart :  in 
all  of  which  great  objects,  every  portion  of  our  country,  widely  extended  and  di- 
Tersilied  as  it  is,  has  a  common  and  identical  interest.? |J f  we  have  the  wisdom 
to  place  a  proper  relative  estimate  on  these  more  elevated  and  durable  blessings, 
the  present  and  every  other  conflict  of  like  character  may  be  readily  terminated  ; 
but  if,  reversing  the  scale,  each  section  should  put  a  higher  estimate  on  its  im- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUK.  39 

mediate  and  peculiar  gains,  and,  acting  in  that  spirit,  should  push  favourite  meas 
ures  of  mere  policy,  without  some  regard  to  peace,  harmony,  or  justice,  our 
sectional  conflicts  would  then,  indeed,  without  some  constitutional  check,  become 
interminable,  except  by  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  i-tselfTT-JThat  we  have,  in 
fact,  so  reversed  the  estimate,  is  too  certain  to  be  doubted,  and  the  result  is  our 
present  distempered  and  dangerous  condition.  The  cure  must  commence  in 
the  correction  of  the  error  ;  and  not  to  admit  that  we  have  erred  would  be  the 
worst  possible  symptom.  It  would  prove  the  disease  to  be  incurable,  through 
the  regular  and  ordinary  process  of  legislation  ;  and  would  compel,  finally,  a  re 
sort  to  extraordinary,  but  I  still  trust,  not  only  constitutional,  but  safe  remedies. 

No  one  would  more  sincerely  rejoice  than  myself  to  see  the  remedy  applied 
from  the  quarter  where  it  could  be  most  easily  and  regularly  done.  It  is  the 
only  way  by  which  those  who  think  that  it  is  the  only  quarter  from  which  it 
can  constitutionally  come,  can  possibly  sustain  their  opinion.  To  omit  the  ap 
plication  by  the  General  Government  would  compel  even  them  to  admit  the 
truth  of  the  opposite  opinion,  or  force  them  to  abandon  our  political  system  in 
despair  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  all  their  enlightened  and  patriotic  opponents 
would  rejoice  at  such  evidence  of  moderation  and  wisdom,  on  the  part  of  the 
General  Government,  as  would  supersede  a  resort  to  what  they  believe  to  be 
the  higher  powers  of  our  political  system,  as  indicating  a  sounder  state  of  pub 
lic  sentiment  than  has  ever  heretofore  existed  in  any  country,  and  thus  afford 
ing  the  highest  possible  assurance  of  the  perpetuation  of  our  glorious  institu 
tions  to  the  latest  generation.  For,  as  a  people  advance  in  knowledge,  in  the 
same  degree  they  may  dispense  with  mere  artificial  restrictions  in  their  gov 
ernment  ;  and  we  may  imagine  (but  dare  not  expect  to  see  it)  a  state  of  intelli 
gence  so  universal  and  high,  that  all  the  guards  of  liberty  may  be  dispensed  with 
except  an  enlightened  public  opinion,  acting  through  the  right  of  suffrage ;  but 
it  presupposes  a  state  where  every  class  and  every  section  of  the  community 
are  capable  of  estimating  the  effects  of  every  measure,  not  only  as  it  may  af 
fect  itself,  but  every  other  class  and  section;  and  of  fully  realizing  the  sub 
lime  truth  that  the  highest  and  wisest  policy  consists  in  maintaining  justice,  and 
promoting  peace  and  harmony  L-snd  that,  compared  to  these,  schemes  of  mere 
gain  are  but  trash  and  dross.  £J  fear  experience  has  already  proved  that  we 
are  far  removed  from  such  a  state,  and  that  we  must,  consequently,  rely  on  the 
old  and  clumsy,  but  approved  mode  of  checking  power,  in  order  to  prevent  or 
correct  abuses  ;  but  I  do  trust  that,  though  far  from  perfect,  we  are,  at  least,  so 
much  so  as  to  be  capable  of  remedying  the  present  disorder  in  the  ordinary 
way  ;  and  thus  to  prove  that  with  us  public  opinion  is  so  enlightened,  and  our 
political  machine  so  perfect,  as  rarely  to  require  for  its  preservation  the  inter 
vention  of  the  power  that  created  itTf  How  is  that  to  be  effected  ? 

The  application  may  be  painful,  but  the  remedy,  I  conceive,  is  certain  and 
simple.  £There  is  but  one  effectual  cure — an  honest  reduction  of  the  duties  to 
a  fair  system  of  revenue,  adapted  to  the  just  and  constitutional  wants  of  the 
government.  Nothing  short  of  this  will  restore  the  country  to  peace,  harmony,  /  / 
and  mutual  affection,  j  There  is  already  a  deep  and  growing  conviction,  in  a 
large  section  of  the  country,  that  the  impost,  even  as  a  revenue  system,  is  ex 
tremely  unequal,  and  that  it  is  mainly  paid  by  those  who  furnish  the  means  of 
paying  the  foreign  exchanges  of  the  country  on  which  it  is  laid ;  and  that  the 
case  would  not  be  varied,  taking  into  the  estimate  the  entire  action  of  the  sys 
tem,  whether  the  producer  or  consumer  pays  in  the  first  instance. 

I  do  not  propose  to  enter  formally  into  the  discussion  of  a  point  so  complex 
and  contested  ;  but,  as  it  has  necessarily  a  strong  practical  bearing  on  the  sub 
ject  under  consideration  in  all  its  relations,  I  cannot  pass  it  without  a  few  gen 
eral  and  brief  remarks  : 

If  the  producer  in  reality  pays,  none  will  doubt  but  the  burden  would  mainly 
fall  on  the  section  it  is  supposed  to  do.  The  theory  that  the  consumer  pays  ia 


40  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  first  instance  renders  the  proposition  more  complex,  and  will  require,  in 
order  to  understand  where  the  burden,  in  reality,  ultimately  falls,  on  that  sup 
position,  to  consider  the  protective,  or,  as  its  friends  call  it,  the  American  Sys 
tem,  under  its  threefold  aspect  of  taxation,  of  protection,  and  of  distribution,  or 
as  performing,  at  the  same  time,  the  several  functions  of  giving  a  revenue  to  the 
government,  of  affording  protection  to  certain  branches  of  domestic  industry,  and 
furnishing  means  to  Congress  of  distributing  large  sums  through  its  appropria 
tions  :  all  of  which  are  so  blended  in  their  effects,  that  it  is  impossible  to  un 
derstand  its  true  operation  without  taking  the  whole  into  the  estimate. 

Admitting,  then,  as  supposed,  that  he  who  consumes  the  article  pays  the  tax 
in  the  increased  price,  and  that  the  burden  falls  wholly  on  the  consumers,  with 
out  affecting  the  producers  as  a  class  (which,  by-the-by,  is  far  from  being 
true,  except  in  the  single  case,  if  there  be  such  a  one,  where  the  producers  have 
a  monopoly  of  an  article  so  indispensable  to  life  that  the  quantity  consumed 
cannot  be  affected  by  any  increase  of  price),  and  that,  considered  in  the  light 
of  a  tax  merely,  the  impost  duties  fall  equally  on  every  section  in  proportion 
to  its  population,  still,  when  combined  with  its  other  effects,  the  burden  it  im 
poses  as  a  tax  may  be  so  transferred  from  one  section  to  the  other  as  to  take 
it  from  one  and  place  it  wholly  on  the  other.  Let  us  apply  the  remark  first  to 
its  operation  as  a  system  of  protection : 

The  tendency  of  the  tax  or  duty  on  the  imported  article  is  not  only  to 
raise  its  price,  but  also,  in  the  same  proportion,  that  of  the  domestic  article  of 
the  same  kind,  for  which  purpose,  when  intended  for  protection,  it  is,  in  fact, 
laid  ;  and,  of  course,  in  determining  where  the  system  ultimately  places  the 
burden  in  reality,  this  effect,  also,  must  be  taken  into  the  estimate.  If  one  of 
the  sections  exclusively  produces  such  domestic  articles,  and  the  other  pur 
chases  them  from  it,  then  it  is  clear  that,  to  the  amount  'of  such  increased  pri 
ces,  the  tax  or  duty  on  the  consumption  of  foreign  articles  would  be  transferred 
from  the  section  producing  the  domestic  articles  to  the  one  that  purchased  and 
consumed  them,  unless  the  latter,  in  turn,  be  indemnified  by  the  increased  price 
of  the  objects  of  its  industry,  which  none  will  venture  to  assert  to  be  the  case 
with  the  great  staples  of  the  country,  which  form  the  basis  of  our  exports,  the 
price  of  which  is  regulated  by  the  foreign,  and  not  the  domestic  market.  To 
those  who  grow  them,  the  increased  price  of  the  foreign  and  domestic  articles 
both,  in  consequence  of  the  duty  on  the  former,  is  in  reality,  arid  in  the  strictest 
sense,  a  tax,  while  it  is  clear  that  the  increased  price  of  the  latter  acts  as  a 
bounty  to  the  section  producing  them  ;  and  that,  as  the  amount  of  such  increased 
prices  on  what  it  sells  to  the  other  section  is  greater  or  less  than  the  duty  it 
pays  on  the  imported  articles,  the  system  will,  in  fact,  operate  as  a  bounty  or 
tax  :  if  greater,  the  difference  would  be  a  bounty  ;  if  less,  a  tax. 

Again,  the  operation  may  be  equal  in  every  other  respect,  and  yet  the  pres 
sure  of  the  system,  relatively,  on  the  two  sections,  be  rendered  very  unequal  by 
the  appropriations  or  distribution.  If  each  section  receives  back  what  it  paid 
into  the  treasury,  the  equality,  if  it  previously  existed,  will  continue  ;  but  if  one 
receives  back  less,  and  the  other  proportionably  more  than  is  paid,  then  the  dif 
ference  in  relation  to  the  sections  will  be  to  the  former  a  loss,  and  to  the  latter 
a  gain  ;  and  the  system,  in  this  aspect,  would  operate  to  the  amount  of  the  differ 
ence,  as  a  contribution  from  the  one  receiving  less  than  it  paid  to  the  other  that 
receives  more.  Such  would  be  incontestably  its  general  effects,  taken  in  all  its 
different  aspects,  even  on  the  theory  supposed  to  be  most  favourable  to  prove 
the  equal  action  of  the  system,  that  the  consumer  pays  in  the  first  instance  the 
Avhole  amount  of  the  tax. 

To  show  how,  on  this  supposition,  the  burden  and  advantages  of  the  system 
would  actually  distribute  themselves  between  the  sections,  would  carry  me  too 
far  into  details  ;  but  I  feel  assured,  after  full  and  careful  examination,  that  they 
are  such  as  to  explain  what  otherwise  would  seem  inexplicable,  that  one  sec- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  41 

tion  should  consider  its  repeal  a  calamity  and  the  other  a  blessing ;  and  that 
such  opposite  views  should  be  taken  by  them  as  to  place  them  in  a  state  of  de 
termined  conflict  in  relation  to  the  great  fiscal  and  commercial  interests  of  the 
country.  Indeed,  were  there  no  satisfactory  explanation,  the  opposite  views 
that  prevail  in  the  two  sections,  as  to  the  effects  of  the  system,  ought  to  satis 
fy  all  of  its  unequal  action.  There  can  be  no  safer,  or  more  certain  rule,  than 
to  suppose  each  portion  of  the  country  equally  capable  of  understanding  its 
respective  interests,  and  that  each  is  a  much  better  judge  of  the  effects  of  any 
system  or  measures  on  its  peculiar  interest  than  the  other  can  possibly  be. 
fjjut,  whether  the  opinion  of  its  unequal  action  be  correct  or  erroneous,  no 
thing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  the  impression  is  widely  extending  itself, 
that  the  system,  under  all  its  modifications,  is  essentially  unequal ;  and  if  to 
that  be  added  a  conviction  still  deeper  and  more  universal,  that  every  duty  im 
posed  for  the  purpose  of  protection  is  not  only  unequal,  but  also  unconstitutional , 
it  would  be  a  fatal  error  to  suppose  that  any  remedy,  short  of  that  which  I  have 
stated,  can  heal  our  political  disorders^ 

In  order  to  understand  more  fully  the  difficulty  of  adjusting  this  unhappy  con 
test  on  any  other  ground,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  present  a  general  view  of 
the  constitutional  objection,  that  it  may  be  clearly  seen  how  hopeless  it  is  to 
expect  that  it  can  be  yielded  by  those  who  have  embraced  it. 

frhey  believe  that  all  the  powers  vested  by  the  Constitution  in  Congress  are 
not  only  restricted  by  the  limitations  expressly  imposed,  but  also  by  the  nature 
and  object  of  the  powers  themselves.  Thus,  though  the  power  to  impose  du 
ties  on  imports  be  granted  in  general  terms,  without  any  other  express  limita 
tions  but  that  they  shall  be  equal,  and  no  preference  shall  be  given  to  the  ports 
of  one  state  over  those  of  another,  yet,  as  being  a  portion  of  the  taxing  power 
given  with  the  view  of  raising  revenue,  it  is,  from  its  nature,  restricted  to  that 
object,  as  much  so  as  if  the  Convention  had  expressly  so  limited  it ;  and  that  to 
use  it  to  effect  any  other  purpose  not  specified  in  the  Constitution,  is  an  infrac 
tion  of  the  instrument  in  its  most  dangerous  form — an  infraction  by  perversions 
more  easily  made,  and  more  difficult  to  resist,  than  any  other"7  The  same  view 
is  believed  to  be  applicable  to  the  power  of  regulating  commerce,  as  well  as  all 
the  other  powers.  To  surrender  this  important  principle,  it  is  conceived,  would 
be  to  surrender  all  power,  and  t6  render  the  government  unlimited  and  despotic  ; 
and  to  yield  it  up,  in  relation  to  the  particular  power  in  question,  would  be,  in. 
fact,  to  surrender  the  control  of  the  whole  industry  and  capital  of  the  country  to 
the  General  Government,  and  would  end  in  placing  the  weaker  section  in  a 
colonial  relation  with  the  stronger.  For  nothing  are  more  dissimilar  in  their 
nature,  or  may  be  more  unequally  affected  by  the  same  laws,  than  different  de 
scriptions  of  labour  and  property;  and  if  taxes,  by  increasing  the  amount  and 
changing  the  intent  only,  may  be  perverted,  in  fact,  into  a  system  of  penalties 
and  rewards,  it  would  give  all  the  power  that  could  be  desired  to  subject  the 
labour  and  property  of  the  minority  to  the  will  of  the  majority,  to  be  regulated 
without  regarding  the  interest  of  the  former  in  subserviency  to  the  will  of  the 
latter.  Thus  thinking,  it  would  seem  unreasonable  to  expect  that  any  adjust 
ment,  based  on  the  recognition  of  the  correctness  of  a  construction  of  the  Con 
stitution  which  would  admit  the  exercise  of  such  a  power,  would  satisfy  the 
weaker  of  two  sections,  particularly  with  its  peculiar  industry  and  property, 
which  experience  has  shown  may  be  so  injuriously  affected  by  its  exercise. 
Thus  much  for  one  side. 

The  just  claim  of  the  other  ought  to  be  equally  respected.  Whatever  excite 
ment  the  system  has  justly  caused  in  certain  portions  of  our  country,  I  hope 
and  believe  all  will  conceive  that  the  change  should  be  made  with  the  least. pos 
sible  detriment  to  the  interests  of  those  who  may  be  liable  to  be  affected  by  it, 
consistently  with  what  is  justly  due  to  others,  and  the  principles  of  the  Consti 
tution.  To  effect  this  will  require  the  kindest  spirit  of  conciliation  and  the  ut- 

F 


42  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

most  skill ;  but,  even  with  these,  it  will  be  impossible  to  make  the  transition 
without  a  shock,  greater  or  less,  though  I  trust,  if  judiciously  effected,  it  will 
not  be  without  many  compensating  advantages.  That  there  will  be  some  such 
cannot  be  doubted.  It  will,  at  least,  be  followed  by  greater  stability,  and  will 
tend  to  harmonize  the  manufacturing  with  all  of  the  other  great  interests  of  the 
country,  and  bind  the  whole  in  mutual  affection.  But  these  are  not  all.  Another 
advantage  of  essential  importance  to  the  ultimate  prosperity  of  our  manufactu 
ring  industry  will  follow.  It  will  cheapen  production ;  and,  in  that  view,  the  loss 
of  any  one  branch  will  be  nothing  like  in  proportion  to  the  reduction  of  duty  on 
that  particular  branch.  Every  reduction  will,  in  fact,  operate  as  a  bounty  to 
every  other  branch  except  the  one  reduced  ;  and  thus  the  effect  of  a  general  re 
duction  will  be  to  cheapen,  universally,  the  price  of  production,  by  cheapening 
living,  wages,  and  materials,  so  as  to  give,  if  not  equal  profits  after  the  reduc 
tion — profits  by  no  means  reduced  proportionally  to  the  duties — an  effect  which, 
as  it  regards  the  foreign  markets,  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  It  must  be  ap 
parent,  on  reflection,  that  the  means  adopted  to  secure  the  home  market  for  our 
manufactures  are  precisely  the  opposite  of  those  necessary  to  obtain  the  for 
eign.  In  the  former,  the  increased  expense  of  production,  in  consequence  of  a 
system  of  protection,  may  be  more  than  compensated  by  the  increased  price  at 
home  of  the  article  protected ;  but  in  the  latter,  this  advantage  is  lost ;  and,  as 
there  is  no  other  corresponding  compensation,  the  increased  cost  of  production 
must  be  a  dead  loss  in  the  foreign  market.  But  whether  these  advantages,  and 
many  others  that  might  be  mentioned,  will  ultimately  compensate  to  the  full  ex 
tent  or  not  the  loss  to  the  manufacturers,  on  the  reduction  of  the  duties,  certain 
it  is,  that  we  have  approached  a  point  at  which  a  great  change  cannot  be  much 
longer  delayed ;  and  that  the  more  promptly  it  may  be  met,  the  less  excitement 
there  will  be,  and  the  greater  leisure  and  calmness  for  a  cautious  and  skilful 
operation  in  making  the  transition ;  and  which  it  becomes  those  more  immedi 
ately  interested  duly  to  consider.  £&or  ought  they  to  overlook,  in  considering 
the  question,  the  different  character  of  the  claims  of  the  two  sides.  The  one 
asks  from  government  no  advantage,  but  simply  to  be  let  alone  in  the  undis 
turbed  possession  of  their  natural  advantages,  and  to  secure  which,  as  far  as  was 
consistent  with  the  other  objects  of  the  Constitution,  was  one  of  their  leading 
motives  in  entering  into  the  Union ;  while  the  other  side  claims,  for  the  advance 
ment  of  their  prosperity,  the  positive  interference  of  the  government.  In  such 
cases,  on  every  principle  of  fairness  and  justice,  such  interference  ought  to  be 
restrained  within  limits  strictly  compatible  with  the  natural  advantages  of  the 
other.  He  who  looks  to  all  of  the  causes  in  operation,  the  near  approach  of 
the  final  payment  of  the  public  debt,  the  growing  disaffection  and  resistance  to 
the  system  in  so  large  a  section  of  the  country,  the  deeper  principles  on  which 
opposition  to  it  is  gradually  turning,  must  be,  indeed,  infatuated  not  to  see  a 
great  change  is  unavoidable  ;  and  that  the  attempt  to  elude  or  much  longer  delay 
it  must  finally  but  increase  the  shock  and  disastrous  consequences  which  may 
follovAT.f 

In  forming  the  opinions  I  have  expressed,  I  have  not  been  actuated  by  an  un 
kind  feeling  towards  our  manufacturing  interests.  I  now  am,  and  ever  have  been, 
decidedly  friendly  to  them,  though  I  cannot  concur  in  all  the  measures  which 
have  been  adopted  to  advance  them.  I  believe  considerations  higher  than  any 
question  of  mere  pecuniary  interest  forbade  their  use.  But  subordinate  to  these 
higher  views  of  policy,  I  regard  the  advancement  of  mechanical  and  chemical 
improvements  in  the  arts  with  feelings  little  short  of  enthusiasm  ;  not  only  as 
the  prolific  source  of  national  and  individual  wealth,  but  as  the  great  means  of 
enlarging  the  domain  of  man  over  the  material  world,  and  thereby  of  laying  the 
solid  foundation  of  a  highly-improved  condition  of  society,  morally  and  politi 
cally.  I  fear  not  that  we  shall  extend  our  power  too  far  over  the  great  agents 
of  nature  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  consider  such  enlargement  of  our  power  as 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  43 

tending  more  certainly  and  powerfully  to  better  the  condition  of  our  race  than 
any  one  of  the  many  powerful  causes  now  operating  to  that  result.  With  these 
impressions,  I  not  only  rejoice  at  the  general  progress  of  the  arts  in  the  world, 
but  in  their  advancement  in  our  own  country ;  and  as  far  as  protection  may  be 
incidentally  afforded,  in  the  fair  and  honest  exercise  of  our  constitutional 
powers,  I  think  now,  as  I  have  always  thought,  that  sound  policy,  connected 
with  the  security,  independence,  and  peace  of  the  country,  requires  it  should  be 
done,  but  that  we  cannot  go  a  single  step  beyond  without  jeopardizing  our  peace, 
our  harmony,  and  our  liberty — considerations  of  infinitely  more  importance  to  us 
than  any  measure  of  mere  policy  can  possibly  be. 

In  thus  placing  my  opinions  before  the  public,  I  have  not  been  actuated  by 
the  expectation  of  changing  the  public  sentiment.  Such  a  motive,  on  a  ques 
tion  so  long  agitated,  and  so  beset  with  feelings  of  prejudice  and  interest,  would 
argue,  on  my  part,  an  insufferable  vanity,  and  a  profound  ignorance  of  the 
human  heart.  To  avoid  as  far  as  possible  the  imputation  of  either,  I  have  con 
fined  my  statement,  on  the  many  and  important  points  on  which  I  have  been 
compelled  to  touch,  to  a  simple  declaration  of  my  opinion,  without  advancing 
any  other  reasons  to  sustain  them  than  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  indispensa 
ble  to  the  full  understanding  of  my  views  ;  and  if  they  should,  on  any  point,  be 
thought  to  be  not  clearly  and  explicitly  developed,  it  will,  I  trust,  be  attributed 
to  my  solicitude  to  avoid  the  imputations  to  which  I  have  alluded,  and  not  from 
any  desire  to  disguise  my  sentiments,  nor  the  want  of  arguments  and  illustra 
tions  to  maintain  positions,  which  so  abound  in  both,  that  it  would  require  a 
volume  to  do  them  anything  like  justice.  I  can  only  hope  that  truths  which,  I 
feel  assured,  are  essentially  connected  with  all  that  we  ought  to  hold  most  dear, 
may  not  be  weakened  in  the  public  estimation  by  the  imperfect  manner  in 
which  I  have  been,  by  the  object  in  view,  compelled  to  present  them. 

With  every  caution  on  my  part,  I  dare  not  hope,  in  taking  the  step  I  have,  to 
escape  the  imputation  of  improper  motives ;  though  I  have,  without  reserve, 
freely  expressed  my  opinions,  not  regarding  whether  they  might  or  might  not 
be  popular.  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  are  such  as  will  conciliate 
public  favour,  but  the  opposite,  which  I  greatly  regret,  as  I  have  ever  placed  a 
high  estimate  on  the  good  opinion  of  my  fellow-citizens.  But,  be  that  as  it 
may,  I  shall,  at  least,  be  sustained  by  feelings  of  conscious  rectitude.  I  have 
formed  my  opinions  after  the  most  careful  and  deliberate  examination,  with  all 
the  aids  which  my  reason  and  experience  could  furnish;  I  have  expressed 
them  honestly  and  fearlessly,  regardless  of  their  effects  personally,  which, 
however  interesting  to  me  individually,  are  of  too  little  importance  to  be  taken 
into  the  estimate,  where  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  our  country  are  so  vitally 
involved.  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Fort  Hill,  July  2ft/t,  1831. 


IV. 

•  MR.  CALHOUN'S  LETTER  TO   GENERAL  HAMILTON  ON   THE  SUBJECT   OF  STATE 

INTERPOSITION. 

* 

FORT  HILL,  August  28th,  1832, 

MY  DEAR  SIR  —  I  have  received  your  note  of  the  31st  July,  requesting  me 
to  give  you  a  fuller  development  of  my  views  than  that,  contained  in  my  ad 
dress  last  summer,  on  the  right  of  a  state  to  defend  her  reserved  powers  against 
the  encroachments  of  the  General  Government. 

As  fully  occupied  as  my  time  is,  were  it  doubly  so,  the  quarter  from  which 
the  request  comes,  with  my  deep  conviction  of  the  vital  importance  of  the  sub 
ject,  would  exact  a  compliance. 


44  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

No  one  can  be  more  sensible  than  I  am  that  the  address  of  last  summer  fell 
far  short  of  exhausting  the  subject.  It  was,  in  fact,  intended  as  a  simple  state 
ment  of  my  views.  1  felt  that  the  independence  and  candour  which  ought  to 
distinguish  one  occupying  a  high  public  station,  imposed  a  duty  on  me  to  meet 
the  call  for  my  opinion  by  a  frank  and  full  avowal  of  my  sentiments,  regardless 
of  consequences.  To  fulfil  this  duty,  and  not  to  discuss  the  subject,  was  the 
object  of  the  address.  But,  in  making  these  preliminary  remarks,  I  do  not  in 
tend  to  prepare  you  to  expect  a  full  discussion  on  the  present  occasion.  What 
I  propose  is,  to  touch  some  of  the  more  prominent  points  that  have  received  less 
of  the  public  attention  than  their  importance  seems  to  me  to  demand. 
.  Strange  as  the  assertion  may  appear,  it  is,  nevertheless,  true,  that  the  great 
difficulty  in  determining  whether  a  state  has  the  right  to  defend  her  reserved 
powers  against  the  General  Government,  or,  in  fact,  any  right  at  all  beyond 
those  of  a  mere  corporation,  is  to  bring  the  public  mind  to  realize  plain  histor 
ical  facts  connected  with  the  origin  and  formation  of  the  government.  Till 
they  are  fully  understood,  it  is  impossible  that  a  correct  and  just  view  can  be 
taken  of  the  subject.  In  this  connexion,  the  first  and  most  important  point  is 
to  ascertain  distinctly  who  are  the  real  authors  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Uni 
ted  States — whose  powers  created  it — whose  voice  clothed  it  with  authority; 
and  whose  agent  the  government  it  formed  in  reality  is.  At  this  point,  I  com 
mence  the  execution  of  the  task  which  your  request  has  imposed. 

The  formation  and  adoption  of  the  Constitution  are  events  so  recent,  and  all 
the  connected  facts  so  fully  attested,  that  it  would  seem  impossible  that  there 
should  be  the  least  uncertainty  in  relation  to  them ;  and  yet,  judging  by  what  is 
constantly  heard  and  seen,  there  are  few  subjects  on  which  the  public  opinion 
is  more  confused.  The  most  indefinite  expressions  are  habitually  used  in  speak 
ing  of  them.  Sometimes  it  is  said  that  the  Constitution  was  made  by  the 
states,  and  at  others,  as  if  in  contradistinction,  by  the  people,  without  distin 
guishing  between  the  two  very  different  meanings  which  may  be  attached  to 
those  general  expressions  ;  and  this,  not  in  ordinary  conversation,  but  in  grave 
discussions  before  deliberative  bodies,  and  in  judicial  investigations,  where  the 
greatest  accuracy  on  so  important  a  point  might  be  expected  ;  particularly  as 
one  or  the  other  meaning  is  intended,  conclusions  the  most  opposite  must  fol 
low,  not  only  in  reference  to  the  subject  of  this  communication,  but  as  to  the 
nature  and  character  of  our  political  system.  By  a  state  may  be  meant  either 
the  government  of  a  state  or  the  people,  as  forming  a  separate  and  independent 
community ;  and  by  the  people,  either  the  American  people  taken  collectively, 
as  forming  one  great  community,  or  as  the  people  of  the  several  states,  forming, 
as  above  stated,  separate  and  independent  communities.  These  distinctions 
are  essential  in  the  inquiry.  If  by  the  people  be  meant  the  people  collective 
ly,  and  not  the  people  of  the  several  states  taken  separately  ;  and  if  it  be  true, 
Indeed,  that  the  Constitution  is  the  work  of  the  American  people  collectively  ; 
if  it  originated  with  them,  and  derives  its  authority  from  their  will,  then  there 
is  an  end  of  the  argument.  The  right  claimed  for  a  state  of  defending  her  re 
served  powers  against  the  General  Government  would  be  an  absurdity.  View 
ing  the  American  people  collectively  as  the  source  of  political  power,  the  rights 
of  the  states  would  be  mere  concessions — concessions  from  the  common  major 
ity,  and  to  be  revoked  by  them  with  the  same  facility  that  they  were  granted. 
The  states  would,  on  this  supposition,  bear  to  the  Union  the  same  relation  that 
counties  do  to  the  states  ;  and  it  would,  in  that  case,  be  just  as  preposterous  to 
discuss  the  right  of  interposition,  on  the  part  of  a  state,  against  the  General 
Government,  as  that  of  the  counties  against  the  states  themselves.  That  a 
large  portion  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  thus  regard  the  relation  between 
the  state  and  the  General  Government,,  including  many  who  call  themselves 
the  friends  of  State-rights  and  opponents  of  consolidation,  can  scarcely  be  doubt 
ed,  as  it  is  only  on  that  supposition  it  can  be  explained  that  so  many  of  that 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CA.LHOUN.  45 

description  should  denounce  the  doctrine  for  which  the  state  contends  as  so 
absurd.  But,  fortunately,  the  supposition  is  entirely  destitute  of  truth.  So  far 
from  the  Constitution  being  the  work  of  the  American  people  collectively,  no 
such  political  body  either  now,  or  ever  did.  exist.  In  that  character  the  people 
of  this  country  never  performed  a  single  political  act,  nor,  indeed,  can,  without 
an  entire  revolution  in  all  our  political  relations. 

I  challenge  an  instance.  From  the  beginning,  and  in  all  the  changes  of  po 
litical  existence  through  which  we  have  passed,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  have  been  united  as  forming  political  communities,  and  not  as  individ 
uals.  Even  in  the  first  stage  of  existence,  they  formed  distinct  colonies,  inde 
pendent  of  each  other,  and  politically  united  only  through  the  British  crown. 
In  their  first  imperfect  union,  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  the  encroachments  of 
the  mother-country,  they  united  as  distinct  political  communities  ;  and,  passing 
from  their  colonial  condition,  in  the  act  announcing  their  independence  to  the 
world,  they  declared  themselves,  by  name  and  enumeration,  free  and  inde 
pendent  states.  In  that  character,  they  formed  the  old  confederation  ;  and,  when 
it  was  proposed  to  supersede  the  articles  of  the  confederation  by  the  present 
Constitution,  they  met  in  convention  as  states,  acted  and  voted  as  states ;  and 
the  Constitution,  when  formed,  was  submitted  for  ratification  to  the  people  of 
the  several  states  :  it  was  ratified  by  them  as  states,  each  state  for  itself ;  each 
by  its  ratification  binding  its  own  citizens  ;  the  parts  thus  separately  binding 
themselves,  and  not  the  whole  the  parts  ;  to  which,  if  it  be  added,  that  it  is  de 
clared  in  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution  to  be  ordained  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  in  the  article  of  ratification,  when  ratified,  it  is  declared  "  to 
be  binding  between  the  states  so  .ratifying"  The  conclusion  is  inevitable,  that 
the  Constitution  is  the  work  of  the  people  of  the  states,  considered  as  separate 
and  independent  political  communities  ;  that  they  are  its  authors — their  power 
created  it,  their  voice  clothed  it  with  authority — that  the  government  formed  is, 
in  reality,  their  agent ;  arid  that  the  Union,  of  which  the  Constitution  is  the 
bond,  is  a  union  of  states,  and  not  of  individuals.  No  one,  who  regards  his 
character  for  intelligence  and  truth,  has  ever  ventured  directly  to  deny  facts  so 
certain  ;  but  while  they  are  too  certain  for  denial,  they  are  also  too  conclusive 
in  favour  of  the  rights  of  the  states  for  admission.  The  usual  course  has  been 
adopted — to  elude  what  can  neither  be  denied  nor  admitted  ;  and  never  has  the 
device  been  more  successfully  practised.  By  confounding  states  with  state 
governments,  and  the  people  of  the  states  with  the  American  people  collective 
ly — things,  as  it  regards  the  subject  of  this  communication,  totally  dissimilar, 
as  much  so  as  a  triangle  and  a  square — facts  of  themselves  perfectly  certain  and 
plain,  and  which,  when  well  understood,  must  lead  to  a  correct  conception  of 
the  subject,  have  been  involved  in  obscurity  and  mystery. 

I  will  next  proceed  to  state  some  of  the  results  which  necessarily  follow 
from  the  facts  which  have  been  established. 

(The  first,  and,  in  reference  to  the  subject  of  this  communication,  the  most  im 
portant,  is,  that  there  is  no  direct  and  immediate  connexion  between  the  indi 
vidual  citizens  of  a  state  and  the  General  Government.  The  relation  between 
them  is  through  the  state.  The  Union  is  a  union  of  states  as  commtmities, 
and  not  a  union  of  individualsTj  As  members  of  a  state,  her  citizens  were 
originally  subject  to  no  control  but  that  of  the  state,  and  could  be  subject  to 
no  other,  except  by  the  act  of  the  state  itself.  The  Constitution  was,  accord 
ingly,  submitted  to  the  states  for  their  separate  ratification  ;  and  it  was  only  by 
the  ratification  of  the  state  that  its  citizens  became  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
General  Government.  The  ratification  of  any  other,  or  all  the  other  states, 
without  its  own,  could  create  no  connexion  between  them  and  the  General 
Government,  nor  impose  on  them  the  slightest  obligation.  Without  the  ratifi 
cation  of  their  own  state,  they  would  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  General 
Government  as  do  tke  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  state  ;  and  we  find  the 


46  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

citizens  of  North  Carolina  and  Rhode  Island  actually  bearing  that  relation  ta 
the  government  for  some  time  after  it  went  into  operation  ;  these  states  having, 
in  the  first  instance,  declined  to  ratify.  Nor  had  the  act  of  any  individual  the. 
least  influence  in  subjecting  him  to  the  control  of  the  General  Government,  ex 
cept  as  it  might  influence  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  by  his  own  state. 
Whether  subject  to  its  control  or  not,  depended  wholly  on  the  act  of  the  state. 
His  dissent  had  not  the  least  weight  against  the  assent  of  his  state,  nor  his  as 
sent  against  its  dissent.  It  follows,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  the  act 
of  ratification  bound  the  state  as  a  community,  as  is  expressly  declared  in  the 
article  of  the  Constitution  above  quoted,  and  not  the  citizens  of  the  state  as  in 
dividuals  :  the  latter  being  bound  through  their  state,  and  in  consequence  of  the 
ratification  of  the  former.  Another,  and  a  highly  important  consequence,  as  it 
regards  the  subject  under  investigation,  follows  with  equal  certainty  :  that,  on  a 
question  whether  a  particular  power  exercised  by  the  General  Government  be 
granted  by  the  Constitution,  it  belongs  to  the  state  as  a  member  of  the  Union, 
in  her  sovereign  capacity  in  convention,  to  determine  definitively,  as  far  as  her 
citizens  are  concerned,  the  extent  of  the  obligation  which  she  contracted  ;  and 
if.  in  her  opinion,  the  act  exercising  the  power  be  unconstitutional,  to  declare  it 
null  and  void,  which  declaration  would  be  obligatory  on  her  citizens.  In  coming' 
to  this  conclusion,  it  may  be  proper  to  remark,  to  prevent  misrepresentation, 
that  I  do  not  claim  for  a  state  the  right  to  abrogate  an  act  of  the  General  Gov 
ernment.  It  is  the  Constitution  that  annuls  an  unconstitutional  act.  Such  an 
act  is  of  itself  void  and  of  no  effect.  What  I  claim  is,  the  right  of  the  state, 
as  Jar  as  its  citizens  are  concerned,  to  declare  the  extent  of  the  obligation,  and 
that  such  declaration  is  binding  on  them  —  a  right,  when  limited  to  its  citizens, 
flowing  directly  from  the  relation  of  the  state  to  the  General  Government  on  the 
one  side,  and  its  citizens  on  the  other,  as  already  explained,  and  resting  on 
the  most  plain  and  solid  reasons. 

Passing  over,  what  of  itself  might  be  considered  conclusive,  the  obvious  prin 
ciple,  that  it  belongs  to  the  authority  which  imposed  the  obligation  to  declare 
its  extent,  as  far  as  those  are  concerned  on  whom  the  obligation  is  placed,  I 
shall  present  a  single  argument,  which  of  itself  is  decisive.  I  have  already 
shown  that  there  is  no  immediate  connexion  between  the  citizens  of  a  state 
and  the  General  Government,  and  that  the  relation  between  them  is  through  the 
state.  I  have  also  shown  that,  whatever  obligations  were  imposed  on  the  cit 
izens,  were  imposed  by  the  act  of  the  state  ratifying  the  Constitution.  A  sim 
ilar  act  by  the  same  authority,  made  with  equal  solemnity,  declaring  the  extent 
of  the  obligation,  must,  as  far  as  they  are  concerned,  be  of  equal  authority.  I 
speak,  of  course,  on  the  supposition  that  the  right  has  not  been  transferred,  as 
it  will  hereafter  be  shown  that  it  has  not.  A  citizen  would  have  no  more  right 
to  question  the  one  than  he  would  have  the  other  declaration.  They  rest  on 
the  same  authority  ;  and  as  he  was  bound  by  the  declaration  of  his  state  as 
senting  to  the  Constitution,  whether  he  assented  or  dissented,  so  would  he  be 
equally  bound  by  a  declaration  declaring  the  extent  of  that  assent,  whether'op- 
posed  to,  or  in  favour  of,  such  declaration.  In  this  conclusion  I  am  supported 
by  analogy.  The  case  of  a  treaty  between  sovereigns  is  strictly  analogous. 
There,  as  in  this  case,  the  state  contracts  for  the  citizen  or  subject :  there,  as 
in  this,  the  obligation  is  imposed  by  the  state,  and  is  independent  of  his  will ; 
and  there,  as  in  this,  the  declaration  of  the  state,  determining  the  extent  of 
the  obligation  contracted,  is  obligatory  on  him,  as  much  so  as  the  treaty  itself. 

Having  now,  I  trust,  established  the  very  important  point,  that  the  declara 
tion  of  a  state,  as  to  the  extent  of  the  power  granted,  is  obligatory  on  its  citi 
zens,  I  shall  next  proceed  to  consider  the  effects  of  such  declarations  in  refer 
ence  to  the  General  Government:  a  question  which  necessarily  involves  the 
consideration  of  the  relation  between  it  and  the  states.  It  has  been  shown  that 
the  people  of  the  states,  acting  as  distinct  and  independent  Communities,  are  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  47 

authors  of  the  Constitution,  and  that  the  General  Government  was  organized 
and  ordained  by  them  to  execute  its  powers.  The  government,  then,  with  all 
its  departments,  is,  in  fact,  the  agent  of  the  states,  constituted  to  execute  their 
joint  will,  as  expressed  in  the  Constitution. 

In  using  the  term  agent,  I  do  not  intend  to  derogate  in  any  degree  from  its 
character  as  a  government.  It  is  as  truly  and  properly  a  government  as  are 
the  state  governments  themselves.  I  have  applied  it  simply  because  it  strictly 
belongs  to  the  relation  between  the  General  Government  and  the  states,  as,  in 
fact,  it  does  also  to  that  between  a  state  and  its  own  government.  Indeed,  ac 
cording  to  our  theory,  governments  are  in  their  nature  but  trusts,  and  those  ap 
pointed  to  administer  them  trustees  or  agents  to  execute  the  trust  powers. 
The  sovereignty  resides  elsewhere — in  the  people,  not  in  the  government ;  and 
with  us,  the  people  mean  the  people  of  the  several  states  originally  formed  into 
thirteen  distinct  and  independent  communities,  and  now  into  twenty-four.  Po 
litically  speaking,  in  reference  to  our  own  system,  there  are  no  other  people, 
The  General  Government,  as  well  as  those  of  the  states,  is  but  the  organ  of 
their  power:  the  latter,  that  of  their  respective  states,  through  which  are  exer 
cised  separately  that  portion  of  power  not  delegated  by  the  Constitution,  and  in 
the  exercise  of  which  each  state  has  a  local  and  peculiar  interest ;  the  former, 
the  joint  organ  of  all  the  states  confederated  into  one  general  community,  and 
through  which  they  jpintly  and  concurringly  exercise  the  delegated  powers,  in 
which  all  have  a  common  interest.  Thus  viewed,  the  Constitution  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  with  the  government  it  created,  is  truly  and  strictly  the  Constitution 
of  each  state,  as  much  so  as  its  own  particular  Constitution  and  government, 
ratified  by  the  same  authority,  in  the  same  mode,  and  having,  as  far  as  its  citi 
zens  are  concerned,  its  powers  and  obligations  from  the  same  source,  differing 
only  in  the  aspect,  under  which  I  am  considering  the  subject,  in  the  plighted 
faith  of  the  state  to  its  co-states,  and  of  which,  as  far  as  its  citizens  are  con 
sidered,  the  state,  in  the  last  resort,  is  the  exclusive  judge. 

Such,  then,  is  the  relation  "between  the  state  and  General  Government,  in 
whatever  light  we  may  consider  the  Constitution,  whether  as  a  compact  be 
tween  the  states,  or  of  the  nature  of  the  legislative  enactment  by  the  joint  and 
concurring  authority  of  the  states  in  their  high  sovereignty.  In  whatever  light 
it  may  be  viewed,  I  hold  it  as  necessarily  resulting,  that,  in  the  case  of  a  power 
disputed  between  them,  the  government,  as  the  agent,  has  no  right  to  enforce 
its  construction  against  the  construction  of  the  state  as  one  of  the  sovereign 
parties  to  the  Constitution,  any  more  than  the  state  government  would  have 
agaiivst  the  people  of  the  state  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  the  relation  being 
the  same  between  them.  That  such  would  be  the  case  between  agent  and 
principal  in  the  ordinary  transactions  of  life,  no  one  will  doubt,  nor  will  it  be 
possible  to  assign  a  reason  why  it  is  not  as  applicable  to  the  case  of  gov 
ernment  as  -to  that  of  individuals.  The  principle,  in  fact,  springs  from  the  re 
lation  itself,  and  is  applicable  to  it  in  all  its  forms  and  characters.  It  may,  how 
ever/  be  proper  to  notice  a  distinction  between  the  case  of  a  single  principal 
and  his  agent,  and  that  of  several  principals  and  their  joint  agent,  which  might 
otherwise  cause  some  confusion.  In  both  cases,  as  between  the  agent  and  a 
principal,  the  construction  of  the  principal,  whether  he  be  a  single  principal  or 
one  of  several,  is  equally  conclusive  ;  but.  in  the  latter  case,  both  the  principal 
and  the  agent  bear  relation  to  the  other  principals,  which  must  be  taken  into 
the  estimate,  in  order  to  understand  fully  all  the  results  which  may  grow  out  of 
the  contest  for  power  between  them.  Though  the  construction  of  the  principal 
is  conclusive  against  the  joint  agent,  as  between  them,  such  is  not  the  case  be 
tween  him  and  his  associates.  They  both  have  an  equal  right  of  construction, 
and  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  agent  to  bring  the  subject  before  the  principal 
to  be  adjusted,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  instrument  of  association,  and  of 
the  principal  to  submit  to  such  adjustment.  In  such  cases  the  contract  itself 


48  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

is  the  law,  which  must  determine  the  relative  rights  and  powers  of  the  parties 
to  it.  The  General  Government  is  a  case  of  joint  agency — the  joint  agent  of 
the  twenty-four  sovereign  states.  It  would  be  its  duty,  according  to  the  prin 
ciples  established  in  such  cases,  instead  of  attempting  to  enforce  its  construc 
tion  of  its  powers  against  that  of  the  states,  to  bring  the  subject  before  the  states 
themselves,  in  the  only  form  which,  according  to  the  provision  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  it  can  be — by  a  proposition  to  amend,  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  in 
strument,  to  be  acted  on  by  them  in  the  only  mode  they  can,  by  expressly  grant 
ing  or  withholding  the  contested  power.  Against  this  conclusion  there  can  be 
raised  but  one  objection,  that  the  states  have  surrendered  or  transferred  the 
right  in  question.  If  such  be  the  fact,  there  ought  to  be  no  difficulty  in  estab 
lishing  it.  The  grant  of  the  powers  delegated  is  contained  in  a  written  instru 
ment,  drawn  up  with  great  care,  and  adopted  with  the  utmost  deliberation.  It 
provides  that  the  powers  not  granted  are  reserved  to  the  states  and  the  people. 
If  it  be  surrendered,  let  the  grant  be  shown,  and  the  controversy  will  be  ter 
minated  ;  and,  surely,  it  ought  to  be  shown,  plainly  and  clearly  shown,  before 
the  states  are  asked  to  admit  what,  if  true,  would  not  only  divest  them  of  a  right 
which,  under  all  its  forms,  belongs  to  the  principal  over  his  agent,  unless  surren 
dered,  but  which  cannot  be  surrendered  without  in  effect,  and  for  all  practical 
purposes,  reversing  the  relation  between  them ;  putting  the  agent  in  the  place 
of  the  principal,  and  the  principal  in  that  of  the  agent ;  and  which  would  de 
grade  the  states  from  the  high  and  sovereign  condition  which  they  have  ever 
held,  under  every  form  of  their  existence,  to  be  mere  subordinate  and  dependant 
corporations  of  the  government  of  its  own  creation.  But,  instead  of  showing 
any  such  grant,  not  a  provision  can  be  found  in  the  Constitution  authorizing  the 
General  Government  to  exercise  any  control  whatever  over  a  state  by  force,  by 
veto,  by  judicial  process,  or  in  any  other  form — a  most  important  omission,  de 
signed,  and  not  accidental,  and,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  course  of  these  remarks, 
omitted  by  the  dictates  of  the  profoundest  wisdom. 

The  journal  and  proceedings  of  the  Convention  which  formed  the  Constitu 
tion  afford  abundant  proof  that  there  was  in  the  body  a  powerful  party,  distin 
guished  for  talents  and  influence,  intent  on  obtaining  for  the  General  Govern 
ment  a  grant  of  the  very  power  in  question,  and  that  they  attempted  to  effect 
this  object  in  all  possible  ways,  but,  fortunately,  without  success.     The  first 
project  of  a  Constitution  submitted  to  the  Convention  (Governor  Randolph's) 
embraced  a  proposition  to  grant  power  "  to  negative  all  laws  contrary,  in  the  opin 
ion  of  the  National  Legislature,  to  the  articles  of  the  Union,  or  any  treaty  sub 
sisting  under  the  authority  of  the  Union  ;  and  to  call  forth  the  force  of  the  Union 
against  any  member  of  the  Union  failing  to  fulfil  his  duty  under  the  articles 
thereof."     The  next  project  submitted  (Charles  Pinckriey's)  contained  a  simi 
lar  provision.     It  proposed,  "  that  the  Legislature  of  the  United  States  should 
have  the  power  to  revise  the  laws  of  the  several  states  that  may  be  supposed 
to  infringe  the  powers  exclusively  delegated  by  this  Constitution  to  Congress, 
and  to  negative  and  annul  such  as  do."     The  next  was  submitted  by  Mr.  Pat- 
erson,  of  New-Jersey,  which  provided,  "  if  any  state,  or  body  of  men  in  any 
state,  shall  oppose  or  prevent  the  carrying  into  execution  such  acts  or  treaties" 
(of  the  Union),  "  the  federal  executive  shall  be  authorized  to  call  forth  the  pow 
ers  of  the  confederated  states,  or  so  much  thereof  as  shall  be  necessary  to  en 
force,  or  compel  the  obedience  to  such  acts,  or  observance  of  such  treaties." 
General  Hamilton's  next  succeeded,  which  declared  "  all  laws  of  the  particu- . 
lar  states  contrary  to  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United  States,  to  be  ut 
terly  void  ;  and,  the  better  to  prevent  such  laws  being  passed,  the  governor  or 
president  of  each  state  shall  be  appointed  by  the  General  Government,  and 
shall  have  a  negative  on  the  laws  about  to  be  passed  in  the  state  of  which  he 
is  governor  or  president." 

At  a  subsequent  period,  a  proposition  was  moved  and  referred  to  a  committee 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  49 

to  provide  that  "  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  shall  extend  to  all  con 
troversies  between  the  United  States  and  any  individual  state  ;"  and,  at  a  still 
later  period,  it  was  moved  to  grant  power  "  to  negative  all  laws  passed  by  the 
several  states  interfering,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Legislature,  with  the  general 
harmony  arid  interest  of  the  Union,  provided  that  two  thirds  of  the  members  of 
«ach  house  assent  to  the  same,"  which,  after  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  commit, 
was  withdrawn. 

I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  trace  through  the  journals  of  the  Convention 
the  fate  of  these  various  propositions.  It  is  sufficient  that  they  were  moved 
and  failed,  to  prove  conclusively,  in  a  manner  never  to  be  reversed,  that  the 
Convention  which  framed  the  Constitution  was  opposed  to  granting  the  power 
to  the  General  Government  in  any  form,  through  any  of  its  departments,  legis 
lative,  executive,  or  judicial,  to  coerce  or  control  a  state,  though  proposed  in  all 
conceivable  modes,  and  sustained  by  the  most  talented  and  influential  members 
of  the  body.  This,  one  would  suppose,  ought  to  settle  forever  the  question  of 
the  surrender  or  transfer  of  the  power  under  consideration  ;  and  such,  in  fact, 
would  be  the  case,  were  the  opinion  of  a  large  portion  of  the  community  not  bi 
ased,  as,  in  fact,  it  is,  by  interest.  A  majority  have  almost  always  a  direct  in 
terest  in  enlarging  the  power  of  the  government,  and  the  interested  adhere  to 
power  with  a  pertinacity  which  bids  defiance  to  truth,  though  sustained  by  evi 
dence  as  conclusive  as  mathematical  demonstration ;  and,  accordingly,  the  ad 
vocates  of  the' powers  of  the  General  Government,  notwithstanding  the  impreg 
nable  strength  of  the  proof  to  the  contrary,  have  boldly  claimed,  on  construc 
tion,  a  power,  the  grant  of  which  was  so  perseveringly  sought  and  so  sternly 
resisted  by  the  Convention.  They  rest  the  claim  on  the  provisions  in  the 
Constitution  which  declare  "  that  this  Constitution,  and  the  laws  made  in  pur 
suance  thereof,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  and  that  "  the  judicial 
power  shall  extend  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising  under  this  Corfstitu- 
tion,  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made, 
under  their  authority." 

I  do  not  propose  to  go  into  a  minute  examination  of  these  provisions.  They 
have  been  so  frequently  and  so  ably  investigated,  and  it  has  been  so  clearly 
shown  that  they  do  not  warrant  the  assumption  of  the  power  claimed  for  the 
government,  that  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary.  I  shall,  therefore,  confine  myself- 
to  a  few  detached  remarks. 

I  have  already  stated  that  a  distinct  proposition  was  made  to  confer  the  very 
power  in  controversy  on  the  Supreme  Court,  which  failed ;  which  of  itself 
ought  to  overrule  the  assumption  of  the  power  by  construction,  unless  sustained 
by  the  most  conclusive  arguments ;  but  when  it  is  added  that  this  proposition 
was  moved  (20th  August)  subsequent  to  the  period  of  adopting  the  provisions, 
above  cited,  vesting  the  court  with  its  present  powers  (18th  July),  and  that  an 
effort  was  made,  at  a  still  later  period  (23d  August),  to  invest  Congress  with  a 
negative  on  all  state  laws  which,  in  its 'Opinion,  might  interfere  with  the  gen 
eral  interest  and  harmony  of  the  Union,  the  argument  would  seem  too  conclu 
sive  against  the  powers  of  the  court  to  be  overruled  by  construction,  however 
strong. 

Passing  by,  however,  this,  and  also  the  objection  that  the  terms  cases  in  law 
and  equity  are  technical,  embracing  only  questions  between  parties  amenable  to 
the  process  of  the  court,  and,  of  course,  excluding  questions  between  the  states 
and  the  General  Government — an  argument  which  has  never  been  answered — 
there  remains  another  objection  perfectly  conclusive. 

The  construction  which  would  confer  on  the  Supreme  Court  the  power  in 
question,  rests  on  the  ground  that  the  Constitution  has  conferred  on  that  tribu 
nal  the  high  and  important  right  of  deciding  on  the  constitutionality  of  laws. 
That  it  possesses  this  power  I  do  not  deny,  but  I  do  utterly  deny  that  it  is  confer 
red  by  the  Constitution,  either  by  the  provisions  above  cited,  or  any  other.  It  is  a 

G 


50  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

power  derived  from  the  necessity  of  the  case  ;  and,  so  far  from  being  possessed 
by  the  Supreme  Court  exclusively  or  peculiarly,  it  not  only  belongs  to  every 
court  of  the  country,  high  or  low,  civil  or  criminal,  but  to  all  foreign  courts,  be 
fore  which  a  case  may  be  brought  involving  the  construction  of  a  law  which  may- 
conflict  with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  The  reason  is  plain.  Where 
there  are  two  sets  of  rules  prescribed  in  reference  to  the  same  subject,  one  by 
a  higher  and  the  other  by  an  inferior  authority,  the  judicial  tribunal  called  in 
to  decide  on  the  case  must  unavoidably  determine,  should  they  conflict,  which  is 
the  law  ;  and  that  necessity  compels  it  to  decide  that  the  rule  prescribed  by  the 
inferior  power,  if  in  its  opinion  inconsistent  with  that  of  the  higher,  is  void,  be  it  a 
conflict  between  the  Constitution  and  a  law,  or  between  a  charter  and  the  by-laws 
of  a  corporation,  or  any  other  higher  and  inferior  authority.  The  principle  and 
source  of  authority  are  the  same  in  all  such  cases.  Being  derived  from  neces 
sity,  it  is  restricted  within  its  limits,  and  cannot  pass  an  inch  beyond  the  nar 
row  confines  of  deciding  in  a  case  before  the  court,  and,  of  course,  between  par 
ties  amenable  to  its  process,  excluding  thereby  political  questions,  which  of  the 
two  is,  in  reality,  the  law,  the  act  of  Congress  or  the  Constitution,  when  on 
their  face  they  are  inconsistent ;  and  yet,  from  this  resulting  limited  power,  de 
rived  from  necessity,  and  held  in  common  with  every  court  in  the  world  which, 
by  possibility,  may  take  cognizance  of  a  case  involving  the  interpretation  of  our 
Constitution  and  laws,  it  is  attempted  to  confer  on  the  Supreme  Court  a  power 
which  would  work  a  thorough  and  radical  change  in  our  system,  and  which, 
moreover,  was  positively  refused  by  the  Convention. 

The  opinion  that  the  General  Government  has  the  right  to  enforce  its  con 
struction  of  its  powers  against  a  state,  in  any  mode  whatever,  is,  in  truth,  found 
ed  on  a  fundamental  misconception  of  our  system.  At  the  bottom  of  this,  and, 
in  fact,  almost  every  other  misconception  as  to  the  relation  between  the  states 
and  the  General  Government,  lurks  the  radical  error,  that  the  latter  is  a  national, 
and  not,  as  in  reality  it  is,  a  confederated  government ;  and  that  it  derives  its 
powers  from  a  higher  source  than  the  states.  There  are  thousands  influenced 
by  these  impressions  without  being  conscious  of  it,  and  who,  while  they  believe 
themselves  to  be  opposed  to  consolidation,  Have  infused  into  their  conception 
of  our  Constitution  almost  all  the  ingredients  which  enter  into  that  form  of 
government.  The  striking  difference  between  the  present  government  and  that 
under  the  old  confederation  (I  speak  of  governments  as  distinct  from  constitu 
tions)  has  mainly  contributed  to  this  dangerous  impression.  But,  however  dis 
similar  their  governments,  the  present  Constitution  is  as  far  removed  from  con 
solidation,  and  is  as  strictly  and  as  purely  a  confederation,  as  the  one  which  it  su 
perseded. 

Like  the  old  confederation,  it  was  formed  and  ratified  by  state  authority.  The 
only  difference  in  this  particular  is,  that  one  was  ratified  by  the  people  of  the 
states,  and  the  other  by  the  state  governments  ;  one  forming  strictly  a  union  of 
the  state  governments,  the  other  of  the  states  themselves  ;  one,  of  the  agents  ex 
ercising  the  powers  of  sovereignt)r,  and  the  other,  of  the  sovereigns  themselves  ; 
but  both  were  unions  of  political  bodies,  as  distinct  from  a  union  of  the  people 
individually.  They  are,  indeed,  both  confederations,  but  the  present  in  a  higher 
and  purer  sense  than  that  which  it  succeeded,  just  as  the  act  of  a  sovereign 
is  higher  and  more  perfect  than  that  of  his  agent ;  and  it  was,  doubtless,  in  ref 
erence  to  this  difference  that  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  address 
of  the  Convention  laying  the  Constitution  before  Congress,  speak  of  consolida 
ting  and  perfecting  the  Union  ;  yet  this  difference,  which,  while  it  elevated  the 
General  Government  in  relation  to  the  state  governments,  placed  it  more  imme 
diately  in  the  relation  of  the  creature  and  agent  of  the  states  themselves,  by  a 
natural  misconception,  has  been  the  principal  cause  of  the  impression  so  preva 
lent  of  the  inferiority  of  the  states  to  the  General  Government,  and  of  the  con 
sequent  right  of  the  latter  to  coerce  the  former.  Raised  from  below  to  the  same 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  51 

level  with  the  state  governments,  it  was  conceived  to  be  placed  above  the  states 
themselves. 

I  have  now,  I  trust,  conclusively  shown  that  a  state  has  a  right,  in  her  sov 
ereign  capacity,  in  convention,  to  declare  an  unconstitutional  act  of  Congress  to 
be  null  and  void,  and  that  such  declarations  would  be  obligatory  on  her  citizens, 
as  highly  so  as  the  Constitution  itself,  and  conclusive  against  the  General  Gov 
ernment,  which  would  have  no  right  to  enforce  its  construction  of  its  powers 
against  that  of  the  state. 

I  next  propose  to  consider  the  practical  effect  of  the  exercise  of  this  high  and 
important  right — which,  as  the  great  conservative  principle  of  our  system,  is 
known  under  the  various  names  of  nullification,  interposition,  and  state  veto — in 
reference  to  its  operation  viewed  under  different  aspects  :  nullification,  as  de 
claring  null  an  unconstitutional  act  of  the  General  Government,  as  far  as  the 
state  is  concerned  ;  interposition,  as  throwing  the  shield  of  protection  between 
the  citizens  of  a  state  and  the  encroachments  of  the  Government ;  and  veto,  as 
arresting  or  inhibiting  its  unauthorized  acts  within  the  limits  of  the  state. 

The  practical  effect,  if  the  right  was  fully  recognised,  would  be  plain  and 
simple,  and  has  already,  in  a  great  measure,  been  anticipated.  If  the  state  has 
a  right,  there  must,  of  necessity,  be  a  corresponding  obligation  on  the  part  of 
the  General  Government  to  acquiesce  in  its  exercise  ;  and,  of  course,  it  would 
be  its  duty  to  abandon  the  power,  at  least  as  far  as  the  state  is  concerned,  to 
compromise  the  difficulty,  or  apply  to  the  states  themselves,  according  to  the 
form  prescribed  in  the  Constitution,  to  obtain  the  power  by  a  grant.  If  granted, 
acquiescence,  then,  would  be  a  duty  on  the  part  of  the  state  ;  and,  in  that  event, 
the  contest  would  terminate  in  converting  a  doubtful  constructive  power  into  one 
positively  granted  ;  but.  should  it  not  be  granted,  no  alternative  would  remain  for 
the  General  Government  but  a  compromise  or  its  permanent  abandonment.  In 
either  event,  the  controversy  would  be  closed  and  the  Constitution  fixed :  a  re 
sult  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  steady  operation  of  the  government  and  the 
stability  of  the  system,  and  which  can  never  be  attained,  under  its  present  opera 
tion,  Avithout  the  recognition  of  the  right,  as  experience  has  sliown. 

From  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  we  have  had  but  one  continued  agita 
tion  of  constitutional  questions  embracing  some  of  the  most  important  powers 
exercised  by  the  government ;  and  yet,  in  spite  of  all  the  ability  and  force  of 
argument  displayed  in  the  various  discussions,  backed  by  the  high  authority 
claimed  for  the  Supreme  Court  to  adjust  such  controversies,  not  a  single  con 
stitutional  question,  of  a  political  character,  which  has  ever  been  agitated  during 
this  long  period,  has  been  settled  in  the  public  opinion,  except  that  of  the  un- 
constitutionality  of  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Law  ;  and,  what  is  remarkable,  that 
was  settled  against  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court.     The  tendency  is  to  in 
crease,  and  not  diminish,  this  conflict  for  power.     New  questions  are  yearly 
added  without  diminishing  the  old ;  while  the  contest  becomes  more  obstinate 
as  the  list  increases,  and,  what  is  highly  ominous,  more  sectional.     It  is  im 
possible  that  the  government  can  last  under  this  increasing  diversity  of  opinion, 
and  growing  uncertainty  as  to  its  power  in  relation  to  the  most  important  sub 
jects  of  legislation  ;  and  equally  so,  that  this  dangerous  state  can  terminate 
without  a  power  somewhere  to  compel,  in  effect,  the  government  to  abandon 
doubtful   constructive  powers,  or  to  convert  them  into  positive  grants  by  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution ;  in  a  word,  to  substitute  the  positive  grants  of 
the  parties  themselves  for  the  constructive  powers  interpolated  by  the  agents. 
Nothing  short  of  this,  in  a  system  constructed  as  ours  is,  with  a  double  set  of 
agents,  one  for  local  and  the  other  for  general  purposes,  can  ever  terminate  the 
conflict  for  power,  or  give  uniformity  and  stability  to  its  action. 

Such  would  be  the  practical  and  happy  operation  were  the  right  recognised ; 
but  the  case  is  far  otherwise  ;  and  as  the  right  is  not  only  denied,  but  violently 
opposed,  the  General  Government,  so  far  from  acquiescing  in  its  exercise,  and 


52  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

abandoning  the  power,  as  it  ought,  may  endeavour,  by  all  the  means  within  its 
command,  to  enforce  its  construction  against  that  of  the  state.  It  is  under  this 
aspect  of  the  question  that  I  now  propose  to  consider  the  practical  effect  of  the 
exercise  of  the  right,  with  the  view  to  determine  which  of  the  two,  the  state  or 
the  General  Government,  must  prevail  in  the  conflict ;  which  compels  me  to 
revert  to  some  of  the  grounds  already  established. 

I  have  already  shown  that  the  declaration  of  nullification  would  be  obligatory 
on  the  citizens  of  the  state,  as  much  so,  in  fact,  as  its  declaration  ratifying  the 
Constitution,  resting,  as  it  does,  on  the  same  basis.  It  would  to  them  be  the 
highest  possible  evidence  that  the  power  contested  was  not  granted,  and,  of 
course,  that  the  act  of  the  General  Government  was  unconstitutional.  They 
would  be  bound,  in  all  the  relations  of  life,  private  and  political,  to  respect  and 
obey  it ;  and,  when  called  upon  as  jurymen,  to  render  their  verdict  according 
ly,  or.  as  judges,  to  pronounce  judgment  in  conformity  to  it.  The  right  of  jury 
trial  is  secured  by  the  Constitution  (thanks  to  the  jealous  spirit  of  liberty, 
doubly  secured  and  fortified) ;  and,  with  this  inestimable  right — inestimable,  not 
only  as  an  essential  portion  of  the  judicial  tribunals  of  the  country,  but  infinitely 
more  so,  considered  as  a  popular,  and  still  more,  a  local  representation,  in  that 
department  of  the  government  which,  without  it,  would  be  the  farthest  removed 
from  the  control  of  the  people,  and  a  fit  instrument  to  sap  the  foundation  of  the 
system — with,  I  repeat,  this  inestimable  right,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  Gen 
eral  Government,  within  the  limits  of  the  state,  to  execute,  legally,  the  act  nulli 
fied,  or  any  other  passed  with  a  view  to  enforce  it ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
state  would  be  able  to  enforce,  legally  and  peaceably,  its  declaration  of  nullification. 
Sustained  by  its  court  and  juries,  it  would  calmly  and  quietly,  but  successfully, 
meet  every  effort  of  the  General  Government  to  enforce  its  claim  of  power. 
The  result  would  be  inevitable.  Before  the  judicial  tribunal  of  the  country,  the 
state  must  prevail,  unless,  indeed,  jury  trial  could  be  eluded  by  the  refinement 
of  the  court,  or  by  some  other  device  ;  which,  however,  guarded  as  it  is  by  the 
ramparts  of  the  Constitution,  would,  I  hold,  be  impossible.  The  attempt  to 
elude,  should  it  be  made,  would  itself  be  unconstitutional ;  and,  in  turn,  would 
be  annulled  by  the  sovereign  voice  of  the  state.  Nor  would  the  right  of  appeal 
to  the  Supreme  Court,  under  the  judiciary  act,  avail  the  General  Government. 
If  taken,  it  would  but  end  in  a  new  trial,  and  that  in  another  verdict  against  the 
government ;  but  whether  it  may  be  taken,  would  be  optional  with  the  state. 
The  court  itself  has  decided  that  a  copy  of  the  record  is  requisite  to  review  a 
judgment  of  a  state  court,  and,  if  necessary,  the  state  would  take  the  precaution 
to  prevent,  by  proper  enactments,  any  means  of  obtaining  a  copy.  But  if  ob 
tained,  what  would  it  avail  against  the  execution  of  the  penal  enactments  of  the 
state,  intended  to  enforce  the  declaration  of  nullification  ?  The  judgment  of 
the  state  court  would  be  pronounced  and  executed  before  the  possibility  of  a 
reversal,  and  executed,  too,  without  responsibility  incurred  by  any  one. 

Beaten  before  the  courts,  the  General  Government  would  be  compelled  to 
abandon  its  unconstitutional  pretensions,  or  resort  to  force  :  a  resort,  the  diffi 
culty  (I  was  about  to  say,  the  impossibility)  of  which  would  very  soon  fully 
manifest  itself,  should  folly  or  madness  ever  make  the  attempt. 

In  considering  this  aspect  of  the  controversy,  I  pass  over  the  fact  that  the 
General  Government  has  no  right  to  resort  to  force  against  a  state — to  coerce  a 
sovereign  member  of  the  Union — which,  I  trust,  I  have  established  beyond  all 
possible  doubt.  Let  it,  however,  be  determined  to  use  force,  and  the  difficulty 
would  be  insurmountable,  unless,  indeed,  it  be  also  determined  to  set  aside  the 
Constitution,  and  to  subvert  the  system  to  its  foundations. 

Against  whom  would  it  be  applied  ?  Congress  has,  it  is  true,  the  right  to 
call  forth  the  militia  "  to  execute  the  laws  and  suppress  insurrection ;"  but 
there  would  be  no  law  resisted,  unless,  indeed,  it  be  called  resistance  for  the 
juries  to  refuse  to  find,  and  the  courts  to  render  judgment,  in  conformity  to  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  53 

wishes  of  the  General  Government ;  no  insurrection  to  suppress  ;  no  armed 
force  to  reduce  ;  not  a  sword  unsheathed  ;  not  a  bayonet  raised  ;  none,  absolute 
ly  none,  on  whom  force  could  be  used,  except  it  be  on  the  unarmed  citizens  en 
gaged  peaceably  and  quietly  in  their  daily  occupations. 

No  one  would  be  guilty  of  treason  ("  levying  war  against  the  United  States, 
adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort"),  or  any  other  crime 
made  penal  by  the  Constitution  or  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

To  suppose  that  force  could  be  called  in,  implies,  indeed,  a  great  mistake, 
both  as  to  the  nature  of  our  government  and  that  of  the  controversy.  It  would 
be  a  legal  and  constitutional  contest — a  conflict  of  moral,  and  not  physical  force — 
a  trial  of  constitutional,  not  military  power,  to  be  decided  before  the  judicial 
tribunals  of  the  country,  and  not  on  the  field  of  battle.  In  such  contest,  there 
would  be  no  object  for  force,  but  those  peaceful  tribunals — nothing  on  which  it 
could  be  employed,  but  in  putting  down  courts  and  juries,  and  preventing  the 
execution  of  judicial  process.  Leave  these  untouched,  and  all  the  militia  that 
could  be  called  forth,  backed  by  a  regular  force  of  ten  times  the  number  of  our 
small,  but  gallant  and  patriotic  army,  could  have  not  the  slightest  effect  on  the 
result  of  the  controversy  ;  but  subvert  these  by  an  armed  body,  and  you  subvert 
the  very  foundation  of  this  our  free,  constitutional,  and  legal  system  of  govern 
ment,  and  rear  in  its  place  a  military  despotism. 

Feeling  the  force  of  these  difficulties,  it  is  proposed,  with  the  view,  I  suppose, 
of  disembarrassing  the  operation,  as  much  as  possible,  of  the  troublesome  inter 
ference  of  courts  and  juries,  to  change  the  scene  of  coercion  from  land  to  water ; 
as  if  the  government  could  have  one  particle  more  right  to  coerce  a  state  by 
water  than  by  land  ;  but,  unless  I  am  greatly  deceived,  the  difficulty  on  that 
element  will  not  be  much  less  than  on  the  other.  The  jury  trial,  at  least  the 
local  jury  trial  (the  trial  by  the  vicinage),  may,  indeed,  be  evaded  there,  but 
in  its  place  other,  and  not  much  less  formidable,  obstacles  must  be  encoun 
tered. 

There  can  be  but  two  modes  of  coercion  resorted  to  by  water — blockade  and 
abolition  of  the  ports  of  entry  of  the  state,  accompanied  by  penal  enactments, 
authorizing  seizures  for  entering  the  waters  of  the  state.  If  the  former  be  at 
tempted,  there  will  be  other  parties  besides  the  General  Government  and  the 
state.  Blockade  is  a  belligerent  right :  it  presupposes  a  state  of  war,  and, 
unless  there  be  war  (war  in  due  form,  as  prescribed  by  the  Constitution),  the 
order  for  blockade  would  not  be  respected  by  other  nations  or  their  subjects. 
Their  vessels  would  proceed  directly  for  the  blockaded  port,  with  certain  pros 
pects  of  gain  ;  if  seized  under  the  order  of  blockade,  through  the  claim  of  in 
demnity  against  the  General  Government ;  arid,  if  not,  by  a  profitable  market, 
without  the  exaction  of  duties. 

The  other  mode,  the  abolition  of  the  ports  of  entry  of  the  state,  would  also 
have  its  difficulties.  The  Constitution  provides  that  "no  preference  shall  be 
given  by  any  regulation  of  commerce  or  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one  state  over 
those  of  another  ;  nor  shall  vessels  bound  to  or  from  one  state  be  obliged  to 
enter,  clear,  or  pay  duties  in  another :"  provisions  too  clear  to  be  eluded  even 
by  the  force  of  construction.  There  will  be  another  difficulty.  If  seizures  be 
made  in  port,  or  within  the  distance  assigned  by  the  laws  of  nations  as  the  limits 
of  a  state,  the  trial  must  be  in  the  state,  with  all  the  embarrassments  of  its  courts 
and  juries ;  while  beyond  the  ports  and  the  distance  to  which  I  have  referred, 
it  would  be  difficult  to  point  out  any  principle  by  which  a  foreign  vessel,  at 
least,  could  be  seized,  except  as  an  incident  to  the  right  of  blockade,  and,  of 
course,  with  all  the  difficulties  belonging  to  that  mode  of  coercion. 

But  there  yet  remains  another,  and,  I  doubt  not,  insuperable  barrier,  to  be 
found  in  the  judicial  tribunals  of  the  Union,  against  all  the  schemes  of  introdu 
cing  force,  whether  by  land  or  water.  Though  I  cannot  concur  in  the  opinion 
of  those  who  regard  the  Supreme  Court  as  the  mediator  appointed  by  the  Con- 


54  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

stitution  between  the  states  and  the  .General  Government ;  and  though  I  cannot 
doubt  there  is  a  natural  bias  on  its  part  towards  the  powers  of  the  latter,  yet  I 
must  greatly  lower  my  opinion  of  that  high  and  important  tribunal  for  intelli 
gence,  justice,  and  attachment  to  the  Constitution,  and  particularly  of  that  pure 
and  upright  magistrate  who  has  so  long,  and  with  such  distinguished  honour  to 
himself  and  the  Union,  presided  over  its  deliberations,  with  all  the  weight  that 
belongs  to  an  intellect  of  the  first  order,  united  with  the  most  spotless  integrity, 
to  believe,  for  a  moment,  that  an  attempt  so  plainly  and  manifestly  unconstitu 
tional  as  a  resort  to  force  would  be  in  such  a  contest,  could  be  sustained  by  the 
sanction  of  its  authority.  In  whatever  form  force  may  be  used,  it  must  present 
questions  for  legal  adjudication.  If  in  the  shape  of  blockade,  the  vessels  seized 
under  it  must  be  condemned,  and  thus  would  be  presented  the  question  of  prize 
or  no  prize,  and,  with  it,  the  legality  of  the  blockade  ;  if  in  that  of  a  repeal  of 
the  acts  establishing  ports  of  entries  in  the  state,  the  legality  of  the  seizure 
must  be  determined,  and  that  would  bring  up  the  question  of  the  constitutional 
ity  of  giving  a  preference  to  the  ports  of  one  state  over  those  of  another  ;  and 
so,  if  we  pass  from  water  to  land,  we  will  find  every  attempt  there  to  substitute. 
force  for  law  must,  in  like  manner,  come  under  the  review  of  the  courts  of  the 
Union ;  and  the  unconstitutionally  would  be  so  glaring,  that  the  executive  and 
legislative  departments,  in  their  attempt  to  coerce,  should  either  make  an  attempt 
so  lawless  and  desperate,  would  be  without  the  support  of  the  judicial  depart 
ment.  I  will  not  pursue  the  question  farther,  as  I  hold  it  perfectly  clear  that, 
so  long  as  a  state  retains  its  federal  relations  ;  so  long,  in  a  word,  as  it  continues 
a  member  of  the  Union,  the  contest  between  it  and  the  General  Government 
must  be  before  the  courts  and  juries ;  and  every  attempt,  in  whatever  form, 
whether  by  land  or  water,  to  substitute  force  as  the  arbiter  in  their  place,  must 
fail.  The  unconstitutionality  of  the  attempt  would  be  so  open  and  palpable, 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  sustain  it. 

There  is,  indeed,  one  view,  and  one  only,  of  the  contest  in  which  force  could 
be  employed  ;  but  that  view,  as  between  the  parties,  would  supersede  the  Con 
stitution  itself:  that  nullification  is  secession,  and  would,  consequently,  place 
the  state,  as  to  the  others,  in  the  relation  of  a  foreign  state.  Such,  clearly, 
would  be  the  effect  of  secession  ;  but  it  is  equally  clear  that  it  would  place  the 
state  beyond  the  pale  of  all  her  federal  relations,  and,  thereby,  all  control  on  the 
part  of  the  other  states  over  her.  She  would  stand  to  them  simply  in  the  rela 
tion  of  a  foreign  state,  divested  of  all  federal  connexion,  arid  having  none  other 
between  them  but  those  belonging  to  the  laws  of  nations.  Standing  thus  to 
wards  one  another,  force  might,  indeed,  be  employed  against  a  state,  but  it. 
must  be  a  belligerent  force,  preceded  by  a  declaration  of  war,  and  carried  on 
with  all  its  formalities.  Such  would  be  the  certain  effect  of  secession  ;  and  if 
nullification  be  secession — if  it  be  but  a  different  name  for  the  same  thing — such, 
too,  must  be  its  effect ;  which  presents  the  highly  important  question,  Are  they, 
in  fact,  the  same  ?  on  the  decision  of  which  depends  the  question  whether  it 
be  a  peaceable  and  constitutional  remedy,  that  may  be  exercised  without  termi 
nating  the  federal  relations  of  the  state  or  not. 

1  am  aware  that  there  is  a  considerable  and  respectable  portion  of  our  state, 
with  a  very  large  portion  of  the  Union,  constituting,  in  fact,  a  great  majority, 
who  are  of  the  opinion  that  they  are  the  same  thing,  differing  only  in  name, 
and  who,  under  that  impression,  denounce  it  as  the  most  dangerous  of  all  doc 
trines  ;  and  yet,  so  far  from  being  the  same,  they  are,  unless,  indeed,  I  am 
greatly  deceived,  not  only  perfectly  distinguishable,  but  totally  dissimilar  in 
their  nature,  their  object,  and  effect ;  and  that,  so  far  from  deserving  the  de 
nunciation,  so  properly  belonging  to  the  act  with  which  it  is  confounded,  it  is, 
in  truth,  the  highest  and  most  precious  of  all  the  rights  of  the  states,  and  es 
sential  to  preserve  that  very  Union,  for  the  supposed  effect  of  destroying  which 
it  is  so  bitterly  anathematized. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  55 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  make  good  my  assertion  of  their  total  dissimilarity. 

First,  they  are  wholly  dissimilar  in  their  nature.  One  has  reference  to  the 
parties  themselves,  and  the  other  to  their  agents.  Secession  is  a  withdrawal  from 
the  Union :  a  separation  from  partners,  and,  as  far  as  depends  on  the  member 
withdrawing,  a  dissolution  of  the  partnership.  It  presupposes  an  association : 
a  union  of  several  states  or  individuals  for  a  common  object.  Wherever  these 
exist,  secession  may  ;  and  where  they  do  not,  it  cannot.  Nullification,  on  the 
contrary,  presupposes  the  relation  of  principal  and  agent :  the  one  granting  a 
power  to  be  executed,  the  other,  appointed  by  him  with  authority  to  execute  it ; 
and  is  simply  a  declaration  on  the  part  of  the  principal,  made  in  due  form,  that 
an  act  of  the  agent  transcending  his  power  is  null  and  void.  It  is  a  right  belong 
ing  exclusively  to  the  relation  between  principal  and  agent,  to  be  found  wher 
ever  it  exists,  and  in  all  its  forms,  between  several,  or  an  association  of  princi 
pals,  and  their  joint  agents,  as  well  as  between  a  single  principal  and  his  agent. 

The  difference  in  their  object  is  no  less  striking  than  in  their  nature.  The 
object  of  secession  is  to  free  the  withdrawing  member  from  the  obligation  of 
the  association  or  union,  and  is  applicable  to  cases  where  the  object  of  the 
association  or  union  has  failed,  either  by  an  abuse  of  power  on  the  part  of  its 
members,  or  other  causes.  Its  direct  and  immediate  object,  as  it  concerns  the  with 
drawing  member,  is  the  dissolution  of  the  association  or  union,  as  far  as  it  is  con 
cerned.  On  the  contrary,  the  object  of  nullification  is  to  confine  the  agent  with 
in  the  limits  of  his  powers,  by  arresting  his  acts  transcending  them,  not  with  the 
view  of  destroying  the  delegated  or  trust  power,  but  to  preserve  it,  by  compelling 
the  agent  to  fulfil  the  object  for  which  the  agency  or  trust  was  created;  and  is  ap 
plicable  only  to  cases  where  the  trust  or  delegated  powers  are  transcended  on  the 
part  of  the  agent.  Without  ihe  power  of  secession,  an  association  or  union, 
formed  for  the  common  good  of  all  the  members,  might  prove  ruinous  to  some, 
by  the  abuse  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  others ;  and  without  nullification  the 
agent  might,  under  colour  of  construction,  assume  a  power  never  intended  to 
be  delegated,  or  to  convert  those  delegated  to  objects  never  intended  to  be  com 
prehended  in  the  trust,  to  the  ruin  of  the  principal,  or,  in  case  of  a  joint  agency, 
to  the  ruin  of  some  of  the  principals.  Each  has,  thus,  its  appropriate  object, 
but  objects  in  their  nature  very  dissimilar  ;  so  much  so,  that,  in  case  of  an  asso 
ciation  or  union,  where  the  powers  are  delegated  to  be  executed  by  an  agent, 
the  abuse  of  power,  on  the  part  of  the  agent,  to  the  injury  of  one  or  more  of  the 
members,  would  not  justify  secession  on  their  part.  The  rightful  remedy  in 
that  case  would  be  nullification.  There  would  be  neither  right  nor  pretext  to 
secede  :  not  right,  because  secession  is  applicable  only  to  the  acts  of  the  mem 
bers  of  the  association  or  union,  and  not  to  the  act  of  the  agent ;  nor  pretext, 
because  there  is  another,  and  equally  efficient  remedy,  short  of  the  dissolution 
of  the  association  or  union,  which  can  only  be  justified  by  necessity.  Nullifi 
cation  may,  indeed,  be  succeeded  by  secession.  In  the  case  stated,  should  the 
other  members  undertake  to  grant  the  power  nullified,  and  should  the  nature  of 
the  power  be  such  as  to  defeat  the  object  of  the  association  or  union,  at  least  as 
far  as  the  member  nullifying  is  concerned,  it  would  then  become  an  abuse  of 
power  on  the  part  of  the  principals,  and  thus  present  a  case  where  secession 
would  apply  ;  but  in  no  other  could  it  be  justified,  except  it  be  for  a  failure  of 
the  association  or  union  to  effect  the  object  for  which  it  was  created,  independ 
ent  of  any  abuse  of  power. 

It  now  remains  to  show  that  their  effect  is  as  dissimilar  as  their  nature  or 
object. 

Nullification  leaves  the  members  of  the  association  or  union  in  the  condi 
tion  it  found  them — subject  to  all  its  burdens,  and  entitled  to  all  its  advantages, 
comprehending  the  member  nullifying  as  well  as  the  others — its  object  being, 
not  to  destroy,  but  to  preserve,  as  has  been  stated.  It  simply  arrests  the  act 
of  the  agent,  as  far  as  the  principal  is  concerned,  leaving  in  every  other  respect 


56  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  operation  of  the  joint  concern  as  before  ;  secession,  on  the  contrary,  destroys, 
as  far  as  the  withdrawing  member  is  concerned,  the  association  or  union,  and 
restores  him  to  the  relation  he  occupied  towards  the  other  members  before  the 
existence  of  the  association  or  union.  He  loses  the  benefit,  but  is  released 
from  the  burden  and  control,  and  can  no  longer  be  dealt  with,  by  his  former  as 
sociates,  as  one  of  its  members. 

Such  are  clearly  the  differences  between  them — differences  so  marked,  that, 
instead  of  being  identical,  as  supposed,  they  form  a  contrast  in  all  the  aspects 
in  which  they  can  be  regarded.  The  application  of  these  remarks  to  the  polit 
ical  association  or  Union  of  these  twenty-four  states  and  the  General  Govern 
ment,  their  joint  agcmt,  is  too  obvious,  after  what  has  been  already  said,  to  re 
quire  any  additional  illustration,  and  I  will  dismiss  this  part  of  the  subject  with 
a  single  additional  remark. 

There  are  many  who  acknowledge  the  right  of  a  state  to  secede,  but  deny 
its  right  to  nullify  ;  and  yet,  it  seems  impossible  to  admit  the  one  without  ad 
mitting  the  other.  They  both  presuppose  the  same  structure  of  the  govern 
ment,  that  it  is  a  Union  of  the  states,  as  forming  political  communities,  the 
same  right  on  the  part  of  the  states,  as  members  of  the  Union,  to  determine  for 
their  citizens  the  extent  of  the  powers  delegated  and  those  reserved,  and,  of 
course,  to  decide  whether  the  Constitution  has  or  has  not  been  violated.  The 
simple  difference,  then,  between  those  who  admit  secession  and  deny  nullifica 
tion,  and  those  who  admit  both,  is,  that  one  acknowledges  that  the  declara 
tion  of  a  state  pronouncing  that  the  Constitution  has  been  violated,  and  is,  there 
fore,  null  and  void,  would  be  obligatory  on  her  citizens,  and  would  arrest  all 
the  acts  of  the  government  within  the  limits  of  the  state  ;  while  they  deny  that 
a  similar  declaration,  made  by  the  same  authority,  and  in  the  same  manner,  that 
an  act  of  the  government  has  transcended  its  powers,  and  that  it  is,  therefore, 
null  and  void,  would  have  any  obligation  ;  while  the  other  acknowledges  the 
obligation  in  both  cases.  The  one  admits  that  the  declaration  of  a  state  assent 
ing  to  the  Constitution  bound  her  citizens,  and  that  her  declaration  can  unbind 
them ;  but  denies  that  a  similar  declaration,  as  to  the  extent  she  has,  in  fact, 
bound  them,  has  any  obligatory  force  on  them ;  while  the  other  gives  equal 
force  to  the  declaration  in  the  several  cases.  The  one  denies  the  obligation, 
where  the  object  is  to  preserve  the  Union  in  the  only  way  it  can  be,  by  confining 
the  government,  formed  to  execute  the  trust  powers,  strictly  within  their 
limits,  and  to  the  objects  for  which  they  were  delegated,  though  they  give  full 
force  where  the  object  is  to  destroy  the  Union  itself;  while  the  other,  in  giving 
equal  weight  to  both,  prefers  the  one  because  it  preserves,  and  rejects  the  other  be 
cause  it  destroys ;  and  yet  the  former  is  the  Union,  and  the  latter  the  disunion 
party  I  And  all  this  strange  distinction  originates,  as  far  as  I  can  judge,  in 
attributing  to  nullification  what  belongs  exclusively  to  secession.  The  diffi 
culty  as  to  the  former,  it  seems,  is,  that  a  state  cannot  be  in  and  out  of  the 
Union  at  the  same  time. 

This  is,  indeed,  true,  if  applied  to  secession — the  throwing  off  the  authority 

of  the  Union  itself.     To  nullify  the  Constitution,  if  I  maybe  pardoned  the  sole- 

,cism,  would,  indeed,  be  tantamount  to  disunion;  and,  as  applied  to  such  an 

act,  it  would  be  true  that  a  state  could  not  be  in  and  out  of  the  Union  at  the 

same  time ;  but  the  act  would  be  secession. 

But  to  apply  it  to  nullification,  properly  understood,  the  object  of  which,  in 
stead  of  resisting  or  diminishing  the  powers  of  the  Union,  is  to  preserve  them 
as  they  are,  neither  increased  nor  diminished,  and  thereby  the  Union  itself 
(for  the  Union  may  be  as  effectually  destroyed  by  increasing  as  by  diminish 
ing  its  powers — by  consolidation,  as  by  disunion  itself),  would  be,  I  would  say, 
had  I  not  great  respect  for  many  who  do  thus  apply  it,  egregious  trifling  with  a 
grave  and  deeply-important  constitutional  subject. 

I  might  here  finish  the  task  which  your  request  imposed,  having,  I  trust,  de* 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  57 

monstrated,  beyond  the  power  of  refutation,  that  a  state  has  the  right  to  defend 
her  reserved  powers  against  the  encroachments  of  the  General  Government ; 
and  I  may  add  that  the  right  is,  in  its  nature,  peaceable,  consistent  with  the 
federal  relations  of  the  state,  and  perfectly  efficient,  whether  contested  before 
the  courts,  or  attempted  to  be  resisted  by  force.  But  there  is  another  aspect  of 
the  subject  not  yet -touched,  without  adverting  to  which,  it  is  impossible  to  un 
derstand  the  full  effects  of  nullification,  or  the  real  character  of  our  political  in 
stitutions  :  I  allude  to  the  power  which  the  states,  as  a  confederated  body,  have 
acquired  directly  over  each  other,  and  on  which  I  will  now  proceed  to  make 
some  remarks,  though,  I  fear,  at  the  hazard  of  fatiguing  you. 

Previous  to  the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitution,  no  power  could  be  ex 
ercised  over  any  state  by  any  other,  or  all  of  the  states,  without  its  own  con 
sent  ;  and  we,  accordingly,  find  that  the  old  confederation  and  the  present  Con 
stitution  were  both  submitted  for  ratification  to  each  of  the  states,  and  that 
each  ratified  for  itself,  and  was  bound  only  in  consequence  of  its  own  partic 
ular  ratification,  as  has  been  already  stated.  The  present  Constitution  has  made, 
in  this  particular,  a  most  important  modification  in  their  condition.  I  allude  to 
the  provision  which  gives  validity  to  amendments  of  the  Constitution  when 
ratified  by  three  fourths  of  the  states — a  provision  which  has  not  attracted  as 
much  attention  as  its  importance  deserves.  Without  it,  no  change  could  have 
been  made  in  the  Constitution,  unless  with  the  unanimous  consent  of  all  the 
states,  in  like  manner  as  it  was  adopted.  This  provision,  then,  contains  a  high 
ly-important  concession  by  each  to  all  of  the  states,  of  a  portion  of  the  original 
and  inherent  right  of  self-government,  possessed  previously  by  each  separately, 
in  favour  of  their  general  confederated  powers,  giving  thereby  increased  energy 
to  the  states  in  their  united  capacity,  and  weakening  them  in  the  same  degree 
in  their  separate.  Its  object  was  to  facilitate  and  strengthen  the  action  of  the 
amending,  or  (to  speak  a  little  more  appropriately,  as  it  regards  the  point  under 
consideration)  the  repairing  power.  It  was  foreseen  that  experience  would, 
probably,  disclose  errors  in  the  Constitution  itself ;  that  time  would  make  great 
changes  in  the  condition  of  the  country,  which  would  require  corresponding 
changes  in  the  Constitution  ;  that  the  irregular  and  conflicting  movements  of  the 
bodies  composing  so  complex  a  system  might  cause  derangements  requiring 
correction ;  and  that,  to  require  the  unanimous  consent  of  all  the  states  to  meet 
these  various  contingencies,  would  be  placing  the  whole  too  much  under  the 
control  of  the  parts  :  to  remedy  which,  this  great  additional  power  was  given  to 
the  amending  or  repairing  power — this  vis  medicatrix  of  the  system. 

To  understand  correctly  the  nature  of  this  concession,  we  must  not  confound 
it  with  the  delegated  powers  conferred  on  the  General  Government,  and  to  be 
exercised  by  it  as  the  joint  agent  of  the  states.  They  are  essentially  different* 
The  former  is,  in  fact,  but  a  modification  of  the  original  sovereign  power  re 
siding  in  the  people  of  the  several  states — of  the  creating  or  Constitution-making 
power  itself,  intended,  as  stated,  to  facilitate  and  strengthen  its  action,  and  not 
change  its  character.  Though  modified,  it  is  not  delegated.  It  still  resides  in  the 
states,  and  is  still  to  be  exercised  by  them,  and  not  by  the  government. 

I  propose  next  to  consider  this  important  modification  of  the  sovereign  pow 
ers  of  the  states,  in  connexion  with  the  right  of  nullification. 

It  is  acknowledged  on  all  sides  that  the  duration  and  stability  of  our  system 
depend  on  maintaining  the  equilibrium  between  the  states  and  the  General 
Government — the  reserved  and  delegated  powers.  We  know  that  the  Conven 
tion  which  formed  the  Constitution,  and  the  various  state  conventions  which 
adopted  it,  as  far  as  we  are  informed  of  their  proceedings,  felt  the  deepest  soli 
citude  on  this  point.  They  saw  and  felt  there  would  be  an  incessant  conflict 
between  them,  which  would  menace  the  existence  of  the  system  itself,  unless 
properly  guarded.  The  contest  between  the  states  and  General  Government 
— the  reserved  and  delegated  rights — will,  in  truth,  be  a  conflict  between  the 

H 


58  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

great  predominant  interests  of  the  Union  on  one  side,  controlling  and  directing 
the  movements  of  the  government,  and  seeking  to  enlarge  the  delegated  pow 
ers,  and  thereby  advance  their  power  and  prosperity  ;  and,  on  the  other,  the 
minor  interests  rallying  on  the  reserved  powers,  as  the  only  means  of  protect 
ing  themselves  against  the  encroachment  and  oppression  of  the  other.  In  such 
a  contest,  without  the  most  effectual  check,  the  stronger  will  absorb  the  weak 
er  interests ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  without  an  adequate  provision  of  some 
description  or  other,  the  efforts  of  the  weaker  to  guard  against  the  encroach 
ments  and  oppression  of  the  stronger  might  permanently  derange  the  system. 

On  the  side  of  the  reserved  powers,  no  check  more  effectual  can  be  found  or 
desired  than  nullification,  or  the  right  of  arresting,  within  the  limits  of  a  state, 
the  exercise,  by  the  General  Government,  of  any  powers  but  the  delegated — a 
right  which,  if  the  states  be  true  to  themselves  and  faithful  to  the  Constitution, 
will  ever  prove,  on  the  side  of  the  reserved  powers,  an  effectual  protection  to 
both. 

Nor  is  the  check  on  the  side  of  the  delegated  less  perfect.  Though  less 
strong,  it  is  ample  to  guard  against  encroachments ;  and  is  as  strong  as  the  na 
ture  of  the  system  would  bear,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequal.  It  is  to  be  found 
in  the  amending  power.  Without  the  modification  which  it  contains  of  the 
rights  of  self-government  on  the  part  of  the  states,  as  already  explained,  the 
consent  of  each  state  would  have  been  requisite  to  any  additional  grant  of  power, 
or  other  amendment  of  the  Constitution.  While,  then,  nullification  would  ena 
ble  a  state  to  arrest  the  exercise  of  a  power  not  delegated,  the  right  of  self-gov 
ernment,  if  unmodified,  would  enable  her  to  prevent  the  grant  of  a  power  not 
delegated ;  and  thus  her  conception  of  what  power  ought  to  be  granted  would 
be  as  conclusive  against  the  co-states,  as  her  construction  of  the  powers  grant 
ed  is  against  the  General  Government.  In  that  case,  the  danger  would  be  on 
the  side  of  the  states  or  reserved  powers.  The  amending  power,  in  effect, 
prevents  this  danger.  In  virtue  of  the  provisions  which  it  contains,  the  re 
sistance  of  a  state  to  a  power  cannot  finally  prevail,  unless  she  be  sustain 
ed  by  one  fourth  of  the  co-states ;  and  in  the  same  degree  that  her  resistance 
is  weakened,  the  power  of  the  General  Government,  or  the  side  of  the  delega 
ted  powers,  is  strengthened.  It  is  true  that  the  right  of  a  state  to  arrest  an  un 
constitutional  act  is  of  itself  complete  against  the  government ;  but  it  is  equally 
so  that  the  controversy  may,  in  effect,  be  terminated  against  her  by  a  grant  of 
the  contested  powers  by  three  fourths  of  the  states.  It  is  thus  by  this  simple, 
and,  apparently,  incidental  contrivance,  that  the  right  of  a  state  to  nullify  an  uncon 
stitutional  act,  so  essential  to  the  protection  of  the  reserved  rights,  but  which, 
unchecked,  might  too  much  debilitate  the  government,  is  counterpoised  :  not 
by  weakening  the  energy  of  a  state  in  her  direct  resistance  to  the  encroach 
ment  of  the  government,  or  by  giving  to  the  latter  a  direct  control  over  the 
states,  as  proposed  in  the  Convention,  but  in  a  manner  infinitely  more  safe,  and, 
if  I  may  be  permitted  so  to  express  myself,  scientific,  by  strengthening  the 
amending  or  repairing  power — the  power  of  correcting  all  abuses  or  derange 
ments,  by  whatever  cause,  or  from  whatever  quarter. 

To  sum  all  in  a  few  words.  The  General  Government  has  the  right,  in  the 
first  instance,  of  construing  its  own  powers,  which,  if  final  and  conclusive,  as 
is  supposed  by  many,  would  have  placed  the  reserved  powers  at  the  mercy  of 
the  delegated,  and  thus  destroy  the  equilibrium  of  the  system.  Against  that,  a 
state  has  the  right  of  nullification.  This  right,  on  the  part  of  the  state,  if  not 
counterpoised,  might  tend  too  strongly  to  weaken  the  General  Government  and 
derange  the  system.  To  correct  this,  the  amending  or  repairing  power  is 
strengthened.  The  former  cannot  be  made  too  strong  if  the  latter  be  propor 
tionally  so.  The  increase  of  the  latter  is,  in  effect,  the  decrease  of  the  former. 
Give  to  a  majority  of  the  states  the  right  of  amendment,  and  the  arresting  power, 
on  the  part  of  the  state,  would,  in  fact,  be  annulled.  The  amending  power  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  59 

the  powers  of  the  government  would,  in  that  case,  be,  in  reality,  in  the  same 
hands.  The  same  majority  that  controlled  the  one  would  the  other,  and  the  power 
arrested,  as  not  granted,  would  be  immediately  restored  in  the  shape  of  a  grant. 
This  modification  of  the  right  of  self-government,  on  the  part  of  the  states,  is,  in 
fact,  the  pivot  of  the  system.  By  shifting  its  position  as  the  preponderance  is 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  or,  to  drop  the  simile,  by  increasing  or  diminish 
ing  the  energy  of  the  repairing  power,  effected  by  diminishing  or  increasing 
the  number  of  states  necessary  to  amend  the  Constitution,  the  equilibrium  be 
tween  the  reserved  and  the  delegated  rights  may  be  preserved  or  destroyed  at 
pleasure. 

I  am  aware  it  is  objected  that,  according  to  this  view,  one  fourth  of  the 
states  may,  in  reality,  change  the  Constitution,  and  thus  take  away  powers 
which  have  been  unanimously  granted  by  all  the  states.  The  objection  is  more 
specious  than  solid.  The  right  of  a  state  is  not  to  resume  delegated  powers, 
but  to  prevent  the  reserved  from  being  assumed  by  the  government.  It  is,  how 
ever,  certain  the  right  may  be  abused,  and,  thereby,  powers  be  resumed  which 
were,  in  fact,  delegated  ;  and  it  is  also  true,  if  sustained  by  one  fourth  of  the  co- 
states,  such  resumption  may  be  successfully  and  permanently  made  by  the 
state.  This  is  the  danger,  and  the  utmost  extent  of  the  danger  from  the  side  of 
the  reserved  powers.  It  would,  I  acknowledge,  be  desirable  to  avoid  or 
lessen  it ;  but  neither  can  be  effected  without  increasing  a  greater  and  opposing 
danger.  . 

If  the  right  be  denied  to  the  state  to  defend  her  reserved  powers,  for  fear  she 
might  resume  the  delegated,  that  denial  would,  in  effect,  yield  to  the  General 
Government  the  power,  under  the  colour  of  construction,  to  assume  at  pleasure 
all  the  reserved  powers.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  question  between  the  danger  of  the 
states  resuming  the  delegated  powers  on  one  side,  and  the  General  Government 
assuming  the  reserved  on  the  other.  Passing  over  the  far  greater  probability 
of  the  latter  than  the  former,  which  I  endeavoured  to  illustrate  in  the  address 
of  last  summer,  I  shall  confine  my  remarks  to  the  striking  difference  between 
them,  viewed  in  connexion  with  the  genius  and  theory  of  our  government. 

The  right  of  a  state  originally  to  complete  self-government  is  a  fundamental 
principle  in  our  system,  in  virtue  of  which  the  grant  of  power  required  the  con 
sent  of  all  the  states,  while  to  withhold  power  the  dissent  of  a  single  state  was  suf 
ficient.  It  is  true,  that  this  original  and  absolute  power  of  self-government  has 
been  modified  by  the  Constitution,  as  already  stated,  so  that  three  fourths  of  the 
states  may  now  grant  power  ;  and,  consequently,  it  requires  more  than  one  fourth 
to  withhold.  The  boundary  between  the  reserved  and  the  delegated  powers 
marks  the  limits  of  the  Union.  The  states  are  united  to  the  extent  of  the  latter, 
and  separated  beyond  that  limit.  It  is,  then,  clear  that  it  was  not  intended  that 
the  states  should  be  more  united  than  the  will  of  one  fourth  of  them,  or,  rather, 
one  more  than  a  fourth,  would  permit.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  it  was  pro 
posed  in  the  Convention  to  increase  the  corifederative  power,  as  it  may  be  call 
ed,  by  vesting  two  thirds  of  the  states  with  the  right  of  amendment,  so  as  to 
require  more  than  a  third,  instead  of  a  fourth,  to  withhold  power.  The  propo 
sition  was  rejected,  and  three  fourths  unanimously  adopted.  It  is,  then,  more 
hostile  to  the  nature  and  genius  of  our  system  to  assume  powers  not  delegated, 
than  to  resume  those  that  are ;  and  less  hostile  that  a  state,  sustained  by  one  fourth 
of  her  co-states,  should  prevent  the  exercise  of  power  really  intended  to  be  granted, 
than  that  the  General  Government  should  assume  the  exercise  of  powers  not  in 
tended  to  be  delegated.  In  the  latter  case,  the  usurpation  of  power  would  be 
against  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  system,  the  original  right  of  the  states 
to  self-government ;  while  in  the  former,  if  it  be  usurpation  at  all,  it  would  be, 
if  so  bold  an  expression  may  be  used,  a  usurpation  in  the  spirit  of  the  Consti 
tution  itself — the  spirit  ordaining  that  the  utmost  extent  of  our  Union  should  be 
limited  by  the  will  of  any  number  of  states  exceeding  a  fourth,  and  that  most 


60  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

wisely.  In  a  country  having  so  great  a  diversity  of  geographical  and  political 
interest,  with  so  vast  a  territory,  to  be  filled,  in  a  short  time,  with  almost  count 
less  millions — a  country  of  which  the  parts  will  equal  empires,  a  union  more 
intimate  than  that  ordained  in  the  Constitution,  and  so  intimate,  of  course,  that  it 
might  be  permanently  hostile  to  the  feelings  of  more  than  a  fourth  of  the  states, 
instead  of  strengthening,  would  have  exposed  the  system  to  certain  destruction. 
There  is  a  deep  and  profound  philosophy,  which  he  who  best  knows  our  nature 
will  the  most  highly  appreciate,  that  would  make  the  intensity  of  the  Union,  if 
I  may  so  express  myself,  inversely  to  the  extent  of  territory  and  the  population 
of  a  country,  and  the  diversity  of  its  interests,  geographical  and  political ;  and, 
which  would  hold  in  deeper  dread  the  assumption  of  reserved  rights  by  the 
agent  appointed  to  execute  the  delegated,  than  the  resumption  of  the  delegated 
by  the  authority  which  granted  the  powers  and  ordained  the  agent  to  adminis 
ter  them.  There  appears,  indeed,  to  be  a  great  and  prevailing  principle  that 
tends  to  place  the  delegated  power  in  opposition  to  the  delegating — the  created 
to  the  creating  power — reaching  far  beyond  man  and  his  works,  up  to  the  uni 
versal  source  of  all  power.  The  earliest  pages  of  Sacred  History  record  the  re 
bellion  of  the  archangels  against  the  high  authority  of  Heaven  itself,  and  ancient 
mythology,  the  war  of  the  Titans  against  Jupiter,  which,  according  to  its  nar 
rative,  menaced  the  universe  with  destruction.  This  all-pervading  principle  is 
at  work  in  our  system — the  created  warring  against  the  creating  power;  and 
unless  the  government  be  bolted  and  chained  down  with  links  of  adamant  by  the 
hand  of  the  states  which  created  it,  the  creature  will  usurp  the  place  of  the 
creator,  and  universal  political  idolatry  overspread  the  land. 

If  the  views  presented  be  correct,  it  follows  that,  on  the  interposition  of  a 
state  in  favour  of  the  reserved  rights,  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  General  Gov 
ernment  to  abandon  the  contested  power,  or  to  apply  to  the  states  themselves, 
the  source  of  all  political  authority,  for  the  power,  in  one  of  the  two  modes  pre 
scribed  in  the  Constitution.  If  the  case  be  a  simple  one,  embracing  a  single 
power,  and  that  in  its  nature  easily  adjusted,  the  more  ready  and  appropriate 
mode  would  be  an  amendment  in  the  ordinary  form,  on  a  proposition  of  two 
thirds  of  both  houses  of  Congress,  to  be  ratified  by  three  fourths  of  the  states  ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  should  the  derangement  of  the  system  be  great,  embracing 
many  points  difficult  to  adjust,  the  states  ought  to  be  convened  in  a  general  Con 
vention,  the  most  august  of  all  assemblies,  representing  the  united  sovereignty 
of  the  confederated  states,  and  having  power  and  authority  to  correct  every  er 
ror,  and  to  repair  every  dilapidation  or  injury,  whether  caused  by  time  or  acci 
dent,  or  the  conflicting  movements  of  the  bodies  which  compose  the  system.. 
With  institutions  every  way  so  fortunate,  possessed  of  means  so  well  calculated 
to  prevent  disorders,  and  so  admirable  to  correct  them  when  they  cannot  be  pre 
vented,  he  who  would  prescribe  for  our  political  disease  disunion  on  the  one 
side,  or  coercion  of  a  state  in  the  assertion  of  its  rights  on  the  other,  would  de 
serve,  and  will  receive,  the  execrations  of  this  and  all  future  generations. 

I  have  now  finished  what  I  had  to  say  on  the  subject  of  this  communication;, 
in  its  immediate  connexion  with  the  Constitution.  In  the  discussion,  I  have 
advanced  nothing  but  on  the  authority  of  the  Constitution  itself,  or  that  of  re 
corded  and  unquestionable  facts  connected  with  the  history  of  its  origin  and 
formation  ;  and  have  made  no  deduction  but  such  as  rested  on  principles  which 
I  believe  to  be  unquestionable  ;  but  it  would  be  idle  to  expect,  in  the  present  state 
of  the  public  mind,  a  favourable  reception  of  the  conclusions  to  which  I  have 
been  carried.  There  are  too  many  misconceptions  to  encounter,  too  many  prej 
udices  to  combat,  and,  above  all,  too  great  a  weight  of  interest  to  resist.  I  do 
not  propose  to  investigate  these  great  impediments  to  the  reception  of  the  truth, 
though  it  would  be  an  interesting  subject  of  inquiry  to  trace  them  to  their  cause, 
and  to  measure  the  force  of  their  impeding  power ;  but  there  is  one  among 
them  of  so  marked  a  character,  and  which  operates  so  extensively,  that  I  can-r 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  61 

not  conclude  without  making  it  the  subject  of  a  few  remarks,  particularly  as  they 
will  be  calculated  to  throw  much  light  on  what  has  already  been  said. 

Of  all  the  impediments  opposed  to  a  just  conception  of  the  nature  of  our  po 
litical  system,  the  impression  that  the  right  of  a  state  to  arrest  an  unconstitu 
tional  act  of  the  General  Government  is  inconsistent  with  the  great  and  funda 
mental  principle  of  all  free  states — that  a  majority  has  the  right  to  govern — is  the 
greatest.  Thus  regarded,  nullification  is,  without  farther  reflection,  denounced 
as  the  most  dangerous  and  monstrous  of  all  political  heresies,  as,  in  truth,  it 
would  be,  were  the  objection  as  well-founded  as,  in  fact,  it  is  destitute  of  all 
foundation,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show. 

Those  who  make  the  objection  seem  to  suppose  that  the  right  of  a  majority 
to  govern  is  a  principle  too  simple  to  admit  of  any  distinction  ;  and  yet,  if  I  do  not 
mistake,  it  is  susceptible  of  the  most  important  distinction — entering  deeply  into 
the  construction  of  our  system,  and,  I  may  add,  into  that  of  all  free  states  in 
proportion  to  the  perfection  of  their  institutions,  and  is  essential  to  the  very  ex 
istence  of  liberty. 

When,  then,  it  is  said  that  a  majority  has  the  right  to  govern,  there  are  two 
modes  of  estimating  the  majority,  to  either  of  which  the  expression  is  applica 
ble.  The  one,  in  which  the  whole  community  is  regarded  in  the  aggregate, 
and  the  majority  is  estimated  in  reference  to  the  entire  mass.  This  may  be 
called  the  majority  of  the  whole,  or  the  absolute  majority.  The  other,  in  which 
it  is  regarded  in  reference  to  its  different  political  interests,  whether  composed 
of  different  classes,  of  different  communities,  formed  into  one  general  confeder 
ated  community,  and  in  which  the  majority  is  estimated,  not  in  reference  to  the. 
whole,  but  to  each  class  or  community  of  which  it  is  composed,  the  assent  of 
each  taken  separately,  and  the  concurrence  of  all  constituting  the  majority. 
A  majority  thus  estimated  may  be  called  the  concurring  majority. 

When  it  is  objected  to  nullification,  that  it  is  opposed  to  the  principle  that  a 
majority  ought  to  govern,  he  who  makes  the  objection  must  mean  the  absolute, 
as  distinguished  from  the  concurring.  It  is  only  in  the  sense  of  the  former  the 
objection  can  be  applied.  In  that  of  the  concurring,  it  would  be  absurd,  as  the 
concurring  assent  of  all  the  parts  (with  us,  all  the  states)  is  of  the  very  essence 
of  such  majority.  Again,  it  is  manifest,  that  in  the  sense  it  would  be  good 
against  nullification,  it  would  be  equally  so  against  the  Constitution  itself;  for, 
in  whatever  light  that  instrument  may  be  regarded,  it  is  clearly  not  the  work 
of  the  absolute,  but  of  the  concurring  majority.  It  was  formed  and  ratified  by 
the  concurring  assent  of  all  the  states,  and  not  by  the  majority  of  the  whole  ta 
ken  in  the  aggregate,  as  has  been  already  stated.  Thus,  the  acknowledged 
right  of  each  state  in  reference  to  the  Constitution,  is  unquestionably  the  same 
right  which  nullification  attributes  to  each  in  reference  to  the  unconstitutional 
acts  of  the  government;  and,  if  the  latter  be  opposed  to  the  i^ht  of  a  majority 
to  govern,  the  former  is  equally  so.  I  go  farther.  The  objection  might,  with 
equal  truth,  be  applied  to  all  free  states  that  have  ever  existed :  I  mean  states 
deserving  the  name,  and  excluding,  of  course,  those  which,  after  a  factious  and 
anarchical  existence  of  a  few  years,  have  sunk  under  the  yoke  of  tyranny  or 
the  dominion  of  some  foreign  power.  *  There  is  not,  with  this  exception,  a  sin 
gle  free  state  whose  institutions  were  not  based  on  the  principle  of  the  con 
curring  majority :  not  one  in  which  the  community  was  not  regarded  in  refer 
ence  to  its  different  political  interests,  and  which  did  not,  in  some  form  or  oth£r, 
take  the  assent  of  each  in  the  operation  of  the  government. 

In  support  of  this  assertion,  I  might  begin  with  our  own  government  and  go 
back  to  that  of  Sparta,  and  show  conclusively  that  there  is  not  one  on  the  list 
whose  institutions  were  not  organized  on  the  principle  of  the  concurring  ma 
jority,  and  in  the  operation  of  which  the  sense  of  each  great  interest  was  not 
separately  consulted.  The  various  devices  which  have  been  contrived  for  this 
purpose,  with  the  peculiar  operation  of  each,  would  be  a  curious  and  highly  im- 


62  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

portant  subject  of  investigation.  I  can  only  allude  to  some  of  the  most  promi 
nent. 

The  principle  of  the  concurring  majority  has  sometimes  been  incorporated 
in  the  regular  and  ordinary  operation  of  the  government,  each  interest  having  a 
distinct  organization,  and  a  combination  of  the  whole  forming  the  government ; 
but  still  requiring  the  consent  of  each,  within  its  proper  sphere,  to  give  validity 
to  the  measures  of  government.  Of  this  modification  the  British  and  Spartan 
governments  are  by  far  the  most  memorable  and  perfect  examples.  In  others, 
the  right  of  acting — of  making  and  executing  the  laws — was  vested  in  one  in 
terest,  and  the  right  of  arresting  or  nullifying  in  another.  Of  this  description, 
the  Roman  government  is  much  the  most  striking  instance.  In  others,  the 
right  of  originating  or  introducing  projects  of  laws  was  in  one,  and  of  enacting 
them  in  another  :  as  at  Athens  before  its  government  degenerated,  where  the 
Senate  proposed,  and  the  General  Assembly  of  the  people  enacted,  laws. 

These  devices  were  a]l  resorted  to  with  the  intention  of  consulting  the  separ 
ate  interests  of  which  the  several  communities  were  composed,  and  against 
all  of  which  the  objection  to  nullification,  that  it  is  opposed  to  the  will  of  a  ma 
jority,  could  be  raised  with  equal  force — as  strongly,  and  I  may  say  much  more 
so,  against  the  unlimited,  unqualified,  and  uncontrollable  veto  of  a  single  tribune 
out  of  ten  at  Rome  on  all  laws  and  the  execution  of  laws,  as  against  the  same 
right  of  a  sovereign  state  (one  of  the  twenty-four  tribunes  of  this  Union),  limit 
ed,  as  the  right  is,  to  the  unconstitutional  acts  of  the  General  Government,  and 
liable,  as  in  effect  it  is,  to  be  controlled  by  three  fourths  of  the  co-states  ;  and 
yet  the  Roman  Republic,  and  the  other  states  to  which  I  have  referred,  are  the 
renowned  among  free  states,  whose  examples  have  diffused  the  spirit  of  liberty 
over  the  world,  and  which,  if  struck  from  the  list,  would  leave  behind  but  little 
to  be  admired  or  imitated.  There,  indeed,  would  remain  one  class  deserving 
from  us  particular  notice,  as  ours  belongs  to  it — I  mean  confederacies  ;  but,  as 
a  class,  heretofore  far  less  distinguished  for  power  and  prosperity  than  those 
already  alluded  to  ;  though  I  trust,  with  the  improvements  we  have  made,  des 
tined  to  be  placed  at  the  very  head  of  the  illustrious  list  of  states  which  have 
blessed  the  world  with  examples  of  well-regulated  liberty ;  and  which  stand 
as  so  many  oases  in  the  midst  of  the  desert  of  oppression  and  despotism,  which 
occupies  so  vast  a  space  in  the  chart  of  governments.  That  such  will  be  the 
great  and  glorious  destiny  of  our  system,  I  feel  assured,  provided  we  do  not 
permit  our  government  to  degenerate  into  the  worst  of  all  possible  forms,  a  con 
solidated  government,  swayed  by  the  will  of  an  absolute  majority.  But  to  pro 
ceed. 

Viewing  a  confederated  community  as  composed  of  as  many  distinct  politi 
cal  interests  as  there  are  states,  and  as  requiring  the  consent  of  each  to  its  meas 
ures,  no  government  can  be  conceived  in  which  the  sense  of  the  whole  com 
munity  can  be  more  perfectly  taken,  and  all  its  interests  be  more  fully  represent 
ed  and  protected.  But,  with  this  great  advantage,  united  with  the  means  of 
the  most  just  and  perfect  local  administration  through  the  agency  of  the  states, 
and  combined  with  the  capacity  of  embracing  within  its  limits  the  greatest  ex 
tent  of  territory  and  variety  of  interests,  ft  is  liable  to  one  almost  fatal  objection, 
the  tardiness  and  feebleness  of  its  movements — a  defect  difficult  to  be  reme 
died,  and  when  not,  so  great  as  to  render  a  form  of  government,  in  other  re 
spects  so  admirable,  almost  worthless.  To  overcome  this  difficulty  was  the 
great  desideratum  in  political  science,  and  the  most  difficult  problem  within  its 
circle.  To  us  belongs  the  glory  of  its  solution,  if,  indeed,  our  experiment  (for 
such  it  must  yet  be  called)  shall  prove  that  we  have  overcome  it,  as  I  sincerely 
believe  and  hope  it  will,  on  account  of  our  own,  as  well  as  the  liberty  and  happi 
ness  of  our  race. 

Our  first  experiment  in  government  was  on  the  old  form  of  a  simple  confed 
eracy,  unmodified,  and  extending  the  principle  of  the  concurring  majority  alike 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  63 

to  the  Constitution  (the  articles  of  union)  and  to  the  government  which  it  con 
stituted.  It  failed,  and  the  present  structure  was  reared  in  its  place,  combining, 
for  the  first  time  in  a  confederation,  the  absolute  with  the  concurring  majority ; 
and  thus  uniting  the  justice  of  the  one  with  the  energy  of  the  other. 

The  new  government  was  reared  on  the  foundation  of  the  old,  strengthened, 
but  not  changed.  It  stands  on  the  same  solid  basis  of  the  concurring  majority, 
perfected  by  the  sanction  of  the  people  of  the  states  directly  given,  and  not  in 
directly  through  the  state  governments,  as  their  representatives,  as  in  the  old 
confederation.  With  that  difference,  the  authority  which  made  the  two  Consti 
tutions — which  granted  their  powers,  and  ordained  and  organized  their  respect 
ive  governments  to  execute  them — is  the  same.  But,  in  passing  from  the  Con 
stitution  to  the  government  (the  law-making  and  the  law-administering  powers), 
the  difference  between  the  two  becomes  radical  and  essential.  There,  in  the 
present,  the  concurring  majority  is  dropped,  and  the  absolute  substituted.  In 
determining,  then,  what  powers  ought  to  be  granted,  and  how  the  government 
appointed  for  their  execution  ought  to  be  organized,  the  separate  and  concur 
ring  voice  of  the  states  was  required — the  union  being  regarded,  for  this  pur 
pose,  in  reference  to  its  various  and  distinct  interests  ;  but  in  the  execution  of 
these  powers  (delegated  only  because  all  the  states  had  a  common  interest  in 
their  exercise),  the  union  is  no  longer  regarded  in  reference  to  its  parts,  but  as 
forming,  to  the  extent  of  its  delegated  powers,  one  great  community,  to  be  gov 
erned  by  a  common  will,  just  as  the  states  are  in  reference  to  their  separate  in 
terests,  and  by  a  government  organized  on  principles  similar  to  theirs.  By  this 
simple  but  fortunate  arrangement,  we  have  ingrafted  the  absolute  on  the  con 
curring  majority,  thereby  giving  to  the  administration  of  the  powers  of  the  gov 
ernment,  where  they  were  required,  all  the  energy  and  promptness  belonging 
to  the  former,  while  we  have  retained  in  the  power  granting  and  organizing 
authority  (if  I  may  so  express  myself)  the  principle  of  the  concurring  majori 
ty,  and  with  it  that  justice,  moderation,  and  full  and  perfect  representation  of 
all  the  interests  of  the  community  which  belong  exclusively  to  it. 

Such  is  the  solidity  and  beauty  of  our  admirable  system,  but  which,  it  is  per 
fectly  obvious,  can  only  be  preserved  by  maintaining  the  ascendency  of  the 

CONSTITUTION-MAKING   AUTHORITY  OVER   THE   LA'W-MAKING THE   CONCURRING 

OVER  THE  ABSOLUTE  MAJORITY.  Nor  is  it  less  clear  that  this  can  only  be  ef 
fected  by  the  right  of  a  state  to  annul  the  unconstitutional  acts  of  the  govern 
ment — a  right  confounded  with  the  idea  of  a  minority  governing  a  majority,  but 
which,  so  far  from  being  the  case,  is  indispensable  to  prevent  the  more  ener 
getic  but  imperfect  majority  which  controls  the  movements  of  the  government, 
from  usurping  the  place  of  that  more  perfect  and  just  majority  which  formed 
the  Constitution  and  ordained  government  to  execute  its  powers. 

Nor  need  we  apprehend  that  this  check,  as  powerful  as  it  is,  will  prove  ex 
cessive.  The  distinction  between  the  Constitution  and  the  law  making  pow 
ers,  so  strongly  marked  in  our  institutions,  may  yet  be  considered  as  a  new  and 
untried  experiment.  It  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  existed  at  all  before  our 
system  of  government.  We  have  yet  much  to  learn  as  to  its  practical  opera 
tion  ;  and,  among  other  things,  if  I  do  not  mistake,  we  are  far  from  realizing 
the  many  and  great  difficulties  of  holding  the  latter  subordinate  to  the  former, 
and  without  which,  it  is  obvious,  the  entire  scheme  of  constitutional  govern 
ment,  at  least  in  our  sense,  must  prove  abortive.  Short  as  has  been  our  expe 
rience,  some  of  these,  of  a  very  formidable  character,  have  begun  to  disclose 
themselves,  particularly  between  the  Constitution  and  the  government  of  the 
Union.  The  two  powers  there  represent  very  different  interests  :  the  one, 
that  of  all  the  states  taken  separately ;  and  the  other,  that  of  a  majority  of  the 
states  as  forming  a  confederated  community.  Each  acting  under  the  impulse 
of  these  respective  and  very  different  interests,  must  necessarily  strongly  tend 
to  come  into  collision,  and,  in  the  conflict,  the  advantage  will  be  found  almost 


.64  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

exclusively  on  the  side  of  the  government  or  law-making  power.     A  few  re 
marks  will  be  sufficient  to  illustrate  these  positions. 

The  Constitution,  while  it  grants  powers  to  the  government,  at  the  same  time  im 
poses  restrictions  on  its  action,  with  the  intention  of  confining  it  within  a  limited 
range  of  powers,  and  of  the  means  of  executing  them.  The  object.of  the  powers  is 
to  protect  the  rights  and  promote  the  interests  of  all ;  and  of  the  restrictions,  to  pre 
vent  the  majority,  or  the  dominant  interests  of  the  government,  from  perverting 
powers  intended  for  the  common  good  into  the  means  of  oppressing  the  minor  inter 
ests  of  the  community.  Thus  circumstanced,  the  dominant  interest  in  possession 
of  the  powers  of  the  government,  and  the  minor  interest  on  whom  they  are  exer 
cised,  must  regard  these  restrictions  in  a  very  different  light :  the  latter,  as  a 
protection,  and  the  former,  as  a  restraint,  and,  of  course,  accompanied  with  all 
the  impatient  feelings  with  which  restrictions  on  cupidity  and  ambition  are 
ever  regarded  by  those  unruly  passions.  Under  their  influence,  the  Constitu 
tion  will  be  viewed  by  the  majority,  not  as  the  source  of  their  authority,  as  it 
should  be,  but  as  shackles  on  their  power.  To  them  it  will  have  no  value  as 
the  means  of  protection.  As  a  majority  they  require  none.  Their  number  and 
strength,  and  not  the  Constitution,  are  their  protection  ;  and,  of  course,  if  I  may 
so  speak,  their  instinct  will  be  to  weaken  and  destroy  the  restrictions,  in  order 
to  enlarge  the  powers.  He  must  have  a  very  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  hu 
man  heart  who  does  not  see,  in  this  state  of  things,  an  incessant  conflict  between 
the  government  or  the  law-making  power  and  the  Constitution-making  power. 
Nor  is  it  less  certain  that,  in  the  contest,  the  advantage  will  be  exclusively  with 
the  former. 

The  law-making  power  is  organized  and  in  constant  action,  having  the  con 
trol  of  the  honours  and  emoluments  of  the  country,  and  armed  with  the  power 
to  punish  and  reward  ;  the  other,  on  the  contrary,  is  unorganized,  lying  dormant 
in  the  great  inert  mass  of  the  community,  till  called  into  action  on  extraordinary 
occasions  and  at  distant  intervals  ;  and  then  bestowing  no  honours,  exercising 
no  patronage,  having  neither  the  faculty  to  reward  nor  to  punish,  but  endowed 
simply  with  the  attribute  to  grant  powers  and  ordain  the  authority  to  execute 
them.  The  result  is  inevitable.  With  so  strong  an  instinct  on  the  part  of  the 
government  to  throw  off  the  restrictions  of  the  Constitution  and  to  enlarge  its 
powers,  and  with  such  powerful  faculties  to  gratify  this  instinctive  impulse,  the 
law-making  must  necessarily  encroach  on  the  Constitution-making  power,  un 
less  restrained  by  the  most  efficient  check — at  least  as  strong  as  that  for  which 
we  contend.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that,  all  other  circumstances  being  equal, 
the  more  dissimilar  the  interests  represented  by  the  two,  the  more  powerful  will 
be  this  tendency  to  encroach  ;  and  it  is  from  this,  among  other  causes,  that  it  is 
so  much  stronger  between  the  government  and  the  Constitution-making  powers 
of  the  Union,  where  the  interests  are  so  very  dissimilar,  than  between  the  two 
in  the  several  states. 

That  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  were  aware  of  the  danger  which  I  have 
described,  we  have  conclusive  proof  in  the  provision  to  which  I  have  so  fre 
quently  alluded — I  mean  that  which  provides  for  amendments  to  the  Constitu 
tion. 

I  have  already  remarked  on  that  portion  of  this  provision  which,  with  the 
view  of  strengthening  the  confederated  power,  conceded  to  three  fourths  of  the 
states  a  right  to  amend,  which  otherwise  could  only  have  been  exercised  by 
the  unanimous  consent  of  all.  It  is  remarkable,  that,  while  this  provision  thus 
strengthened  the  amending  power  as  it  regards  the  states,  it  imposed  imped 
iments  on  it  as  far  as  the  government  was  concerned.  The  power  of  acting, 
as  a  general  rule,  is  invested  in  the  majority  of  Congress ;  but,  instead  of  per 
mitting  a  majority  to  propose  amendments,  the  provision  requires  for  that  pur 
pose  two  thirds  of  both  houses,  clearly  with  a  view  of  interposing  a  barrier 
against  this  strong  instinctive  appetite  of  the  government  for  the  acquisition  of 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  65 

power.  But  it  would  have  been  folly  in  the  extreme  thus  carefully  to  guard 
the  passage  to  the  direct  acquisition,  had  the  wide  door  of  construction  been 
left  open  to  its  indirect ;  and  hence,  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  two  thirds  of 
both  houses  were  required  to  propose  amendments,  the  Convention  that  fnftned 
the  Constitution  rejected  the  many  propositions  which  were  moved  in  the  body 
with  the  intention  of  divesting  the  states  of  the  right  of  interposing,  and,  there 
by,  of  the  only  effectual  means  of  preventing  the  enlargement  of  the  powers  of 
the  government  by  construction. 

It  is  thus  that  the  Constitution-making  power  has  fortified  itself  against  the 
law-making ;  and  that  so  effectually,  that,  however  strong  the  disposition  and 
capacity  pf  the  latter  to  encroach,  the  means  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
former  are  not  less  powerful.  If,  indeed,  encroachments  have  been  made,  the 
fault  is  not  in  the  system,  but  in  the  inattention  and  neglect  of  those  whose  in 
terest  and  duty  it  was  to  interpose  the  ample  means  of  protection  afforded  by 
the  Constitution. 

To  sum  up  in  few  words,  in  conclusion,  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the  entire 
philosophy  of  government,  in  reference  to  the  subject  of  this  communication. 

Two  powers  are  necessary  to  the  existence  and  preservation  of  free  states  : 
a  power  on  the  part  of  the  ruled  to  prevent  rulers  from  abusing  their  authority, 
by  compelling  them  to  be  faithful  to  their  constituents,  and  which  is  effected 
through  the  right  of  suffrage ;  and  a  power  TO  COMPEL  THE  PARTS  OF  SOCIETY 

TO  BE  JUST  TO  ONE  ANOTHER,  BY  COMPELLING  THEM  TO  CONSULT  THE  INTER 
EST  OF  EACH  OTHER,  which  can  only  be  effected,  whatever  may  be  the  device 
for  the  purpose,  by  requiring  the  concurring  assent  of  all  the  great  and  distinct 
interests  of  the  community  to  the  measures  of  the  government.  This  result  is 
the  sum-total  of  all  the  contrivances  adopted  by  free  states  to  preserve  their 
liberty,  by  preventing  the  conflicts  between  the  several  classes  or  parts  of 
the  community.  Both  powers  are  indispensable.  The  one  as  much  so  as  the 
other.  The  rulers  are  not  more  disposed  to  encroach  on  the  ruled  than  the  dif 
ferent  interests  of  the  community  on  one  another ;  nor  would  they  more  cer 
tainly  convert  their  power  from  the  just  and  legitimate  objects  for  which  gov 
ernments  are  instituted  into  an  instrument  of  aggrandizement,  at  the  expense 
of  the  ruled,  unless  made  responsible  to  their  constituents,  than  would  the 
stronger  interests  theirs,  at  the  expense  of  the  weaker,  unless  compelled  to  con 
sult  them  in  the  measures  of  the  government,  by  taking  their  separate  and  con 
curring  assent.  The  same  cause  operates  in  both  cases.  The  constitution  of 
our  nature,  which  would  impel  the  rulers  to  oppress  the  ruled,  unless  prevented, 
would  in  like  manner,  and  with  equal  force,  impel  the  stronger  to  oppress  the 
weaker  interest.  To  vest  the  right  of  government  in  the  absolute  majority, 
would  be,  in  fact,  BUT  TO  IMBODY  THE  WILL  OF  THE  STRONGER  INTEREST  IN 

THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT,  AND  NOT  THE  WILL  OF  THE  WHOLE 
COMMUNITY,  AND  TO  LEAVE  THE  OTHERS  UNPROTECTED,  A  PREY  TO  ITS  AMBI 
TION  AND  CUPIDITY,  just  as  would  be  the  case  between  rulers  and  ruled,  if  the 
right  to  govern  was  vested  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  former.  They 
would  both  be,  in  reality,  absolute  and  despotic  governments  :  the  one  as  much 
so  as  the  other. 

They  would  both  become  mere  instruments  of  cupidity  and  ambition  in  the 
hands  of  those  who  wielded  them.  No  one  doubts  that  such  would  be  the  case 
were  the  government  placed  under  the  control  of  irresponsible  rulers  ;  but,  un 
fortunately  for  the  cause  of  liberty,  it  is  not  seen  with  equal  clearness  that  it 
must  as  necessarily  be  so  when  controlled  by  an  absolute  majority ;  and  yet, 
the  former  is  not  more  certain  than  the  latter.  To  this  we  may  attribute  the 
mistake  so  often  and  so  fatally  repeated,  that  TO  EXPEL  A  DESPOT  is  TO  ESTAB 
LISH  LIBERTY — a  mistake  to  which  we  may  trace  the  failure  of  many  noble 
and  generous  efforts  in  favour  of  liberty.  The  error  consists  in  considering 
communities  as  formed  of  interests  strictly  identical  throughout,  instead  of  be- 


66  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ing  composed,  as  they  in  reality  are,  of  as  many  distinct  interests  as  there  are 
individuals.  The  interests  of  no  two  persons  are  the  same,  regarded  in  refer 
ence  to  each  other,  though  they  may  be,  viewed  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the 
community.  It  is  this  diversity  which  the  several  portions  of  the  community 
bear  to  each  other,  in  reference  to  the  whole,  that  renders  the  principle  of  the 
concurring  majority  necessary  to  preserve  liberty.  Place  the  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  absolute  majority,  and  the  strongest  of  these  -would  certainly  per 
vert  the  government  from  the  object  for  which  it  was  instituted,  the  equal  pro 
tection  of  the  rights  of  all,  into  an  instrument  of  advancing  itself  at  the  expense* 
of  the  rest  of  the  community.  Against  this  abuse  of  power  no  remedy  can  be 
devised  but  that  of  the  concurring  majority.  Neither  the  righf,:  of  suffrage  nor 
public  opinion  can  possibly  check  it.  They,  in  fact,  but  tend  to  aggravate  the 
disease.  It  seems  really  surprising  that  truths  so  obvious  should  be  so  imper 
fectly  understood.  There  would  appear,  indeed,  a  feebleness  in  our  intellect 
ual  powers  on  political  subjects  when  directed  to  large  masses.  We  readily 
see  why  a  single  individual,  as  a  ruler,  would,  if  not  prevented,  oppress  the 
rest  of  the  community ;  but  are  at  a  loss  to  understand  why  seven  millions 
would,  if  not  also  prevented,  oppress  six  millions,  as  if  the  relative  numbers  on. 
either  side  could  in  the  least  degree  vary  the  principle. 

In  stating  what  I  have,  I  have  but  repeated  the  experience  of  ages,  compre 
hending  all  free  governments  preceding  ours,  and  ours  as  far  as  it  has  advan 
ced.  The  PRACTICAL  operation  of  ours  has  been  substantially  on  the  principle 
of  the  absolute  majority.  We  have  acted,  with  some  exceptions,  as  if  the  Gen 
eral  Government  had  the  right  to  interpret  its  own  powers,  without  limitation  or 
check  ;  and  though  many  circumstances  have  favoured  us,  and  greatly  impeded 
the  natural  progress  of  events,  under  such  an  operation  of  the  system,  yet  we 
already  see,  in  whatever  direction  we  turn  our  eyes,  the  growing  symptoms  of 
disorder  and  decay — the  growth  of  faction,  cupidity,  and  corruption  ;  and  the 
decay  of  patriotism,  integrity,  and  disinterestedness.  In  the  midst  of  youth,  we 
see  the  flushed  cheek,  and  the  short  and  feverish  breath,  that  mark  the  approach 
of  the  fatal  hour ;  and  come  it  will,  unless  there  be  a  speedy  and  radical  change 
— a  return  to  the  great  conservative  principle  which  brought  the  Republican 
party  into  authority,  but  which,  with  the  possession  of  power  and  prosperity,  it 
has  long  ceased  to  remember. 

I  have  now  finished  the  task  which  your  request  imposed.  If  I  have  been 
so  fortunate  as  to  add  to  your  fund  a  single  new  illustration  of  this  great  con 
servative  principle  of  our  government,  or  to  furnish  an  additional  argument  cal 
culated  to  sustain  the  state  in  her  noble  and  patriotic  struggle  to  revive  and 
maintain  it,  and  in  which  you  have  acted  a  part  long  to  be  remembered  by  the 
friends  of  freedom,  I  shall  feel  amply  compensated  for  the  time  occupied  in  so 
long  a  communication.  I  believe  the  cause  to  be  the  cause  of  truth  and  justice, 
of  union,  liberty,  and  the  Constitution,  before  which  the  ordinary  party  strug 
gles  of  the  day  sink  into  perfect  insignificance  ;  and  that  it  will  be  so  regarded 
by  the  most  distant  posterity,  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt. 

With  great  and  sincere  regard, 

I  am  yours,  &c.,  &c., 

JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

His  Excellency  JAMES  HAMILTON,  Jun., 
Governor  of  South  Carolina. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  67 

V. 

SPEECH   AGAINST   THE    FORCE    BILL. 

MR.  PRESIDENT — I  know  not  which  is  most  objectionable,  the  provision  of 
the  bill,  or  the  temper  in  which  its  adoption  has  been  urged.  If  the  extraordi 
nary  powers  with  which  the  bill  proposes  to  clothe  the  executive,  to  the  utter 
prostration  of  the  Constitution  and  the  rights  of  the  states,  be  calculated  to  im 
press  our  minds  with  alarm  at  the  rapid  progress  of  despotism  in  our  country ; 
the  zeal  with  which  every  circumstance  calculated  to  misrepresent  or  exagger 
ate  the  conduct  of  Carolina  in  the  controversy,  is  seized  on  with  a  view  to  ex 
cite  hostility  against  her,  but  too  plainly  indicates  the  deep  decay  of  that  broth 
erly  feeling  which  once  existed  between  these  states,  and  to  which  we  are 
indebted  for  our  beautiful  federal  system,  and  by  the  continuance  of  which 
alone  it  can  be  preserved.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  advert  to  all  these  mis 
representations,  but  there  are  some  so  well  calculated  to  mislead  the  mind  as 
to  the  real  character  of  the  controversy,  and  hold  up  the  state  in  a  light  so 
odious,  that  I  do  not  feel  myself  justified  in  permitting  them  to  pass  unnoticed. 

Among  them,  one  of  the  most  prominent  is  the  false  statement  that  the  ob 
ject  of  South  Carolina  is  to  exempt  herself  from  her  share  of  the  public  burdens, 
while  she  participates  in  the  advantages  of  the  government.  If  the  charge  were 
true — if  the  state  were  capable  of  being  actuated  by  such  low  and  unworthy 
motives,  mother  as  I  consider  her,  I  would  not  stand  up  on  this  floor  to  vindi 
cate  her  conduct.  Among  her  faults,  and  faults  I  will  not  deny  she  has,  no  one 
has  ever  yet  charged  her  with  that  low  and  most  sordid  of  vices — avarice.  Her 
conduct,  on  all  occasions,  has  been  marked  with  the  very  opposite  quality. 
From  the  commencement  of  the  Revolution — from  its  first  breaking  out  at  Bos 
ton  till  this  hour,  no  state  has  been  more  profuse  of  its  blood  in  the  cause  of 
the  country,  nor  has  any  contributed  so  largely  to  the  common  treasury  in 
proportion  to  wealth  and  population.  She  has  in  that  proportion  contributed 
more  to  the  exports  of  the  Union,  on  the  exchange  of  which  with  the  rest  of 
the  world  the  greater  portion  of  the  public  burden  has  been  levied,  than  any 
other  state.  No  :  the  controversy  is  not  such  as  has  been  stated  ;  the  state  does 
not  seek  to  participate  in  the  advantages  of  the  government  without  contributing 
her  full  share  to  the  public  treasury.  Her  object  is  far  different.  A  deep  con 
stitutional  question  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  controversy.  The  real  question  at 
issue  is,  Has  the  government  a  right  to  impose  burdens  on  the  capital  ancf  indus 
try  of  one  portion  of  the  country,  not  with  a  view  to  revenue,  but  to  benefit 
another  ?  and  I  must  be  permitted  to  say  that,  after  the  long  and  deep  agitation 
of  this  controversy,  it  is  with  surprise  that  I  perceive  so  strong  a  disposition  to 
misrepresent  its  real  character.  To  correct  the  impression  which  those  misrep 
resentations  are  calculated  to  make,  I  will  dwell  on  the  point  under  consider 
ation  for  a  few  moments  longer. 

The  Federal  Government  has,  by  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution, 
the  right  to  lay  duties  on  imports.  The  state  has  never  denied  or  resisted  this 
right,  nor  even  thought  of  so  doing.  The  government  has,  however,  not  been 
contented  with  exercising  this  power  as  she  had  a  right  to  do,  but  has  gone  a 
-step  beyond  it,  by  laying  imposts,  not  for  revenue,  but  for  protection.  This  the 
state  considers  as  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  power — highly  injurious  and 
oppressive  to  her  and  the  other  staple  states,  and  hss,  accordingly,  met  it  with 
the  most  determined  resistance.  I  do  not  intend  to  enter,  at  this  time,  into  the 
argument  as  to  the  unconstitutionally  of  the  protective  system.  It  is  not  ne 
cessary.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  power  is  nowhere  granted  ;  and  that,  from  the 
journals  of  the  Convention  which  formed  the  Constitution,  it  would  seem  that 
it  was  refused.  In  support  of  the  journals,  I  might  cite  the  statement  of  Luther 


68  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

Martin,  which  has  already  been  referred  to,  to  show  that  the  Convention,  so  far 
from  conferring  the  power  on  the  Federal  Government,  left  to  the  state  the  right  to 
impose  duties  on  imports,  with  the  express  view  of  enabling  the  several  states  to 
protect  their  own  manufactures.  Notwithstanding  this,  Congress  has  assumed, 
without  any  warrant  from  the  Constitution,  the  right  of  exercising  this  most  im 
portant  power,  and  has  so  exercised  it  as  to  impose  a  ruinous  burden  on  the  labour 
and  capital  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  by  which  her  resources  are  exhaust 
ed — the  enjoyments  of  her  citizens  curtailed — the  means  of  education  contracted 
— and  all  her  interests  essentially  and  injuriously  affected.  We  have  been, 
sneeringly  told  that  she  is  a  small  state  ;  that  her  population  does  not  much  ex 
ceed  half  a  million  of  souls  ;  and  that  more  than  one  half  are  not  of  the  Euro 
pean  race.  The  facts  are  so.  I  know  she  never  can  be  a  great  state,  and 
that  the  only  distinction  to  which  she  can  aspire  must  be  based  on  the  moral 
and  intellectual  acquirements  of  her  sons.  To  the  development  of  these  much 
of  her  attention  has  been  directed  ;  but  this  restrictive  system,  which  has  so  un 
justly  exacted  the  proceeds  of  her  labour,  to  be  bestowed  on  other  sections,  has 
so  impaired  the  resources  of  the  state,  that,  if  not  speedily  arrested,  it  will  dry 
up  the  means  of  education,  and  with  it  deprive  her  of  the  only  source  through 
which  she  can  aspire  to  distinction. 

There  is  another  inisstatement,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  controversy,  so  fre 
quently  made  in  debate,  and  so  well  calculated  to  mislead,  that  I  feel  bound  to 
notice  it.  It  has  been  said  that  South  Carolina  claims  the  right  to  annul  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  ;  and  to  rebut  this  supposed  claim, 
the  gentleman  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives)  has  gravely  quoted  the  Constitution, 
to  prove  that  the  Constitution,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  are  the 
supreme  laws  of  the  land — as  if  the  state  claimed  the  right  to  act  contrary  to 
this  provision  of  the  Constitution.  Nothing  can  be  more  erroneous  :  her  object 
is  not  to  resist  laws  made  in  pursuance  of  the  Constitution,  but  those  made 
without  its  authority,  and  which  encroach  on  her  reserved  powers.  She  claims 
not  even  the  right  of  judging  of  the  delegated  powers  ;  but  of  those  that  are  re 
served,  and  to  resist  the  former,  when  they  encroach  upon  the  latter.  I  will 
pause  to  illustrate  this  important  point. 

All  must  admit  that  there  are  delegated  and  reserved  powers,  and  that  the 
powers  reserved  are  reserved  to  the  states  respectively.  The  powers,  then,  of 
the  system  are  divided  between  the  general  and  the  state  government ;  and 
the  point  immediately  under  consideration  is,  whether  a  state  has  any  right 
to  judge  as  to  the  extent  of  its  reserved  powers,  and  to  defend  them  against  the 
encroachments  of  the  General  Government.  Without  going  deeply  into  this 
point  at  this  stage  of  the  argument,  or  looking  into  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
government,  there  is  a  simple  view  of  the  subject  which  I  consider  as  conclu 
sive.  The  very  idea  of  a  divided  power  implies  the  right  on  the  part  of  the 
state  for  which  I  contend.  The  expression  is  metaphorical  when  applied  to 
power.  Every  one  readily  understands  that  the  division  of  matter  consists  in 
the  separation  of  the  parts.  But  in  this  sense  it  is  not  applicable  to  power. 
What,  then,  is  meant  by  a  division  of  power  1  I  cannot  conceive  of  a  division, 
without  giving  an  equal  right  to  each  to  judge  of  the  extent  of  the  power  allotted 
to  each..  Such  right  I  hold  to  be  essential  to  the  existence  of  a  division; 
and  that,  to  give  to  either  party  the  conclusive  right  of  judging,  not  only  of  the 
share  allotted  to  it,  but  of  that  allotted  to  the  other,  is  to  annul  the  division,  and 
would  confer  the  whole  power  on  the  party  vested  with  such  right. 

But  it  is  contended  that,  the  Constitution  has  conferred  on  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  right  of  judging  between  the  states  and  the  General  Government.  Those 
who  make  this  objection  overlook,  I  conceive,  an  important  provision  of  the 
Constitution.  By  turning  to  the  10th  amended  article,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
reservation  of  power  to  the  states  is  not  only  against  the  powers  delegated  to 
Congress,  but  against  the  United  States  themselves  ;  and  extends,  of  course,  as 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  69 

well  to  the  judiciary  as  to  the  other  departments  of  the  government.  The  ar 
ticle  provides,  that  all  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States,  or  prohibited 
by  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  or  to  the  people. 
This  presents  the  inquiry,  What  powers  are  delegated  to  the  United  States  ? 
They  may  be  classed  under  four  divisions  :  first,  those  that  are  delegated  by  the 
states  to  each  other,  by  virtue  of  which  the  Constitution  may  be  altered  or 
amended  by  three  fourths  of  the  states,  when,  without  which,  it  would  have  re 
quired  the  unanimous  vote  of  all ;  next,  the  powers  conferred  on  Congress  ; 
then  those  on  the  President ;  and,  finally,  those  on  the  judicial  department — all 
of  which  are  particularly  enumerated  in  the  parts  of  the  Constitution  which  or 
ganize  the  respective  departments.  The  reservation  of  powers  to  the  states  is, 
as  I  have  said,  against  the  whole,  and  is  as  full  against  the  judicial  as  it  is 
against  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the  government.  It  cannot 
be  claimed  for  the  one  without  claiming  it  for  the  whole,  and  without,  in  fact, 
annulling  this  important  provision  of  the  Constitution. 

Against  this,  as  it  appears  to  me,  conclusive  view  of  the  subject,  it  has  been 
urged  that  this  power  is  expressly  conferred  on  the  Supreme  Court  by  that 
portion  of  the  Constitution  which  provides  that  the  judicial  power  shall  extend 
to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising  under  the  Constitution,  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  treaties  made  under  their  authority.  I  believe  the  assertion 
to  be  utterly  destitute  of  any  foundation.  It  obviously  is  the  intention  of  the 
Constitution  simply  to  make  the  judicial  power  commensurate  with  the  law- 
making  and  treaty-making  powers  ;  and  to  vest  it  with  the  right  of  applying  the 
Constitution,  the  laws,  and  the  treaties,  to  the  cases  which  might  arise  under 
them ;  and  not  to  make  it  the  judge  of  the  Constitution,  the  laws,  and  the  trea 
ties  themselves.  In  fact,  the  power  of  applying  the  laws  to  the  facts  of  the 
case,  and  deciding  upon  such  application,  constitutes,  in  truth,  the  judicial  pow 
er.  The  distinction  between  such  power,  and  that  of  judging  of  the  laws,  will 
be  perfectly  apparent  when  we  advert  to  what  is  the  acknowledged  power  of 
the  court  in  reference  to  treaties  or  compacts  between  sovereigns.  It  is  per 
fectly  established,  that  the  courts  have  no  right  to  judge  of  the  violation  of 
treaties  ;  and  that,  in  reference  to  them,  their  power  is  limited  to  the  right  of 
judging  simply  of  the  violation  of  rights  under  them  ;  and  that  the  right  of 
judging  of  infractions  belongs  exclusively  to  the  parties  themselves,  and  not  to 
the  courts  :  of  which  we  have  an  example  in  the  French  treaty,  which  was  de 
clared  by  Congress  null  and  void,  in  consequence  of  its  violation  by  the  gov 
ernment  of  France.  Without  such  declaration,  had  a  French  citizen  sued  a 
citizen  of  this  country  under  the  treaty,  the  court  could  have  taken  no  cogni 
zance  of  its  infraction  ;  nor,  after  such  a  declaration,  would  it  have  heard  any 
argument  or  proof  going  to  show  that  the  treaty  had  not  been  violated. 

The  declaration  of  itself  is  conclusive  on  the  court.  But  it  will  be  asked 
how  the  court  obtained  the  powers  to  pronounce  a  law  or  treaty  unconstitution 
al,  when  they  come  in  conflict  with  that  instrument.  I  do  not  deny  that  it 
possesses  the  right,  but  I  can  by  no  means  concede  that  it  was  derived  from 
the  Constitution.  It  had  its  origin  in  the  necessity  of  the  case.  Where  there 
are  two  or  more  rules  established,  one  from  a  higher,  the  other  from  a  lower 
authority,  which  may  come  into  conflict  in  applying  them  to  a  particular  case,  the 
judge  cannot  avoid  pronouncing  in  favour  of  the  superior  against  the  inferior. 
It  is  from  this  necessity,  and  this  alone,  that  the  power  which  is  now  set  up  to 
overrule  the  rights  of  the  states  against  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution 
was  derived.  It  had  no  other  origin.  That  I  have  traced  it  to  its  true  source, 
will  be  manifest  from  the  fact  that  it  is  a  power  which,  so  far  from  being  con 
ferred  exclusively  on  the  Supreme  Court,  as  is  insisted,  belongs  to  every 
court — inferior  and  superior — state  and  general — and  even  to  foreign  courts. 

But  the  senator  from  Delaware  (Mr.  Clayton)  relies  on  the  journals  of  the 
Convention  to  prove  that  it  was  the  intention  of  that  body  to  confer  on  the  Su- 


70  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

preme  Court  the  right  of  deciding  in  the  last  resort  between  a  state  and  the 
General  Government.  I  will  not  follow  him  through  the  journals,  as  I  do  not 
deem  that  to  be  necessary  to  refute  his  argument.  It  is  sufficient  for  this  pur 
pose  to  state,  that  Mr.  Rutledge  reported  a  resolution,  providing  expressly  that 
the  United  States  and  the  states  might  be  parties  before  the  Supreme  Court. 
If  this  proposition  had  been  adopted,  I  would  ask  the  senator  whether  this  very 
controversy  between  the  United  States  and  South  Carolina  might  not  have  been 
brought  before  the  court  ?  I  would  also  ask  him  whether  it  can  be  brought  be 
fore  the  court  as  the  Constitution  now  stands  1  If  he  answers  the  former  in  the 
affirmative,  and  the  latter  in  the  negative,  as  he  must,  then  it  is  clear,  his  elabo 
rate  argument  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  that  the  report  of  Mr.  Rutledge 
was  not,  in  substance,  adopted  as  he  contended ;  and  that  the  journals,  so  far 
from  supporting,  are  in  direct  opposition  to  the  position  which  he  attempts  to 
maintain.  I  might  push  the  argument  much  farther  against  the  power  of  the 
court,  but  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary,  at  least  in  this  stage  of  the  discussion. 
If  the  views  which  have  already  been  presented  be  correct,  and  I  do  not  see 
how  they  can  be  resisted,  the  conclusion  is  inevitable,  that  the  reserved  powers 
were  reserved  equally  against  every  department  of  the  government,  and  as 
strongly  against  the  judicial  as  against  the  other  departments,  and,  of  course, 
were  left  under  the  exclusive  will  of  the  states. 

There  still  remains  another  misrepresentation  of  the  conduct  of  the  state 
which  has  been  made  with  the  view  of  exciting  odium.  I  allude  to  the  charge, 
that  South  Carolina  supported  the  tariff  of  1816,  and  is,  therefore,  responsible 
for  the  protective  system.  To  determine  the  truth  of  this  charge,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  ascertain  the  real  character  of  that  law — whether  it  was  a  tariff 
for  revenue  or  for  protection — which  presents  the  inquiry,  What  was  the  condi 
tion  of  the  country  at  that  period  ?  The  late  war  with  Great  Britain  had  just 
terminated,  which,  with  the  restrictive  system  that  preceded  it,  had  diverted  a 
large  amount  of  capital  and  industry  from  commerce  to  manufactures,  particu 
larly  to  the  cotton  and  woollen  branches.  There  was  a  debt,  at  the  same  time, 
of  one  hundred  and  thirty  millions  of  dollars  hanging  over  the  country,  and  the 
heavy  war  duties  were  still  in  existence.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  ques 
tion  was  presented,  to  what  point  the  duties  ought  to  be  reduced.  That  ques 
tion  involved  another — at  what  time  the  debt  ought  to  be  paid ;  which  was  a 
question  of  policy  involving  in  its  consideration  all  the  circumstances  connected 
with  the  then  condition  of  the  country.  Among  the  most  prominent  arguments 
in  favour  of  an  early  discharge  of  the  debt  was,  that  the  high  duties  which  it 
would  require  to  effect  it  would  have,  at  the  same  time,  the  effect  of  sustaining 
the  infant  manufactures,  which  had  been  forced  up  under  the  circumstances  to 
which  I  have  adverted.  This  view  of  the  subject  had  a  decided  influence  in, 
determining  in  favour  of  an  early  payment  of  the  debt.  The  sinking  fund  was, 
accordingly,  raised  from  seven  to  ten  millions  of  dollars,  with  the  provision  to 
apply  the  surplus  which  might  remain  in  the  treasury  as  a  contingent  appro 
priation  to  that  fund ;  and  the  duties  were  graduated  to  meet  this  increased 
expenditure.  It  was  thus  that  the  policy  and  justice  of  protecting  the  large 
amount  of  capital  and  industry  which  had  been  diverted  by  the  measures  of  the 
government  into  new  channels,  as  I  have  stated,  was  combined  with  the  fiscal 
action  of  the  government,  and  which,  while  it  secured  a  prompt  payment  of  the 
debt,  prevented  the  immense  losses  to  the  manufacturers  which  would  have  fol 
lowed  a  sudden  and  great  reduction.  Still,  revenue  was  the  main  object,  and 
protection  but  the  incidental.  The  bill  to  reduce  the  duties  was  reported  by 
the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  not  of  Manufactures,  and  it  proposed 
a  heavy  reduction  on  the  then  existing  rate  of  duties.  But  what  of  itself,  with 
out  other  evidence,  was  decisive  as  to  the  character  of  the  bill,  is  the  fact  that 
it  fixed  a  much  higher  rate  of  duties  on  the  unprotected  than  on  the  protected 
articles.  I  will  enumerate  a  few  leading  articles  only:  woollen  and  cotton 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  71 

above  the  value  of  25  cents  on  the  square  yard,  though  they  were  the  leading 
objects  of  protection,  were  subject  to  a  permanent  duty  of  only  20  per  cent. 
Iron,  another  leading  article  among  the  protected,  had  a  protection  of  not  more 
than  9  per  cent,  as  fixed  by  the  act,  and  of  but  fifteen  as  reported  in  the  bill. 
These  rates  were  all  below  the  average  duties  as  fixed  in  the  act,  including 
the  protected,  the  unprotected,  and  even  the  free  articles.  I  have  entered  into 
some  calculation,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  average  rate  of  duties  under  the  act. 
There  is  some  uncertainty  in  the  data,  but  I  feel  assured  that  it  is  not  less  than 
thirty  per  cent,  ad  valorem :  showing  an  excess  of  the  average  duties  above  that 
imposed  on  the  protected  articles  enumerated  of  more  than  10  per  cent.,  and 
thus  clearly  establishing  the  character  of  the  measure — that  it  was  for  revenue, 
and  not  protection. 

Looking  back,  even  at  this  distant  period,  with  all  our  experience,  I  perceive 
but  two  errors  in  the  act :  the  one  in  reference  to  iron,  and  the  other  the  mini 
mum  duty  on  coarse  cottons.  As  to  the  former,  I  conceive  that  the  bill,  as  re 
ported,  proposed  a  duty  relatively  too  low,  which  was  still  farther  reduced  in 
its  passage  through  Congress.  The  duty,  at  first,  was  fixed  at  seventy-five 
cents  the  hundred  weight ;  but,  in  the  last  stage  of  its  passage,  it  was  reduced, 
by  a  sort  of  caprice,  occasioned  by  an  unfortunate  motion,  to  forty-five  cents. 
This  injustice  was  severely  felt  in  Pennsylvania,  the  state,  above  all  others, 
most  productive  of  iron ;  and  was  the  principal  cause  of  that  great  reaction 
which  has  since  thrown  her  so  decidedly  on  the  side  of  the  protective  policy. 
The  other  error  was  that  as  to  coarse  cottons,  on  which  the  duty  was  as  much 
too  high  as  that  on  iron  was  too  low.  It  introduced,  besides,  the  obnoxious 
minimum  principle,  which  has  since  been  so  mischievously  extended ;  and  to 
that  extent,  I  am  constrained,  in  candour,  to  acknowledge,  as  I  wish  to  disguise 
nothing,  the  protective  principle  was  recognised  by  the  act  of  1816.  How  this 
was  overlooked  at  the  time,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  say.  It  escaped  my  ob-  ' 
servation,  which  I  can  account  for  only  on  the  ground  that  the  principle  was 
then  new,  and  that  my  attention  was  engaged  by  another  important  subject 
— the  question  of  the  currency,  then  so  urgent,  and  with  which,  as  chairman 
of  the  committee,  I  was  particularly  charged.  With  these  exceptions,  I  again, 
repeat,  I  see  nothing  in  the  bill  to  condemn ;  yet  it  is  on  the  ground  that  the 
members  from  the  state  voted  for  the  bill,  that  the  attempt  is  now  made  to  hold 
up  Carolina  as  responsible  for  the  whole  system  of  protection  which  has  since 
followed,  though  she  has  resisted  its  progress  in  every  stage.  Was  there  ever 
greater  injustice  ?  And  how  is  it  to  be  accounted  for,  but  as  forming  a  part  of 
that  systematic  misrepresentation  and  calumny  which  has  been  directed  for  so 
many  years,  without  interruption,  against  that  gallant  and  generous  state  ?  And 
why  has  she  thus  been  assailed  ?  Merely  because  she  abstained  from  taking 
any  part  in  the  Presidential  canvass — believing  that  it  had  degenerated  into  a 
mere  system  of  imposition  on  the  people — controlled,  almost  exclusively,  by 
those  whose  object  it  is  to  obtain  the  patronage  of  the  government,  and  that 
without  regard  to  principle  or  policy.  Standing  apart  from  what  she  considered 
a  contest  in  which  the  public  had  no  interest,  she  has  been  assailed  by  both 
parties  with  a  fury  altogether  unparalleled ;  but  which,  pursuing  the  course 
which  she  believed  liberty  and  duty  required,  she  has  met  with  a  firmness  equal 
to  the  fierceness  of  the  assault.  In  the  midst  of  this  attack,  I  have  not  escaped. 
With  a  view  of  inflicting  a  wound  on  the  state  through  me,  I  have  been  held 
up  as  the  author  of  the  protective  system,  and  one  of  its  most  strenuous  advo 
cates.  It  is  with  pain  that  I  allude  to  myself  on  so  deep  and  grave  a  subject 
as  that  now  under  discussion,  and  which,  I  sincerely  believe,  involves  the  lib 
erty  of  the  country.  I  now  regret  that,  under  the  sense  of  injustice  whiclj  the 
remarks  of  a  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Wilkins)  excited  for  the  moment, 
I  hastily  gave  my  pledge  to  defend  myself  against  the  charge  which  has  been 
made  in  reference  to  my  course  in  1816 :  not  that  there  will  be  any  difficulty 


72  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

in  repelling  the  charge,  but  because  I  feel  a  deep  reluctance  in  turning  the  dis~ 
ciission,  in  any  degree,  from  a  subject  of  so  much  magnitude  to  one  of  so  little 
importance  as  the  consistency  or  inconsistency  of  myself,  or  any  other  indi 
vidual,  particularly  in  connexion  with  an  event  so  long  since  passed.  But  for 
this  hasty  pledge,  I  would  have  remained  silent,  as  to  my  own  course,  on  this 
occasion,  and  would  have  borne  with  patience  and  calmness  this,  with  the 
many  other  misrepresentations  with  which  I  have  been  so  incessantly  assailed 
for  so  many  years. 

The  charge  that  I  was  the  author  of  the  protective  system  has  no  other 
foundation  but  that  I,  in  common  with  the  almost  entire  South,  gave  my  support 
to  the  tariff  of  1816.  It  is  true  that  I  advocated  that  measure,  for  which  I  may 
rest  my  defence,  without  taking  any  other,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  tariff  for 
revenue,  and  not  for  protection,  -which  I  have  established  beyond  the  power  of 
controversy.  But  my  speech  on  the  occasion  has  been  brought  in  judgment 
against  me  by  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania.  I  have  since  cast  my  eyes  over 
the  speech;  and  I  will  surprise,  I  have  no  doubt,  the  senator,  by  telling  him 
that,  with  the  exception  of  some  hasty  and  unguarded  expressions,  I  retract 
nothing  I  uttered  on  that  occasion.  I  only  ask  that  I  may  be  judged,  in  refer 
ence  to  it,  in  that  spirit  of  fairness  and  justice  which  is  due  to  the  occasion: 
taking  into  consideration  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  delivered,  and 
bearing  in  mind  that  the  subject  was  a  tariff  for  revenue,  and  not  for  protection  ; 
for  reducing,  and  not  raising  the  revenue.  But,  before  I  explain  the  then  con 
dition  of  the  country,  from  which  my  main  arguments  in  favour  of  the  measure 
were  drawn,  it  is  nothing  but  an  act  of  justice  to  myself  that  I  should  state  a 
fact  in  connexion  with  my  speech,  that  is  necessary  to  explain  what  1  have  call 
ed  hasty  and  unguarded  expressions.  My  speech  was  an  impromptu  ;  and,  as 
such,  I  apologized  to  the  house,  as  appears  from  the  speech  as  printed,  for  of 
fering  my  sentiments  on  the  question  without  having  duly  reflected  on  the  sub 
ject.  It  was  delivered  at  the  request  of  a  friend,  when  I  had  not  previously 
the  least  intention  of  addressing  the  house.  I  allude  to  Samuel  D.  Ingham, 
then  and  now,  as  I  am  proud  to  say,  a  personal  and  political  friend — a  man  of 
talents  and  integrity — with  a  clear  head,  and  firm  and  patriotic  heart ;  then, 
among  the  leading  members  of  the  house  :  in  the  palmy  state  of  his  political 
glory,  though  now  for  a  moment  depressed — depressed,  did  I  say  1  no  !  it  is 
his  state  which  is  depressed — Pennsylvania,  and  not  Samuel  D.  Ingham ! 
Pennsylvania,  which  has  deserted  him  under  circumstances  which,  instead  of 
depressing,  ought  to  have  elevated  him  in  her  estimation.  He  came  to  me, 
when  sitting  at  my  desk  writing,  and  said  that  the  house  was  falling  into  some 
confusion,  accompanying  it  with  a  remark,  that  I  knew  how  difficult  it  was  to 
rally  so  large  a  body  when  once  broken  on  a  tax  bill,  as  had  been  experienced 
during  the  late  war.  Having  a  higher  opinion  of  my  influence  than  it  deserved, 
he  requested  me  to  say  something  to  prevent  the  confusion.  I  replied  that  I 
was  at  a  loss  what  to  say ;  that  I  had  been  busily  engaged  on  the  currency, 
which  was  then  in  great  confusion,  and  which,  as  I  have  stated,  had  been  pla 
ced  particularly  under  my  charge,  as  the  chairman  of  the  committee  on  that 
subject.  He  repeated  his  request,  and  the  speech  which  the  senator  from  Penn 
sylvania  has  complimented  so  highly  was  the  result. 

I  will  ask  whether  the  facts  stated  ought  not,  in  justice,  to  be  borne  in  mind, 
by  those  who  would  hold  me  accountable,  not  only  for  the  general  scope  of  the 
speech,  but  for  every  word  and  sentence  which  it  contains  ?  But,  in  asking  this 
question,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  repudiate  the  speech.  All  I  ask  is,  that  I 
may  be  judged  by  the  rules  which,  in  justice,  belong  to  the  case.  Let  it  be 
recollected  that  the  bill  was  a  revenue  bill,  and,  of  course,  that  it  was  constitu 
tional.  I  need  not  remind  the  Senate  that,  when  the  measure  is  constitutional, 
all  arguments  calculated  to  show  its  beneficial  operation  may  be  legitimately 
pressed  into  service,  without  taking  into  consideration  whether  the  subject  to 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  73 

which  the  arguments  refer  be  within  the  sphere  of  the  Constitution  or  not.  If, 
for  instance,  a  question  were  before  this  body  to  lay  a  duty  on  Bibles,  arid  a 
motion  were  made  to  reduce  the  duty,  or  admit  Bibles  duty  free,  who  could  doubt 
that  the  argument  in  favour  of  the  motion,  that  the  increased  circulation  of  the 
Bible  would  be  in  favour  of  the  morality  and  religion  of  the  country,  would  be 
strictly  proper  ?  Or  who  would  suppose  that  he  who  adduced  it  had  committed 
himself  on  the  constitutionality  of  taking  the  religion  or  morals  of  the  country 
under  the  charge  of  the  Federal  Government  ?  Again  :  .suppose  the  question, 
to  be  to  raise  the  duty  on  silk,  or  any  other  article  of  luxury,  and  that  it  should 
be  supported  on  the  ground  that  it  was  an  article  mainly  consumed  by  the  rich 
and  extravagant,  could  it  be  fairly  inferred  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  speaker, 
Congress  had  a  right  to  pass  sumptuary  laws  ?  I  only  ask  that  these  plain 
rules  may  be  applied  to  my  argument  on  the  tariff  of  1816.  They  turn  almost 
entirely  on  the  benefits  which  manufactures  conferred  on  the  country  in  time 
war,  and  which  no  one  could  doubt.  The  country  had  recently  passed  through 
such  a  state.  The  world  was  at  that  time  deeply  agitated  by  the  effects  of  the 
great  conflict  which  had  so  long  raged  in  Europe,  and  which  no  one  could  tell 
how  soon  again  might  return.  Bonaparte  had  but  recently  been  overthrown  ; 
the  whole  southern  part  of  this  Continent  was  in  a  state  of  revolution,  and  was 
threatened  with  the  interference  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  which,  had  it  occurred, 
must  almost  necessarily  have  involved  this  country  in  a  most  dangerous  conflict, 
It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  I  delivered  the  speech,  in  which  I  urged 
the  house  that,  in  the  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  reference  ought  to  be  had  to  a 
state  of  war  as  well  as  peace,  and  that  its  provisions  ought  to  be  fixed  on  the 
compound  views  of  the  two  periods — making  some  sacrifice  in  peace,  in  order 
that  less  might  be  made  in  war.  Was  this  principle  false  ?  and,  in  urging  it,  did  I 
commit  myself  to  that  system  of  oppression  since  grown  up,  and  which  has  for 
its  object  the  enriching  of  one  portion  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of  the  other  ? 

The  plain  rule  in  all  such  cases  is,  that  when  a  measure  is  proposed,  the  first 
thing  is  to  ascertain  its  constitutionality  ;  and,  that  being  ascertained,  the  next  is 
its  expediency ;  which  last  opens  the  whole  field  of  argument  for  and  against. 
Every  topic  may  be  urged  calculated  to  prove  it  wise  or  unwise  :  so  in  a  bill 
to  raise  imposts.  It  must  first  be  ascertained  that  the  bill  is  based  on  the  prin 
ciples  of  revenue,  and  that  the  money  raised  is  necessary  for  the  wants  of 
the  country.  These  being  ascertained,  every  argument,  direct  and  indirect,  may 
be  fairly  offered,  which  may  go  to  show  that,  under  all  the  circumstances,  the 
provisions  of  the  bill  are  proper  or  improper.  Had  this  plain  and  simple  rule 
been  adhered  to,  we  should  never  have  heard  of  the  complaint  against  Carolina. 
Her  objection  is  not  against  the  improper  modification  of  a  bill  acknowledged  to 
be  for  revenue,  but  that,  under  the  name  of  imposts,  a  power  essentially  differ 
ent  from  the  taxing  power  is  exercised — partaking  much  more  of  the  character 
of  a  penalty  than  a  tax.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  that  things  closely  re 
sembling  in  appearance  should  widely  and  essentially  differ  in  their  character. 
Arsenic,  for  instance,  resembles  flour,  yet  one  is  a  deadly  poison,  and  the  other 
that  which  constitutes  the  staff  of  life.  So  duties  imposed,  whether  for  reve 
nue  or  protection,  may  be  called  imposts  ;  though  nominally  and  apparently  the 
same,  yet  they  differ  essentially  in  their  real  character. 

I  shall  now  return  to  my  speech  on  the  tariff  of  1816.  To  determine  what 
my  opinions  really  were  on  the  subject  of  protection  at  that  time,  it  will  be 
proper  to  advert  to  my  sentiments  before  and  after  that  period.  My  sentiments 
preceding  1816,  on  this  subject,  are* matter  of  record.  I  came  into  Congress, 
in  1812,  a  devoted  friend  and  supporter  of  the  then  administration  ;  yet  one  of 
my  first  efforts  was  to  brave  the  administration,  by  opposing  its  favourite  meas 
ure,  the  restrictive  system— embargo,  non-intercourse,  and  all — and  that  upon 
the  principle  of  free  trade.  The  system  remained  in  fashion  for  a  time  ;  but, 
after  the  overthrow  of  Bonaparte,  I  reported  a  bill  from  the  Committee  on  For- 

K 


74  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

eign  Relations,  to  repeal  the  whole  system  of  restrictive  measures.  While  the 
bill  was  under  consideration,  a  worthy  man,  then  a  member  of  the  house  (Mr. 
M'Kim,  of  Baltimore),  moved  to  except  the  non-importation  act,  which  he  sup 
ported  on  the  ground  of  encouragement  to  manufactures.  I  resisted  the  motion 
on  the  very  grounds  on  which  Mr.  M'Kim  supported  it.  I  maintained  that  the 
manufacturers  were  then  receiving  too  much  protection,  and  warned  its  friends 
that  the  withdrawal  of  the  protection  which  the  war  and  the  high  duties  then 
afforded  would  cause  great  embarrassment ;  and  that  the  true  policy,  in  the 
mean  time,  was  to  admit  foreign  goods  as  freely  as  possible,  in  order  to  dimin 
ish  the  anticipated  embarrassment  on  the  return  of  peace  ;  intimating,  at  the 
same  time,  my  desire  to  see  the  tariff  revised,  with  a  view  of  affording  a  moder 
ate  and  permanent  protection.* 

Such  was  my  conduct  before  1816.  Shortly  after  that  period  I  left  Congress, 
and  had  no  opportunity  of  making  known  my  sentiments  in  reference  to  the  pro 
tective  system,  which  shortly  after  began  to  be  agitated.  But  I  have  the  most 
conclusive  evidence  that  I  considered  the  arrangement  of  the  revenue,  in  1816, 
as  growing  out  of  the  necessity  of  the  case,  and  due  to  the  consideration  of  jus 
tice  ;  but  that,  even  at  that  early  period,  I  was  not  without  my  fears  that  even, 
that  arrangement  would  lead  to  abuse  and  future  difficulties.  I  regret  that  I 
have  been  compelled  to  dwell  so  long  on  myself;  but  trust  that,  whatever  cen 
sure  may  be  incurred,  will  not  be  directed  against  me,  but  against  those  who 
have  drawn  my  conduct  into  the  controversy  ;  and  who  may  hope,  by  assailing 
my  motives,  to  wound  the  cause  with  which  I  am  proud  to  be  identified. 

I  may  add,  that  all  the  Southern  States  voted  with  South  Carolina  in  support  of 
the  bill :  not  that  they  had  any  interest  in  manufactures,  but  on  the  ground  that 
they  had  supported  the  war,  and,  of  course,  felt  a  corresponding  obligation  to 
sustain  those  establishments  which  had  grown  up  under  the  encouragement  it 
had  incidentally  afforded ;  while  most  of  the  New-England  members  were  op 
posed  to  the  measure  principally,  as  I  believe,  on  opposite  principles. 

I  have  now,  I  trust,  satisfactorily  repelled  the  charge  against  the  state,  and 
myself  personally,  in  reference  to  the  tariff  of  1816.  Whatever  support  the 
state  has  given  the  bill,  originated  in  the  most  disinterested  motives. 

There  was  not  within  the  limits  of  the  state,  so  far  as  my  memory  serves  me, 
a  single  cotton  or  wollen  establishment.  Her  whole  dependance  was  on  agri 
culture,  and  the  cultivation  of  two  great  staples,  rice  and  cotton.  Her  obvious 
policy  was  to  keep  open  the  market  of  the  world  unchecked  and  unrestricted  : 
to  buy  cheap,  and  to  sell  high  ;  but  from  a  feeling  of  kindness,  combined  with  a 
sense  of  justice,  she  added  her  support  to  the  bill.  We  had  been  told  by  the 
agents  of  the  manufacturers  that  the  protection  which  the  measure  afforded 
would  be  sufficient ;  to  which  we  the  more  readily  conceded,  as  it  was  consid 
ered  a  final  adjustment  of  the  question. 

Let  us  now  turn  our  eyes  forward,  and  see  what  has  been  the  conduct  of  the 
parties  to  this  arrangement.  Have  Carolina  and  the  South  disturbed  this  ad 
justment  ?  No  :  they  have  never  raised  their  voice  in  a  single  instance  against 
it,  even  though  this  measure,  moderate,  comparatively,  as  it  is,  was  felt  with 
no  inconsiderable  pressure  on  their  interests.  Was  this  example  imitated  on 
the  opposite  side?  Far  otherwise.  Scarcely  had  the  president  signed  his 
name,  before  application  was  made  for  an  increase  of  duties,  which  was  repeat 
ed,  with  demands  continually  growing,  till  the  passage  of  the  act  of  1828.  What 
course  now,  I  would  ask,  did  it  become  Carolina  to  pursue  in  reference  to  these 
demands  ?  Instead  of  acquiescing  in  them,  because  she  had  acted  generously 
in  adjusting  the  tariff  of  1816,  she  saw,  in  her  generosity  on  that  occasion,  ad 
ditional  motives  for  that  firm  and  decided  resistance  which  she  has  since  made 
against  the  system  of  protection.  She  accordingly  commenced  a  systematic 
opposition  to  all  farther  encroachments,  which  continued  from  1818  till  1828  : 
*  See  Mr.  C.'s  Speech  in  the  National  Intelligencer,  April,  1814. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  'C.  CALHOUN.  75 

by  discussions  and  by  resolutions,  by  remonstrances  and  by  protests  through 
her  Legislature.  These  all  proved  insufficient  to  stem  the  current  of  encroach 
ment  ;  but,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  pressure  on  her  industry,  she  never  de 
spaired  of  relief  till  the  passage  of  the  act  of  1828 — that  bill  of  abominations — 
engendered  by  avarice  and  political  intrigue.  Its  adoption  opened  the  eyes 
of  the  state,  and  gave  a  new  character  to  the  controversy.  Till  then,  the  ques 
tion  had  been,  whether  the  protective  system  was  constitutional  and  expedient ; 
but,  after  that,  she  no  longer  considered  the  question  whether  the  right  of  regu 
lating  the  industry  of  the  states  was  a  reserved  or  delegated  power,  but  what 
right  a  state  possesses  to  defend  her  reserved  powers  against  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  Federal  Government :  a  question  on  the  decision  of  which  the 
value  of  all  the  reserved  powers  depends.  The  passage  of  the  act  of  1828,  with 
all  its  objectionable  features,  and  under  the  odious  circumstances  under  which 
it  was  adopted,  almost,  if  not  entirely,  closed  the  door  of  hope  through  the  Gen 
eral  Government.  It  afforded  conclusive  evidence  that  no  reasonable  prospect 
of  relief  from  Congress  could  be  entertained  ;  yet,  the  near  approach  of  the  pe 
riod  of  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  and  the  elevation  of  General  Jackson  to 
the  presidency,  still  afforded  a  ray  of  hope — not  so  strong,  however,  as  to  pre 
vent  the  state  from  turning  her  eyes  for  final  relief  to  her  reserved  powers. 

Under  these  circumstances  commenced  that  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  reserved  powers  of  a  state,  and  the  means  which  they  afford  of  resist 
ance  against  the  encroachments  of  the  General  Government,  which  has  been 
pursued  with  so  much  zeal  and  energy,  and,  I  may  add,  intelligence.  Never 
was  there  a  political  discussion  carried  on  with  greater  activity,  and  which 
appealed  more  directly  to  the  intelligence  of  a  community.  Throughout  the 
whole,  no  address  has  been  made  to  the  low  and  vulgar  passions  ;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  discussion  has  turned  upon  thq  higher  principles  of  political  econ 
omy,  connected  with  the  operations  of  the  tariff  system,  calculated  to  show  its 
real  bearing  on  the  interests  of  the  state,  and  on  the  structure  of  our  political 
system ;  and  to  show  the  true  character  of  the  relations  between  the  state  and 
the  General  Government,  and  the  means  which  the  states  possess  of  defending 
those  powers  which  they  reserved  in  forming  the  Federal  Government. 

In  this  great  canvass,  men  of  the  most  commanding  talents  and  acquirements 
have  engaged  with  the  greatest  ardour ;  and  the  people  have  been  addressed 
through  every  channel — by  essays  in  the  public  press,  and  by  speeches  in  their 
public  assemblies — until  they  have  become  thoroughly  instructed  on  the  nature 
of  the  oppression,  and  on  the  rights  which  they  possess,  under  the  Constitution, 
to  throw  it  off. 

If  gentlemen  suppose  that  the  stand  taken  by  the  people  of  Carolina  rests  on 
passion  and  delusion,  they  are  wholly  mistaken.  The  case  is  far  otherwise. 
No  community,  from  the  legislator  to  the  ploughman,  were  ever  better  instruct 
ed  in  their  rights ;  and  the  resistance  on  which  the  state  has  resolved  is  the 
result  of  mature  reflection,  accompanied  with  a  deep  conviction  that  their  rights 
have  been  violated,  and  that  the  means  of  redress  which  they  have  adopted  are 
consistent  with  the  principles  of  the  Constitution. 

But  while  this  active  canvass  was  carried  on,  which  looked  to  the  reserved 
powers  as  the  final  means  of  redress  if  all  others  failed,  the  state  at  the  same 
time  cherished  a  hope,  as  I  have  already  stated,  that  the  election  of  General 
Jackson  to  the  presidency  would  prevent  the  necessity  of  a  resort  to  extrem 
ities.  He  was  identified  with  the  interests  of  the  staple  states  ;  and,  having  the 
same  interest,  it  was  believed  that  his  great  popularity — a  popularity  of  the 
strongest  character,  as  it  rested  on  military  services — would  enable  him,  as  they 
hoped,  gradually  to  bring  down  the  system  of  protection,  without  shock  or  inju 
ry  to  any  interest.  Under  these  views,  the  canvass  in  favour  of  General  Jack 
son's  election  to  the  presidency  was  carried  on  with  great  zeal,  in  conjunction 
with  that  active  inquiry  into  the  reserved  powers  of  the  states  on  which  final 


76  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

reliance  was  placed.  But  little  did  the  people  of  Carolina  dream  that  the  man 
•whom  they  were  thus  striving  to  elevate  to  the  highest  seat  of  power  would 
disappoint  all  their  hopes.  Man  is,  indeed,  ignorant  of  the  future  ;  nor  was 
there  ever  a  stronger  illustration  of  the  observation  than  is  afforded  by  the  re 
sult  of  that  election  !  The  very  event  on  which  they  had  built  their  hopes  has 
been  turned  against  them,  and  the  very  individual  to  whom  they  looked  as  a  de 
liverer,  and  whom,  under  that  impression,  they  strove  for  so  many  years  to  ele 
vate  to  power,  is  now  the  most  powerful  instrument  in  the  hands  of  his  and 
their  bitterest  opponents  to  put  down  them  and  their  cause ! 

Scarcely  had  he  been  elected,  when  it  became  apparant,  from  the  organization 
of  his  cabinet,  and  other  indications,  that  all  their  expectations  of  relief  through 
him  were  blasted.  The  admission  of  a  single  individual  into  the  cabinet,  under 
the  circumstances  which  accompanied  that  admission,  threw  all  into  confusion. 
The  mischievous  influence  over  the  President,  through  which  this  individual 
was  admitted  into  the  cabinet,  soon  became  apparent.  Instead  of  turning  his 
eyes  forward  to  the  period  of  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  which  was  then 
near  at  hand,  and  to  the  present  dangerous  political  crisis,  which  was  inevita 
ble  unless  averted  by  a  timely  and  wise  system  of  measures,  the  attention  of 
the  President  was  absorbed  by  mere  party  arrangements,  and  circumstances  too 
disreputable  to  be  mentioned  here,  except  by  the  most  distant  allusion. 

Here  I  must  pause  for  a  moment  to  repel  a  charge  which  has  been  so  often 
made,  and  which  even  the  President  has  reiterated  in  his  proclamation — the 
charge  that  I  have  been  actuated,  in  the  part  which  I  have  taken,  by  feelings  of 
disappointed  ambition.  I  again  repeat,  that  I  deeply  regret  the  necessity  of 
noticing  myself  in  so  important  a  discussion  ;  and  that  nothing  can  induce  me 
to  advert  to  my  own  course  but  the  conviction  that  it  is  due  to  the  cause,  at 
which  a  blow  is  aimed  through  me.*  It  is  only  in  this  view  that  I  notice  it. 

It  illy  became  the  chief  magistrate  to  make  this  charge.  The  course  which 
the  state  took,  and  which  led  to  the  present  controversy  between  her  and  the 
General  Government,  was  taken  as  far  back  as  1828 — in  the  very  midst  of  that 
severe  canvass  which  placed  him  in  power — and  in  that  very  canvass  Carolina 
openly  avowed  and  zealously  maintained  those  very  principles  which  he,  the 
chief  magistrate,  now  officially  pronounces  to  be  treason  and  rebellion.  That  was 
the  period  at  which  he  ought  to  have  spoken.  Having  remained  silent  then,  and 
having,  under  his  approval,  implied  by  that  silence,  received  the  support  and  the 
vote  of  the  state,.!,  if  a  sense  of  decorum  did  not  prevent  it,  might  recriminate 
with  the  double  charge  of  deception  and  ingratitude.  My  object,  however,  is  not 
to  assail  the  President,  but  to  defend  myself  against  a  most  unfounded  charge. 
The  time  alone  at  which  the  course  upon  which  this  charge  of  disappointed  am 
bition  is  founded,  will  of  itself  repel  it,  in  the  eye  of  every  unprejudiced  and 
honest  man.  The  doctrine  which  I  now  sustain,  under  the  present  difficulties, 
I  openly  avowed  and  maintained  immediately  after  the  act  of  1828,  that  "  bill 
of  abominations,"  as  it  has  been  so  often  and  properly  termed.  AVas  I  at  that 
period  disappointed  in  any  views  of  ambition  which  I  might  be  supposed  to  en 
tertain?  I  was  Vice-president  of  the  United  States,  elected  by  an  overwhelm 
ing  majority.  I  was  a  candidate  for  re-election  on  the  ticket  with  General 
Jackson  himself,  with  a  certain  prospect  of  a  triumphant  success  of  that  tick 
et,  and  with  a  fair  prospect  of  the  highest  office  to  which  an  American  citizen 
can  aspire.  What  was  my  course  under  these  prospects  ?  Did  I  look  to  my 
own  advancement,  or  to  an  honest  and  faithful  discharge  of  my  duty  ?  Let  facts 
speak  for  themselves.  When  the  bill  to  which  I  have  referred  came  from  the 
other  house  to  the  Senate,  the  almost  universal  impression  was,  that  its  fate 
would  depend  upon  my  casting  vote.  It  was  known  that,  as  the  bill  then  stood, 
the  Senate  was  nearly  equally  divided  ;  and  as  it  was  a  combined  measure,  ori 
ginating  with  the  politicians  and  manufacturers,  and  intended  as  much  to  bear 
upon  the  Presidential  election  as  to  protect  manufactures,  it  was  believed  that» 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  77 

as  a  stroke  of  political  policy,  its  fate  would  be  made  to  depend  on  my  vote,  in 
order  to  defeat  General  Jackson's  election,  as  well  as  my  own.  The  friends 
of  General  Jackson  were  alarmed,  and  I  was  earnestly  entreated  to  leave  the 
chair  in  order  to  avoid  the  responsibility,  under  the  plausible  argument  that,  if 
the  Senate  should  be  equally  divided,  the  bill  would  be  lost  without  the  aid  of 
my  casting  vote.  The  reply  to  this  entreaty  was,  that  no  consideration  person 
al  to  myself  could  induce  me  to  take  such  a  course  ;  that  I  considered  the 
measure  as  of  the  most  dangerous  character,  and  calculated  to  produce  the  most 
fearful  crisis  ;  that  the  payment  of  the  public  debt  was  just  at  hand  ;  and  that  the 
great  increase  of  revenue  which  it  would  pour  into  the  treasury  would  acceler 
ate  the  approach  of  that  period,  and  that  the  country  would  be  placed,  in  the 
most  trying  of  situations — with  an  immense  revenue  without  the  means  of  ab 
sorption  upon  any  legitimate  or  constitutional  object  of  appropriation,  and  would 
be  compelled  to  submit  to  all  the  corrupting  consequences  of  a  large  surplus,  or 
to  make  a  sudden  reduction  of  the  rates  of  duties,  which  would  prove  ruinous  to 
the  very  interests  which  were  then  forcing  the  passage  of  the  bill.  Under  these 
views  I  determined  to  remain  in  the  chair,  and  if  the  bill  came  to  me,  to  give 
my  casting  vote  against  it,  and  in  doing  so,  to  give  my  reasons  at  large  ;  but  at 
the  same  time  I  informed  my  friends  that  I  would  retire  from  the  ticket,  so  that 
the  election  of  General  Jackson  might  not  be  embarrassed  by  any  act  of  mine. 
Sir,  I  was  amazed  at  the  folly  and  infatuation  of  that  period.  So  completely 
absorbed  was  Congress  in  the  gajne  of  ambition  and  avarice,  from  the  double 
impulse  of  the  manufacturers  and  politicians,  that  none  but  a  few  appeared  to 
anticipate  the  present  crisis,  at  which  now  all  are  alarmed,  but  which  is  the  in 
evitable  result  of  what  was  then  done. .  As  to  myself,  I  clearly  foresaw  what 
has  since  followed.  The  road  of  ambition  lay  open  before  me — I  had  but  to 
follow  the  corrupt  tendency  of  the  times — but  I  chose  to  tread  the  rugged  path 
of  duty. 

It  was  thus  that  the  reasonable  hope  of  relief  through  the  election  of  Gen 
eral  Jackson  was  blasted ;  but  still  one  other  hope  remained,  that  the  final  dis 
charge  of  the  public  debt — an  event  near  at  hand — would  remove  our  burden. 
That  event  would  leave  in  the  treasury  a  large  surplus  :  a  surplus  that  could 
not  be  expended  under  the  most  extravagant  schemes  of  appropriation,  having 
the  least  colour  of  decency  or  constitutionality.  That  event  at  last  arrived. 
At  the  last  session  of  Congress,  it  was  avowed  on  all  sides  that  the  public  debt, 
for  all  practical  purposes,  was  in  fact  paid,  the  small  surplus  remaining  being 
nearly  covered  by  the  money  in  the  treasury  and  the  bonds  for  duties,  which 
had  already  accrued  ;  but  with  the  arrival  of  this  event  our  last  hope  was  doom 
ed  to  be  disappointed.  After  a  long  session  of  many  months,  and  the  most  ear 
nest  effort  on  the  part  of  South  Carolina  and  the  other  Southern  States  to  obtain 
relief,  all  that  could  be  effected  was  a  small  reduction  in  the  amount  of  the  du 
ties  ;  but  a  reduction  of  such  a  character,  that,  while  it  diminished  the  amount 
of  burden,  distributed  that  burden  more  unequally  than  even  the  obnoxious  act 
of  1828  :  reversing  the  principle  adopted  by  the  bill  of  1816,  of  laying  higher 
duties  on  the  unprotected  than  the  protected  articles,  by  repealing  almost  en 
tirely  the  duties  laid  upon  the  former,  and  imposing  the  burden  almost  entirely 
on  the  latter.  It  was  thus  that,  instead  of  relief — instead  of  an  equal  distribu 
tion  of  the  burdens  and  benefits  of  the  government,  on  the  payment  of  the  debt, 
as  had  been  fondly  anticipated — the  duties  were  so  arranged  as  to  be,  in  fact, 
bounties  on  one  side  and  taxation  on  the  other  :  thus  placing  the  two  great  sec 
tions  of  the  country  in  direct  conflict  in  reference  to  its  fiscal  action,  and  there 
by  letting  in  that  flood  of  political  corruption  which  threatens  to  sweep  away 
our  Constitution  and  our  liberty. 

This  unequal'and  unjust  arrangement  was  pronounced,  both  by  the  adminis 
tration,  through  its  proper  organ,  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  arid  by  the  op 
position,  to  be  a  permanent  adjustment;  and  it  was  thus  that  all  hope  of  relief 


78  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOTIN. 

through  the  action  of  the  General  Government  terminated,  and  the  crisis  so  long 
apprehended  at  length  arrived,  at  which  the  state  was  compelled  to  choose  be 
tween  absolute  acquiescence  in  a  ruinous  system  of  oppression,  or  a  resort  to 
her  reserved  powers — powers  of  which  she  alone  was  the  rightful  judge,  and 
which  only,  in  this  momentous  juncture,  can  save  her.  She  determined  on  the 
latter. 

The  consent  of  two  thirds  of  her  Legislature  was  necessary  for  the  call  of  a 
convention,  which  was  considered  the  only  legitimate  organ  through  which  the 
people,  in  their  sovereignty,  could  speak.  After  an  arduous  struggle,  the  State 
Rights  party  succeeded :  more  than  two  thirds  of  both  branches  of  the  Legisla 
ture  favourable  to  a  convention  were  elected ;  a  convention  was  called — the 
ordinance  adopted.  The  convention  was  succeeded  by  a  meeting  of  the  Legis 
lature,  when  the  laws  to  carry  the  ordinance  into  execution  were  enacted :  all 
of  which  have  been  communicated  by  the  President,  have  been  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  and  this  bill  is  the  result  of  their  labour. 

Having  now  corrected  some  of  the  prominent  misrepresentations  as  to  the  na 
ture  of  this  controversy,  and  given  a  rapid  sketch  of  the  movement  of  the  state 
in  reference  to  it,  I  will  next  proceed  to  notice  some  objections  connected  with 
the  ordinance  and  the  proceedings  under  it. 

The  first  and  most  prominent  of  these  is  directed  against  what  is  called  the 
test  oath,  which  an  effort  has  been  made  to  render  odious.  So  far  from  de 
serving  the  denunciation  which  has  been  levelled  against  it,  I  view  this  provis 
ion  of  the  ordinance  as  but  the  natural  result  of  the  doctrines  entertained  by 
the  state,  and  the  position  which  she  occupies.  The  people  of  that  state  be 
lieve  that  the  Union  is  a  union  of  states,  and  not  of  individuals  ;  that  it  was 
formed  by  the  states,  and  that  the  citizens  of  the  several  states  were  bound  to  it 
through  the  acts  of  their  several  states  ;  that  each  state  ratified  the  Constitution 
for  itself,  and  that  it  was  only  by  such  ratification  of  a  state  that  any  obligation 
was  imposed  upon  the  citizens :  thus  believing,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  people 
of  Carolina  that  it  belongs  to  the  state  which  has  imposed  the  obligation  to  de 
clare,  in  the  last  resort,  the  extent  of  this  obligation,  as  far  as  her  citizens  are 
concerned  ;  and  this  upon  the  plain  principles  which  exist  in  all  analogous 
cases  of  compact  between  sovereign  bodies.  On  this  principle,  the  people  of 
the  state,  acting  in  their  sovereign  capacity  in  convention,  precisely  as  they 
adopted  their  own  and  the  federal  Constitution,  haved  eclared  by  the  ordi 
nance,  that  the  acts  of  Congress  which  imposed  duties  under  the  authority  to 
lay  imposts,  are  acts,  not  for  revenue,  as  intended  by  the  Constitution,  but  for 
protection,  and  therefore  null  and  void.  The  ordinance  thus  enacted  by  the 
people  of  the  state  themselves,  acting  as  a  sovereign  community,  is  as  obliga 
tory  on  the  citizens  of  the  state  as  any  portion  of  the  Constitution.  In  pre 
scribing,  then,  the  oath  to  obey  the  ordinance,  no  more  was  done  than  to  pre 
scribe  an  oath  to  obey  the  Constitution.  It  is,  in  fact,  but  a  particular  oath  of 
allegiance,  and  in  every  respect  similar  to  that  which  is  prescribed  under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  to  be  administered  to  all  the  officers  of  the 
State  and  Federal  Governments  ;  and  is  no  more  deserving  the  harsh  and  bit 
ter  epithets  which  have  been  heaped  upon  it  than  that,  or  any  similar  oath.  It 
ought  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that,  according  to  the  opinion  which  prevails  in  Caro 
lina,  the  right  of  resistance  to  the  unconstitutional  laws  of  Congress  belongs  to 
the  state,  and  not  to  her  individual  citizens ;  and  that,  though  the  latter  may,  in 
a  mere'  question  of  meum  and  tuum,  resist,  through  the  courts,  an  unconstitu 
tional  encroachment  upon  their  rights,  yet  the  final  stand  against  usurpation 
rests  not  with  them,  but  with  the  state  of  which  they  are  members ;  and  such 
act  of  resistance  by  a  state  birds  the  conscience  and  allegiance  of  the  citizen. 
But  there  appears  to  be  a  general  misapprehension  as  to- the  extent  to  which 
the  state  has  acted  under  this  part  of  the  ordinance.  Instead  of  sweeping  every 
officer  by  a  general  proscription  of  the  minority,  as  has  been  represented  in  de- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  79 

bate,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  extends,  not  a  single  individual  has  been  remo 
ved.  The  state  has,  in  fact,  acted  with  the  greatest  tenderness,  all  circumstan- 
.ces  considered,  towards  citizens  who  differed  from  the  majority  ;  and,  in  that, 
spirit,  has  directed  the  oath  to  be  administered  only  in  cases  of  some  official 
act  directed  to  be  performed  in  which  obedience  to  the  ordinance  is  involved. 

It  has  been  farther  objected  that  the  state  has  acted  precipitately.  What ! 
precipitately  !  after  making  a  strenuous  resistance  for  twelve  years — by  discus 
sion  here  and  in  the  other  house  of  Congress — by  essays  in  all  forms — by  res 
olutions,  remonstrances,  and  protests  on  the  part  of  her  Legislature — and,  final 
ly,  by  attempting  an  appeal  to  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  ?  I  say 
attempting,  for  they  have  been  prevented  from  bringing  the  question  fairly  be 
fore  the  court,  and  that  by  an  act  of  that  very  majority  in  Congress  who  now 
upbraid  them  for  not  making  that  appeal :  of  that  majority  who,  on  a  motion  of 
one  of  the  members  in  the  other  house  from  South  Carolina,  refused  to  give  to 
the  act  of  1828  its  true  title — that  it  was  a  protective,  and  not  a  revenue  act. 
The  state  has  never,  it  is  true,  relied  upon  that  tribunal,  the  Supreme  Court,  to 
vindicate  its  reserved  rights  ;  yet  they  have  always  considered  it  as  an  auxili 
ary  means  of  defence,  of  which  they  would  gladly  have  availed  themselves  to 
test  the  constitutionality  of  protection,  had  they  not  been  deprived  of  the  means 
of  doing  so  by  the  act  of  the  majority. 

Notwithstanding  this  long  delay  of  more  than  ten  years,  under  this  continued 
encroachment  of  the  government,  we  now  hear  it  on  all  sides,  by  friends  and  foes, 
gravely  pronounced  that  the  state  has  acted  precipitately — that  her  conduct  has 
been  rash  !  That  such  should  be  the  language  of  an  interested  majority,  who, 
by  means  of  this  unconstitutional  and  oppressive  system,  are  annually  extorting 
millions  from  the  South  to  be  bestowed  upon  other  sections,  is  not  at  all  sur 
prising.  Whatever  impedes  the  course  of  avarice  and  ambition  will  ever  be  de 
nounced  as  rash  and  precipitate  ;  and  had  South  Carolina  delayed  her  resist 
ance  fifty  instead  of  twelve  years,  she  would  have  heard  from  the  same  quarter 
the  same  language  ;  but  it  is  really  surprising  that  those  who  are  suffering  in 
common  with  herself,  and  who  have  complained  equally  loud  of  their  grievan 
ces,  who  have  pronounced  the  very  acts  which  she  has  asserted  within  her 
limits  to  be  oppressive,  unconstitutional,  and  ruinous,  after  so  long  a  struggle — a 
struggle  longer  than  that  which  preceded  the  separation  of  these  states  from  the 
mother-country — longer  than  the  period  of  the  Trojan  war — should  now  com 
plain  of  precipitancy  !  No,  it  is  not  Carolina  which  has  acted  precipitately ;  but 
her  sister  states,  who  have  suffered  in  common  with  her,  have  acted  tardily. 
Had  they  acted  as  she  has  done,  had  they  performed  their  duty  with  equal  en 
ergy  and  promptness,  our  situation  this  day  would  be  very  different  from  what 
we  now  find  it.  Delays  are  said  to  be  dangerous ;  and  never  was  the  maxim 
more  true  than  in  the  present  case,  a  case  of  monopoly.  It  is  the  very  nature 
of  monopolies  to  grow.  If  we  take  from  one  side  a  large  portion  of  the  pro 
ceeds  of  its  labour  and  give  it  to  the  other,,  the  side  from  which  we  take  must 
constantly  decay,  and  that  to  which  we  give  must  prosper  and  increase.  Such 
is  the  action  of  the  protective  system.  It  exacts  from  the  South  a  large  portion 
of  the  proceeds  of  its  industry,  which  it  bestows  upon  the  other  sections,  in  the 
shape  of  bounties  to  manufactures,  and  appropriations  in  a  thousand  forms  ; 
pensions,  improvement  of  rivers  and  harbours,  roads  and  canals,  and  in  every 
shape  that  wit  or  ingenuity  can  devise.  Can  we,  then,  be  surprised  that  the 
principle  of  monopoly  grows,  when  it  is  so  amply  remunerated  at  the  expense 
of  those  who  support  it  ?  And  this  is  the  real  reason  of  the  fact  which  we  wit 
ness,  that  all  acts  for  protection  pass  with  small  minorities,  but  soon  come  to  be 
sustained  by  great  and  overwhelming  majorities.  Those  who  seek  the  monop 
oly  endeavour  to  obtain  it  in  the  most  exclusive  shape  ;  and  they  take  care, 
accordingly,  to  associate  only  a  sufficient  number  of  interests  barely  to  pass  it 
through  the  two  hoiftes  of  Congress,  on  the  plain  principle  that  the  greater  the 


80  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

number  from  whom  the  monopoly  takes,  and  the  fewer  on  whom  it  bestows,  the 
greater  is  the  advantage  to  the  monopolists.  Acting  in  this  spirit,  we  have 
often  seen  with  what  exact  precision  they  count :  adding  wool  to  woollens,  as 
sociating  lead  and  iron,  feeling  their  way,  until  a  bare  majority  is  obtained, 
when  the  bill  passes,  connecting  just  as  many  interests  as  are  sufficient  to  ensure 
its  success,  and  no  more.  In  a  short  time,  however,  we  have  invariably  found 
that  this  lean  becomes  a  decided  majority,  under  the  certain  operation  which 
compels  individuals  to  desert  the  pursuits  which  the  monopoly  has  rendered 
unprofitable,  that  they  may  participate  in  those  pursuits  which  it  has  rendered 
profitable.  It  is  against  this  dangerous  and  growing  disease  which  South  Car 
olina  has  acted  :  a  disease  whose  cancerous  action  would  soon  have  spread  to 
every  part  of  the  system,  if  not  arrested. 

There  is  another  powerful  reason  why  the  action  of  the  state  could  not  have 
been  safely  delayed.  The  public  debt,  as  I  have  already  stated,  for  all  practi 
cal  purposes,  has  already  been' paid;  and,  under  the  existing  duties,  a  large 
annual  surplus  of  many  millions  must  come  into  the  treasury.  It  is  impossi 
ble  to  look  at  this  state  of  things  without  seeing  the  most  mischievous  conse 
quences  :  and,  among  others,  if  not  speedily  corrected,  it  would  interpose  pow 
erful  and  almost  insuperable  obstacles  to  throwing  off  the  burden  under  which 
the  South  has  been  so  long  labouring.  The  disposition  of  the  surplus  would 
become  a  subject  of  violent  and  corrupt  struggle,  and  could  not  fail  to  rear  up 
new  and  powerful  interests  in  support  of  the  existing  system,  not  only  in  those 
sections  which  have  been  heretofore  benefited  by  it,  but  even  in  the  South  itself. 
I  cannot  but  trace  to  the  anticipation  of  this  state  of  the  treasury  the  sudden 
and  extraordinary  movements  which  took  place  at  the  last  session  in  the  Vir 
ginia  Legislature,  in  which  the  whole  South  is  vitally  interested.*  It  is  im 
possible  for  any  rational  man  to  believe  that  that  state  could  seriously  have 
thought  of  effecting  the  scheme  to  which  I  allude  by  her  own  resources,  with 
out  powerful  aid  from  the  General  Government. 

It  is  next  objected,  that  the  enforcing  acts  have  legislated  the  United  States 
out  of  South  Carolina.  I  have  already  replied  to  this  objection  on  another  oc 
casion,  and  will  now  but  repeat  what  I  then  said  :  that  they  have  been  legisla 
ted  out  only  to  the  extent  that  they  had  no  right  to  enter.  The  Constitution 
has  admitted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  within  the  limits  of  the  sev 
eral  states  only  so  far  as  the  delegated  powers  authorize  ;  beyond  that  they  are 
intruders,  and  may  rightfully  be  expelled  ;  and  that  they  have  been  efficiently 
expelled  by  the  legislation  of  tjie  state  through  her  civil  process,  as  has  bseji 
acknowledged  on  all  sides  in  the  debate,  is  only  a  confirmation  of  the  truth  of 
the  doctrine  for  which  the  majority  in  Carolina  have  contended. 

The  very  point  at  issue  between  the  two  parties  there  is,  whether  nullifica 
tion  is  a  peaceable  and  an  efficient  remedy  against  an  unconstitutional  act  of  the 
General  Government,  and  which  may  be  asserted  as  such  through  the  state  tri 
bunals.  Both  parties  agree  that  the  acts  against  which  it  is  directed  are  un 
constitutional  and  oppressive.  The  controversy  is  only  as  to  the  means  by 
which  our  citizens  may  be  protected  against  the  acknowledged  encroachments 
on  their  rights.  This  being  the  point  at  issue  between  the  parties,  and  the 
very  object  of  the  majority  being  an  efficient  protection  of  the  citizens  through 
the  state  tribunals,  the  measures  adopted  to  enforce  the  ordinance  of  course 
received  the  most  decisive  character.  We  were  not  children,  to  act  by  halves. 
Yet  for  acting  thus  efficiently  the  state  is  denounced,  and  this  bill  reported,  to 
overrule,  by  military  force,  the  civil  tribunals  and  civil  process  of  the  state  ! 
Sir,  I  consider  this  bill,  and  the  arguments  which  have  been  urged  on  this  floor 
in  its  support,  as  the  most  triumphant  acknowledgment  that  nullification  is 
peaceful  and  efficient,  and  so  deeply  intrenched  in  the  principles  of  our  system, 

*  Having  for  their  object  the  emancipation  and  colonization  of  slaves. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  81 

that  it  cannot  be  assailed  but  by  prostrating  the  Constitution,  and  substituting 
the  supremacy  of  military  force  in  lieu  of  the  supremacy  of  the  laws.  In  fact, 
the  advocates  of  this  bill  refute  their  own  argument.  They  tell  us  that  the  or 
dinance  is  unconstitutional ;  that  they  infract  the  Constitution  of  South  Carolina, 
although,  to  me,  the  objection  appears  absurd,  as  it  was  adopted  by  the  very 
authority  which  adopted  the  Constitution  itself.  They  also  tell  us  that  the  Su 
preme  Court  is  the  appointed  arbiter  of  all  controversies  between  a  state  and 
the  General  Government.  Why,  then,  do  they  not  leave  this  controversy  to 
that  tribunal  ?  Why  do  they  not  confide  to  them  the  abrogation  of  the  ordi 
nance,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance  of  it,  and  the  assertion  of  that  suprema 
cy  which  they  claim  for  the  laws  of  Congress  ?  The  state  stands  pledged  to 
resist  no  process  of  the  court.  Why,  then,  confer  on  the  President  the  exten 
sive  and  unlimited  powers  provided  in  this  bill  ?  Why  authorize  him  to  use 
military  force  ta  arrest  the  civil  process  of  the  state  ?  But  one  answer  can  be 
given  :  That,  in  a  contest  between  the  state  and  the  General  Government,  if 
the  resistance  be  limited  on  both  sides  to  the  civil  process,  the  state,  by  its  in 
herent  sovereignty,  standing  upon  its  reserved  powers,  will  prove  too  powerful 
in  such  a  controversy,  arid  must  triumph  over  the  Federal  Government,  sustain 
ed  by  its  delegated  and  limited  authority  ;  and  in  this  answer  we  have  an  ac 
knowledgment  of  the  truth  of  those  great  principles  for  which  the  state  has  so 
fomly  and  nobly  contended. 

Having  made  these  remarks,  the  .great  question  is  now  presented,  Has  Con 
gress  the  right  to  pass  this  bill  ?  which  I  will  next  proceed  to  consider.  The 
decision  of  this  question  involves  the  inquiry  into  the  provisions  of  the  bill. 
What  are  they  ?  It  puts  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  the  army  and  navy,  and 
the  entire  militia  of  the  country  ;  it  enables  him,  at  his  pleasure,  to  subject  every 
man  in  the  United  States,  not  exempt  from  militia  duty,  to  martial  law  :  to  call 
fcim  from  his  ordinary  occupation  to  the  field,  and  under  the  penalty  of  fine  and  im 
prisonment,  inflicted  by  a  court-martial,  to  compel  him  to  imbrue  his  hand  in  his 
brothers'  blood.  There  is  no  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  sword,  and  that 
over  the  purse  is  equally  without  restraint;  for,  among  the  extraordinary  fea 
tures  of  the  bill,  it  contains  no  appropriation,  which,  under  existing  circumstan 
ces,  is  tantamount  to  an  unlimited  appropriation.  The  President  may,  under  its 
authority,  incur  any  expenditure,  and  pledge  the  national  faith  to  meet  it.  He 
may  create  a  new  national  debt,  at  the  very  moment  of  the  termination  of  the 
former — a  debt  of  millions,  to  be  paid  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  labour  of  that 
section  of  the  country  whose  dearest  constitutional  rights  this  bill  prostrates ! 
Thus  exhibiting  the  extraordinary  spectacle,  that  the  very  section  of  the  coun 
try  which  is  urging  this  measure,  and  carrying  the  sword  of  devastation  against 
us,  are,  at  the  same  time,  incurring  a  new  debt,  to  be  paid  by  those  whose  rights 
are  violated ;  while  those  who  violate  them  are  to  receive  the  benefits,  in  the 
shape  of  bounties  and  expenditures. 

And  for  what  purpose  is  the  unlimited  control  of  the  purse  and  of  the  sword 
thus  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  executive  ?  To  make  war  against  one  of 
the  free  and  sovereign  members  of  this  confederation,  which  the  bill  proposes 
to  deal  with,  not  as  a  state,  but  as  a  collection  of  banditti  or  outlaws.  Thus  ex 
hibiting  the  impious  spectacle  of  this  government,  the  creature  of  the  states, 
making  war  against  the  power  to  which  it  owes  its  existence. 

The  bill  violates  the  Constitution,  plainly  and  palpably,  in  many  of  its  pro 
visions,  by  authorizing  the  President,  at  his  pleasure,  to  place  the  different 
ports  of  this  Union  on  an  unequal  footing,  contrary  to  that  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution  which  declares  that  no  preference  shall  be  given  to  one  port  over 
another.  It  also  violates  the  Constitution  by  authorizing  him,  at  his  discretion. 
to  impose  cash  duties  on  one  port,  while  credit  is  allowed  in  others  ;  by  enabling 
the  President  to  regulate  commerce,  a  power  vested  in  Congress  alone  ;  and  by 
drawing  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  courts  powers  never  in- 

L  * 


82  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tended  to  be  conferred  on  them.  As  great  as  these  objections  are,  they  become 
insignificant  in  the  provisions  of  a  bill  which,  by  a  single  blow — by  treating  the 
states  as  a  mere  lawless  mass  of  individuals — prostrates  all  the  barriers  of  the 
Constitution.  I  will  pass  over  the  minor  considerations,  and  proceed  directly' 
to  the  great  point.  This  bill  proceeds  on  the  ground  that  the  entire  sovereignty 
of  this  country  belongs  to  the  American  people,  as  forming  one  great  community, 
and  regards  the  states  as  mere  fractions  or  counties,  and  not  as  an  integral  part 
of  the  Union  :  having  no  more  right  to  resist  the  encroachments  of  the  govern 
ment  than  a  county  has  to  resist  the  authority  of  a  state ;  and  treating  such  re 
sistance  as  the  lawless  acts  of  so  many  individuals,  without  possessing  sover 
eignty  or  political  rights.  It  has  been  said  that  the  bill  declares  war  against 
South  Carolina.  No.  It  decrees  a  massacre  of  her  citizens !  War  has  some 
thing  ennobling  about  it,  and,  with  all  its  horrors,  brings  into  action  the  highest 
qualities,  intellectual  and  moral.  It  was,  perhaps,  in  the  order  of  Providence 
that  it  should  be  permitted  for  that  very  purpose.  But  this  bill  declares  no  war, 
except,  indeed,  it  be  that  which  savages  wage — a  war,  not  against  the  commu 
nity,  but  the  citizens  of  whom  that  community  is  composed.  But  I  regard  it  as 
worse  than  savage  warfare — as  an  attempt  to  take  away  life  under  the  colour  of 
law,  without  the  trial  by  jury,  or  any  other  safeguard  which  the  Constitution  has 
thrown  around  the  life  of  the  citizen  !  It  authorizes  the  President,  or  even  his 
deputies,  when  they  may  suppose  the  law  to  be  violated,  without  the  interven 
tion  of  a  court  or  jury,  to  kill  without  mercyuor  discrimination  ! 

It  has  been  said  by  the  senator  from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy)  to  be  a  meas 
ure  of  peace  !  Yes,  such  peace  as  the  wolf  gives  to  the  lamb — the  kite  to  the 
dove  !  Such  peace  as  Russia  gives  to  Poland,  or  death  to  its  victim !  A  peace, 
by  extinguishing  the  political  existence  of  the  state,  by  awing  her  into  an  aban 
donment  of  the  exercise  of  every  power  which  constitutes  her  a  sovereign  com- 
munity.  It  is  to  South  Carolina  a  question  of  self-preservation  ;  and  I  proclaim 
it,  that,  should  this  bill  pass,  and  an  attempt  be  made  to  enforce  it,  it  will  be 
resisted,  at  every  hazard — even  that  of  death  itself.  Death  is  not  the  greatest 
calamity :  there  are  others  still  more  terrible  to  the  free  and  brave,  and  among 
them  may  be  placed  the  loss  of  liberty  and  honour.  There  are  thousands  of 
her  brave  sons  who,  if  need  be,  are  prepared  cheerfully  to  lay  down  their  lives  in 
defence  of  the  state,  and  the  great  principles  of  constitutional  liberty  for  which 
she  is  contending.  God  forbid  that  this  should  become  necessary !  It  never 
can  be,  unless  this  government  is  resolved  to  bring  the  question  to  extremity,  when 
her  gallant  sons  will  stand  prepared  to  perform  the  last  duty — to  die  nobly. 

I  go  on  the  ground  that  this  Constitution  was  made  by  the  states  ;  that  it  is  a 
federal  union  of  the  states,  in  which  the  several  states  still  retain  their  sover 
eignty.  If  these  views  be  correct,  I  have  not  characterized  the  bill  too  strongly, 
which  presents  the  question  whether  they  be  or  be  not.  I  will  riot  enter  into 
the  discussion  of  that  question  now.  I  will  rest  it,  for  the  present,  on  what  I 
have  said  on  the  introduction  of  the  resolutions  now  on  the  table,  under  a  hope 
that  another  opportunity  will  be  afforded  for  more  ample  discussion.  I  will,  for 
the  present,  confine  my  remarks  to  the  objections  which  have  been  raised  to 
the  views  which  I  presented  when  I  introduced  them.  The  authority  of  Luther 
Martin  has~been  adduced  by  the  senator  from  Delaware,  to  prove  that  the  citi 
zens  of  a  state,  acting  under  the  authority  of  a  state,  are  liable  to  be  punished 
as  traitors  by  this  government.  As  eminent  as  Mr.  Martin  was  as  a  lawyer, 
and  as  high  as  his  authority  may  be  considered  on  a  legal  point,  I  cannot  ac 
cept  it  in  determining  the  point  at  issue.  The  attitude  which  he  occupied,  if 
taken  into  view,  would  lessen,  if  not  destroy,  the  weight  of  his  authority.  He 
had  been  violently  opposed  in  Convention  to  the  Constitution,  and  the  very  let 
ter  from  which  the  senator  has  quoted  was  intended  to  dissuade  Maryland  from 
its  adoption.  With  this  view,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  every  consideration 
calculated  to  effect  that  object  should  be  urged  ;  that  real  objections  should  be 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  83 

exaggerated  ;  and  that  those  having  no  foundation,  except  mere  plausible  deduc 
tions,  should  be  presented.  It  is  to  this  spirit  that  I  attribute  the  opinion  of 
Mr.  Martin  in  reference  to  the  point  under  consideration.  But  if  his  authority 
be  good  on  one  point,  it  must  be  admitted  to  be  equally  so  on  another.  If  his 
opinion  be  sufficient  to  prove  that  a  citizen  of  the  state  may  be  punished  as  a 
traitor  when  acting  under  allegiance  to  the  state,  it  is  also  sufficient  to  show 
that  no  authority  was  intended  to  be  given  in  the  Constitution  for  the  protection 
of  manufactures  by  the  General  Government,  and  that  the  provision  in  the  Con 
stitution  permitting  a  state  to  lay  an  impost  duty,  with  the  consent  of  Congress, 
was  intended  to  reserve  the  right  of  protection  to  the  states  themselves,  arid 
that  each  state  should  protect  its  own  industry.  Assuming  his  opinion  to  be 
of  equal  authority  on  both  points,  how  embarrassing  would  be  the  attitude  in 
which  it  would  place  the  senator  from  Delaware,  and  those  with  whom  he  is 
acting — that  of  using  the  sword  and  the  bayonet  to  enforce  the  execution  of  an 
unconstitutional  act  of  Congress.  I  must  express  my  surprise  that  the  slightest 
authority  in  favour  of  power  should  be  received  as  the  most  conclusive  evidence, 
while  that  which  is,  at  least,  equally  strong  in  favour  of  right  and  liberty,  is 
wholly  overlooked  or  rejected. 

Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said,  I  must  say  that  neither  the  senator 
from  Delaware  (Mr.  Clayton),  nor  any  other  who  has  spoken  on  the  same  side, 
has  directly  and  fairly  met  the  great  questions  at  issue  :  Is  this  a  federal  union  ? 
a  union  of  states,  as  distinct  from  that  of  individuals  ?  Is  the  sovereignty  in  the 
several  states,  or  in -the  American  people  in  the  aggregate  ?  The  very  language 
which  we  are  compelled  to  use,  when  speaking  of  our  political  institutions,  af 
fords  proof  conclusive  as  to  its  real  character.  The  terms  union,  federal,  uni 
ted,  all  imply  a  combination  of  sovereignties,  a  confederation  of  states.  They 
are  never  applied  to  an  association  of  individuals.  Who  ever  heard  of  the  Uni 
ted  State  of  New- York,  of  Massachusetts,  or  of  Virginia  ?  Who  ever  heard 
the  term  federal  or  union  applied  to  the  aggregation  of  individuals  into  one 
community  ?  Nor  is  the  other  point  less  clear — that  the  sovereignty  is  in  the 
several  states,  and  that  our  system  is  a  union  of  twenty-four  sovereign  powers, 
under  a  constitutional  compact,  and  not  of  a  divided  sovereignty  between  the 
states  severally  and  the  United  States.  In  spite  of  all  that  has  been  said,  I 
maintain  that  sovereignty  is  in  its  nature  indivisible.  It  is  the  supreme  power 
in  a  state,  and  we  might  just  as  well  speak  of  half  a  square,  or  half  of  a  trian 
gle,  as  of  half  a  sovereignty.  It  is  a  gross  error  to  confound  the  exercise  of 
sovereign  powers  with  sovereingty  itself,  or  the  delegation  of  such  powers  with 
a.  surrender  of  them.  A  sovereign  may  delegate  his  powers  to  be  exercised  by 
as  many  agents  as  he  may  think  proper,  under  such  conditions  and  with  such 
limitations  as  he  may  impose  ;  but  to  surrender  any  portion  of  his  sovereignty 
to  another  is  to  annihilate  the  whole.  The  senator  from  Delaware  (Mr.  Clay 
ton)  calls  this  metaphysical  reasoning,  which,  he  says,  he  cannot  comprehend. 
If  by  metaphysics  he  means  that  scholastic  refinement  which  makes  distinc 
tions  without  difference,  no  one  can  hold  it  in  more  utter  contempt  than  I  do  ; 
but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  means  the  power  of  analysis  and  combination — that 
power  which  reduces  the  most  complex  idea  into  its  elements,  which  traces 
causes  to  their  first  principle,  and,  by  the  power  of  generalization  and  combi 
nation,  unites  the  whole  in  one  harmonious  system — then,  so  far  from  deserv 
ing  contempt,  it  is  the  highest  attribute  of  the  human  mind.  It  is  the  power 
which  raises  man  above  the  brute — which  distinguishes  his  faculties  from  mere 
sagacity,  which  he  holds  in  common  with  inferior  animals.  It  is  this  power 
which  has  raised  the  astronomer  from  being  a  mere  gazer  at  the  stars  to  the 
high  intellectual  eminence  of  a  Newton  or  Laplace,  and  astronomy  itself  from 
a  mere  observation  of  insulated  facts  into  that  noble  science  which  displays  to 
our  admiration  the  system  of  the  universe.  And  shall  this  high  power  of  the 
mind,  which  has  effected  such  wonders  when  directed  to  the  laws  which  con- 


84  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

trol  the  material  world,  be  forever  prohibited,  under  a  senseless  cry  of  metaphys 
ics,  from  being  applied  to  the  high  purpose  of  political  science  and  legislation  ? 
I  hold  them  to  be  subject  to  laws  as  fixed  as  matter  itself,  and  to  be  as  fit  a 
subject  for  the  application  of  the  highest  intellectual  power.  Denunciation  may, 
indeed,  fall  upon  the  philosophical  inquirer  into  these  first  principles,  as  it  did 
upon  Galileo  and  Bacon  when  they  first  unfolded  the  great  discoveries  which 
have  immortalized  their  names  ;  but  the  time  will  come  when  truth  will  pre 
vail  in  spite  of  prejudice  and  denunciation,  and  when  politics  aud  legislation 
will  be  considered  as  much  a  science  as  astronomy  and  chemistry. 

In  connexion  with  this  part  of  the  subject,  I  understood  the  senator  from  Vir 
ginia  (Mr.  Rives)  to  say  that  sovereignty  was  divided,  and  that  a  portion  re 
mained  with  the  states  severally,  and  that  the  residue  was  vested  in  the  Union. 
By  Union,  I  suppose  the  senator  meant  the  United  States.  If  such  be  his 
meaning — if  he  intended  to  affirm  that  the  sovereignty  was  in  the  twenty-four 
states,  in  whatever  light  he  may  view  them,  our  opinions  will  not  disagree  ;  but, 
according  to  my  conception,  the  whole  sovereignty  is  in  the  several  states,  while 
the  exercise  of  sovereign  powers  is  divided — a  part  being  exercised  under  com 
pact,  through  this  General  Government,  and  the  residue  through  the  separate 
state  governments.  But  if  the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives)  means  to  as 
sert  that  the  twenty-four  states  form  but  one  community,  with  a  single  sovereign 
power  as  to  the  objects  of  the  Union,  it  will  be  but  the  revival  of  the  old  ques 
tion,  of  whether  the  Union  is  a  union  between  states,  as  distinct  communities, 
or  a  mere  aggregate  of  the  American  people,  as  a  mass  of  individuals ;  and  in 
this  light  his  opinions  would  lead  directly  to  consolidation. 

But  to  return  to  the  bill.  It  is  said  that  the  bill  ought  to  pass,  because  the 
law  must  be  enforced.  The  law  must  be  enforced.  The  imperial  edict  must 
be  executed.  It  is  under  such  sophistry,  couched  in  general  terms,  without 
looking  to  the  limitations  which  must  ever  exist  in  the  practical  exercise  of 
power,  that  the  most  cruel  and  despotic  acts  ever  have  been  covered.  It  was 
such  sophistry  as  this  that  cast  Daniel  into  the  lion's  den,  and  the  three  Inno 
cents  into  the  fiery  furnace.  Under  the  same  sophistry  the  bloody  edicts  of 
Nero  and  Caligula  were  executed.  The  law  must  be  enforced.  Yes,  the  act 
imposing  the  "  tea-tax  must  be  executed."  This  was  the  very  argument  which 
impelled  Lord  North  and  his  administration  in  that  mad  career  which  forever 
separated  us  from  the  British  crown.  Under  a  similar  sophistry,  "  that  religion 
must  be  protected,"  how  many  massacres  have  been  perpetrated  ?  and  how  many 
martyrs  have  been  tied  to  the  stake  ?  What !  acting  on  this  vague  abstraction, 
are  you  prepared  to  enforce  a  law  without  considering  whether  it  be  just  or  un 
just,  constitutional  or  unconstitutional  ?  Will  you  collect  money  when  it  is  ac 
knowledged  that  it  is  not  wanted  ?  He  who  earns  the  money,  who  digs  it  from 
the  earth  with  the  sweat  of  his  brow,  has  a  just  title  to  it  against  the  universe. 
No  one  has  a  right  to  touch  it  without  his  consent  except  his  government,  and 
it  only  to  the  extent  of  its  legitimate  wants ;  to  take  more  is  robbery,  and  you 
propose  by  this  bill  to  enforce  robbery  by  murder.  Yes :  to  this  result  you 
must  come,  by  this  miserable  sophistry,  this  vague  abstraction  of  enforcing  the 
law,  without  a  regard  to  the  fact  whether  the  law  be  just  or  unjust,  constitution 
al  or  unconstitutional. 

In  the  same  spirit,  we  are  told  that  the  Union  must  be  preserved,  without  re 
gard  to  the  means.  And  how  is  it  proposed  to  preserve  the  Union?  By 
force !  Does  any  man  in  his  senses  believe  that  this  beautiful  structure — this 
harmonious  aggregate  of  states,  produced  by  the  joint  consent  of  all — can  be 
preserved  by  force  ?  Its  very  introduction  will  be  certain  destruction  of  this 
Federal  Union.  No,  no.  You  cannot  keep  the  states  united  in  their  consti 
tutional  and  federal  bonds  by  force.  Force  may,  indeed,  hold  the  parts  togeth 
er,  but  such  union  Avould  be  the  bond  between  master  and  slave  :  a  union  of 
exaction  on  one  side,  and  of  unqualified  obedience  on  the  other.  That  obedience 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  55 

which,  we  are  told  by  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Wilkins),  is  the 
Union !  Yes,  exaction  on  the  side  of  the  master ;  for  this  very  bill  is  intend 
ed  to  collect  what  can  be  no  longer  called  taxes — the  voluntary  contribution  of 
a  free  people — but  tribute — tribute  to  be  collected  under  the  mouths  of  the  can 
non  !  Your  custom-house  is  already  transferred  to  a  garrison,  and  that  garri 
son  with  its  batteries  turned,  not  against  the  enemy  of  your  country,  but  on  sub 
jects  (I  will  not  say  citizens),  on  whom  you  propose  to  levy  contributions.  Has 
reason  fled  from  our  borders  ?  Have  we  ceased  to  reflect  ?  It  is  madness 
to  suppose  that  the  Union  can  be  preserved  by  force.  I  tell  you  plainly,  that 
the  bill,  should  it  pass,  cannot  be  enforced.  It  will  prove  only  a  blot  upon  your 
statute-book,  a  reproach  to  the  year,  and  a  disgrace  to  the  American  Senate. 
I  repeat  that  it  will  not  be  executed :  it  will  rouse  the  dormant  spirit  of  the 
people,  and  open  their  eyes  to  the  approach  of  despotism.  The  country  has 
sunk  into  avarice  and  political  corruption,  from  which  nothing  can  arouse  it  but 
some  measure,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  of  folly  and  madness,  such  as 
that  now  under  consideration. 

Disguise  it  as  you  may,  the  controversy  is  one  between  power  and  liberty ; 
and  I  will  tell  the  gentlemen  who  are  opposed  to  me,  that,  as  strong  as  may  be 
the  love  of  power  on  their  side,  the  love  of  liberty  is  still  stronger  on  ours. 
History  furnishes  many  instances  of  similar  struggles  where  the  love  of  liberty 
has  prevailed  against  power  under  every  disadvantage,  and  among  them  few 
more  striking  than  that  of  our  own  Revolution  ;  where,  as  strong  as  was  the  pa 
rent  country,  and  feeble  as  were  the  colonies,  yet,  under  the  impulse  of  liberty, 
and  the  blessing  of  God,  they  gloriously  triumphed  in  the  contest.  There  are, 
indeed,  many  and  striking  analogies  between  that  and  the  present  controversy : 
they  both  originated  substantially  in  the  same  cause,  with  this  difference,  that, 
in  the  present  case,  the  power  of  taxation  is  converted  into  that  of  regulating 
industry  ;  in  that,  the  power  of  regulating  industry,  by  the  regulation  of  com 
merce,  was  attempted  to  be  converted  into  the  power  of  taxation.  Were  I  to 
trace  the  analogy  farther,  we  should  find  that  the  perversion  of  the  taxing  pow 
er,  in  one  case,  has  given  precisely  the  same  control  to  the  Northern  section 
over  the  industry  of  the  Southern  section  of  the  Union,  which  the  power  to  reg 
ulate  commerce  gave  to  Great  Britain  over  the  industry  of  the  colonies ;  and 
that  the  very  articles  in  which  the  colonies  were  permitted  to  have  a  free  trade, 
and  those  in  which  the  mother-country  had  a  monopoly,  are  almost  identically 
the  same  as  those  in  which  the  Southern  States  are  permitted  to  have  a  free 
trade  by  the  act  of  1832,  and  in  which  the  Northern  States  have,  by  the  same 
act,  secured  a  monopoly :  the  only  difference  is  in  the  means.  In  the  former, 
the  colonies  were  permitted  to  have  a  free  trade  with  all  countries  south  of 
Cape  Finisterre.  a  cape  in  the"  northern  part  of  Spain  ;  while  north  of  that 
the  trade  of  the  colonies  was  prohibited,  except  through  the  mother-country,  by 
means  of  her  commercial  regulations.  If  we  compare  the  products  of  the  coun 
try  north  and  south  of  Cape  Finisterre,  we  shall  find  them  almost  identical  with 
the  list  of  the  protected  and  unprotected  articles  contained  in  the  act  of  last 
year.  Nor  does  the  analogy  terminate  here.  The  very  arguments  resorted 
to  at  the  commencement  of  the  American  Revolution,  and  the  measures  adopt 
ed,  and  the  motives  assigned  to  bring  on  that  contest  (to  enforce  the  law),  are 
almost  identically  the  same. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression  to  the  consideration  of  the  bill.  Whatever 
difference  of  opinion  may  exist  upon  other  points,  there  is  one  on  which  I  should 
suppose  there  can  be  none  :  that  this  bill  rests  on  principles  which,  if  carried 
out,  will  ride  over  state  sovereignties,  and  that  it  will  be  idle  for  any  of  its  ad 
vocates  hereafter  to  talk  of  state  rights.  The  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives) 
says  that  he  is  the  advocate  of  state  rights  ;  but  he  must  permit  me  to  tell  him 
that,  although  he  may  differ  in  premises  from  the  other  gentlemen  with  whom 
he  acts  on  this  occasion,  yet  in  supporting  this  bill  he  obliterates  every  vestige 


86  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  distinction  between  him  and  them,  saving  only  that,  professing  the  principles 
of  '98,  his  example  will  be  more  pernicious  than  that  of  the  most  open  and  bit 
ter  opponents  of  the  rights  of  the  states.  I  will  also  add,  what  I  am  compelled 
to  say,  that  I  must  consider  him  (Mr.  Rives)  as  less  consistent  than  our  old 
opponents,  whose  conclusions  were  fairly  drawn  from  their  premises,  while 
his  premises  ought  to  have  led  him  to  opposite  conclusions.  The  gentleman 
has  told  us  that  the  new-fangled  doctrines,  as  he  chooses  to  call  them,  have 
brought  state  rights  into  disrepute.  I  must  tell  him,  in  reply,  that  what  he  calls 
new-fangled  are  but  the  doctrines  of  '98 ;  and  that  it  is  he  (Mr.  Rives),  and 
others  with  him,  who,  professing  these  doctrines,  have  degraded  them  by  ex 
plaining  away  their  meaning  and  efficacy.  He  (Mr.  R.)has  disclaimed,  in  be 
half  of  Virginia,  the  authorship  of  nullification.  I  will  not  dispute  that  point. 
If  Virginia  chooses  to  throw  away  one  of  her  brightest  ornaments,  she  must 
not  hereafter  complain  that  it  has  become  the  property  of  another.  But  while 
I  have,  as  a  representative  of  Carolina,  no  right  to  complain  of  the  disavowal 
of  the  senator  from  Virginia,  I  must  believe  that  he  (Mr.  R.)  has  done  his  na 
tive  state  great  injustice  by  declaring  on  this  floor  that,  when  she  gravely  re- 
solved,  in  '98,  that,  "  in  cases  of  deliberate  and  dangerous  infractions  of  the  Con 
stitution,  the  states,  as  parties  to  the  compact,  have  the  right,  and  are  in  'duty 
bound,  to  interpose  to  arrest  the  progress  of  the  evil,  and  to  maintain  within  their 
respective  limits  the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties  appertaining  to  them,"  she 
meant  no  more  than  to  ordain  the  right  to  protest  and  to  remonstrate.  To  sup 
pose  that,  in  putting  forth  so  solemn  a  declaration,  which  she  afterward  sustain 
ed  by  so  able  arid  elaborate  an  argument,  she  meant  no  more  than  to  assert  what 
no  one  had  ever  denied,  would  be  to  suppose  that  the  state  had  been  guilty  of 
the  most  egregious  trifling  that  ever  was  exhibited  on  so  solemn  an  occasion. 

In  reviewing  the  ground  over  which  I  have  passed,  it  will  be  apparent  that 
the  question  in  controversy  involves  that  most  deeply  important  of  all  political 
questions,  whether  ours  is  a  federal  or  a  consolidated  government :  a  question, 
on  the  decision  of  which  depend,  as  I  solemnly  believe,  the  liberty  of  the  peo 
ple,  their  happiness,  and  the  place  which  we  are  destined  to  hold  in  the  moral 
and  intellectual  scale  of  nations.  Never  was  there  a  controversy  in  which 
'more  important  consequences  were  involved  :  not  excepting  that  between  Per 
sia  and  Greece,  decided  by  the  battles  of  Marathon,  Platea,  and  Salamis  ; 
which  gave  ascendency  to  the  genius  of  Europe  over  that  of  Asia ;  and  which, 
in  its  consequences,  has  continued  to  affect  the  destiny  of  so  large  a  portion  of 
the  world  even  to  this  day.  There  is  often  close  analogies  between  events  ap 
parently  very  remote,  which  are  strikingly  illustrated  in  this  case.  In  the  great 
contest  between  Greece  and  Persia,  between  European  and  Asiatic  polity  and 
civilization,  the  very  question  between  the  federal  and  consolidated  form  of  gov 
ernment  was  involved.  The  Asiatic  governments,  from  the  remotest  time,  with 
some  exceptions  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean,  have  been  based 
on  the  principle  of  consolidation,  which  considers  the  whole  community  as  but 
a  unit,  and  consolidates  its  powers  in  a  central  point.  The  opposite  principle 
has  prevailed  in  Europe — Greece,  throughout  all  her  states,  was  based  on  a 
federal  system.  All  were  united  in  one  common,  but  loose  bond,  and  the  gov 
ernments  of  the  several  states  partook,  for  the  most  part,  of  a  complex  organi 
zation,  which  distributed  political  power  among  different  members  of  the  com 
munity.  The  same  principles  prevailed  in  ancient  Italy  ;  and,  if  we  turn  to  the 
Teutonic  race,  our  great  ancestors — the  race  which  occupies  the  first  place  in 
power,  civilization,  and  science,  and  which  possesses  the  largest  and  the  fairest 
part  of  Europe — we  shall  find  that  their  governments  were  based  on  the  federal 
organization,  as  has  been  clearly  illustrated  by  a  recent  and  able  writer  on  the 
British  Constitution  (Mr.  Palgrave).  from  whose  writings  I  introduce  the  follow 
ing  extract  : 

"  In  this  manner  the  first  establishment  of  the  Teutonic  States  was  effected. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  87 

They  were  assemblages  of  septs,  clans,  and  tribes  ;  they  were  confederated 
hosts  and  armies,  led  on  by  princes,  magistrates,  and  chieftains  ;  each  of  whom 
was  originally  independent,  and  each  of  whom  lost  a  portion  of  his  pristine  in 
dependence  in  proportion  as  he  and  his  compeers  became  united  under  the  su 
premacy  of  a  sovereign,  who  was  superinduced  upon  the  state,  first  as  a  milita 
ry  commander,  and  afterward  as  a  king.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  political  con 
nexion,  each  member  of  the  state  continued  to  retain  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  rights  of  sovereignty.  Every  ancient  Teutonic  monarchy  must  be  consid 
ered  as  a  federation :  it  is  not  a  unit,  of  which  the  smaller  bodies  politic  there 
in  contained  are  the  fractions,  but  they  are  the  integers,  and  the  state  is  the 
multiple  which  results  from  them.  Dukedoms  and  counties,  burghs  and  baron 
ies,  towns  and  townships,  and  shires,  form  the  kingdom  ;  all,  in  a  certain  de 
gree,  strangers  to  each  other,  and  separate  in  jurisdiction,  though  all  obedient 
to  the  supreme  executive  authority.  This  general  description,  though  not  al 
ways  strictly  applicable  in  terms,  is  always  so  substantially  and  in  effect ;  and 
hence  it  becomes  necessary  to  discard  the  language  which  has  been  very  gen 
erally  employed  in  treating  on  the  English  Constitution.  It  has  been  supposed 
that  the  kingdom  was  reduced  into  a  regular  and  gradual  subordination  of  gov 
ernment,  and  that  the  various  legal  districts  of  which  it  is  composed  arose  from 
the  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  the  country.  But  this  hypothesis,  which  tends 
greatly  to  perplex  our  history,  cannot  be  supported  by  fact ;  and  instead  of  view 
ing  the  Constitution  as  a  whole,  and  then  proceeding  to  its  parts,  we  must  ex 
amine  it  synthetically,  and  assume  that  the  supreme  authorities  of  the  state 
were  created  by  the  concentration  of  the  powers  originally  belonging  to  the 
members  and  corporations  of  which  it  is  composed."  [Here  Mr.  C.  gave  way 
for  a  motion  to  adjourn.] 

On  the  next  day  Mr.  Calhoun  said,  I  have  omitted  at  the  proper  place,  in  the 
course  of  my  observations  yesterday,  two  or  three  points,  to  which  I  will  now 
advert,  before  I  resume  the  discussion  where  I  left  off.  I  have  stated  that  the 
ordinance  and  acts  of  South  Carolina  were  directed,  not  against  the  revenue, 
but  against  the  system  of  protection.  But  it  may  be  asked,  If  such  was  her 
object,  how  happens  it  that  she  has  declared  the  whole  system  void — revenue 
as  well  as  protection,  without  discrimination  ?  It  is  this  question  which  I  pro 
pose  to  answer.  Her  justification  will  be  found  in  the  necessity  of  the  case  ; 
and  if  there  be  any  blame,  it  cannot  attach  to  her.  The  two  are  so  blended, 
throuo-hout  the  whole,  as  to  make  the  entire  revenue  system  subordinate  to  the 
protective,  so  as  to  constitute  a  complete  system  of  protection,  in  which  it  is 
impossible  to  discriminate  the  two  elements  of  which  it  is  composed.  South 
Carolina,  at  least,  could  not  make  the  discrimination,  and  she  was  reduced  to  the 
alternative  of  acquiescing  in  a  system  which  she  believed  to  be  unconstitution 
al,  and  which  she  felt  to  be  oppressive  and  ruinous,  or  to  consider  the  whole 
as  one,  equally  contaminated  through  all  its  parts,  by  the  unconstitutionally  of 
the  protective  portion,  and,  as  such,  to  be  resisted  by  the  act  of  the  siate.  I 
maintain  that  the  state  has  a  right  to  regard  it  in  the  latter  character,  and  that, 
if  a  loss  of  revenue  follow,  the  fault  is  not  hers,  but  of  this  government,  which 
has  improperly  blended  together,  in  a  manner  not  to  be  separated  by  the  state, 
two  systems  wholly  dissimilar.  If  the  sincerity  of  the  state  be  doubted  ;  if  it 
be  supposed  that  her  action  is  against  revenue  as  well  as  protection,  let  the  two 
be  separated  :  let  so  much  of  the  duties  as  are  intended  for  revenue  be  put  in 
one  bill,  and  the  residue  intended  for  protection  be  put  in  another,  and  I  pledge 
myself  that  the  ordinance  and  the  acts  of  the  state  will  cease  as  to  the  former, 
and  be  directed  exclusively  against  the  latter. 

I  also  stated,  in  the  course  of  my  remarks  yesterday,  and  I  trust  I  have  con 
clusively  shown,  that  the  act  of  1816,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  item,  to 
which  I  have  alluded,  was,  in  reality,  a  revenue  measure,  and  that  Carolina  and 
the  other  states,  in  supporting  it,  have  not  incurred  the  slighted  responsibility 


88  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

in  relation  to  the  system  of  protection  which  has  since  grown  up,  and  which 
now  so  deeply  distracts  the  country.  Sir,  I  am  willing,  as  one  of  the  repre 
sentatives  of  Carolina,  and  I  believe  I  speak  the  sentiment  of  the  state,  to  take 
1<hat  act  as  the  basis  of  a  permanent  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  simply  reducing  the 
duties,  in  an  average  proportion,  on  all  the  items  to  the  revenue  point.  I  make 
that  offer  now  to  the  advocates  of  the  protective  system ;  but  I  must,  in  candour, 
inform  them  that  such  an  adjustment  would  distribute  the  revenue  between  the 
protected  and  unprotected  articles  more  favourably  to  the  state,  and  to  the  South, 
and  less  so  to  the  manufacturing  interest,  than  an  average  uniform  ad  valorem, 
and,  accordingly,  more  so  than  that  now  proposed  by  Carolina  through  her  con 
vention.  After  such  an  offer,  no  man  who  values  his  candour  will  dare  accuse 
the  state,  or  those  who  have  represented  her  here,  with  inconsistency  in  refer 
ence  to  the  point  under  consideration. 

.  I  omitted,  also,  on  yesterday,  to  notice  a  remark  of  the  senator  from  Virginia 
(Mr.  Rives),  that  the  only  difficulty  in  adjusting  the  tariff  grew  out  of  the  ordi 
nance  and  the  acts  of  South  Carolina.  I  must  attribute  an  assertion  so  incon 
sistent  with  the  facts  to  an  ignorance  of  the  occurrences  of  the  last  few  years 
in  reference  to  this  subject,  occasioned  by  the  absence  of  the  gentleman  from 
the  United  States,  to  which  he  himself  has  alluded  in  his  remarks.  If  the  sen 
ator  will  take  pains  to  inform  himself,  he  will  find  that  this  protective  system 
advanced  with  a  continued  and  rapid  step,  in  spite  of  petitions,  remonstrances, 
and  protests,  of  not  only  Carolina,  but  also  of  Virginia  and  of  all  the  Southern 
States,  until  1828,  when  Carolina,  for  the  first  time,  changed  the  character  of 
her  resistance,  by  holding  up  her  reserved  rights  as  the  shield  of  her  defence 
against  farther  encroachment.  This  attitude  alone,  unaided  by  a  single  state, 
arrested  the  farther  progress  of  the  system,  so  that  the  question  from  that  pe 
riod  to  this,  on  the  part  of  the  manufacturers,  has  been,  not  how  to  acquire 
more,  but  to  retain  that  which  they  have  acquired.  I  will  inform  the  gentle 
man  that,  if  this  attitude  had  not  been  taken  on  the  part  of  the  state,  the  ques 
tion  would  not  now  be  how  duties  ought  to  be  repealed,  but  a  question,  as  to 
the  protected  articles,  between  prohibition  on  one  side  and  the  duties  establish 
ed  by  the  act  of  1828  on  the  other.  But  a  single  remark  will  be  sufficient  ia 
reply  to  what  I  must  consider  the  invidious  remark  of  the  senator  from  Virgin 
ia  (Mr.  Rives).  The  act  of  1832,  which  has  not  yet  gone  into  operation,  and 
which  was  passed  but  a  few  months  since,  was  declared  by  the  supporters  of 
the  system  to  be  a  permanent  adjustment,  and  the  bill  proposed  by  the  Treasury 
Department,  not  essentially  different  from  the  act  itself,  was  in  like  manner  de 
clared  to  be  intended  by  the  administration  as  a  permanent  arrangement. 
What  has  occurred  since,  except  this  ordinance,  and  these  abused  acts  of  the 
calumniated  state,  to  produce  this  mighty  revolution  in  reference  to  this  odious 
system  ?  Unless  the  senator  from  Virginia  can  assign  some  other  cause,  he  is 
bound,  upon  every  principle  of  fairness,  to  retract  this  unjust  aspersion  upon  the 
acts  of  South  Carolina. 

The  senator  from  Delaware  (Mr.  Clayton),  as  well  as  others,  has  relied  with 
great  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  we  are  citizens  of  the  United  States.  1  do  not 
object  to  the  expression,  nor  shall  I  detract  from  the  proud  and  elevated  feel 
ings  with  which  it  is  associated  ;  but  I  trust  that  I  may  be  permitted  to  raise  the 
inquiry,  In  what  manner  are  we  citizens  of  the  United  States  ?  without  weak 
ening  the  patriotic  feeling  with  which,  I  trust,  it  will  ever  be  uttered.  If  by  cit 
izen  of  the  United  States  he  means  a  citizen  at  large,  one  whose  citizenship 
extends  to  the  entire  geographical  limits  of  the  country,  without  having  a  local 
citizenship  in  some  state  or  territory,  a  sort  of  citizen  of  the  world,  all  I  have 
to  say  is,  that  such  a  citizen  would  be  a  perfect  nondescript ;  that  not  a  single 
individual  of  this  description  can  be  found  in  the  entire  mass  of  our  population. 
Notwithstanding  all  the  pomp  and  display  of  eloquence  on  the  occasion,  every 
citizen  is  a  citizen  of  some  state  or  territory,  and,  as  such,  under  an  express  pro- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  89 

vision  of  the  Constitution,  is  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens 
in  the  several  states  ;  and  it  is  in  this,  and  in  no  other  sense,  that  we  are  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  The  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Dallas),  indeed,  re 
lies  upon  that  provision  in  the  Constitution  which  gives  Congress  the  power 
to  establish  a  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  the  operation  of  the  rule  actu 
ally  established  under  this  authority,  to  prove  that  naturalized  citizens  are  citi 
zens  at  large,  without  being  citizens  of  any  of  the  states.  I  do  not  deem  it  ne 
cessary  to  examine  the  law  of  Congress  upon  this  subject,  or  to  reply  to  the  ar 
gument  of  the  senator,  though  I  cannot  doubt  that  he  (Mr.  D.)  has  taken  an  en 
tirely  erroneous  view  of  the  subject.  It  is  sufficient  that  the  power  of  Congress 
extends  simply  to  the  establishment  of  a  uniform  rule  by  which  foreigners  may 
be  naturalized  in  the  several  states  or  territories,  without  infringing  in  any  other 
respect,  in  reference  to  naturalization,  the  rights  of  the  states  as  they  existed 
before  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 

Having  supplied  the  omissions  of  yesterday,  I  now  resume  the  subject  at  the 
point  where  my  remarks  then  terminated.  The  Senate  will  remember  that 
I  stated,  at  their  close,  that  the  great  question  at  issue  is,  whether  ours  is  a 
federal  or  a  consolidated  system  of  government ;  a  system  in  which  the  parts, 
to  use  the  emphatic  language  of  Mr.  Palgrave,  are  the  integers,  and  the  whole 
the  multiple,  or  in  which  the  whole  is  a  unit  and  the  parts  the  fractions  ;  that  I 
stated,  that  on  the  decision  of  this  question,  I  believe,  depend  not  only  the  lib 
erty  and  prosperity  of  this  country,  but  the  place  which  we  are  destined  to  hold 
in  the  intellectual  and  moral  scale  of  nations.  I  stated,  also,  in  my  remarks  on 
this  point,  that  there  is  a  striking  analogy  between  this  and  the  great  struggle 
between  Persia  and  Greece,  which  was  decided  by  the  battles  of  Marathon, 
Platea,  and  Salamis,  and  which  immortalized  the  names  of  Miltiades  and  The- 
mistocles.  I  illustrated  this  analogy  by  showing  that  centralism  or  consolida 
tion,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  nations  along  the  eastern  border  of  the  Medi 
terranean,  has  been  the  pervading  principle  in  the  Asiatic  governments,  while 
the  federal  system,  or,  what  is  the  same  in  principle,  that  system  which  organ 
izes  a  community  in  reference  to  its  parts,  has  prevailed  in  Europe. 

Among  the  few  exceptions  in  the  Asiatic  nations,  the  government  of  the 
twelve  tribes  of  Israel,  in  its  early  period,  is  the  most  striking.  Their  govern 
ment,  at  first,  was  a  mere  confederation  without  any  central  power,  till  a  mil 
itary  chieftain,  with  the  title  of  king,  was  placed  at  its  head,  without,  however, 
merging  the  original  organization  of  the  twelve  distinct  tribes.  This  was  the 
commencement  of  that  central  action  among  that  peculiar  people  which,  in 
three  generations,  terminated  in  a  permanent  division  of  their  tribes.  It  is  im 
possible  even  for  a  careless  reader  to  peruse  the  history  of  that  event  without 
being  forcibly  struck  with  the  analogy  in  the  causes  which  led  to  their  separa 
tion,  and  those  which  now  threaten  us  with  a  similar  calamity.  With  the  es 
tablishment  of  the  central  power  in  the  king  commenced  a  system  of  taxation, 
which,  under  King  Solomon,  was  greatly  increased  to  defray  the  expense  of 
rearing  the  temple,  of  enlarging  and  embellishing  Jerusalem,  the  seat  of  the 
central  government,  and  the  other  profuse  expenditures  of  his  magnificent  reign. 
Increased  taxation  was  followed  by  its  natural  consequences — discontent  and 
complaint;  which  before  his  death  began  to  excite  resistance.  On  the  succes 
sion  of  his  son,  Rehoboam,  the  ten  tribes,  headed  by  Jeroboam,  demanded  a  re 
duction  of  the  taxes  ;  the  temple  being  finished,  and  the  embellishment  of  Jeru 
salem  completed,  and  the  money  which  had  been  raised  for  that  purpose  being 
no  longer  required,  or,  in  other  words,  the  debt  being  paid,  they  demanded  a 
reduction  of  the  duties— a  repeal  of  the  tariff.  The  demand  was  taken  under 
consideration,  and  after  consulting  the  old  men,  the  counsellors  of  '98,  who  ad 
vised  a  reduction,  he  then  took  the  opinion  of  the  younger  politicians,  who  had 
since  grown  up,  and  knew  not  the  doctrines  of  their  fathers  ;  he  hearkened  unto 
their  counsel,  and  refused  to  make  the  reduction,  and  the  secession  of  the  ten 

M 


90  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tribes  under  Jeroboam  followed.     The  tribes  of  Judah  and  Benjamin,  which 
had  received  the  disbursements,  alone  remained  to  the  house  of  David. 

But  to  return  to  the  point  immediately  under  consideration.  I  know  that  it 
is  not  only  the  opinion  of  a  large  majority  of  our  country,  but  it  may  be  said  to  ' 
be  the  opinion  of  the  age,  that  the  very  beau  ideal  of  a  perfect  government  is 
the  government  of  a  majority,  acting  through  a  representative  body,  without 
check  or  limitation  in  its  power ;  yet,  if  we  may  test  this  theory  by  experience 
and  reason,  we  shall  find  that,  so  far  from  being  perfect,  the  necessary  tenden 
cy  of  all  governments,  based  upon  the  will  of  an  absolute  majority,  without  con 
stitutional  check  or  limitation  of  power,  is  to  faction,  corruption,  anarchy,  and 
despotism ;  and  this,  whether  the  will  of  the  majority  be  expressed  directly 
through  an  assembly  of  the  people  themselves,  or  by  their  representatives.  1 
know  that,  in  venturing  this  assertion,  I  utter  that  which  is  unpopular  both 
within  and  without  these  walls ;  but  where  truth  and  liberty  are  concerned,^ 
such  considerations  should  not  be  regarded.  I  will  place  the  decision  of  this 
point  on  the  fact  that  no  government  of  the  kind,  among  the  many  attempts 
which  have  been  made,  has  ever  endured  for  a  single  generation,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  has  invariably  experienced  the  fate  which  I  have  assigned  to  it.  Let 
a  single  instance  be  pointed  out,  and  I  will  surrender  my  opinion.  But,  if  we 
had  not  the  aid  of  experience  to  direct  our  judgment,  reason  itself  would  be  a 
certain  guide.  The  view  which  considers  the  community  as  a  unit,  and  all  its 
parts  as  having  a  similar  interest,  is  radically  erroneous.  However  small  the 
community  may  be,  and  however  homogeneous  its  interests,  the  moment  that 
government  is  put  into  operation,  as  soon  as  it  begins  to  collect  taxes  and  to 
make  appropriations,  the  different  portions  of  the  community  must,  of  necessity, 
bear  different  and  opposing  relations  in  reference  to  the  action  of  the  govern 
ment.  There  must  inevitably  spring  up  two  interests — a  direction  and  a  stock 
holder  interest — an  interest  profiting  by  the  action  of  the  government,  and  in 
terested  in  increasing  its  powers  and  action ;  and  another,  at  whose  expense 
the  political  machine  is  kept  in  motion.  I  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  commu 
nicate  distinct  ideas  on  such  a  subject,  through  the  medium  of  general  proposi 
tions,  without  particular  illustration ;  and  in  order  that  I  may  be  distinctly  un 
derstood,  though  at  the  hazard  of  being  tedious,  I  will  illustrate  the  important 
principle  which  I  have  ventured  to  advance  by  examples. 

Let  us,  then,  suppose  a  small  community  of  five  persons,  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  world  ;  and,  to  make  the  example  strong,  let  us  suppose  them  all  to  be 
engaged  in  the  same  pursuit,  and  to  be  of  equal  wealth.  Let  us  farther  sup 
pose  that  they  determine  to  govern  the  community  by  the  will  of  a  majority ; 
and,  to  make  the  case  as  strong  as  possible,  let  us  suppose  that  the  majority,  in 
order  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  government,  lay  an  equal  tax,  say  of  $100,  on 
each  individual  of  this  little  community.  Their  treasury  would  contain  five 
hundred  dollars.  Three  are  a  majority ;  and  they,  by  supposition,  have  con 
tributed  three  hundred  as  their  portion,  and  the  other  two  (the  minority), 
two  hundred.  The  three  have  the  right  to  make  the  appropriations  as  they 
may  think  proper.  The  question  is,  How  would  the  principle  of  the  abso 
lute  and  unchecked  majority  operate,  under  these  circumstances,  in  this  little 
community  ?  If  the  three  be  governed  by  a  sense  of  justice — if  they  should 
appropriate  the  money  to  the  objects  for  which  it  was  raised,  the  common  and 
equal  benefit  of  the  five,  then  the  object  of  the  association  would  be  fairly  and 
"honestly  effected,  and  each  would  have  a  common  interest  in  the  government. 
But,  should  the  majority  pursue  an  opposite  course — should  they  appropriate  the 
money  in  a  manner  to  benefit  their  own  particular  interest,  without  regard  to 
the  interest  of  the  two  (and  that  they  will  so  act,  unless  there  be  some  effi 
cient  check,  he  who  best  knows  human  nature  will  least  doubt),  who  does  not 
see  that  the  three  and  the  two  would  have  directly  opposite  interests  in  refer 
ence  to  the  action  of  the  government  ?  The  three  who  contribute  to  the  com- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHfr    C.    CALHOUN.  91 

•mon  treasury  but  three  hundred  dollars,  could,  in  fact,  by  appropriating  the  five 
hundred  to  their  own  use,  convert  the  action  of  the  government  into  the  means 
of  making  money,  and,  of  consequence,  would  have  a  direct  interest  in  increas 
ing  the  taxes.  They  put  in  three  hundred  and  take  out  five  :  that  is, -they  take 
back  to  themselves  all  that  they  had  put  in,  and,  in  addition,  that  which  was 
put  in  by  their  associates  ;  or,  in  other  words,  taking  taxation  and  appropriation 
together,  they  have  gained,  and  their  associates  have  lost,  two  hundred  dollars 
by  the  fiscal  action  of  the  government.  Opposite  interests,  in  reference  to  the 
action  of  the  government,  are  thus  created  between  them  :  the  one  having  an 
interest  in  favour,  and  the  other  against  the  taxes  ;  the  one  to  increase,  and  the 
other  to  decrease  the  taxes  ;  the  one  to  retain  the  taxes  when  the  money  is  no 
longer  wanted,  and  the  other  to  repeal  them  when  the  objects  for  which  they 
were  levied  have  been  executed. 

Let  us  now  suppose  this  community  of  five  to  be  raised  to  twenty-four  indi 
viduals,  to  be  governed,  in  like  manner,  by  the  will  of  a  majority :  it  is  obvious 
that  the  same  principle  would  divide  them  into  two  interests — into  a  majority 
and  a  minority,  thirteen  against  eleven,  or  in  some  other  proportion  ;  and  that 
all  the  consequences  which  I  have  shown  to  be  applicable  to  the  small  com 
munity  of  five  would  be  equally  applicable  to  the  greater,  the  cause  not  de 
pending  upon  the  number,  but  resulting  necessarily  from  the  action  of  the  gov 
ernment  itself.      Let  us  now  suppose  that,  instead  of  governing  themselves  di 
rectly  in  an  assembly  of  the  whole,  without  the  intervention  of  agents,  they 
should  adopt  the  representative  principle,  and  thaf,  instead  of  being  governed 
by  a  majority  of  themselves,  they  should  be  governed  by  a  majority  of  their 
representatives.      It  is  obvious  that  the  operation  of  the  system  would  not  be 
affected  by  the  change  :  the  representatives  being  responsive  to  those  who 
choose  them,  would  conform  to  the  will  of  their  constituents,  and  would  act  as 
they  would  do  were  they  present  and  acting  for  themselves  ;  and  the  same  con 
flict  of  interest,  which  we  have  shown  would  exist  in  one  case,  would  equally 
exist  in  the  other.      In  either  case,  the  inevitable  result  would  be  a  system  of 
hostile  legislation  on  the  part  of  the  majority,  or  the  stronger  interest,  against  the 
minority,  or  the  weaker  interest :  the  object  of  which,  on  the  part  of  the  former, 
would  be  to  exact  as  much  as  possible  from  the  latter,  which  would  necessarily 
be  resisted  by  all  the  means  in  their  power.     Warfare,  by  legislation,  would 
thus  be  commenced  between  the  parties,  with  the  same  object,  and  not  less 
hostile  than  that  which  is  carried  on  between  distinct  and  rival  nations — the 
only  distinction  would  be  in  the  instruments  and  the  mode.     Enactments,  in  the 
one  case,  would  supply  what  could  only  be  effected  by  arms  in  the  other ;  and 
the  inevitable  operation  would  be  to  engender  the  most  hostile  feelings  between 
the  parties,  which  would  merge  every  feeling  of  patriotism — that  feeling  which 
embraces  the  whole,  and  substitute  in  its  place  the  most  violent  party  attach 
ment  ;  and,  instead  of  having  one  common  centre  of  attachment,  around  which 
the  affections  of  the  community  might  rally,  there  would,  in  fact,  be  two — the 
interests  of  the  majority,  to  which  those  who  constitute  that  majority  would  be 
more  attached  than  they  would  be  to  the  whole,  and  that  of  the  minority,  to 
which  they,  in  like  manner,  would  also  be  more  attached  than  to  the  interests  of 
the  whole.     Faction  would  thus  take  the  place  of  patriotism  ;  and,  with  the  loss 
of  patriotism,  corruption  must  necessarily  follow,  and  in  its  train,  anarchy,  and, 
finally,  despotism,  or  the  establishment  of  absolute  power  in  a  single  individual, 
as  a  means  of  arresting  the  conflict  of  hostile  interests :  on  the  principle  that 
it  is  better  to  submit  to  the  will  of  a  single  individual,  who,  by  being  made  lord 
and  master  of  the  whole  community,  would  have  an  equal  interest  in  the  pro 
tection  of  all  the  parts. 

Let  us  next  suppose  that,  in  order  to  avert  the  calamitous  train  of  consequen 
ces,  this  little  community  should  adopt  a  written  constitution,  with  limitations 
restricting  the  will  of  the  majority,  in  order  to  protect  the  minority  against  the 


92  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

oppression  which  I  have  shown  would  necessarily  result  without  such  restric 
tions.  It  is  obvious  that  the  case  would  not  be  in  the  slightest  degree  varied, 
if  the  majority  be  left  in  possession  of  the  right  of  judging  exclusively  of  the 
extent  of  its  powers,  without  any  right  on  the  part  of  the  minority  to  enforce 
the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Constitution  on  the  will  of  the  majority.  The 
point  is  almost  too  clear  for  illustration.  Nothing  can  be  more  certain  than 
that,  when  a  constitution  grants  power,  and  imposes  limitations  on  the  exercise 
of  that  power,  whatever  interests  may  obtain  possession  of  the  government,  will 
be  in  favour  of  extending  the  power  at  the  expense  of  the  limitation  ;  and  that, 
unless  those  in  whose  behalf  the  limitations  were  imposed  have,  in  some  form 
or  mode,  the  right  of  enforcing  them,  the  power  will  ultimately  supersede  the 
limitation,  and  the  government  must  operate  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as 
if  the  will  of  the  majority  governed  without  constitution  or  limitation  of  power. 

I  have  thus  presented  all  possible  modes  in  which  a  government  founded 
upon  the  will  of  an  absolute  majority  will  be  modified,  and  have  demonstrated 
that,  in  all  its  forms,  whether  in  a  majority  of  the  people,  as  in  a  mere  Democ 
racy,  or  in  a  majority  of  their  representatives,  without  a  constitution  or  with  a 
constitution,  to  be  interpreted  as  the  will  of  the  majority,  the  result  will  be  the 
same  :  two  hostile  interests  will  inevitably  be  created  by  the  action  of  the  gov 
ernment,  to  be  followed  by  hostile  legislation,  and  that  by  faction,  corruption, 
anarchy,  and  despotism. 

The  great  and  solemn  question  here  presents  itself,  Is  there  any  remedy  for' 
these  evils  ?  on  the  decision  of  which  depends  the  question,  whether  the  people 
can  govern  themselves,  which  has  been  so  often  asked  with  so  much  skepticism 
and  doubt.  There  is  a  remedy,  and  but  one,  the  effects  of  which,  whatever 
may  be  the  form,  is  to  organize  society  in  reference  to  this  conflict  of  interests, 
which  springs  out  of  the  action  of  government ;  and  which  can  only  be  done  by 
giving  to  each  part  the  right  of  self-protection  ;  which,  in  a  word,  instead  of  con 
sidering  the  community  of  twenty-four  a  single  community,  having  a  common 
interest,  and  to  be  governed  by  the  single  will  of  an  entire  majority,  shall,  upon, 
all  questions  tending  to  bring  the  parts  into  conflict,  the  thirteen  against  the 
eleven,  take  the  will,  not  of  the  twenty-four  as  a  unit,  but  that  of  the  thirteen 
and  that  of  the  eleven  separately,  the  majority  of  each  governing  the  parts,  and 
where  they  concur,  governing  the  whole,  and  where  they  disagree,  arresting 
the  action  of  the  government.  This  I  will  call  the  concurring,  as  distinct  from, 
the  absolute  majority.  It  would  not  be,  as  was  generally  supposed,  a  minority 
governing  a  majority.  In  either  way  the  number  would  be  the  same,  whether 
taken  as  the  absolute  or  as  the  concurring  majority.  Thus,  the  majority  of  the 
thirteen  is  seven,  and  of  the  eleven  six ;  and  the  two  together  make  thirteen,  which. 
is  the  majority  of  twenty-four.  But,  though  the  number  is  the  same,  the  mode  of 
counting  is  essentially  different :  the  one  representing  the  strongest  interest, 
and  the  other,  the  entire  interests  of  the  community.  The  first  mistake  is,  in 
supposing  that  the  government  of  the  absolute  majority  is  the  government  of  this 
people — that  beau  ideal  of  a  perfect  government  which  has  been  so  enthusias 
tically  entertained  in  every  age  by  the  generous  and  patriotic,  where  civiliza 
tion  and  liberty  have  made  the  smallest  progress.  There  can  be  no  greater  er 
ror  :  the  government  of  the  people  is  the  government  of  the  whole  community 
— of  the  twenty-four — the  self-government  of  all  the  parts — too  perfect  to  be  re 
duced  to  practice  in  the  present,  or  any  past  stage  of  human  society.  The  gov 
ernment  of  the  absolute  majority,  instead  of  the  government  of  the  people,  is 
but  the  government  of  the  strongest  interests,  and,  when  not  efficiently  checked, 
is  the  most  tyrannical  and  oppressive  that  can  be  devised.  Between  this  ideal 
perfection  on  one  side  and  despotism  on  the  other,  none  other  can  be  devised 
but  that  which  considers  society  in  reference  to  its  parts,  as  differently  affected 
by  the  action  of  the  government,  and  which  takes  the  sense  of  each  part  sepa 
rately,  and  thereby  the  sense  of  the  whole,  in  the  manner  already  illustrated. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  93 

These  principles,  as  I  have  already  stated,  are  not  affected  by  the  number 
of  which  the  community  may  be  composed,  and  are  just  as  applicable  to  one 
of  thirteen  millions,  the  number  which  composes  ours,  as  of  the  small  commu 
nity  of  twenty-four,  which  I  have  supposed  for  the  purpose  of  illustration ;  and 
are  not  less  applicable  to  the  twenty-four  states  united  in  one  community,  than 
to  the  case  of  the  twenty-four  individuals.  There  is,  indeed,  a  distinction  be 
tween  a  large  and  a  small  community,  not  affecting  the  principle,  but  the  vio 
lence  of  the  action.  In  the  former,  the  similarity  of  the  interests  of  all  the 
parts  will  limit  the  oppression  from  the  hostile  action  of  the  parts,  in  a  great 
degree,  to  the  fiscal  action  of  the  government  merely  ;  but  in  the  large  commu 
nity,  spreading  over  a  country  of  great  extent,  and  having  a  great  diversity  of 
interests,  with  different  kinds  of  labour,  capital,  and  production,  the  conflict  and 
oppression  will  extend,  not  only  to  a  monopoly  of  the  appropriations  on  the 
part  of  the  stronger  interests,  but  will  end  in  unequal  taxes,  and  a  general  con 
flict  between  the  entire  interests  of  conflicting  sections,  which,  if  not  arrested 
by  the  most  powerful  checks,  will  terminate  in  the  most  oppressive  tyranny 
that  can  be  conceived,  or  in  the  destruction  of  the  community  itself. 

If  we  turn  our  attention  from  these  supposed  cases,  and  direct  it  to  our  gov 
ernment  and  its  actual  operation,  we  shall  find  a  practical  confirmation  of  the 
truth  of  what  has  been  stated,  not  only  of  the  oppressive  operation  of  the  sys 
tem  of  an  absolute  majority,  but  also  a  striking  and  beautiful  illustration,  in  the 
formation  of  our  system,  of  the  principle  of  the  concurring  majority,  as  distinct 
from  the  absolute,  which  I  have  asserted  to  be  the  only  means  of  efficiently 
checking  the  abuse  of  power,  and,  of  course,  the  only  solid  foundation  of  con 
stitutional  liberty.  That  our  government,  for  many  years,  has  been  gradually 
verging  to  consolidation  ;  that  the  Constitution  has  gradually  become  a  dead  let 
ter  ;  and  that  all  restrictions  upon  the  power  of  government  have  been  virtually 
removed,  so  as  practically  to  convert  the  General  Government  into  a  govern 
ment  of  an  absolute  majority,  without  check  or  limitation,  cannot  be  denied  by 
any  one  who  has  impartially  observed  its  operation. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  trace  the  commencement  and  gradual  progress  of  the 
causes  which  have  produced  this  change  in  our  system  :  it  is  sufficient  to  state 
that  the  change  has  taken  place  within  the  last  few  years.  What  has  been  the 
result  ?  Precisely  that  which  might  have  been  anticipated  :  the  growth  of  fac 
tion,  corruption,  anarchy,  and,  if  not  despotism  itself,  its  near  approach,  as  wit 
nessed  in  the  provisions  of  this  bill.  And  from  what  have  these  consequences 
sprung  ?  We  have  been  involved  in  no  war !  We  have  been  at  peace  with 
all  the  world.  We  have  been  visited  with  no  national  calamity.  Our  people 
have  been  advancing  in  general  intelligence,  and,  I  will  add,  as  great  and 
alarming  as  has  been  the  advance  of  political  corruption  among  the  mercenary 
corps  who  look  to  government  for  support,  the  morals  and  virtue  of  the  commu 
nity  at  large  have  been  advancing  in  improvement.  What,  I  will  again  repeat, 
is  the  cause  ?  No  other  can  be  assigned  but  a  departure  from  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Constitution,  which  has  converted  the  government  into  the  will 
of  an  absolute  and  irresponsible  majority,  and  which,  by  the  laws  that  must  in 
evitably  govern  in  all  such  majorities,  has  placed  in  conflict  the  great  inter 
ests  of  the  country  :  by  a  system  of  hostile  legislation,  by  an  oppressive  and 
unequal  imposition  of  taxes,  by  unequal  and  profuse  appropriations,  and  by  ren 
dering  the  entire  labour  and  capital  of  the  weaker  interest  subordinate  to  the 
stronger. 

This  is  the  cause,  and  these  the  fruits,  which  have  converted  the  government 
into  a  mere  instrument  of  taking  money  from  one  portion  of  the  community  to 
be  given  to  another,  and  which  has  rallied  around  it  a  great,  a  powerful,  and 
mercenary%orps  of  office-holders,  office-seekers,  and  expectants,  destitute  of 
principle  and  patriotism,  and  who  have  no  standard  of  morals  or  politics  but  the 
•will  of  the  executive — the  will  of  him  who  has  the  distribution  of  the  loaves 


94  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  the  fishes.  I  hold  it  impossible  for  any  one  to  look  at  the  theoretical  illus 
tration  of  the  principle  of  the  absolute  majority  in  the  cases  which  I  have  sup 
posed,  and  not  be  struck  with  the  practical  illustration  in  the  actual  operation 
of  our  government.  Under  every  circumstance,  the  absolute  majority  will  ever 
have  its  American  system  (I  mean  nothing  offensive  to  any  senator) ;  but  the 
real  meaning  of  the  American  system  is,  that  system  of  plunder  which  the 
strongest  interest  has  ever  waged,  and  will  ever  wage,  against  the  weaker, 
where  the  latter  is  not  armed  with  some  efficient  and  constitutional  check  to 
arrest  its  action.  Nothing  but  such  check  on  the  part  of  the  weaker  interest 
can  arrest  it :  mere  constitutional  limitations  are  wholly  insufficient.  Whatever 
interest  obtains  possession  of  the  government  will,  from  the  nature  of  things,  be 
in  favour  of  the  powers,  and  against  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  Constitution, 
and  will  resort  to  every  device  that  can  be  imagined  to  remove  those  restraints. 
On  the  contrary,  the  opposite  interest,  that  which  I  have  designated  as  the 
stockholding  interest,  the  tax-payers,  those  on  whom  the  system  operates,  will 
resist  the  abuse  of  powers,  and  contend  for  the  limitations.  And  it  is  on  this 
point,  then,  that  the  contest  between  the  delegated  and  the  reserved  powers  will 
be  waged  ;  but  in  this  contest,,  as  the  interests  in  possession  of  the  govern 
ment  are  organized  and  armed  by  all  its  powers  and  patronage,  the  opposite  in 
terest,  if  not  in  like  manner  organized  and  possessed  of  a  power  to  protect  them- 
selves  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  will  be  as  inevitably  crushed  as 
would  be  a  band  of  unorganized  militia  when  opposed  by  a  veteran  and  train 
ed  corps  of  regulars.  Let  it  never  be  forgotten  that  power  can  only  be  oppo 
sed  by  power,  organization  by  organization  ;  and  on  this  theory  stands  our  beau 
tiful  federal  system  of  government.  No  free  system  was  ever  farther  removed 
from  the  principle  that  the  absolute  majority,  without  check  or  limitation,  ought 
to  govern.  To  understand  what  our  government  is,  we  must  look  to  the  Con 
stitution,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  system.  I  do  not  intend  to  enter  into  any 
minute  examination  of  the  origin  and  the  source  of  its  powers :  it  is  sufficient 
for  my  purpose  to  state,  what  I  do  fearlessly,  that  it  derived  its  power  from  the 
people  of  the  separate  states,  each  ratifying  by  itself,  each  binding  itself  by  its 
own  separate  majority,  through  its  separate  convention,  the  concurrence  of  the 
majorities  of  the  several  states  forming  the  Constitution,  thus  taking  the  sense 
of  the  whole  by  that  of  the  several  parts,  representing  the  various  interests  of 
the  entire  community.  It  was  this  concurring  and  perfect  majority  which  form 
ed  the  Constitution,  and  not  that,  majority  which  would  consider  the  American, 
people  as  a  single  community,  and  which,  instead  of  representing  fairly  and 
fully  the  interests  of  the  whole,  would  but  represent,  as  has  been  stated,  the  in 
terest  of  the  stronger  section.  No  candid  man  can  dispute  that  I  have  given  a 
correct  description  of  the  constitution-making  power :  that  power  which  created 
and  organized  the  government,  which  delegated  to  it,  as  a  common  agent,  cer 
tain  powers,  in  trust  for  the  common  good  of  all  the  states,  and  which  imposed 
strict  limitation  and  checks  against  abuses  and  usurpations.  In  administer 
ing  the  delegated  powers,  the  Constitution  provides,  very  properly,  in  order  to 
give  promptitude  and  efficiency,  that  the  government  shall  be  organized  upon 
the  principle  of  the  absolute  majority,  or,  rather,  of  two  absolute  majorities  com 
bined  :  a  majority  of  the  states  considered  as  bodies  politic,  which  prevails  in 
this  body  ;  and  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  states,  estimated  in  federal  num 
bers,  in  the  other  house  of  Congress.  A  combination  of  the  two  prevails  in 
the  choice  of  the  President,  and,  of  course,  in  the  appointment  of  judges,  they  be 
ing  nominated  by  the  President  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  It  is  thus  that  the 
concurring  and  the  absolute  majorities  are  combined  in  one  complex  system  : 
the  one  in  forming  the  Constitution,  and  the  other  in  making  and  ey  cuting  the 
laws  ;  thus  beautifully  blending  the  moderation,  justice,  and  equity  of  the  former, 
and  more  perfect  majority,  with  the  promptness  and  energy  of  the  latter,  but 
less  perfect. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  95 

To  maintain  the  ascendency  of  the  Constitution  over  the  law-making  majori 
ty  is  the  great  and  essential  point,  on  which  the  success  of  the  system  must 
depend  :  unless  that  ascendency  can  be  preserved,  the  necessary  consequence 
must  be,  that  the  laws  will  supersede  the  Constitution,  and,  finally,  the  will  of 
the  executive,  by  the  influence  of  his  patronage,  will  supersede  the  laws,  indi 
cations  of  which  are  already  perceptible.  This  ascendency  can  only  be  pre 
served  through  the  action  of  the  states  as  organized  bodies,  having  their  own 
separate  governments,  and  possessed  of  the  right,  under  the  structure  of  our 
system,  of  judging  of  the  extent  of  their  separate  powers,  and  of  interposing 
their  authority  to  arrest  the  enactments  of  the  General  Government  within  their 
respective  limits.  I  will  not  enter  at  this  time  into  the  discussion  of  this  im 
portant  point,  as  it  has  been  ably  and  fully  presented  by  the  senator  from  Ken 
tucky  (Mr.  Bibb),  and  others  who  preceded  him  in  this  debate  on  the  same 
side,  whose  arguments  riot  only  remain  unanswered,  but  are  unanswerable.  It 
is  only  by  this  power  of  interposition  that  the  reserved  rights  of  the  states  can 
be  peacefully  and  efficiently  protected  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Gener 
al  Government,  that  the  limitations  imposed  upon  its  authority  will  be  enforced, 
and  its  movements  confined  to  the  orbit  allotted  to  it  by  the  Constitution. 

It  has,  indeed,  been  said  in  debate,  that  this  can  be  effected  by  the  or 
ganization  of  the  General  Government  itself,  particularly  by  the  action  of  this 
body,  which  represents  the  states,  and  that  the  states  themselves  must  look  to 
the  General  Government  for  the  preservation  of  many  of  the  most  important  of 
their  reserved  rights.  I  do  not  underrate  the  value  to  be  attached  to  the  organ 
ic  arrangement  of  the  General  Government,  and  the  wise  distribution  of  its  pow 
ers  between  the  several  departments,  and,  in  particular,  the  structure  and  the 
important  functions  of  this  body ;  but  to  suppose  that  the  Senate,  or  any  depart 
ment  of  this  government,  was  intended  to  be  the  only  guardian  of  the  reserved 
rights,  is  a  great  and  fundamental  mistake.  The  government,  through  all  its 
departments,  represents  the  delegated,  and  not  the  reserved  powers  ;  and  it  is  a 
violation  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  free  institutions  to  suppose  that  any 
but  the  responsible  representative  of  any  interest  can  be  its  guardian.  The 
distribution  of  the  powers  of  the  General  Government,  and  its  organization, 
were  arranged  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  power  in  fulfilling  the  important  trusts 
confided  to  it,  and  not,  as  preposterously  supposed,  to  protect  the  reserved  pow 
ers,  which  are  confided  wholly  to  the  guardianship  of  the  several  states. 

Against  the  view  of  our  system  which  I  have  presented,  and  the  right  of  the 
state  to  interpose,  it  is  objected  that  it  would  lead  to  anarchy  and  dissolution. 
I  consider  the  objection  as  without  the  slightest  foundation,  and  that,  so  far  from 
tending  to  weakness  or  disunion,  it  is  the  source  of  the  highest  power  and  of 
the  strongest  cement.  Nor  is  its  tendency  in  this  respect  difficult  of  explana 
tion.  The  government  of  an  absolute  majority,  unchecked  by  efficient  consti 
tutional  restraint,  though  apparently  strong,  is,  in  reality,  an  exceedingly  feeble 
government.  That  tendency  to  conflict  between  the  parts,  which  I  have  shown 
to  be  inevitable  in  such  governments,  wastes  the  powers  of  the  state  in  the 
hostile  action  of  contending  factions,  which  leaves  very  little  more  power  than 
the  excess  of  the  strength  of  the  majority  over  the  minority.  But  a  government 
based  upon  the  principle  of  the  concurring  majority,  where  each  great  interest 
possesses  within  itself  the  means  of  self-protection,  which  ultimately  requires 
the  mutual  consent  of  all  the  parts,  necessarily  causes  that  unanimity  in  coun 
cil,  and  ardent  attachment  of  all  the  parts  to  the  whole,  which  give  an  irresist 
ible  energy  to  a  government  so  constituted.  I  might  appeal  to  history  for  the 
truth  of  these  remarks,  of  which  the  Roman  furnishes  the  most  familiar  and 
striking.  It  is  a  well-known  fact,  that,  from  the  expulsion  of  the  Tarquins  to 
the  time  of  the  establishment  of  the  tribunitian  power,  the  government  fell  into 
a  state  of  the  greatest  disorder  and  distraction,  and,  I  may  add,  corruption. 
How  did  this  happen  ?  The  explanation  will  throw  important  light  on  the  sub- 


96  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ject  under  consideration.  The  community  was  divided  into  two  parts — the 
Patricians  and  the  Plebeians :  with  the  power  of  the  state  principally  in  the 
hands  of  the  former,  without  adequate  check  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  latter. 
The  result  was  as  might  be  expected.  The  patricians  converted  the  powers  of 
the  government  into  the  means  of  making  money,  to  enrich  themselves  and  their 
dependants.  They,  in  a  word,  had  their  American  system,  growing  out  of  the 
peculiar  character  of  the  government  and  condition  of  the  country.  This  re 
quires  explanation.  At  that  period,  according  to  the  laws  of  nations,  when  one 
nation  conquered  another,  the  lands  of  the  vanquished  belonged  to  the  victors  ; 
and,  according  to  the  Roman  law,  the  lands  thus  acquired  were  divided  into  two 
parts,  one  allotted  to  the  poorer  class  of  the  people,  and  the  other  assigned  to 
the  use  of  the  treasury,  of  which  the  patricians  had  the  distribution  and  admin 
istration.  The  patricians  abused  their  power  by  withholding  from  the  plebeians 
that  which  ought  to  have  been  allotted  to  them,  and  by  converting  to  their  own 
use  that  which  ought  to  have  gone  to  the  treasury.  In  a  word,  they  took  to 
themselves  the  entire  spoils  of  victory,  and  they  had  thus  the  most  powerful 
motive  to  keep  the  state  perpetually  involved  in  war,  to  the  utter  impoverish 
ment  and  oppression  of  the  plebeians.  After  resisting  the  abuse  of  power  by 
all  peaceable  means,  and  the  oppression  becoming  intolerable,  the  plebeians,  at 
last,  withdrew  from  the  city — they,  in  a  word,  seceded ;  arid,  to  induce  them  to 
reunite,  the  patricians  conceded  to  the  plebeians,  as  the  means  of  protecting 
their  separate  interests,  the  very  power  which  I  contend  is  necessary  to  protect 
the  rights  of  the  states,  but  which  is  now  represented  as  necessarily  leading  to 
disunion.  They  granted  to  them  the  right  of  choosing  three  tribunes  from 
among  themselves,  whose  persons  should  be  sacred,  and  who  should  have  the 
right  of  interposing  their  veto,  not  only  against  the  passage  of  laws,  but  even 
against  their  execution  :  a  power  which  those  who  take  a  shallow  insight  into 
human  nature  would  pronounce  inconsistent  with  the  strength  and  unity  of  the 
state,  if  not  utterly  impracticable ;  yet,  so  far  from  that  being  the  effect,  from 
that  day  the  genius  of  Rome  became  ascendant,  and  victory  followed  her  steps 
till  she  had  established  an  almost  universal  dominion.  How  can  a  result  so 
contrary  to  all  anticipation  be  explained  1  The  explanation  appears  to  me  to 
be  simple.  No  measure  or  movement  could  be  adopted  without  the  concurring 
assent  of  both  the  patricians  and  plebeians,  and  each  thus  became  dependant 
on  the  other ;  and,  of  consequence,  the  desire  and  objects  of  neither  could  be 
effected  without  the  concurrence  of  the  other.  To  obtain  this  concurrence, 
each  was  compelled  to  consult  the  good-will  of  the  other,  and  to  elevate  to 
office,  not  simply  those  who  might  have  the  confidence  of  the  order  to  which 
he  belonged,  but  also  that  of  the  other.  The  result  was,  that  men  possessing 
those  qualities  which  would  naturally  command  confidence — moderation,  wis 
dom,  justice,  and  patriotism — were  elevated  to  office ;  and  these,  by  the  weight 
of  their  authority  and  the  prudence  of  their  counsel,  together  with  that  spirit  of 
unanimity  necessarily  resulting  from  the  concurring  assent  of  the  two  orders, 
furnishes  the  real  explanation  of  the  power  of  the  Roman  State,  and  of  that  ex 
traordinary  wisdom,  moderation,  and  firmness  which  in  so  remarkable  a  degree 
characterized  her  public  men.  I  might  illustrate  the  truth  of  the  position  which 
I  have  laid  down  by  a  reference  to  the  history  of  all  free  states,  ancient  and 
modern,  distinguished  for  their  power  and  patriotism,  and  conclusively  show, 
not  only  that  there  was  riot  one  which  had  not  some  contrivance,  under  some 
form,  by  which  the  concurring  assent  of  the  different  portions  of  the  community 
was  made  necessary  in  the  action  of  government,  but  also  that  the  virtue, 
patriotism,  and  strength  of  the  state  were  in  direct  proportion  to  the  perfection 
of  the  means  of  securing  such  assent.  In  estimating  the  operation  of  this  prin 
ciple  in  our  system,  which  depends,  as  I  have  stated,  on  the  right  of  interposi 
tion  on  the  part  of  the  state,  we  must  not  omit  to  take  into  consideration  the 
amending  power,  by  which  new  powers  may  be  granted,  or  any  derangement 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C,  CALHOUN.  97 

of  the  system  be  corrected,  by  the  concurring  assent  of  three  fourths  of  the 
states,  and  thus,  in  the  same  degree,  strengthening  the  power  of  repairing  any 
derangement  occasioned  by  the  eccentric  action  of  a  state.  In  fact,  the  power 
of  interposition,  fairly  understood,  may  be  considered  in  the  light  of  an  appeal 
against  the  usurpations  of  the  General  Government,  the  joint  agent  of  all  the 
states,  to  the  states  themselves,  to  be  decided  under  the  amending  power, 
affirmatively  in  favour  of  the  government,  by  the  voice  of  three  fourths  of  the 
states,  as  the  highest  power  known  under  the  system.  I  know  the  difficulty, 
in  our  country,  of  establishing  the  truth  of  the  principle  for  which  I  contend, 
though  resting  upon  the  clearest  reason,  and  tested  by  the  universal  experience 
of  free  nations.  I  know  that  the  governments  of  the  several  states  will  be  cited 
as  an  argument  against  the  conclusion  to  which  I  have  arrived,  and  which,  for 
the  most  pare,  are  constructed  on  the  principle  of  the  absolute  majority ;  but,  in 
my  opinion,  a  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given  :  that  the  objects  of  expenditure 
which  fall  within  the  sphere  of  a  state  government  are  few  and  inconsiderable, 
so  that,  be  their  action  ever  so  irregular,  it  can  occasion  but  little  derangement. 
If,  instead  of  being  members  of  this  great  confederacy,  they  formed  distinct 
communities,  and  were  compelled  to  raise  armies,  and  incur  other  expenses 
necessary  to  their  defence,  the  laws  which  I  have  laid  down  as  necessarily 
controlling  the  action  of  a  state  where  the  will  of  an  absolute  and  unchecked 
majority  prevailed,  would  speedily  disclose  themselves  in  faction,  anarchy,  and 
corruption.  Even  as  the  case  is,  the  operation  of  the  causes  to  which  I  have 
referred  are  perceptible  in  some  of  the  larger  and  more  populous  members  of 
the  Union,  whose  governments  have  a  powerful  central  action,  and  which  al 
ready  show  a  strong  tendency  to  that  moneyed  action  which  is  the  invariable 
forerunner  of  corruption  and  convulsions. 

But,  to  return  to  the  General  Government,  we  have  now  sufficient  experi 
ence  to  ascertain  that  the  tendency  to  conflict  in  its  action  is  between  southern 
and  other  sections.  The  latter  having  a  decided  majority,  must  habitually  be 
possessed  of  the  powers  of  the  government,  both  in  this  and  in  the  other  house  ; 
and,  being  governed  by  that  instinctive  love  of  power  so  natural  to  the  human 
breast,  they  must  become  the  advocates  of  the  power  of  government,  and  in  the 
same  degree  opposed  to  the  limitations  ;  while  the  other  and  weaker  section  is 
as  necessarily  thrown  on  the  side  of  the  limitations.  One  section  is  the  natural 
guardian  of  the  delegated  powers,  and  the  other  of  the  reserved ;  and  the  strug 
gle  on  the  side  of  the  former  will  be  to  enlarge  the  powers,  while  that  on  the 
opposite  side  will  be  to  restrain  them  within  their  constitutional  limits.  The 
Contest  will,  in  fact,  be  a  contest  between  power  and  liberty,  and  such  I  con 
sider  the  present — a  contest  in  which  the  weaker  section,  with  its  peculiar 
labour,  productions,  and  institutions,  has  at  stake  all  that  can  be  dear  to  free 
men.  Should  we  be  able  to  maintain  in  their  full  vigour  our  reserved  rights, 
liberty  and  prosperity  will  be  our  portion  ;  but  if  we  yield,  and  permit  the 
stronger  interest  to  concentrate  within  itself  all  the  powers  of  the  government, 
then  will  our  fate  be  more  wretched  than  that  of  the  aborigines  whom  we  have 
expelled.  In  this  great  struggle  between  the  delegated  and  reserved  powers, 
so  far  from  repining  that  my  lot,  and  that  of  those  whom  I  represent,  is  cast  on 
the  side  of  the  latter,  I  rejoice  that  such  is  the  fact ;  for,  though  we  participate 
in  but  few  of  the  advantages  of  the  government,  we  are  compensated,  and  more 
than  compensated,  in  not  being  so  much  exposed  to  its  corruption.  Nor  do  I 
repine  that  the  duty,  so  difficult  to  be  discharged,  as  the  defence  of  the  reserved 
powers,  against  apparently  such  fearful  odds,  has  been  assigned  to  us.  To  dis 
charge  successfully  this  high  duty  requires  the  highest  qualities,  moral  and  in 
tellectual ;  and  should  we  perform  it  with  a  zeal  and  ability  in  proportion  to 
its  magnitude,  instead  of  being  mere  planters,  our  section  will  become  dis 
tinguished  for  its  patriots  and  statesmen.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  prove 
unworthy  of  this  high  destiny — if  we  yield  to  the  steady  encroachment  of 

N 


98  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

power,  the  severest  calamity  and  most,  debasing  corruption  will  overspread  the 
land.  Every  Southern  man,  true  to  the  interests  of  his  section,  and  faithful  to 
the  duties  which  Providence  has  allotted  him,  will  be  forever  excluded  from  the 
honours  and  emoluments  of  this  government,  which  will  be  reserved  for  those 
only  who  have  qualified  themselves,  by  political  prostitution,  for  admission  into 
the  Magdalen  Asylum. 


VI. 

SPEECH    ON    HIS    RESOLUTIONS,    AND    REPLY    TO    MR.    WEBSTER,   FEBRUARY    26, 

/1833. 

THE  following  resolutions,  submitted  by  Mr.  CALHOUN,  came  up  for  consider 
ation,  viz.  : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  people  of  the  several  states  composing  these  United 
States  are  united  as  parties  to  a  .constitutional  compact,  to  which  the  people  of 
each  state  acceded  as  a  separate  and  sovereign  community,  each  binding  itself 
by  its  own  particular  ratification  ;  and  that  the  Union,  of  which  the  said  com 
pact  is  the  bond,  is  a  union  between  the  states  ratifying  the  same. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  people  of  the  several  states  thus  united  by  the  constitu 
tional  compact,  in  forming  that  instrument,  and  in  creating  a  General  Govern 
ment  to  carry  into  effect  the  objects  for  which  it  was  formed,  delegated  to  that 
government,  for  that  purpose,  certain  definite  powers,  to  be  exercised  jointly, 
reserving,  at  the  same  time,  each  state  to  itself,  the  residuary  mass  of  powers,  to 
be  exercised  by  its  own  separate  government ;  and  that,  whenever  the  General 
Government  assumes  the  exercise  of  powers  not  delegated  by  the  compact,  its 
acts  are  unauthorized,  void,  and  of  no  effect ;  and  that  the  said  government  is 
not  made  the  final  judge  of  the  powers  delegated  to  it,  since  that  would  make 
its  discretion,  and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measure  of  its  powers  ;  but  that,  as 
in  all  other  cases  of  compact  among  sovereign  parties,  without  any  common 
judge,  each  has  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself,  as  well  of  the  infraction,  as  of 
the  mode  and  measure  of  redress. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  assertions  that  the  people  of  these  United  States,  taken 
collectively  as  individuals,  are  now,  or  ever  have  been,  united  on  the  principle 
of  the  social  compact,  and,  as  such,  are  now  formed  into  one  nation  or  people, 
or  that  they  have  ever  been  so  united,  in  any  one  stage  of  their  political  existi 
ence ;  that  the  people  of  the  several  states  composing  the  Union  have  not,  as 
members  thereof,  retained  their  sovereignty ;  that  the  allegiance  of  their  citi 
zens  has  been  transferred  to  the  General  Government ;  that  they  have  parted 
with  the  right  of  punishing  treason  through  their  respective  state  governments  ; 
and  that  they  have  not  the  right  of  judging,  in  the  last  resort,  as  to  the  extent  of 
powers  reserved,  and,  of  consequence,  of  those  delegated,  are  not  only  without 
foundation  in  truth,  but  are  contrary  to  the  most  certain  and  plain  historical 
facts,  and  the  clearest  deductions  of  reason  ;  and  that  all  exercise  of  power  on 
the  part  of  the  General  Gevernment,  or  any  of  its  departments,  deriving  author 
ity  from  such  erroneous  assumptions,  must  of  necessity  be  unconstitutional — 
must  tend  directly  and  inevitably  to  subvert  the  sovereignty  of  the  states — to 
destroy  the  federal  character  of  the  Union,  and  to  rear  on  its  ruins  a  consolida 
ted  government,  without  constitutional  check  or  limitation,  and  which  must  ne 
cessarily  terminate  in  the  loss  of  liberty  itself." 
Which  being  read, 

Mr.  CALHOUN  said  :  When  the  bill  with  which  the  resolutions  are  connected 
was  under  discussion,  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  thought  proper  to  give 
his  remarks  a  personal  bearing  in  reference  to  myself.  I  had  said  nothing  to 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  99 

justify  this  course  on  the  part  of  that  gentleman.  I  had,  it  is  true,  denounced 
the  bill  in  strong  language,  but  not  stronger  than  the  rules  which  govern  parlia 
mentary  proceedings  permit ;  nor  stronger  than  the  character  of  the  bill,  and  its 
bearing  on  the  state  which  it  is  my  honour  to  represent,  justified.  I  am  at  a 
loss  to  understand  what  motive  governed  the  senator  in  giving  a  personal  char 
acter  to  his  remarks.  If  he  intended  anything  unkind — (here  Mr.  WEBSTER 
said,  audibly,  Certainly  not ;  and  Mr.  C.  replied,  I  will  not,  then,  say  what  I  in 
tended,  if  such  had  been  his  motives) — but  still  I  must  be  permitted  to  ask,  If  he 
intended  nothing  unkind,  what  was  the  object  of  the  senator  ?  Was  his  motive 
to  strengthen  a  cause  which  he  feels  to  be  weak,  by  giving  the  discussion  a  per 
sonal  direction  ?  If  such  was  his  motive,  his  experience  as  a  debater  ought  to 
have  taught  him  that  it  was  one  of  those  weak  devices  which  seldom  fail  to 
react  on  those  who  resort  to  them.  If  his  motive  was  to  acquire  popularity 
by  attacking  one  who  had  voluntarily,  and  from  a  s<mse  of  duty — from  a  deep 
conviction  that  liberty  and  the  Constitution  were  at  ptake — had  identified  him 
self  with  an  unpopular  question,  I  would  say  to  him  that  a  true  sense  of  dignity 
would  have  impelled  him  in  an  opposite  direction-  Among  the  possible  motives 
which  might  have  influenced  him,  there  is  another  to  the  imputation  of  which 
he  is  exposed,  but  which,  certainly,  I  wi'i  i*>t  attribute  to  him— that  his  motive 
was  to  propitiate  in  a  certain  high  quarter — a  quarter  in  which  he  must  know 
that  no  offering  could  be  more  acceptable  than  the  immolation  of  the  character 
of  him  who  now  addresses  you.  Bvi  whatever  may  have  been  the  motive  of 
the  senator,  I  can  assure  him  that  I  will  not  follow  his  example.  I  never  had 
any  inclination  to  gladiatorial  exhibitions  in  the  halls  of  legislation,  and  if  I  now 
had,  I  certainly  would  not  indulge  them  on  so  solemn  a  question  :  a  question 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,  as  expressed  in  debate, 
involves  the  union  of  these  states,  and  in  mine,  the  liberty  and  the  Constitution 
of  the  country.  Before  nowever,  I  conclude  the  prefatory  observations,  I  must 
allude  to  the  remark  w^ich  the  senator  made  at  the  termination  of  the  argument 
of  my  friend  from  Mississippi  (Mr.  POINDEXTER).  I  understood  the  senator 
to  say  that,  if  I  chose  to  put  at  issue  his  character  for  consistency,  he  stood  pre 
pared  to  vindicate  his  Bourse.  I  assure  the  senator  that  I  have  no  idea  of  call- 
ino-  in  question  his  consistency,  or  that  of  any  other  member  of  this  body.  It 
is  *a  subject  in  which  I  feel  no  concern ;  but  if  I  am  to  understand  the  remark 
of  the  secator  as  intended  indirectly  as  a  challenge  to  put  in  issue  the  consist 
ency  of  my  course  as  compared  to  his  own,  I  have  to  say  that,  though  I  do  not 
accept  of  his  challenge,  yet,  if  he  should  think  proper  to  make  a  trial  of  charac 
ter  on  that  or  any  other  point  connected  with  our  public  conduct,  and  will  select 
a  suitable  occasion,  I  stand  prepared  to  vindicate  my  course,  as  compared  with 
his,  or  that  of  any  other  member  of  this  body,  for  consistency  of  conduct,  purity 
of  motive,  and  devoted  attachment  to  the  country  and  its  institutions. 

Having  made  these  remarks,  which  have  been  forced  upon  me,  I  shall  now 
proceed  directly  to  the  subject  before  the  Senate  ;  and  in  order  that  it  may,  with 
all  its  bearings,  be  fully  understood,  I  must  go  back  to  the  period  at  which  I  in 
troduced  the  resolutions.  They  were  introduced  in  connexion  with  the  bill 
which  has  passed  this  house,  and  is  now  pending  before  the  other.  That  bill 
was  couched  in  general  terms,  without  naming  South  Carolina  or  any  other 
state,  though  it  was  understood,  and  avowed  by  the  committee,  as  intended  to 
act  directly  on  her. 

Believing  that  the  government  had  no  right  to  use  force  in  the  controversy, 
and  that  the  attempt  to  introduce  it  rested  upon  principles  utterly  subversive  of  the 
Constitution  and  the  sovereignty  of  the  states,  I  drew  up  the  resolutions,  and  intro 
duced  them  expressly  with  the  view  to  test  those  principles,  with  a  desire  that 
they  should  be  discussed  and  voted  on  before  the  bill  came  up  for  consideration. 
The  majority  ordered  otherwise.  The  resolutions  were  laid  on  the  table,  and 
the  bill  taken  up  for  discussion.  Under  this  arrangement,  which  it  was  under- 


100  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN   C.    CALHOUN. 

stood  originated  with  the  committee  that  reported  the  bill,  I,  of  course,  conclu 
ded  that  its  members  would  proceed  in  the  discussion,  and  explain  the  princi 
ples,  and  the  necessity  for  the  bill,  before  the  other  senators  would  enter  into 
the  discussion,  and  particularly  those  from  South  Carolina  ;  understanding,  how 
ever,  that,  by  the  arrangement  of  the  committee,  it  was  allotted  to  the  senator 
from  Tennessee  to  close  the  discussion  on  the  bill.  I  waited  to  the  last  moment, 
in  expectation  of  hearing  from  the  senator  from  Massachusetts.  He  is  a  mem 
ber  of  the  committee.  But  not  hearing  from  him,  I  rose  to  speak  to  the  bill,  and 
as  soon  as  I  had  concluded,  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  arose — I  will  not 
say  to  reply  to  rive,  and  certainly  not  to  discuss  the  bill,  but  the  resolutions 
which  had  been  laid  on  the  table,  as  I  have  stated.  I  do  not  state  these  facts 
in  the  way  of  complaint,  but  in  order  to  explain  my  own  course.  The  senator 
having  directed  his  argument  against  my  resolutions,  I  felt  myself  compelled  to 
seize  the  first  opportunity  to  call  them  up  from  the  table,  and  to  assign  a  day  for 
their  discussion,  in  the  hbpe  \iot  only  that  the  Senate  would  hear  me  in  their 
vindication,  but  would  also  aflfori  me  an  opportunity  of  taking  the  sense  of  this 
.body  on  the  great  principles  OK  wVjch  they  are  based. 

The  senator  from  Massachusetts,  in  his  argument  against  the  resolutions, 
directed  his  attack  almost  exclusively  gainst  the  first,  on  the  ground,  I  suppose, 
that  it  was  the  basis  of  the  other  two,  an3.  that,  unless  the  first  could  be  demol 
ished,  the  others  would  follow  of  course     Jn  this  he  was  right.     As  plain  and 
as  simple  as  the  facts  contained  in  the  fii^t  are,  they  cannot  be  admitted  to  be 
true  without  admitting  the  doctrines  for  whith  I,  and  the  state  I  represent,  con 
tend.     He  (Mr.  W.)  commenced  his  attack  w^h  a  verbal  criticism  on  the  res 
olution,  in  the  course  of  which  he  objected  strtngly  to  two  words,  "  constitu 
tional,"  and  "accede."     To  the  former  on  the  gr*Und  that  the  word,  as  used 
-(constitutional  compact),  was  obscure — that  it  conveyed  no  definite  meaning — 
and  that  the  Constitution  was  a  noun-substantive,  and  not  an  adjective.     I  re 
gret  that  I  have  exposed  myself  to  the  criticism  of  the  senator.     I  certainly 
did  not  intend  to  use  any  expression  of  a  doubtful  sense,  a»d  if  I  have  done  so, 
the  senator  must  attribute  it  to  the  poverty  of  my  language,  ^nd  not  to  design. 
I  trust,  however,  that  the  senator  will  excuse  me,  when  he  comes  to  hear  my 
apology.     In  matters  of  criticism,  authority  is  of  the  highest  importance,  and  I 
have  an  authority  of  so  high  a  character,  in  this  case,  for  using  ihe  expression 
which  he  considers  so  obscure  and  so  unconstitutional,  as  will  justify  me  even 
in  his  eyes.     It  is  no  less  than  the  authority  of  the  senator  him&elf — given  on 
a  solemn  occasion  (the  discussion  on  Mr.  Foote's  resolution),  and  doubtless 
with  great  deliberation,  after  having  duly  weighed  the  force  of  the  expression. 
(Here  Mr.  C.  read  from  Mr.  Webster's  speech  in  reply  to  Mr.  Hayne,  in  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States,  delivered  January  26,  1830,  as  follows:) 

"  The  domestic  slavery  of  the  South  I  leave  where  I  find  it — in  the  hands  of 
their  own  governments.  It  is  their  affair,  not  mine.  Nor  do  I  complain  of 
the  peculiar  effect  which  the  magnitude  of  that  population  has  had  in  the  dis 
tribution  of  power  under  the  Federal  Government.  We  know,  sir,  that  the 
representation  of  the  states  in  the  other  house  is  not  equal.  We  know  that 
great  advantage,  in  that  respect,  is  enjoyed  by  the  slaveholding  states  ;  and  we 
know,  too,  that  the  intended  equivalent  for  that  advantage,  that  is  to  say,  the 
imposition  of  direct  taxes  in  the  same  ratio,  has  become  merely  nominal :  the 
habit  of  the  government  being  almost  invariably  to  collect  its  revenues  from 
other  sources,  and  in  other  modes.  Nevertheless,  I  do  not  complain,  nor 
would  I  countenance  any  movement  to  alter  this  arrangement  of  representation. 
It  is  the  original  bargain — the  compact — let  it  stand  ;  let  the  advantage  of  it  be 
fully  enjoyed.  The  Union  itself  is  too  full  of  benefits  to  be  hazarded  in  propo 
sitions  for  changing  its  original  basis.  I  go  for  the  Constitution  as  it  is.  and 
for  the  Union  as  it  is.  But  I  am  resolved  not  to  submit  in  silence  to  accusa 
tions,  either  against  myself  individually,  or  against  the  North,  wholly  unfoimd- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  101 

ed  and  unjust :  accusations  which  impute  to  us  a  disposition  to  evade  the  CON 
STITUTIONAL  COMPACT,  and  to  extend  the  power  of  the  government  over  the 
internal  laws  and  domestic  condition  of  the  states." 

It  will  be  seen,  by  this  extract,  that  the  senator  not  only  uses  the  phrase 
"  constitutional  compact,"  which  he  now  so  much  condemns,  but,  what  is  still 
more  important,  he  calls  the  Constitution  itself  a  compact — a  bargain  ;  which, 
contains  important  admissions,  having  a  direct  and  powerful  bearing  on  the 
main  issue  involved  in  the  discussion,  as  will  appear  in  the  course  of  his  re- 
marks.  But,  as  strong  as  his  objection  is  to  the  word  "  constitutional,"  it  is 
still  stronger  to  the  word  "  accede,"  which,  he  thinks,  has  been  introduced  into 
the  resolution  with  some  deep  design,  as  I  suppose,  to  entrap  the  Senate  into 
an  admission  of  the  doctrine  of  state  rights.  Here,  again,  I  must  shelter 
myself  under  authority.  But  I  suspect  that  the  senator,  by  a  sort  of  instinct 
(for  our  instincts  often  strangely  run  before  our  knowledge),  had  a  prescience, 
which  would  account  for  his  aversion  for  the  word,  that  this  authority  was  no  less 
than  Thomas  Jefferson  himself,  the  great  apostle  of  the  doctrines  of  state  rights. 
The  word  was  borrowed  from  him.  It  was  taken  from  the  Kentucky  Resolu 
tion,  as  well  as  the  substance  of  the  resolution  itself.  But  I  trust  that  I  may 
neutralize  whatever  aversion  the  authorship  of  this  word  may  have  excited  in 
the  mind  of  the  senator,  by  the  introduction  of  another  authority — that  of  Wash 
ington  himself,  who,  in  his  speech  to  Congress,  speaking  of  the  admission  of 
North  Carolina  into  the  Union,  uses  this  very  term,  which  was  repeated  by  the 
Senate  in  their  reply.  Yet,  in  order  to  narrow  the  ground  between  the  sena 
tor  and  myself  as  much  as  possible,  I  will  accommodate  myself  to  his  strange 
antipathy  against  the  two  unfortunate  words,  by  striking  them  out  of  the  reso 
lution,  and  substituting  in  their  place  those  very  words  which  the  senator  him 
self  has  designated  as  constitutional  phrases.  In  the  place  of  that  abhorred  ad 
jective  "  constitutional,"  I  will  insert  the  very  noun-substantive  "  constitution  ;" 
and  in  the  place  of  the  word  "  accede,"  I  will  insert  the  word  "  ratify,"  which 
he  designates  as  the  proper  term  to  be  used. 

Let  us  now  see  how  the  resolution  stands,  and  how  it  will  read  after  these 
amendments.  Here  Mr.  C.  said  the  resolution,  as  introduced,  reads  : 

Resolved,  That  the  people  of  the  several  states  composing  these  United  States 
are  united  as  parties  to  a  constitutional  compact,  to  which  the  people  of  each 
state  acceded  as  a  separate  and  sovereign  community,  each  binding  itself  by  its 
own  particular  ratification ;  and  that  the  Union,  of  which  the  said  compact  is- 
a  bond,  is  a  union  between  the  states  ratifying  the  same. 
As  proposed  to  be  amended  : 

Resolved,  That  .the  people  of  the  several  states  composing  these  United  States 
are  united  as  parties  to  a  compact,  under  the  title  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  which  the  people  of  each  state  ratified  as  a  separate  and  sovereign 
community,  each  binding  itself  by  its  own  particular  ratification ;  and  that  the 
Union,  of  which  the  said  compact  is  the  bond,  is  a  Union  between  the  states 
ratifying  the  same. 

Where,  sir,  I  ask,  is  that  plain  case  of  revolution  ?  Where  that  hiatus,  as- 
wide  as  the  globe,  between  the  premises  and  conclusion,  which  the  senator  pro 
claimed  would  be  apparent  if  the  resolution  was  reduced  into  constitutional  lan 
guage  ?  For  my  part,  with  my  poor  powers  of  conception,  I  cannot  perceive 
the  slightest  difference  between  the  resolution  as  first  introduced,  and  as  it  is 
proposed  to  be  amended  in  conformity  to  the  views  of  the  senator.  And,  in 
stead  of  that  hiatus  between  premises  and  conclusion,  which  seems  to  startle 
the  imagination  of  the  senator,  I  can  perceive  nothing  but  a  continuous  and  sol 
id  surface,  sufficient  to  sustain  the  magnificent  superstructure  of  state  rights. 
Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  senator's  vision  is  distorted  by  the  medium 
through  which  he  views  everything  connected  with  the  subject ;  and  that  the 
same  distortion  which  has  presented  to  his  imagination  this  hiatus,  as  wide  as 


102  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  globe,  where  not  even  a  fissure  exists,  also  presented  that  beautiful  and  clas 
sical  image  of  a  strong  man  struggling  in  a  bog  without  the  power  of  extricating 
himself,  and  incapable  of  being  aided  by  any  friendly  hand,  while,  instead  of 
struggling  in  a  bog,  he  stands  on  the  everlasting  rock  of  truth. 

Having  now  noticed  the  criticism  of  the  senator,  I  shall  proceed  to  meet  and 
repel  the  main  assault  on  the  resolution.  He  directed  his  attack  against  the 
strong  point,  the  very  horn  of  the  citadel  of  state  rights.  The  senator  clearly 
perceived  that,  if  the  Constitution  be  a  compact,  it  was  impossible  to  deny  the 
assertions  contained  in  the  resolutions,  or  to  resist  the  consequences  which  1 
had  drawn  from  them,  and,  accordingly,  directed  his  whole  fire  against  that  point ; 
but,  after  so  vast  an  expenditure  of  ammunition,  not  the  slightest  impression,  so 
far  as  I  can  perceive,  has  been  made.  But,  to  drop  the  simile,  after  a  careful 
examination  of  the  notes  which  I  took  of  what  the  senator  said,  I  am  now  at  a 
loss  to  know  whether,  in  the  opinion  of  the  senator,  our  Constitution  is  a  com 
pact  or  not,  though  almost  the  whole  argument  of  the  senator  was  directed  to 
that  point.  At  one  time  he  would  seem  to  deny  directly  and  positively  that  it 
was  a  compact,  while  at  another  he  would  appear,  in  language  not  less  strong, 
to  admit  that  it  was. 

I  have  collated  all  that  the  senator  has  said  upon  this  point ;  and,  that  what 
I  have  stated  may  not  appear  exaggerated,  I  will  read  his  remarks  in  juxtapo 
sition.  He  said  that 

"  The  Constitution  means  a  government,  not  a  compact.  Not  a  constitution 
al  compact,  but  a  government.  If  compact,  it  rests  on  plighted  faith,  and  the 
mode  of  redress  would  be  to  declare  the  whole  void.  States  may  secede  if  a 
league  or  compact." 

1  thank  the  senator  for  these  admissions,  which  I  intend  to  use  hereafter. 
(Here  Mr.  C.  proceeded  to  read  from  his  notes.) 

"  The  states  agreed  that  each  should  participate  in  the  sovereignty  of  the 
other." 

Certainly,  a  very  correct  conception  of  the  Constitution ;  but  when  did  they 
make  that  agreement  but  by  the  Constitution,  and  how  could  they  agree  but  by 
compact  ? 

"  The  system,  not  a  compact  between  states  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  but 
a  government  proper,  founded  on  the  adoption  of  the  people,  and  creating  indi 
vidual  relations  between  itself  and  the  citizens." 

This  the  senator  lays  down  as  a  leading  fundamental  principle  to  sustain  his 
doctrine,  and,  I  must  say,  by  a  strange  confusion  and  uncertainty  of  language  ; 
not,  certainly,  to  be  explained  by  any  want  of  command  of  the  most  appropriate 
words  on  his  part. 

"  It  does  not  call  itself  a  compact,  but  a  constitution.  The  Constitution  rests 
on  compact,  but  it  is  no  longer  a  compact." 

I  would  ask,  To  what  compact  does  the  senator  refer,  as  that  on  which  the 
Constitution  rests  ?  Before  the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitution,  the  states 
had  formed  but  one  compact,  and  that  was  the  old  confederation  ;  and,  certain 
ly,  the  gentleman  does  not  intend  to  assert  that  the  present  Constitution  rests 
upon  that.  What,  then,  is  his  meaning  ?  What  can  it  be,  but  that  the  Con 
stitution  itself  is  a  compact  ?  and  how  will  his  language  read,  when  fairly  in 
terpreted,  but  that  the  Constitution  was  a  compact,  but  is  no  longer  a  compact  ? 
It  had,  by  some  means  or  another,  changed  its  nature,  or  become  defunct. 

He  next  states  that 

"  A  man  is  almost  untrue  to  his  country  who  calls  the  Constitution  a  com 
pact." 

I  fear  the  senator,  in  calling  it  a  compact,  a  bargain,  has  called  down  this 
heavy  denunciation  on  his  own  head.  He  finally  states  that 

"  It  is  founded  on  compact,  but  not  a  compact  results  from  it." 

To  what  are  we  to  attribute  the  strange  confusion  of  words  ?     The  senator 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  103 

has  a  mind  of  high  order,  and  perfectly  trained  to  the  most  exact  use  of  lan 
guage.  No  man  knows  better  the  precise  import  of  the  words  he  uses.  The 
difficulty  is  not  in  him,  but  in  his  subject.  He  who  undertakes  to  prove  that  this 
Constitution  is  not  a  compact,  undertakes  a  task  which,  be  his  strength  ever 
so  great,  must  oppress  him  by  its  weight.  Taking  the  whole  of  the  argument 
of  the  senator  together,  I  would  say  that  it  is  his  impression  that  the  Constitu 
tion  is  not  a  compact,  and  will  now  proceed  to  consider  the  reason  which  he 
has  assigned  for  this  opinion. 

He  thinks  there  is  an  incompatibility  between  constitution  and  compact.  To 
prove  this,  he  adduces  the  words  "  ordain  and  establish,"  contained  in  the  pre 
amble  of  the  Constitution.  I  confess  I  am  not  capable  of  perceiving  in  what 
manner  these  words  are  incompatible  with  the  idea  that  the  Constitution  is  a 
compact.  The  senator  will  admit  that  a  single  state  may  ordain  a  constitution ; 
and  where  is  the  difficulty,  where  the  incompatibility  of  two  states  concurring 
in  ordaining  and  establishing  a  constitution  ?  As  between  the  states  themselves, 
the  instrument  would  be  a  compact ;  but  in  reference  to  the  government,  and 
those  on  whom  it  operates,  it  would  be  ordained  and  established — ordained  and 
established  by  the  joint  authority  of  two,  instead  of  the  single  authority  of  one. 
The  next  argument  which  the  senator  advances  to  show  that  the  language 
of  the  Constitution  is  irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  its  being  a  compact,  is  ta 
ken  from  that  portion  of  the  instrument  which  imposes  prohibitions  on  the  au 
thority  of  the  states.  He  said  that  the  language  used  in  imposing  the  prohibi 
tions  is  the  language  of  a  superior  to  an  inferior  ;  and  that,  therefore,  it  was  not 
the  language  of  a  compact,  which  implies  the  equality  of  the  parties.  As  a 
proof,  the  senator  cited  the  several  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which  provide 
that  no  state  shall  enter  into  treaties  of  alliance  and  confederation,  lay  imposts, 
&c.,  without  the  assent  of  Congress.  If  he  had  turned  to  the  articles  of  the 
old  confederation,  which  he  acknowledges  to  have  been  a  compact,  he  would 
have  found  that  those  very  prohibitory  articles  of  the  Constitution  were  borrow 
ed  from  that  instrument ;  that  the  language  which  he  now  considers  as  imply 
ing  superiority  was  taken  verbatim  from  it.  If  he  had  extended  his  researches 
still  farther,  he  would  have  found  that  it  is  the  habitual  language  used  in  treat 
ies,  whenever  a  stipulation  is  made  against  the  performance  of  any  act.  Among 
many  instances  which  I  could  cite  if  it  were  necessary,  I  refer  the  senator  to 
the  celebrated  treaty  negotiated  by  Mr.  Jay  with  Great  Britain  in  1793,  and  in 
which  the  very  language  used  in  the  Constitution  is  employed. 

To  prove  that  the  Constitution  is  not  a  compact,  the  senator  next  observes 
that  it  stipulates  nothing,  and  asks,  with  an  air  of  triumph,  Where  are  the  evi 
dences  of  the  stipulations  between  the  states  ?  I  must  express  my  surprise  at 
this  interrogatory,  coming  from  so  intelligent  a  source.  Has  the  senator  never 
seen  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  by  the  several  states  ?  Did  he  not  cite 
them  on  this  very  occasion  ?  Do  they  contain  no  evidence  of  this  stipulation 
on  the  part  of  the  states  ?  Nor  is  the  assertion  less  strange  that  the  Constitu 
tion  contains  no  stipulation.  So  far  from  regarding  it  in  the  light  in  which  the 
senator  regards  it,  I  consider  the  whole  instrument  but  a  mass  of  stipulation  : 
what  is  that  but  a  stipulation  to  which  the  senator  refers  when  he  states,  in  the 
course  of  his  argument,  that  each  state  had  agreed  to  participate  in  the  sover 
eignty  of  the  others  ? 

But  the  principal  argument  on  which  the  senate?  relied  to  show  that  the 
Constitution  is  not  a  compact,  rests  on  the  provision  in  that  instrument  which 
declares  that  "  this  Constitution,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  and 
treaties  made  under  their  authority,  are  the  supreme  laws  of  the  land."  He 
asked,  with  marked  emphasis,  Can  a  compact  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land  ? 
I  ask,  in  return,  whether  treaties  are  not  compacts,  and  whether  treaties,  as  well 
3,s  the  Constitution,  are  not  declared  to  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  larrd  ?  His 
argument,  in  fact,  as  conclusively  proves  that  treaties  are  not  compacts  as  it 


104  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

does  that  this  Constitution  is  not  a  compact.  I  might  rest  this  point  on  this 
decisive  answer  ;  but,  as  I  desire  to  leave  not  a  shadow  of  doubt  on  this  impor 
tant  point,  I  shall  follow  the  gentleman  in  the  course  of  his  reasoning. 

He  defines  a  constitution  to  be  a  fundamental  law,  which  organizes  the  gov 
ernment,  and  points  out  the  mode  of  its  action.  I  will  not  object  to  the  defini 
tion,  though,  in  my  opinion,  a  more  appropriate  one,  or,  at  least,  one  better 
adapted  to  American  ideas,  could  be  given.  My  objection  is  not  to  the  defini 
tion,  but  to  the  attempt  to  prove  that  the  fundamental  laws  of  a  state  cannot  be 
a  compact,  as  the  senator  seems  to  suppose.  I  hold  the  very  reverse  to  be  the 
case  ;  and  that,  according  to  the  most 'approved  writers  on  the  subject  of  gov 
ernment,  these  very  fundamental  laws  which  are  now  stated  not  only  not  to  be 
compacts,  but  inconsistent  with  the  very  idea  of  compacts,  are  held  invariably 
to  be  compacts ;  arid,  in  that  character,  as  distinguished  from  the  ordinary  laws 
of  the  country.  I  will  cite  a  single  authority,  which  is  full  and  explicit  on  this- 
point,  from  a  writer  of  the  highest  repute. 

Burlamaqui  says,  vol.  ii.,  part  1,  chap,  i.,  sec.  35,  36,  37,  38  :  "  It  entirely  de 
pends  upon  a  free  people  to  invest  the  sovereigns  whom  they  place  over  their 
heads  with  an  authority  either  absolute,  or  limited  by  certain  laws.  These 
regulations,  by  which  the  supreme  authority  is  kept  within  bounds,  are  called  the 
fundamental  laws  of  the  state" 

"  The  fundamental  laws  of  a  state,  taken  in  their  full  extent,  are  not  only  the 
decrees  by  which  the  entire  body  of  the  nation  determine  the  form  of  govern 
ment,  and  the  mariner  of  succeeding  to  the  crown,  but  are  likewise  covenants 
between  the  people  and  the  person  on  whom  they  confer  the  sovereignty,  which 
regulate  the  manner  of  governing,  and  by  which  the  supreme  authority  is  lim 
ited." 

"  These  regulations  are  called  fundamental  laws,  because  they  are  the  basis, 
as  it  were,  and  foundation  of  the  state  on  which  the  structure  of  the  government- 
is  raised,  and  because  the  people  look  upon  these  regulations  as  their  principal 
strength  and  support." 

"  The  name  of  laws,  however,  has  been  given  to  these  regulations  in  an  im 
proper  and  figurative  sense,  for,  properly  speaking,  they  are  real  covenants. 
But  as  those  covenants  are  obligatory  between  the  contracting  parties,  they  have 
the  force  of  laws  themselves." 

The  same,  vol.  ii.,  part  2,  ch.  i.,  sec.  19  and  22,  in  part.  "  The  whole  body 
of  the  nation,  in  whom  the  supreme  power  originally  resides,  may  regulate  the 
government  by  a  fundamental  law  in  such  manner  as  to  commit  the  exercise 
of  the  different  parts  of  the  supreme  power  to  different  persons  or  bodies,  who 
may  act  independently  of  each  other  in  regard  to  the  rights  committed  to  thenij 
but  still  subordinate  to  the  laws  from  which  those  rights  are  derived." 

"  And  these  fundamental  laws  are  real  covenants,  or  what  the  civilians  call 
pacta  conventa,  between  the  different  orders  of  the  Republic,  by  which  they 
stipulate  that  each  shall  have  a  particular  part  of  the  sovereignty,  and  that  this 
shall  establish  the  form  of  government.  It  is  evident  that,  by  these  means,  each 
of  the  contracting  parties  acquires  a  right  not  only  of  exercising  the  power 
granted  to  it,  but  also  of  preserving  that  original  right." 

A  reference  to  the  Constitution  of  Great  Britain,  with  which  we  are  better 
acquainted  than  with  that  of  any  other  European  government,  will  show  that 
it  is  a  compact.  Magn*  Charta  may  certainly  be  reckoned  among  the  funda 
mental  laws  of  that  kingdom.  Now,  although  it  did  not  assume,  originally,  the 
form  of  a  compact,  yet,  before  the  breaking  up  of  the  meeting  of  the  barons 
which  imposed  it  on  King  John,  it  was  reduced  into  the  form  of  a  covenant, 
and  duly  signed  by  Robert  Fitzwalter  and  others,  on  the  one  part,  and  the  king 
on  the  other. 

But  we  have  a  more  decisive  proof  that  the  Constitution  of  England  is  a  com 
pact  in  the  resolution  of  the  Lords  and  Commons  in  1688,  which  declared  that 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  105 

"  King  James  the  Second,  having  endeavoured  to  subvert  the  Constitution  of  the 
kingdom,  by  breaking  the  original  contract  between  the  king  and  people,  and 
having,  by  the  advice  of  Jesuits  and  other  wicked  persons,  violated  the  fun 
damental  law,  and  withdrawn  himself  out  of  the  kingdom,  hath  abdicated  the 
government,  and  that  the  throne  is  thereby  become  vacant." 

But  why  should  I  refer  to  writers  upon  the  subject  of  government,  or  inquire 
into  the  constitution  of  foreign  states,  when  there  are  such  decisive  proofs  that 
our  Constitution  is  a  compact  ?  On  this  point  the  senator  is  estopped.  I  bor 
row  from  the  gentleman,  and  thank  him  for  the  word.  His  adopted  state, 
which  he  so  ably  represents  on  this  floor,  and  his  native  state,  the  states  of 
Massachusetts  and  New-Hampshire,  both  declared,  in  their  ratification  of  the 
Constitution,  that  it  was  a  compact.  The  ratification  of  Massachusetts  is  in  the 
following  words  (here  Mr.  C.  read) : 

"  In  Convention  of  the  Delegates  of  the  People  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts,  Feb.  6,  1788. 

"  The  Convention  having  impartially  discussed  and  fully  considered  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  reported  to  Congress  by  the  Conven 
tion  of  Delegates  from  the  United  States  of  America,  and  submitted  to  us  by 
a  resolution  of  the  General  Court  of  said  Commonwealth,  passed  the  25th  day 
of  October  last  past,  and  acknowledging,  with  grateful  hearts,  the  goodness  of 
the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  universe,  in  affording  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
in  the  course  of  his  providence,  an  opportunity  deliberately  and  peaceably, 
without  fraud  or  surprise,  of  entering  into  an  explicit  and  solemn  compact  with 
each  other,  by  assenting  to  and  ratifying  a  new  Constitution,  in  order  to  form  a 
more  perfect  union,  establish  justice,  ensure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the 
common  defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  lib 
erty  to  themselves  and  of  Massachusetts,  assent  to  and  ratify  the  said  Constitu 
tion  for  the  United  States  of  America." 

The  ratification  of  New-Hampshire  is  taken  from  that  of  Massachusetts,  and 
almost  in  the  same  words.  But  proof,  if  possible,  still  more  decisive,  may  be 
found  in  the  celebrated  resolutions  of  Virginia  on  the  alien  and  sedition  law, 
in  1798,  and  the  responses  of  Massachusetts  and  the  other  states.  Those 
resolutions  expressly  assert  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact  between  the 
states,  in  the  following  language  (here  Mr.  C.  read  from  the  resolutions  of 
Virginia  as  follows) : 

"  That  this  Assembly  doth  explicitly  and  peremptorily  declare  that  it  VIEWS 

THE  POWERS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT,  AS  RESULTING  FROM  THE  COMPACT, 
TO  WHICH  THE  STATES  ARE  PARTIES,  AS  LIMITED  BY  THE  PLAIN  SENSE  AND  IN 
TENTION  OF  THE  INSTRUMENT  CONSTITUTING  THAT  COMPACT  AS  NO  FARTHER 
VALID  THAN  THEY  ARE  AUTHORIZED  BY  THE  GRANTS  ENUMERATED  IN  THAT  COM 
PACT  ;  AND  THAT,  IN  CASE  OF  A  DELIBERATE,  PALPABLE,  AND  DANGEROUS  EX 
ERCISE  OF  OTHER  POWERS  NOT  GRANTED  BY  THE  SAID  COMPACT,  THE  STATES 
WHO  ARE  PARTIES  THERETO  HAVE  THE  RIGHT,  AND  ARE  IN  DUTY  BOUND,  TO 
INTERPOSE  FOR  ARRESTING  THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  EVIL,  AND  FOR  MAINTAINING 
WITHIN  THEIR  RESPECTIVE  LIMITS  THE  AUTHORITIES,  RIGHTS,  AND  LIBERTIES 
APPERTAINING  TO  THEM. 

"  That  the  General  Assembly  doth  also  express  its  deep  regret  that  a  spirit 
has,  in  sundry  instances,  been  manifested  by  the  Federal  Government  to  en 
large  its  powers  by  forced  constructions  of  the  constitutional  charter,  which  de 
fines  them  ;  arid  that  indications  have  appeared  of  a  design  to  expound  certain 
general  phrases  (which,  having  been  copied  from  the  very  limited  grant  of  powers 
in  the  former  articles  of  confederation,  were  the  less  liable  to  be  misconstrued), 
so  as  to  destroy  the  meaning  and  effect  of  the  particular  enumeration  which 
necessity  explains,  and  limits  the  general  phrases,  and  so  as  to  CONSOLIDATE 

THE  STATES,  BY    DEGREES,  INTO    ONE    SOVEREIGNTY,  THE    OBVIOUS    TENDENCY 

0 


106  SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

AND  INEVITABLE  RESULT  OF  WHICH  WOULD  BE  TO  TRANSFORM  THE  PRESENT 
REPUBLICAN  SYSTEM  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  INTO  AN  ABSOLUTE,  OR,  AT  BEST, 
A  MIXED  MONARCHY." 

They  were  sent  to  the  several  states.  We  have  the  reply  of  Delaware, 
New- York,  Connecticut,  New-Hampshire,  Vermont,  and  Massachusetts,  not 
one  of  which  contradicts  this  important  assertion  on  the  part  of  Virginia ;  and, 
by  their  silence,  they  all  acquiesce  in  its  truth.  The  case  is  still  stronger 
against  Massachusetts,  which  expressly  recognises  the  fact  that  the  Constitu 
tion  is  a  compact. 

In  her  answer  she  says  (here  Mr.  C.  read  from  the  answer  of  Massachusetts 
as  follows) :  "  But  they  deem  it  their  duty  solemnly  to  declare  that,  while  they 
hold  sacred  the  principle,  that  consent  of  the  people  is  the  only  pure  source  of 
just  and  legitimate  power,  they  cannot  admit  the  right  of  the  state  Legislatures 
to  denounce  the  administration  of  that  government,  to  which  the  people  them 
selves,  by  a  solemn  compact,  have  exclusively  committed  their  national  concerns. 
That,  although  a  liberal  and  enlightened  vigilance  among  the  people  is  always 
to  be  cherished,  yet  an  unreasonable  jealousy  of  the  men  of  their  choice,  and  a 
recurrence  to  measures  of  extremity  upon  groundless  or  trivial  pretexts,  have  a 
strong  tendency  to  destroy  all  rational  liberty  at  home,  and  to  deprive  the  Uni 
ted  States  of  the  most  essential  advantages  in  their  relations  abroad.  That  this 
Legislature  are  persuaded  that  the  decision  of  all  cases  in  law  or  equity,  arising 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the  construction  of  all  laws 
made  in  pursuance  thereof,  are  exclusively  vested  by  the  people  in  the  judicial 
courts  of  the  United  States." 

"  That  the  people,  in  that  solemn  compact,  which  is  declared  to  be  the  supreme 
law  of  the  land,  have  not  constituted  the  state  Legislatures  the  judges  of  the  acts 
or  measures  of  the  Federal  Government,  but  have  confided  to  them  the  power  of 
proposing  such  amendments  of  the  Constitution  as  shall  appear  to  them  neces 
sary  to  the  interests,  or  conformable  to  the  wishes,  of  the  people  whom  they 
represent." 

Now,  I  ask  the  senator  himself — I  put  it  to  his  candour  to  say,  if  South  Car 
olina  be  estopped  on  the  subject  of  the  protective  system  because  Mr.  Burke 
and  Mr.  Smith  proposed  a  moderate  duty  on  hemp,  or  some  other  article,  I 
know  not  what,  nor  do  I  care,  with  a  view  of  encouraging  its  production,  of 
which  motion,  I  venture  to  say,  not  one  individual  in  a  hundred  in  the  state 
ever  heard,  whether  he  and  Massachusetts,  after  this  clear,  full,  and  solemn 
recognition  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact,  both  on  his  part  and  that  of  his 
state,  be  not  forever  estopped  on  this  important  point  ? 

There  remains  one  more  of  the  senator's  arguments  to  prove  that  the  Con 
stitution  is  not  a  compact,  to  be  considered.  He  says  it  is  not  a  compact,  be 
cause  it  is  a  government ;  which  he  defines  to  be  an  organized  body,  possessed 
of  the  will  and  power  to  execute  its  purposes  by  its  own  proper  authority ;  and 
which,  he  says,  bears  not  the  slightest  resemblance  to  a  compact.  But  I  would 
ask  the  senator,  Who  ever  considered  a  government,  when  spoken  of  as  the 
agent  to  execute  the  powers  of  the  Constitution,  as  distinct  from  the  Constitu 
tion  itself,  as  a  compact  ? 

In  that  light  it  would  be  a  perfect  absurdity.  It  is  true  that,  in  general  and 
loose  language,  it  is  often  said  that  the  government  is  a  compact,  meaning  the 
Constitution  which  created  it,  and  vested  it  with  authority  to  execute  the  powers 
contained  in  the  instrument ;  but  when  the  distinction  is  drawn  between  the 
Constitution  and  the  government,  as  the  senator  has  done,  it  would  be  as  ridic 
ulous  to  call  the  government  a  compact  as  to  call  an  individual,  appointed  to 
execute  provisions  of  the  contract,  a  contract ;  and  not  less  so  to  suppose  that 
there  could  be  the  slightest  resemblance  between  them.  In  connexion  with 
this  point  the  senator,  to  prove  that  the  Constitution  is  not  a  compact,  asserts 
that  it  is  wholly  independent  of  the  state,  and  pointedly  declares  that  the  states 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  107 

have  not  a  right  to  touch  a  hair  of  its  head ;  and  this,  with  that  provision  in  the 
Constitution  that  three  fourths  of  the  states  have  a  right  to  alter,  change,  or 
amend,  or  even  to  abolish  it,  staring  him  in  the  face. 

I  have  examined  all  of  the  arguments  of  the  senator  intended  to  prove  that 
the  Constitution  is  not  a  compact ;  and  I  trust  I  have  shown,  by  the  clearest 
demonstration,  that  his  arguments  are  perfectly  inconclusive,  and  that  his  as 
sertion  is  against  the  clearest  and  most  solemn  evidence — evidence  of  record, 
and  of  such  a  character  that  it  ought  to  close  his  lips  forever. 

I  turn  now  to  consider  the  other,  and,  apparently,  contradictory  aspect  in 
which  the  senator  presented  this  part  of  the  subject :  I  mean  that  one  in  which 
he  states  that  the  government  is  founded  in  compact,  but  is  no  longer  a  com 
pact.  I  have  already  remarked,  that  no  other  interpretation  could  be  given  to 
this  assertion,  except  that  the  Constitution  was  once  a  compact,  but  is  no  long 
er  so.  There  is  a  vagueness  and  indistinctness  in  this  part  of  the  senator's 
argument,  which  left  me  altogether  uncertain  as  to  its  real  meaning.  If  he 
meant,  as  I  presume  he  did,  that  the  compact  is  an  executed,  and  not  an  execu 
tory  one — that  its  object  was  to  create  a  government,  and  to  invest  it  with 
proper  authority — and  that,  having  executed  this  office,  it  had  performed  its 
functions,  and,  with  it,  had  ceased  to  exist,  then  we  have  the  extraordinary 
avowal  that  the  Constitution  is  a  dead  letter — that  it  has  ceased  to  have  any 
binding  effect,  or  any  practical  influence  or  operation. 

It  had,  indeed,  often  been  charged  that  the  Constitution  had  become  a  dead 
letter;  that  it  was  continually  violated,  and  had  lost  all  its  control  over  the 
government ;  but  no  one  had  ever  before  been  bold  enough  to  advance  a  theory 
on  the  avowed  basis  that  it  was  an  executed,  and.  therefore,  an  extinct  instru 
ment.  I  will  not  seriously  attempt  to  refute  an  argument  which  to  me  appears 
so  extravagant.  I  had  thought  that  the  Constitution  was  to  endure  forever ; 
and  that,  so  far  from  its  being  an  executed  contract,  it  contained  great  trust 
powers  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  created  it,  and  all  future  generations,  which 
never  could  be  finally  executed  during  the  existence  of  the  world,  if  our  gov 
ernment  should  so  long  endure. 

I  will  now  return  to  the  first  resolution,  to  see  how  the  issue  stands  between 
the  senator  from  Massachusetts  and  myself.  It  contains  three  propositions. 
First,  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact ;  second,  that  it  was  formed  by  the 
states,  constituting  distinct  communities ;  and,  lastly,  that  it  is  a  subsisting  and 
binding  compact  between  the  states.  How  do  these  three  propositions  now 
stand  1  f  The  first,  I  trust,  has  been  satisfactorily  established ;  the  second,  the 
senator  has  admitted,  faintly,  indeed,  but  still  he  has  admitted  it  to  be  true. 
This  admission  is  something.  It  is  so  much  gained  by  discussion.  Three 
years  ago  even  this  was  a  contested  point.  But  I  cannot  say  that  I  thank  him 
for  the  admission  :  we  owe  it  to  the  force  of  truth.  The  fact  that  these  states 
were  declared  to  be  free  and  independent  states  at  the  time  of  tjieir  independ 
ence  ;  that  they  were  acknowledged  to  be  so  by  Great  Britain  in  the  treaty 
which  terminated  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  and  secured  their  independence  ; 
that  they  were  recognised  in  the  same  character  in  the  old  articles  of  the  con 
federation  ;  and,  finally,  that  the  present  Constitution  was  formed  by  a  conven 
tion  of  the  several  states,  afterward  submitted  to  them  for  their  ratification,  and 
was  ratified  by  them  separately,  each  for  itself,  and  each,  by  its  own  act,  bind 
ing  its  citizens,  formed  a  body  of  facts  too  clear  to  be  denied  and  too  strong  to 
be  resisted. 

It  now  remains  to  consider  the  third  and  last  proposition  contained  in  the 
resolution — that  it  is  a  binding  and  a  subsisting  compact  between  the  states. 
The  senator  was  not  explicit  on  this  point.  I  understood  him,  however,  as  as 
serting  that,  though  formed  by  the  states,  the  Constitution  was  not  binding  be 
tween  the  states  as  distinct  communities,  but  between  the  American  people  in 
4he  aggregate,  who,  in  consequence  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  accord- 


108  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ing  to  the  opinion  of  the  senator,  became  one  people,  at  least,  to  the  extent  of 
the  delegated  powers.  This  would,  indeed,  be  a  great  change.  All  acknowl 
edge  that,  previous  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the  states  constituted 
distinct  and  independent  communities,  in  full  possession  of  their  sovereignty ; 
and,  surely,  if  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  was  intended  to  effect  the  great 
and  important  change  in  their  condition  which  the  theory  of  the  senator  sup 
poses,  some  evidence  of  it  ought  to  be  found  in  the  instrument  itself.  It  pro 
fesses  to  be  a  careful  and  full  enumeration  of  all  the  powers  which  the  states 
delegated,  and  of  every  modification  of  their  political  condition.  The  senator 
said  that  he  looked  to  the  Constitution  in  order  to  ascertain  its  real  character ; 
and,  surely,  he  ought  to  look  to  the  same  instrument  in  order  to  ascertain  what 
changes  were,  in  fact,  made  in  the  political  condition  of  the  states  and  the  coun 
try.  But  with  the  exception  of  "  we,  the  people  of  the  United  States,"  in  the 
preamble,  he  has  not  pointed  out  a  single  indication  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
great  change  which  he  conceives  has  been  effected  in  this  respect. 

Now,  sir,  I  intend  to  prove  that  the  only  argument  on  which  the  gentleman 
relies  on  this  point  must  utterly  fail  him.  I  do  not  intend  to  go  into  a  critical 
examination  of  the  expression  of  the  preamble  to  which  I  have  referred.  I  do 
not  deem  it  necessary ;  but  were  it,  it  might  be  easily  shown  that  it  is  at  least 
as  applicable  to  my  view  of  the  Constitution  as  to  that  of  the  senator ;  and  that 
the  whole  of  his  argument  on  this  point  rests  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  term  thir 
teen  United  States  ;  which  may  mean  certain  territorial  limits,  comprehending 
•within  them  the  whole  of  the  states  and  territories  of  the  Union.  In  this  sense 
the  people  of  the  United  States  may  mean  all  the  people  living  within  these 
limits,  without  reference  to  the  states  or  territories  in  which  they  may  reside, 
or  of  which  they  may  be  citizens,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  only  that  the  expres 
sion  gives  the  least  countenance  to  the  argument  of  the  senator. 

But  it  may  also  mean  the  states  united,  which  inversion  alone,  without  farther 
explanation,  removes  the  ambiguity  to  which  I  have  referred.  The  expression, 
in  this  sense,  obviously  means  no  more  than  to  speak  of  the  people  of  the  sev 
eral  states  in  their  united  and  confederated  capacity ;  and,  if  it  were  requisite, 
it  might  be  shown  that  it  is  only  in  this  sense  that  the  expression  is  used  in  the 
Constitution.  But  it  is  not  necessary.  A  single  argument  will  forever  settle 
this  point.  Whatever  may  be  the  true  meaning  of  this  expression,  it  is  not  ap 
plicable  to  the  condition  of  the  states  as  they  exist  under  the  Constitution,  but 
as  it  was  under  the  old  confederation,  before  its  adoption.  The  Constitution 
had  not  yet  been  adopted,  and  the  states,  in  ordaining  it,  could  only  speak  of 
themselves  in  the  condition  in  which  they  then  existed,  and  not  in  that  in  which 
they  would  exist  under  the  Constitution.  So  that,  if  the  argument  of  the  sena 
tor  proves  anything,  it  proves,  not,  as  he  supposes,  that  the  Constitution  forms 
the  American  people  into  an  aggregate  mass  of  individuals,  but  that  such  was 
their  political  condition  before  its  adoption,  under  the  old  confederation,  direct 
ly  contrary  to  his  argument  in  the  previous  part  of  this  discussion. 

But  I  intend  not  to  leave  this  important  point,  the  last  refuge  of  those  who 
advocate  consolidation,  even  on  this  conclusive  argument.  I  have  shown  that 
the  Constitution  affords  not  the  least  evidence  of  the  mighty  change  of  the  po 
litical  condition  of  the  states  and  the  country,  which  the  senator  supposed  it 
effected ;  and  I  intend  now,  by  the  most  decisive  proof,  drawn  from  the  consti 
tutional  instrument  itself,  to  show  that  no  such  change  was  intended,  and  that 
the  people  of  the  states  are  united  under  it  as  states  and  not  as  individuals.  On 
this  point  there  is  a  very  important  part  of  the  Constitution  entirely  and  strange 
ly  overlooked  by  the  senator  in  this  debate,  as  it  is  expressed  in  the  first  reso 
lution,  which  furnishes  the  conclusive  evidence,  not  only  that  the  Constitution 
is  a  compact,  but  a  subsisting  compact,  binding  between  the  states.  I  allude  to 
the  seventh  article,  which  provides  that  "  the  ratification  of  the  convention  of 
nine  states  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  establishment  of  this  Constitution  betivtcn 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  109 

ike,  states  so  ratifying  the  same."  Yes,  between  the  states :  these  little  words 
mean  a  volume — compacts,  not  laws,  bind  between  the  states  ;  and  it  here  binds, 
not  between  individuals,  but  between  the  states  :  the  states  ratifying,  implying, 
as  strong  as  language  can  make  it,  that  the  Constitution  is  what  I  have  assert 
ed  it  to  be — a  compact,  ratified  by  the  states,  and  a  subsisting  compact,  binding 
the  states  ratifying  it. 

But,  sir,  I  will  not  leave  this  point,  all-important  in  establishing  the  true  the 
ory  of  our  government,  on  this  argument  alone,  as  demonstrative  and  conclusive 
as  I  hold  it  to  be.  Another,  not  much  less  powerful,  but  of  a  different  charac 
ter,  may  be  drawn  from  the  tenth  amended  article,  which  provides  that  "  the 
powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited 
to  it  by  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  respectively  or  to  the  people." 
The  article  of  ratification  which  I  have  just  cited  informs  us  that  the  Constitu 
tion,  which  delegates  powers,  was  ratified  by  the  states,  and  is  binding  between, 
them.  This  informs  us  to  whom  the  powers  are  delegated,  a  most  important 
fact  in  determining  the  point  immediately  at  issue  between  the  senator  and  my 
self.  According  to  his  views,  the  Constitution  created  a  union  between  indi 
viduals,  if  the  solecism  may  be  allowed,  and  that  it  formed,  at  least  to  the  ex 
tent  of  the  powers  delegated,  one  people,  and  not  a  Federal  Union  of  the  states, 
as  I  contend  ;  or,  to  express  the  same  idea  differently,  that  the  delegation  of 
powers  was  to  the  American  people  in  the  aggregate  (for  it  is  only  by  such 
delegation  that  they  could  be  made  into  one  people),  and  not  to  the  United 
States,  directly  contrary  to  the  article  just  cited,  which  declares  that  the  pow 
ers  are  delegated  to  the  United  States.  And  here  it  is  worthy  of  notice  that 
the  senator  cannot  shelter  himself  under  the  ambiguous  phrase  "  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States,"  under  which  he  would  certainly  have  taken  refuge,  had 
the  Constitution  so  expressed  it ;  but,  fortunately  for  the  cause  of  truth  and  for 
the  great  principles  of  constitutional  liberty  for  which  I  am  contending,  "  peo 
ple"  is  omitted  :  thus  making  the  delegation  of  power  clear  and  unequivocal  to 
the  United  States,  as  distinct  political  communities,  and  conclusively  proving 
that  all  the  powers  delegated  are  reciprocally  delegated  by  the  states  to  each 
other,  as  distinct  political  communities. 

So  much  for  the  delegated  powers.  Now,  as  all  admit,  and  as  it  is  express 
ly  provided  for  in  the  Constitution,  the  reserved  powers  are  reserved  to  the 
states  respectively,  or  to  the  people  :  none  will  pretend  that,  as  far  as  they  are 
concerned,  we  are  one  people,  though  the  argument  to  prove  it,  however  ab 
surd,  would  be  far  more  plausible  than  that  which  goes  to  show  that  we  are 
one  people  to  the  extent  of  the  delegated  powers.  This  reservation  "  to  the 
people"  might,  in  the  hands  of  subtle  and  trained  logicians,  be  a  peg  to  hang  a 
doubt  upon ;  and  had  the  expression  "  to  the  people"  been  connected,  as  fortu 
nately  it  is  not,  with  the  delegated  instead  of  the  reserved  powers,  we  should 
not  have  heard  of  this  in  the  present  discussion. 

I  have  now  established,  I  hope,  beyond  the  power  of  controversy,  every  alle 
gation  contained  in  the  first  resolution  —  that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact 
formed  by  the  people  of  the  several  states,  as  distinct  political  communities, 
subsisting  and  binding  between  the  states  in  the  same  character ;  which  brings 
me  to  the  consideration  of  the  consequences  which  may  be  fairly  deduced  in 
reference  to  the  character  of  our  political  system  from  these  established  facts. 

The  first,  and  most  important,  is,  that  they  conclusively  establish  that  ours  is 
a  federal  system  :  a  system  of  states  arranged  in  a  Federal  Union,  and  each  re 
taining  its  distinct  existence  and  sovereignty.  Ours  has  every  attribute  which 
belongs  to  a  federative  system.  It  is  founded  on  compact  ;  it  is  formed  by 
sovereign  communities  ;  and  is  binding  between  them  in  their  sovereign  capaci 
ty.  I  might  appeal,  in  confirmation  of  this  assertion,  to  all  elementary  writers 
on  the  subject  of  government,  but  will  content  myself  with  citing  one  only : 
Burlamaqui,  quoted  with  approbation  by  Judge  Tucker,  in  his  Commentary  oil 


110  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Blackstone,  himself  a  high  authority,  who  says  (here  Mr.  C.  read  from  Tuck 
er's  Blackstone  as  follows) : 

Extracts  from  Blackstone's  Commentaries. 

"  Political  bodies,  whether  great  or  small,  if  they  are  constituted  by  a  people 
formerly  independent,  and  under  no  civil  subjection,  or  by  those  who  justly 
claim  independence  from  any  civil  power  they  were  formerly  subject  to,  have 
the  civil  supremacy  in  themselves,  and  are  in  a  state  of  equal  right  and  liberty 
with  respect  to  all  other  states,  whether  great  or  small.  No  regard  is  to  be  had 
in  this  matter  to  names,  whether  the  body  politic  be  called  a  kingdom,  an  em 
pire,  a  principality,  a  dukedom,  a  country,  a  republic,  or  free  town.  If  it  can 
exercise  justly  all  the  essential  parts  of  civil  power  within  itself,  independently 
of  any  other  person  or  body  politic,  and  no  other  hath  any  right  to  rescind  or 
annul  its  acts,  it  has  the  civil  supremacy,  how  small  .soever  its  territory  may  be, 
or  the  number  of  its  people,  and  has  all  the  rights  of  an  independent  state. 

"  This  independency  of  states,  and  there  being  distinct  political  bodies  from 
each  other,  is  not  obstructed  by  any  alliance  or  confederacies  whatsoever,  about 
exercising  jointly  any  parts  of  the  supreme  powers,  such  as  those  of  peace  and 
war,  in  league  offensive  and  defensive.  Two  states,  notwithstanding  such 
treaties,  are  separate  bodies,  and  independent. 

"  These  are,  then,  only  deemed  politically  united  when  some  one  person  or 
council  is  constituted  with  a  right  to  exercise  some  essential  powers  for  both, 
and  to  hinder  either  from  exercising  them  separately.  If  any  person  or  coun 
cil  is  empowered  to  exercise  all  these  essential  powers  for  both,  they  are  then 
one  state :  such  is  the  State  of  England  and  Scotland,  since  the  act  of  union 
made  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  whereby  the  two  kingdoms 
were  incorporated  into  one,  all  parts  of  the  supreme  power  of  both  kingdoms 
being  thenceforward  united,  and  vested  in  the  three  estates  of  the  realm  of  Great 
Britain ;  by  which  entire  coalition,  though  both  kingdoms  retain  their  ancient 
laws  and  usages  in  many  respects,  they  are  as  effectually  united  and  incorpo 
rated  as  the  several  petty  kingdoms  which  composed  the  heptarchy  were  before 
that  period. 

"  But  when  only  a  portion  of  the  supreme  civil  power  is  vested  in  one  person 
or  council  for  both,  such  as  that  of  peace  and  war,  or  of  deciding  controversies 
between  different  states,  or  their  subjects,  while  each  within  itself  exercises 
other  parts  of  the  supreme  power,  independently  of  all  the  others — in  this  case 
they  are  called  systems  of  states,  which  Burlamaqui  defines  to  be  an  assemblage 
of  perfect  governments,  strictly  united  by  some  common  bond,  so  that  they  seem 
to  make  but  a  single  body  with  respect  to  those  affairs  which  interest  them  in 
common,  though  each  preserves  its  sovereignty,  full  and  entire,  independently 
of  all  others.  And  in  this  case,  he  adds,  the  confederate  states  engage  to  each 
other  only  to  exercise  with  common  consent  certain  parts  of  the  sovereignty, 
especially  that  which  relates  to  their  mutual  defence  against  foreign  enemies. 
But  each  of  the  confederates  retains  an  entire  liberty  of  exercising  as  it  thinks 
proper  those  parts  of  the  sovereignty  which  are  not  mentioned  in  the  treaty  of 
union,  as  parts  that  ought  to  be  exercised  in  common.  And  of  this  nature  is  the 
American  confederacy,  in  which  each  state  has  resigned  the  exercise  of  certain 
parts  of  the  supreme  civil  power  which  they  possessed  before  (except  in  com 
mon  with  the  other  states  included  in  the  confederacy),  reserving  to  themselves 
all  their  former  powers,  which  are  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the 
common  bond  of  union. 

"  A  visible  distinction,  and  not  less  important  than  obvious,  occurs  to  our  ob 
servation  in  comparing  thes3  different  kinds  of  union.  The  kingdoms  of  Eng 
land  and  Scotland  are  united  into  one  kingdom ;  and  the  two  contracting  states, 
by  such  an  incorporate  union,  are,  in  the  opinion  of  Judge  Blackstone,  totally 
annihilated,  without  any  power  of  revival ;  and  a  third  arises  from  their  con- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  Ill 

junction,  in  which  all  the  rights  of  sovereignty,  and  particularly  that  of  legisla 
tion,  are  vested.  From  whence  he  expresses  a  doubt  whether  any  infringe 
ments  of  the  fundamental  and  essential  conditions  of  the  union  would  of  itself 
dissolve  the  union  of  those  kingdoms ;  though  he  readily  admits  that,  in  the 
case  of  a  federate  alliance,  such  an  infringement  would  certainly  rescind  the 
compact  between  the  confederated  states.  In  the  United  States  of  America,  on 
the  contrary,  each  state  retains  its  own  antecedent  form  of  government ;  its  own. 
laws,  subject  to  the  alteration  and  control  of  its  own  Legislature  only ;  its  own 
executive  officers  and  council  of  state ;  its  own  courts  of  judicature,  its  own 
judges,  its  own  magistrates,  civil  officers,  and  officers  of  the  militia ;  and,  in 
short,  its  own  civil  state,  or  body  politic,  in  every  respect  whatsoever.  And 
by  the  express  declaration  of  the  12th  article  of  the  amendments  to  the  Consti 
tution,  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor 
prohibited  by  it  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  or  to  the 
people.  In  Great  Britain,  a  new  civil  state  is  created  by  the  annihilation  of  two 
antecedent  civil  states ;  in  the  American  States,  a  general  federal  council  and 
administration  is  provided  for  the  joint  exercise  of  such  of  their  several  powers 
as  can  be  more  conveniently  exercised  in  that  mode  than  any  other,  leaving  their 
civil  state  unaltered  ;  and  all  the  other  powers,  which  the  states  antecedently 
possessed,  to  be  exercised  by  them  respectively,  as  if  no  union  or  connexion 
were  established  between  them. 

"  The  ancient  Achaia  seems  to  have  been  a  confederacy  founded  upon  a 
similar  plan  :  each  of  those  little  states  had  its  distinct  possessions,  territories, 
and  boundaries  ;  each  had  its  Senate  or  Assembly,  its  magistrates  and  judges  ; 
and  every  state  sent  deputies  to  the  general  convention,  and  had  equal  weight 
in  all  determinations.     And  most  of  the  neighbouring  states  which,  moved  by 
fear  of  danger,  acceded  to  this  confederacy,  had  reason  to  felicitate  themselves. 
"  These  confederacies,  by  which  several  states  are  united  together  by  a  per 
petual  league  of  alliance,  are  chiefly  founded  upon  this  circumstance,  that  each 
particular  people  choose  to  remain  their  own  masters,  and  yet  are  not  strong 
enough  to  make  head  against  a  common  enemy.     The  purport  of  such  an 
agreement  usually  is,  that  they  shall  not  exercise  some  part  of  the  sovereignty 
there  specified  without  the  general  consent  of  each  other.     For  the  leagues  to 
which  these  systems  of  states  owe  their  rise  seem  distinguished  from  others 
(so  frequent  ^mong  different  states)  chiefly  by  this  consideration,  that,  in  the 
latter,  each  confederate  people  determine  themselves,  by  their  own  judgment, 
to  certain  mutual  performances,  yet  so  that  in  all  other  respects  they  design  not 
in  the  least  to  ma^e  the  exercise  of  that  part  of  the  sovereignty,  whence  these 
performances  proceed,  dependant  on  the  consent  of  their  allies,  or  to  retrench 
anything  from  their  full  and  unlimited  power  of  governing  their  own  states. 
Thus  we  see  that  ordinary  treaties  propose,  for  the  most  part,  as  their  aim,  only 
some  particular  advantage  of  the  states  thus  transacting — their  interests  happen 
ing  at  present  to  fall  in  with  each  other — but  do  not  produce  any  lasting  union 
as  to  the  chief  management  of  affairs.    Such  was  the  treaty  of  alliance  between 
America  and  France  in  the  year  1778,  by  which,  among  other  articles,  it  was 
agreed  that  neither  of  the  two  parties  should  conclude  either  truce  or  peace 
with  Great  Britain  without  the  formal  consent  of  the  other  first  obtained,  and 
whereby  they  mutually  engaged  not  to  lay  down  their  arms  until  the  independ 
ence  of  the  United  States  should  be  formally  or  tacitly  assured  by  the  treaty 
or  treaties  which  should  terminate  the  war.     Whereas,  in  these  confederacies^ 
of  which  we  are  now  speaking,  the  contrary  is  observable,  they  being  estab 
lished  with  this  design,  that  the  several  states  shall  forever  link  their  safety  one 
with  another,  and,  in  order  to  their  mutual  defence,  shall  engage  themselves  not 
to  exercise  certain  parts  of  their  sovereign  power,  otherwise  than  by  a  common 
agreement  and  approbation.     Such  were  the  stipulations,  among  others,  con 
tained  in  the  articles  of  confederation  and  perpetual  union  between  the  Amen- 


H2  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

can  States,  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  no  state  should,  without  the  consent 
of  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  send  any  embassy  to,  or  receive 
any  embassy  from,  or  enter  into  any  conference,  agreement,  alliance,  or  treaty 
•with,  any  king,  prince,  or  state  ;  nor  keep  up  any  vessels  of  war,  or  body  of 
forces,  in  time  of  peace ;  nor  engage  in  any  war,  without  the  consent  of  the 
United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  unless  actually  invaded ;  nor  grant  com 
missions  to  any  ships  of  war,  or  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  except  after  a 
declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  with  several 
others ;  yet  each  state  respectively  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  inde 
pendence,  and  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right  which  is  not  expressly  dele 
gated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled.  The  promises  made  in 
these  two  cases  here  compared  run  very  differently ;  in  the  former,  thus :  '  1 
will  join  you  in  this  particular  war  as  a  confederate,  and  the  manner  of  our 
attacking  the  enemy  shall  be  concerted  by  our  common  advice  ;  nor  will  we 
desist  from  war  till  the  particular  end  thereof,  the  establishment  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  United  States,  be  obtained.'  In  the  latter,  thus  :  '  None  of  us 
•who  have  entered  into  this  alliance  will  make  use  of  our  right  as  to  the  affairs 
of  war  and  peace,  except  by  the  general  consent  of  the  whole  confederacy.' 
"We  observed  before  that  these  unions  submit  only  some  certain  parts  of  the 
sovereignty  to  mutual  direction  ;  for  it  seems  hardly  possible  that  the  affairs  of 
different  states  should  have  so  close  a  connexion,  as  that  all  and  each  of  them 
should  look  on  it  as  their  interest  to  have  no  part  of  the  chief  government  ex 
ercised  without  the  general  concurrence.  The  most  convenient  method,  there 
fore,  seems  to  be,  that  the  particular  states  reserve  to  themselves  all  those 
branches  of  the  supreme  authority,  the  management  of  which  can  have  little  or 
no  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  rest." 

Mr.  CALHOUN  proceeded  : 

If  we  compare  our  present  system  with  the  old  confederation,  which  all 
acknowledge  to  have  been  federal  in  its  character,  we  shall  find  that  it  possesses 
all  the  attributes  which  belong  to  that  form  of  government  as  fully  and  com 
pletely  as  that  did.  In  fact,  in  this  particular,  there  is  but  a  single  difference, 
and  that  not  essential,  as  regards  the  point  immediately  under  consideration, 
though  very  important  in  other  respects.  The  confederation  was  the  act  of  the 
state  governments,  and  formed  a  union  of  governments.  The  present  Consti 
tution  is  the  act  of  the  states  themselves,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  of  the 
people  of  the  several  states,  and  forms  a  union  of  them  as  sovereign  communi 
ties.  The  states,  previous  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  vere  as  separate 
and  distinct  political  bodies  as  the  governments  which  represent  them,  and  there 
is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  things  to  prevent  them  from  uniting  ander  a  compact, 
in  a  federal  union,  without  being  blended  in  one  mass,ran/  more  than  uniting 
the  governments  themselves,  in  like  manner,  without  mergicg  them  in  a  single 
government.  To  illustrate  what  I  have  stated  by  reference  to  ordinary  trans 
actions,  the  confederation  was  a  contract  between  agents — the  present  Consti 
tution  between  the  principals  themselves  ;  or,  to  take  a  more  analogous  case, 
one  is  a  league  made  by  ambassadors  ;  the  other,  a  league  made  by  sovereigns 
— the  latter  no  more  tending  to  unite  the  parties  into  a  single  sovereignty  than 
the  former.  The  only  difference  is  in  the  solemnity  of  the  act  and  the  force  of 
the  obligation. 

There,  indeed,  results  a  most  important  difference,  under  our  theory  of  govern 
ment,  as  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the  act  itself,  whether  executed  by  the 
states  themselves,  or  by  their  governments ;  but  a  result,  as  I  have  already 
stated,  not  at  all  affecting  the  question  under  consideration,  but  which  will 
throw  much  light  on  a  subject  in  relation  to  which  I  must  think  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  has  formed  very  confused  conceptions. 

The  senator  dwelt  much  on  the  point  that  the  present  system  is  a  constitu 
tion  and  a  government,  in  contradistinction  to  the  old  confederation,  with  a  view 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  113 

of  proving  that  the  Constitution  was  not  a  compact.  Now,  I  concede  to  the 
senator  that  our  present  system  is  a  constitution  and  a  government ;  and  that 
the  former,  the  old  confederation,  was  not  a  constitution  or  government :  not, 
however,  for  the  reason  which  he  assigned,  that  the  former  was  a  compact,  and 
the  latter  not,  but  from  the  difference  of  the  origin  from  which  the  two  com 
pacts  are  derived.  According  to  our  American  conception,  the  people  alone 
can  form  constitutions  or  governments,  and  not  their  agents.  It  is  this  differ 
ence,  and  this  alone,  which  makes  the  distinction.  Had  the  old  confederation 
been  the  act  of  the  people  of  the  several  states,  and  not  of  their  governments, 
that  instrument,  imperfect  as  it  is,  would  have  been  a  constitution,  and  the 
agency  which  it  created  to  execute  its  powers,  a  government.  This  is  the 
true  cause  of  the  difference  between  the  two  acts,  and  not  that  in  which  the 
senator  seems  to  be  bewildered. 

There  is  another  point  on  which  this  difference  throws  important  light,  and 
which  has  been  frequently  referred  to  in  debate  on  this  and  former  occasions. 
I  refer  to  the  expression  in  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution,  which  speaks  of 
"  forming  a  more  perfect  union,"  and  in  the  letter  of  General  Washington,  lay 
ing  the  draught  of  the  Convention  before  the  old  Congress,  in  which  he  speaks 
of  "  consolidating  the  Union ;"  both  of  which  I  conceive  to  refer  simply  to  the 
fact  that  the  present  Union,  as  already  stated,  is  a  union  between  the  states 
themselves,  and  not  a  union  like  that  which  had  existed  between  the  govern 
ments  of  the  states. 

We  will  now  proceed  to  consider  some  of  the  conclusions  which  necessarily 
follow  from  the  facts  and  positions  already  established.  They  enable  us  to  de 
cide  a  question  of  vital  importance  under  our  system  :  Where  does  sovereignty 
reside  ?  If  I  have  succeeded  in  establishing  the  fact  that  ours  is  a  federal  sys 
tem,  as  I  conceive  I  conclusively  have,  that  fact  of  itself  determines  the  ques 
tion  which  I  have  proposed.  It  is  of  the  very  essence  of  such  a  system,  that 
the  sovereignty  is  in  the  parts,  and  not  in  the  whole ;  or,  to  use  the  language  of 
Mr.  Palgrave,  the  parts  are  the  units  in  such  a  system,  and  the  whole  the  mul 
tiple  ;  and  not  the  whole  the  units  and  the  parts  the  fractions.  Ours,  then,  is 
a  government  of  twenty-four  sovereignties,  united  by  a  constitutional  compact, 
for  the  purpose  of  exercising  certain  powers  through  a  common  government  as 
their  joint  agent,  and  not  a  union  of  the  twenty-four  sovereignties  into  one, 
which,  according  to  the  language  of  the  Virginia  Resolutions,  already  cited,  would 
form  a  consolidation.  And  here  I  must  express  my  surprise  that  the  senator 
from  Virginia  should  avow  himself  the  advocate  of  these  very  resolutions,  when 
he  distinctly  maintains  the  idea  of  a  union  of  the  states  in  one  sovereignty, 
which  is  expressly  condemned  by  those  resolutions  as  the  essence  of  a  consol 
idated  government. 

Another  consequence  is  equally  clear,  that,  whatever  modification  was  made 
in  the  condition  of  the  states  under  the  present  Constitution,  were  modifications 
extending  only  to  the  exercise  of  their  powers  by  compact,  and  not  to  the  sover 
eignty  itself,  and  are  such  as  sovereigns  are  competent  to  make  :  it  being  a  con 
ceded  point,  that  it  is  competent  to  them  to  stipulate  to  exercise  their  powers 
in  a  particular  manner,  or  to  abstain  altogether  from  their  exercise,  or  to  dele 
gate  them  to  agents,  without  in  any  degree  impairing  sovereignty  itself.  The 
plain  state  of  the  facts,  as  regards  our  government,  is,  that  these  states  have 
agreed  by  compact  to  exercise  their  sovereign  powers  jointly,  as  already  stated  ; 
and  that,  for  this  purpose,  they  have  ratified  the  compact  in  their  sovereign  ca 
pacity,  thereby  making  it  the  constitution  of  each  state,  in  nowise  distinguish 
ed  from  their  own  separate  constitution,  but  in  the  superadded  obligation  of  com 
pact — of  faith  mutually  pledged  to  each  other.  In  this  compact,  they  have  stip 
ulated,  among  other  things,  that  it  may  be  amended  by  three  fourths  of  the  states  : 
that  is,  they  have  conceded  to  each  other  by  compact  the  right  to  add  new  pow 
ers  or  to  subtract  old,  by  the  consent  of  that  proportion  of  the  states,  without  re- 

P 


114  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

quiring,  as  otherwise  would  be  the  case,  the  consent  of  all :  a  modification  no 
more  inconsistent,  as  has  been  supposed,  with  their  sovereignty,  than  any  other 
contained  in  the  compact.  In  fact,  the  provision  to  which  I  allude  furnishes 
strong  evidence  that  the  sovereignty  is,  as  I  contend,  in  the  states  severally  : 
as  the  amendments  are  effected,  not  by  any  one  three  fourths,  but  by  any  three 
fourths  of  the  states,  indicating  that  the  sovereignty  is  in  each  of  the  states. 

If  these  views  be  correct,  it  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  allegiance 
of  the  people  is  to  their  several  states,  and  that  treason  consists  in  resistance 
to  the  joint  authority  of  the  states  united,  not,  as  has  been  absurdly  contended, 
in  resistance  to  the  government  of  the  United  States,  which,  by  the  provision  of 
the  Constitution,  has  only  the  right  of  punishing. 

These  conclusions  have  all  a  most  important  bearing  on  that  monstrous  and 
despotic  bill  which,  to  the  disgrace  of  the  Senate  and  the  age,  has  passed  this 
body.  I  have  still  a  right  thus  to  speak  without  violating  the  rules  of  order, 
as  it  is  not  yet  a  law.  These  conclusions  show  that  the  states  can  violate  no 
law ;  that  they  neither  are,  nor  in  the  nature  of  things  can  be,  \mder  the  domin 
ion  of  the  law  ;  that  the  worst  that  can  be  imputed  to  them  is  a  violation  of 
compact,  for  which  they,  and  not  their  citizens,  are  responsible  ;  and  that,  to 
undertake  to  punish  a  state  by  law,  or  to  hold  the  citizens  responsible  for  the 
acts  of  the  state,  which  they  are  on  their  allegiance  bound  to  obey,  and  liable 
to  be  punished  as  traitors  for  disobeying,  is  a  cruelty  unheard  of  among  civilized 
nations,  and  destructive  of  every  principle  upon  which  our  government  is  found 
ed.  It  is,  in  short,  a  ruthless  and  complete  revolution  of  our  entire  system. 

I  was  desirous  to  present  these  views  fully  before  the  passage  of  this  long- 
to-be-lamented  bill,  but  as  I  was  prevented  -by  the  majority,  as  I  have  stated  at 
the  commencement  of  my  remarks,  I  trust  that  it  is  not  yet  too  late. 

Having  now  said  what  I  intended  in  relation  to  my  first  resolution,  both  in 
reply  to  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,  and  in  vindication  of  its  correctness,  I 
will  now  proceed  to  consider  the  conclusions  drawn  from  it  in  the  second  res 
olution — that  the  General  Government  is  not  the  exclusive  and  final  judge  of 
the  extent  of  the  powers  delegated  to  it,  but  that  the  states,  as  parties  to  the 
compact,  have  a  right  to  judge,  in  the  last  resort,  of  the  infractions  of  the  com 
pact,  and  of  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress. 

It  can  scarcely  be  necessary,  before  so  enlightened  a  body,  to  premise  that 
our  system  comprehends  two  distinct  governments — the  General  and  State  Gov 
ernments,  which,  properly  considered,  form  but  one.  The  former  representing 
the  joint  authority  of  the  states  in  their  confederate  capacity,  and  the  latter  that 
of  each  state  separately.  I  have  premised  this  fact  simply  with  a  view  of  pre 
senting  distinctly  the  answer  to  the  argument  offered  by  the  senator  from  Mas 
sachusetts  to  prove  that  the  General  Government  has  a  final  and  exclusive  right 
to  judge,  not  only  of  its  delegated  jpowers,  but  also  of  those  reserved  to  the 
states.  That  gentleman  relies  for  his  main  argument  on  the  assertion  that  a 
government,  which  he  defines  to  be  an  organized  body,  endowed  with  both  will, 
and  power,  and  authority  in  propriv  vigore  to  execute  its  purpose,  has  a  right 
inherently  to  judge  of  its  powers,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  comment  upon  the 
definition  of  the  senator,  though  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  his  ideas 
of  government  are  not  very  American.  My  object  is  to  deal  with  the  conclu 
sion,  and  not  the  definition.  Admit,  then,  that  the  government  has  the  right  of 
judging  of  its  powers,  for  which  he  contends.  How,  then,  will  he  withhold, 
upon  his  own  principle,  the  right  of  judging  from  the  state  governments,  which 
he  has  attributed  to  the  General  Government  ?  If  it  belongs  to  one,  on  his  prin 
ciple  it  belongs  to  both ;  and  if  to  both,  when  they  differ,  the  veto,  so  abhorred 
by  the  senator,  is  the  necessary  result :  as  neither,  if  the  right  be  possessed  by 
both,  can  control  the  other. 

The  senator  felt  the  force  of  this  argument,  and,  in  order  to  sustain  his  main 
position,  he  fell  back  on  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  provides  that 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  115 

-  this  Constitution,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  shall  be  the  su 
preme  law  of  the  land." 

This  is  admitted :  no  one  has  ever  denied  that  the  Constitution,  and  the  laws 
made  in  pursuance  of  it,  are  of  paramount  authority.  But  it  is  equally  undenia 
ble  that  laws  not  made  in  pursuance  are  not  only  not  of  paramount  authority, 
but  are  of  no  authority  whatever,  being  of  themselves  null  and  void ;  which  pre 
sents  the  question,  Who  are  to  judge  whether  the  laws  be  or  be  not  pursuant 
to  the  Constitution  ?  and  thus  the  difficulty,  instead  of  being  taken  away,  is  re 
moved  but  one  step  farther  back.  This  the  senator  also  felt,  and  has  attempted 
to  overcome  the  difficulty  by  setting  up,  on  the  part  of  Congress  and  the  judi 
ciary,  the  final  and  exclusive  right  of  judging,  both  ibr  the  Federal  Government 
and  the  states,  as  to  the  extent  of  their  powers.  That  I  may  do  full  justice  to 
the  gentleman,  I  will  give  his  doctrine  in  his  own  words.  He  states : 

"  That  there  is  a  supreme  law,  composed  of  the  Constitution,  the  laws  pass 
ed  in  pursuance  of  it,  and  the  treaties ;  but  in  cases  coming  before  Congress, 
not  assuming  the  shape  of  cases  in  law  and  equity,  so  as  to  be  subjects  of  ju 
dicial  discussion,  Congress  must  inteiprec  the  Constitution  so  often  as  it  has  oc 
casion  to  pass  laws  ;  and  in  cases  capable  of  assuming  a  judicial  shape,  the  Su 
preme  Court  must  be  the  final  interpreter.'3 

Now,  passing  over  this  vague  snd  loose  phraseology,  I  would  ask  the  sena 
tor  upon  what  principle  can  lie  concede  this  extensive  power  to  the  legislative 
and  judicial  departments,  and  withhold  it  entirely  from  the  executive  ?  If  one 
has  the  right,  it  cannoi  be  withheld  from  the  other.  I  would  also  ask  him  on 
what  principle,  if  the  departments  of  the  General  Government  are  to  possess 
the  right  of  judging,  finally"  and  conclusively,  of  their  respective  powers,  on  what 
principle  can  the  same  right  be  withheld  from  the  State  Governments,  which, 
as  well  as  the  General  Government,  properly  considered,  are  but  departments 
of  the  same  general  system,  and  form  together,  properly  speaking,  but  one  gov 
ernment.  This  vas  a  favourite  idea  of  Mr.  Macon,  for  whose  wisdom  I  have 
a  respect,  increasing  with  my  experience,  and  whom  I  have  frequently  heard 
say  that  most  of  the  misconceptions  and  errors  in  relation  to  our  system  origi 
nated  in  forgetting  that  they  were  but  parts  of  the  same  system.  I  would  far 
ther  tell  the  senator,  that,  if  this  right  be  withheld  from  the  State  Governments  ; 
if  this  restraining  influence,  by  which  the  General  Government  is  coerced  to  its 
proper  spiiere,  be  withdrawn,  then  that  department  of  the  government  from  which 
he  has  withheld  the  right  of  judging  of  its  own  powers  (the  executive)  will,  so 
far  from  being  excluded,  become  the  sole  interpreter  of  the  powers  of  the  gov 
ernment.  It  is  the  armed  interpreter,  with  powers  to  execute  its  own  construc 
tion,  and  without  the  aid  of  which  the  construction  of  the  other  departments 
will  be  impotent. 

But  I  contend  that  the  states  have  a  far  clearer  right  to  the  sole  construction 
of  their  powers  than  any  of  the  departments  of  the  Federal  Government  can 
have  ;  this  power  is  expressly  reserved,  as  I  have  stated  on  another  occasion, 
not  only  against  the  several  departments  of  the  General  Government,  but  against 
the  United  States  themselves.  I  will  not  repeat  the  arguments  which  I  then 
offered  on  this  point,  and  which  remain  unanswered,  but  I  must  be  permitted  to 
offer  strong* additional  proof  of  the  views  then  taken,  and  which,  if  I  am  not 
mistaken,  are  conclusive  on  this  point.  It  is  drawn  from  the  ratification  of  the 
Constitution  by  Virginia,  and  is  in  the  following  words  (Mr.  C.  then  read  as 
follows) : 

"  We,  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  duly  elected  in  pursuance  of  a 
recommendation  from  the  General  Assembly,  and  now  met  in  Convention,  hav 
ing  fully  and  freely  investigated  and  discussed  the  proceedings  of  the  Federal 
Convention,  and  being  prepared,  as  well  as  the  most  mature  deliberation  hath 
enabled  us,  to  decide  thereon,  do,  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  the  people  of 
Virginia,  declare  and  make  knov/n  that  the  powers  granted  under  the  Constitu- 


116  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tion,  being  derived  from  the  people  of  the  United  States,  may  be  resumed  by 
them  whensoever  the  same  shall  be  perverted  to  their  injury  or  oppression,  and 
that  every  power  not  granted  thereby  remains  with  them,  and  at  their  will ;  that, 
therefore,  no  right  of  any  denomination  can  be  cancelled,  abridged,  restrained, 
or  modified  by  the  Congress,  by  the  Sena-te  or  House  of  Representatives,  act 
ing  in  any  capacity,  by  the  President  or  any  departmer>t  or  officer  of  the  United 
States,  except  in  \hose  instances  in  which  power  is  given  by  the  Constitution 
for  those  purposes  ;  and  that,  among  other  essential  rights,  the  liberty  of  con 
science  and  of  the  pres-s  cannot  be  cancelled,  abridged,  restrained,  or  modified 
by  any  authority  of  the  United  States.  With  these  impressions,  with  a  solemn 
appeal  to  the  Searcher  of  all  hearts  for  the  purity  of  our  intentions,  and  under 
the  conviction  that  whatsoever  imperfections  may  exist  in  the  Constitution  ought 
rather  to  be  examined  in  the  mode  prescribed  therein,  than  to  bring  the  Union 
in  danger  by  a  delay,  with  the  hojve  of  obtaining  amendments  previous  to  the 
ratification — we,  the  said  delegate*,  in  the  name  and  in  the  behalf  of  the  people 
of  Virginia,  do,  by  these  presents,  Assent  to  and  ratify  the  Constitution  recom 
mended  on  the  17th  day  of  September,  1787,  by  the  Federal  Convention,  for 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  hereby  announcing  to  all  those  whom  it 
may  concern,  that  the  said  Constitution  is  Binding  upon  the  said  people,  accord 
ing  to  an  authentic  copy  hereto  annexed,  in  \he  words  following,"  &c. 

It  thus  appears  that  that  sagacious  state  (I  fear,  however,  that  her  sagacity 
is  not  as  sharpsighted  now  as  formerly)  ratified  the  Constitution,  with  an  ex 
planation  as  to  her  reserved  powers  ;  that  they  \vei?  powers  subject  to  her  own 
will,  and  reserved  against  every  department  of  the  general  Government — le 
gislative,  executive,  and  judicial — as  if  she  had  a  prophetic  knowledge  of  the  at 
tempts  now  made  to  impair  and  destroy  them :  which  explanation  can  be  con 
sidered  in  no  other  light  than  as  containing  a  condition  <m  which  she  ratified, 
and,  in  fact,  making  part  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States— extending  as 
well  to  the  other  states  as  herself.  I  am  no  lawyer,  and  it  may  appear  to  be 
presumption  in  me  to  lay  down  the  rule  of  law  which  governs  i*  such  cases,  in  a 
controversy  with  so  distinguished  an  advocate  as  the  senator  from  Massachusetts. 
But  I  shall  venture  to  lay  it  down  as  a  rule  in  such  cases,  which  I  have  no  fear 
that  the  gentleman  will  contradict,  that,  in  case  of  a  contract  betveen  several 
partners,  if  the  entrance  of  one  on  condition  be  admitted,  the  condition  enures  to 
the  benefit  of  all  the  partners.  But  I  do  not  rest  the  argument  simply  upon  this 
view  :  Virginia  proposed  the  tenth  amended  article,  the  one  in  question,  and  her 
ratification  must  be  at  least  received  as  the  highest  evidence  of  its  true  mean 
ing  and  interpretation. 

If  these  views  be  correct — and  I  do  not  see  how  they  can  be  resisted — the 
rights  of  the  states  to  judge  of  the  extent  of  their  reserved  powers  stands  on  tKe 
most  solid  foundation,  and  is  good  against  every  department  of  the  General  Gov 
ernment  ;  and  the  judiciary  is  as  much  excluded  from  an  interference  with  the 
reserved  powers  as  the  legislative  or  executive  departments.  To  establish  the 
opposite,  the  senator  relies  upon  the  authority  of  Mr.  Madison,  in  the  Federal 
ist,  to  prove  that  it  was  intended  to  invest  the  court  with  the  power  in  question. 
In  reply,  I  will  meet  Mr.  Madison  with  his  own  opinion,  given  on  a  most  solemn 
occasion,  and  backed  by  the  sagacious  Commonwealth  of  Virginia.  *The  opinion 
to  which  I  allude  will  be  found  in  the  celebrated  report  of  1799,  of  which  Mr. 
Madison  was  the  author.  It  says  : 

•"  But  it  is  objected,  that  the  JUDICIAL  AUTHORITY  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  soU 
expositor  of  the  Constitution  in  the  last  resort ;  and  it  may  be  asked  for  what 
reason,  the  declaration  by  the  General  Assembly,  supposing  it  to  be  theoretical 
ly  true,  could  be  required  at  the  present  day,  and  in  so  solemn  a  manner. 

"  On  this  objection  it  might  be  observed,  first,  that  there  may  be  instances 
of  usurped  power,  which  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  would  never  draw  with 
in  the  control  of  the  judicial  department :  secondly,  that,  if  the  decision  of  the  ju- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  117 

diciary  be  raised  above  the  authority  of  the  sovereign  parties  to  the  Constitu 
tion,  the  decisions  of  the  other  departments,  not  carried  by  the  forms  of  the 
Constitution  before  the  judiciary,  must  bo  equally  authoritative  and  final  with 
decisions  of  the  department.  But  the  proper  answer  to  this  objection  is,  that 
the  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  relates  to  those  great  and  extraordinary 
cases  in  which  all  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  may  prove  ineffectual  against 
infractions  dangerous  to  the  essential  rights  of  the  parties  to  it.  The  resolution 
supposes  that  dangerous  powers,  not  delegated,  may  not  only  be  usurped  and 
executed  by  the  other  departments,  but  that  the  judicial  department,  also,  may 
exercise  or  sanction  dangerous  powers  beyond  the  grant  of  the  Constitution ; 
and,  consequently,  that  the  ultimate  right  of  the  parties  to  the  Constitution  to 
judge  whether  the  compact  was  dangerously  violated,  must  extend  to  violations 
by  one  delegated  authority  as  well  as  by  another ;  by  the  judiciary  as  well  as 
by  the  executive  or  the  legislative." 

The  senator  also  relies  upon  the  authority  of  Luther  Martin  to  the  same 
point,  to  which  I  have  already  replied  so  fully  on  another  occasion  (in  answer 
to  the  senator  from  Delaware,  Mr.  CLAYTON),  that  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary 
to  add  any  farther  remarks  on  the  present  occasion. 

But  why  should  I  waste  words  in  reply  to  these  or  any  other  authorities, 
when  it  has  been  so  clearly  established  that  the  rights  of  the  states  are  reserved 
against  all  and  every  department  of  the  government,  that  no  authority  in  oppo 
sition  can  possibly  shake  a  position  so  well  established  ?  Nor  do  I  think  it  ne 
cessary  to  repeat  the  argument  which  I  offered  when  the  bill  was  under  dis 
cussion,  to  show  that  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  which  provides  that  the  ju 
dicial  power  shall  extend  to  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arising  under  this  Con 
stitution,  and  to  the  laws  and  treaties  made  under  its  authority,  has  no  bearing 
on  the  point  in  controversy ;  and  that  even  the  boasted  power  of  the  Supreme 
Court  to  decide  a  law  to  be  unconstitutional,  so  far  from  being  derived  from  this 
or  any  other  portion  of  the  Constitution,  results  from  the  necessity  of  the  case — 
where  two  rules  of  unequal  authority  come  in  conflict — and  is  a  power  belong 
ing  to  all  courts,  superior  and  inferior,  state  and  general,  domestic  and  foreign. 

I  have  now,  I  trust,  shown  satisfactorily  that  there  is  no  provision  in  the 
Constitution  to  authorize  the  General  Government,  through  any  of  its  depart 
ments,  to  control  the  action  of  the  state  within  the  sphere  of  its  reserved  pow 
ers  ;  and  that,  of  course,  according  to  the  principle  laid  down  by  the  senator  from 
Massachusetts  himself,  the  government  of  the  states,  as  well  as  the  General 
Government,  has  the  right  to  determine  the  extent  of  their  respective  powers, 
without  the  right  on  the  part  of  either  to  control  the  other.  The  necessary  re 
sult  is  the  veto,  to  which  he  so  much  objects  ;  and  to  get  clear  of  which,  he  in 
forms  us,  was  the  object  for  which  the  present  Constitution  was  formed.  I  know 
not  whence  he  has  derived  his  information,  but  my  impression  is  very  different 
as  to  the  immediate  motives  which  led  to  the  formation  of  that  instrument.  I 
have  always  understood  that  the  principal  was,  to  give  to  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  commerce,  to  lay  impost  duties,  and  to  raise  a  revenue  for  the  pay 
ment  of  the  public  debt  and  the  expenses  of  the  government ;  and  to  subject  the 
action  of  the  citizens  individually  to  the  operation  of  the  laws,  as  a  substitute 
for  force.  If  the  object  had  been  to  get  clear  of  the  veto  of  the  states,  as  the 
senator  states,  the  Convention  certainly  performed  their  work  in  a  most  bungling 
manner.  There  was  unquestionably  a  large  party  in  that  body,  headed  by  men 
of  distinguished  talents  and  influence,  who  commenced  early  and  worked  ear 
nestly  to  the  last,  to  deprive  the  states — not  directly,  for  that  would  have  been 
too  bold  an  attempt,  but  indirectly — of  the  veto.  The  good  sense  of  the  Con 
vention,  however,  put  down  every  effort,  however  disguised  and  perseveringly 
made.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  give  from  the  journals  the  history  of  these 
various  and  unsuccessful  attempts,  though  it  would  afford  a  very  instructive  les 
son.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  it  was  attempted  by  proposing  to  give  Congress 


118  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN   C.    CALHOUN. 

power  to  annul  the  acts  of.  the  states  which  they  might  deem  inconsistent  with 
the  Constitution  ;  to  give  to  the  President  the  power  of  appointing  the  governors 
of  the  states,  with  a  view  of  vetoing  state  laws  through  his  authority ;  and, 
finally,  to  give  to  the  judiciary  the  power  to  decide  controversies  between  the 
states  and  the  GenerM  Government :  all  of  which  failed — fortunately  for  the 
liberty  of  the  country — utterly  and  entirely  failed  ;  and  in  their  failure  we  have 
the  strongest  evidence  that  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Convention  to  deprive 
the  states  of  the  veto  power.  Had  the  attempt  to  deprive  them  of  this  power 
been  directly  made,  and  failed,  every  one  would  have  seen  and  felt  that  it  would 
furnish  conclusive  evidence  in  favour  of  its  existence.  Now,  I  would  ask, 
What  possible  difference  can  it  make  in  what  form  this  attempt  was  made  ? 
whether  by  attempting  to  confer  on  the  General  Government  a  power  incom 
patible  with  the  exercise  of  the  veto  on  the  part  of  the  states,  or  by  attempting 
directly  to  deprive  them  of  the  right  of  exercising  it.  We  have  thus  direct  and 
strong  proof  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Convention,  the  states,  unless  deprived 
of  it,  possess  the  veto  power,  or,  what  is  another  name  for  the  same  thing,  the 
light  of  nullification.  I  know  that  there  is  a  diversity  of  opinion  among  the 
friends  of  state  rights  in  regard  to  this  power,  which  I  regret,  as  I  cannot  but 
consider  it  as  a  power  essential  to  the  protection  of  the  minor  and  local  inter 
ests  of  the  community,  and  the  liberty  and  the  union  of  the  country.  It  is  the 
very  shield  of  state  rights,  and  the  only  power  by  which  that  system  of  injus 
tice  against  which  we  have  contended  for  more  than  thirteen  years  can  be 
arrested  :  a  system  of  hostile  legislation,  of  plundering  by  law,  which  must  ne 
cessarily  lead  to  a  conflict  of  arms  if  not  prevented. 

But  I  rest  the  right  of  a  state  to  judge  of  the  extent  of  its  reserved  powers, 
in  the  last  resort,  on  higher  grounds — that  the  Constitution  is  a  compact,  to 
which  the  states  are  parties  in  their  sovereign  capacity;  and  that,  as  in  all 
other  cases  of  compact  between  parties  having  no  common  umpire,  each  has  a 
right  to  judge  for  itself.  To  the  truth  of  this  proposition  the  senator  from  Mas 
sachusetts  has  himself  assented,  if  the  Constitution  itself  be  a  compact — and 
that  it  is,  I  have  shown,  I  trust,  beyond  the  possibility  of  a  doubt.  Having  es 
tablished  that  point,  I  now  claim,  as  I  stated  I  would  do  in  the  course  of  the  dis 
cussion,  the  admissions  of  the  senator,  and,  among  them,  the  right  of  secession 
and  nullification,  which  he  conceded  would  necessarily  follow  if  the  Constitu 
tion  be  indeed  a  compact. 

I  have  now  replied  to  the  arguments  of  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  so 
far  as  they  directly  apply  to  the  resolutions,  and  will,  in  conclusion,  notice  some 
of  his  general  and  detached  remarks.  To  prove  that  ours  is  a  consolidated  gov 
ernment,  and  that  there  is  an  immediate  conriexion  between  the  government  and 
the  citizen,  he  relies  on  the  fact  that  the  laws  act  directly  on  individuals.  That 
such  is  the  case  I  will  not  deny ;  but  I  am  very  far  from  conceding  the  point 
that  it  affords  the  decisive  proof,  or  even  any  proof  at  all,  of  the  position  which 
the  senator  wishes  to  maintain.  I  hold  it  to  be  perfectly  within  the  competen 
cy  of  two  or  more  states  to  subject  their  citizens,  inr  certain  cases,  to  the  direct 
action  of  each  other,  without  surrendering  or  impairing  their  sovereignty.  I  rec 
ollect,  while  I  was  a  member  of  Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet,  a  proposition  was  sub 
mitted  by  the  British  Government  to  permit  a  mutual  right  of  search  and  seizure 
on  the  part  of  each  government  of  the  citizens  of  the  other,  on  board  of  vessels 
engaged  in  the  slave-trade,  and  to  establish  a  joint  tribunal  for  their  trial  and  pun 
ishment.  The  proposition  was  declined,  not  because  it  would  impair  the  sover 
eignty  of  either,  but  on  the  ground  of  general  expediency,  and  because  it  would 
be  incompatible  with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which  establish  the  ju 
dicial  power,  and  which  provisions  require  the  judges  to  be  appointed  by  the 
President  and  Senate.  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  propositions  of  the  same  kind 
were  made  and  acceded  to  by  some  of  the  Continental  powers. 

With  the  same  view,  the  senator  cited  the  suability  of  the  states  as  evidence 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  119 

of  their  want  of  sovereignty  ;  at  which.  I  must  express  my  surprise,  coming  from 
the  quarter  it  does.  No  one  knows  better  than  the  senator  that  it  is  perfectly 
within  the  competency  of  a  sovereign  state  to  permit  itself  to  be  sued.  We  have 
on  the  statute-book  a  standing  law,  under  which  the  United  States  maybe  sued 
in  certain  land  cases.  If  the  provision  in  the  Constitution  on  this  point  proves 
anything,  it  proves,  by  the  extreme  jealousy  with  which  the  right  of  suing  a  state 
is  permitted,  the  very  reverse  of  that  for  which  the  senator  contends. 

Among  other  objections  to  the  views  of  the  Constitution  for  which  I  contend, 
it  is  said  that  they  are  novel.  I  hold  this  to  be  a  great  mistake.  The  novelty 
is  not  on  my  side,  but  on  that  of  the  senator  from  Massachusetts.  The  doctrine 
of  consolidation  which  he  maintains  is  of  recent  growth.  It  is  not  the  doctrine 
of  Hamilton,  Ames,  or  any  of  the  distinguished  federalists  of  .that  period,  all  of 
•whom  strenuously  maintained  the  federative  character  of  the  Constitution, 
though  they  were  accused  of  supporting  a  system  of  policy  which  would  neces 
sarily  lead  to  consolidation.  The  first  disclosure  of  that  doctrine  was  in  the 
case  of  M'Culloch,in  which  the  Supreme  Court  held  the  doctrine,  though  wrapped 
up  in  language  somewhat  indistinct  and  ambiguous.  The  next,  and  more  open 
avowal,  was  by  the  senator  of  Massachusetts  himself,  about  three  years  ago,  in 
the  debate  on  Foot's  resolution.  The  first  official  annunciation  of  the  doctrine 
was  in  the  recent  proclamation  of  the  President,  of  which  the  bill  that  has  re 
cently  passed  this  body  is  the  bitter  fruit. 

It  is  farther  objected  by  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,  and  others,  against 
this  doctrine  of  state  rights,  as  maintained  in  this  debate,  that,  if  they  should 
prevail,  the  peace  of  the  country  would  be  destroyed.  But  what  if  they  should 
not  prevail  ?  Would  there  be  peace  ?  Yes,  the  peace  of  despotism  :  that  peace 
which  is  enforced  by  the  bayonet  and  the  sword ;  the  peace  of  death,  where 
all  the  vital  functions  of  liberty  have  ceased.  It  is  this  peace  which  the  doc 
trine  of  state  sovereignty  may  disturb  by  that  conflict,  which  in  every  free  state, 
if  properly  organized,  necessarily  exists  between  liberty  and  power  ;  but  which, 
if  restrained  within  proper  limits,  is  a  salutary  exercise  to  our  moral  and  intel 
lectual  faculties.  In  the  case  of  Carolina,  which  has  caused  all  this  discus 
sion,  who  does  not  see,  if  the  effusion  of  blood  be  prevented,  that  the  excite 
ment,  the  agitation,  and  the  inquiry  which  it  has  caused,  will  be  followed  by 
the  most  beneficial  consequences  ?  The  country  had  sunk  into  avarice,  in 
trigue,  and  electioneering,  from  which  nothing  but  some  such  event  could  rouse 
it,  or  restore  those  honest  and  patriotic  feelings  which  had  almost  disappeared 
under  their  baneful  influence.  What  government  has  ever  attained  power  and 
distinction  without  such  conflicts  ?  Look  at  the  degraded  state  of  all  those  na 
tions  where  they  have  been  put  down  by  the  iron  arm  of  the  government. 

I,  for  rny  part,  have  no  fear  of  any  dangerous  conflict,  under  the  fullest  ac 
knowledgment  of  state  sovereignty  :  the  very  fact  that  the  states  may  interpose 
will  produce  moderation  and  justice.  The  General  Government  will  abstain 
from  the  exercise  of  any  power  in  which  they  may  suppose  three  fourths  of  the 
states  will  not  sustain  them ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  states  will  not  in 
terpose  but  on  the  conviction  that  they  will  be  supported  by  one  fourth  of  their 
co-states.  Moderation  and  justice  will  produce  confidence,  attachment,  and  patri 
otism  ;  and  these,  in  turn,  will  offer  most  powerful  barriers  against  the  excess 
of  conflicts  between  the  states  and  the  General  Government. 

But  we  are  told  that,  should  the  doctrine  prevail,  the  present  system  would 
be  as  bad,  if  not  worse,  than  the  old  confederation.  I  regard  the  assertion  only 
as  evidence  of  that  extravagance  of  declaration  in  which,  from  excitement  of 
feeling,  we  so  often  indulge.  Admit  the  power,  and  still  the  present  system 
would  be  as  far  removed  from  the  weakness  of  the  old  confederation  as  it  would 
be  from  the  lawless  and  despotic  violence  of  consolidation.  So  far  from  being- 
the  same,  the  difference  between  the  confederation  and  the  present  Constitution 
would  still  be  most  strongly  marked.  If  there  were  no  other  distinction,  the 


120  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

fact  that  the  former  required  the  concurrence  of  the  states  to  execute  its  acts, 
and  the  latter,  the  act  of  a  state  to  arrest  its  acts,  would  make  a  distinction  as 
broad  as  the  ocean  :  in  the  former,  the  vis  inertia  of  our  nature  is  in  opposition  to 
the  action  of  the  system.  Not  to  act  was  to  defeat.  In  the  latter,  the  same 
principle  is  on  the  opposite  side — action  is  required  to  defeat.  He  who  under 
stands  human  nature  will  see  in  this  difference  the  difference  between  a  feeble 
and  illy-contrived  confederation,  and  the  restrained  energy  of  a  federal  system. 
Of  the  same  character  is  the  objection  that  the  doctrine  will  be  the  source  of 
weakness.  If  we  look  to  mere  organization  and  physical  power  as  the  only 
source  of  strength,  without  taking  into  the  estimate  the  operation  of  moral 
causes,  such  would  appear  to  be  the  fact ;  but  if  we  take  into  the  estimate  the 
latter,  we  shall  find  that  those  governments  have  the  greatest  strength  in  which 
power  has  been  most  efficiently  checked.  The  government  of  Rome  furnishes 
a  memorable  example.  There,  two  independent  and  distinct  powers  existed — 
the  people  acting  by  tribes,  in  which  the  plebeians  prevailed,  and  by  centuries, 
in  which  the  patricians  ruled.  The  tribunes  were  the  appointed  representa 
tives  of  the  one  power,  and  the  Senate  of  the  other :  each  possessed  of  the  au 
thority  of  checking  and  overruling  one  another,  not  as  departments  of  the  gov 
ernment,  as  supposed  by  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,  but  as  independent 
powers — as  much  so  as  the  State  and  General  Governments.  A  shallow  ob 
server  would  perceive,  in  such  an  organization,  nothing  but  the  perpetual  source 
of  anarchy,  discord,  and  weakness  ;  and  yet,  experience  has  proved  that  it  was 
the  most  powerful  government  that  ever  existed ;  and  reason  teaches  that  this 
power  was  derived  from  the  very  circumstance  which  hasty  reflection  would 
consider  the  cause*  of  weakness.  I  will  venture  an  assertion,  which  may  be 
considered  extravagant,  but  in  which  history  will  fully  bear  me  out,  that  we  have 
no  knowledge  of  any  people  in  which  a  power  of  arresting  the  improper  acts  of  the 
government,  or  what  may  be  called  the  negative  power  of  government,  was  too> 
strong,  except  Poland,  where  every  freeman  possessed  a  veto ;  but  even  there, 
although  it  existed  in  so  extravagant  a  form,  it  was  the  source  of  the  highest 
arid  most  lofty  attachment  to  liberty,  and  the  most  heroic  courage  :  qualities  that 
more  than  once  saved  Europe  from  the  domination  of  the  crescent  and  cime- 
ter.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  fate  of  Poland  is  not  to  be  attributed  so 
much  to  the  excess  of  this  negative  power  of  itself,  as  to  the  facility  which  it 
afforded  to  foreign  influence  in  controlling  its  political  movements. 

I  am  not  surprised  that,  with  the  idea  of  a  perfect  government  which  the 
senator  from  Massachusetts  has  formed — a  government  of  an  absolute  majority, 
unchecked  and  unrestrained,  operating  through  a  representative  body — that  he 
should  be  so  much  shocked  with  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  the  absurdity  of  the 
state  veto.  But  let  me  tell  him  that  his  scheme  of  a  perfect  government,  as 
beautiful  as  he  conceives  it  to  be,  though  often  tried,  has  invariably  failed,  and 
has  always  run,  whenever  tried,  through  the  same  uniform  process  of  faction, 
corruption,  anarchy,  and  despotism.  He  considers  the  representative  principle 
as  the  great  modern  improvement  in  legislation,  and  of  itself  sufficient  to  secure 
liberty.  I  cannot  regard  it  in  the  light  in  which  he  does.  Instead  of  modern, 
it  is  of  remote  origin,  and  has  existed,  in  greater  or  less  perfection,  in  every 
free  state,  from  the  remotest  antiquity.  Nor  do  I  consider  it  as  of  itself  sufficient 
to  secure  liberty,  though  I  regard  it  as  one  of  the  indispensable  means — the 
means  of  securing  the  people  against  the  tyranny  and  oppression  of  their  rulers. 
To  secure  liberty,  another  means  is  still  necessary — the  means  of  securing  the 
different  portions  of  society  against  the  injustice  and  oppression  of  each  other, 
which  can  only  be  effected  by  veto,  interposition,  or  nullification,  or  by  what 
ever  name  the  restraining  or  negative  power  of  government  may  be  called. 

The  senator  appears  to  be  enamoured  with  his  conception  of  a  consolidated 
government,  and  avows  himself  to  be  prepared,  seeking  no  lead,  to  rush,  in  its 
defence,  to  the  front  rank,  where  the  blows  fall  heaviest  and  thickest.  I  ad- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  121 

mire  his  gallantry  and  courage,  but  I  will  tell  him  that  he  will  find  in  the  op 
posite  ranks,  under  the  flag  of  liberty,  spirits  as  gallant  as  his  own ;  and  that 
experience  will  teach  him  that  it  is  infinitely  easier  to  carry  on  the  war  of 
legislative  exaction  by  bills  and  enactments,  than  to  extort  by  sword  and  bayo 
net  from  the  brave  and  the  free. 

The  bill  which  has  passed  this  body  is  intended  to  decide  this  great  contro 
versy  between  that  view  of  our  government  entertained  by  the  senator  and  those 
who  act  with  him,  and  that  supported  on  our  side.  It  has  merged  the  tariff, 
and  all  other  questions  connected  with  it,  in  the  higher  and  direct  issue  which 
it  presents  between  the  federal  and  national  system  of  governments.  I  con 
sider  the  bill  as  far  worse,  and  more  dangerous  to  liberty,  than  the  tariff.  It  has 
been  most  wantonly  passed,  when  its  avowed  object  no  longer  justified  it.  I 
consider  it  as  chains  forged  and  fitted  to  the  limbs  of  the  states,  and  hung  up  to 
be  used  when  occasion  may  require.  We  are  told,  in  order  to  justify  the  pas 
sage  of  this  fatal  measure,  that  it  was  necessary  to  present  the  olive-branch, 
with  one  hand  and  the  sword  with  the  other.  We  scorn  the  alternative.  You 
have  no  right  to  present  the  sword.  The  Constitution  never  put  the  instru 
ment  in  your  hands  to  be  employed  against  a  state  ;  and  as  to  the  olive-branch, 
whether  we  receive  it  or  not  will  not  depend  on  your  menace,  but  on  our  own 
estimate  of  what  is  due  to  ourselves  and  the  rest  of  the  community  in  reference 
to  the  difficult  subject  on  which  we  have  taken  issue. 

The  senator  from  Massachusetts  has  struggled  hard  to  sustain  his  cause,  but 
the.  load  was  too  heavy  for  him  to  bear.  I  am  not  surprised  at  the  ardour  and 
zeal  with  which  he  has  entered  into  the  controversy.  It  is  a  great  struggle 
between  power  and  liberty — power  on  the  side  of  the  North,  and  liberty  on  the 
side  of  the  South.  But,  while  I  am  not  surprised  at  the  part  which  the  sena 
tor  from  Massachusetts  has  taken,  I  must  express  my  amazement  at  the  prin 
ciples  advanced  by  the  senator  from  Georgia,  nearest  me  (Mr.  Forsyth).  I  had 
supposed  it  was  impossible  that  one  of  his  experience  and  sagacity  should  not 
perceive  the  new  and  dangerous  direction  which  this  controversy  is  about  to  take. 
For  the  first  time,  we  have  heard  an  ominous  reference  to  a  provision  in  the  Con 
stitution  which  I  have  never  known  to  be  before  alluded  to  in  discussion,  or  in 
connexion  with  any  of  our  measures.  I  refer  to  that  provision  in  the  Constitu 
tion  in  which  the  General  Government  guaranties  a  republican  form  of  gov 
ernment  to  the  states — a  power  which  hereafter,  if  not  rigidly  restricted  to  the 
objects  intended  by  the  Constitution,  is  destined  to  be  a  pretext  to  interfere 
•with  our  political  affairs  and  domestic  institutions  in  a  manner  infinitely  more 
dangerous  than  any  other  power  which  has  ever  been  exercised  on  the  part  of 
the  General  Government.  I  had  supposed  that  every  Southern  senator,  at  least, 
would  have  been  awake  to  the  danger  which  menaces  us  from  this  new  quar 
ter  ;  and  that  no  sentiment  would  be  uttered,  on  their  part,  calculated  to  coun 
tenance  the  exercise  of  this  dangerous  power.  With  these  impressions,  I  heard 
the  senator,  with  amazement,  alluding  to  Carolina  as  furnishing  a  case  which 
called  for  the  enforcement  of  this  guarantee.  Does  he  not  see  the  hazard  of 
the  indefinite  extension  of  this  dangerous  power?  There  exists  in  every 
Southern  State  a  domestic  institution,  which  would  require  a  far  less  bold  con 
struction  to  consider  the  government  of  every  state,  in  that  quarter,  not  to  be 
Republican,  and,  of  course,  to  demand,  on  the  part  of  this  government,  a  sup 
pression  of  the  institution  to  which  I  allude,  in  fulfilment  of  the  guarantee.  I 
believe  there  is  now  no  hostile  feelings  combined  with  political  considerations, 
in  any  section,  connected  with  this  delicate  subject.  But  it  requires  no  stretch 
of  the  imagination  to  see  the  danger  which  must  one  day  come,  if  not  vigilant 
ly  watched.  With  the  rapid  strides  with  which  this  government  is  advancing 
to  power,  a  time  will  come,  and  that  not  far  distant,  when  petitions  will  be  re 
ceived  from  the  quarter  to  which  I  allude  for  protection  :  when  the  faith  of  the 
guarantee  will  be,  at  least,  as  applicable  to  that  case  as  the  senator  from  Geor- 

Q 


122  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CAUIOUN. 

gia  now  thinks  it  is  to  Carolina.  Unless  his  doctrine  be  opposed  by  united  and 
iirm  resistance,  its  ultimate  effect  will  be  to  drive  the  white  population  from  the 
Southern  Atlantic  States. 


VII. 

SPEECH  ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF  THE  REMOVAL  OF  THE  DEPOSITES  FROM  THE  BANK  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES,  JANUARY  13,  1834. 

THE  Special  Order  now  came  up,  the  question  being  on  Mr.  CLAY'S  resolu 
tions  in  regard  to  the  removal  of  the  Public  Deposites. 

Mr.  CALHOUN  then  rose,  and  said,  that  the  statement  of  this  case  might  be 
given  in  a  very  few  words.  The  16th  section  of  the  act  incorporating  the  Bank 
provides  that,  wherever  there  is  a  bank  or  branch  of  the  United  States  Bank, 
the  public  moneys  should  be  deposited  therein,  unless  otherwise  ordered  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  that,  in  that  case,  he  should  report  to  Congress, 
if  in  session,  immediately ;  and,  if  not,  at  the  commencement  of  the  next  ses 
sion.  The  secretary,  acting  under  the  provision  of  this  section,  has  ordered 
the  deposites  to  be  withheld  from  the  Bank,  and  has  reported  his  reasons,  in 
conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  section.  The  Senate  is  now  called  upon 
to  consider  his  reasons,  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  secretary  is  justified 
or  not.  I  have  examined  them  with  care  and  deliberation,  without  the  slightest 
bias,  as  far  as  I  am  conscious,  personal  or  political.  I  have  but  a  slight  ac 
quaintance  with  the  secretary,  and  that  little  is  not  unfavourable  to  him.  I 
stand  wholly  disconnected  with  the  two  great  parties  now  contending  for  as 
cendency.  My  political  connexions  are  with  that  small  and  denounced  party 
which  has  voluntarily  wholly  retired  from  the  party  strifes  of  the  day,  with  a 
view  of  saving,  if  possible,  the  liberty  and  the  Constitution  of  the  country,  in 
this  great  crisis  of  our  affairs. 

Having  maturely  considered,  with  these  impartial  feelings,  the  reasons  of  the 
secretary,  I  am  constrained  to  say  that  he  has  entirely  failed  to  make  out  his 
justification.  At  the  very  commencement,  he  has  placed  his  right  to  remove 
the  deposites  on  an  assumption  resting  on  a  misconception  of  the  case.  In  the 
progress  of  his  argument  he  has  entirely  abandoned  the  first,  and  assumed  a  new 
and  greatly  enlarged  ground,  utterly  inconsistent  with  the  first,  and  equally  un 
tenable  ;  and  yet,  as  broad  as  his  assumptions  are,  there  is  an  important  part  of 
the  transaction  which  he  does  not  attempt  to  vindicate,  and  to  which  he  has  not 
even  alluded.  I  shall,  said  Mr.  CALHOUN,  now  proceed,  without  farther  remark, 
to  make  good  these  assertions. 

The  secretary,  at  the  commencement  of  his  argument,  assumes  the  position 
that,  in  the  absence  of  all  legal  provision,  he,  as  the  head  of  the  financial  depart 
ment,  had  the  right,  in  virtue  of  his  office,  to  designate  the  agent  and  place  for 
the  safe-keeping  of  the  public  deposites.  He  then  contends  that  the  16th  sec 
tion  does  not  restrict  his  power,  which  stands,  he  says,  on  the  same  ground  that 
it  had  before  the  passing  of  the  act  incorporating  the  Bank.  It  is  unnecessary 
to  inquire  into  the  correctness  of  the  position  assumed  by  the  secretary  ;  but,  if 
it  were,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  when  an  agent,  with  general  pow 
ers,  assumes,  in  the  execution  of  his  agency,  a  power  not  delegated,  the  assump 
tion  rests  on  the  necessity  of  the  case  ;  and  that  no  power,  in  such  case,  can  be 
lawfully  exercised,  which  was  not  necessary  to  effect  the  object  intended.  Nor 
would  it  be  difficult  to  show  tha%  in  this  case,  the  power  assumed  by  the  secre 
tary  would  belong,  not  to  him,  but  to  the  treasurer,  who,  under  the  act  organ 
izing  the  Treasury  Department,  is  expressly  charged  with  the  safe-keeping  of 
the  public  funds,  for  which  he  is  responsible  under  bond,  in  heavy  penalties. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  123 

But,  as  strongly  and  directly  as  these  considerations  bear  on  the  question  of  the 
power  of  the  secretary,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  pursue  them,  for  the  plain 
reason  that  the  secretary  has  entirely  mistaken  the  case.  It  is  not  a  case,  as 
he  supposes,  where  there  is  no  legal  provision  in  relation  to  the  safe-keeping 
of  the  public  funds,  but  one  of  precisely  the  opposite  character.  The  16th  sec 
tion  expressly  provides  that  the  deposites  shall  be  made  in  the  Bank  and  its 
branches,  and,  of  course,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  all  powers  which  the  secre 
tary  has  derived  from  the  general  and  inherent  powers  of  his  office,  in  the  ab 
sence  of  such  provision,  are  wholly  inapplicable  to  this  case.  Nor  is  it  less 
clear  that,  if  the  section  had  terminated  with  the  provision  directing  the  deposites 
to  be  made  in  the  Bank,  the  secretary  would  have  had  no  more  control  over  the 
subject  than  myself,  or  any  other  senator  ;  and  it  follows,  of  course,  that  he  must 
derive  his  power,  not  from  any  general  reasons  connected  with  the  nature  of 
his  office,  but  from  some  express  provision  contained  in  the  section,  or  some 
other  part  of  the  act.  It  has  not  been  attempted  to  be  shown  that  there  is  any 
such  provision  in  any  other  section  or  part  of  the  act.  The  only  control,  then, 
which  the  secretary  can  rightfully  claim  over  the  deposites  is  contained  in  the 
provision  which  directs  that  the  deposites  shall  be  made  in  the  Bank,  unless 
otherwise  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury ;  which  brings  the  whole 
question  in  reference  to  the  deposites  to  the  extent  of  the  power  which  Con 
gress  intended  to  confer  upon  the  secretary,  in  these  few  words,  "  unless  other 
wise  ordered." 

In  ascertaining  the  intention  of  Congress,  I  lay  it  down  as  a  rule,  which  I 
suppose  will  not  be  controverted,  that  all  political  powers  under  our  free  insti 
tutions  are  trust  powers,  and  not  rights,  liberties,  or  immunities,  belonging  per 
sonally  to  the  officer.  I  also  lay  it  down  as  a  rule  not  less  incontrovertible, 
that  trust  powers  are  necessarily  limited  (unless  there  be  some  express  pro 
vision  to  the  contrary)  to  the  subject-matter  and  object  of  the  trust.  This  brings 
us  to  the  question,  What  is  the  subject  and  object  of  the  trust  in  this  case  ?  The 
whole  section  relates  to  deposites — to  the  safe  and  faithful  keeping  of  the  pub 
lic  funds.  With  this  view  they  are  directed  to  be  made  in  the  Bank.  With 
the  same  view,  and  in  order  to  increase  the  security,  power  was  conferred  on 
the  secretary  to  withhold  the  deposites ;  and,  with  the  same  view,  he  is  direct 
ed  to  report  his  reasons  for  the  removal,  to  Congress.  All  have  one  common 
object,  the  security  of  the  public  funds.  To  this  point  the  whole  section  con 
verges.  The  language  of  Congress,  fairly  understood,  is,  We  have  selected 
the  Bank  because  we  confide  in  it  as  a  safe  and  faithful  agent  to  keep  the  pub 
lic  money ;  but,  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  so  important  a  trust,  we  invest  the  sec 
retary  with  power  to  remove  the  deposites,  with  a  view  te  their  increased  se 
curity.  And  lest  the  secretary,  on  his  part,  should  abuse  so  important  a  trust, 
and  in  order  still  farther  to  increase  that  security,  we  direct,  in  case  of  removal, 
that  he  shall  report  his  reasons.  It  is  obvious,  under  this  view  of  the  subject, 
that  the  secretary  has  no  right  to  act  in  relation  to  the  deposites  but  with  a  view 
to  their  increased  security  ;  that  he  has  no  right  to  order  them  to  be  withheld 
from  the  Bank  so  long  as  the  funds  are  safe,  and  the  Bank  has  faithfully  per 
formed  the  duties  imposed  in  relation  to  them ;  and  not  even  then,  unless  the 
deposites  can  be  placed  in  safer  and  more  faithful  hands.  That  such  was  the 
opinion  of  the  executive  in  the  first  instance,  we  have  demonstrative  proof  in 
the  message  of  the  President  to  Congress  at  the  close  of  the  last  session,  which 
placed  the  subject  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites  exclusively  on  the  question 
of  their  safety  ;  and  that  such  was  also  the  opinion  of  the  House  of  Representa 
tives  then,  we  have  equally  conclusive  proof  from  the  vote  of  that  body  that  the 
public  funds  in  the  Bank  were  safe,  which  was  understood,  at  that  time,  on  all 
sides,  by  friends  and  foes,  as  deciding  the  question  of  the  removal  of  the  de 
posites. 

The  extent  of  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred  being  established,  the  ques- 


124  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

lion  now  arises,  Has  the  secretary  transcended  its  limit  ?  It  can  scarcely  be 
necessary  to  argue  this  point.  It  is  not  even  pretended  that  the  public  deposites 
were  in  danger,  or  that  the  Bank  had  not  faithfully  performed  all  the  duties  im 
posed  on  it  in  relation  to  them,  nor  that  the  secretary  had  placed  the  money  in 
a  safer  or  in  more  faithful  hands.  So  far  otherwise,  there  is  not  a  man  who 
hears  me  who  will  not  admit  that  the  public  moneys  are  now  less  safe  than 
they  were  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  And  I  will  venture  to  assert  that 
not  a  capitalist  can  be  found  who  would  not  ask  a  considerably  higher  per  cent- 
age  to  ensure  them  in  their  present,  than  in  the  place  of  deposite  designated  by 
law.  If  these  views  are  correct,  and  I  hold  them  to  be  unquestionable,  the  ques 
tion  is  decided.  The  secretary  has  no  right  to  withhold  the  deposites  from  the 
Bank.  There  has  been,  and  can  be  but  one  argument  advanced  in  favour  of  his 
right,  which  has  even  the  appearance  of  being  tenable — that  the  power  to  with 
hold  is  given  in  general  terms,  and  without  qualification,  "  unless  the  secretary 
otherwise  direct.'1''  Those  who  resort  to  this  argument  must  assume  the  posi 
tion,  that  the  letter  ought  to  prevail  over  the  clear  and  manifest  intention  of  the 
act.  They  must  regard  the  power  of  the  secretary,  not  as  a  trust  power,  limit 
ed  by  the  subject  and  the  object  of  the  trust,  but  as  a  chartered  right,  to  be  used 
according  to  his  discretion  and  pleasure.  There  is  a  radical  defect  in  our  mode 
of  construing  political  powers,  of  which  this  and  many  other  instances  afford 
striking  examples,  but  I  will  give  the  secretary  his  choice :  either  the  intention 
or  the  letter  must  prevail :  he  may  select  either,  but  cannot  be  permitted  to  take 
one  or  the  other  as  may  suit  his  purpose.  If  he  chooses  the  former,  he  has 
transcended  his  powers,  as  I  have  clearly  demonstrated.  If  he  selects  the  lat 
ter,  he  is  equally  condemned,  as  he  has  clearly  exercised  power  not  compre 
hended  in  the  letter  of  his  authority.  He  has  not  confined  himself  simply  to- 
withholding  the  public  moneys  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  but  he  has 
ordered  them  to  be  deposited  in  other  banks,  though  there  is  not  a  word  in  the 
section  to  justify  it.  I  do  not  intend  to  argue  the  question  whether  he  had  a 
right  to  order  the  funds  withheld  from  the  United  States  Bank  to  be  placed  in 
the  state  banks,  which  he  has  selected ;  but  I  ask,  How  has  he  acquired  that 
right  ?  It  rests  wholly  on  construction — on  the  supposed  intention  of  the  Legis 
lature,  which,  when  it  gives  a  power,  intends  to  give  all  the  means  necessary  to 
render  it  available.  But,  as  clear  as  this  principle  of  construction  is,  it  is  not 
more  clear  than  that  which  would  limit  the  right  of  the  secretary  to  the  question, 
of  the  safe  and  faithful  keeping  of  the  public  funds  ;  and  I  cannot  admit  that  the 
secretary  shall  be  permitted  to  resort  to  the  letter  or  to  construction,  as  may 
best  be  calculated  to  enlarge  his  power,  when  the  right  construction  is  denied 
to  those  who  would  limit  his  power  by  the  clear  and  obvious  intention  of  Con 
gress. 

I  might  here,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  rest  the  question  of  the  power  of  the  secre 
tary  over  the  deposites,  without  adding  another  word.  I  have  placed  it  on 
grounds  from  which  no  ingenuity,  however  great,  or  subtlety,  however  refined, 
can  remove  it ;  but  such  is  the  magnitude  of  the  case,  and  such  my  desire  to 
give  the  reasons  of  the  secretary  the  fullest  consideration,  that  I  shall  follow 
him  through  the  remainder  of  his  reasons. 

That  the  secretary  was  conscious  that  the  first  position  which  he  assumed, 
and  which  I  have  considered,  was  untenable,  we  have  ample  proof  in  the  pre 
cipitancy  with  which  he  retreated  from  it.  He  had  scarcely  laid  it  down,  when, 
without  illustration  or  argument,  he  passed  with  a  rapid  transition,  and,  I  must 
say,  a  transition  as  obscure  as  rapid,  to  another  position  wholly  inconsistent 
with  the  first,  and  in  assuming  which,  he  expressly  repudiates  the  idea  that  the 
safe  and  faithful  keeping  of  the  puolic  funds  had  any  necessary  connexion  with 
his  removal  of  the  deposites  ;  his  power  to  do  which,  he  places  on  the  broad 
and  unlimited  ground  that  he  had  a  right  to  make  such  disposition  of  them  as 
the  public  interest  or  the  convenience  of  the  people  might  require.  I  have 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  125 

said  that  the  transition  of  the  secretary  was  as  obscure  as  it  was  rapid ;  but,  ob 
scure  as  it  is,  he  has  said  enough  to  enable  us  to  perceive  the  process  by  which 
he  has  reached  so  extraordinary  a  position  ;  and  we  may  safely  affirm,  that  his 
arguments  are  not  less  extraordinary  than  the  conclusion  at  which  he  arrives. 
His  first  proposition,  which,  however,  he  has  not  ventured  to  lay  down  express 
ly,  is,  that  Congress  has  an  unlimited  control  over  the  deposites,  and  that  it 
may  dispose  of  them  in  whatever  manner  it  may  please,  in  order  to  promote 
the  general  welfare  and  convenience  of  the  people.  He  next  asserts  that  Con 
gress  has  parted  with  this  power  under  the  sixteenth  section,  which  directs  the 
deposites  to  be  made  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  then  concludes 
with  affirming  that  it  has  invested  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  with  it,  for 
reasons  which  I  am  unable  to  understand. 

It  cannot  be  necessary,  before  so  enlightened  a  body,  that  I  should  undertake 
to  refute  an  argument  so  utterly  untrue  in  premises  and  conclusion — to  show 
that  Congress  never  possessed  the  power  which  the  secretary  claims  for  it — 
that  it  is  a  power,  from  its  very  nature,  incapable  of  such  enlargement,  being- 
limited  solely  to  the  safe  keeping  of  the  public  funds  ;  that  if  it  existed,  it 
would  be  susceptible  of  the  most  dangerous  abuses  ;  that  Congress  might  make 
the  wildest  and  most  dangerous  association  the  depository  of  the  public  funds  ; 
might  place  them  in  the  hands  of  the  fanatics  and  the  madmen  of  the  North, 
who  are  waging  war  against  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  South,  under  the 
plea  of  promoting  the  general  welfare.  But  admitting  that  Congress  possessed 
the  power  which  the  secretary  attributes  to  it,  by  what  process  of  reasoning  can 
he  show  that  it  has  parted  with  this  unlimited  power,  simply  by  directing  the 
public  moneys  to  be  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  1  or,  if  it  has 
parted  with  the  power,  by  what  extraordinary  process  has  it  been  transferred 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  by  those  few  and  simple  words,  "unless  he 
shall  otherwise  direct  ?"  In  support  of  this  extraordinary  argument,  the  secre 
tary  has  offered  not  a  single  illustration,  nor  a  single  remark  bearing  the  sem 
blance  of  reason,  but  one,  which  I  shall  now  proceed  to  notice. 

He  asserts,  and  asserts  truly,  that  the  Bank  charter  is  a  contract  between  the 
government,  or,  rather,  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  the  Bank,  and  then 
assumes  that  it  constitutes  him  a  common  agent  or  trustee,  to  superintend  the 
execution  of  the  stipulations  contained  in  that  portion  of  the  contract  compre 
hended  in  the  sixteenth  section.  Let  us  now,  taking  these  assumptions  to  be 
true,  ascertain  what  those  stipulations  are,  the  superintendence  of  the  execution 
of  which,  as  he  affirms,  are  jointly  confided  by  the  parties  to  the  secretary. 
The  government  stipulated,  on  its  part,  that  the  public  money  should  be  deposi 
ted  in  the  Bank  of  the  United  States — a  great  and  valuable  privilege,  on  which 
the  successful  operation  of  the  institution  mainly  depends.  The  Bank,  on  its 
part,  stipulated  that  the  funds  should  be  safely  kept,  that  the  duties  imposed  in 
relation  to  them  should  be  faithfully  discharged,  and  that  for  this,  with  other 
privileges,  it  would  pay  to  the  government  the  sum  of  one  million  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars.  These  are  the  stipulations,  the  execution  of  which,  accord 
ing  to  the  secretary's  assumption,  he  has  been  appointed,  as  joint  agent  or  trus 
tee,  to  superintend,  and  from  which  he  would  assume  the  extraordinary  power 
which  he  claims  over  the  deposites,  to  dispose  of  them  in  such  manner  as  he 
may  think  the  public  interest  or  the  convenience  of  the  people  may  require. 

Is  it  not  obvious  that  the  whole  extent  of  power  conferred  upon  him,  admitting 
his  assumption  to  be  true,  is  to  withhold  the  deposites  in  case  that  the  Bank 
should  violate  its  stipulations  in  relation  to  them,  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other, 
to  prevent  the  government  from  withholding  the  deposites,  so  long  as  the  Bank 
faithfully  performed  its  part  of  the  contract  ?  This  is  the  full  extent  of  his, pow 
er.  According  to  his  own  showing,  not  a  particle  more  can  be  added.  But 
there  is  another  aspect  in  which  the  position  in  which  the  secretary  has  pla 
ced  himself  may  be  viewed.  It  offers  for  consideration  riot  only  a  question  of 


126  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  extent  of  his  power,  but  a  question  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  duty 
which  has  been  imposed  upon  him.  If  the  position  be  such  as  he  has  descri 
bed,  there  has  been  confided  to  him  a  trust  of  the  most  sacred  character,  ac 
companied  by  duties  of  the  most  solemn  obligation.  He  stands,  by  the  mutual 
confidence  of  the  parties,  vested  with  the  high  judicial  power  to  determine  on 
the  infraction  or  observance  of  a  contract  in  which  government  and  a  large  and 
respectable  portion  of  the  citizens  are  deeply  interested  ;  and,  in  the  execution 
of  this  high  power,  he  is  bound,  by  honour  and  conscience,  so  to  act  as  to  pro 
tect  each  of  the  parties  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  their  respective  portion  of  ben 
efit  in  the  contract,  so  long  as  they  faithfully  observe  it.  How  has  the  secre 
tary  performed  these  solemn  duties,  which,  according  to  his  representation, 
have  been  imposed  upon  him  ?  Has  he  protected  the  Bank  against  the  aggres 
sion  of  the  government,  or  the  government  against  the  unfaithful  conduct  of  the 
Bank  in  relation  to  the  deposites  ?  Or  has  he,  forgetting  his  sacred  obligations, 
disregarded  the  interests  of  both  :  on  one  side,  divesting  the  Bank  of  the  de 
posites,  and  on  the  other,  defeating  the  government  in  the  intended  security  of 
the  public  funds,  by  seizing  on  them  as  the  property  of  the  executive,  to  be  dis 
posed  at  pleasure  to  favourite  and  partisan  banks  ? 

But  I  shall  relieve  the  secretary  from  this  awkward  and  disreputable  posi 
tion  in  which  his  own  arguments  have  placed  him.  He  is  not  the  mutual  trus 
tee,  as  he  has  represented,  of  the  government  and  the  Bank,  but  simply  the 
agent  of  the  former,  vested,  under  the  contract,  with  power  to  withhold  the  de 
posites,  with  a  view,  as  has  been  stated,  to  their  additional  security — to  their 
safe  keeping  ;  and  if  he  had  but  for  a  moment  reflected  on  the  fact  that  he  was 
directed  to  report  his  reasons  to  Congress  only,  and  not  also  to  the  Bank,  for 
withholding  the  deposites,  he  could  scarcely  have  failed  to  perceive  that  he 
was  simply  the  agent  of  one  of  the  parties,  and  not,  as  he  supposes,  a  joint 
agent  of  both. 

The  secretary  having  established,  as  he  supposes,  his  right  to  dispose  of 
the  deposites  as,  in  his  opinion,  the  general  interest  and  convenience  of  the 
people  might  require,  proceeds  to  claim  and  exercise  power  with  a  boldness 
commensurate  with  the  extravagance  of  the  right  which  he  has  assumed.  He 
commences  with  a  claim  to  determine,  in  his  official  character,  that  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  is  unconstitutional :  a  monopoly,  baneful  to  the  welfare  of 
the  community.  Having  determined  this  point,  he  comes  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  charter  of  the  Bank  ought  not  to  be  renewed,  and  then  assumes  that  it 
will  not  be  renewed.  Having  reached  this  point,  he  then  determines  that  it  is 
his  duty  to  remove  the  deposites.  No  one  can  object  that  Mr.  Taney,  as  a 
citizen,  in  his  individual  character,  should  entertain  an  opinion  as  to  the  uncon 
stitutionally  of  the  Bank  ;  but  that  he,  acting  in  his  official  character,  and  per 
forming  official  acts  under  the  charter  of  the  Bank,  should  undertake  to  deter 
mine  that  the  institution  was  unconstitutional,  and  that  those  who  granted  the 
charter,  and  bestowed  upon  him  his  power  to  act  under  it,  had  violated  the 
Constitution,  is  an  assumption  of  power  of  a  nature  which  I  will  not  undertake 
to  characterize,  as  I  wish  not  to  be  personal. 

But  he  is  not  content  with  the  power  simply  to  determine  on  the  uriconstitu- 
tionality  of  the  Bank.  He  goes  far  beyond :  he  claims  to  be  the  organ  of  the 
voice  of  the  people.  In  this  high  character,  he  pronounces  that  the  question 
of  the  renewal  of  the  Bank  charter  was  put  at  issue  at  the  last  presidential  elec 
tion,  and  that  the  people  had  determined  that  it  should  not  be  renewed.  I  do 
not,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  intend  to  enter  into  the  argument  whether,  in  point  of 
tact,  the  renewal  of  the  charter  was  put  at  issue  at  the  last  election.  That 
point  was  ably  and  fully  discussed  by  the  honourable  senators  from  Kentucky 
(Mr.  Clay)  and  New-Jersey  (Mr.  Southard),  who  conclusively  proved  that  no 
such  question  was  involved  in  the  issue  ;  and  if  it  were,  the  issue  comprehend 
ed  so  many  others,  that  it  was  impossible  to  conjecture  on  which  the  election 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  127 

turned.  I  look  to  higher  objections.  I  would  inquire  by  what  authority  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  constitutes  himself  the  organ  of  the  people  of  the  Uni 
ted  States.  He  has  the  reputation  of  being  an  able  lawyer,  and  can  he  be  ig 
norant  that,  so  long  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  exists,  the  only  or 
gans  of  the  people  of  these  states,  as  far  as  the  action  of  the  General  Govern 
ment  is  concerned,  are  the  several  departments,  legislative,  executive,  and  judi 
cial,  which,  acting  within  the  respective  limits  assigned  by  the  Constitution, 
have  a  right  to  pronounce  authoritatively  the  voice  of  the  people  ?  A  claim  on 
the  part  of  the  executive  to  interpret,  as  the  secretary  has  done,  the  voice  of 
the  people  through  any  other  channel,  is  to  shake  the  foundation  of  our  system. 
Has  the  secretary  forgotten  that  the  last  step  to  absolute  power  is  this  very  as 
sumption  which  he  has  claimed  for  that  department  ?  I  am  thus  brought,  said 
Mr.  C.,  to  allude  to  the  extraordinary  manifesto  read  by  the  President  to  the 
cabinet,  and  which  is  so  intimately  connected  with  the  point  immediately  under 
consideration.  That  document,  though  apparently  addressed  to  the  cabinet, 
was  clearly  and  manifestly  intended  as  an  appeal  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  and  opens  a  new  and  direct  organ  of  communication  between  the  Presi 
dent  and  them  unknown  to  the  Constitution  and  the  laws.  There  are  but  two 
channels  known  to  either  through  which  the  President  can  communicate  with 
the  people — by  messages  to  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  as  expressly  provided 
for  in  the  Constitution,  or  by  proclamation,  setting  forth  the  interpretations 
which  he  places  upon  a  law  it  has  become  his  official  duty  to  execute.  Going 
beyond,  is  one  among  the  alarming  signs  of  the  times  which  portend  the  over 
throw  of  the  Constitution  and  the  approach  of  despotic  power. 

The  secretary,  having  determined  that  the, Bank  was  unconstitutional,  and 
that  the  people  had  pronounced  against  the  recharter,  concludes  that  Congress 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  subject.  With  a  provident  foresight,  he  perceives 
the  difficulty  and  embarrassment  into  which  the  currency  of  the  country  would 
be  thrown  on  the  termination  of  the  Bank  charter ;  to  prevent  which,  he  pro 
ceeds  deliberately,  with  a  parental  care,  to  supply  a  new  currency,  "  equal  to  or 
better"  than  that  which  Congress  had  supplied.  With  this  view,  he  determines 
on  an  immediate  removal  of  the  deposites  ;  he  puts  them  in  certain  state  insti 
tutions,  intending  to  organize  them,  after  the  fashion  of  the  empire  state,  into  a 
great  safety-fund  system,  but  which,  unfortunately,  undoubtedly  for  the  project 
ors,  if  not  for  the  country,  the  limited  power  of  the  state  banks  did  not  permit 
him  to  effect.  But  a  substitute  was  found  by  associating  them  in  certain  arti 
cles  of  agreement,  and  appointing  an  inspector-general  of  all  this  league  of 
banks  !  and  all  this  without  law  or  appropriation  !  Is  it  not  amazing  that  it  never 
occurred  to  the  secretary  that  the  subject  of  currency  belonged  exclusively  to 
Congress,  and  that  to  assume  to  regulate  it  was  a  plain  usurpation  of  the  pow 
ers  of  that  department  of  the  government  ? 

Having  thus  assumed  the  power  officially  to  determine  on  the  constitutional 
ity  of  the  Bank  ;  having  erected  himself  into  an  organ  of  the  people's  voice,  and 
settled  the  question  of  the  regulation  of  the  currency,  he  next  proceeds  to  as 
sume  the  judicial  powers  over  the  Bank.  He  declares  that  the  Bank  has  trans 
cended  its  powers,  and  has,  therefore,  forfeited  its  charter,  for  which  he  inflicts 
on  the  institution  the  severe  and  exemplary  punishment  of  withholding  the  de 
posites  ;  and  all  this  in  the  face  of  an  express  provision  investing  the  court 
with  power  touching  the  infraction  of  the  charter,  directing  in  what  manner  the 
trial  should  be  commenced  and  conducted,  and  securing  expressly  to  the  Bank 
the  sacred  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  finding  the  facts.  All  this  passed  for  nothing 
in  the  eyes  of  the  secretary,  who  was  too  deeply  engrossed  in  providing  for  the 
common  welfare  to  regard  either  Congress,  the  Court,  or  the  Constitution.  The 
secretary  next  proceeds  to  supervise  the  general  operations  of  the  Bank,  pro 
nouncing,  with  authority,  that  at  one  time  it  has  discounted  too  freely,  and  at  an 
other  too  sparingly,  without  reflecting  that  all  the  control  which  the  government 


128  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

can  rightfully  exercise  over  the  operations  of  the  institution  is  through  the  five 
directors  who  represent  the  government  in  this  respect.  Directors  !  Mr.  Cal- 
houn  exclaimed,  did  I  say  ?  (alluding  to  the  present).  No,  spies  is  their  prop 
er  designation. 

I  cannot,  said  Mr.  C.,  proceed  with  the  remarks  which  I  intended  on  the  re 
mainder  of  the  secretary's  reasons  :  I  have  not  patience  to  dwell  on  assump 
tions  of  power  so  bold,  so  lawless,  and  so  unconstitutional ;  they  deserve  not 
the  name  of  argument,  and  I  cannot  waste  time  in  treating  them  as  such. 
There  are,  however,  two  which  I  cannot  pass  over,  not  because  they  are  more 
extraordinary  or  audacious  than  the  others,  but  for  another  quality,  which  I 
choose  not  to  designate. 

The  secretary  alleges  that  the  Bank  has  interfered  with  the  politics  of  the 
country.  If  this  be  true,  it  certainly  is  a  most  heinous  offence.  The  Bank  is 
a  great  public  trust,  possessing,  for  the  purpose  of  discharging  the  trust,  great 
power  and  influence,  which  it  could  not  pervert  from  the  object  intended  to  that 
of  influencing  the  politics  of  the  country  without  being  guilty  of  a  great  politi 
cal  crime.  In  making  these  remarks,  I  do  not  intend  to  give  any  countenance 
to  the  truth  of  the  charge  alleged  by  the  secretary,  nor  to  deny  to  the  officers 
of  the  Bank  the  right  which  belongs  to  them,  in  common  with  every  citizen,  free- 
l/  to  form  political  principles,  and  act  on  them  in  their  private  capacity,  with 
out  permitting  them  to  influence  their  official  conduct.  But  it  is  strange  it  did 
not  occur  to  the  secretary,  while  he  was  accusing  and  punishing  the  Bank  on 
the  charge  of  interfering  in  the  politics  oC  the  country,  that  the  government  also 
was  a  great  trust,  vested  with  powers  still  more  extensive,  and  influence  im 
measurably  greater  than  that  of  the  Bank,  given  to  enable  it  to  discharge  the  ob 
ject  for  which  it  was  created ;  and  that  it  has  no  more  right  to  pervert  its  pow 
er  and  influence  into  the  means  of  controlling  the  politics  of  the  country  than 
the  Bank  itself.  Can  it  be  unknown  to  him  that  the  fourth  auditor  of  the  treasu 
ry  (an  officer  in  his  own  department),  the  man  who  has  made  so  prominent  a 
figure  in  this  transaction,  was  daily  and  hourly  meddling  in  politics,  and  that 
he  is  one  of  the  principal  political  managers  of  the  administration  ?  Can  he  be 
ignorant  that  the  whole  power  of  the  government  has  been  perverted  into  a  great 
political  machine,  with  a  view  of  corrupting  and  controlling  the  country  ?  Can 
he  be  ignorant  that  the  avowed  and  open  policy  of  the  government  is  to  reward 
political  friends  and  punish  political  enemies  ?  and  that,  acting  on  this  princi 
ple,  it  has  driven  from  office  hundreds  of  honest  and  competent  officers  for  opin 
ion's  sake  only,  and  filled  their  places  with  devoted  partisans  ?  Can  he  be  ig 
norant  that  the  real  offence  of  the  Bank  is  not  that  it  has  intermeddled  in  poli 
tics,  but  because  it  would  not,  intermeddle  on  the  side  of  power  ?  There  is  no 
thing  more  dignified  than  reproof  from  the  lips  of  innocence,  or  punishment  from 
the  hands  of  justice  ;  but  change  the  picture — let  the  guilty  reprove  and  the 
criminal  punish,  and  what  more  odious,  more  hateful,  can  be  presented  to  the 
imagination  ? 

The  secretary  next  tells  us,  in  the  same  spirit,  that  the  Bank  had  been  waste 
ful  of  the  public  funds.  That  it  has  spent  some  thirty,  forty,  or  fifty  thousand 
dollars — I  do  not  remember  the  exact  amount  (trifles  have  no  weight  in  the 
determination  of  so  great  a  question) — in  circulating  essays  and  speeches  in  de 
fence  of  the  institution,  of  which  sum,  one  fifth  part — some  seven  thousand  dol 
lars — belonged  to  the  government.  Well,  sir,  if  the  Bank  has  really  wasted  this 
amount  of  the  public  money,  it  is  a  grave  charge.  It  has  not  a  right  to  waste  a 
single  cent ;  but  I  must  say,  in  defence  of  the  Bank,  that,  assailed  as  it  was  by 
the  executive,  it  would  have  been  unfaithful  to  its  trust,  both  to  *he- stockholders 
and  to  the  public,  had  it  not  resorted  to  every  proper  means  in  its  power  to  de 
fend  its  conduct,  and,  among  others,  the  free  circulation  of  able  and  judicious 
publications. 

But  admit  that  the  Bank  has  been  guilty  of  wasting  the  public  funds  to  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  129 

full  extent  charged  by  the  secretary,  I  would  ask  if  he,  the  head  of  the  finan 
cial  department  of  the  government,  is  not  under  as  high  and  solemn  obligation 
to  take  care  of  the  moneyed  interest  of  the  public  as  the  Bank  itself.  I  would 
ask  him  to  answer  me  a  few  simple  questions  :  How  has  he  performed  this  dutj 
in  relation  to  the  interest  which  the  public  holds  in  the  Bank  1  Has  he  been 
less  wasteful  than  he  has  charged  the  Bank  to  have  been  ?  Has  he  not  wast 
ed  thousands  where  the  Bank,  even  according  to  his  own  statement,  has  hun 
dreds  ?  Has  he  not,  by  withdrawing  the  deposites  and  placing  them  in  the 
state  banks,  where  the  public  receives  not  a  cent  of  interest,  greatly  affected 
the  dividends  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  in  which  the  government,  as  n. 
stockholder,  is  a  loser  to  the  amount  of  one  fifth  of  the  diminution  ?  a  sum  which 
I  will  venture  to  predict  will  many  fold  exceed  the  entire  amount  which  the 
Bank  has  expended  in  its  defence.  But  this  is  a  small,  a  very  small  proportion 
of  the  public  loss,  in  consequence  of  the  course  which  the  executive  has  pur 
sued  in  relation  to  the  Bank,  and  which  has  reduced  the  value  of  the  shares 
from  130  to  108  (a  senator  near  me  says  much  more.  It  may  be;  I  am  not 
particular  in  such  things),  and  on  which  the  public  sustains  a  corresponding 
loss  on  its  share  of  the  stock,  amounting  to  seven,  millions  of  dollars — a  sum 
more  than  two  hundred  fold  greater  than  the  waste  which  he  has  charged  upon 
the  Bank.  Other  administrations  may  exceed  this  in  talents,  patriotism,  and 
hionesty,  but,  certainly,  in  audacity,  in  effrontery,  it  stands  without  a  parallel ' 

The  secretary  has  brought  forward  many  and  grievous  charges  against  the 
Bank.  I  will  not  condescend  to  notice  them — it  is  the  conduct  of  the  secreta 
ry,  and  not  that  of  the  Bank,  which  is  immediately  under  examination,  and  he 
has  no  right  to  drag  the  conduct  of  the  Bank  into  the  issue,  beyond  its  opera 
tions  in  regard  to  the  deposites.  To  that  extent  I  am  prepared  to  examine  his 
allegations  against  it,  but  beyond  that  he  has  no  right — no,  not  the  least — to  ar 
raign  the  conduct  of  the  Bank  ;  and  I,  for  one,  will  not,  by  noticing  his  charges 
beyond  that  point,  sanction  his  authority  to  call  its  conduct  in  question.  But 
let  the  point  in  issue  be  determined,  and  I,  as  far  as  my  voice  extends,  will  give 
to  those  who  desire  it  the  means  of  the  freest  arid  most  unlimited  inquiry  into 
its  conduct.  I  am  no  partisan  of  the  Bank — I  am  connected  with  it  in  no  way, 
by  moneyed  or  political  ties.  I  might  say,  with  truth,  that  the  Bank  owes  as 
much  to  me  as  to  any  other  individual  in  the  country ;  and  1  might  even  add 
that,  had  it  not  been  for  my  efforts,  it  would  not  have  been  chartered.  Standing 
in  this  relation  to  the  institution,  a  high  sense  of  delicacy,  a  regard  to  independ 
ence  and  character,  has  restrained  me  from  any  connexion  with  the  institution 
•whatever,  except  some  trifling  accommodations  in  the  way  of  ordinary  business, 
which  were  not  of  the  slightest  importance  either  to  the  Bank  or  myself. 

But  while  I  shall  not  condescend  to  notice  the  charges  of  the  secretary 
against  the  Bank  beyond  the  extent  which  [  have  stated,  a  sense  of  duty  to  the 
institution,  and  regard  to  the  part  which  I  took  in  its  creation,  compels  me  to 
notice  two  allegations  against  it  which  have  fallen  from  another  quarter.  It  is 
said  that  the  Bank  had  no  agency,  or  at  least  efficient  agency,  in  the  restoration 
of  specie  payment  in  1817,  and  that  it  had  failed  to  furnish  the  country  with  a 
uniform  and  sound  currency,  as  had  been  promised  at  its  creation.  Both  of 
these  allegations  I  pronounce  to  be  without  just  foundation.  To  enter  into  a 
minute  examination  of  them  would  carry  me  too  far  from  the  subject,  and  I  must 
content  myself  with  saying  that,  having  been  on  the  political  stage,  without  in 
terruption,  from  that  day  to  this — having  been  an  attentive  observer  of  the  ques 
tion  of  the  currency  throughout  the  whole  period — that  the  Bank  has  been  an 
indispensable  agent  in  the  restoration  of  specie  payments  ;  that  without  it  the 
restoration  could  riot  have  been  effected  short  of  the  utter  prostration  of  all  the 
moneyed  institutions  of  the  country,  and  an  entire  depreciation  of  bank  paper  ; 
and  that  it  has  not  only  restored  specie  payment,  but  has  given  a  currency  far 
more  uniform  between  the  extremes  of  the  country  than  was  anticipated,  or  even 

R 


130  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

dreamed  of,  at  the  time  of  its  creation.  I  will  say  for  myself,  that.  I  did  not  be 
lieve,  at  that  time,  that  the  exchange  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  West  would 
be  brought  lower  than  two  and  a  half  per  cent. — the  estimated  expense  then, 
including  insurance  and  loss  of  time,  of  transporting  specie  between  the  two- 
points.  How  much  it  was  below  the  anticipated  point  I  need  not  state  :  the 
whole  commercial  world  knows  that  it  was  not  a  fourth  part  at  the  time  of  the 
removal  of  the  deposites. 

But  to  return  from  this  digression.  Though  I  will  not  notice  the  charges  of 
the  secretary  for  the  reasons  already  stated,  1  will  take  the  liberty  of  propound 
ing  to  those  who  support  them  on  this  floor  a  few  plain  questions.  If  there 
be  in  banking  institutions  an  inherent  tendency  so  strong  to  abuse  and  corrup 
tion  as  they  contend — if,  in  consequence  of  this  tendency,  the  Bank  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  be  guilty  of  the  enormous  charges  and  corruptions  alleged,  notwith 
standing  its  responsibility  to  the  government  and  our  control  over  it,  what  is  to 
be  expected  from  an  irresponsible  league  of  banks,  as  called  by  the  senator  from 
Kentucky  (Mr.  CLAY),  over  which  we  have  no  legal  control  ?  If  our  power  of 
renewing  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States — if  our  right  to  vacate 
the  charter  by  scire  facias,  in  case  of  misconduct— if  the  influence  which  the 
appointment  of  five  government  directors  gives  us — and,  finally,  if  the  power 
which  we  have  of  appointing  committees  to  examine  into  its  condition,  are  not 
sufficient  to  hold  the  institution  in  check :  if,  in  spite  of  all  these,  it  has,  from  the 
innate  corruption  of  such  institutions,  been  guilty  of  the  enormous  abuses  and 
crimes  charged  against  it,  what  may  we  not  expect  from  the  associated  banks> 
the  favourites  of  the  treasury,  over  the  renewal  of  whose  charter  the  government 
has  no  power,  against  which  it  can  issue  no  scire  facias,  in  whose  direction  it 
has  not  a  single  individual,  and  into  whose  conduct  Congress  can  appoint  no 
committee  to  look  ?  With  these  checks  all  withdrawn,  what  will  be  the  con 
dition  of  the  public  funds  ? 

I,  said  Mr.  CALHOUN,  stated  in  the  outset  of  my  remarks,  that,  as  broad  as 
was  the  power  which  the  secretary  had  assumed  in  relation  to  the  deposites, 
there  was  a  portion  of  the  transaction  of  a  highly  important  character,  to  which 
he  has  not  alluded,  and  in  relation  to  which  he  has  not  even  attempted  a  justifi 
cation.  I  will  now  proceed  to  make  good  this  assertion  to  the  letter. 

There  is  a  material  difference  between  withholding  money  from  going  into  the 
Bank,  and  withdrawing  it  after  it  has  been  placed  there.  The  former  is  authorized 
in  the  manner  which  I  have  stated,  under  the  sixteenth  section,  which  directs,  as 
has  been  frequently  stated,  that  the  public  money  shall  be  deposited  in  the  Bank, 
unless  otherwise  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  But  neither  that  sec 
tion,  nor  any  portion  of  the  act  incorporating  the  Bank,  nor,  in  truth,  any  other 
act,  gives  the  secretary  any  authority  of  himself  to  withdraw  public  money  de 
posited  in  the  Bank.  There  is,  I  repeat,  a  material  difference  between  with 
holding  public  money  from  deposite  and  withdrawing  it.  When  paid  into  the 
place  designated  by  law  as  the  deposite  of  the  public  money,  it  passes  to  the 
credit  of  the  treasurer,  and  then  is  in  the  treasury  of  the  United  States,  where 
it  is  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  Constitution  itself,  and  from  which,  by 
an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  it  can  only  be  withdrawn  by  an  appro 
priation  made  by  law.  So  careful  were  the  framers  of  the  act  of  1816  to  leave 
nothing  to  implication,  that  express  authority  is  given  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  in  the  fifteenth  section,  to  transfer  the  deposites  from  one  place  to  an 
other,  for  the  convenience  of  disbursements  ;  but  which,  by  a  strange  perversion, 
is  now  attempted  to  be  so  construed  as  to  confer  on  the  secretary  the  power  to 
withdraw  the  money  from  the  deposite,  and  loan  it  to  favourite  state  banks — I 
express  myself  too  favourably,  I  should  say  give  (they  pay  no  interest) — with 
a  view  to  sustain  their  credits  or  enlarge  their  profits — a  power  not  only  far  be 
yond  the  secretary,  but  which  Congress  itself  could  not  exercise  without  a  fla 
grant  breach  of  the  Constitution.  But  it  is  said,  in  answer  to  these  views, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  131 

that  money  paid  in  deposite  into  the  Bank,  as  directed  by  law,  is  not  in  the 
treasury.  I  will  not  stop,  said  Mr.  C.,  to  reply  to  such  an  objection.  If  it  be 
not  in  the  treasury,  where  is  the  treasury  ?  If  it  be  not  money  in  the  treasury, 
where  is  the  money  annually  reported  to  be  in  the  treasury  ?  where  the  eight  or 
nine  millions  which,  by  the  annual  report  of  the  secretary,  are  said  to  be  now  in 
the  treasury  ?  Are  we  to  understand  that  none  of  this  money  is,  in  truth,  in  the 
treasury  1  that  it  is  floating  about  at  large,  subject  to  be  disposed  of,  to  be  given 
away,  at  the  will  of  the  executive,  to  favourites  and  partisans  ?  So  it  would 
seem ;  for  it  appears,  by  a  correspondence  between  the  treasurer  and  the  cash 
ier  of  the  Bank,  derived  through  the  Bank  (the  secretary  not  deeming  it  worth 
while  to  give  the  slightest  information  of  the  transaction,  as  if  a  matter  of 
course),  that  he  has  drawn  out  two  millions  and  a  quarter  of  the  public  money 
without  appropriation,  and  distributed  it  at  pleasure  among  his  favourites ! 

But  it  is  attempted  to  .indicate  the  conduct  of  the  secretary  on  the  ground  of 
precedent.  I  will  not  otop  to  notice  whether  the  cases  cited  are  in  point,  nor 
will  I  avail  myself  of  the  great  and  striking  advantage  that  I  might  have  on  the 
question  of  precedent :  this  case  stands  alone  and  distinct  from  all  others.  There 
is  none  similar  to  it  in  magnitude  and  importance.  I  waive  all  that :  I  place 
myself  on  higher  grounds — I  stand  on  the  immovable  principle  that,  on  a  ques 
tion  of  law  and  constitution,  in  a  deliberative  assembly,  there  is  no  room — no 
place  for  precedents.  To  admit  them  would  be  to  make  the  violation  of  to-day 
the  law  and  Constitution  of  to-morrow  ;  and  to  substitute  in  the  place  of  the  writ" 
ten  and  sacred  will  of  the  people  and  the  Legislature,  the  infraction  of  those  char 
ged  with  the  execution  of  the  law.  Such,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  relative  force  of 
law  and  constitution  on  one  side,  as  compared  with  precedents  on  the  other. 
Viewed  in  a  different  light,  not  in  reference  to  the  law  or  Constitution,  but  to 
the  conduct  of  the  officer,  I  am  disposed  to  give  rather  more  weight  to  prece 
dents,  when  the  question  relates  to  an  excuse  or  apology  for  the  officer,  in  case 
of  infraction.  If  the  infraction  be  a  trivial  one,  in  a  case  not  calculated  to  ex 
cite  attention,  an  officer  might  fairly  excuse  himself  on  the  ground  of  precedent ; 
but  in  one  like  this,  of  the  utmost  magnitude,  involving  the  highest  interests  and 
most  important  principles,  where  the  attention  of  the  officer  must  be  aroused  to 
a  most  careful  examination,  he  cannot -avail  himself  of  the  plea  of  precedent  to 
excuse  his  conduct.  It  is  a  case  where  false  precedents  are  to  be  corrected,  and 
not  followed.  An  officer  ought  to  be  ashamed,  in  such  a  case,  to  attempt  to  vin 
dicate  his  conduct  on  a  charge  of  violating  law  or  Constitution  by  pleading  pre 
cedent.  The  principle  in  such  case  is  obvious.  If  the  secretary's  right  to 
withdraw  public  money  from  the  treasury  be  clear,  he  has  no  need  of  precedent 
to  vindicate  him.  If  not,  he  ought  not,  in  a  case  of  so  much  magnitude,  to 
have  acted. 

I  have  not  (said  Mr.  Calhoun)  touched  a  question,  which  has  had  so  promi 
nent  a  part  in  the  debate,  whether  the  withholding  of  the  deposites  was  the  act 
of  the  secretary  or  the  President.  Under  my  view  of  the  subject,  the  question, 
is  not  of  the  slightest  importance.  It  is  equally  unauthorized  and  illegal, 
whether  done  by  President  or  secretary  ;  but,  as  the  question  has  been  agitated, 
and  as  my  views  do  not  entirely  correspond  on  this  point  with  those  advocating 
the  side  which  I  do,  I  deem  it  due  to  frankness  to  express  my  sentiments. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  the  President  removed  the  former  secretary,  and  placed 
the  present  in  his  place,  expressly  with  a  view  to  the  removal  of  the  deposites. 
I  am  equally  clear,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  that  the  President's 
conduct  is  wholly  indefensible  ;  and,  among  other  objections,  I  fear  he  had  in 
view,  in  the  removal,  an  object  eminently  dangerous  and  unconstitutional — to 
give  an  advantage  to  his  veto  never  intended  by  the  Constitution — a  power  in 
tended  as  a  shield  to  protect  the  executive  against  the  encroachment  of  the 
legislative  department — to  maintain  the  present  slate  of  things  against  dangerous 
or  hasty  innovation,  but  which,  I  fear,  is,  in  this  case,  intende?  <  s  a  sword  to 


132  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

defend  the  usurpation  of  the  executive.  I  say  I  fear  ;  for.  although  the  circum 
stance  of  this  case  leads  to  a  just  apprehension  that  such  is  the  intention,  I  will 
not  permit  myself  to  assert  that  such  is  the  fact — that  so  lawless  and  unconsti 
tutional  an  object  is  contemplated  by  the  President,  till  his  act  shall  compel  me 
to  believe  to  the  contrary.  But  while  I  thus  severely  condemn  the  conduct  of 
the  President  in  removing  the  former  secretary  and  appointing  the  present,  I 
must  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  it  is  a  case  of  the  abuse,  and  not  of  the  usurpation 
of  power.  The  President  has  the  right  of  removal  from  office.  The  power  of 
removal,  wherever  it  exists,  does,  from  necessity,  involve  the  power  of  general 
supervision ;  nor  can  I  doubt  that  it  might  be  constitutionally  exercised  in  ref 
erence  to  the  deposites.  Reverse  the  present  case  :  suppose  the  late  secreta 
ry,  instead  of  being  against,  had  been  in  favour  of  the  removal,  and  that  the 
President,  instead  of  for,  had  been  against  it,  deeming  the  removal  not  only  in 
expedient,  but,  under  the  circumstances,  illegal ;  would  any  man  doubt  that, 
under  such  circumstances,  he  had  a  right  to  remove  his  secretary,  if  it  were  the 
only  means  of  preventing  the  removal  of  the  deposites  ?  Nay,  would  it  not  be 
his  indispensable  duty  to  have  removed  him  ?  and  had  he  not,  would  not  he 
have  been  universally,  and  justly,  held  responsible  ? 

1  have  now  (said  Mr.  C.)  offered  all  the  remarks  I  intended  in  reference  to 
the  deposite  question ;  and,  on  reviewing  the  whole  ground,  I  must  say,  that 
the  secretary,  in  removing  the  deposites,  has  clearly  transcended  his  power ;  that 
he  has  violated  the  contract  between  the  Bank  and  the  United  States ;  that,  in 
so  doing,  he  has  deeply  injured  that  large  and  respectable  portion  of  our  citi 
zens  who  have  been  invited,  on  the  faith  of  the  government,  to  invest  their 
property  in  the  institution  ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  has  deeply  injured  the 
public  in  its  character  of  stockholder ;  and,  finally,  that  he  has  inflicted  a  deep 
wound  on  the  public  faith.  To  this  last  I  attribute  the  present  embarrassment 
in  the  currency,  which  has  so  injuriously  affected  all  the  great  interests  of  the 
country.  The  credit  of  the  country  is  an  important  portion  of  the  currency  of 
the  country — credit  in  every  shape,  public  and  private — credit,  not  only  in  the 
shape  of  paper,  but  that  of  faith  and  confidence  between  man  and  man — through 
the  agency  of  which,  in  all  its  forms,  the  great  and  mighty  exchanges  of  this 
commercial  country,  at  home  and  abroad^  are,  in  a  great  measure,  effecte,d«  To 
inflict  a  wound  anywhere,  particularly  on  the  public  faith,  is  to  embarrass  all 
the  channels  of  currency  and  exchange  ;  and  it  is  to  this,  and  not  to  the  with 
drawing  the  few  millions  of  dollars  from  circulation,  that  I  attribute  the  present 
moneyed  embarrassment.  Did  I  believe  the  contrary — if  I  thought  that  any  great 
and  permanent  distress  would  of  itself  result  from  winding  up,  in  a  regular  and 
legal  manner,  the  present  or  any  other  Bank  of  the  United  States,  I  would  deem 
it  an  evidence  of  the  dangerous  power  of  the  institution,  and,  to  that  extent,  an 
argument  against  its  existence ;  but,  as  it  is,  I  regard  the  present  embarrass 
ment,  not  as  an  argument  against  the  Bank,  but  an  argument  against  the  law 
less  and  wanton  exercise  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  executive — an  embarrass 
ment  which  is  likely  to  continue  if  the  deposites  be  not  restored.  The  banks 
which  have  received  them,  at  the  expense  of  the  public  faith,  and  in  violation 
of  law,  will  never  be  permitted  to  enjoy  their  spoils  in  quiet.  No  one  who  re 
gards  the  subject  in  the  light  in  which  I  do,  can  ever  give  his  sanction  to  any 
law  intended  to  protect  or  carry  through  the  present  illegal  arrangement ;  on 
the  contrary,  all  such  must  feel  bound  to  wage  perpetual  war  against  a  usurpa 
tion  of  power  so  flagrant  as  that  which  controls  the  present  deposites  of  the 
public  money.  If  I  stand  alone  (said  Mr.  Calhoun),  I,  at  least,  will  continue 
to  maintain  the  contest  so  long  as  I  remain  in  public  life. 

As  important  (said  Mr.  Calhoun)  as  I  consider  the  question  of  the  deposites, 
in  all  its  bearings,  public  and  private,  it  is  one  on  the  surface,  a  mere  pretext 
to  another,  and  one  greatly  more  important,  which  lies  beneath,  and  which 
must  be  taken  into  consideration,  to  understand  correctly  all  the  circumstances 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  133 

attending  this  extraordinary  transaction.  It  is  felt  and  acknowledged  on  all 
sides  that  there  is  another  and  a  deeper  question,  which  has  excited  the  pro 
found  sensation  and  alarm  which  pervade  the  country. 

If  we  are  to  believe  what  we  hear  from  the  advocates  of  the  administration, 
we  would  suppose  at  one  time  that  the  real  question  was  Bank  or  no  Bank  ;  at 
another,  that  the  question  was  between  the  United  States  Bank  and  the  state 
banks  ;  and,  finally,  that  it  was  a  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  administration  to 
guard  and  defend  the  rights  of  the  states  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Gen 
eral  Government.  The  administration  the  guardians  and  defenders  of  the 
rights  of  the  states  !  What  shall  I  call  it  ?  audacity  or  hypocrisy  ?  The  au 
thors  of  the  proclamation  the  guardians  and  defenders  of  the  rights  of  the  states  ! 
The  authors  of  the  war  message  against  a  member  of  this  confederacy — the  au 
thors  of  the  "  bloody  bill"  the  guardians  and  defenders  of  the  rights  of  the 
states!  'This  a  struggle  for  state  rights  ?  No,  sir  :  state  rights  are  no  more. 
The  struggle  is  over  for  the  present.  The  bill  of  the  last  session,  which  vested 
in  the  government  the  right  of  judging  of  the  extent  of  its  powers,  finally  and 
conclusively,  and  gave  it  the  right  of  enforcing  its  judgments  by  the  sword,  de 
stroyed  all  distinction  between  delegated  and  reserved  rights,  concentrated  in 
the  government  the  entire  power  of  the  system,  and  prostrated  the  states,  as  poor 
and  helpless  corporations,  at  the  foot  of  this  sovereignty. 

Nor  is  it  more  true  that  the  real  question  is  Bank  or  no  Bank.  Taking  the 
deposite  question  in  the  broadest  sense  :  suppose,  as  it  is  contended  by  the 
friends  of  the  administration,  that  it  involves  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the 
charter,  and,  consequently,  the  existence  of  the  Bank  itself,  still  the  banking  sys 
tem  would  stand  almost  untouched  and  unimpaired.  Four  hundred  banks 
would  still  remain  scattered  over  this  wide  Republic,  and  on  the  ruins  of  the 
United  States  Bank  many  would  rise  to  be  added  to  the  present  list.  Under 
this  aspect  of  the  subject,  the  only  possible  question  that  could  be  presented 
for  consideration  would  be,  whether  the  banking  system  was  more  safe,  more 
beneficial,  or  more  constitutional,  with  or  without  the  United  States  Bank. 

If,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  this  was  a  question  of  Bank  or  no  Bank — if  it  involved 
the  existence  of  the  banking  system,  it  would  indeed  be  a  great  question — one 
of  the  first  magnitude,  and,  with  my  present  impression,  long  entertained  and 
daily  increasing,  I  would  hesitate — long  hesitate — before  I  would  be  found  un 
der  the  banner  of  the  system.  I  have  great  doubts,  if  doubts  they  may  be  call 
ed,  as  to  the  soundness  and  tendency  of  the  whole  system,  in  all  its  modifica 
tions  :  I  have  great  fears  that  it  will  be  found  hostile  to  liberty  and  the  advance 
of  civilization — fatally  hostile  to  liberty  in  our  country,  where  the  system  ex 
ists  in  its  worst  and  most  dangerous  form.  Of  all  institutions  affecting  the 
great  question  of  the  distribution  of  wealth — a  question  least  explored  and  the 
most  important  of  any  in  the  whole  range  of  political  economy — the  banking  in 
stitution  has,  if  not  the  greatest,  one  of  the  greatest,  and,  I  fear,  most  pernicious 
influence  on  the  mode  of  distribution.  Were  the  question  really  before  us,  I 
would  not  shun  the  responsibility,  as  great  as  it  might  be,  of  freely  and  fully  of 
fering  my  sentiments  on  these  deeply-important  points ;  but,  as  it  is,  I  must 
content  myself  with  the  few  remarks  which  I  have  thrown  out. 

What,  then,  is  the  real  question  which  now  agitates  the  country  ?  I  answer, 
it  is  a  struggle  between  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the  gov 
ernment  :  a  struggle,  not  in  relation  to  the  existence  of  the  Bank,  but  which, 
Congress  or  the  President,  shall  have  the  power  to  create  a  Bank,  and  the 
consequent  control  over  the  currency  of  the  country.  This  is  the  real  question. 
Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  :  this  league,  this  association  of  banks,  created  by 
the  executive,  bound  together  by  its  influence,  united  in  common  articles  of  as 
sociation,  vivified  and  sustained  by  receiving  the  deposites  of  the  public  money, 
and  having  their  notes  converted,  by  being  received  everywhere  by  the  treasu 
ry,  into  the  common  currency  of  the  country,  is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a 


134  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Bank  of  the  United  States — the  executive  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  distin 
guished  from  that  of  Congress.  However  it  might  fail  to  perform  satisfactorily 
the  useful  functions  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  as  incorporated  by  law,  it 
would  outstrip  it — far  outstrip  it — in  all  its  dangerous  qualities,  in  extending  the 
power,  the  influence,  and  the  corruption  of  the  government.  It  is  impossible 
to  conceive  any  institution  more  admirably  calculated  to  advance  these  objects. 
Not  only  the  selected  banks,  but  the  whole  banking  institutions  of  the  country, 
and  with  them  the  entire  money  power,  for  the  purpose  of  speculation,  peculation, 
and  corruption,  would  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the  executive.  A  system 
of  menaces  and  promises  will  be  established :  of  menace  to  the  banks  in  po^- 
session  of  the  deposites,  but  which  might  not  be  entirely  subservient  to  execu 
tive  views  ;  and  of  promise  of  future  favours  to  those  who  may  not  as  yet  enjoy 
its  favours.  Between  the  two,  the  banks  would  be  left  without  influence,  hon 
our,  or  honesty,  and  a  system  of  speculation  and  stock-jobbing  would  com 
mence,  unequalled  in  the  annals  of  our  country.  I  fear  they  have  already  com 
menced  ;  I  fear  the  means  which  have  been  put  in  the  hands  of  the  minions  of 
power  by  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  placing  them  in  the  vaults  of  de 
pendant  banks,  have  extended  their  cupidity  to  the  public  lands,  particularly  in 
the  Southwest,  and  that  to  this  we  must  attribute  the  recent  phenomena  in  that 
quarter — immense  and  valuable  tracts  of  land  sold  at  short  notice  ;  sales  fraudu 
lently  postponed  to  aid  the  speculators,  with  which,  if  I  am  not  misinformed,  a 
name  not  unknown  to  this  body  has  performed  a  prominent  part.  But  I  leave 
this  to  my  vigilant  and  able  friend  from  Mississippi  (Mr.  Poindexter),  at  the 
head  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands,  who,  I  doubt  not,  will  see  justice  done 
to  the  public.  As  to  stock-jobbing,  this  new  arrangement  will  open  a  field 
which  Rothschild  himself  may  envy.  It  has  been  found  hard  work — very 
hard,  no  doubt — by  the  jobbers  in  stock,  who  have  been  engaged  in  attempts  to 
raise  or  depress  the  price  of  United  States  Bank  stock ;  but  no  work  will  be 
more  easy  than  to  raise  or  depress  the  price  of  the  stock  of  the  selected  banks, 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  executive.  Nothing  more  will  be  required  than  to  give 
or  withhold  deposites ;  to  draw,  or  abstain  from  drawing  warrants ;  to  pamper 
them  at  one  time,  and  starve  them  at  another.  Those  who  would  be  in  the  se 
cret,  and  who  would  know  when  to  buy  and  when  to  sell,  would  have  the  means 
of  realizing,  by  dealing  in  the  stocks,  whatever  fortune  they  might  please. 

So  long  as  the  question  is  one  between  a  Bank  of  the  United  States  incorpo 
rated  by  Congress,  and  that  system  of  banks  which  has  been  created  by  the 
will  of  the  executive,  it  is  an  insult  to  the  understanding  to  discourse  on  the 
pernicious  tendency  and  unconstitutionality  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
To  bring  up  that  question  fairly  and  legitimately,  you  must  go  one  step  farther  : 
you  must  divorce  the  government  and  the  banking  system.  You  must  refuse 
all  connexion  with  banks.  You  must  neither  receive  nor  pay  away  bank-notes  ; 
you  must  go  back  to  the  old  system  of  the  strong  box,  and  of  gold  and  silver. 
If  you  have  a  right  to  receive  bank-notes  at  all — to  treat  them  as  money  by  re 
ceiving  them  in  your  dues,  or  paying  them  away  to  creditors — you  have  a  right 
to  create  a  bank.  Whatever  the  government  receives  and  treats  as  money,  is 
money  in  effect ;  and  if  it  be  money,  then  they  have  the  right,  under  the  Consti 
tution,  to  regulate  it.  Nay,  they  are  bound  by  a  high  obligation  to  adopt  the 
most  efficient  means,  according  to  the  nature  of  that  which  they  have  recogni 
sed  as  money,  to  give  it  the  utmost  stability  and  uniformity  of  value.  And  if 
it  be  in  the  shape  of  bank-notes,  the  most  efficient  means  of  giving  those  quali 
ties  is  a  Bank  of  the  United  States,  incorporated  by  Congress.  Unless  you 
give  the  highest  practical  uniformity  to  the  value  of  bank-notes,  so  long  as  you 
receive  them  in  your  dues,  and  treat  them  as  money,  you  violate  that  provision 
of  the  Constitution  which  provides  that  taxation  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the 
United  States.  There  is  no  other  alternative  :  I  repeat,  you  must  divorce  the 
government  entirely  from  the  banking  system,  or,  if  not,  you  are  bound  to  incor- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  135 

porate  a  bank  as  the  only  safe  and  efficient  means  of  giving  stability  and  uni 
formity  to  the  currency.  And  should  the  deposites  not  be  restored,  and  the 
present  illegal  and  unconstitutional  connexion  between  the  executive  and  the 
league  of  banks  continue,  I  shall  feel  it  my  duty,  if  no  one  else  moves,  to  in 
troduce  a  measure  to  prohibit  government  from  receiving  or  touching  bank-notes 
in  any  shape  whatever,  as  the  only  means  left  of  giving  safety  and  stability  to 
the  currency,  and  saving  the  country  from  corruption  and  ruin. 

Viewing  "the  question,  in  its  true  light,  as  a  struggle  on  the  part  of  the  execu 
tive  to  seize  on  the  power  of  Congress,  and  to  unite  in  the  President  the  power 
of  the  sword  and  the  purse.,  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  said,  truly, 
and,  let  me  add,  philosophically,  that  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution.  Yes, 
the  very  existence  of  free  governments  rests  on  the  proper  distribution  and  or 
ganization  of  power ;  and  to  destroy  this  distribution,  and  thereby  concentrate 
power  in  any  one  of  the  departments,  is  to  effect  a  revolution ;  but,  while  I 
agree  with  the  senator  that  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a  revolution,  I  cannot  agree 
with  him  as  to  the  time  at  which  it  commenced,  or  the  point  to  which  it  has 
progressed.  Looking  to  the  distribution  of  the  powers  of  the  General  Govern 
ment — into  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  departments — and  confining 
his  views  to  the  encroachment  of  the  executive  upon  the  legislative,  he  dates 
the  commencement  of  the  revolution  but  sixty  days  previous  to  the  meeting  of 
the  present  Congress.  I,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  take  a  wider  range,  and  date  it 
from  an  earlier  period.  Besides  the  distribution  among  the  departments  of  the 
General  Government,  there  belongs  to  our  system  another,  and  a  far  more  im 
portant  division  or  distribution  of  power — that  between  the  states  and  the  Gen 
eral  Government,  the  reserved  and  delegated  rights,  the  maintenance  of  which 
is  still  more  essential  to  the  preservation  of  our  institutions.  Taking  this  wide 
review  of  our  political  system,  the  revolution  in  the  midst  of  which  we  are,  be 
gan,  not,  as  supposed  by  the  senator  from  Kentucky,  shortly  before  the  com 
mencement  of  the  present  session,  but  many  years  ago,  with  the  commence 
ment  of  the  restrictive  system,  and  terminated  its  first  stage  with  the  passage 
of  the  force  bill  of  the  last  session,  which  absorbed  all  the  rights  and  sovereign 
ty  of  the  states,  and  consolidated  them  in  this  government.  While  this  pro 
cess  was  going  on,  of  absorbing  the  reserved  powers  of  the  states  on  the  part 
of  the  General  Government,  another  commenced,  of  concentrating  in  the  execu 
tive  the  powers  of  the  other  two,  the  legislative  and  judicial  departments  of  the 
government,  which  constitutes  the  second  stage  of  the  revolution,  in  which  we 
have  advanced  almost  to  the  termination. 

The  senator  from  Kentucky,  in  connexion  with  this  part  of  his  argument,  read  a 
striking  passage  from  one  of  the  most  pleasing  and  instructive  writers  in  any  lan 
guage  (Plutarch),  giving  the  description  of  Caesar  forcing  himself,  sword  in  hand, 
into  the  treasury  of  the  Roman  Commonwealth.  We  are  at  the  same  stage  of 
our  political  revolution,  and  the  analogy  between  the  two  cases  is  complete,  va 
ried  only  by  the  character  of  the  actors  and  the  circumstances  of  the  times. 
That  was  a  case  of  an  intrepid  and  bold  warrior,  as  an  open  plunderer,  seiz 
ing  forcibly  the  treasury  of  the  country,  which,  in  that  Republic,  as  well  as 
ours,  was  confided  to  the  custody  of  the  legislative  department  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  actors  in  our  case  are  of  a  different  character :  artful  and  cunning 
politicians,  and  not  fearless  warriors.  They  have  entered  the  treasury,  not 
sword  in  hand,  as  public  plunderers,  but  with  the  false  keys  of  sophistry,  under 
the  silence  of  midnight.  The  motive  and  object  are  the  same,  varied  only  by 
character  and  circumstances.  "  With  money  I  will  get  men,  and  with  men 
money,"  was  the  maxim  of  the  Roman  plunderer.  With  money  we  will  get 
partisans,  with  partisans  votes,  and  with  votes  money,  is  the  maxim  of  our  pub 
lic  pilferers.  With  men  and  money,  Caesar  struck  down  Roman  liberty  at  the 
fatal  battle  of  Pharsalia,  never  to  rise  again  ;  from  which  disastrous  hour,  all  the 
powers  of  the  Roman  Republic  were  consolidated  in  the  person  of  Caesar,  and 


136  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

perpetuated  in  his  line.  With  money  and  corrupt  partisans,  a  great  effort  is 
now  making  to  choke  and  stifle  the  voice  of  American'liberty,  through  all  its  con 
stitutional  and  legal  organs  ;  by  pensioning  the  press  ;  by  overawing  the  other 
departments  ;  and,  finally,  by  setting  up  a  new  organ,  composed  of  office-holders 
and  partisans,  under  the  name  of  a  national  convention,  which,  counterfeiting  the 
voice  of  the  people,  will,  if  not  resisted,  in  their  name  dictate  the  succession  ; 
when  the  deed  shall  have  been  done — the  revolution  completed — and  all  the 
powers  of  our  Republic,  in  like  manner,  consolidated  in  the  executive  in  time, 
and  perpetuated  by  his  dictation. 

The  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  C.)  anticipates  with  confidence  that  the 
small  party,  who  were  denounced  at  the  last  session  as  traitors  and  disunionists 
will  be  found,  on  this  trying  occasion,  standing  in  the  front  rank,  and  manfully- 
resisting  the  advance  of  despotic  power.  I,  said  Mr.  CALHOUN,  heard  the  an 
ticipation  with  pleasure,  not  on  account  of  the  compliment  which  it  implied,  but 
the  evidence  which  it  affords  that  the  cloud  which  has  been  so  industriously 
thrown  over  the  character  and  motive  of  that  small,  but  patriotic  party,  begins 
to  be  dissipated.  The  senator  hazarded  nothing  in  the  prediction.  That  party- 
is  the  determined,  the  fixed,  and  sworn  enemy  to  usurpation,  come  from  what 
quarter  and  under  what  form  it  may — whether  from  the  executive  upon  the  other 
departments  of  this  government,  or  from  this  government  on  the  sovereignty  and 
rights  of  the  states.  The  resolution  and  fortitude  with  which  it  maintained  its 
position  at  the  last  session,  under  so  many  difficulties  and  dangers,  in  defence 
of  the  states  against  the  encroachments  oif  the  General  Government,  furnished 
evidence  riot  to  be  mistaken,  that  that  party,  in  the  present  momentous  struggle, 
would  be  found  arrayed  in  defence  of  the  rights  of  Congress  against  the  en 
croachments  of  the  President.  And  let  me  tell  the  senator  from  Kentucky,  said 
Mr.  C.,  that,  if  the  present  struggle  against  executive  usurpation  be  successful, 
it  will  be  owing  to  the  success  with  which  we,  the  nullifiers — I  am  not  afraid 
of  the  word — maintained  the  rights  of  the  states  against  the  encroachment  of 
the  General  Government  at  the  last  session. 

A  very  few  words  will  place  this  point  beyond  controversy.  To  the  inter 
position  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  we  are  indebted  for  the  adjustment  of 
the  tariff  question;  without  it,  all  the  influence  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky 
over  the  manufacturing  interest,  great  as  it  deservedly  is,  would  have  been 
wholly  incompetent,  if  he  had  even  thought  proper  to  exert  it,  to  adjust  the 
question.  The  attempt  would  have  prostrated  him,  and  those  who  acted  with 
him,  and  not  the  system.  It  was  the  separate  action  of  the  state  that  gave  him 
the  place  to  stand  upon,  created  the  necessity  for  the  adjustment,  and  disposed 
the  minds  of  all  to  compromise.  Now,  I  put  the  solemn  question  to  all  who 
hear  me,  If  the  tariff  had  not  then  been  adjusted — if  it  was  now  an  open  ques 
tion — what  hope  of  successful  resistance  against  the  usurpations  of  the  executive, 
on  the  part  of  this  or  any  other  branch  of  the  government,  could  be  entertained  ? 
Let  it  not  be  said  that  this  is  the  result  of  accident — of  an  unforeseen  contin 
gency.  It  was  clearly  perceived,  and  openly  stated,  that  no  successful  resist 
ance  could  be  made  to  the  corruption  and  encroachments  of  the  executive  while 
the  tariff  question  remained  open — while  it  separated  trie  North  from  the  South, 
and  wasted  the  energy  of  the  honest  and  patriotic  portions  of  the  community 
against  each  other,  the  joint  effort  of  which  is  indispensably  necessary  to  expel 
those  from  authority  who  are  converting  the  entire  powers  of  government  into* 
a  corrupt  electioneering  machine  ;  and  that,  without  separate  state  interposition, 
the  adjustment  was  impossible.  The  truth  of  this  position  rests  not  upon  the 
accidental  state  of  things,  but  on  a  profound  principle  growing  out  of  the  nature 
of  government  and  party  struggles  in  a  free  state.  History  and  reflection  teach 
us  that,  when  great  interests  come  into  conflict,  and  the  passions  and  the  preju 
dices  of  men  are  roused,  such  struggles  can  never  be  composed  by  the  influ 
ence  of  any  individuals,  however  great ;  and  if  there  be  not  somewhere  in  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  137 

system  some  high  constitutional  power  to  arrest  their  progress,  and  compel  the 
parties  to  adjust  the  difference,  they  go  on  till  the  state  falls  by  corruption  or 
violence. 

I  will,  said  Mr.  C.,  venture  to  add  to  these  remarks  another,  in  connexion 
with  the  point  under  consideration,  not  less  true.  We  are  not  only  indebted  to  the 
cause  which  I  have  stated  for  our  present  strength  in  this  body  against  the  pres 
ent  usurpation  of  the  executive,  but  if  the  adjustment  of  the  tariff  had  stood  alone, 
as  it  ought  to  have  done,  without  the  odious  bill  which  accompanied  it — if  those 
who  led  in  the  compromise  had  joined  the  State  Rights  party  in  their  resistance 
to  that  unconstitutional  measure,  and  thrown  the  responsibility  on  its  real  authors, 
the  administration,  their  party  would  have  been  so  prostrated  throughout  the  en 
tire  South,  and  their  power,  in  consequence,  so  reduced,  that  they  would  not 
have  dared  to  attempt  the  present  measure ;  or,  if  they  had,  they  would  have 
been  broke  and  defeated. 

Were  I,  said  Mr.  C.,  to  select  the  case  best  calculated  to  illustrate  the  ne 
cessity  of  resisting  usurpation  at  the  very  commencement,  and  to  prove  how 
difficult  it  is  to  resist  it  in  any  subsequent  stage  if  not  met  at  first,  I  would  se 
lect  this  very  case.  What,  he  asked,  is  the  cause  of  the  present  usurpation  of 
power  on  the  part  of  the  executive  ?  What  the  motive,  the  temptation,  which 
has  induced  them  to  seize  on  the  deposites  ?  What  but  the  large  surplus 
revenue  1  the  eight  or  ten  millions  in  the  public  treasury  beyond  the  wants  of 
the  government  ?  And  what  has  put  so  large  an  amount  of  money  in  the  treas 
ury,  when  not  needed  ?  I  answer,  the  protective  system — that  system  which 
graduated  duties,  not  in  reference  to  the  wants  of  the  government,  but  in  refer 
ence  to  the  importunities  and  demands  of  the  manufacturers,  and  which  poured 
millions  of  dollars  into  the  treasury  beyond  the  most  profuse  demands,  and  even, 
the  extravagance  of  the  government — taken — unlawfully  taken,  from  the  pockets 
of  those  who  honestly  made  it.  I  hold  that  those  who  make  are  entitled  to 
what  they  make  against  all  the  world,  except  the  government ;  and  against  it, 
except  to  the  extent  of  its  legitimate  and  constitutional  wants ;  and  that  for  the 
government  to  take  one  cent  more  is  robbery.  In  violation  of  this  sacred  prin 
ciple,  Congress  first  removed  the  deposites  into  the  public  treasury  from  the 
pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  where  they  were  rightfully  placed  by  all  laws, 
human  and  divine.  The  executive,  in  his,  turn,  following  the  example,  has 
taken  them  from  that  deposite,  and  distributed  them  among  favourite  and  partisan 
banks.  The  means  used  have  been  the  same  in  both  cases.  The  Constitution 
gives  to  Congress  the  power  to  lay  duties  with  a  view  to  revenue.  This  power, 
without  regarding  the  object  for  which  it  was  intended,  forgetting  that  it  was  a. 
great 'trust  power,  necessarily  limited,  by  the  very  nature  of  such  powers,  to  the 
subject  and  the  object  of  the  trust,  was  perverted  to  a  use  never  intended,  that 
of  protecting  the  industry  of  one  portion  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of  another ; 
and,  under  this  false  interpretation,  the  money  was  transferred  from  its  natural 
and  just  deposite,  the  pockets  of  those  who  made  it,  into  the  public  treasury,  as 
I  have  stated.  In  this,  too,  the  executive  followed  the  example  of  Congress. 

By  the  magic  construction  of  a  few  simple  words — "  unless  otherwise  order 
ed" — intended  to  confer  on  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  a  limited  power — to 
give  additional  security  to  the  public  deposites,  he  has,  in  like  manner,  pervert 
ed  this  power,  and  made  it  the  instrument,  by  similar  sophistry,  of  drawing  the 
money  from  the  treasury,  and  bestowing  it,  as  I  have  stated,  on  favourite  and 
partisan  banks.  Would  to  God,  said  Mr,  C.,  would  to  God  I  could  reverse  the 
whole  of  this  nefarious  operation,  and  terminate  the  controversy  by  returning 
the  money  to  the  pockets  of  the  honest  and  industrious  citizens,  by  the  sweat 
of  whose  brows  it  was  made,  and  to  whom  only  it  rightfully  belongs.  But,  as 
this  cannot  be  done,  I  must  content  myself  by  giving  a  vote  to  return  it  to  the 
public  treasury,  where  it  was  ordered  to  be  deposited  by  an  act  of  the  Legis 
lature. 

S 


J138  SPEECHES   OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

There  is  another  aspect,  said  Mr.  C.,  in  which  this  subject  may  be  viewed. 
We  all  remember  how  early  the  question  of  the  surplus  revenue  began  to  agi 
tate  the  country.  At  a  very  early  period,  a  senator  from  New- Jersey  (Mr. 
DICKERSON)  presented  his  scheme  for  disposing  of  it  by  distributing  it  among 
the  states.  The  first  message  of  the  President  recommended  a  similar  project, 
which  was  followed  up  by  a  movement  on  the  part  of  the  Legislature  of  New- 
York,  and,  I  believe,  some  of  the  other  states.  The  public  attention  was  aroused 
— the  scheme  scrutinized — its  gross  unconstitutionally  and  injustice,  and  its 
dangerous  tendency — its  tendency  to  absorb  the  power  and  existence  of  the 
states,  were  clearly  perceived  and  denounced.  The  denunciation  was  too  deep 
to  be  resisted,  and  the  scheme  was  abandoned.  What  have  we  now  in  lieu 
of  it  ?  What  is  the  present  scheme  but  a  distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  ? 
A  distribution  at  the  sole  will  and  pleasure  of  the  executive — a  distribution  to 
favourite  banks,  and  through  them,  in  the  shape  of  discounts  and  loans,  to  corrupt 
partisans,  as  the  means  of  increasing  political  influence  ? 

We  have,  said  Mr.  C.,  arrived  at  a  fearful  crisis.  Things  cannot  long  re 
main  as  they  are.  It  behooves  all  who  love  their  country — who  have  affection 
for  their  offspring,  or  who  have  any  stake  in  our  institutions,  to  pause  and  re 
flect.  Confidence  is  daily  withdrawing  from  the  General  Government.  Alien 
ation  is  hourly  going  on.  These  will  necessarily  create  a  state  of  things 
inimical  to  the  existence  of  our  institutions,  and,  if  not  arrested,  convulsions 
must  follow ;  and  then  comes  dissolution  or  despotism,  when  a  thick  cloud  will 
be  thrown  over  the  cause  of  liberty  arid  the  future  prospects  of  our  country. 


VIII. 

SPEECH    ON    MR.    WEBSTER'S    PROPOSITION    TO     RECHARTER    THE    UNITED     STATES 
BANK,  MARCH  26,   1834. 

THE  question  being  upon  granting  leave  to  Mr.  Webster  to  introduce  into  tne 
Senate  a  bill  to  recharter,  for  the  term  of  six  years,  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  with  modifications  : 

I  rise,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  in  order  to  avail  myself  of  an  early  opportunity  to 
express  my  opinion  on  the  measure  proposed  by  the  senator  from  Massachu 
setts,  and  the  questions  immediately  connected  with  it,  under  the  impression 
that,  on  a  subject  so  intimately  connected  with  the  interests  of  every  class  in 
the  community,  there  should  be  an  early  declaration  of  their  sentiments  by  the 
members  of  this  body,  so  that  all  might  know  what  to  expect,  and  on  what  to 
calculate. 

I  shall  vote  for  the  motion  of  the  senator,  not  because  I  approve  of  the  meas 
ure  he  proposes,  but  because  I  consider  it  due  in  courtesy  to  grant  leave,  un 
less  there  be  strong  reasons  to  the  contrary,  which  is  not  the  case  in  this  in 
stance  ;  but  while  I  am  prepared  to  vote  for  his  motion,  and,  let  me  add,  to  do 
ample  justice  to  his  motives  for  introducing  the  bill,  I  cannot  approve  of  the 
measure  he  proposes.  In  every  view  which  I  have  been  able  to  take,  it  is  ob 
jectionable.  Among  the  objections,  I  place  the  uncertainty  as  to  its  object.  It 
is  left  perfectly  open  to  conjecture  whether  a  renewal  of  the  charter  is  intend 
ed,  or  a  mere  continuance,  with  the  view  of  affording  the  Bank  time  to  wind  up 
its  affairs  ;  and  what  increases  the  uncertainty  is,  if  we  compare  the  provisions 
of  the  proposed  bill  with  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  objects,  it  is  equally  un- 
suited  to  either.  If  a  renewal  of  the  charter  be  intended,  six  years  is  too  short ; 
if  a  continuance,  too  long.  I,  however,  state  this  as  a  minor  objection.  There 
-is  another  of  far  more  decisive  character :  it  settles  nothing  ;  it  leaves  every 
thing  unfixed ;  it  perpetuates  the  present  struggle,  which  so  injuriously  agitates 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  139 

the  country — a  struggle  of  bank  against  bank — of  one  set  of  opinions  against 
another  ;  and  prolongs  the  whole,  without  even  an  intervening  armistice,  to  the 
year  1842  :  a  period  that  covers  two  presidential  terms,  and,  by  inevitable  con 
sequence,  running,  for  two  successive  presidential  elections,  the  politics  of  the 
country  into  the  Bank  question,  and  the  Bank  question  into  politics,  with  the 
mutual  corruption  which  must  be  engendered ;  keeping,  during  the  whole  peri 
od,  the  currency  of  the  country,  which  the  public  interest  requires  should  have 
the  utmost  stability,  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  and  fluctuation. 

But  why  should  I  pursue  the  objections  to  the  plan  proposed  by  the  senator  ? 
He  himself  acknowledged  the  measure  to  be  defective,  and  that  he  would  pre 
fer  one  of  a  more  permanent  character.  He  has  not  proposed  this  as  the  best 
measure,  but  has  brought  it  forward  under  a  supposed  necessity — under  the  im 
pression  that  something  must  be  done — something  prompt  and  immediate,  to  re 
lieve  the  existing  distress  which  overspreads  the  land.  I  concur  with  him  in 
relation  to  the  distress,  that  it  is  deep  and  extensive  ;  that  it  fell  upon  us  sudden 
ly,  and  in  the  midst  of  prosperity  almost  unexampled ;  that  it  is  daily  consign 
ing  hundreds  to  poverty  and  misery  ;  blasting  the  hopes  of  the  enterprising  ; 
taking  employment  and  bread  from  the  labourer  ;  and  working  a  fearful  change  in 
the  relative  condition  of  the  money  dealers  on  one  side,  and  the  man  of  busi 
ness  on  the  other — raising  the  former  rapidly  to  the  top  of  the  wheel,  while  it 
is  whirling  the  latter,  with  equal  rapidity,  to  the  bottom.  While  I  thus  agree 
with  the  senator  as  to  the  distress,  I  am  also  sensible  that  there  are  great  pub 
lic  emergencies  in  which  no  permanent  relief  can  be  afforded,  and  when  the 
wisest  are  obliged  to  resort  to  expedients  :  to  palliate  and  to  temporize,  in  order 
to  gain  time  with  a  view  to  apply  a  more  effectual  remedy.  But  there  are  also 
emergencies  of  precisely  the  opposite  character :  when  the  best  and  most  per 
manent  is  the  only  practicable  measure,  and  when  mere  expedients  tend  but  to 
distract,  to  divide,  and  confound,  and  thereby  to  delay  or  defeat  all  relief ;  and 
such,  viewed  in  all  its  relations  and  bearing,  I  consider  the  present ;  and  that 
the  senator  from  Massachusetts  has  not  also  so  considered  it,  I  attribute  to  the 
fact  that,  of  the  two  questions  blended  in  the  subject  under  consideration,  he 
has  given  an  undue  prominence  to  that  which  has  by  far  the  least  relative  im 
portance — I  mean  those  of  the  Bank  and  of  the  currency.  As  a  mere  bank 
question,  as  viewed  by  the  senator,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  but  little  importance 
whether  the  renewal  should  be  for  six  years  or  for  a  longer  period  ;  and  a  pref 
erence  might  very  properly  be  given  to  one  or  the  other,  as  it  might  be  suppo 
sed  most  likely  to  succeed ;  but  I  must  say,  that,  in  my  opinion,  in  selecting  the 
period  of  six  years,  he  has  taken  that  which  will  be  much  less  likely  to  succeed 
than  one  of  a  reasonable  and  proper  duration.  But  had  he  turned  his  view  to  the 
other  and  more  prominent  question  involved  ;  had  he  regarded  the  question  as 
a  question  of  currency,  and  that  the  great  point  was  to  give  it  uniformity,  per 
manency,  and  safety ;  that,  in  effecting  these  essential  objects,  the  Bank  is  a 
mere  subordinate  agent,  to  be  used  or  not  to  be  used,  and  to  be  modified,  as  to 
its  duration  and  other  provisions,  wholly  in  reference  to  the  higher  question  of 
the  currency,  I  cannot  think  that  he  would  ever  have  proposed  the  measure 
which  he  has  brought  forward,  which  leaves,  as  I  have  already  said,  everything 
connected  with  the  subject  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  and  fluctuation. 

All  feel  that  the  currency  is  a  delicate  subject,  requiring  to  be  touched  with 
the  utmost  caution ;  but  in  order  that  it  may  be  seen  as  well  as  felt  why  it  is 
so  delicate,  why  slight  touches,  either  in  depressing  or  elevating  it,  agitate  and 
^convulse  the  whole  community,  I  will  pause  to  explain  the  cause.  If  we  take 
the  aggregate  property  of  a  community,  that  which  forms  the  currency  consti 
tutes,  in  value,  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  whole.  What  this  proportion  is 
in  our  country  and  other  commercial  and  trading  communities,  is  somewhat  un 
certain.  I  speak  conjecturally  in  fixing  it  as  one  to  twenty-five  or  thirty,  though 
J  presume  that  is  not  far  from  the  truth  ;  and  yet  this  small  proportion  of  the 


140  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

property  of  the  community  regulates  the  value  of  all  the  rest,  and  forms  the  me 
dium  of  circulation  by  which  all  its  exchanges  are  effected ;  bearing,  in  this  re 
spect,  a  striking  similarity,  considering  the  diversity  of  the  subjects,  to  the  blood 
in  the  human  or  animal  system. 

If  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  laws  which  govern  the  circulation,  we  shall 
find  one  of  the  most  important  to  be,  that,  as  the  circulation  is  decreased  or  in 
creased,  the  rest  of  the  property  will,  all  other  circumstances  remaining  the 
same,  be  decreased  or  increased  in  value  exactly  in  the  same  proportion.  To 
illustrate  :  If  a  community  should  have  an  aggregate  amount  of  property  of  thir 
ty-one  millions  of  dollars,  of  which  one  million  constitutes  its  currency ;  and 
that  one  million  should  be  reduced  one  tenth  part,  that  is  to  say,  one  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  the  value  of  the  rest  will  be  reduced  in  like  manner  one  tenth 
part,  that  is,  three  millions  of  dollars.  And  here  a  very  important  fact  dis 
closes  itself,  which  explains  why  the  currency  should  be  touched  with  such 
delicacy,  and  why  stability  and  uniformity  are  such  essential  qualities  ;  I  mean 
that  a  small  absolute  reduction  of  the  currency  makes  a  great  absolute  reduction 
of  the  value  of  the  entire  property  of  the  community,  as  we  see  in  the  case  pro 
posed  ;  where  a  reduction  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  the  currency  re 
duces  the  aggregate  value  of  property  three  millions  of  dollars — a  sum  thirty 
times  greater  than  the  reduction  of  the  currency.  From  this  results  an  impor 
tant  consideration.  If  we  suppose  the  entire  currency  to  be  in  the  hands  of  one 
portion  of  the  community,  and  the  property  in  the  hands  of  the  other  portion, 
the  former,  by  having  the  currency  under  their  exclusive  control,  might  control 
the  value  of  all  the  property  in  the  community,  and  possess  themselves  of  it  at 
their  pleasure.  Take  the  case  already  selected,  and  suppose  that  those  who 
hold  the  currency  diminish  it  one  half  by  abstracting  that  amount  from  circula 
tion  :  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to  reduce  the  circulation  to  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars  ;  the  value  of  property  would  also  be  reduced  one  half,  that  is, 
fifteen  millions  of  dollars.  Let  the  process  be  reversed,  and  the  money  abstract 
ed  gradually  restored  to  circulation,  and  the  value  of  the  property  would  agaia 
be  increased  to  thirty  millions.  It  must  be  obvious  that,  by  alternating  these 
processes,  and  purchasing  at  the  point  of  the  greatest  depression,  when  the  cir 
culation  is  the  least,  and  selling  at  the  point  of  the  greatest  elevation,  when  it  is 
the  fullest,  the  supposed  moneyed  class,  who  could  at  pleasure  increase  or  di 
minish  the  circulation,  by  abstracting  or  restoring  it,  might  also  at  pleasure  con 
trol  the  entire  property  of  the  country.  Let  it  be  ever  borne  in  mind,  that  the 
exchangeable  value  of  the  circulating  medium,  compared  with  the  property  and 
the  business  of  the  community,  remains  fixed,  and  can  never  be  diminished  or 
increased  by  increasing  or  diminishing  its  quantity  ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  the 
exchangeable  value  of  the  property,  compared  to  the  currency,  must  increase 
or  decrease  with  every  addition  or  diminution  of  the  latter.  It  results,  from  this, 
that  there  is  a  dangerous  antagonist  relation  between  those  who  hold  or  com 
mand  the  currency  and  the  rest  of  the  community  ;  but,  fortunately  for  the  coun 
try,  the  holders  of  property  and  of  the  currency  are  so  blended  as  not  to  consti 
tute  separate  classes.  Yet  it  is  worthy  of  remark — it  deserves  strongly  to  at 
tract  the  attention  of  those  who  have  charge  of  the  public  affairs — that  under 
the  operation  of  the  banking  system,  and  that  peculiar  description  of  property  ex 
isting  in  the  shape  of  credit  or  stock,  public  and  private,  which  so  strikingly  dis 
tinguishes  modern  society  from  all  that  preceded  it,  there  is  a  strong  tendency 
to  create  a  separate  moneyed  interest,  accompanied  with  all  the  dangers  which 
must  necessarily  result  from  such  interest,  and  which  deserves  to  be  most  care 
fully  watched  and  restricted. 

I  do  not  stand  here  the  partisan  of  any  particular  class  in  society — the  rich 
or  the  poor,  the  property  holder  or  the  money  holder  ;  and,  in  making  these  re 
marks,  I  am  not  actuated  by  the  slightest  feeling  of  opposition  to  the  latter. 
My  object  is  simply  to  point  out  important  relations  that  exiet  between  them,  re- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  141 

suiting  from  the  laws  which  govern  the  currency,  in  order  that  the  necessity 
for  a  uniform,  stable,  and  safe  currency,  to  guard  against  dangerous  control  of 
one  class  over  another,  may  be  clearly  seen.  I  stand  in  my  place  simply  as  a 
senator  from  South  Carolina,  to  represent  her  on  this  floor,  and  to  advance  the 
common  interest  of  these  states  as  far  as  we  have  the  constitutional  power,  and 
as  far  as  it  can  be  done  consistently  with  equity  and  justice  to  the  parts.  I  am 
the  partisan,  as  I  have  said,  of  no  class,  nor,  let  me  add,  of  any  political  party. 
I  am  neither  of  the  opposition  nor  of  the  administration.  If  I  act  with  the  former 
in  any  instance,  it  is  because  I  approve  of  the  course  on  the  particular  occasion  ; 
and  I  shall  always  be  happy  to  act  with  them  when  I  do  approve.  If  I  oppose 
the  administration — if  I  desire  to  see  power  change  hands— it  is  because  I  dis 
approve  of  the  general  course  of  those  in  authority — because  they  have  depart 
ed  from  the  principles  on  which  they  came  into  office — because,  instead  of  using 
the  immense  power  and  patronage  put  in  their  hands  to  secure  the  liberty  of  the 
country  and  advance  the  public  good,  they  have  perverted  them  into  party  in 
struments  for  personal  objects.  But  mine  has  not  been,  nor  will  it  be,  a  syste 
matic  opposition.  Whatever  measure  of  theirs  I  may  deem  right,  I  shall  cheer 
fully  support ;  and  I  only  desire  that  they  shall  afford  me  more  frequent  occa 
sions  for  support,  and  fewer  for  opposition,  than  they  have  heretofore  done. 

With  these  impressions,  and  entertaining  a  deep  conviction  that  an  unfixed, 
unstable,  and  fluctuating  currency  is  to  be  ranked  among  the  most  fruitful  sour 
ces  of  evil,  whether  viewed  politically,  or  in  reference  to  the  business  transac 
tions  of  the  country,  1  cannot  give  my  consent  to  any  measure  that  does  not 
place  the  currency  on  a  solid  foundation.  If  I  thought  this  determination  would 
delay  the  relief  so  necessary  to  mitigate  the  present  calamity,  it  would  be  to  me 
a  subject  of  the  deepest  regret.  I  feel  that  sympathy  which  I  trust  I  ought,  for 
the  suffering  of  so  many  of  my  fellow-citizens,  who  see  their  hopes  daily  with 
ered.  I,  however,  console  myself  with  the  reflection  that  delay  will  not  be 
the  result,  but,  on  the  contrary,  relief  will  be  hastened  by  the  view  which  I 
take  of  the  subject.  I  hold  it  impossible  that  anything  can  be  effected,  regard 
ing  the  subject  as  a  mere  bank  question.  Viewed  in  that  light,  the  opinion  of 
this  house,  and  of  the  other  branch  of  Congress,  is  probably  definitively  made 
up.  In  the  Senate,  it  is  known  that  we  have  three  parties,  whose  views,  con 
sidering  it  as  a  bank  question,  appear  to  be  irreconcilable.  All  hope,  then,  of 
relief,  must  centre  in  taking  a  more  elevated  view,  and  in  considering  it,  in  its 
true  light,  as  a  subject  of  currency.  Thus  regarded,  I  shall  be  surprised  if,  on 
full  investigation,  there  will  not  appear  a  remarkable  coincidence  of  opinion, 
even  between  those  whose  views,  on  a  slight  inspection,  would  seem  to  be  con 
tradictory.  Let  us,  then,  proceed  to  the  investigation  of  the  subject  under  the 
aspect  which  I  have  proposed. 

What,  then,  is  the  currency  of  the  United  States  ?  What  its  present  state 
and  condition  ?  These  are  the  questions  which  I  propose  now  to  consider,  with 
a  view  of  ascertaining  what  is  the  disease,  what  the  remedy,  and  what  the 
means  of  applying  it,  that  may  be  necessary  to  restore  our  currency  to  a  sound 
condition. 

The  legal  currency  of  this  country — that  in  which  alone  debts  can  be  dis 
charged  according  to  law — are  certain  gold,  silver,  and  copper  coins  authorized 
by  Congress  under  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution.  Such  is  the  law. 
What,  now,  are  the  facts  ?  That  the  currency  consists  almost  exclusively  of 
bank-notes,  gold  having  entirely  disappeared,  and  silver,  in  a  great  measure, 
expelled  by  banks  instituted  by  twenty-five  distinct  and  independent  powers, 
and  notes  issued  under  the  authority  of  the  direction  of  those  institutions.  They 
are,  in  point  of  fact,  the  mint  of  the  United  States.  They  coin  the  actual 
money  (for  such  we  must  call  bank-notes),  and  regulate  its  issue,  and,  conse 
quently,  its  value.  If  we  inquire  as  to  their  number,  the  amount  of  their  issue, 
and  other  circumstances  calculated  to  show  their  actual  condition,  we  shall  find 


142  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

that,  so  rapid  has  been  their  increase,  and  so  various  their  changes,  that  no  ac 
curate  information  can  be  had.  According  to  the  latest  and  best  that  I  have 
been  able  to  obtain,  they  number  at  least  four  hundred  and  fifty,  with  a  capital 
of  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  forty-five  millions  of  dollars,  with  an  issue  ex 
ceeding  seventy  millions ;  and  the  whole  of  this  immense  fabric  standing  on  a 
metallic  currency  of  less  than  fifteen  millions  of  dollars,  of  which  the  greater 
part  is  held  by  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  If  we  compare  the  notes  in 
circulation  with  the  metallic  currency  in  their  vaults,  we  shall  find  the  propor 
tion  about  six  to  one  ;  and  if  we  compare  the  latter  with  the  demands  that  may 
be  made  upon  the  banks,  we  shall  find  that  the  proportion  is  about  one  to  elev 
en.  If  we  examine  the  tendency  of  the  system  at  this  moment,  we  shall  find 
that  it  is  on  the  increase — rapidly  on  the  increase.  There  is  now  pending  a 
project  of  a  ten  million  bank  before  the  Legislature  of  New-York  ;  but  recently 
one  of  five  millions  was  established  in  Kentucky ;  within  a  short  period  one  of 
a  large  capital  was  established  in  Tennessee,  besides  others  in  agitation  in 
several  of  the  other  states  (here  Mr.  Porter,  of  Louisiana,  said  that  one  of 
eleven  millions  had  just  been  established  in  that  state). 

This  increase  is  not  accidental.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  law,  that,  where 
two  currencies  are  permitted  to  circulate  in  any  country,  one  of  a  cheap  and 
the  other  of  a  dear  material,  the  former  necessarily  tends  to  grow  upon  the  lat 
ter,  and  will  ultimately  expel  it  from  circulation,  unless  its  tendency  to  increase 
t^e  restrained  by  a  powerful  and  efficient  check.  Experience  tests  the  truth  of 
this  remark,  as  the  history  of  the  banking  system  clearly  illustrates.  The  sen 
ator  from  Massachusetts  truly  said  that  the  Bank  of  England  was  derived  from 
that  of  Amsterdam,  as  ours,  in  turn,  are  from  that  of  England.  Throughout  its 
progress,  the  truth  of  what  I  have  stated  to  be  a  law  of  the  system  is  strongly 
evinced.  The  Bank  of  Amsterdam  was  merely  a  bank  of  deposite — a  storehouse 
for  the  safe-keeping  of  the  bullion  and  precious  metals  brought  into  that  com 
mercial  metropolis,  through  all  the  channels  of  its  widely-extended  trade.  It 
was  placed  under  the  custody  of  the  city  authorities  ;  and  on  the  deposite,  a  cer 
tificate  was  issued  as  evidence  of  the  fact,  which  was  transferable,  so  as  to  en 
title  the  holder  to  demand  the  return.  An  important  fact  was  soon  disclosed — 
that  a  large  portion  of  the  deposites  might  be  withdrawn,  and  that  the  residue 
would  be  sufficient  to  meet  the  returning  certificates ;  or,  what  is  the  same  in 
effect,  that  certificates  might  be  issued  without  making  a  deposite.  This  sug 
gested  the  idea  of  a  bank  of  discount  as  well  as  deposite.  The  fact  thus  dis 
closed  fell  too  much  in  with  the  genius  of  the  system  to  be  lost,  and,  accord 
ingly,  when  transplanted  to  England,  it  suggested  the  idea  of  a  bank  of  discount 
and  of  deposite  ;  the  very  essence  of  which  form  of  banking,  that  on  which  their 
profit  depends,  consists  in  issuing  a  greater  amount  of  notes  than  it  has  specie 
in  its  vaults.  But  the  system  is  regularly  progressing,  under  the  impulse  of  the 
laws  that  govern  it,  from  its  present  form  to  a  mere  paper  machine — a  machine 
for  fabricating  and  issuing  notes,  not  convertible  into  specie.  Already  has  it 
once  reached  this  condition,  both  in  England  and  the  United  States,  and  from 
which  it  has  been  forced  back,  in  both,  to  a  redemption  of  its  notes  with  great, 
difficulty. 

The  natural  tendency  of  the  system  is  accelerated  in  our  country  by  pecu 
liar  causes,  which  have  greatly  increased  its  progress.  There  are  two  power 
ful  causes  in  operation.  The  one  resulting  from  that  rivalry  which  must  ever 
take  place  in  states  situated,  as  ours  are,  under  one  General  Government,  and 
having  a  free  and  open  commercial  intercourse.  The  introduction  of  the  bank 
ing  system  in  one  state  necessarily,  on  this  principle,  introduces  it  into  all  the 
others,  of  which  we  have  seen  a  striking  illustration  on  the  part  of  Virginia 
and  some  of  the  other  Southern  States,  which  entertained,  on  principle,  strong 
aversion  to  the  system ;  yet  they  were  compelled,  after  a  long  and  stubborn  re 
sistance,  to  yield  their  objections,  or  permit  their  circulation  to  be  furnished  by 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  143 

the  surrounding  states,  at  the  expense  of  their  own  capital  and  commerce. 
The  same  cause  which  thus  compels  one  state  to  imitate  the  example  of  an 
other,  in  introducing  the  system  from  self-defence,  will  compel  the  other  states,  in 
like  manner,  and  from  the  same  cause,  to  enlarge  and  give  increased  activity 
to  the  banking  operation,  whenever  any  one  of  the  states  sets  the  example  of 
so  doing  on  its  part ;  and  thus,  by  mutual  action  and  reaction,  the  whole  sys 
tem  is  rapidly  accelerated  to  the  final  destiny  which  I  have  assigned. 

This  is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the  rapid  progress  of  the  system  since  its 
first  introduction  into  our  country.  At  the  adoption  of  our  Constitution,  forty- 
five  years  ago,  there  were  but  three  banks  in  the  United  States,  the  amount  of 
whose  capital  I  do  not  now  recollect,  but  it  was  very  small.  In  this  short 
space,  they  have  increased  to  four  hundred  and  fifty,  with  a  capital  of  one  hun 
dred  and  forty-five  millions,  as  has  already  been  stated :  an  increase  exceeding 
nearly  a  hundred  fold  the  increase  of  our  wealth  and  population,  as  great  as 
they  have  been. 

But  it  is  not  in  numbers  only  that  they  have  increased :  there  has,  in  the 
same  time,  been  a  rapid  advance  in  the  proportion  which  their  notes  in  circu 
lation  bear  to  the  specie  in  their  vaults.  Some  twenty  or  thirty  years  ago,  it 
was  not  considered  safe  for  the  issues  to  exceed  the  specie  by  more  than  two 
and  a  half  or  three  for  one  ;  but  now,  taking  the  whole,  and  including  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  with  the  state  banks,  the  proportion  is  about  six  to  one  ; 
and  excluding  that  Bank,  it  would  very  greatly  exceed  that  proportion.  This 
increase  of  paper  in  proportion  to  metal  results  from  a  cause  which  deserves 
much  more  notice  than  it  has  heretofore  attracted.  It  originates  mainly  in  the 
number  of  the  banks.  I  will  proceed  to  illustrate  it. 

The  senator  from  New- York  (Mr.  WRIGHT),  in  assigning  his  reasons  for  be 
lieving  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  to  be  more  dangerous  than  those  of  the 
states,  said  that  one  bank  was  more  dangerous  than  many.  That  in  some  re 
spects  may  be  true ;  but  in  one,  and  that  a  most  important  one,  it  is  strikingly 
the  opposite — I  mean  in  the  tendency  of  the  system  to  increase.  Where  there 
is  but  one  bank,  the  tendency  to  increase  is  not  near  so  strong  as  where  there 
are  many,  as  illustrated  in  England,  where  the  system  has  advanced  much  less 
rapidly,  in  proportion  to  the  wealth  and  population  of  the  kingdom,  than  in  the 
United  States.  But  where  there  is  no  limitation  as  to  their  number,  the  in 
crease  will  be  inevitable,  so  long  as  banking  continues  to  be  among  the  most 
certain,  eligible,  and  profitable  employments  of  capital,  as  now  is  the  case. 
With  these  inducements,  there  must  be  constant  application  for  new  banks, 
whenever  there  is  the  least  prospect  of  profitable  employment — banks  to  be 
founded  mainly  on.  nominal  and  fictitious  capital,  and  adding  but  little  additional 
capital  to  that  already  in  existence — and  with  our  just  and  natural  aversion  to 
monopoly,  it  is  difficult,  on  principles  of  equality  and  justice,  to  resist  such  ap 
plication.  The  admission  of  a  new  bank  tends  to  diminish  the  profits  of  the 
old,  and,  between  the  aversion  of  the  old  to  reduce  their  income  and  the  desire 
of  the  new  to  acquire  profits,  the  result  is  an  enlargement  of  discounts,  effected 
by  a  mutual  spirit  of  forbearance  ;  an  indisposition  on  the  part  of  each  to  oppress 
the  other  ;  and,  finally,  the  creation  of  a  common  feeling  to  stigmatize  and  oppose 
those,  whether  banks  or  individuals,  who  demand  specie  in  payment  of  their 
notes.  This  community  of  feeling,  which  ultimately  identifies  the  whole  as  a, 
peculiar  and  distinct  interest  in  the  community,  increases,  and  becomes  more  and 
more  intense,  just  in  proportion  as  banks  multiply ;  as  they  become,  if  I  may 
use  the  expression,  too  populous,  when,  from  the  pressure  of  increasing  num 
bers,  there  results  a  corresponding  increase  of  issues,  in  proportion  to  their 
means,  which  explains  the  present  extraordinary  disproportion  between  specie 
and  notes  in  those  states  where  banks  have  been  most  multiplied ;  equal,  in 
some,  to  sixteen  to  one.  There  results  from  this  state  of  things  some  political 
considerations,  which  demand  the  profound  attention  of  all  who  value  the  liberty 
and  peace  of  the  country. 


144  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

While  the  banking  system  rests  on  a  solid  foundation,  there  will  be,  on  their 
part,  but  little  dependance  on  the  government,  and  but  little  means  by  which  the 
government  can  influence  them,  and  as  little  disposition  on  the  'part  of  the 
banks  to  be  connected  with  the  government ;  but  in  the  progress  of  the  system, 
•when  their  number  is  greatly  multiplied,  and  their  issues,  in  proportion  to  their 
means,  are  correspondingly  increased,  the  condition  of  the  banks  becomes  more 
and  more  critical.     Every  adverse  event  in  the  commercial  world,  or  political 
movement  that  disturbs  the  existing  state  of  things,  agitates  and  endangers  them. 
They  become  timid  and  anxious  for  their  safety,  and  necessarily  court  those  in 
power,  in  order  to  secure  their  protection.     Property  is,  in  its  nature,  timid,  and 
seeks  protection,  and  nothing  is  more  gratifying  to  government  than  to  become 
a  protector.     A  union  is  the  result ;  and  when  that  union  takes  place — when  the 
government,  in  fact,  becomes  the  bank  direction,  regulating  its  favours  and  ac 
commodation — the  downfall  of  liberty  is  at  hand.    Are  there  no  indications  that 
we  are  not  far  removed  from  this  state  of  things  ?     Do  we  not  behold  in  those 
events  which  have  so  deeply  agitated  us  within  the  last  few  months,  and  which 
have  interrupted  all  the  business  transactions  of  this  community,  a  strong  ten 
dency  to  this  union  on  the  part  of  a  department  of  this  government,  and  a  por 
tion  of  the  banking  system  ?     Has  not  this  union  been,  in  fact,  consummated  in 
the  largest  and  most  commercial  of  the  states  ?     What  is  the  safety-fund  system 
of  New-York  but  a  union  between  the  banks  and  the  state,  and  a  consummation 
by  law  of  that  community  of  feeling  in  the  banking  system  which  I  have  at 
tempted  to  illustrate,  the  object  of  which  is  to  extend  their  discounts,  and  to  ob 
tain  which,  the  interior  banks  of  that  state  have  actually  put  themselves  under 
the  immediate  protection  of  the  government  ?     The  effects  have  been  striking. 
Already  have  they  become  substantially  mere  paper  machines,  several  having 
not  more  than  from  one  to  two  cents  in  specie  to  the  dollar,  when  compared 
with  their  circulation ;  and,  taking  the  aggregate,  their  average  condition  will 
be  found  to  be  but  little  better.     I  care  not,  said  Mr.  C.,  whether  the  present 
commissioners    are    partisans  of  the  present   state  administration  or  not,  or 
•whether  the  assertion  of  the  senator  from  New-York  (Mr.  WRIGHT),  that  the 
government  of  the  state  has  not  interfered  in  the  control  of  these  institutions,  be 
correct.    Whether  it  has  taken  place  or  not,  interference  is  inevitable.    In  such 
state  of  weakness,  a  feeling  of  dependance  is  unavoidable,  and  the  control  of 
the  government  over  the  action  of  the  banks,  whenever  that  control  shall  be 
come  necessary  to  subserve  the  ambition  or  the  avarice  of  those  in  power,  is 
certain. 

Such  is  the  strong  tendency  of  our  banks  to  terminate  their  career  in  the  pa 
per  system — in  an  open  suspension  of  specie  payment.  Whenever  that  event 
occurs,  the  progress  of  convulsion  and  revolution  will  be  rapid.  The  currency 
will  become  local,  and  each  state  will  have  a  powerful  interest  to  depreciate 
its  currency  more  rapidly  than  its  neighbour,  as  means,  at  the  same  time,  of  ex 
empting  itself  from  the  taxes  of  the  government,  and  drawing  the  commerce  of 
the  country  to  its  ports.  This  was  strongly  exemplified  after  the  suspension 
of  specie  payment  during  the  late  war,  when  the  depreciation  made  the  most 
rapid  progress,  till  checked  by  the  establishment  of  the  present  Bank  of  the  Uni 
ted  States,  and  when  the  foreign  trade  of  the  country  was  as  rapidly  conver 
ging  to  the  point  of  the  greatest  depreciation,  with  a  view  of  exemption  from  du- 
'ties,  by  paying  in  the  debased  currency  of  the  place. 

WThat,  then,  is  the  disease  which  afflicts  the  system  ?  what  the  remedy  ?  and 
•what  the  means  of  applying  it  ?  These  are  the  questions  which  I  shall  next 
proceed  to  consider.  What  I  have  already  stated  points  out  the  disease.  It 
consists  in  a  great  and  growing  disproportion  between  the  metallic  and  paper 
circulation  of  the  country,  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  banks  :  a 
disproportion  daily  arid  hourly  increasing,  under  the  impulse  of  most  powerful 
causes,  which  are  rapidly  accelerating  the  country  to  that  state  of  convulsion 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  145 

and  revolution  which  I  have  indicated.  The  remedy  is  to  arrest  its  future  prog 
ress,  and  to  diminish  the  existing  disproportion — to  increase  the  metals  and  to 
diminish  the  paper — advancing  till  the  currency  shall  be  restored  to  a  sound, 
safe,  arid  settled  condition.  On  these  two  points  all  must  be  agreed.  There 
is  no  man  of  any  party,  capable  of  reflecting,  and  who  will  take  the  pains  to  in 
form  himself,  but  must  agree  that  our  currency  is  in  a  dangerous  condition,  and 
that  the  danger  is  increasing  ;  nor  is  there  any  one  who  can  doubt  that  the  only 
safe  and  effectual  remedy  is  to  diminish  this  disproportion  to  which  I  have  re 
ferred.  Here  the  extremes  unite  :  the  senator  from  Missouri  (Mr.  Benton), 
and  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster),  who  stands  here  as  the  able 
and  strenuous  advocate  of  the  banking  system,  are  on  this  point  united,  and  must 
move  from  it  in  the  same  direction :  though  it  may  be  the  design  of  the  one  to 
go  through,  and  of  the  other  to  halt  after  a  moderate  advance. 

There  is  another  point  on  which  all  must  be  agreed — that  the  remedy  must 
be  gradual — the  change  from  the  present  to  another  and  sounder  condition,  slow 
and  cautious.  The  necessity  for  this  results  from  that  highly  delicate  nature 
of  currency  which  I  have  already  illustrated.  Any  sudden  and  great  change 
from  our  present  to  even  a  sounder  condition  would  agitate  and  convulse  socie 
ty  to  the  centre.  On  another  point  there  can  be  but  little  disagreement.  What 
ever  may  be  the  different  theoretical  opinions  of  the  members  of  the  Senate  as 
to  the  extent  to  which  the  reformation  of  the  currency  should  be  carried,  even 
those  who  think  it  may  be  carried  practically  and  safely  to  the  restoration  of  a 
metallic  currency,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  paper,  must  agree  that  the  restora 
tion  ought  not  to  be  carried  farther  than  a  cautious  and  slow  experience  shall 
prove  that  it  can  be  done,  consistently  with  the  prosperity  of  the  country,  in  the 
existing  fiscal  and  commercial  condition  of  the  world.  To  go  beyond  the  point 
to  which  experience  shall  show  it  is  proper  to  go,  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  pub 
lic  interest  merely  to  a  favourite  conception.  There  may  be  ultimately  a  disa 
greement  of  opinion  where  that  point  is,  but,  since  all  must  be  agreed  to  move 
forward  in  the  same  direction  and  at  the  same  pace,  let  us  set  out  in  the  spirit  • 
of  harmony  and  peace,  though  we  intend  to  stop  at  different  points.  It  may  be 
that,  enlightened  by  experience,  those  who  intended  to  stop  at  the  nearest  point 
may  be  disposed  to  advance  farther,  and  that  those  who  intended  the  farthest, 
may  halt  on  this  side,  so  that  finally  all  may  agree  to  terminate  the  journey  to 
gether. 

This  brings  us  to  the  question  of  how  shall  so  salutary  a  change  be  effected  ? 
What  the  means,  and  the  mode  of  application  ?  A  great  and  difficult  question, 
on  which  some  diversity  of  opinion  may  be  expected. 

No  one  can  be  more  sensible  than  I  am  of  the  responsibility  that  must  be  in 
curred  in  proposing  measures  on  questions  of  so  much  magnitude,  and  which 
in  so  distracted  a  state,  must  affect  seriously  great  and  influential  interests. 
But.  this  is  no  time  to  shun  responsibility.  The  danger  is  great  and  menacing, 
and  delay  hazardous,  if  not  ruinous.  While,  however,  I  would  not  shun,  I  have 
not  sought  the  responsibility.  1  have  waited  for  others  ;  and,  had  any  one  pro 
posed  an  adequate  remedy,  I  would  have  remained  silent.  And  here,  said  Mr. 
Calhoun,  let  me  express  the  deep  regret  which  I  feel  that  the  administration, 
with  all  that  weight  of  authority  which  belongs  to  its  power  and  immense  pat 
ronage,  had  not,  instead  of  the  deposite  question,  which  has  caused  such  agita 
tion  and  distress,  taken  up  the  great  subject  of  the  currency  ;  examined  it  grave 
ly  and  deliberately  in  all  its  bearings  ;  pointed  out  its  diseased  condition ;  des 
ignated  the  remedy,  and  proposed  some  safe,  gradual,  and  effectual  means  of 
applying  it.  Had  that  course  been  pursued,  my  zealous  and  hearty  co-opera 
tion  would  not  have  been  wanting.  Permit  me,  also,  to  express  a  similar  re 
gret  that  the  administration,  having  failed  in  this  great  point  of  duty,  the  oppo 
sition,  with  all  its  weight  and  talents,  headed  on  this  question  by  the  distinguish 
ed  and  able  senator  from  Massachusetts,  who  is  so  capable  of  comprehending 

T 


146  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

this  subject  in  all  its  bearings,  had  not  brought  forward,  under  its  auspices,  some 
permanent  system  of  measures,  based  upon  a  deliberate  and  mature  investiga 
tion  into  the  cause  of  the  existing  disease,  and  calculated  to  remedy  the  disor 
dered  state  of  the  currency.  What  might  have  been  brought  forward  by  them 
with  such  fair  prospects  of  success,  has  been  thrown  on  more  incompetent  hands, 
unaided  by  patronage  or  influence,  save  only  that  power  which  truth  clearly 
developed,  and  honestly  and  zealously  advanced,  may  be  supposed  to  possess, 
and  on  which  I  must  wholly  rely. 

But  to  return  to  the  subject.  Whatever  diversity  of  sentiment  there  may  be 
as  to  the  means,  on  one  point  all  must  be  agreed  :  nothing  effectual  can  be  done, 
no  check  interposed  to  restore  or  arrest  the  progress  of  the  system,  by  the  ac- 
toi  of  the  states.  The  reasons  already  assigned  to  prove  that  banking  by  one: 
state  compels  all  others  to  bank,  and  that  the  excess  of  banking  in  one  in  like 
manner  compels  all  others  to  like  excess,  equally  demonstrate  that  it  is  impossi 
ble  for  the  states,  acting  separately,  to  interpose  any  means  to  prevent  the  catas 
trophe  which  certainly  awaits  the  system,  and  perhaps  the  government  itself,  un 
less  the  great  and  growing  danger  to  which  I  refer  be  timely  and  effectually 
arrested.  There  is  no  power  anywhere  but  in  this  government — the  joint  agent 
of  all  the  states,  and  through  which  a  concert  of  action  can  be  effected  adequate 
to  this  great  task.  The  responsibility  is  upon  us,  and  upon  us  alone.  The 
means,  if  means  there  be,  must  be  applied  by  our  hands,  or  not  applied  at  all — 
a  consideration,  in  so  great  an  emergency,  arid  in  the  presence  of  such  imminent 
danger,  calculated,  I  should  suppose,  to  arouse  even  the  least  patriotic. 

What  means  do  we  possess,  and  how  can  they  be  applied  ? 

If  the  entire  banking  system  was  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  Gener 
al  Government,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  devising  a  safe  and  effectual 
remedy  to  restore  the  equilibrium,  so  desirable,  between  the  specie  and  the  pa 
per  which  compose  our  currency.  But  the  fiict  is  otherwise.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  all  the  other  banks  owe  their  origin 
to  the  authority  of  the  several  states,  and  are  under  their  immediate  control, 
which  presents  the  great  difficulty  experienced  in  devising  the  proper  means 
of  effecting  the  remedy  which  all  feel  to  be  so  desirable. 

Among  the  means  which  have  been  suggested,  a  senator  from  Virginia,  not 
now  a  member  of  this  body  (Mr.  Rives),  proposed  to  apply  the  taxing  power  to- 
suppress  the  circulation  of  small  notes,  with  a  view  of  diminishing  the  paper 
and  increasing  the  specie  circulation.  The  remedy  would  be  simple  and  effect 
ive,  but  is  liable  to  great  objection.  The  taxing  power  is  odious  under  any 
circumstances  ;  it  would  be  doubly  so  when  called  into  exercise  with  an  over 
flowing  treasury  ;  and  still  more  so,  with  the  necessity  of  organizing  an  expen 
sive  body  of  officers  to  collect  a  single  tax,  and  that  of  an  inconsiderable 
amount.  But  there  is  another,  and  of  itself  a  decisive  objection.  It  would  be 
unconstitutional — palpably  and  dangerously  so.  All  political  powers,  as  I  sta 
led  on  another  occasion,  are  trust  powers,  and  limited  in  their  exercise  by  the 
subject  and  object  of  the  grant.  The  tax  power  was  granted  to  raise  revenue 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  supplying  the  necessary  means  of  carrying  on  the  oper 
ations  of  the  government.  To  pervert  this  power  from  the  object  thus  intend 
ed  by  the  Constitution,  to  that  of  suppressing  the  circulation  of  bank-notes, 
would  be  to  convert  it  from  a  revenue  into  a  penal  power — a  power  in  its  nature 
and  object  essentially  different  from  that  intended  to  be  granted  in  the  Consti 
tution  ;  and  a  power  which  in  its  full  extension,  if  once  admitted,  would  be  suf 
ficient  of  itself  to  give  an  entire  control  to  this  government  over  the  property 
and  the  pursuits  of  the  community,  and  thus  concentrate  and  consolidate  in  it 
the  entire  power  of  the  system. 

Rejecting,  then,  the  taxing  power,  there  remains  two  obvious  and  direct 
means  in  possession  of  the  government,  which  may  be  brought  into  action  to 
effect  the  object  intended,  but  neither  of  which,  either  separately  or  jointly,  is 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  147 

of  sufficient  efficacy,  however  indispensable  they  may  be  as  a  part  of  an  effi- 
,cient  system  of  measures,  to  correct  the  present,  or  repress  the  growing  disor 
ders  of  the  currency  ;  I  mean  that  provision  in  the  Constitution  which  empow 
ers  Congress  to  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign  coin,  and 
the  power  of  prohibiting  anything  but  the  legal  currency  to  be  received,  either 
in  whole  or  in  part,  in  the  dues  of  the  government.  The  mere  power  of  coining 
and  regulating  the  value  of  coins,  of  itself,  and  unsustained  by  any  other  meas 
ure,  can  exercise  but  a  limited  control  over  the  actual  currency  of  the  country, 
and  is  inadequate  to  check  excess  or  correct  disorder,  as  is  demonstrated  by  the 
present  diseased  state  of  the  currency.  Congress  has  had,  from  the  beginning, 
laws  upon  the  statute-books  to  regulate  the  value  of  coins  ;  and  at  an  early  pe 
riod  of  the  government  the  mint  was  erected,  and  has  been  in  active  operation 
ever  since  ;  and  yet,  of  the  immense  amount  which  has  been  coined,  a  small  res 
idue  only  remains  in  the  country,  the  great  body  having  been  expelled  under 
the  banking  system.  To  give  efficiency  to  this  power,  then,  some  other  must 
be  combined  with  it.  The  most  immediate  and  obvious  is  that  which  has  been 
suggested— of  excluding  all  but  specie  in  the  receipts  of  the  government.  This 
measure  would  be  effectual  to  a  certain  extent;  but  with  a  declining  income, 
which  must  take  place  under  the  operation  of  the  act  of  the  last  session,  to  ad 
just  the  tariff,  and  which  must  greatly  reduce  the  revenue  (a  point  of  the  ut 
most  importance  to  the  reformation  and  regeneration  of  our  institutions),  the  effi 
cacy  of  the  measure  must  be  correspondingly  diminished.  From  the  nature 
of  things,  it  cannot  greatly  exceed  the  average  of  the  government  deposites, 
which  I  hope  will,  before  many  years,  be  reduced  to  the  smallest  possible 
amount,  so  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  the  recurrence  of  the  shameful  and 
dangerous  state  of  things  which  now  exists,  and  which  has  been  caused  by  the 
vast  amount  of  the  surplus  revenue.  But  there  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  strong  ob 
jection  against  resorting  to  this  measure,  resulting  from  the  fact  that  an  exclu 
sive  receipt  of  specie  in  the  treasury  would,  to  give  it  efficacy,  and  to  prevent 
extensive  speculation  and  fraud,  require  an  entire  disconnexion  on  the  part  of 
the  government  with  the  banking  system  in  ail  its  forms,  and  a  resort  to  the 
strong  box  as  the  means  of  preserving  and  guarding  its  funds — a  means,  if  prac 
ticable,  in  the  present  state  of  things  liable  to  the  objection  of  being  far  less 
safe,  economical,  arid  efficient  than  the  present. 

What,  then,  Mr.  Calhoun  inquired,  what  other  means  do  we  possess,  of  suffi 
cient  efficacy,  in  combination  with  those  to  which  I  have  referred,  to  arrest  its 
progress,  and  correct  the  disordered  state  of  the  currency  ?  This  is  the  deeply- 
important  question,  and  here  some  division  of  opinion  must  be  expected,  how 
ever  united  we  may  be,  as  I  trust  we  are  thus  far,  on  all  other  points.  I  intend 
to  meet  this  question  explicitly  and  directly,  without  reservation  or  concealment. 

After  a  full  survey  of  the  whole  subject,  I  see  none  :  I  can  conjecture  no 
means  of  extricating  the  country  from  the  present  danger,  and  to  arrest  its,  far 
ther  increase,  but  a  Bank — the  agency  of  which,  in  some  form,  or  under  some 
authority,  is  indispensable.  The  country  has  been  brought  into  the  present  dis 
tressed  state  of  currency  by  banks,  and  must  be  extricated  by  their  agency. 
We  must,  in  a  word,  use  a  bank  to  unbank  the  banks,  to  the  extent  that  may  be 
necessary  to  restore  a  safe  and  stable  currency — just  as  we  apply  snow  to  a 
frozen  limb  in  order  to  restore  vitality  and  circulation,  or  hold  up  a  burn  to  the 
flame  to  extract  the  inflammation.  All  must  see  that  it  is  impossible  to  sup 
press  the  banking  system  at  once.  It  must  continue  for  a  time.  Its  greatest 
enemies,  and  the  advocates  of  an  exclusive  specie  circulation,  must  make  it  a 
part  of  their  system  to  tolerate  the  banks  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  period.  To 
suppress  them  at  once  would,  if  it  were  possible,  work  a  greater  revolution — a 
greater  change  in  the  relative  condition  of  the  various  classes  of  the  communi 
ty,  than  would  the  conquest  of  the  country  by  a  savage  enemy.  What,  then, 
must  be  done  ?  I  answer,  a  new  and  safe  system  must  gradually  grow  up  un- 


148  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

der,  and  replace  the  old  ;  imitating,  in  this  respect,  the  beautiful  process  which 
we  sometimes  see  of  a  wounded  or  diseased  part  in  a  living  organic  body- 
gradually  superseded  by  the  healing  process  of  nature. 

How  is  this  to  be  effected  ?  How  is  a  bank  to  be  used  as  the  means  of  cor 
recting  the  excess  of  the  banking  system  ?  and  what  bank  is  to  be  selected  as 
the  agent  to  effect  this  salutary  change  ?  I  know,  said  Mr.  C.,  that  a  diversity 
of  opinion  will  be  found  to  exist,  as  to  the  agent  to  be  selected,  among  those 
who  agree  on  every  other  point,  and  who,  in  particular,  agree  on  the  necessity 
of  using  some  bank  as  the  means  of  effecting  the  object  intended  :  one  prefer 
ring  a  simple  recharter  of  the  existing  Bank,  another  the  charter  of  a  new  Bank 
of  the  United  States  ;  a  third,  a  new  Bank  ingrafted  upon  the  old  ;  and  a  fourth, 
the  use  of  the  state  banks  as  the  agent.  I  wish,  said  Mr.  C.,  to  leave  all  these 
as  open  questions,  to  be  carefully  surveyed  and  compared  with  each  other, 
calmly  and  dispassionately,  without  prejudice  or  party  feeling ;  and  that  to  be 
selected  which,  on  the  whole,  shall  appear  to  be  best,  the  most  safe,  the  most, 
efficient,  the  most  prompt  in  application,  and  the  least  liable  to  constitutional 
objections.  It  would,  however,  be  wanting  in  candour  on  my  part  not  to  de 
clare  that  my  impression  is,  that  a  new  Bank  of  the  United  States,  ingrafted 
upon  the  old,  will  be  found,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  to  combine 
the  greatest  advantages,  and  to  be  liable  to  the  fewest  objections ;  but  this  im 
pression  is  not  so  firmly  fixed  as  to  be  inconsistent  with  a  calm  review  of  the 
whole  ground,  or  to  prevent  my  yielding  to  the  conviction  of  reason,  should  the 
result  of  such  review  prove  that  any  other  is  preferable.  Among  its  peculiar 
recommendations  may  be  ranked  the  consideration  that,  while  it  would  afford  the 
means  of  a  prompt  and  effectual  application  for  mitigating  and  finally  removing 
the  existing  distress,  it  would,  at  the  same  time,  open  to  the  whole  community  a 
fair  opportunity  of  participation  in  the  advantages  of  the  institution,  be  they  what 
they  may. 

Let  us,  then,  suppose  (in  order  to  illustrate,  and  not  to  indicate  a  preference) 
that  the  present  Bank  be  selected  as  the  agent  to  effect  the  intended  object. 
What  provisions  will  be  necessary  ?  I  will  suggest  those  that  have  occurred  to 
me,  mainly,  however,  with  a  view  of  exciting  the  reflections  of  those  much 
more  familiar  with  banking  operations  than  myself,  and  who,  of  course,  are  more 
competent  to  form  a  correct  judgment  of  their  practical  effect. 

Let,  then,  the  Bank  charter  be  renewed  for  twelve  years  after  the  expiration 
of  the  present  term,  with  such  modifications  and  limitations  as  may  be  judged 
proper  ;  and  that  after  that  period  it  shall  issue  no  notes  under  ten  dollars — that 
government  shall  not  receive  in  its  dues  any  sum  less  than  ten  dollars,  except 
in  the  legal  coins  of  the  United  States  ;  that  it  shall  not  receive  in  its  dues  the 
notes  of  any  bank  that  issues  notes  of  a  denomination  less  than  five  dollars  ; 
and  that  the  United  States  Bank  shall  not  receive  in  payment,  or  on  deposite, 
the  notes  of  any  bank  whose  notes  are  not  receivable  in  the  dues  of  the  govern 
ment,  nor  the  notes  of  any  bank  which  may  receive  the  notes  of  any  bank  whose 
notes  are  not  receivable  by  the  government.  At  the  expiration  of  six  years  from 
the  commencement  of  the  renewed  charter,  let  the  Bank  be  prohibited  from  is 
suing  any  note  under  twenty  dollars,  and  let  no  sum  under  that  amount  be  re 
ceived  in  dues  of  the  government,  except  in  specie  ;  and  let  the  value  of  gold  be 
raised  at  least  equal  to  that  of  silver,  to  take  effect  immediately  ;  so  that  the 
country  may  be  replenished  with  the  coin,  the  lightest  and  the  most  portable 
in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  take  the  place  of  the  receding  bank-notes.  It  is 
unnecessary  for  me  to  state,  that  at  present  the  standard  value  of  gold  is  less 
than  that  of  silver  ;  the  necessary  effect  of  which  has  been  to  expel  gold  entire 
ly  from  circulation,  and  to  deprive  us  of  a  coin  so  well  calculated  for  the 
circulation  of  a  country  so  great  in  extent,  and  having  so  vast  an  intercourse, 
commercial,  social,  and  political,  between  all  its  parts,  as  ours.  As  an  addition 
al  recommendation  to  raise  its  relative  value,  gold  has,  of  late,  become  an  impor- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  149 

tant  product  of  three  considerable  states  of  the  Union — Virginia,  North  Caro 
lina,  and  Georgia — to  the  industry  of  which  the  measure  proposed  would  give 
a  strong  impulse,  and  which,  in  turn,  would  greatly  increase  the  quantity  pro 
duced. 

Such  are  the  means  which  have  occurred  to  me.  There  are  members  of  this 
body  far  more  competent  to  judge  of  their  practical  operation  than  myself;  and 
as  my  object  is  simply  to  suggest  them  for  their  reflection,  and  for  that  of  others 
who  are  more  familiar  with  this  part  of  the  subject,  I  will  not  at  present  enter 
into  an  inquiry  as  to  their  efficiency,  with  a  view  of  determining  whether  they 
are  fully  adequate  to  effect  the  object  in  view  or  not.  There  are,  doubtless,  others 
of  a  similar  description,  and  perhaps  more  efficacious,  that  may  occur  to  the  ex 
perienced,  which  I  would  freely  embrace,  as  my  object  is  to  adopt  the  best  and 
most  efficient.  And  it  may  be  hoped,  that  if,  on  experience,  it  should  be  found 
that  neither  these  provisions,  nor  any  other  in  the  power  of  Congress,  are  fully 
adequate  to  effect  the  important  reform  which  I  have  proposed,  the  co-operation 
of  the  states  may  be  afforded,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  suppressing  the  circula 
tion  of  notes  under  five  dollars,  where  such  are  permitted  to  be  issued  under 
their  authority. 

I  omitted,  in  the  proper  place,  to  state  my  reason  for  suggesting  twelve  years 
as  the  term  for  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  Bank.  It  appears  to  me  that 
it  is  long  enough  to  permit  the  agitation  and  distraction  which  now  disturbs  the 
country  to  subside,  while  it  is  sufficiently  short  to  enable  us  to  avail  ourselves 
of  the  full  benefit  of  the  light  of  experience,  which  may  be  expected  to.be  de 
rived  frtfm  the  operation  of  the  system  under  its  new  provisions.  But  there  is 
another  reason  which  appears  to  me  to  be  entitled  to  great  weight.  The  char 
ter  of  the  Bank  of  England  has  recently  been  renewed  for  the  term  of  ten 
years,  with  very  important  changes,  calculated  to  furnish  much  experience  upon 
the  nature  of  banking  operations  and  currency.  It  is  highly  desirable,  if 
the  Bank  charter  should  be  renewed,  or  a  new  bank  created,  that  we  should 
have  the  full  benefit  of  that  experience  before  the  expiration  of  the  term,  which 
would  be  effected  by  fixing  the  period  I  have  designated.  But  as  my  object  in 
selecting  the  recharter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  simply  to  enable 
me  to  present  the  suggestions  I  have  made  in  the  clearest  form,  and  not  advocate 
the  recharter,  I  shall  omit  to  indicate  many  limitations  and  provisions,  which 
seem  to  me  to  be  important  to  be  considered,  when  the  question  of  its  perma 
nent  renewal  is  presented,  should  it  ever  be.  Among  others,  I  entirely  concur 
in  the  suggestion  of  the  senator  from  Georgia,  of  fixing  the  rate  of  interest  at 
five  per  cent.  — a  suggestion  of  importance,  and  to  which  but  one  objection  can, 
in  my  opinion,  be  presented — I  mean  the  opposing  interest  of  existing  state  in 
stitutions,  all  of  which  discount  at  higher  rates,  and  which  may  defeat  any 
measure  of  which  it  constitutes  a  part.  In  addition,  I  will  simply  say  that  I, 
for  one,  shall  feel  disposed  to  adopt  such  provisions  as  are  best  calculated  to 
secure  the  government  from  any  supposed  influence  on  the  part  of  the  Bank,  or 
the  Bank  from  any  improper  interference  on  the  part  of  the  government,  or 
which  may  be  necessary  to  protect  the  rights  or  interests  of  the  states. 

Having  now  stated  the  measure  necessary  to  apply  the  remedy,  I  am  thus 
brought  to  the  question,  Can  the  measure  succeed  '?  which  brings  up  the  inqui 
ry  of  how  far  it  may  be  expected  to  receive  the  support  of  the  several  parties 
which  now  compose  the  Senate,  and  on  which  1  shall  next  proceed  to  make  a 
few  remarks. 

Firsjt^then,  can  the  State  Rights  party  give  it  their  support  ?  that  party  of 
which  I  am  iproud  of  being  a  member,  and  for  which  I  entertain  so  strong  an 
attachment — the  stronger  becaus.©  we  are  few  among  many.  In  proposing  this 
question,  I  am  not  igncfrant  oftheir  long-standing  constitutional  objection  to  the 
Bank,  on  the  ground  >hat  tni§  was  intended  to  be,  as  it  is  usually  expressed,  a 
hard-money  government,  whoseNqirculating  medium  was  intended  to  consist  of 


150  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  precious  metals,  and  for  which  object  the  power  of  coining  money,  and 
regulating  the  value  thereof,  was  expressly  conferred  by  the  Constitution.  I 
know  how  long  and  how  sincerely  this  opinion  has  been  entertained,  and  under 
how  many  difficulties  it  has  been  maintained.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  attempt 
to  change  an  opinion  so  firmly  fixed ;  but  I  may  be  permitted  to  make  a  few 
observations,  in  order  to  present  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the  true  question  in 
reference  to  this  constitutional  point,  in  order  that  we  may  fully  comprehend  the 
circumstances  under  which  we  are  placed  in  reference  to  it. 

With  this  view,  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  inquire  whether,  in  conferring 
the  power  to  coin  money,  and  to  regulate  the  value  thereof,  the  Constitution  in 
tended  to  limit  the  power  strictly  to  coming  money  and  regulating  its  value,  or 
whether  it  intended  to  confer  a  more  general  power  over  the  currency  ;  nor  do  I  in 
tend  to  inquire  whether  the  word  coin  is  limited  simply  to  the  metals,  or  may  be 
extended  to  other  substances,  if,  through  a  gradual  change,  they  may  become  the 
medium  of  the  general  circulation  of  the  world.  I  pass  these  points.  Whatever 
opinion  there  may  be  entertained  in  reference  to  them,  we  must  all  agree,  as  a 
fixed  principle  in  our  system  of  thinking  on  constitutional  questions,  that  the 
power  under  consideration,  like  other  powers,  is  a  trust  power  ;  and  that,  like 
all  such  powers,  it  must  be  so  exercised  as  to  effect  the  object  of  the  trust  as 
far  as  it  may  be  practicable.  Nor  can  we  disagree  that  the  object  of  the  power 
was  to  secure  to  these  states  a  safe,  uniform,  and  stable  currency.  The  nature 
of  the  power,  the  terms  used  to  convey  it,  the  history  of  the  times,  the  necessi 
ty,  with  the  creation  of  a  common  government,  of  having  a  common  and  uniform 
circulating  medium,  and  the  power  conferred  to  punish  those  who,  by-  coun 
terfeiting,  may  attempt  to  debase  and  degrade  the  coins  of  the  country,  all  pro 
claim  this  to  be  the  object. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  inquire  whether,  admitting  this  to  be  the  object,  Con 
gress  is  not  bound  to  use  all  the  means  in  its  power  to  give  this  safety,  this  sta 
bility,  this  uniformity  to  the  currency,  for  which  the  power  was  conferred ;  nor 
to  inquire  whether  the  states  are  not  bound  to  abstain  from  acts,  on  their  part,  in 
consistent  with  them ;  nor  to  inquire  whether  the  right  of  banking,  on  the  part 
of  a  state,  does  not  directly,  and  by  immediate  consequence,  injuriously  affect 
the  currency — whether  the  effect  of  banking  is  not  to  expel  the  specie  currency, 
which,  according  to  the  assumption  that  this  is  a  hard-money  government,  it 
was  the  object  of  the  Constitution  to  furnish,  in  conferring  the  power  to  coin 
money  ;  or  whether  the  effect  of  banking  does  not  necessarily  tend  to  diminish 
the  value  of  a  specie  currency  as  certainly  as  clipping  or  reducing  its  weight 
would ;  and  whether  it  has  not,  in  fact,  since  its  introduction,  reduced  the  val 
ue  of  the  coins  one  half.  Nor  do  I  intend  to  inquire  whether  Congress  is  not 
bound  to  abstain  from  all  acts,  on  its  part,  calculated  to  affect  injuriously  the 
specie  circulation,  and  whether  the  receiving  anything  but  specie,  in  its  dues, 
must  not  necessarily  so  affect  it  by  diminishing  the  quantity  in  circulation,  and 
depreciating  the  value  of  what  remains.  All  these  questions  I  leave  open.  I 
decide  none  of  them.  There  is  one,  however,  that  I  will  decide.  If  Congress 
has  a  right  to  receive  anything  else  than  specie  in  its  dues,  they  have  the  right 
to  regulate  its  value  ;  and  have  a  right,  of  course,  to  adopt  all  necessary  and 
proper  means,  in  the  language  of  the  Constitution,  to  effect  the  object.  It  mat 
ters  not  what  they  receive,  tobacco,  or  anything  else,  this  right  must  attach  to 
it.  I  do  not  assert  the  right  of  receiving,  but  I  do  hold  it  to  be  incontroverti 
ble,  that,  if  Congress  were  to  order  the  dues  of  the  government  to  be  paid,  for  in 
stance,  in  tobacco,  they  would  have  the  right,  nay,  more,  they  would  be  bound 
to  use  all  necessary  and  proper  means  to  give  it  a  uniform  and  stable  value — 
inspections,  appraisement,  designation  of  qualities,  and  whatever  else  would  be 
necessary  to  that  object.  So,  on  the  same  principle,  if  they  receive  bank-notes, 
they  are  equally  bound  to  use  all  means  necessary  and  proper,  according  to  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  subject,  to  give  them  uniformity,  stability,  and  safety. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  151 

The  very  receipt  of  bank-notes,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  in  its  dues, 
would,  it  is  conceded,  make  them  money,  as  for  as  the  government  may  be 
concerned,  and,  by  a  necessary  consequence,  would  make  them,  to  a  great  ex 
tent,  the  currency  of  the  country.  I  say  nothing  of  the  positive  provisions  in 
the  Constitution  which  declare  that  *'  all  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be 
uniform  throughout  the  United  "States,"  which  cannot  be,  unless  that  in  which 
they  are  paid  should  also  have,  as  nearly  as  practicable,  a  uniform  value 
throughout  the  country.  To  effect  this,  if  bank-notes  are  received,  the  bank 
ing  power  is  necessary  and  proper  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  ;  and, 
consequently,  if  the  government  has  the  right  to  receive  bank-notes  in  its  dues, 
the  power  becomes  constitutional.  Here  lies,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  the  real  con 
stitutional  question  :  Has  the  government  a  right  to  receive  bank-notes,  or  not  ? 
The  question  is  not  upon  the  mere  power  of  incorporating  a  bank,  as  it  has 
been  commonly  argued  ;  though  even  in  that  view  there  would  be  as  great  a 
constitutional  objection  to  any  act  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  or  any  other 
branch  of  the  government,  which  should  unite  any  association  of  state  banks 
into  one  system,  as  the  means  of  giving  the  uniformity  and  stability  to  the  cur 
rency  which  the  Constitution  intends  to  confer.  The  very  act  of  so  associa 
ting  or  uniting  them  into  one,  by  whatever  name  called,  or  by  whatever  depart 
ment  performed,  would  be,  in  fact,  an  act  of  incorporation. 

But,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  my  object,  as  I  have  stated,  is  not  to  discuss  the  con 
stitutional  questions,  nor  to  determine  whether  the  Bank  be  constitutional  or 
not.  It  is,  I  repeat,  to  show  where  the  difficulty  lies  :  a  difficulty  which  I  have 
felt  from  the  time  I  first  came  into  the  public  service.  I  found  then,  as  now, 
the  currency  of  the  country  consisting  almost  entirely  of  bank-notes.  I  found 
the  government  intimately  connected  with  the  system :  receiving  bank-notes  in 
its  dues,  and  paying  them  away,  under  its  appropriations,  as  cash.  The  fact  was 
beyond  my  control :  it  existed  long  before  my  time,  and  without  my  agency  ; 
and  I  was  compelled  to  act  on  the  fact  as  it  existed,  without  deciding  on  the 
many  questions  which  I  have  suggested  as  connected  with  this  subject,  and  on 
many  of  which  I  have  never  yet  formed  a  definite  opinion.  No  one  can  pay 
less  regard  to  the  precedent  than  I  do,  acting  here,  in  my  representative  and  de 
liberative  character,  on  legal  or  constitutional  questions  ;  but  I  have  felt  from 
the  beginning  the  full  force  of  the  distinction  so  sensibly  taken  by  the  senator 
from  Virginia  (Mr.  Leigh)  between  doing  and  undoing  an  act,  and  which  he 
so  strongly  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  purchase  of  Louisiana.  The  constitu 
tionality  of  that  act  was  doubted  by  many  at  the  time,  and,  among  others,  by  its 
author  himself ;  yet  he  would  be  considered  a  madman  who,  coming  into  polit 
ical  life  at  this  late  period,  would  now  seriously  take  up  the  question  of  the 
constitutionality  of  the  purchase,  and,  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  un 
constitutional,  should  propose  to  rescind  the  act,  and  eject  from  the  Union  two 
flourishing  states  and  a  growing  territory  :  nor  would  it  be  an  act  of  much  less 
madness  thus  to  treat  the  question  of  the  currency,  and  undertake  to  suppress 
at  once  the  system  of  bank  circulation  which  has  been  growing  up  from  the 
beginning  of  the  government,  which  has  penetrated  into  and  connected  itself 
with  every  department  of  our  political  system,  on  the  ground  that  the  Constitu 
tion  intended  a  specie  circulation  ;  or  who  would  treat  the  constitutional  ques 
tion  as  one  to  be  taken  up  de  novo,  and  decided  upon  elementary  principles, 
without  reference  t6  the  imperious  state  of  facts. 

But  in  raising  the  question  whether  my  friends  of  the  State  Rights  party  can 
consistently  vote  for  the  measure  which  I  have  suggested,  I  rest  not  its  decision 
on  the  ground  that  their  constitutional  opinion  in  reference  to  the  Bank  is  errone 
ous.  I  assume  their  opinion  to  be  correct — I  place  the  argument,  not  on  the 
constitutionality  or  unconstitutionality,  but  on  wholly  different  ground.  I  lay  it 
down,  as  an  incontrovertible  principle,  that,  admitting  an  act  to  be  unconstitu 
tional,  but  of  such  a  nature  that  it  cannot  be  reversed  at  once,  or  at  least  without 


152  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

involving  gross  injustice  to  the  community,  we  may,  under  such  circumstances, 
vote  for  its  temporary  continuance,  for  undoing  gradually,  as  the  only  practica 
ble  mode  of  terminating  it,  consistently  with  the  strictest  constitutional  objects. 
The  act  of  the  last  session,  adjusting  the  tariff,  furnishes  an  apt  illustration. 
All  of  us  believed  that  measure  to  be  unconstitutional  and  oppressive,  yet  we 
voted  for  it  without  supposing  that  we  violated  the  Constitution  in  so  doing, 
although  it  allowed  upward  of  eight  years  for  the  termination  of  the  system, 
on  the  ground  that  to  reverse  it  at  once  would  spread  desolation  and  ruin  over 
a  large  portion  of  the  country.  I  ask  the  principle  in  that  case  to  be  applied 
to  this.  It  is  equally  as  impossible  to  terminate  suddenly  the  present  system 
of  paper  currency,  without  spreading  a  desolation  still  wider  and  deeper  over 
the  face  of  the  country.  If  it  can  be  reversed  at  all — if  we  can  ever  return  to 
a  metallic  currency,  it  must  be  by  gradually  undoing  what  we  have  done,  and 
to  tolerate  the  system  while  the  process  is  going  on.  Thus,  the  measure 
which  I  have  suggested  proposes,  for  the  period  of  twelve  years,  to  be  follow 
ed  up  by  a  similar  process,  as  far  as  a  slow  and  cautious  experience  shall  prove 
we  may  go  consistently  with  the  public  interest,  even  to  its  entire  reversal,  if 
experience  shall  prove  we  may  go  so  far,  which,  however,  I,  for  one,  do  not 
anticipate  ;  but  the  effort,  if  it  should  be  honestly  commenced  and  pursued,  would 
present  a  case  every  way  parallel  to  the  instance  of  the  tariff  to  which  I  have 
already  referred.  I  go  farther,  and  ask  the  question,  Can  you,  consistently  with 
your  obligation  to  the  Constitution,  refuse  to  vote  for  a  measure,  if  intended,  in 
good  faith,  to  effect  the  object  already  stated  ?  Would  not  a  refusal  to  vote  for 
the  only  means  of  terminating  it  consistently  with  justice,  and  without  involving 
the  horror  of  revolution,  amount  in  fact,  and  in  all  its  practical  consequences,  to 
a  vote  to  perpetuate  a  state  of  things  which  all  must  acknowledge  to  be  emU 
nently  unconstitutional,  and  highly  dangerous  to  the  liberty  of  the  country  ? 

But  I  know  that  it  will  be  objected  that  the  Constitution  ought  to  be  amended, 
and  the  power  conferred  in  express  terms.  I  feel  the  full  force  of  the  objection. 
I  hold  the  position  to  be  sound,  that,  when  a  constitutional  question  has  been 
agitated  involving  the  powers  of  the  government,  which  experience  shall  prove 
cannot  be  settled  by  reason,  as  is  the  case  of  the  Bank  question,  those  who 
claim  the  power  ought  to  abandon  it,  or  obtain  an  express  grant  by  an  amend 
ment  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  .yet,  even  with  this  impression,  I  would,  at  the 
present  time,  feel  much,  if  not  insuperable  objection,  to  vote  for  an  amendment, 
till  an  effort  shall  be  fairly  made,  in  order  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  the  power 
might  be  dispensed  with,  as  I  have  proposed. 

I  hold  it  a  sound  principle,  that  no  more  power  should  be  conferred  upon  the 
General  Government  than  is  indispensable  ;  and  if  experience  should  prove  that 
the  power  of  banking  is  indispensable,  in  the  actual  condition  of  the  currency 
of  this  country  and  of  the  world  generally,  I  should  even  then  think  that,  what 
ever  power  ought  to  be  given,  should  be  given  with  such  restrictions  and  limita 
tions  as  would  limit  it  to  the  smallest  amount  necessary,  and  guard  it  with  the 
utmost  care  against  abuse.  As  it  is,  without  farther  experience,  we  are  at  a 
loss  to  determine  how  little  or  how  much  would  be  required  to  correct  a  dis 
ease  which  must,  if  not  corrected,  end  in  convulsions  and  revolution.  I  con 
sider  the  whole  subject  of  banking  and  credit  as  undergoing  at  this  time, 
throughout  the  civilized  world,  a  progressive  change,  of  which  I  think  I  per 
ceive  many  indications.  Among  the  changes  in  progression,  it  appears  to  me- 
there  is  a  strong  tendency  in  the  banking  system  to  resolve  itself  into  two 
parts — one  becoming  a  bank  of  circulation  and  exchange,  for  the  purpose  of 
regulating  and  equalizing  the  circulating  medium,  and  the  other  assuming 
more  the  character  of  private  banking ;  of  which  separation  there  are  indica 
tions  in  the  tendency  of  the  English  system,  particularly  perceptible  in  the  late 
modification  of  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  England.  In  the  mean  time,  it  would 
be  wise  in  us  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  experience  of  the  next  few  years  before- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  153' 

any  change  be  made  in  the  Constitution,  particularly  as  the  course  which,  it 
'seems  to  me,  it  would  be  advisable  to  pursue,  would  be  the  same,  whether  the 
power  be  expressly  conferred  or  not. 

I  next  address  myself  to  the  members  of  the  opposition,  who  principally  rep 
resent  the  commercial  and  manufacturing  portions  of  the  country,  where  the 
banking  system  has  been  the  farthest  extended,  and  where  a  larger  portion  of 
the  property  exists  in  the  shape  of  credit  than  in  any  other  section,  and  to 
whom  a  sound  and  stable '  currency  is  most  necessary,  and  the  opposite  most 
dangerous.  You  have  no  constitutional  objection  :  to  you  it  is  a  mere  question 
of  expediency.  Viewed  in  this  light,  can  you  vote  for  the  measure  suggested  ? 
A  measure  designed  to  arrest  the  approach  of  events  which,  I  have  demonstra 
ted,  must,  if  not  arrested,  create  convulsions  and  revolutions  ;  and  to  correct  a 
disease  which  must,  if  not  corrected,  subject  the  currency  to  continued  agita 
tions  and  fluctuations  ;  and,  in  order  to  give  that  permanence,  stability,  and  uni 
formity,  which  is  so  essential  to  your  safety  and  prosperity.  To  effect  this 
may  require  some  diminution  of  the  profits  of  banking,  some  temporary  sacri 
fice  of  interest ;  but  if  such  should  be  the  fact,  it  will  be  compensated  more 
than  a  hundred  fold  by  increased  security  and  durable  prosperity.  If  the  sys 
tem  must  advance  in  the  present  course  without  a  check,  and  if  explosion  must 
follow,  remember  that  where  you  stand  will  be  the  crater — should  the  system 
quake,  under  your  feet  the  chasm  will  open  that  will  ingulf  your  institutions  and 
your  prosperity. 

Can  the  friends  of  the  administration  vote  for  this  measure  ?  If  I  understand 
their  views,  as  expressed  by  the  senator  from  Missouri,  behind  me  (Mr.  Ben- 
ton),  and  the  senator  from  New- York  (Mr.  Wright),  and  other  distinguished 
members  of  the  party,  and  the  views  of  the  President  as  expressed  in  reported 
conversations,  I  see  not  how  they  can  reject  it.  They  profess  to  be  the  advo 
cates  of  a  metallic  currency. 

I  propose  to  restore  it  by  the  most  effectual,  measures  that  can  be  devised ; 
gradually  and  slowly,  and  to  the  extent  that  experience  may  show  that  it  can 
be  done  consistently  with  a  due  regard  to  the  public  interest.  Farther  no  one 
can  desire  to  go.  If  the  means  I  propose  are  not  the  best  and  most  effectual, 
let  better  and  more  effectual  be  devised.  If  the  process  which  I  propose  be  too 
slow  or  too  fast,  let  it  be  accelerated  or  retarded.  Permit  me  to  add  to  these 
views  what,  it  appears  to  me,  those  whom  I  address  ought  to  feel  with  deep 
and  solemn  obligation  of  duty.  They  are  the  advocates  and  the  supporters  of 
the  administration.  It  is  now  conceded,  almost  universally,  that  a  rash  and 
precipitate  act  of  the  executive,  to  speak  in  the  mildest  terms,  has  plunged  this 
country  into  deep  and  almost  universal  distress.  You  are  the  supporters  of  that 
measure — you  personally  incur  the  responsibility  by  that  support.  How  are 
its  consequences  to  terminate  ?  Do  you  see  the  end  ?  Can  things  remain, 
as  they  are,  with  the  currency  and  the  treasury  of  the  country  under  the  ex 
clusive  control  of  the  executive  ?  And  by  what  scheme,  what  device,  do  you 
propose  to  extricate  the  country  and  the  Constitution  from  their  present  dan 
gers  ? 

I  have  now  said  what  I  intended.  I  have  pointed  out,  without  reserve,  what 
I  believe  in  my  conscience  to  be  for  the  public  interest.  May  what  I  have  said 
be  received  with  favour  equal  to  the  sincerity  with  which  it  has  been  uttered.  In 
conclusion,  I  have  but  to  add,  that,  if  what  I  have  said  shall  in  any  degree  con 
tribute  to  the  adjustment  of  this  question,  which  I  believe  cannot  be  left  open 
without  imminent  danger,  I  shall  rejoice  ;  but  if  not,  I  shall  at  least  have  the; 
consolation  of  having  discharged  my  duty. 


154  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

V  ix. 

SPEECH   DELIVERED   IN   THE    SENATE   OF    THE    UNITED   STATES   APRIL  9,    1834,  ON 
THE    BILL    TO   REPEAL    THE    FORCE    ACT. 

I  HAVE,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  introduced  this  bill  from  a  deep  conviction 
that  the  act  which  it  proposes  to  repeal  is,  in  its  tendency,  subversive  of  our 
political  institutions,  and  fatal  to  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  country  ; 
which  I  trust  to  be  able  to  establish  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Senate, 
should  I  be  so  fortunate  as  to  obtain  a  dispassionate  and  favourable  hear 
ing. 

In  resting  the  repeal  on  this  ground,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  avail  my 
self  of  the  objections  to  the  details  of  the  act,  as  repugnant  as  many  of 
them  are  to  the  principles  of  our  government.  In  illustration  of  the  truth 
of  this  assertion,  I  might  select  that  provision  which  vests  in  the  Pres 
ident,  in  certain  cases,  of  which  he  is  made  the  judge,  the  entire  force  of 
the  country,  civil,  military,  and  naval,  with  the  implied  power  of  pledging 
the  public  faith  for  whatever  expenditure  he  may  choose  to  incur  in  its 
application.  And,  to  prove  how  dangerous  it  is  to  vest  such  extraordi 
nary  powers  in  the  executive,  I  might  avail  myself  of  the  experience  which 
\ve  have  had  in  the  last  few  months  of  the  aspiring  character  of  that  de 
partment  of  the  government,  and  which  has  furnished  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  danger  of  vesting  in  it  even  a  very  limited  discretion.  It  is  not  for 
me  to  judge  of  the  propriety  of  the  course  which  the  members  of  this 
body  may  think  proper  to  pursue  in  reference  to  the  question  under  con 
sideration  ;  but  I  must  say  that  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  how  any  one, 
who  regards  as  I  do  the  acts  to  which  I  have  referred,  as  palpable  usur 
pations  of  power,  and  as  indicating  on  the  part  of  the  executive  a  danger 
ous  spirit  of  aggrandizement,  can  vote  against  the  bill  under  considera 
tion,  and  thereby  virtually  vote  to  continue  in  the  President  the  extraor 
dinary  and  dangerous  power  in  question. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  the  provision  of  the  act  which  confers  this  pow 
er  will  expire,  by  its  own  limitation,  at  the  termination  of  the  present 
session.  It  is  true  it  will  then  cease  to  be  law ;  but  it  is  no  less  true 
that  the  precedent,  unless  the  act  be  expunged  from  the  statute-book,  will 
live  forever,  ready,  on  any  pretext  of  future  danger,  to  be  quoted  as  an  au 
thority  to  confer  on  the  chief  magistrate  similar,  or  even  more  dangerous 
powers,  if  more  dangerous  can  be  devised.  We  live  in  an  eventful  period, 
and,  among  other  things,  we  have  had,  recently,  some  impressive  lessons 
on  the  danger  of  precedents.  To  them  immediately  we  owe  the  act  which 
has  caused  the  present  calamitous  and  dangerous  condition  of  the  coun 
try  ;  which  has  been  defended  almost  solely  on  the  ground  of  precedents 
• — precedents  almost  unnoticed  at  the  time  ;  but  had  they  not  existed,  or 
had  they  been  reversed  at  the  time  by  Congress,  the  condition  of  the 
country  would  this  day  be  far  different  from  what  it  is.  With  this  knowl 
edge  of  the  facts,  we  must  see  that  a  bad  precedent  is  as  dangerous  as 
the  bad  measure  itself;  and  in  some  respects  more  so,  as  it  maj-  give  rise 
to  acts  far  worse  than  itself,  as  in  the  case  to  which  I  have  alluded.  In 
this  view  of  the  subject,  to  refuse  to  vote  against  the  repeal  of  the  act, 
and  thereby  constitute  a  precedent  to  confer  similar,  or  more  dangerous 
powers  hereafter,  would  be  as  dangerous  as  to  vote  for  an  act  to  vest  per 
manently  in  the  President  the  power  in  question. 

But  I  pass  over  this  and  other  objections  to  the  details  not  much  less 
formidable.  I  take  a  higher  stand  against  the  act :  I  object  to  the  princi 
ple  in  which  it  originated,  putting  the  details  aside,  on  the  ground,  as  I 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  155 

have  stated,  that  they  are  subversive  of  our  political  institutions,  and  fatal, 
in  their  tendency,  to  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  country.  Fortunate 
ly,  we  are  not  left  to  conjecture  or  inference  as  to  what  these  principles 
are.  It  was  openly  proclaimed,  both  here  and  elsewhere,  in  the  debates 
of  this  body  and  the  proclamation  and  message  of  the  President,  in  which 
the  act  originated,  that  the  very  basis  on  which  it  rests — the  assumption 
on  which  only  it  could  be  supported — was,  that  this  government  had  the 
final  and  conclusive  right,  in  the  last  resort,  to  judge  of  the  extent  of  its 
powers  ;  and  that,  to  execute  its  decision,  it  had  the  right  to  use  all  the 
means  of  the  country,  civil,  military,  and  fiscal,  not  only  against  individ 
uals,  but  against  the  states  themselves,  and  all  acting  under  their  author 
ity,  whether  in  a  legislative,  executive,  or  judicial  capacity. 

If  farther  evidence  be  required  as  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
act,  it  will  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  events  in  which  it  took  its  ori 
gin.  It  originated,  as  we  all  know,  in  a  controversy  between  this  govern 
ment  and  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  in  reference  to  a  power  which  in 
volved  the  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  a  protective  tariff.  I  do  not 
intend  to  give  the  history  of  this  controversy  j  it  is  sufficient  for  my  pur 
pose  to  say  that  the  state,  in  maintenance  of  what  she  believed  to  be  her 
unquestionable  power,  assumed  the  highest  ground  :  she  placed  herself  on 
her  sovereign  authority  as  a  constituent  member  of  this  confederacy,  and 
made  her  opposition  to  the  encroachment  on  her  rights  through  a  conven 
tion  of  the  people,  the  only  organ  by  which,  according  to  our  conception, 
the  sovereign  will  of  a  state  can  be  immediately  and  directly  pronounced. 
This  government,  on  its  part,  in  resistance  to  the  action  of  the  state,  as 
sumed  the  right  to  t*rample  upon  the  authority  of  the  convention,  and  to 
look  beyond  the  state  to  the  individuals  who  compose  it :  not  as  form 
ing  a  political  community,  but  as  a  mere  mass  of  insolated  individuals, 
without  political  character  or  authority  ;  and  thus  asserted  in  the  strongest 
manner,  not  only  the  right  of  judging  of  its  own  powers,  but  that  of  over 
looking,  in  a  contest  for  power,  the  very  existence  of  the  state  itself,  and 
of  recognising,  in  the  assertion  of  what  it  might  claim  to  be  its  power,  no 
other  authority  whatever  in  the  system  but  its, own. 

Such  being  the  principle  in  which  this  bill  originated,  we  are  brought 
to  the  consideration  of  a  question  of  the  deepest  import.  Is  an  act,  which 
assumes  such  powers  for  this  government,  consistent  with  the  nature  and 
character  of  our  political  institutions  1 

It  is  not  my  intention,  in  the  discussion  of  this  question,  to  renew  the 
debate  of  the  last  session.  But,  in  declining  to  renew  that  discussion,  I 
wish  to  be  directly  understood  that  I  do  so  exclusively  on  the  ground 
that  I  do  not  feel  myself  justified  in  repeating  arguments  so  recently  ad 
vanced  ;  and  not  on  the  ground  that  there  is  the  least  abatement  of  con 
fidence  in  the  positions  then  assumed,  or  in  the  decisive  bearing  which 
they  ought  to  have  against  the  act.  So  far  otherwise,  time  and  reflection 
have  but  served  to  confirm  me  in  the  impression  which  I  then  entertain 
ed  ;  and,  without  repeating  the  arguments,  I  now  avail  myself,  in  this  dis 
cussion,  of  the  positions  then  established,  and  stand  prepared  to  vindicate 
them  against  whatever  assaults  may  be  made  upon  them,  come  from  what 
quarter  they  may.  Without,  then,  reopening  the  discussion  of  the  last 
session  on  the  elementary  principles  of  our  government,  which  were 
then  brought  into  controversy,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  take  the  plainest 
and  most  common-sense  view  of  our  political  institutions,  regarding  them 
merely  in  a  matter-of-fact  way,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  parts  of  which 
they  are  composed,  and  the  relations  which  they  bear  to  each  other. 

Thus  regarding  our  institutions,  we  are  struck,  on  the  first  view,  with 
the  number  and  complexity  of  the  parts — with  the  division,  classification, 


156  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  organization  which  pervade  every  part  of  the  system.  It  is,  in  fact, 
a  system  of  governments  ;  and  these,  in  turn,  are  a  system  of  departments — 
a  system  in  which  government  bears  the  same  relation  to  government,  in 
reference  to  the  whole,  as  departments  do  to  departments,  in  reference  to 
each  particular  government.  As  each  government  is  made  up  of  the  le 
gislative,  executive,  and  judicial  departments  organized  into  one,  so  the 
system  is  made  up  of  this  government,  and  the  state  governments,  in  like 
manner,  organized  into  one  system.  So,  too,  as  the  powers  which  consti 
tute  the  respective  governments  are  divided  and  organized  into  depart 
ments,  in  like  manner  in  the  formation  of  the  governments,  their  powers 
are  classed  into  two  distinct  divisions  :  the  one  containing  powers  local 
and  peculiar  in  their  character,  which  the  interests  of  the  states  require 
to  be  exercised  by  each  state  through  a  separate  government ;  the  other 
containing  those  which  are  more  general  and  comprehensive,  and  which 
can  be  best  exercised  in  some  uniform  mode  through  a  common  govern 
ment.  The  former  of  these  divisions  constitutes  what,  in  our  system,  are 
known  as  the  reserved  powers,  and  are  exercised  by  each  state  through 
its  own  separate  government.  The  latter  are  known  as  the  delegated 
powers,  and  are  exercised  through  this,  the  common  government  of  the 
several  states.  This  division  of  power  into  two  parts,  with  distinct  and 
independent  governments,  regularly  organized  into  departments,  legisla 
tive,  executive,  and  judicial,  to  carry  their  respective  parts  into  effect, 
constitutes  the  great  striking  and  peculiar  character  of  our  system,  and  is 
without  example  in  ancient  or  modern  times  j  and  may  be  regarded  as  the 
fundamental  distribution  of  power  under  the  system,  and  as  constituting 
its  great  conservative  principle. 

If  we  extend  our  eyes  beyond,  we  shall  find  another  striking  division 
between  the  power  of  the  people  and  that  of  the  government — between 
that  inherent,  primitive,  creative  power  which  resides  exclusively  in  the 
people,  and  from  which  all  authority  is  derived,  and  the  delegated  power 
or  trust  conferred  upon  the  government  to  effect  the  object  of  their  cre 
ation.  If  we  look  still  beyond,  we  shall  find  another  and  most  important 
division.  The  people,  instead  of  being  united  in  one  general  community, 
are  divided  into  twenty-four  states,  each  forming  a  distinct  sovereign  com 
munity,  and  in  which,  separately,  the  whole  power  of  the  system  ulti 
mately  resides. 

If  we  examine  how  this  ultimate  power  is  called  into  action,  we  shall 
find  that  its  only  organ  is  a  primary  assemblage  of  the  people,  known  un 
der  the  name  of  a  convention,  through  which  their  sovereign  will  is  an 
nounced,  and  by  which  governments  are  formed  and  organized.  If  we 
trace  historically  the  exertion  of  this  power  in  the  formation  of  the  gov 
ernments  constituting  our  system,  we  shall  find  that,  originally,  on  the 
separation  of  the  thirteen  colonies  from  the  crown  of  Great  Britain,  each 
state  for  itself,  through  its  own  convention,  formed  separate  constitu 
tions  and  governments,  and  that  these  governments,  in  turn,  formed  a 
league  or  confederacy  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  those  powers,  in  the 
regulation  of  which  the  states  had  a  common  interest.  But  this  confed 
eracy,  proving  incompetent  for  its  object,  was  superseded  by  the  present 
Constitution,  which  essentially  changed  the  character  of  the  system.  If 
we  compare  the  mode  of  the  adoption  of  this  Constitution  with  that  of 
the  adoption  of  original  constitutions  of  the  several  states,  we  shall  find 
them  precisely  the  same.  In  both,  each  state  adopted  the  Constitution 
through  its  own  convention,  by  its  separate  act,  each  for  itself,  and  is 
only  bound  in  consequence  of  its  own  adoption,  without  reference  to  the 
adoption  of  any  other  state.  The  only  point  in  which  they  can  be  dis 
tinguished  is  the  mutual  compact,  in  which  each  state  stipulated  with  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  157 

other  to  adopt  it  as  a  common  Constitution.  Thus  regarded,  this  Con 
stitution  is,  in  fact,  the  Constitution  of  each  state.  In  Virginia,  for  in 
stance,  it  is  the  Constitution  of  Virginia  ;  and  so,  too,  this  government, 
and  the  laws  which  it  enacts,  are,  within  the  limits  of  the  state,  the  gov 
ernment  and  the  laws  of  the  state.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  Constitution  and  gov 
ernment  of  the  whole,  because  it  is  the  Constitution  and  government  of 
each  part ;  and  not  the  Constitution  and  government  of  the  parts  because 
it  is  of  the  whole.  The  system  commences  with  the  parts,  and  ends  with 
the  whole.  The  parts  are  the  units,  and  the  whole  the  multiple,  instead 
of  the  whole  being  a  unit  and  the  parts  the  fractions.  Thus  viewed,  each 
state  has  two  distinct  Constitutions  and  governments — a  separate  Consti 
tution  and  government,  instituted,  as  I  have  stated,  to  regulate  the  object  in 
which  each  has  a  peculiar  interest  j  and  a  general  one  to  regulate  the  inter 
ests  common  to  all,  and  binding  by  a  common  compact  the  whole  into  one 
community,  in  which  the  separate  and  independent  existence  of  each 
state  as  a  sovereign  community  is  preserved,  instead  of  being  fused  into 
a  common  mass. 

Such  is  our  system  :  such  are  its  parts,  and  such  their  relation  to  each 
other.  I  have  stated  no  fact  that  can  be  questioned,  nor  have  I  omitted 
any  that  is  essential  which  I  am  capable  of  perceiving.  In  reviewing  the 
whole,  we  must  be  no  less  struck  with  the  simplicity  of  the  means  by 
which  all  are  blended  into  one,  than  we  are  by  the  number  and  complex- 
ity  of  the  parts.  I  know  of  no  system,  in  either  respect,  ancient  or  mod 
ern,  to  be  compared  with  it ;  and  can  compare  it  to  nothing  but  that  sub 
lime  and  beautiful  system  of  which  our  globe  constitutes  a  part,  and  to 
which  it  bears  in  many  particulars  so  striking  a  resemblance.  In  this  sys 
tem,  this  government,  as  we  have  seen,  constitutes  a  part — a  prominent, 
•but  a  subordinate  part,  with  defined,  limited,  and  restricted  powers. 

I  now  repeat  the  question,  Is  the  act  which  assumes  for  this  government 
the  right  to  interpret,  in  the  last  resort,  the  extent  of  its  powers,  and  to 
enforce  its  interpretation  against  all  other  authority,  consistent  with  our 
institutions  1  To  state  the  question  is  to  answer  it.  We  might  with 
equal  propriety  ask  whether  a  government  of  unlimited  power  is  consist 
ent  with  one  of  enumerated  and  restricted  powers.  I  say  unlimited,  for  I  . 
would  hold  his  understanding  in  low  estimation  who  can  make,  practical 
ly,  any  distinction  between  a  government  of  unlimited  powers,  and  one 
which  has  an  unlimited  right  to  construe  and  enforce  its  powers  as  it 
pleases;  who  does  not  see  that,  to  divide  power,  and  to  give  one  of  the 
parties  the  exclusive  right  to  determine  what  share  belongs  to  him,  is  to 
annihilate  the  division,  and  to  vest  the  whole  in  him  who  possesses  the 
right  1  It  would  be  no  less  absurd,  than  for  one  in  private  life  to  divide 
his  property  with  another,  and  vest  in  that  other  the  absolute  and  uncon 
ditional  right  to  determine  the  extent  of  his  share  ;  which  would  be,  in 
fact,  to  give  him  the  whole.  Nor  could  I  think  much  more  highly  of  the 
understanding  of  him  who  does  not  perceive  that  this  exclusive  right,  on 
the  part  of  this  government,  of  determining  the  extent  of  its  powers,  ne 
cessarily  destroys  all  distinction  between  reserved  and  delegated  powers; 
and  that  it  thus  strikes  a  fatal  blow  at  that  fundamental  distribution  of 
power  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  our  system.  It  also,  by  inevitable  con 
sequence,  destroys  all  distinction  between  constitutional  and  unconstitu 
tional  laws,  making  the  latter  to  the  full  as  obligatory  as  the  former  ;  of 
which  we  had  a  remarkable  example  when  the  act  proposed  to  be  repeal 
ed  was  before  the  Senate.  It  is  well  known  that  the  power  in  controver 
sy  between  this  government  and  the  State  of  South  Carolina  had  been 
pronounced  to  be  unconstitutional  by  the  legislatures  of  most  of  the 
Southern  States,  and  also  by  many  of  the  members  of  this  body ;  and  yet 


158  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

there  were  instances,  however  extraordinary  it  may  appear,  of  members 
of  the  body  voting  to  enforce  an  act  which  they  believed  to  be  unconsti 
tutional,  and  that,  too,  at  the  hazard  of  civil  war.  As  strange  as  such  a 
course  must  appear,  it  was  the  natural  and  legitimate  consequence  of  the 
power  which  the  act  assumed  for  this  government,  and  illustrates,  in  the 
strongest  manner  imaginable,  the  truth  of  what  I  have  advanced.  But  to 
proceed.  This  unlimited  right  of  judging  as  to  its  powers,  not  only  de 
stroys,  as  I  have  stated,  all  distinction  between  constitutional  and  uncon 
stitutional  acts,  but  merges  in  this  government  the  very  existence  of  the 
separate  governments  of  the  states,  by  reducing  them  from  that  independ 
ent  and  distinct  existence,  as  co-governments,  assigned  to  them  in  the 
system,  to  mere  subordinate  and  dependant  bodies,  holding  their  power 
and  existence  at  the  mercy  of  this  government.  It  stops  not  here — it  an 
nihilates  the  states  themselves.  The  right  which  it  assumes  of  trampling 
upon  the  authority  of  a  Convention  of  the  people  of  the  states,  the  only 
organ  through  which  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  can  exert  itself,  and  to 
look  beyond  the  states  to  the  individuals  who  compose  them,  and  to  treat 
them  as  entirely  destitute  of  all  political  character  or  power,  is,  in  fact, 
to  annihilate  the  states,  and  to  transfer  their  sovereignty,  and  all  their 
powers,  to  this  government. 

If  we  now  raise  our  eyes,  and  direct  them  towards  that  once  beautiful 
system,  with  all  its  various,  separate,  and  independent  parts  blended  into 
one  harmonious  whole,  we  must  be  struck  with  the  mighty  change  !  All 
have  disappeared — gone — absorbed — concentrated  and  consolidated  in  this 
government,  which  is  left  alone  in  the  midst  of  the  desolation  of  the  sys 
tem,  the  sole  and  unrestricted  representative  of  an  absolute  and  despotic 
majority. 

Will  it  be  tolerated,  that  I  should  ask  whether  an  act  which  has  caused 
so  complete  a  revolution — which  has  entirely  subverted  our  political  sys 
tem,  as  it  emanated  from  the  hands  of  its  creators,  and  reared  in  its  place 
one  in  every  respect  so  different — must  not,  in  its  consequences,  prove  fa 
tal  to  the  liberty  and  the  happiness  of  these  states  1  Can  it  be  necessary 
for  me  to  prove  that  no  other  system  that  human  ingenuity  can  devise, 
or  imagination  conceive,  but  that  which  this  fatal  act  has  subverted,  can 
preserve  the  liberty  or  secure  the  happiness  of  the  country  1  Need  I  show 
that  the  most  difficult  problem  which  ever  was  presented  to  the  mind  of 
a  legislator  to  solve,  was  to  devise  a  system  of  government  for  a  country 
of  such  vast  extent,  that  should  at  once  possess  sufficient  power  to  hold 
the  whole  together,  without,  at  the  same  time,  proving  fatal  to  liberty  % 
There  never  existed  an  example  before  of  a  free  community  spreading 
over  such  an  extent  of  territory  ;  and  the  ablest  and  profoundest  thinkers, 
at  the  time,  believed  it  to  be  utterly  impracticable  that  there  should  be. 
Yet  this  difficult  problem  was  solved — successfully  solved,  by  the  wise 
and  sagacious  men  who  framed  our  Constitution.  No :  it  was  above  un 
aided  human  wisdom — above  the  sagacity  of  the  most  enlightened.  It 
was  the  result  of  a  fortunate  combination  of  circumstances,  co-operating 
and  leading  the  way  to  its  formation  ;  directed  by  that  kind  Providence 
which  has  so  often  and  so  signally  disposed  events  in  our  favour. 

To  solve  this  difficult  problem,  and  to  overcome  the  apparently  insu 
perable  obstacle  which  it  presents,  required  that  peculiar  division,  distribu 
tion,  and  organization  of  power  which,  as  I  have  stated,  so  remarkably 
distinguish  our  system,  and  which  serve  as  so  many  breakwaters  to  ar 
rest  the  angry  waves  of  power,  impelled  by  avarice  and  ambition,  and 
which,  driven  furiously  over  a  broad  and  unbroken  expanse,  would  be  re 
sistless.  Of  this  partition  and  breaking  up  of  power  into  separate  parts, 
the  most  remarkable  division  is  that  between  the  reserved  and  delegated 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  159 

powers,  which  forms  the  basis  on  which  this  and  the  separate  governments 
of  the  states  are  organized,  as  the  great  and  primary  departments  of  the 
system.  It  is  this  important  division  which  mainly  gives  that  expansive 
character  to  our  institutions,  by  means  of  which  they  have  the  capacity  of 
being  spread  over  the  vast  extent  of  our  country  without  exposing  us  on 
the  one  side  to  the  danger  of  disunion,  or  on  the  other  to  the  loss  of  lib 
erty.  Without  this  happy  device,  the  people  of  these  states,  after  having 
achieved  their  independence,  would  have  been  compelled  to  resolve  them 
selves  into  small  and  hostile  communities,  in  despite  of  a  common  origin, 
a  common  language,  and  the  common  renown  and  glory  acquired  by  their 
united  wisdom  and  valour  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  or  have  submitted 
quietly  to  the  yoke  of  despotic  power  as  the  only  alternative. 

In  the  place  of  this  admirably-contrived  system,  the  act  proposed  to  be 
repealed  has  erected  one  great  consolidated  government.  Can  it  be  ne 
cessary  for  me  to  show  what  must  be  the  inevitable  consequences  1  Need 
I  prove  that  all  consolidated  governments — governments  in  which  a  sin 
gle  power  predominates  (for  such  is  their  essence) — are  necessarily  despot 
ic,  whether  that  power  be  wielded  by  the  will  of  one  man,  or  that  of  an 
absolute  and  unchecked  majority  1  Need  I  demonstrate  that  it  is,  on  the 
contrary,  the  very  essence  of  liberty  that  the  power  should  be  so  divided, 
distributed,  and  organized,  that  one  interest  may  check  the  other,  so  as 
to  prevent  the  excessive  action  of  the  separate  interests  of  the  communi 
ty  against  each  other  ;  on  the  principle  that  organized  power  can  only  be 
checked  by  organized  power  1 

The  truth  of  these  doctrines  was  fully  understood  at  the  time  of  the 
formation  of  this  Constitution.  It  was  then  clearly  foreseen  and  foretold 
what  must  be  the  inevitable  consequences  of  concentrating  all  the  powers 
of  the  system  in  this  government.  Yes,  we  are  in  a  state  predicted,  fore 
told,  prophesied  from  the  beginning.  All  the  calamities  we  have  expe 
rienced,  and  those  which  are  yet  to  come,  are  the  result  of  trie  consolida 
ting  tendency  of  the  government ;  and  unless  that  tendency  be  arrested 
— unless  we  reverse  our  steps,  all  that  has  been  foretold  will  certainly 
befall  us — even  to  the  pouring  out  of  the  last  vial  of  wrath — military  des 
potism.  To  this  fruitful  source  of  woes  may  be  traced  that  remarkable 
decay  of  public  virtue  ;  that  rapid  growth  of  corruption  arid  subserviency  ; 
that  decline  of  patriotism  ;  that  increase  of  faction  ;  that  tendency  to  an 
archy  5  and,  finally,  that  visible  approach  of  the  absolute  power  of  one  man 
which  so  lamentably  characterizes  the  times.  Should  there  be  any  one 
seeing  and  acknowledging  all  these  morbid  and  dangerous  symptoms,  but 
should  doubt  whether  the  disease  is  to  be  traced  to  the  cause  which  I 
have  assigned,  I  would  ask  him,  To  what  other  can  it  be  attributed  1  There 
is  no  event — no,  not  in  the  political  or  moral  world,  more  than  in  the  physi 
cal — without  an  adequate  cause.  I  would  ask  hip,  Does  he  attribute  it  to 
the  people  1  to  their  want  of  sufficient  intelligence  and  virtue  for  self-gov 
ernment  I  If  the  true  cause  may  be  traced  to  them,  very  melancholy 
would  be  our  situation  ;  gloomy  would  be  the  prospect  before  us.  If  such 
be  the  fact,  that  our  people  are,  indeed,  incapable  of  self-government,  I 
know  of  no  people  upon  earth  with  whom  we  might  not  desire  to  change 
condition.  When  the  day  comes  when  this  people  shall  be  compelled  to 
surrender  self-government,  a  people  so  spirited  and  so  long  accustomed 
to  liberty,  it  will  be  indeed  a  day  of  revolution,  of  convulsion  and  blood, 
such  as  has  rarely,  if  ever,  been  witnessed  in  any  age  or  country  ;  and, 
until  compelled  by  irresistible  evidence,  so  fearful  a  cause  cannot  be  ad 
mitted. 

Can  it  be  attributed  to  the  nature  of  our  system  of  government  1    Shall 
we  pronounce  it  radically  defective,  and  incapable  of  effecting  the  objects 


160  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

for  which  it  was  created  1  If  that  be,  in  truth,  the  case,  our  situation  would 
be,  in  fact,  not  much  less  calamitous  than  if  attributable  to  the  people.  To 
what  other  system  could  we  resort  1  To  a  confederation  1  That  has  already 
been  tried,  and  has  proved  utterly  inadequate.  To  consolidation  1  Rea 
son  and  experience  (as  far  as  we  have  had  experience)  proclaim  it  to  be 
the  worst  possible  form.  But  if  the  cause  be  not  in  the  people  or  the 
system,  to  what  can  it  be  attributed  but  to  some  misapprehension  of  the 
nature  and  character  of  our  institutions,  and  consequent  misdirection  of 
their  powers  or  functions  1  And  if  so,  to  what  other  misapprehension  or 
misdirection,  but  that  which  directed  our  system  towards  consolidation, 
and  consummated  its  movement  in  that  direction  in  the  act  proposed  to 
be  repealed  1  That  such  is  the  fact — that  this  is  the  true  explanation  of 
all  the  symptoms  of  decay  and  corruption  which  I  have  enumerated — is, 
in  reality,  our  only  consolation  ;  furnishes  the  only  hope  that  can  be  ra 
tionally  entertained  of  extricating  ourselves  from  our  present  calamity, 
and  of  averting  the  still  greater  that  are  impending. 

I  know  that  there  are  those  who  take  a  different,  but,  in  my  opinion,  a 
very  superficial  view  of  the  cause  of  our  difficulties.  They  attribute  it 
exclusively  to  those  who  are  in  power,  and  see  in  the  misconduct  of  Gen 
eral  Jackson  the  cause  of  all  that  has  befallen  us.  That  he  has  done  much 
to  aggravate  the  evil,  I  acknowledge  with  pain.  I  had  my  full  share  of 
responsibility  in  elevating  him  to  power,  and  there  once  existed  between 
us  friendly  relations,  personal  and  political,  and  I  would  rejoice  had  he  so 
continued  to  conduct  himself  as  to  advance  the  interests  of  the  country, 
and  his  own  reputation  and  fame.  He  certainly  might  have  effected 
much  good.  He  came  into  office  under  circumstances,  and  had  a  weight 
of  popularity  which  placed  much  in  his  power,  for  good  or  for  evil ;  but 
either  from  a  want  of  a  just  comprehension  of  the  duties  attached  to  the 
situation  in  which  he  is  placed,  or  an  indisposition  to  discharge  them,  or 
the  improper  influence  and  control  of  those  who,  unfortunately  for  the 
country  and  for  himself,  have  acquired,  through  flattery  and  subserviency, 
an  ascendency  over  him,  he  has  disappointed  the  hopes  of  his  friends,  and 
realized  the  predictions  of  his  enemies.  But  the  question  recurs,  How 
happened  it  that  he  who  has  proved  himself  so  illy  qualified  to  fill  the 
high  station  that  he  occupies,  was  elected  by  the  people  1  If  it  be  attrib 
uted  to  a  misapprehension  of  his  qualifications,  or  to  an  undue  gratitude 
for  distinguished  military  services,  which  at  times  leads  astray  the  most 
intelligent  and  virtuous  people  in  the  selection  of  rulers — how  shall  we 
explain  his  re-election,  after  he  had  actually  proved  himself  so  incompe 
tent  ;  after  he  had  violated  every  pledge  which  he  had  made  previous  to 
election  ;  after  he  had  disregarded  the  principles  on  which  he  had  permit 
ted  his  friends  and  partisans  to  place  his  elevation,  and  had  outraged  the 
feelings  of  the  community  by  attempting  to  regulate  the  domestic  inter 
course  and  relations  of  Society  !  Shal.  we  say  that  the  feelings  of  grat 
itude  for  military  services  outweighed  all  this  1  or  that  the  people,  with 
all  this  experience,  were  incapable  of  forming  a  correct  opinion  of  his  con 
duct  or  character,  or  of  understanding  the  tendency  of  the  measures  of 
his  administration  1  To  assert  this  would  be  neither  more  nor  less  than 
to  assert  that  they  have  neither  the  intelligence  nor  the  virtue  for  self- 
government  ;  as  the  very  criterion  by  which  their  capacity  in  that  respect 
is  tested,  is  their  ability  duly  to  appreciate  the  character  and  conduct  of 
public  rulers,  and  the  true  tendency  of  their  public  measures  ;  and  to  ad 
mit  their  incapacity  in  that  respect  would,  in  fact,  bring  us  back  to  the 
people  as  the  cause. 

To  understand  truly  how  the  distinguished  individual  now  at  the  head 
of  the  nation  was  elevated  to  this  exalted  station,  in  despite  of  his  ac- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  161 

knowledged  defects  in  several  respects,  and  how  he  has  retained  his 
power  among  an  intelligent  and  patriotic  people,  notwithstanding  all  the 
objections  to  his  administration  that  have  been  stated,  we  must  elevate 
our  views  from  the  individual,  and  his  qualifications  and  conduct,  to  the 
working  of  the  system  itself,  by  which  only  we  can  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  true  cause  of  our  present  condition  ;  how  we  have  arrived  at  it, 
and  by  what  means  we  can  extricate  ourselves  from  its  dangers  and  diffi 
culties.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary,  in  taking  this  view,  to  go  back  and 
trace  the  operation  of  our  government  from  the  commencement,  or  to 
point  out  the  departure  from  its  true  principles  from  the  beginning,  with 
the  evils  thence  resulting,  however  interesting  and  instructive  the  inves 
tigation  might  be.  I  might  show  that  from  the  first,  beginning  with  the 
formation  of  the  Constitution,  there  were  two  parties  in  the  Convention : 
one  in  favour  of  a  national,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  a  consolidated 
government,  and  the  other  in  favour  of  the  confederative  principle  j  how 
the  latter,  from  being  in  the  minority  at  first,  gradually,  and  after  a  long 
struggle,  gained  the  ascendency ;  and  how  the  fortunate  result  of  that  as 
cendency  terminated  in  the  establishment  of  that  beautiful,  complex,  fed 
erative  system  of  government  which  I  have  attempted  to  explain. 

I  might  show  that  the  struggle  between  the  two  parties  did  not  termi 
nate  with  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution ;  that  after  it  went  into  opera 
tion  the  national  party  gained  the  ascendency  in  the  counsels  of  the  na 
tion  ;  and  that  the  result  of  that  ascendency  was  to  give  an  impulse  to  the 
government  in  the  direction  which  their  principles  led,  and  from  which 
it  never  afterward  recovered.  I  a;n  far  from  attributing  this  to  any  sin 
ister  design.  The  party  were  not  less  distinguished  for  patriotism  than 
for  ability,  and  no  doubt  honestly  intended  to  give  the  system  a  fair  trial; 
but  they  would  have  been  more  than  men,  if  their  attachment  to  a  favour 
ite  plan  had  not  biased  their  feelings  and  judgment.  I  (said  Mr.  C.) 
avail  myself  of  the  occasion  to  avow  my  high  respect  for  both  of  the 
great  parties  which  divided  the  country  in  its  early  history.  They  were 
both  eminently  honest  and  patriotic,  and  the  preference  which  each  gave 
to  its  respective  views  resulted  from  a  zealous  attachment  to  the  public 
interest.  At  that  early  period,  before  there  was  any  experience  as  to  the 
operation  of  the  system,  it  is  not  surprising  that  one  should  believe  that 
the  danger  was  a  tendency  to  anarchy,  while  the  other  be^'eved  it  to  be 
towards  despotism,  and  that  these  different  theoretical  vi^ws  should  hon 
estly  have  a  decided  influence  on  their  public  conduct. 

I  pass  over  the  intermediate  events  :  the  reaction  pgainst  the  national, 
or,  as  it  was  then  called,  federal  party — the  elevatiri  of  Mr.  Jefferson  in 
consequence  of  that  reaction  in  1801 — and  the  gradual  departure  (from 
the  influence  of  power)  of  the  Republican  party  torn  the  principles  which 
brought  them  into  office.  I  come  down  at  once  to  the  year  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  twenty-four,  when  a  protective  tariff  was  for  the  first  time  adopt 
ed  ;  when  the  power  to  impose  duties,  grafted  for  the  purpose  of  raising 
revenue,  was  converted  into  an  instrument  of  regulating,  controlling,  and 
organizing  the  entire  capital  and  industry  of  the  country,  and  placing  them 
under  the  influence  of  this  government  ;  and  when  the  principles  of  con 
solidation  gained  an  entire  ascendency  in  both  houses  of  Congress.  Its 
first  fruit  was  to  give  a  sectional  potion  to  the  government,  and,  of  course, 
a  sectional  character  to  political  parties — arraying  the  non-exporting  states^ 
against  the  exporting,  and  the  IVorthern  against  the  Southern  section. 

It  is  my  wish  to  speak  of  tAe  events  to  which  I  feel  myself  compelled 
to  refer,  in  illustration  of  ihe  practical  operation  of  that  consolidating 
tendency  of  the  government,  which  was  consummated  by  the  act  pro- 
posed  to  be  repealed,  and  which  I  believe  to  be  the  cause  of  all  our  evils 

X 


162  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

with  the  greatest  possible  moderation.  I  know  how  delicate  a  task  it  .is 
to  speak  of  recent  political  events,  and  of  the  actors  concerned  in  them  ; 
and  I  would,  on  this  occasion,  gladly  avoid  so  painful  a  duty,  if  I  did  not 
believe  that  truth  and  public  interest  require  it.  Without  a  full  under 
standing  of  the  events  of  this  period,  from  '24<  down  to  the  present  time, 
it  is  impossible  that  we  can  have  a  just  knowledge  of  the  cause  of  our 
present'  condition,  or  a  clear  perception  of  the  means  of  remedying  it. 
To  avoid  all  personal  feeling,  I  shall  endeavour  to  recede,  in  imagination, 
a  century  from  the  present  time,  and  from  that  distant  position  regard  the 
events  to  which  I  allude,  in  that  spirit  of  philosophical  inquiry  by  which  an. 
earnest  seeker  after  truth,  at  so  remote  a  day,  may  be  supposed  to  be  ac 
tuated.  I  feel  I  may  be  justified  in  speaking  with  the  less  reserve  of  these 
events,  as  the  great  question  which,  during  the  greater  part  of  the  period, 
so  deeply  agitated  the  country  (the  protective  tariff),  may  now  be  consid 
ered  as  terminated  in  the  adjustment  of  the  last  winter,  never  to  be  re- 
agitated,  as  I  trust ;  and,  of  course,  may  be  spoken  of  with  the  freedom  of 
a  past  event. 

But  to  proceed  with  the  narrative  :  the  presidential  contest,  which  was 
terminated  the  next  year,  placed  the  executive  department  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  same  interest  that  controlled  the  legislative,  so  that  all  depart 
ments  of  this  government  were  united  in  favour  of  that  great  interest. 
The  successful  termination  of  the  election  in  favour  of  the  individual  then 
elevated  to  the  chief  magistracy,  and  for  whom  1  then  and  now  entertain, 
kind  feelings,  may  be  attributed  in  part,  no  doubt,  to  the  predominance 
of  the  tariff  interest,  and  may  be  considered  as  the  first  instance  of  the 
predominance  of  that  interest  in  a  presidential  contest. 

Let  us  pause  at  this  point  (it  is  an  important  one),  in  order  to  survey 
the  state  of  public  affairs  at  that  juncture.     In  casting  our  eyes  over  the 
scene,  we  find  the  country  divided  into  two  great  hostile  and  sectional 
parties — placed  in  conflict  on  a  question,  believed  to  be  on  both  sides  of 
vital  importance,  in  reference  to  their  respective  interests  ;  and,  on  the 
side  of  the  weaker  party,  believed,  in  addition,  to  involve  a  constitutional 
question  of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  having  a  direct,, and  important 
bearing  on  the  duration  of  the  liberty  "and  Constitution  of  the  country.    In 
this  conflict,  we  find  both  houses  of  Congress,  with  the  chief  magistrate, 
and,  of  cour&e,  the  government  itself,  on  the  side  of  the  dominant  interest, 
and  identified  vith  it  in  principles  and  feelings.     In  this  state  of  things,  a 
great  and  solem*  question,  What  ought  to  be  done  1   was  forced  on  the 
decision  of  the  minority.    Shall  we  acquiesce,  or  shall  we  oppose  1  and  if 
oppose,  how  1     To  Acquiesce  quietly  would  be  to  subject  the  property 
and  industry  of  an  entVe  section  of  the  country  to  an  unlimited  and  indef 
inite  exaction  ;  as  it  vva^  openly  avowed  that  the  protective  system  could 
only  be  perfected  by  beiLo-  carried  to  the  point  of  prohibition  on  all  ar 
ticles  of  which  a  sufficient  supply  could  be  made  or  manufactured  in  the 
country.     To  submit  under  sech  circumstances  would  have  been,  accord 
ing  to  our  view  of  the  subject,  a  gross  dereliction  both  of  interest  and 
duty.     It  was  impossible.     But  \iow'  could  the  majority  be  successfully- 
opposed,  possessed,  as  they  were,  o?  every  department  of  the  government  I 
How,  in  this  state  of  things,  could  *he  minority  effect  a  change  in  their 
favour  through  the  ordinary  operation*  of  the  government  1     They  could 
effect  no  favourable  change  in  this  or  the  other  house — the  majority  in 
*both  but  too  faithfully  represented  what  vheir  constituents  believed  to  be 
the  interest  of  their  section,  to  whom  only  and  not  to  us,  they  were  re 
sponsible.     The  only  branch  of  the  government,  then,  on  which  the  mi 
nority  could  act,  and  through  which  they  could  hope  to  effect  a  favourable 
change,  was  the  executive.     The  President  is  elected  by  a  majority  of 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUtf.  163 

the  whole  electoral  votes,  and,  of  course,  the  minority  have  a  weight  in  his 
election,  in  proportion  to  their  number  and  the  unity  of  their  voice.  Here 
was  all  our  hope,  and  to  this  point  all  our  efforts  to  effect  a  change  were 
necessarily  directed  j  but  even  here  our  power  of  acting  with  effect  was 
limited  to  a  narrow  circle.  It  would  have  been  hopeless  to  present  a  can 
didate  openly  and  fully  identified  with  our  own  interest.  Defeat  would  have 
been  the  certain  result,  had  his  acknowledged  qualifications  for  intelli 
gence,  experience,  and  patriotism  been  ever  so  great.  We  were  thus 
forced  by  inevitable  consequence — neither  to  be  avoided  nor  resisted — to 
abandon  the  contest,  or  to  select  a  candidate  who,  at  best,  was  but  a 
choice  of  evils  j  one  whose  opinions  were  intermediate  or  doubtful  on. 
the  subject  which  divided  the  two  sections.  However  great  the  hazard, 
or  the  objections  to  such  a  selection  for  such  an  office,  it  must  be  char 
ged,  not  to  us,  but  to  that  action  of  the  system  which  compelled  us  to 
make  the  choice— compelling  us  by  that  consolidating  tendency  which 
had  drawn  under  the  control  of  this  government  the  local  and  reserved 
powers  belonging  to  the  states  separately ;  the  exercise  of  which  had  ne 
cessarily  given  that  direction  to  its  action,  that  created  and  placed  in  con 
flict  the  two  great  sectional,  political  parties. 

But  it  was  not  sufficient  that  the  opinion  of  our  candidate  should  not 
be  fully  in  coincidence  with  our  own.  That  alone  could  not  be  sufficient 
to  ensure  his  success.  It  was  necessary  that  he  should  have  great  per 
sonal  popularity,  distinct  from  political ;  to  be,  in  a  wor^,  a  successful 
military  chieftain,  which  gives  a  popularity  the  most  extensive,  and  the 
least  affected  by  political  considerations ;  and  this  w=s  another  fruit — a 
necessary  fruit  of  consolidation.  To  these  recommendations  others  must 
be  added,  in  order  to  conciliate  the  feelings  of  the  wiinority — that  he  should 
be  identified,  for  instance,  with  them  in  interest,  possess  the  same  prop 
erty,  and  pursue  the  same  industry.  These  qualifications,  all  of  which 
were  made  indispensable  by  the  juncture,  pointed  clearly  to  one  man,  and 
but  one,  General  Jackson.  There  was,  however,  another  circumstance 
which  gave  him  great  prominence  arU  strength,  and  which  greatly  con 
tributed  to  recommend  him  as  the  opposing  candidate.  He  had  been  de 
feated  in  the  presidential  contest  before  the  House  of  Eepresentatives 
(though  returned  with  the  highest  vote)  under  circumstances  which  were 
supposed  to  involve  a  disregard  of  the  public  voice.  I  do  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  enter  into  an  inquiry  as  to  the  principles  which  controlled 
the  election,  or  as  to  the  view  of  the  actors  in  that  scene.  Many  con 
siderations  doubtless  governed,  and,  among  others,  the  feelings  of  prom 
inent  irfdividuals  in  reference  to  the  candidates,  and  their  opinion  of  their 
respective  qualifications,  besides  the  one  to  which  I  have  alluded— that  of 
giving  to  the  dominant  interest  that  control  over  the  executive  which 
they  had  over  the  legislative  department. 

These  combined  motives,  as  I  have  stated,  pointed  distinctly  to  Gen 
eral  Jackson.  He  was  selected  as  the  candidate  of  the  minority,  and  the 
canvass  entered  into  with  all  that  zeal  which  belonged  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  stake,  united  with  the  consciousness  of  honest  and  patriotic  pur 
pose.  The  leading  objects  were  to  effect  a  great  political  reform,  and  to 
arrest,  if  possible,  what  we  believed  to  be  a  dangerous,  and  felt  to  be  an 
oppressive  action  of  the  government.  It  is  true  that  the  qualifications  of 
the  individual,  thus  necessarily  selected,  were  believed  to  be,  in  many  im 
portant  particulars,  defective  ;  that  he  lacked  experience,  extensive  polit 
ical  information,  and  a  command  of  temper ;  but  it  was  believed  that  his 
firmness  of  purpose,  and  his  natural  sagacity,  by  calling  to  his  aid  the  ex 
perience,  the  talents,  and  patriotism  of  those  who  supported  his  claims, 
would  compensate  for  these  defects. 


164  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  enter  into  a  history  of  this  interesting 
and  animated  canvass  ;  but  there  is  one  circumstance  attendino-  it  so 
striking,  so  full  of  instruction,  and  so  illustrative  of  the  point  under  con 
sideration,  that  I  cannot  pass  it  in  silence.  The  canvass  soon  ran  into 
the  great  and  absorbing  question  of  the  day,  as  all  ordinary  diseases  run 
into  the  prevailing  one.  Those  in  power  sought  to  avail  themselves  of 
the  popularity  of  the  system  with  which  they  were  identified.  I  speak 
it  not  in  censure.  It  was  natural,  perhaps  unavoidable,  as  connected  with 
the  morbid  action  of  the  government.  That  portion  of  our  allies  iden 
tified  with  the  same  interest  were  in  like  manner,  and  from  the  same 
motive  and  cause,  forced  into  a  rivalry  of  zeal  for  the  same  interest.  The 
result  of  these  causes,  combined  with  a  monopolizing  spirit  of  the  protect 
ive  system,  was  the  tariff  of  eighteen  hundred  and  twenty-eight :  that 
disastrous  measure,  which  has  brought  so  many  calamities  upon  us,  and 
put  in  peril  the  Union  and  liberty  of  the  country.  It  poured  millions  into 
the  treasury,  beyond  even  the  most  extravagant  wants  of  the  government  j 
and  which,  on  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  caused  that  hazardous  junc 
ture,  resulting  from  a  large  undisposable  surplus  revenue,  which  has 
spread  such  deep  corruption  in  every  direction. 

This  disastrous  event  opened  our  eyes  (I  mean  myself,  and  those  imme 
diately  connected  with  me)  as  to  the  full  extent  of  the  danger  and  op 
pression  of  the  protective  system,  and  the  hazard  of  failing  to  effect  the 
reform  intended  through  the  election  of  General  Jackson.  With  these 
disclosures,  it  Vecame  necessary  to  seek  some  other  ultimate,  but  more 
certain  measure  oC  protection.  We  turned  to  the  Constitution  to  find  this 
remedy.  We  directed  a  more  diligent  and  careful  scrutiny  into  its  pro 
visions,  in  order  to  ascertain  fully  the  nature  and  character  of  our  polit 
ical  system.  We  found  *  certain  and  effectual  remedy  in  that  great  fun 
damental  division  of  the  powers  of  the  system  between  this  government 
and  its  independent  co-deptuctments :  the  separate  government  of  the 
states,  to  be  called  into  action  to  arrest  the  unconstitutional  acts  of  this 
government,  by  the  interposition  of  the  state — the  paramount  source 
from  which  both  governments  derive  their  power.  But  in  relying  on  this 
as  our  ultimate  remedy,  we  did  not  abate  our  zeal  in  the  presidential 
canvass;  we  still  hoped  that  General  Jackson,  if  elected,  would  effect  the 
necessary  reform,  and  thereby  supersede  the  necessity  for  calling  into 
action  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  state,  which  we  were  anxious  to 
avoid.  With  these  views,  the  two  were  pushed  with  equal  zeal  at  the 
same  time  ;  which  double  operation  commenced  in  the  fall  of  eighteen 
hundred  and  twenty-eight,  but  a  few  months  after  the  passage  of  "the  Tar 
iff  Act  of  that  year  ;  and  at  the  meeting  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State, 
at  the  same  period,  a  paper,  known  as  the  South  Carolina  Exposition,  was 
reported  to  that  body,  containing  a  full  development,  as,  well  on  the  con 
stitutional  point,  as  the  operation  of  the  protective  system,  preparatory 
to  a  state  of  things  which  might  eventually  render  the  action  of  the  state 
necessary  in  order  to  protect  her  rights  and  interests,  and  to  stay  a  course 
of  policy  which  we  believed  would,  if  not  arrested,  prove  destructive  of 
liberty  and  the  Constitution.  This  movement  on  the  part  of  the  state 
places  beyond  all  controversy  the  true  character  of  the  motives  which 
governed  us  in  the  presidential  canvass.  We  were  not  the  mere  partisans 
of  the  candidate  we  supported.  We  aimed  at  a  far  more  exalted  object 
than  his  election — the  defence  of  the  rights  of  the  state,  and  the  security 
of  liberty  and  of  the  Constitution.  To  this  we  held  his  election  entirely 
subordinate.  This  we  pursued,  unwarped  by  selfish  or  ambitious  views. 

The  contest  terminated  in  the  elevation  of  him  who  now  presides  j  but 
it  soon  became  apparent  that  our  apprehensions  that  we  might  be  dis- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  165 

appointed  in  the  expected  reform,  was  not  without  foundation.  That  oc 
curred,  which  we  ought,  perhaps,  to  have  expected,  and  which,  under 
similar  circumstances,  has  rarely  failed  to  follow.  He  who  was  elevated 
to  power  proved  to  be  more  solicitous  to  retain  what  he  had  acquired 
than  to  fulfil  the  expectation  of  those  who  had  honestly  contributed  to  his 
elevation,  with  a  view  to  political  reform.  The  tale  may  be  readily  told: 
not  a  promise  fulfilled — not  a  measure  adopted  to  correct  the  abuses  of 
the  system — not  a  step  taken  to  arrest  the  progress  of  consolidation,  and 
to  restore  the  confederative  principles  of  our  government — not  a  look  cast 
to  the  near  approach  of  the  payment  of  the  public  debt — nor  an  effort 
made  to  reduce  gradually  the  duties,  in  order  to  prevent  a  surplus  revenue, 
and  to  save  the  manufactures  which  had  grown  up  under  the  protective 
system,  from  the  hazard  of  a  shock  caused  by  a  sudden  reduction  of  the 
duties.  All  were  forgotten;  and,  instead  of  attempting  to  control  events, 
the  executive  was  only  solicitous  to  occupy  a  position  the  most  propitious 
to  retain  and  increase  his  power.  It  required  but  little  penetration  to  see 
that  the  position  sought  was  a  middle  one  between  the  contending  parties : 
to  be  identified  with  no  principle  or  policy,  and  rely  on  the  personal  pop 
ularity  of  the  incumbent,  and  the  power  and  patronage  of  the  government, 
as  the  means  of  support.  Hence  a  third  party  was  formed,  a  personal 
and  government  party,  made  up  of  those  who  were  attached  to  the  person, 
and  the  fortunes  of  a  successful  political  chief.  In  a  word,  we  had  ex 
hibited  to  our  view,  for  the  first  time  under  our  system,  that  most  danger 
ous  spectacle,  in  a  country  like  ours,  a  prerogative  party,  who  take  their 
creed  wholly  from  the  mandate  of  their  chief.  The  times  were  eminently 
propitious  for  the  formation  of  such  a  party.  Millions  were  poured  into 
the  treasury  by  the  high  protective  duties  of  eighteen  hundred  and 
twenty-eight,  furnishing  an  overflowing  fund  to  secure  the  services  of  ex 
pectants  and  partisans.  Against  these  superabundant  means  of  power 
there  was  not,  nor  could  there  be,  as  things  were  situated,  any  effective 
resistance,  all  being  necessarily  withdrawn  in  consequence  of  the  fierce 
contest  between  the  two  sections  which  continued  to  rage  with  increasing 
violence,  and  which  wasted  the  strength  of  the  parties  on  each  other,  in 
stead  of  opposing  the  rapidly-increasing  power  of  the  executive.  This, 
and  not  the  personal  or  the  military  popularity  of  General  Jackson,  is  the 
true  explanation  of  the  fact,  which  has  struck  so  many  with  wonder,  that 
no  misconduct,  that  no  neglect  of  duty  nor  perversions  of  the  power  of 
government,  however  gross,  has  been  able  to  shake  his  power  and  pop 
ularity  ;  and  that  the  people  have  looked  idly  on,  apparently  bereaved  of 
every  patriotic  sentiment,  or  joined  to  swell  the  tide  of  power  with  shouts 
of  approbation  at  every  act,  however  outrageous.  I  do  not  doubt  that  his 
personal  popularity,  arising  from  his  military  achievements,  contributed 
much  to  his  elevation  (in  fact,  it  was  one  of  the  elements,  as  stated,  which 
governed  his  selection  as  a  candidate),  and  to  sustain  him  while  in  power; 
but  I  feel  a  perfect  conviction  that,  whatever  advantage  he  has  gained 
from  this  source,  has  been  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  mismanage 
ment  and  blunders  of  his  administration,  and  that  it  would  be  equally  dif 
ficult  to  expel  from  power  any  individual  of  sagacity  and  firmness,  in 
possession  of  that  department,  under  the  circumstances  which  he  has  held 
it.  Let  us  learn,  from  the  instructive  history  of  this  interesting  period, 
that  despotic  power,  under  our  system,  commences  with  usurpation  of 
this  government  on  the  reserved  powers  of  the  states,  and  terminates  in 
the  concentration  of  all  the  powers  of  this  government  in  the  person  of  a 
chief  magistrate ;  and  that,  unless  the  first  be  resisted,  the  latter  follows 
by  a  necessary,  resistless,  and  inevitable  law,  as  much  so  as  that  which 
governs  the  movements  of  the  solar  system. 


166  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

As  soon  as  it  was  perceived  that  he  whom  we  had  elevated  to  office 
was,  as  I  have  stated,  more  intent  to  retain  and  augment  his  power  than 
to  meet  the  just  expectations  on  which  he  was  supported,  we  totally  de 
spaired  of  relief  and  reform  through  the  ordinary  action  of  this  govern 
ment,  and  separated,  from  that  moment,  from  the  administration  j  with 
drew  from  the  political  contest  here,  and  concentrated  all  our  energies  on 
that  ultimate  remedy  which  we  had  taken  the  precaution  to  prepare,  in 
order  to  be  called  into  action  in  the  event  of  things  taking  the  direction 
which  they  have. 

An  active  discussion  followed  in  the  state,  in  which  the  principles  and 
character  of  our  political  institutions  were  fully  investigated,  and  a  clear 
perception  of  the  danger  to  which  the.  country  was  exposed  was  impress 
ed  upon  the  public  mind.  Still  the  determination  was  fixed  not  to  act 
while  there  was  a  ray  of  hope  of  redress  from  the  government ;  and  we 
accordingly  waited  the  approach  of  the  final  payment  of  the  public  debt, 
when  all  pretexts  for  keeping  up  the  extravagant  duties  of  eighteen  hun 
dred  and  twenty-eight  would  cease.  The  near  approach  of  that  event 
caused  the  passage  of  the  act  of  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-two,  which 
was  proclaimed  on  both  sides,  by  the  opposition  and  the  administration, 
to  be  a  final  and  permanent  adjustment  of  the  protective  system.  We 
felt  every  disposition  to  acquiesce  in  any  reasonable  adjustment,  but 
it  was  impossible,  consistently  with  our  views  of  the  nature  of  our  rights, 
and  the  consequences  involved  in  the  contest,  to  submit  to  the  act.  The 
protective  principle  was  fully  maintained;  the  reduction  was  small,  and 
the  distribution  of  the  burden  between  the  two  sections  more  unequal  than 
under  the  act  of  eighteen  hundred  and  twenty-eight.  Every  effort  was 
made  to  magnify  the  amount  of  reduction.  With  that  view  false  and  de- 
ceptious  calculations  were  made,  and  that,  too,  in  official  documents,  in 
order  to  make  the  impression  that  the  revenue  would  be  reduced  to  the 
legitimate  wants  of  the  government,  or,  at  least,  nearly  so.  We  were  not 
to  be  imposed  upon  by  such  calculations.  We  clearly  perceived  that  the 
income  would  be  at  least  from  twenty-two  to  twenty-five  millions  of  dol 
lars,  nearly  double  what  the  government  ought  to  expend ;  and  we  as 
clearly  saw  how  much  so  large  a  permanent  surplus  must  contribute  to 
corrupt  the  country  and  undermine  our  political  institutions.  Seeing 
this,  with  a  prospect  of  an  indefinite  continuance  of  the  heavy  and  useless 
tax  levied  in  the  shape  of  duties,  the  state  interposed,  and  by  that  inter 
position  prepared  to  arrest  within  its  limits  the  operation  of  the  protective 
system — interposed,  not  to  dissolve  the  Union,  as  was  calumniously 
charged,  but  to  compel  an  adjustment  here  or  through  a  convention  of  the 
states,  or,  if  an  adjustment  could  not  be  had  through  either,  to  compel 
the  government  to  abandon  the  protective  system. 

The  moment  was  portentous.  Our  political  system  rocked  to  the 
centre.  Whatever  diseases  existed  within,  engendered  by  long  corrup 
tion  and  abuse,  were  struck  to  the  surface.  The  proclamation  and  the 
message  of  the  President  appeared,  containing  doctrines  never  before 
officially  avowed — going  far  beyond  the  extreme  tenets  of  the  Federal 
party,  and  in  direct  conflict  with  all  that  had  ever  been  entertained  by  the 
Republican  party  ;  and  yet,  such  was  the  corruption,  such  the  subserviency 
to  power,  that  both  parties,  forgetting  the  past,  abandoning  every  political 
principle,  however  sacred  or  long  entertained,  rushed  to  the  embrace  of 
the  new  creed — suddenly,  instantly,  without  the  slightest  hesitation. 
Never  did  a  free  people  exhibit  so  degraded  a  spectacle  ;  give  such  evi 
dence  of  the  loose  attachment  to  principle,  or  greater  subserviency  to 
power.  At  this  moment  the  current  of  events  tended  towards  despotic 
authority  in  the  person  of  the  chief  magistrate  on  one  side,  and  to  dis- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  167 

union  on  the  other :  on  one  side  to  clothe  the  President  with  power  more 
than  dictatorial,  in  order  to  maintain  the  ascendency  of  the  protective 
system  ;  and,  on  the  other,  to  resist  the  loss  of  liberty  at  every  hazard. 
Fortunately  for  the  country,  there  was  at  the  time  in  the  councils  of  the 
nation  an  individual  who  had  the  highest  weight  of  authority  with  the 
supporters  of  that  system — one  who  had  done  more  to  advance  it  than 
any  other — who  was  the  most  intimately  identified  with  it,  and  to  whom, 
of  course,  the  task  of  adjustment  most  appropriately  belonged.  For 
tunately,  also,  he  had  the  disposition  and  the  fortitude  to  undertake  it. 
An  adjustment  followed;  the  crisis  of  our  disease  was  passed  ;  the  body 
politic  from  that  moment  became  convalescent ;  the  tendency  to  despotic 
power  in  the  executive  was  weakened — doubly  weakened — by  enabling 
those  who  had  been  so  long  wasting  their  strength  in  mutual  conflict,  to 
unite  in  resisting  the  usurpation  of  that  department,  as  we  this  day  behold 
on  the  question  of  the  deposites ;  and  by  diminishing  the  revenue — the 
food  on  which  it  had  grown  to  such  enormous  dimensions.  In  a  short 
time  the  decreasing  scale  of  duties  will  cause  the  effect  of  this  diminution 
to  be  felt :  a  period  that  will  be  hastened  by  that  profuse  and  profligate 
disbursement  which  has  nearly  doubled  the  public  expenditure,  and  which 
is  so  rapidly  absorbing  the  surplus  revenue. 

I  have  said  that  the  crisis  is  passed;  yet  there  remains  some  trouble 
some  and  even  dangerous  symptoms,  growing  out  of  the  former  cause  of 
the  disease,  which,  however,  may  be  overcome  by  skill  and  decision;  un 
less,  indeed,  they  should  run  into  the  lurking  cause  of  another,  and  most 
dangerous  disease,  with  which  it  is  intimately  connected,  and  excite  it 
into  action ;  I  mean  the  rotten  state  of  the  currency.  There  are  indica 
tions  of  a  very  dangerous  and  alarming  character  of  this  tendency,  at  the 
point  where  the  currency  is  the  most  disordered.  I  refer  to  the  measure 
now  pending  before  the  Legislature  of  New-York,  to  pledge  the  capital 
and  the  industry  of  the  state,  to  the  amount  of  six  millions  of  dollars,  in 
support  of  the  banks — a  measure  of  a  kind  that  a  British  minister  (Lord 
Althorp),  with  all  the  power  of  Parliament  to  support  him,  refused  to  adopt, 
because  of  its  dangerous  and  corrupting  tendency. 

Let  us  now  turn,  and  inquire,  What  would  have  been  the  course  of 
events  if  the  state  had  not  interposed,  and  things  had  been  permitted  to 
take  their  natural  course  1  The  act  of  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-two 
was  proclaimed,  as  I  have  stated,  on  both  sides,  to  be  a  final  settlement 
of  the  tariff  question,  and,  of  course,  was  intended  to  be  a  permanent  law 
of  the  land.  The  revenue,  as  I  have  already  stated,  under  that  act, 
and  the  sales  of  public  lands,  would,  in  all  probability,  be  not  less  than 
twenty-live  millions  of  dollars  per  annum :  a  sum  exceeding  the  legiti 
mate  wants  of  the  government,  estimated  on  a  liberal  scale,  by  ten  or 
eleven  millions  of  dollars.  Now,  I  ask,  What  would  have  been  our  situa 
tion,  with  so  large  an  annual  surplus,  and  a  fierce  sectional  conflict  raging 
between  the  Northern  and  Southern  portions  of  the  Union  1  If  we  find  it 
so  difficult  to  resist  the  usurpation  of  the  executive  department  with  a 
temporary  surplus  revenue,  to  continue  at  most  but  for  one  or  two  years, 
how  much  more  difficult  would  it  have  been  to  resist  with  a  permanent 
surplus  such  as  I  have  stated  1  If  we  find  it  so  difficult  to  resist  that  de 
partment  when  those  who  have  been  separated  by  the  tariff  are  united, 
how  utterly  hopeless  would  have  been  the  prospect  of  resistance  were 
that  question  now  open,  and  those  who  are  now  united  against  executive 
encroachments  were  exhausting  their  strength  against  each  other  1  Is 
it  not  obvious  that  the  executive  power,  under  such  circumstances,  would 
have  been  irresistible,  and  that  we  should  have  been  impelled  rapidly  to 
despotism  or  disunion  1  One  or  the  other  would  certainly  have  been  our 


368  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

fate,  if  events  had  been  permitted  to  move  in  the  channel  in  which  they 
were  then  flowing,  and  despotism  much  more  probably  than  disunion. 
It  is  almost  without  example  that  free  states  should  be  disunited  in  con 
sequence  of  the  violence  of  internal  conflicts  ;  but  very  numerous  are  the 
cases  in  which  such  conflicts  have  terminated  in  the  establishment  of  de 
spotic  power.  The  danger  of  disunion  is  small ;  that  of  despotism  great. 
We  have,  however,  I  trust,  escaped,  for  the  present,  the  danger  of  both, 
for  which  we  are  indebted  to  that  great  conservative  principle  of  our  sys 
tem,  which  considers  this  government  and  that  of  the  states  as  co-depart 
ments  5  and  which  proved  successful,  although  rejected  by  every  state  but 
one,  and  although  called  into  action  on  the  most  trying  occasion  that  can 
be  imagined,  and  under  the  most  adverse  circumstances. 

1  said  that  the  danger  has  passed  for  the  present.  The  seeds  of  the 
disease  still  remain  in  the  system.  The  act  which  I  propose  to  repeal 
accompanied  the  adjustment  of  the  tariff.  It  was  passed  solely  on  the 
ground  of  recognising  the  principles  in  which  it  originated,  and  to  estab 
lish  them,  as  far  as  an  act  of  Congress  could  do  so,  as  the  permanent  law 
of  the  land.  While  these  seeds  remain,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  expect  a 
healthy  state  of  the  body  politic:  alienation,  the  loss  of  confidence,  sus 
picion,  jealousy,  on  the  part  of  the  weaker  section  at  least,  who  have  ex 
perienced  the  bitter  fruits  that* spring  from  those  principles,  must  accom 
pany  the  movements  of  this  government.  But  these  seeds  will  not  remain, 
in  the  system  without  germinating.  Unless  removed,  the  genius  of  con 
solidation  will  again  exhibit  itself;  but  in  what  form,  whether  in  revival 
of  the  question  from  whose  dangers  we  have  not  yet  wholly  escaped  ; 
whether  between  North  and  South,  East  and  West ;  whether  between  the 
slaveholding  and  the  non-slaveholding  states ;  the  rich  and  poor,  or  the 
capitalists  and  the  operatives,  it  is  not  for  me  to  say ;  but  that  it  will 
again  revive  (unless,  by  your  votes,  you  expunge  the  act  from  your  statute- 
book),  to  divide,  distract,  and  corrupt  the  community,  is  certain.  Nor  is 
it  much  less  so  that,  when  it  again  revives,  it  will  pass  through  all  those 
stages  which  we  have  witnessed,  and,  in  all  human  probability,  consum 
mate  itself,  arid  terminate,  finally,  in  a  military  despotism.  Keverse  the 
scene — let  the  act  be  obliterated  forever  from  among  our  laws ;  let  the 
principle  of  consolidation  be  forever  suppressed,  and  that  admirable  and 
beautiful  federative  system,  which  I  have  so  imperfectly  portrayed,  be 
firmly  established,  and  renovated  health  and  vigour  will  be  restored  to  the 
body  politic,  and  our  country  may  yet  realize  that  permanent  state  of 
liberty,  prosperity,  and  greatness,  which  we  all  once  so  fondly  hoped  was 
our  allotted  destiny. 


x. 

A  REPORT  ON  THE  EXTENT  OF  EXECUTIVE  PATRONAGE,  FEBRUARY  9,  1835 

The  Select  Committee  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  extent  of  the  executive  patron 
age  ;  the  circumstances  which  have  contributed  to  its  great  increase  of  late  ;  the 
expediency  and  practicability  of  reducing  the  same,  and  the  means  of  such  re 
duction,  have  bestowed  on  the  subjects  into  which  they  were  directed  to  inquire 
that  deliberate  attention  which  their  importance  demands,  and  submit,  as  the  re 
sult  of  their  investigation,  the  following  report,  -in  part  : 

To  ascertain  the  extent  of  executive  patronage,  the  first  subject  to  which  the 
resolution  directs  the  attention  of  the  committee,  it  becomes  necessary  to  as- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  169 

certain  previously  the  amount  of  the  revenue  and  the  expenditure,  and  the  number 
of  officers,  agents,  and  persons  in  the  employment  of  the  government,  or  who 
receive  money  from  the  public  treasury,  all  of  which,  taken  collectively,  consti 
tute  the  elements  of  which  patronage  is  mainly  composed. 

As  the  returns  of  the  revenue  and  expenditure  for  the  year  1834  are  not  yet 
completed,  your  committee  have  selected  the  year  1833  as  being  the  last  of 
which  complete  and  certain  returns  can  be  obtained. 

The  result  of  their  investigation  on  all  these  points  will  be  found  in  a  table  an 
nexed  to  the  report,  which  contains  a  statement  of  the  gross  amount  of  the  rev 
enue  under  the  various  heads  of  customs,  lands,  postoffice,  and  miscellaneous, 
for  the  year  1833  ;  the  expenditures  for  the  same  period,  arranged  under  the  va 
rious  heads  of  appropriations,  the  number  of  officers,  agents,  contractors,  and 
persons  in  the  employment  of  the  government,  or  who  receive  money  from  the 
public  treasury.  From  this  table  it  appears  that  the  aggregate  amount  of  the 
revenue  for  the  year  was  $35,298,426,  and  of  the  disbursements  $22,713,755; 
that  the  number  of  officers,  agents,  and  persons  in  the  employment  of  the  gov 
ernment  is  60,294 :  of  which  there  belong  to  the  civil  list,  including  persons 
in  civil  employ,  attached  to  the  army  and  navy,  12,144 ;  to  the  military  and  In 
dian  department,  9643  ;  to  the  navy,  including  marine  corps,  6499  ;  to  the  post- 
office,  31,917  ;  all  of  whom  hold  their  places  directly  or  indirectly  from  the  ex 
ecutive,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  judicial  officers,  are  liable  to  be  dismiss 
ed  at  his  pleasure.  If  to  the  above  there  be  added  39,5^9  pensioners,  we  shall 
have  a  grand  total  of  100,079  persons  who  are  in  the  employ  of  the  govern 
ment,  or  dependant  directly  on  the  public  treasury. 

But,  as  great  as  is  this  number,  it  gives  a  very  imperfect  conception  of  the 
sum-total  of  those  who,  as  furnishing  supplies  or  otherwise,  are  connected  with, 
and  more  or  less  dependant  on,  the  government,  and,  of  course,  liable  to  be  in 
fluenced  by  its  patronage,  the  number  of  whom,  with  their  dependants,  cannot 
even  be  conjectured.  If  to  these  be  added  the  almost  countless  host  of  expect 
ants  who  are  seeking  to  displace  those  in  office,  or  to  occupy  their  places  as 
they  become  vacant,  all  of  whom  must  look  to  the  executive  for  the  gratification 
of  their  wishes,  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the  immense  number  sub 
ject  to  the  influence  of  executive  patronage. 

But  to  ascertain  the  full  extent  of  this  influence,  and  the  prodigious  control 
which  it  exerts  over  public  opinion  and  the  movements  of  the  government,  we 
must,  in  addition  to  the  amount,  of  the  revenue  and  expenditure,  and  the  num 
ber  of  persons  dependant  upon  the  government,  or  in  its  employ,  take  into 
the  estimate  a  variety  of  circumstances  which  contribute  to  add  to  the  force  and 
extent  of  patronage.  These,  in  the  regular  course  of  the  investigation,  would 
next  claim  the  attention  of  your  committee  ;  but  as  all,  or,  at  least,  a  far  greater 
part  of  them,  are  of  recent  origin,  they  will  properly  fall  under  the  next  head  to 
which  the  resolution  directs  the  attention  of  your  committee,  and  which  they 
will  now  proceed  to  investigate. 

Among  the  circumstances  which  have  contributed  to  the  great  increase  of 
executive  patronage  of  late,  the  most  prominent,  doubtless,  are  the  great  increase 
of  the  expenditure  of  the  government,  which,  within  the  last  eight  years  (from, 
1825  to  1833),  has  risen  from  $11,490,460  to  $22,713,755,  not  including  pay 
ments  on  account  of  the  public  debt :  a  corresponding  increase  of  officers,  agents, 
contractors,  and  others,  dependant  on  the  government ;  the  vast  quantity  ot  land 
to  which  the  Indian  title  has,  in  the  same  period,  been  extinguished,  and  which 
has  been  suddenly  thrown  into  the  market,  accompanied  with  the  patronage  in 
cident  to  holding  Indian  treaties,  and  removing  the  Indians  to  the  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  also  a  great  increase  of  the  number  and  influence  of  survey 
ors,  receivers,  registers,  and  others  employed  in  the  branch  of  the  administra 
tion  connected  with  the  public  lands  ;  all  of  which  have  greatly  increased  the 
influence  of  executive  patronage  over  an  extensive  region,  and  that  the  most 

Y 


170  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

growing  and  flourishing  portion  of  the  Union.  In  this  connexion,  the  recent 
practice  of  the  government  must  be  taken  into  estimate,  of  reserving  to  individ- 
aal  Indians  a  large  portion  of  the  best  land  of  the  country,  to  which  the  title  of 
the  nation  is  extinguished,  to  be  disposed  of  under  the  sanction  of  the  execu 
tive,  on  the  recommendation  of  agents  appointed  solely  by  him,  and  which  has 
prevailed  to  so  great  an  extent  of  late,  especially  in  the  Southwestern  section 
of  the  Union. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  device  better  calculated  to  augment  the  patronage 
of  the  executive,  and,  with  it,  to  give  rise  to  speculations  calculated  to  deprave 
and  corrupt  the  community,  without  benefit  to  the  Indians.  But  as  greatly  as 
these  causes  have  added  to  the  force  of  patronage  of  late,  there  are  others  of  a 
different  nature,  which  have  contributed  to  give  it  a  far  greater  and  more  dan 
gerous  influence.  At  the  head  of  these  should  be  placed  the  practice  so  great 
ly  extended,  if  not  for  the  first  time  introduced,  of  removing  from  office  persons 
well  qualified,  and  who  had  faithfully  performed  their  duty,  in  order  to  fill  their 
places  with  those  who  are  recommended  on  the  ground  that  they  belong  to  the 
party  in  power. 

Your  committee  feel  that  they  are  touching  ground  which  may  be  considered 
•of  a  party  character,  and  which,  were  it  possible  consistently  with  the  discharge 
©f  their  duty,  they  would  wholly  avoid,  as  their  object  is  to  inquire  into  facts 
©nly,  as  contributing  to  increase  the  patronage  of  the  executive,  without  looking 
to  intention,  or  desiring  to  cast  censure  on  those  in  power  ;  but  while  they 
would  cautiously  avoid  any  remark  of  a  party  character,  as  inconsistent  with  the 
gravity  of  the  subject,  and  incompatible  with  the  intention  of  the  Senate  in  di- 
jccting  the  inquiry,  they  trust  that  they  are  incapable  of  shrinking  from  the  per 
formance  of  the  important  and  solemn  duty  confided  to  them,  of  thoroughly  in 
vestigating  to  the  bottom  a  subject  involving,  as  they  believe,  the  fate  of  our  po 
litical  institutions  and  the  liberty  of  the  country,  by  declining  to  investigate,  fully 
and  freely,  as  regards  its  character  and  consequence,  every  measure  or  practice 
of  the  government  connected  with  the  inquiry,  whether  ft  has  or  has  not  been 
a  subject  of  party  controversy. 

In  speaking  of  the  practice  of  removing  from  office  on  party  ground  as  of  re 
cent  date,  and,  of  course,  comprehended  under  the  causes  which  have,  of  late, 
contributed  to  the  increase  of  executive  patronage,  your  committee  are  aware 
that  cases  of  such  removals  may  be  found  in  the  early  stages  of  the  govern- 
jnent ;  but  they  are  so  few,  and  exercised  so  little  influence,  that  they  may  be 
said  to  constitute  instances  rather  than  as,  forming  a  practice.  It  is  only  within 
the  last  few  years  that  removals  from  office  have  been  introduced  as  a  system ; 
and  for  the  first  time,  an  opportunity  has  been  afforded  of  testing  the  tendency 
of  the  practice,  and  witnessing  the  mighty  increase  which  it  has  given  to  the 
force  of  executive  patronage  ;  and  the  entire  and  fearful  change,  in  conjunction 
with  other  causes,  it  is  effecting  in  the  character  of  our  political  system.  Nor 
will  it  require  much  reflection  to  perceive  in  what  manner  it  contributes  to  in 
crease  so  vastly  the  extent  of  executive  patronage. 

So  long  as  offices  were  considered  as  public  trusts,  to  be  conferred  on  the 
honest,  the  faithful,  and  capable,  for  the  common  good,  and  not  for  the  benefit 
or  gain  of  the  incumbent  or  his  party,  and  so  long  as  it  was  the  practice  of  the 
government  to  continue  in  office  those  who  faithfully  performed  their  duties,  its 
patronage,  in  point  of  fact,  was  limited  to  the  mere  power  of  nominating  to  ac 
cidental  vacancies  or  to  newly-created  offices,  and  could,  of  course,  exercise  but  a 
moderate  influence,  either  over  the  body  of  the  community,  or  of  the  office-hold 
ers  themselves  ;  but  when  this  practice  was  reversed — when  offices,  instead  of 
being  considered  as  publiq  trusts,  to  be  conferred  on  the  deserving,  were  regard 
ed  as  the  spoils  of  victory,  to  be  bestowed  as  rewards  for  partisan  services, 
without  respect  to  merit ;  when  it  came  to  be  understood  that  all  who  hold  of 
fice  hold  by  the  tenure  of  partisan  zeal  and  party  service,  it  is  easy  to  see  that 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  171 

the  certain,  direct,  and  inevitable  tendency  of  such  a  state  of  things  is  to  convert 
the  entire  body  of  those  in  office  into  corrupt  and  supple  instruments  of  power, 
and  to  raise  up  a  host  of  hungry,  greedy,  and  subservient  partisans,  ready  for 
every  service,  however  base  and  corrupt.  Were  a  premium  offered  for  the  best 
means  of  extending  to  the  utmost  the  power  of  patronage  ;  to  destroy  the  love 
of  country,  and  to  substitute  a  spirit  of  subserviency  and  man-worship ;  to  en 
courage  vice  and  discourage  virtue  ;  and,  in  a  word,  to  prepare  for  the  subver 
sion  of  liberty  and  the  establishment  of  despotism,  no  scheme  more  perfect  could 
be  devised ;  and  such  must  be  the  tendency  of  the  practice,  with  whatever  in 
tention  adopted,  or  to  whatever  extent  pursued. 

As  connected  with  this  portion  of  the  inquiry,  your  committee  cannot  avoid 
adverting  to  the  practice,  similar  in  its  character  and  tendency,  growing  out  of 
the  act  of  the  15th  of  May,  1820,  which  provides,  among  other  things,  that, 
from  and  after  its  passage,  all  district  attorneys,  collectors,  and  other  disbur 
sing  officers  therein  mentioned,  to  be  appointed  under  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  shall  be  appointed  for  the  term  of  four  years.  The  object  of  Congress 
in  passing  this  act  was,  doubtless,  to  enforce  a  more  faithful  performance  of 
duty  on  the  part  of  the  disbursing  officers,  by  withholding  reappointments 
from  those  who  had  not  faithfully  discharged  their  duty,  without  intending 
to  reject  those  who  had.  At  first  the  practice  conformed  to  the  intention  of 
the  law,  and  thereby  the  good  intended  was  accomplished,  without  material 
ly  increasing  the  patronage  of  the  executive  ;  but  a  very  great  change  has  fol 
lowed,  which  has,  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  defeated  the  object  of 
the  act,  and,  at  the  same  time,  added  greatly  to  the  influence  of  patronage. 
Faithful  performance  of  duty  no  longer  ensures  a  renewal  of  appointment.  The 
consequence  is  inevitable :  a  feeling  of  dependance  on  the  executive,  on  the 
part  of  the  incumbent,  increasing  as  his  term  approaches  its  end,  with  a  great 
increase  of  the  number  of  those  who  desire  his  place,  followed  by  an  active  com 
petition  between  the  occupant  and  those  who  seek  his  place,  accompanied  by 
all  those  acts  of  compliance  and  subserviency  by  which  power  is  conciliated ; 
and,  of  course,  with  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  number  of  those  influenced 
by  the  executive  will. 

In  enumerating  the  causes  which  have,  of  late,  increased  executive  patronage, 
your  committee  cannot,  without  a  dereliction  of  duty,  pass  over  one  of  very  re 
cent  origin,  although  they  are  aware  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  allude  to  it, 
in  the  most  delicate  manner,  without  exciting  feelings  of  a  party  character,  which 
they  are  sincerely  anxious  to  avoid :  they  refer  to  the  increased  power  which 
late  events  have  given  to  the  executive  over  the  public  funds,  and,  with  it,  the 
currency  of  the  country. 

In  considering  this  part  of  the  subject  of  their  inquiry,  it  is  the  intention  of 
the  committee  to  confine  themselves  exclusively  to  the  tendency  of  the  events 
to  which  they  refer  as  increasing  executive  patronage,  avoiding  all  allusion  to 
motives,  or  to  the  legality  of  the  acts  in  question. 

Whatever  diversity  of  opinion  may  exist  as  to  the  expediency  or  the  legality 
of  removing  the  deposites,  there  can,  it  is  supposed,  be  none  as  to  the  fact  that 
the  removal  has,  as  things  now  stand,  increased  the  power  and  patronage  of 
the  executive  in  reference  to  the  public  funds.  They  are  now,  in  point  of  fact, 
under  his  sole  and  unlimited  control ;  and  may,  at  his  pleasure,  be  withdrawn 
from  the  banks  where  he  has  ordered  them  to  be  deposited,  be  placed  in  other 
banks,  or  in  the  custody  of  whomsoever  he  may  choose  to  select,  without  limit 
ation  or  restriction  ;  arid  must  continue  subject  to  his  sole  will,  till  placed,  by 
an  act  of  Congress,  under  the  custody  of  the  laws.  Whether  any  provision  can 
be  devised  which  would  place  them  as  much  beyond  the  control  of  the  execu 
tive  in  their  present  as  they  were  in  their  former  place  of  deposite,  and  which, 
at  the  same  time,  would  not  endanger  their  safety,  are  points  on  which  your  com 
mittee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  venture  an  opinion.  What  addition  this  un- 


172  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

limited  control  over  the  public  funds,  from  the  time  of  their  collection  till  that 
of  their  expenditure,  makes  to  the  patronage  of  the  executive,  is  difficult  to  es 
timate.  According  to  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  amount 
of  the  public  funds  in  deposite  on  the  1st  of  January,  1834,  was  $11,702,905  ; 
and  their  estimated  amount,  on  the  31st  of  December  last,  was  $8,695,981 ; 
making  an  average  amount  for  the  year  of  $10,199,443,  the  use  of  which,  con 
sidering  the  permanency  of  the  deposites,  may  be  estimated  as  not  of  less  value 
to  the  banks  in  which  they  were  deposited  than  four  per  cent. ;  making,  at  that 
rate,  on  the  average  amount  in  deposite,  the  sum  of  $407,977  per  annum.  This 
immense  gain  to  these  powerful  and  influential  monopolies  depends  upon  the 
will  and  pleasure  of  the  executive,  and  must  give  him  a  corresponding  control 
over  them  ;  but  this,  of  itself,  affords  a  very  imperfect  view  of  the  extent  of  his 
patronage,  dependant  on  his  control  over  the  public  deposites.  To  ascertain  its 
full  extent,  the  advantages  which  these  banks  have,  in  consequence  of  the  de 
posites,  in  circulating  their  notes  and  in  dealing  in  exchanges,  and  the  compe 
tition  which  it  must  excite  among  the  banks  generally  to  supplant  each  other  in. 
these  advantages,  and,  of  course,  in  executive  favour,  on  which  they  depend, 
and  which  must  tend  to  create,  on  their  part,  a  universal  spirit  of  dependance 
and  subserviency  ;  the  means  which  the  deposites  necessarily  afford  to  raise  or 
depress  at  pleasure  the  value  of  the  stock  of  this  or  that  bank ;  and  the  wide 
field  which  is  consequently  opened  to  the  initiated  partisans  of  power  for  the 
accumulation  of  fortunes  by  speculations  in  bank  stock ;  the  facility  which  all 
these  causes  combined  must  give  to  political  favourites  in  obtaining  bank  accom 
modations  ;  and,  finally,  the  control  which  the  accompanying  power  of  desig 
nating  the  notes  of  what  banks  may,  and  what  may  not,  be  received  in  the  pub 
lic  dues,  gives  to  the  executive  over  these  institutions,  must  be  taken  into  the 
estimate,  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  the  full  force  of  this  tremendous  engine  of 
power  and  influence,  wielded,  as  things  now  stand,  by  the  will  of  a  single  in 
dividual. 

Your  committee  have  now  enumerated  the  principal  causes  which  have  of 
late  contributed  to  increase  so  greatly  the  patronage  of  the  executive.  There 
are  others  still  remaining  to  be  noticed,  which  have  greatly  contributed  to  this 
increase,  and  which  claim  the  most  serious  consideration  ;  but,  as  they  are  of 
an  incidental  character,  it  is  proposed  to  consider  them  in  their  proper  connex 
ion,  in  a  subsequent  part  of  this  report.  Having  completed,  under  its  proper 
head,  the  inquiry  as  to  the  extent  of  executive  patronage,  and  the  cause  of  its 
recent  increase,  your  committee  will  next  proceed  to  investigate  the  deeply-in 
teresting  questions  of  the  expediency  and  practicability  of  its  reduction. 

In  considering  the  question  of  the  expediency  of  its  reduction,  your  commit 
tee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  enter  into  an  elaborate  argument  to  prove  that 
patronage,  at  best,  is  but  a  necessary  evil ;  that  its  tendency,  where  it  is  not 
effectually  checked  and  regulated,  is  to  debase  and  corrupt  the  community  ; 
and  that  it  is,  of  course,  a  fundamental  maxim  in  all  states  having  free  and  pop 
ular  institutions,  that  no  more  should  be  tolerated  than  is  necessary  to  maintain, 
the  proper  efficacy  of  government.  How  little  this  principle,  so  essential  to 
the  preservation  of  liberty  in  popular  governments,  has  been  respected  under 
ours,  the  view  which  has  already  been  presented  of  the  vast  extent  to  which 
patronage  has  already  attained  under  this  government,  and  its  rapid  growth,  but 
too  clearly  demonstrate.  But  as  great  and  as  rapid  as  has  been  its  growth,  it 
may  be  thought  by  some  who  have  not  duly  reflected  upon  the  subject,  that  it 
is.  not  more  than  sufficient  to  maintain  the  government  in  its  proper  efficiency, 
and  that  it  cannot  be  diminished  without  exposing  our  institutions  to  the  danger 
of  weakness  and  anarchy.  To  demonstrate  the  utter  fallacy  of  such  a  suppo 
sition,  it  is  only  necessary  to  compare  the  present  to  the  past,  in  reference  to 
the  point  under  consideration. 

No  one  capable  of  judging  will  venture  to  assert  that  the  patronage  of  th© 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  173 

executive  branch  of  this  government,  in  any  stage  of  its  existence,  from  the 
time  it  went  fairly  into  operation,  has  ever  proved  deficient  in  proper  influence 
and  control ;  yet,  if  the  present  be  compared  with  any  past  period  of  our  histo 
ry,  excluding,  of  course,  that  of  the  late  war,  the  patronage  now  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  executive  will  be  found  greatly  to  exceed  that  of  any  former  period. 
To  illustrate  the  truth  of  this  remark,  your  committee  will  select,  for  compari 
son,  the  years  1825  and  1833  :  the  former,  because  it  was  thought,  even  then, 
by  many  of  the  most  experienced  and  reflecting  of  our  citizens,  that  executive 
patronage  had  attained  a  dangerous  extent ;  and  the  latter,  because  it  is  the 
latest  period  of  which  we  have  the  requisite  materials  with  which  to  make  the 
comparison.  What,  then,  is  the  comparative  extent  of  executive  patronage, 
respectively,  with  the  short  interval  of  but  eight  years  between  them  ?  What, 
at  these  respective  periods,  was  the  amount  of  the  revenue  and  expenditure  ? 
What  the  number  of  persons  in  the  employ  of  the  government,  or  dependant  on 
its  bounty  ?  and  what  the  extent  to  which,  according  to  the  practice  of  the  re 
spective  periods,  the  patronage  of  the  government  was  brought  to  exert  over 
those  subject  to  its  control  ?  A  short  comparative  statement  will  show. 

The  income  of  the  government,  in  all  its  branches,  including  the  postoffice, 
was,  in  1825,  $28,147,883  ;  and  1833,  $36,667,274.  The  gross  expenditures, 
including  the  public  debt,  in  1825,  was  $24,814,847;  in  1833,  $27,229,389. 
Excluding  the  public  debt,  it  was,  in  1825,  $12,719,503  ;  in  1833,  $25,685,846. 
The  number  of  persons  employed,  and  living  on  the  bounty  of  the  government, 
in  1825,55,777;  in  1833,  100,079. 

Measuring  the  extent  of  the  patronage,  at  these  respective  periods,  by  these 
elements  combined,  without  taking  into  consideration  the  circumstances  which, 
as  already  shown,  have  in  this  short  period  given  such  increased  force  to  ex 
ecutive  patronage,  the  result  of  the  whole,  in  1825,  compared  to  1833,  is  as  65 
to  89,  making  an  increase  of  upward  of  36  per  cent.  If  the  comparative  ra 
pidity  of  this  great  increase  be  examined,  it  will  be  found  that  it  has  had  a  pro 
gressive  acceleration  throughout  the  period.  If  we  divide  the  period  into  equal 
parts  of  four  years  each,  the  increase  in  the  first  four  years  will  be  found  much 
Jess  than  in  the  last  four.  The  increase,  for  instance,  of  the  revenue  during 
the  first  four  years,  was  4,616,594  dollars  ;  and  during  the  last  four,  4,906,026 
dollars  ;  of  the  expenditures  during  the  first  four,  1,873,675  dollars  ;  and  during 
the  last  four,  9,313,340  dollars. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  increase  of  patronage,  great  as  it  is,  does  not  mate 
rially  exceed  the  growth  and  population  of  the  country,  with  which  it  is  as 
sumed  that  it  ought  to  keep  pace.  This  view  overlooks  entirely  the  increase 
of  patronage  from  those  circumstances  which  have  so  much  increased  it  during 
the  period  in  question,  as  has  already  been  shown.  If  these  be  taken  into  con 
sideration  ;  if  to  the  increase  of  revenue  and  expenditure,  and  the  number  de 
pendant  on  government,  we  add  the  vast  increase  of  executive  patronage  from  the 
immense  public  domain  recently  thrown  into  market,  the  great  extent  of  Indian 
reservations,  the  control  which  the  practice  of  removal  has  established  over  those 
in  office,  and  the  great  addition  to  executive  power  over  the  public  funds,  and, 
through  this,  over  the  banking  institutions  of  the  country,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that,  instead  of  increasing  only  36  per  cent.,  it  has  more  than  doubled  in  the 
period  in  question,  while  the  growth  and  population  of  the  country  have  prob 
ably  not  exceeded  24  per  cent. 

But  your  committee  cannot  agree  that  there  is  any  substantial  reason  why 
executive  patronage  should  increase  in  the  same  proportion  with  the  growth  and 
population  of  the  country.  With  the  exception  of  the  postoffice  establishment, 
there  is  no  necessary  connexion  between  the  increasing  growth  and  population 
of  the  country  and  the  increasing  patronage  of  the  government.  On  the  con 
trary,  many  of  the  public  establishments  are,  or  ought  to  be,  stationary  ;  others 
on  the  decrease  ;  others,  though  necessarily  increasing,  increase  at  a  rate  far 


174  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

less  than  our  population  ;  and  yet  we  find  that,  for  the  last  eight  years,  there 
has  been  a  progressive  increase  of  patronage  far  greater  than  the  growth  and 
population  of  the  country. 

But  the  assumption  that  executive  patronage  and  influence  should  increase  in 
the  same  ratio  with  the  growth  and  population  of  the  country,  is  not  less  dan 
gerous  than  it  is  erroneous.     If  this  assumption  be  carried  out  in  practice,  it 
must  finally  prove  fatal  to  our  institutions  and  liberty.     The  same  amount  of 
patronage  and  influence,  in  proportion  to  the  extent  and  population  of  a  country, 
which,  in  a  small  state,  moderately  populous,  would  be  perfectly  safe,  might 
prove  fatal  in  an  extensive  and  populous  community,  just  as  a  much  smaller 
military  force,  in  proportion,  would  hold  under  subjection  the  latter  than  the 
former.     The  principle  is  the  same  in  both  cases  :  the  great  advantage  which 
an  organized  body,  such  as  a  government  or  an  army,  has  over  an  unorganized 
mass — an  advantage  increasing  with  the  increased  difficulty  of  concert  and  co 
operation  ;  and  this,  again,  increasing  with  the  number  and  dispersion  of  those 
on  whose  concert  and  co-operation  resistance  depends  ;  and  hence,  from  their 
combined  action,  both  as  applied  to  the  civil  and  military,  the  great  advan 
tage  which  power  has  over  liberty  in  large  and  populous  countries — an  advan 
tage  so  great  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  in  such  countries  to  defend  the  latter 
against  the  former,  unless  aided  by  a  highly  artificial  political  organization  such, 
as  ours,  based  on  local  and  geographical  interests.     If  to  this  difficulty,  result 
ing  from  numbers  and  extent  only,  there  be  added  others  of  a  most  formidable 
character,  the  greater  capacity,  in  proportion,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  in 
large  communities,  to  seize  on  and  corrupt  all  the  organs  of  public  opinion,  and 
thus  to  delude  and  impose  on  the  people  ;  the  greater  tendency  in  such  com 
munities  to  the  formation  of  parties  on  local  and  separate  interests,  resting  on 
opposing  and  conflicting  principles,  with  separate  and  rival  leaders  at  the  head 
of  each,  and  the  great  difficulty  of  combining  such  parties  in  any  system  of  re 
sistance  against  the  common  danger  from  the  government,  some  conception  may 
be  formed  of  the  vast  superiority  which  that  organized  and  central  party,  con 
sisting  of  office-holders  and  office-seekers,  with  their  dependants,  forming  one 
compact,  disciplined  corps,  wielded  by  a  single  individual,  without  conflict  of 
opinion  within  either  as  to  policy  or  principle,  and  aiming  at  the  single  object 
of  retaining  and  perpetuating  power  in  their  own  ranks,  must  have,  in  such  a 
country  as  ours,  over  the  people  a  superiority  so  decisive,  that  it  may  be  safe 
ly  asserted  that,  whenever  the  patronage  and  influence  of  the  government  are 
sufficiently  strong  to  form  such  a  party,  liberty,  without  a  speedy  reform,  must 
inevitably  be  lost.     When  we  add  that  this  great  advantage  of  the  government 
over  the  people,  of  power  over  liberty,  must  increase  proportionately  with  the 
growth  and  population  of  our  country,  it  must  be  apparent  how  fatal  would  be 
the  assumption,  if  acted  on,  that  patronage  and  influence  should  increase  in  the 
same  proportion  ;  and  how  infinitely  dangerous  has  been  the  tendency  of  our 
affairs  of  late,  when,  as  has  been  shown,  instead  of  increasing  simply  in  the 
same  proportion,  they  have  advanced  with  a  rapidity  more  than  double.     So  far 
is  the  assumption  from  being  true,  if  we  regard  the  duration  of  our  institutions 
and  the  preservation  of  our  liberty,  we  must  hold  it  as  a  fundamental  maxim, 
that  the   action  of  the   government  should,  with  our   growth,   gradually   be 
come  more  moderate  instead  of  more  intense :  a  maxim  resting  on  principles 
deep  and  irreversible,  and  which  cannot  be  violated  without  inevitable  destruc 
tion.     Moderation  in  the  action  of  this  government,  the  great  central  power  of 
our  system,  is,  in  fact,  the  condition  on  which  our  political  existence  depends ; 
and,  in  acting  in  conformity,  it  but  conforms  to  the  principle  which  Divine  wis 
dom  has  impressed  upon  the  beautiful  and  sublime  system  of  which  our  globe 
is  a  part,  and  in  which  the  great  mass  that  gives  life,  and  harmony,  and  action 
to  the  whole,  reposes  almost  motionless  in  the  centre. 

Your  committee  are  aware  that,  since  1833,  there  has  been  a  very  consid- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  175 

erable  decrease  of  revenue,  under  the  act  of  March  2d,  1833,  known  as  the 
Compromise  Law,  with  other  preceding  acts,  in  consequence  of  the  payment 
of  the  public  debt,  which  would  very  considerably  affect  the  comparison,  if 
the  year  1834,  instead  of  1833,  had  been  selected  ;  and  they  have  to  express 
their  regret  that  the  want  of  full  and  accurate  materials  for  the  former  year 
prevents  them  from  furnishing  a  statement  which,  while  it  would  show  the  de 
crease,  would  also  show  how  little  the  final  discharge  of  the  public  debt  has 
contributed  to  diminish  either  the  public  expenditure  or  the  patronage  of  the 
executive  :  facts  of  no  small  moment,  as  connected  with  the  subject  of  inquiry. 
The  deep  interest  which  the  enlightened  and  patriotic  took  in  that  great  event 
was  not  to  indulge  in  the  idle  boast  that  the  country  was  free  from  debt,  but 
that  it  would,  as  they  believed,  be  necessarily  followed  by  the  substantial  bless 
ing  of  reducing  the  public  burdens,  and,  with  it,  the  patronage  of  the  govern 
ment  ;  and  thus,  while  it  relieved  industry,  it  would,  at  the  same  time,  strength 
en  liberty  against  power.  Thus  far,  these  anticipations  have  been  but  very  im 
perfectly,  if  at  all,  realized.  As  great  as  has  been  the  reduction  of  the  revenue,  it 
is  still  as  great  as  it  was  when  the  debt  exceeded  more  than  $100,000,000  ; 
and,  what  is  more  to  the  point,  what  conclusively  shows  how  much  easier  it  is 
to  discharge  a  public  debt  than  to  obtain  the  corresponding  benefits,  a  proportion 
ate  diminution  of  the  public  expenditure,  is  the  fac't,  that  now,  when  we  are  free 
from  all  debt,  the  public  expenditure  is  as  great  as  it  was  when  the  debt  was 
most  burdensome  to  the  country.  The  only  difference  is,  that  then  the  money 
went  to  the  public  creditors,  but  now  goes  into  the  pockets  of  those  who  live 
on  the  government,  with  great  addition  to  the  patronage  and  influence  of  the  ex 
ecutive,  but  without  diminution  of  burden  to  the  people. 

Your  committee  will  next  proceed  to  inquire  what  has  been  the  effects  of 
this  great,  growing,  and  excessive  patronage  on  our  political  condition  and 
prospects  :  a  question  of  the  utmost  importance  in  deciding  on  the  expediency 
of  its  reduction. '  Has  it  tended  to  strengthen  our  political  institutions,  and  to 
give  a  stronger  assurance  of  perpetuating  them,  and,  with  them,  the  blessings 
of  liberty  to  our  posterity  ?  Has  it  purified  the  public  and  political  morals  of 
our  country,  and  strengthened  the  feeling  of  patriotism  ?  Or,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  it  tended  to  sap  the  foundation  of  our  institutions ;  to  throw  a  cloud  of  un 
certainty  over  the  future  ;  to  degrade  and  corrupt  the  public  morals  ;  and  to 
substitute  devotion  and  subserviency  to  power,  in  the  place  of  that  disinterested 
and  noble  attachment  to  principles  and  country,  which  are  essential  to  the  pres 
ervation  of  free  institutions  ?  These  are  the  questions  to  be  decided ;  and  it 
is  with  profound  regret  that  your  committee  are  constrained,  however  painful,  to 
say  that  the  decision  admits  of  little  doubt.  They  are  compelled  to  admit  the 
fact,  that  there  never  has  been  a  period,  from  the  foundation  of  the  government, 
when  there  were  such  general  apprehensions  and  doubts  as  to  the  permanency 
and  success  of  our  political  institutions  ;  when  the  prospect  of  perpetuating- 
them,  and,  with  them,  our  liberty,  appeared  so  uncertain ;  when  public  and  po 
litical  morals  were  more  depressed  ;  when  attachment  to  country  and  principles 
were  more  feeble,  and  devotion  to  party  and  power  stronger  :  for  the  truth  of 
all  which  they  appeal  to  the  observation  and  reflections  of  the  experienced  and 
enlightened  of  all  parties.  If  we  turn  our  eyes  to  the  government,  we  shall  find 
that,  with  this  increase  of  patronage* the  entire  character  and  structure  of  the 
government  itself  is  undergoing  a  great  and  fearful  change,  which,  if  not  arrest 
ed,  must,  at  no  distant  period,  concentrate  all  its  power  in  a  single  department. 

Your  committee  are  aware  that,  in  a  country  of  such  vast  extent  and  diversity 
of  interests  as  ours,  a  strong  executive  is  necessary  ;  and,  among  other  reasons, 
in  order  to  sustain  the  government,  by  its  influence,  against  the  local  feelings 
and  interests  which  it  must,  in  the  execution  of  its  duties,  necessarily  encoun 
ter  ;  and  it  was  doubtless  with  this  view  mainly  that  the  framers  of  the  Consti 
tution  vested  the  executive  powers  in  a  single  individual,  and  clothed  him  with 


176  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  almost  entire  patronage  of  the  government.  As  long  as  the  patronage  of 
the  executive  is  so  moderate  as  to  compel  him  to  identify  his  administration 
•with  the  public  interest,  and  to  hold  his  patronage  subordinate  to  the  principles 
and  measures  necessary  to  promote  the  common  good,  the  executive  power  may 
be  said  to  act  within  the  "sphere  assigned  to  it  by  the  Constitution,  and  may  be 
considered  as  essential  to  the  steady  and  equal  operation  of  the  government ; 
but  when  it  becomes  so  strong  as  to  be  capable  of  sustaining  itself  by  its  influ 
ence  alone,  unconnected  with  any  system  of  measures  or  policy,  it  is  the  cer 
tain  indication  of  the  near  approach  of  irresponsible  and  despotic  power.  When 
it  attains  that  point,  it  will  be  difficult  to  find  anywhere  in  our  system  a  power 
sufficient  to  restrain  its  progress  to  despotism.  The  very  causes  which  render 
a  strong  executive  necessary,  the  great  extent  of  country  and  diversity  of  inter 
ests,  will  form  great  and  almost  insuperable  impediments  to  any  effectual  re 
sistance.  Each  section,  as  has  been  shown,  will  have  its  own  party  and  its 
own  favourites,  entertaining  views  of  principles  and  policy  so  different  as  to 
render  a  united  effort  against  executive  power  almost  impossible,  while  their 
separate  and  disjointed  efforts  must  prove  impotent  against  a  power  far  stronger 
than  either,  taken  separately ;  nor  can  the  aid  of  the  states  be  successfully  in 
voked  to  arrest  the  progress  to  despotism.  So  far  from  weakening,  they  will 
add  strength  to  executive  patronage.  A  majority  of  the  states,  instead  of  oppo 
sing,  will  be  usually  found  acting  in  concert  with  the  Federal  Government,  and, 
of  course,  will  increase  the  influence  of  the  executive  :  so  that,  to  ascertain  his 
patronage,  the  sum-total  of  the  patronage  of  all  the  states,  acting  in  conjunction 
•with  the  federal  executive,  must  be  added  to  his.  The  two,  as  things  now 
stand,  constitute  a  joint  force,  difficult  to  be  resisted. 

Against  a  danger  so  formidable,  which  threatens,  if  not  arrested,  and  that 
speedily,  to  subvert  the  Constitution,  there  can  be  but  one  effectual  remedy :  a 
prompt  and  decided  reduction  of  executive  patronage  ;  the  practicability  and 
means  of  effecting  which,  your  committee  will  next  proceed  to  consider. 

The  first,  most  simple,  and  usually  the  most  certain  mode  of  reducing  patron 
age,  is  to  reduce  the  public  income,  the  prolific  source  from  which  it  almost  ex 
clusively  flows.  Experience  has  shown  that  it  is  next  to  impossible  to  reduce 
the  public  expenditure  with  an  overflowing  treasury  ;  and  not  much  less  difficult 
to  reduce  patronage  without  a  reduction  of  expenditure  ;  or,  in  other  words,  that 
the  most  simple  and  effectual  mode  of  retrenching  the  superfluous  expenditure 
of  the  government,  of  introducing  a  spirit  of  frugality  and  economy  in  the  admin 
istration  of  public  affairs,  oficorrecting  the  corruption  and  abuses  of  the  government, 
and,  finally,  of  arresting  the  progress  of  power,  is  to  leave  the  money  in  the  pock 
ets  of  those  who  made  it,  where  all  laws,  human  and  divine,  place  it,  and  from 
which  it  cannot  be  removed  by  government  itself,  except  for  its  necessary  and 
indispensable  wants,  without  violation  of  its  highest  trust  and  the  most  sacred 
principles  of  justice.  Yet,  as  manifest  as  is  this  truth,  such  is  our  peculiar 
(it  may  be  said  extraordinary)  situation,  that  this  simple  and  obvious  remedy  to 
excessive  patronage,  the  reduction  of  the  revenue,  can  be  applied  only  to  a  very 
limited  extent. 

But  before  they  proceed  to  the  question  of  reducing  the  revenue,  your  com 
mittee  propose  to  show  what  will  be  its  probable  amount  in  future,  as  the  laws 
now  stand,  to  what  limits  the  public  expenditure  may  be  reduced  consistently 
with  the  just  wants  of  government,  and,  finally,  what,  with  such  reduction,  will 
be  the  probable  annual  surplus  to  the  year  1842,  when  the  highest  duties  will 
be  reduced  to  20  per  cent,  under  the  act  of  March  2,  1833  ;  and  when,  as  the 
act  provides,  the  revenue  is  to  be  reduced  to  a  sum  necessary  to  an  economical 
administration  of  the  government. 

According  to  the  statement  from  the  Treasury  Department,  the  receipts  of  the 
year  1834,  from  all  sources,  amounted  to  $22,584,365  ;  of  which,  customs  yield 
ed  $16,105,372;  land,  $5,020,940;  the  residue  being  made  uo  of  bank  divi- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  177 

dends  and  incidental  items ;  and  the  question  now  for  consideration  is,  What 
will  be  the  probable  annual  receipts  from  all  sources  during  the  next  seven 
years,  if  the  income,  as  has  just  been  irtated,  is  to  be  reduced  to  the  economical 
wants  of  the  government  ?  a  question  which,  from  its  nature,  can  only  be  an 
swered  by  probable  estimates  and  conjectures,  and  which,  in  this  case,  is  the 
more  difficult  to  be  answered  frcKii  a  defect  of  data  in  reference  to  the  customs, 
the  principal  source  of  revenue.  The  changes  in  the  rates  of  duties  have  been 
so  great  latterly,  and  the  period  so  recent  since  the  laws,  as  they  now  stand, 
commenced  operation,  thai-  it  is  impracticable  to  resort  to  those  average  results, 
deduced  from  long  periods,  by  which  only  the  temporary  changes  and  fluctu 
ations  of  commerce  can  be  detected,  and  its  habitual  current  ascertained  and 
subjected  to  calculation.  The  act  of  the  2d  of  March,  1833,  which  made  the 
last  change,  and  on  the  provisions  of  which  the  estimates  of  the  income  from 
the  customs  for  the  period  in  question  must  be  based,  commenced  its  operation 
on  the  first  of  January,  1834,  and  we,  of  course,  have  the  result  of  but  a  single 
year.  From  a  statement  furnished  by  the  treasury  department,  it  seems  that 
the  domestic  exports  of  that  year  amounted,  in  round  numbers,  to  eighty  mill 
ions  of  dollars,  and  the  imports,  given  in  round  numbers  (as  all  the  subsequent 
statements  are),  to  $125,500,000;  of  which  $23,000,000  were  reshipped, 
leaving  $102,500,000  for  the  consumption  and  use  of  the  country,  of  which 
$55,000,000  were  of  articles  free  of  duty,  and  $47,000,000  of  those  liable  to  du 
ties;  that  the  gross  receipts  amounted  to  $  15,572,448,  and  the  nett  to  $14,222,448, 
leaving  $1,350,000  as  the  expense  of  collection;  that  the  reduction  of  one  tenth 
of  the  duties  above  20  per  cent,  ad  valorem  every  two  years,  according  to  the 
provisions  of  the  act  of  2d  of  March,  1833,  amounted  to  $850,000. 

As  scanty  as  are  these  data,  it  is  believed  that  it  may  be  safely  anticipated 
that  the  average  annual  income  of  the  period  in  question  will  be  equal,  at  least, 
to  the  income  of  the  last  year.  Instead  of  entering  into  all  the  details  through 
which  your  committee  have  come  to  this  conclusion,  which  would  swell  this  re 
port  to  an  unwieldy  size,  they  will  content  themselves  with  simply  giving  the 
results  of  the  causes  which,  as  far  as  can  be  foreseen,  may  either  increase  or 
diminish  the  receipts  of  the  customs  for  the  next  seven  years  as  compared 
with  the  past  year,  accompanied  by  a  statement  of  their  probable  effects  in  the 
aggregate. 

It  will,  however,  be  previously  necessary  to  inquire  whether  the  receipts 
from  the  customs  during  the  last  year  in  fact  equalled  the  amount  which  the 
commercial  transactions  of  the  year,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  ought  to 
have  produced.  It  is  not  possible,  in  such  an  inquiry,  to  overlook  the  very  un 
usual  importation  of  the  precious  metals  during  the  year,  which,  according  to 
the  statements  from  the  treasury  department,  amounted  to  $16,572,582,  consti 
tuting,  to  that  amount,  a  part  of  the  articles  imported  in  the  year  free  of  duty. 
The  reshipment  for  the  same  period  amounted  to  $1,676,208,  leaving  in  the 
country,  of  the  amount  imported,  $14,896,374  :  a  sum  greatly  exceeding  our  an 
nual  consumption,  which,  in  addition  to  the  supplies  from  our  own  mines,  prob 
ably  falls  short  of  $2,000,000.  The  excess  was  doubtless  caused  by  the  pecu 
liar  condition  of  the  country,  in  reference  to  its  currency,  during  the  year  ;  and 
would,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  have  been  imported  in  goods  of  various 
descriptions  for  the  usual  supply  of  the  country  instead  of  gold  and  silver.  Sub 
tracting,  then,  the  two  millions  from  this  sum,  and  the  balance  from  the  amount 
of  the  articles  free  of  duty,  which,  as  stated,  is  $55,000,000,  it  would  reduce 
the  annual  consumption  of  goods  free  of  duty,  including  the  precious  metals,  to 
$42,103,626;  and  assuming  that  the  proportion  between  goods  free  of  duty, 
and  those  liable  to  duty,  to  be  as  that  sum  is  to  $47,000,000 ;  and,  also,  that 
the  excess  of  the  supply  of  gold  and  silver  imported  during  the  year  would,  un 
der  ordinary  circumstances,  have  returned  in  that  proportion  between  the  dutied 
and  the  free  articles,  it  would  add  to  the  former  $7,133,313,  and,  of  course,  in- 

Z 


178  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

crease  the  receipts  from  the  customs  in  the  same  proportion  ;  that  is,  it  would 
make  an  addition  to  them  of  $2,150,000,  and  would  have  raised  the  receipts 
from  customs  during  the  year  from  $14,220,000  to  $16,370,000  ;  which  last, 
it  is  believed,  may  be  assumed,  at  the  present  rate  of  the  duties,  as  the  proba 
ble  receipts,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  of  an  export  and  import  trade  equal 
to  that  of  the  last  year. 

Let  us  now  inquire  into  the  causes  which  may  tend  to  diminish  or  increase 
this  estimated  receipt  during  the  next  seven  years,  and  their  probable  effects, 
in  the  aggregate,  on  the  income  from  the  customs. 

The  only  cause,  as  is  believed,  that  will  tend  to  diminish  the  amount,  as  far 
as  can  now  be  foreseen,  is  the  gradual  reduction  of  one  tenth  every  two  years, 
under  the  act  of  the  2d  of  March,  1833,  till  the  year  1841,  as  has  been  stated.  It 
will  be  seen,  by  reference  to  the  statement  from  the  treasury  already  given,  that 
this  reduction  last  year,  on  an  importation  of  $47,000,000  of  dutiable  articles, 
amounted  to  $850,000.  If,  however,  instead  of  that  amount,  the  importation 
of  such  articles  had  been  $54,133,000,  as  it  is  assumed  they  would  have  been 
had  not  the  derangement  of  the  currency  prevented,,  the  reduction  on  account 
of  the  one  tenth  would  have  increased  in  the  same  proportion,  and  would  have, 
of  course,  amounted  to  $975,000. 

Against  this  increased  reduction  there  must  be  set  off  a  probable  gradual  in 
crease  of  the  domestic  exports  of  the  country  ;  and  with  them,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  imports,  and  with  them  the  re 
ceipts  from  the  customs.  If  we  take  the  last  six  years,  from  1828  to  1834,  the 
last  included,  the  average  annual  increase  of  domestic  exports  in  the  period  is 
nearly  $5,000,000,  of  which  the  increase  in  1833  was  $7,200,000,  and  in  1834, 
$9,600,000,  making  in  the  last  two  years  an  average  increase  of  $8,800,000  : 
thus  showing  a  much  more  rapid  increase  at  the  end  than  at  the  beginning  of 
the  series.  If  to  this  fact  we  add  the  effect  which  the  decrease  of  duties  under 
the  act  of  the  2d  of  March,  1833,  must  have  on  the  exports,  the  growing  de 
mand  for  the  great  staples  of  the  country,  and  the  vast  amount  of  fertile  and 
fresh  lands  brought  into  market  within  the  last  five  years  in  the  region  most 
congenial  to  the  growth  of  cotton,  it  is  believed  that  it  may  be  safely  assumed 
that  the  average  annual  increase  of  our  domestic  exports  for  the  next  seven 
years  will,  at  least,  equal  $6,000,000.  This  increase  must  be  followed  by  a 
corresponding  increase  of  imports,  and  with  them,  as  stated,  of  the  receipts 
from  the  customs.  Assuming  that  the  proportion  between  the  free  and  dutied 
articles,  in  consequence  of  this  increase  of  imports,  will  be  as  has  been  estimated, 
it  will  add  to  the  receipts  from  the  customs  an  annual  increase  of  $1,000,000, 
from  which,  however,  must  be  deducted  $59,000  on  account  of  the  biennial 
reduction  of  one  tenth,  which  would  reduce  the  increase  to  $941.000.  If  this 
be  deducted  from  the  average  reduction  of  one  tenth,  as  above  ascertained, 
we  shall  have,  taking  the  two  causes  together,  the  increase  of  the  customs 
from  increased  imports,  and  the  decrease  from  the  biennial  reduction  of  one 
tenth,  a  decrease  of  revenue  equal  to  $34,000  annually  :  making,  in  seven  years, 
$238,000. 

But  it  must  be  taken  into  the  estimate,  that  the  increase  of  revenue  from  the 
increase  of  exports  is  annually  added,  while  the  reduction  on  account  of  the 
one  tenth  is  biennially.  Taking  this  into  the  estimate,  the  increase  of  revenue 
on  account  of  the  increase  of  the  exports  over  the  decrease,  on  account  of  the 
biennial  reduction  of  one  tenth,  will  in  the  seven  years  equal  $3,298,500  ;  from 
which  take  $238,000,  and  it  will  leave  an  aggregate  increase  over  the  decrease 
of  $3,060,500. 

This  conclusion,  however,  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  proportion  be 
tween  the  free  and  dutied  articles  will  remain  during  the  period  the  same  as  is 
estimated  for  last  year  ;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  reduction  of  the  price  of  the 
free  articles,  in  conseouence  of  the  repeal  of  the  duties,  will  greatly  increase 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  179 

their  consumption,  and,  of  course,  have  a  corresponding  effect  in  reducing  the 
amount  of  the  dutiable  articles,  and,  with  them,  the  receipts  into  the  treasury. 
It  is,  however,  believed  to  be  a  safe  estimate,  that  the  reduction  of  the  receipts 
from  this  cause  will  be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  excess  of  the  increase 
of  income  from  the  increase  of  exports  over  the  reduction  of  one  tenth  biennial 
ly,  as  has  been  shown  ;  and  that  it  may,  therefore,  be  assumed  with  reasonable 
confidence,  if  no  untoward  event  should  intervene,  that  the  average  annual  re 
ceipts  from  the  customs  will  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  $16,370,000,  the  sum 
which  the  commerce  of  last  year  ought  to  have  yielded,  as  has  been  shown, 
under  ordinary  circumstances. 

Your  committee  will  next  inquire  what  will  be  the  probable  amount  of  re 
ceipts  from  the  public  lands  during  the  period  in  question.  The  receipts  from 
that  source  during  the  last  year,  according  to  a  statement  from  the  treasury, 
equalled  $5,020,940.  This,  however,  probably  greatly  exceeds  the  permanent 
receipts  from  that  source,  as  it  was  caused,  probably,  by  the  great  quantity  of 
rich  and  valuable  land  thrown  into  the  market  during  the  year.  The  receipts 
of  1833  equalled  $3,967,682,  and  that  of  the  last  four  years  averaged  $3,705,405. 
If  we  take  into  consideration,  with  these  facts,  the  rapid  increase  of  our  popu 
lation,  the  steady  rise  in  landed  property  generally,  the  vast  quantity  of  lands 
held  by  the  government,  it  is  believed  to  be  a  safe  estimate,  that  the  average  an 
nual  income  from  this  source,  during  the  period  in  question,  will  be  at  least  equal 
to  $3,500,000. 

Of  the  remaining  sources  of  revenue,  the  bank  dividends  is  the  only  one  that 
requires  notice.  They  amounted  in  1833  to  $450,000  ;*  and  it  is  probable  that 
they  will  give  an  equal  annual  income  till  the  expiration  of  its  charter,  1836, 
after  which  time  there  will  be  a  reduction  from  the  income  of  the  government 
equal  to  the  annual  dividends  ;  but  it  is  believed,  by  those  who  are  most  familiar 
•with  the  subject,  that  a  retrenchment  in  the  collection  of  the  customs,  by  a  reform 
ation  of  that  branch  of  the  administration,  may  be  effected,  at  least  equal  to  this  re 
duction.  It  cost  the  government  the  last  year  $1,350,000  to  collect  $14,222,448, 
which  is  more  than  equal  to  nine  per  cent. :  a  rate,  considering  the  facility  of 
collecting  this  branch  of  the  revenue,  and  the  decreased  inducement  to  elude 
the  duties  in  consequence  of  the  great  reduction  in  the  rate  of  duties,  altogether 
extravagant. 

If  these  calculations  should  prove  correct,  the  average  income  of  the  gov 
ernment  for  the  next  seven  years,  not  including  incidental  items,  will  equal 
$20,320,000,  making  in  the  whole  period  the  aggregate  sum  of  $142,240,000  ;  to 
which,  if  we  add  the  residue  of  the  government  stock  in  the  United  States  Bank, 
amounting  to  $6,343,400,  and  which  must  be  paid  into  the  treasury  at  the  ex 
piration  of  its  charter,  and  the  surplus  in  the  treasury  on  the  31st  of  December 
last,  which,  .after  deducting  $2,000,000,  will  amount  to  $6,695,981,  it  will 
give  an  aggregate  sum  of  $148,679,381  ;  which,  divided  by  seven,  will  make 
the  average  annual  sum,  subject  to  the  disposition  of  the  government  for  the 
next  seven  years,  amount  to  $21,239,911. 

Such  being  the  probable  average  annual  income  and  means  of  the  govern 
ment  for  the  seven  ensuing  years,  the  next  question  which  presents  itself  for 
consideration  is,  What  ought  to  be  the  average  expenditure  for  the  same  period  ? 

The  expenditure  for  the  year  1834,  as  taken  from  the  annual  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  equals  $19,430,373,  and  for  the  preceding  year 
$22,713,753  ;  deducting  in  both  cases  the  payments  on  account  of  the  public 
debt.  Your  committee  are,  however,  of  the  opinion,  that  these  amounts  far 
exceed  what  ought  to  be  the  expenditure  on  a  just  and  economical  scale,  and 
that  it  may  be  very  greatly  reduced  without  injury  to  the  public  service.  They 
are  also  of  opinion,  that  to  this  great  and  extravagant  expenditure  may  be  at- 

*  The  amount  of  dividends  for  1834  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  treasury. 


180  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tributed,  in  no  small  degree,  the  disease  which  now  threatens  so  seriously  the 
body  politic.  That  a  just  conception  may  be  formed  of  this  extraordinary  in 
crease,  they  have  annexed  a  table  of  expenditures  from  the  year  1823  to  1833, 
deducting  the  payment  on  account  of  the  public  debt,  by  which  it  appears  that, 
in  this  short  period  of  ten  years,  the  expenditure  has  risen  from  $9,784,000 
to  $22,713,000,  being  an  increase  in  the  latter  over  the  former  of  almost 
$3,000,000  beyond  the  whole  expenditure  of  the  government  in  1823,  exclu 
ding,  as  stated,  the  public  debt ;  and  this,  too,  during  a  period  of  profound  peace, 
when  not  an  event  had  occurred  calculated  to  warrant  any  unusual  expenditure. 
Of  this  enormous  increase  the  greater  part  occurred  in  the  last  three  years,  in 
which  time  the  expenditure  has  risen  nearly  $9,000,000,  which  may  well  ac 
count  for  the  present  dangerous  symptoms. 

Your  committee  have  not  time  to  give  that  minute  attention  to  the  expendi 
tures  necessary  to  determine  what  particular  items  can  or  ought  to  be  retrenched  ; 
nor  do  they  deem  it  important,  at  present,  to  enter  into  so  laborious  an  inquiry, 
even  if  time  did  not  prevent.  It  is  sufficient  for  their  purpose  to  assume  that 
the  expenditures  of  1823  were,  at  the  time,  considered  ample  to  meet  all  the  just 
•wants  of  the  government ;  and  that,  so  far  from  being  a  period  distinguished  by 
parsimony,  the  then  administration  were  thought  by  many  to  be  unreasonably 
profuse,  and  were,  accordingly,  the  object  of  systematic  attacks  on  account  of 
their  supposed  extravagance.  Assuming,  then,  the  expenditure  of  $9,784,000 
to  have  been  ample  at  that  period,  the  question  which  presents  itself  is,  What 
ought  it  to  be  at  present,  taking  into  consideration  the  necessity  of  increased 
expenditures  in  consequence  of  increased  population  ? 

They  have  already  shown  that  the  government  cannot  bear  a  permanent  in 
crease  of  expenditure  in  proportion  to  the  growth  of  the  population,  which  may 
be  estimated  at  about  three  per  cent.,  without  an  increase  of  patronage  which 
must,  in  its  progress,  inevitably  prove  fatal  to  the  institutions  and  liberty  of  the 
country.  On  this  principle,  the  expenditure,  instead  of  increasing  nearly  thir 
teen  millions  in  ten  years,  as  it  has,  ought  to  have  increased  much  less  than 
three,  and  ought  not,  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  to  have  exceeded  two 
millions  at  the  farthest.  Assuming  that  sum  as  a  liberal  allowance,  and  adding 
it  to  the  expenditure  of  1823,  we  shall  have  the  sum  of  $11,784,000,  beyond 
which  the  present  expenditure  ought  not  to  have  passed,  including  the  pensions  ; 
and,  excluding  them,  $10,012,412,  instead  of  $22,713,000.  the  sum  actually 
expended. 

But  it  is  believed  that  this  sum  will  very  considerably  exceed,  on  the  basis 
assumed,  what  ought  to  be  the  average  annual  expenditure  for  the  next  seven 
years.  Of  the  items  which  compose  the  present  expenditure,  that  for  pensions 
constituted,  last  year,  the  sum  of  $3,341,877.  Considering  the  advanced  age 
of  the  pensioners,  there  ought  to  be,  according  to  the  annuity  tables,  a  decrease 
by  deaths  of  fourteen  per  cent,  annually,  which,  in  seven  years,  would  diminish 
the  expenditure  on  pensions  from  the  sum  above  mentioned  to  $1,040,802  annu 
ally,  giving  an  annual  average  deduction  of  $328,725,  and  would  reduce  the 
expenditure  on  pensions  for  the  ensuing  seven  years  to  an  average  sum  of 
$2,048,000.  Add  this  sum  to  $10,012,412,  the  sum  beyond  which  the  present 
expenditure  ought  not  to  extend,  excluding  the  pensions,  and  we  shall  have 
$12,060,412,  as  what  the  annual  average  expenditure  for  the  next  seven  years 
ought  to  be. 

Take  this  from  the  sum  of  $21,239,911,  which,  as  has  been  shown,  will  be 
the  probable  average  annual  means  of  the  government  for  the  same  period,  and 
it  would  leave  $9,179,499  ;  or,  in  round  numbers,  for  the  facility  of  calculation, 
nine  millions,  as  the  average  surplus  means  during  the  period  at  the  disposition 
of  the  government,  on  the  supposition  that  the  expenditures  will  be  reduced  to 
the  economical  wants  of  the  government. 

Having  shown  what  will  be  the  probable  surplus  revenue  should  the  expen- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  181 

diture  be  reduced  to  its  proper  limits,  the  committee  propose  next  to  consider 
whether,  under  existing  circumstances,  the  revenue  can  be  reduced. 

The  two  great  sources  of  revenue  are  lands  and  customs.  The  others  (not 
including  the  postoffice,  which  is  a  particular  fund)  are  of  small  amount.  Af 
ter  a  careful  investigation,  your  committee  are  of  opinion  that  the  act  of  2d  of 
March,  1833,  has  reduced  the  duties  on  imports,  with  some  exceptions,  as  far 
as  is  practicable,  under  existing  circumstances,  consistently  with  the  intent  and 
spirit  of  the  act. 

The  act  provides,  among  other  things,  that  after  the  31st  day  of  December, 
1833,  in  all  cases  where  the  duties  shall  exceed  twenty  per  cent,  ad  valorem, 
one  tenth,  part  of  such  excess  shall  be  reduced,  and,  in  like  manner,  one  tenth 
part  every  two  years,  till  the  31st  of  December,  1839 ;  and  that,  on  the  31st  of 
December,  1841,  one  half  of  the  residue  of  such  excess  shall  be  deducted ; 
and  on  the  30th  of  June,  1842,  the  residue.  It  also  provides  that,  till  the  30th 
of  June,  1842,  the  duties  imposed  by  the  then  existing  law  shall  remain  un 
changed,  except  as  provided  in  the  sixth  section. 

Your  committee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  inquire  whether  the  circumstan 
ces  under  which  it  passed  involves  anything  in  the  nature  of  a  pledge  or  con 
tract,  which  would  forbid  any  alterations  of  its  provisions.  It  is  sufficient  for 
their  purpose  to  state  the  fact,  that  the  act  is  the  result  of  a  compromise  between 
great  sectional  interests,  brought  into  conflict  under  circumstances  which  threat 
ened  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  country ;  and  that  it  continues  to  be  the  only 
ground  on  which  the  adjustment  of  the  controversy  can  stand.  Under  these 
circumstances,  to  disregard  the  provisions  of  the  act  would  be  to  open  a  contro 
versy  which  your  committee  hope  is  closed  forever  :  a  controversy  which,  if 
renewed,  would  do  more  to  increase  the  power  and  influence  of  the  executive 
than  any  other  event  that  could  occur.  With  the  impression,  then,  that  the 
provisions  of  the  act  cannot  be  disturbed  without  endangering  the  peace  of  the 
country,  and  adding  greatly,  by  its  consequences,  to  executive  patronage,  your 
committee  have  limited  their  inquiries  to  the  reduction  of  the  duties  on  such  ar 
ticles  as,  by  the  provisions  of  the  act,  are  subject  to  be  reduced ;  and.  after  a 
careful  investigation,  they  are  of  the  opinion  that  all  the  reductions  which  can 
be  effected,  consistently  with  the  spirit  of  the  compromise,  are  inconsiderable ; 
and  that,  to  make  those  that  might  be  made,  would  require  too  much  time  and 
investigation  to  permit  it  to  be  done  at  this  session,  as  will  appear  by  a  reference 
to  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  herewith  annexed ;  but,  in  order 
that  the  subject  may  be  taken  up  with  full  information  at  the  next  session,  they 
have  instructed  their  chairman  to  submit  a  resolution  for  the  consideration  of 
the  Senate,  directing  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  report,  at  the  commence 
ment  of  the  next  session,  what  duties  under  twenty  per  cent,  ad  valorem  may, 
with  a  due  regard  to  the  manufacturing  interests  of  the  country,  be  repealed  or 
reduced,  with  an  estimate  of  the  probable  amount  of  the  reduction. 

In  turning  from  the  customs  to  the  public  lands,  your  committee  find  that  the 
difficulty  of  reducing  the  revenue  from  that  source  is  not  less  considerable  than 
that  from  the  customs.  They  fully  agree  in  that  liberal  policy  in  relation  to  the 
public  lands  that  regards  them  as  the  means  of  settlement,  as  well  as  a  source 
of  revenue  ;  and  that  they  should  be  disposed  of,  accordingly,  in  the  manner  best 
calculated  to  diffuse  a  flourishing  and  happy  population  over  the  vast  regions 
placed  under  our  dominion  ;  a  policy,  the  wisdom  of  which  is  best  illustrated 
by  the  wonderful  success  with  which  it  has  been  accomplished.  It  is  an  es 
sential  maxim  of  this  noble  and  generous  policy,  that  the  price  of  the  public 
lands  should  be  fixed  so  low  as  to  be  accessible  to  the  great  mass  of  the  citi 
zens,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  high  as  not  to  subject  them  to  the  monopoly  of 
the  great  capitalists  of  the  country.  Your  committee  are  of  opinion  that  this 
happy  medium  is  attained  by  the  present  price  ;  and,  judging  from  many  indica 
tions  of  late,  that  no  considerable  reduction  can  be  made  in  the  price  without 


182  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

making  them  the  prey  of  hungry  and  voracious  speculators  and  monopolists,  to 
the  great  injury  of  the  honest  and  industrious  portion  of  the  community,  as 
well  as  to  the  portion  of  the  country  where  the  lands  may  be  situated.  Be  thisr 
however,  as  it  may,  it  is  at  least  certain  that  the  immediate  effect  of  reduction 
would  be  to  increase  rather  than  diminish  the  revenue  from  lands,  and,  of  course, 
to  augment  instead  of  reducing  the  public  income. 

To  this  may  be  added  another,  and,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  conclusive 
objection  against  the  reduction. 

The  reduction  of  the  price  of  public  lands,  while  it  would  act,  in  effect,  as  a 
bounty  to  the  purchasers  from  the  government,  by  enabling  them  to  acquire  more 
land  for  the  same  sum  of  money,  would  act,  at  the  same  time,  as  a  tax  upon  the 
entire  body  of  landholders,  who  constitute  the  great  mass  of  our  population — a 
tax  on  them  immeasurably  greater  than  the  bounty  to  the  purchasers. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  is,  in  fact,  the  great  land-dealer  of  the 
country,  and,  as  such,  has  the  power,  by  raising  or  reducing  the  price  of  its  lands, 
to  reduce  or  raise,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  the  value  of  lands  everywhere, 
and,  of  course,  to  affect  in  the  same  degree  the  property  of  the  landholders 
throughout  the  Union.  To  what  extent  any  given  reduction  of  the  price  of  pub 
lic  lands  would  affect  the  price  of  lands  generally,  would  be  difficult,  if  not  im 
possible,  to  ascertain.  It  would  be  greater  or  less,  according  td  the  circumstan 
ces.  The  price  of  land  in  the  adjacent  portion  of  the  country,  or  that  from 
which  emigration  principally  flowed,  would  be  reduced  nearly  in  the  same  pro 
portion  with  that  of  the  public  lands  ;  that  is,  if  the  price  of  public  lands  be  re 
duced  one  half,  lands  adjacent,  or  lying  in  the  emigrating  portion  of  the  country, 
would  generally  fall  one  half,  while  the  more  remote  would  be  less  affected,  in. 
proportion  to  distance  and  the  absence  of  emigration.  But  it  may  be  safely  as 
sumed,  taking  the  whole  country,  that  the  actual  fall  in  the  value  of  lands  gen 
erally,  in  the  hands  of  the  holders,  would  greatly  exceed  the  actual  reduction  of 
the  price  of  public  lands.  To  illustrate  :  if  the  price  of  the  latter  be  reduced 
one  half,  which  at  present  would  be  sixty-two  and  one  half  cents  per  acre,  lands 
generally  throughout  the  country  would  be  reduced  in  value  per  acre  much 
more  than  that  sum ;  and  if  the  far  greater  quantity  held  by  the  whole  body  of 
land  proprietors,  compared  to  the  quantity  sold  by  the  government,  be  taken  into 
the  estimate,  some  idea  may  be  formed  how  great  the  aggregate  loss  of  the  pro 
prietors  generally  would  be,  on  any  reduction  of  price,  compared  with  the  ag 
gregate  gain  of  the  purchasers.  As  great,  however,  as  it  must  be,  none  who 
know  the  public  spirit  and  enlightened  patriotism  of  that  great  and  respectable 
portion  of  our  citizens  can  doubt  their  cheerful  acquiescence  in  the  sacrifice, 
should  the  public  interest,  or  the  fundamental  maxim  which  ought  to  govern  in 
the  disposition  of  the  public  lands,  require  it ;  but,  otherwise,  it  would  be  a  plain 
and  palpable  sacrifice  of  one,  and  that  the  largest  portion  of  the  community,  to 
the  other,  without  a  corresponding  benefit.  In  presenting  this  view,  it  is  not 
the  intention  of  your  committee  to  offer  any  opinion  on  the  propriety  of  a  grad 
uated  reduction,  as  a  measure  of  general  policy,  in  the  price  of  such  public  lands 
as  have  remained  long  in  the  market  unsold,  and  of  which  there  is  no  imme 
diate  prospect  of  making  sale  at  the  present  price,  because  of  their  inferior  qual 
ity.  Their  case  is  very  distinguishable  from  that  of  the  great  body  of  the  pub 
lic  lands  ;  but  the  immediate  effects  of  such  reduction  would  obviously  be  to 
raise  instead  of  reduce  the  revenue,  and  would,  of  course,  increase  instead  of 
diminish  the  difficulty  under  consideration. 

Having  now  shown  that  no  other  reduction  of  the  revenue  can  be  effected, 
under  existing  circumstances,  than  the  progressive  reduction  already  provided 
for  by  the  act  of  March  2d,  1833,  in  either  of  the  great  sources  of  our  public 
income,  with  the  exception  already  stated,  your  committee  will  next  proceed  to 
inquire  whether  executive  patronage  can  be  reduced  by  reducing  the  expendi 
tures  of  the  Government. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  183 

The  result  of  their  investigation  on  this  point  is,  that,  for  reasons  which  will 
Itereafter  be  offered,  a  reduction  of  expenditure,  under  existing  circumstances, 
would  tend  to  increase  instead  of  reducing  executive  patronage.  But  if  it  were 
otherwise,  it  would  be  found  utterly  impracticable,  for  reasons  already  assigned, 
to  reduce  the  expenditure  much  below  the  income.  Experience  has  abundant 
ly  proved  that,  so  long  as  there  is  a  large  surplus  in  the  treasury,  the  interests 
in  favour  of  its  expenditure  will  ever  be  stronger  than  that  opposed  to  it ;  and 
that  no  prudential  consideration,  arising  from  the  necessity  of  accumulating 
funds  to  meet  future  wants,  or  the  hazard  of  enlarging  executive  patronage,  or 
the  danger  of  corrupting  the  political  and  public  morals  of  the  country  by  use 
less  and  profuse  expenditure,  or  any  other  whatever,  is  sufficient  to  resist  the 
temptation  to  expend.  If  one  unworthy  object  of  appropriation  is  defeated,  an 
other,  with  no  greater  claims  on  the  public  bounty  or  justice,  will  ever  stand 
ready  to  urge  its  claims,  till  the  frugal  and  patriotic  are  wearied  out  with  inces 
sant  and  useless  efforts  to  guard  the  treasury.  But  were  it  practicable,  with 
an  overflowing  treasury,  to  bring  the  expenditures  within  proper  limits,  such  is 
the  present  condition  of  things,  that  to  reduce  expenditure  would,  as  has  been 
stated,  increase  the  patronage  of  the  executive,  and  that  to  an  extent  so  great 
that  no  object  of  expenditure  can  be  suggested,  having  a  plausible  claim  on  the 
justice  or  bounty  of  the  public,  which  would  tend  half  so  much  to  increase  his 
patronage  as  leaving  the  public  money  unexpended,  to  accumulate  as  surplus 
revenue  in  the  deposite  banks. 

To  realize  the  truth  of  this  remark,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  depos- 
ites  are  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  executive ;  that  they  are  deposited 
in  banks  selected  by  him ;  that  they  have  the  free  use  of  trfem  without  com 
pensation  to  the  public,  arid  they  may  be  continued  or  dismissed  as  depositories 
of  the  public  funds,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  executive. 

With  these  facts  before  us,  the  result  must  be  obvious.  To  accumulate  a  per 
manent  surplus  revenue  in  the  banks  is,  in  fact,  but  to  add  so  much  additional 
bank  capital — capital,  in  this  case,  exclusively  under  executive  control,  without 
check  or  limitation ;  and,  with  its  increasing  amount,  daily  giving  to  him  a 
greater  control  over  the  deposite  banks,  and,  through  them,  over  the  banking 
institutions  of  the  country  generally  :  thus  adding  the  deep  and  wide-spread 
influence  of  the  banks  to  the  already  almost  overwhelming  patronage  of  the 
executive. 

As  the  expenditure  cannot  be  reduced,  the  next  inquiry  is,  whether  some  ob 
ject  of  general  utility,  in  which  every  portion  of  the  country  has  an  interest,  may 
not  be  selected  as  a  fixed  and  permanent  object  on  which  to  expend  the  sur 
plus  revenue. 

Your  committee  admit  that,  if  such  an  object  of  expenditure  could  be  selected, 
under  a  well-regulated  system  of  disbursements  established  by  law,  much  of  the 
patronage  incident  to  the  present  loose  and  unregulated  disbursements  might  be 
curtailed ;  but  they  are  at  a  loss  to  find  such  an  object.  Internal  improvement 
approaches  the  nearest;  but  there  is  opposed  to  it,  with  the  object  in  view,  in 
superable  objections.  To  pass  by  the  formidable  difficulty,  the  long-establish 
ed  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  its  constitutionality,  which  divides  the  two  great 
sections  of  the  country,  experience  has  shown  that  there  is  no  expenditure  so 
little  susceptible  of  being  regulated  by  law ;  none  calculated  to  excite  deeper 
competition,  or  to  enlist  a  greater  number  in  its  favour,  in  proportion  to  the 
amount  expended ;  and,  of  course,  calculated  to  add  more  to  executive  patron 
age.  To  these  an  additional  objection  of  a  recent  origin  may  be  added.  Your 
committee  allude  to  the  executive  veto,  as  applied  to  internal  improvements,  the 
effect  o(  which  has  been  to  increase  very  considerably  his  power  and  patronage 
in  reference  to  this  branch  of  expenditure.  The  executive,  in  his  veto  mes 
sage,  assumes  the  ground  that  internal  improvements  may  or  may  not  be  con 
stitutional,  according  to  the  nature  of  each  particular  object ;  the  distinction  to 


184  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

be  determined  by  him  in  the  exercise  of  his  constitutional  function  of  giving  or 
withholding  his  approval  to  acts  of  Congress  ;  the  practical  effect  of  which  is 
to  draw  within  his  control  the  power  and  influence  which  appertain,  not  only 
to  the  administration,  but  also  to  the  enactment  of  the  law  ;  and,  of  course,  to  in 
crease  in  the  same  degree  his  influence  and  patronage  in  reference  to  internal 
improvements. 

In  making  these  remarks,  the  object  of  your  committee  is  not  to  call  in  ques 
tion  the  motive  of  the  executive,  or  his  right  to  draw  what  distinction  he  may 
think  just  and  right  in  the  exercise  of  his  veto  power,  or  the  correctness  of  the 
distinctions  in  reference  to  the  particular  subject  under  consideration ;  but  sim 
ply  to  exhibit  the  full  extent  of  the  objections  to  selecting  it  as  the  subject  on 
which  to  expend  the  surplus  revenue — objections,  in  their  nature,  incapable  of 
being  wholly  removed  even  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution,  were  an. 
amendment  practicable. 

But  if  no  subject  of  expenditure  can  be  selected  on  which  the  surplus  can  be 
safely  expended,  and  if  neither  the  revenue  nor  expenditure  can,  under  existing 
circumstances,  be  reduced,  the  next  inquiry  is,  What  is  to  be  done  with  the  sur 
plus  ?  which,  as  has  been  shown,  will  probably  equal,  on  an  average,  for  the  next 
eight  years,  the  sum  of  $9.000,000  beyond  the  just  wants  of  the  government : 
a  surplus  of  which,  unless  some  safe  disposition  can  be  made,  all  other  means 
of  reducing  the  patronage  of  the  executive  must  prove  ineffectual. 

Your  committee  are  deeply  sensible  of  the  great  difficulty  of  finding  any  sat 
isfactory  solution  of  this  question  ;  but,  believing  that  the  very  existence  of  our 
institutions,  and,  with  them,  the  liberty  of  the  country,  may  depend  on  the  suc 
cess  of  their  investigation,  they  have  carefully  explored  the  whole  ground,  and 
the  result  of  their  inquiry  is,  that  but  one  means  has  occurred  to  them  holding 
out  any  reasonable  prospect  of  success.  A  few  preliminary  remarks  will  be 
necessary  to  explain  their  views. 

Amid  all  the  difficulties  of  our  situation,  there  is  one  consolation — that  the 
danger  from  executive  patronage,  as  far  as  it  depends  on  excess  of  revenue, 
must  be  temporary.  Assuming  that  the  act  of  2d  of  March,  1833,  will  be  left 
undisturbed  by  its  provisions,  the  income,  after  the  year  1842,  is  to  be  reduced 
to  the  economical  wants  of  the  government.  The  government,  then,  is  in  a 
state  of  passage  from  one  where  the  revenue  is  excessive,  to  another  in  which, 
at  a  fixed  and  no  distant  period,  it  will  be  reduced  to  its  proper  limits.  The 
difficulty,  in  the  intermediate  time,  is,  that  the  revenue  cannot  be  brought  down 
to  the  expenditure,  nor  the  expenditure,  without  great  danger,  raised  to  the  rev 
enue,  for  reasons  already  explained.  How  is  this  difficulty  to  be  overcome  ? 
It  might  seem  that  the  simple  and  natural  means  would  be  to  vest  the  surplus 
in  some  safe  and  profitable  stock,  to  accumulate  for  future  use  ;  but  the  difficul 
ty  in  such  a  course  will,  on  examination,  be  found  insuperable. 

At  the  very  commencement,  in  selecting  the  stock,  there  would  be  great,  if 
not  insurmountable  difficulties.  No  one  would  think  of  investing  the  surplus  in 
bank  stock,  against  which  there  are  so  many,  and  such  decisive  reasons,  that  it 
is  not  deemed  necessary  to  state  them  ;  nor  would  the  objections  be  less  deci 
sive  against  vesting  in  the  stock  of  the  states,  which  would  create  the  danger 
ous  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  between  the  government  and  the  members  of 
the  Union.  But  suppose  this  difficulty  surmounted,  and  that  some  stock,  per 
fectly  safe,  was  selected,  there  would  still  remain  another  that  could  not  be  sur 
mounted.  There  cannot  be  found  a  stock  with  an  interest  in  its  favour  suffi 
ciently  strong  to  compete  with  the  interests  which,  with  a  large  surplus  reve 
nue,  will  ever  be  found  in  favour  of  expenditures.  It  must  be  perfectly  obvious 
to  all  who  have  the  least  experience,  or  who  will  duly  reflect  on  the  subject, 
that,  were  a  fund  selected  in  which  to  vest  the  surplus  revenue  for  future  use, 
there  would  be  found  in  practice  a  constant  conflict  between  the  interest  in  fa 
vour  of  some  local  or  favourite  scheme  of  expenditure,  and  that  in  favour  of  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  185 

stock.  Nor  can  it  be  less  obvious  that,  in  point  of  fact,  the  former  would  prove 
far  stronger  than  the  latter.  The  result  is  obvious.  The  surplus,  be  it  ever 
so  great,  would  be  absorbed  by  appropriations  instead  of  being  vested  in  the 
stock,  and  the  scheme,  of  course,  would,  in  practice,  prove  an  abortion ;  which 
brings  us  back  to  the  original  inquiry,  How  is  the  surplus  to  be  disposed  of  un 
til  the  excess  shall  be  reduced  to  the  just  and  economical  wants  of  the  govern 
ment  1 

After  bestowing  on  this  question,  on  the  successful  solution  of  which  so  muck 
depends,  the  most  deliberate  attention,  your  committee,  as  they  have  already 
stated,  can  advise  but  one  means  by  which  it  can  be  effected ;  and  that  is  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,  authorizing  the  temporary  distribution  of  the 
surplus  revenue  among  the  states  till  the  year  1843,  when,  as  has  been  shown, 
the  income  and  expenditure  will  be  equalized. 

Your  committee  are  fully  aware  of  the  many  and  fatal  objections  to  the  dis 
tribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  among  the  states,  considered  as  a  part  of  the 
ordinary  and  regular  system  of  this  government.  They  admit  them  to  be  as 
great  as  can  be  well  imagined.  The  proposition  itself,  that  the  government 
should  collect  money  for  the  purpose  of  such  distribution,  or  should  distribute  a 
surplus  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  taxes,  is  too  absurd  to  require  refutation  ; 
and  yet  what  would  be,  when  applied,  as  supposed,  so  absurd  and  pernicious,  is, 
in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  in  the  present  extraordinary  and  deeply-dis 
ordered  state  of  our  affairs,  not  only  useful  and  salutary,  but  indispensable  to 
the  restoration  of  the  body  politic  to  a  sound  condition :  just  as  some  potent 
medicine,  which  it  would  be  dangerous  and  absurd  to  prescribe  to  the  healthy, 
may,  to  the  diseased,  be  the  only  means  of  arresting  the  hand  of  death.  Dis 
tribution,  as  proposed,  is  not  for  the  preposterous  and  dangerous  purpose  of 
raising  a  revenue  for  distribution,  or  of  distributing  the  surplus  as  a  means  of 
perpetuating  a  system  of  duties  or  taxes,  but  a  temporary  measure  to  dispose  of 
an  unavoidable  surplus  while  the  revenue  is  in  the  course  of  reduction,  and 
which  cannot  be  otherwise  disposed  of  without  greatly  aggravating  a  disease 
that  threatens  the  most  dangerous  consequences  ;  and  which  holds  out  hope, 
not  only  of  arresting  its  farther  progress,  but  also  of  restoring  the  body  politic 
to  a  state  of  health  and  vigour.  The  truth  of  this  assertion  a  few  observations 
will  suffice  to  illustrate. 

It  must  be  obvious,  on  a  little  reflection,  that  the  effects  of  distribution  of  the 
surplus  would  be  to  place  the  interests  of  the  states,  on  all  questions  of  expen 
diture,  in  opposition  to  expenditure,  as  every  reduction  of  expense  would  ne 
cessarily  increase  the  sum  to*be  distributed  among  the  states.  The  effect  of 
this  would  be  to  convert  them,  through  their  interests,  into  faithful  and  vigilant 
sentinels  on  the  side  of  economy  and  accountability  in  the  expenditures  of  this 
government ;  and  would  thus  powerfully  tend  to  restore  the  government,  in  its 
fiscal  action,  to  the  honest  simplicity  of  former  days. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  thought  by  some  that  the  power  which  the  distribution, 
among  the  states  would  bring  to  bear  against  the  expenditure,  and  its  conse 
quent  tendency  to  retrench  the  disbursements  of  the  government,  would  be  so 
strong  as  not  only  to  curtail  useless  or  improper  expenditure,  but  also  the  use 
ful  and  necessary.  Such,  undoubtedly,  would  be  the  consequence  if  the  pro 
cess  were  too  long  continued ;  but  in  the  present  irregular  and  excessive  ac 
tion  of  the  system,  when  its  centripetal  force  threatens  to  concentrate  all  its 
powers  in  a  single  department,  the  fear  that  the  action  of  this  government  will 
be  too  much  reduced  by  the  measure  under  consideration,  in  the  short  period  to 
which  it  is  proposed  to  limit  its  operation,  is  without  just  foundation.  On  the 
contrary,  if  the  proposed  measure  should  be  applied  in  the  present  diseased 
state  of  the  government,  its  effect  would  be  like  that  of  some  powerful  altera 
tive  medicine,  operating  just  long  enough  to  change  the  present  morbid  action, 
but  not  sufficiently  long  to  superinduce  another  of  an  opposite  character. 

AA 


186  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that,  though  the  distribution  might  reduce  all  useless 
expenditure,  it  would,  at  the  same  time,  give  additional  power  to  the  interest  in 
favour  of  taxation.  It  is  not  denied  that  such  would  be  its  tendency ;  and,  if 
the  danger  from  increased  duties  or  taxes  was  at  this  time  as  great  as  that  from 
a  surplus  revenue,  the  objection  would  be  fatal ;  but  it  is  confidently  believed 
that  such  is  not  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  in  proposing  the  measure,  it  is  as 
sumed  that  the  act  of  March  2,  1833,  will  remain  undisturbed.  It  is  on  the 
strength  of  this  assumption  that  the  measure  is  proposed,  and,  as  it  is  believed, 
safely  proposed. 

It  may,  however,  be  said  that  the  distribution  may  create,  on  the  part  of  the 
states,  an  appetite  in  its  favour  which  may  ultimately  lead  to  its  adoption  as  a 
permanent  measure.  It  may,  indeed,  tend  to  excite  such  an  appetite,  short  as 
is  the  period  proposed  for  its  operation ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  this  danger  is  far 
more  than  countervailed  by  the  fact,  that  the  proposed  amendment  to  the  Con 
stitution  to  authorize  the  distribution  would  place  the  power  beyond  the  reach 
of  legislative  construction,  and  thus  effectually  prevent  the  possibility  of  its 
adoption  as  a  permanent  measure,  as  it  cannot  be  conceived  that  three  fourths 
of  the  states  will  ever  assent  to  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  to  authorize 
a  distribution,  except  as  an  extraordinary  measure,  applicable  to  some  extraor 
dinary  condition  of  the  country  like  the  present. 

Giving,  however,  to  these,  and  other  objections  which  may  be  urged,  all  the 
force  that  can  be  claimed  for  them,  it  must  be  remembered,  the  question  is  not 
whether  the  measure  proposed  is  or  is  not  liable  to  this  or  that  objection,  but 
whether  any  other  less  objectionable  can  be  devised ;  or,  rather,  whether  there 
is  any  other  which  promises  the  least  prospect  of  relief  that  can  be  applied. 
Let  not  the  delusion  prevail  that  the  disease,  after  running  through  its  natural 
course,  will  terminate  of  itself,  without  fatal  consequences.  Experience  is  op 
posed  to  such  anticipations.  Many  and  striking  are  the  examples  of  free  states 
perishing  under  that  excess  of  patronage  which  now  afflicts  ours.  It  may,  in. 
fact,  be  said  with  truth,  that  all,  or  nearly  all,  diseases  which  afflict  free  govern 
ments,  may  be  traced  directly  or  indirectly  to  excess  of  revenue  and  expendi 
ture  ;  the  effect  of  which  is  to  rally  around  the  government  a  powerful,  corrupt, 
and  subservient  corps — a  corps  ever  obedient  to  its  will,  and  ready  to  sustain 
it  in  every  measure,  whether  right  or  wrong,  and  which,  if  the  cause  of  the  dis 
ease  be  not  eradicated,  must  ultimately  render  the  government  stronger  than 
the  people. 

What  progress  this  dangerous  disease  has  already  made  in  our  country  it  is 
not  for  your  committee  to  say;  but  when  they  reflect  on  the  present  symptoms, 
on  the  almost  unbounded  extent  of  executive  patronage,  wielded  by  a  single 
will ;  the  'surplus  revenue,  which  cannot  be  reduced  within  proper  limits  in  less 
than  seven  years — a  period  which  covers  two  presidential  elections,  on  both  of 
which  all  this  mighty  power  and  influence  will  be  brought  to  bear — and  when 
they  consider  that,  with  the  vast  patronage  arid  influence  of  this  government, 
that  of  all  the  states  acting  in  concert  with  it  will  be  combined,  there  are  just 
grounds  to  fear  that  the  fate  which  has  befallen  so  many  other  free  governments 
must  also  befall  ours,  unless,  indeed,  some  effectual  remedy  be  forthwith  ap 
plied.  It  is  under  this  impression  that  your  committee  have  suggested  the  one 
proposed,  not  as  free  from  all  objections,  but  as  the  only  one  of  sufficient  power 
to  arrest  the  disease,  and  to  restore  the  body  politic  to  a  sound  condition  ;  and 
they  have,  accordingly,  reported  a  resolution  so  to  amend  the  Constitution  that 
the  money  remaining  in  the  treasury  at  the  end  of  each  year,  till  the  1st  of 
January,  1843,  deducting  therefrom  the  sum  of  $2,000,000  to  meet  current 
and  contingent  .expenses,  shall  annually  be  distributed  among  the  states  and 
territories,  including  the  District  of  Columbia  ;  and,  for  that  purpose,  the  sum 
to  be  distributed  to  be  divided  into  as  many  shares  as  there  are  senators  and 
representatives  in  Congress,  adding  two  for  each  territory,  and  two  for  the  Dis- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  187 

trict  of  Columbia  ;  and  that  there  shall  be  allotted  to  each  state  a  number  of 
shares  equal  to  its  representation  in  both  houses,  and  to  the  territories,  inclu 
ding  the  District  of  Columbia,  two  shares  each.  Supposing  the  surplus  to  be 
distributed  should  average  $9,000,000  annually,  as  estimated,  it  would  give  to 
each  share  $3*0,405  ;  which,  multiplied  by  the  number  of  senators  and  repre 
sentatives  of  any  state,  would  show  the  sum  to  which  it  would  be  entitled. 

The  reason  for  selecting  the  ratio  of  distribution  proposed  in  the  amendment 
is  too  obvious  to.  require  much  illustration.  It  is  that  which  indicates  the  rela 
tive  political  weight  assigned  by  the  Constitution  to  the  members  of  the  confed 
eracy  respectively,  and,  it  is  believed,  approaches  as  nearly  to  equality  as  any 
other  that  can  be  selected.  It  may  be  objected  that  some  states,  under  the 
distribution,  may  receive  more,  and  others  less  than  their  actual  contribution  to 
the  treasury,  under  the  existing  system  of  revenue.  The  truth  of  the  objec 
tion  may  be  acknowledged,  but  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  the  inequali 
ty  is  at  least  as  great  under  the  present  system  of  disbursement,  and  would  be 
as  great  under  any  other  disposition  of  the  surplus  that  can  be  adopted. 

But  as  effectual  as  the  distribution  must  be,  if  adopted,  to  retrench  improper 
expenditure,  and  reduce  correspondingly  the  patronage  of  the  government,  yet 
other  means  must  be  added  to  bring  it  within  safe  limits,  and  to  prevent  the  re 
currence  hereafter  of  the  danger  which  now  threatens  the  institutions  and  the 
liberty  of  the  country  ;  and,  with  this  view,  your  committee  have  reported  a  bill 
to  repeal  the  first  and  second  sections  of  the  act  to  limit  the  term  of  certain 
officers  therein  named,  passed  13th  May,  1820  ;  to  make  it  the  duty  of  the 
President  to  lay  before  Congress,  on  the  first  of  January  next,  and  on  the  first 
of  January  every  four  years  thereafter,  the  names  of  all  defaulting  officers  and 
agents  charged  with  the  collection  and  disbursement  of  the  public  money, 
whose  commissions  shall  be  vacated  from  and  after  the  date  of  such  message  ; 
and  also  to  make  it  his  duty,  in  all  cases  of  nomination  to  fill  vacancies  occa 
sioned  by  removal  from  office,  to  assign  the  reason  for  which  said  officer  may 
have  been  removed. 

The  provisions  of  this  bill  are  the  same  as  those  contained  in  bill  No.  2,  re 
ported  to  the  Senate  on  the  4th  of  May,  1826,  by  a  select  committee  appointed  to 
"  inquire  into  the  expediency  of  reducing  the  patronage  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States,"  and  which  was  accompanied  by  an  explanatory  report,  to 
which  your  committee  would  refer  the  Senate  ;  and,  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
reference,  they  have  instructed  their  chairman  to  move  to  reprint  the  report  for 
their  use. 

But  the  great  and  alarming  strides  which  patronage  has  made  in  the  short 
period  that  has  intervened  since  the  date  of  the  report,  has  demonstrated  the 
necessity  of  imposing  other  limitations  on  the  discretionary  powers  of  the  ex 
ecutive,  particularly  in  reference  to  the  General  Postoffice  and  the  public  funds, 
on  which  important  subject  the  executive  has  an  almost  unlimited  discretion  as 
things  now  are. 

In  a  government  like  ours,  liable  to  dangers  so  imminent  from  the  excess 
and  abuse  of  patronage,  it  would  seern  extraordinary  that  a  department  of  such 
vast  powers,  with  an  annual  income  and  expenditure  so  great,  and  with  a  host 
of  persons  in  its  service,  extending  and  ramifying  itself  to  the  remotest  point, 
and  into  every  neighbourhood  of  the  Union,  and  having  a  control  over  the  cor 
respondence  and  intercourse  of  the  whole  community,  should  be  permitted  to 
remain  so  long,  without  efficient  checks  or  responsibility,  under  the  almost  un 
limited  control  of  the  executive.  Such  a  power,  wielded  by  a  single  will,  is 
sufficient  of  itself,  when  made  an  instrument  of  ambition,  to  contaminate  the 
community,  and  to  control  to  a  great  extent  public  opinion.  To  guard  against 
this  danger,  and  to  impose  effectual  restrictions  on  executive  patronage,  acting 
through  this  important  department,  your  committee  are  of  the  opinion  that  an 
entire  reorganization  of  the  department  is  required  ;  but  their  labour,  in  refer- 


188  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

ence  to  this  subject,  has  been  superseded  by  the  Committee  on  the  Postoffice, 
which  has  bestowed  so  much  attention  on  it,  and  which  is  so  much  more  mi 
nutely  acquainted  with  the  diseased  state  of  the  department  than  your  committee 
can  be,  that  it  would  be  presumption  on  their  part  to  attempt  to  add  to  their 
recommendation. 

But,  as  extensive  and  dangerous  as  is  the  patronage  of  the  executive  through 
the  postoffice  department,  it  is  not  much  less  so  in  reference  to  the  public 
funds,  over  which,  as  has  been  stated,  it  now  has  unlimited  control,  and,  through 
them,  over  the  entire  banking  system  of  the  country.  With  a  banking  system 
spread  from  Maine  to  Louisiana,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  utmost  West,  consist 
ing  of  not  less  than  five  or  six  hundred  banks,  struggling  among  themselves  for 
existence  and  gain,  with  an  immense  public  fund  under  the  control  of  the  ex 
ecutive,  to  be  deposited  in  whatever  banks  he  may  favour,  or  to  be  withdrawn  at 
his  pleasure,  it  is  impossible  for  ingenuity  to  devise  any  scheme  better  calcu 
lated  to  convert  the  surplus  revenue  into  a  most  potent  engine  of  power  and  in 
fluence  ;  and,  it  may  be  added,  of  peculation,  speculation,  corruption,  and  fraud. 
The  first  and  most  decisive  step  against  this  danger  is  that  already  proposed, 
of  distributing  tbe  surplus  revenue  among  the  states,  which  will  prevent  its 
growing  accumulation  in  the  banks,  and,  with  it,  the  corresponding  increase  of 
executive  power  and  influence  over  the  banking  system.  In  addition,  your 
committee  have  reported  a  bill  to  charge  the  deposite  banks  at  the  rate  of 
per  cent,  per  annum  for  the  use  of  the  public  funds,  to  be  calculated  on  the 
average  monthly  deposites  ;  to  prohibit  transfers,  except  for  the  purpose  of  dis 
bursements  ;  and  to  prevent  a  removal  of  the  public  funds  from  the  banks  in 
which  they  are  now,  or  may  hereafter  be  deposited,  without  the  consent  of 
Congress,  except  as  is  provided  in  the  bill.  The  object  of  the  bill  is  to  secure 
to  the  government  an  equivalent  for  the  use  of  the  public  funds,  to  prevent  the 
abuses  and  influence  incident  to  transfer- warrants,  and  to  place  the  deposite 
banks,  as  far  as  it  may  be  practicable,  beyond  the  control  of  the  executive. 

In  addition  to  these  measures,  there  are,  doubtless,  many  others  connected 
with  the  customs — Indian  affairs,  public  lands,  army,  navy,  and  other  branches 
of  the  administration — into  which,  it  is  feared,  there  have  crept  inany  abuses, 
which  have  unnecessarily  increased  the  expenditures  and  the  number  of  per 
sons  employed,  and,  with  them,  the  executive  patronage ;  but  to  reform  which 
would  require  a  more  minute  investigation  into  the  general  state  of  the  adminis 
tration  than  your  committee  can  at  present  bestow.  Should  the  measures  which 
they  have  recommended  receive  the  sanction  of  Congress,  they  feel  a  strong 
conviction  that  they  will  greatly  facilitate  the  work  of  carrying  accountability, 
retrenchment,  and  economy  through  every  branch  of  the  administration,  and 
thereby  reduce  the  patronage  of  the  executive  to  those  safe  and  economical 
limits  which  are  necessary  to  a  complete  restoration  of  the  equilibrium  of  the 
system,  now  so  dangerously  disturbed.  Your  committee  are  deeply  impressed 
with  the  necessity  of  commencing  early,  and  of  carrying  through  to  its  full  and 
final  completion,  this  great  work  of  reform. 

The  disease  is  daily  becoming  more  aggravated  and  dangerous,  and,  if  it  be 
permitted  to  advance  for  a  few  years  longer  with  the  rapidity  with  which  it 
has  of  late,  it  will  soon  pass  beyond  the  reach  of  remedy.  This  is  no  party 
question.  Every  lover  of  his  country  and  of  its  institutions,  be  his  party  what 
it  may,  must  see  and  deplore  the  rapid  growth  of  patronage,  with  all  its  attend 
ant  evils,  and  the  certain  catastrophe  which  awaits  its  farther  progress,  if  not 
timely  arrested.  The  question  now  is  not  how,  or  where,  or  with  whom  the 
danger  originated,  but  how  it  is  to  be  arrested ;  not  the  cause,  but  the  remedy ; 
not  how  our  institutions  and  liberty  have  been  endangered,  but  how  they  are  to 
be  rescued. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  189 


XI. 

A  REPORT  ON  THAT  PORTION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE  WHICH  RE 
LATED  TO  THE  ADOPTION  OF  EFFICIENT  MEASURES  TO  PREVENT  THE 
CIRCULATION  OF  INCENDIARY  ABOLITION  PETITIONS  THROUGH  THE 
MAIL,  FEBRUARY  4,  1836. 

The  Select  Committee  to  whom  was  referred  that  portion  of  the  President's  Mes 
sage  which  relates  to  the  attempts  to  circulate,  through  the  mail,  inflammatory 
appeals,  to  excite  the  slaves  to  insurrection,  submit  the  following  report: 

THE  committee  fully  concur  with  the  President  as  to  the  character  and  ten 
dency  of  the  papers  which  have  been  attempted  to  be  circulated  in  the  South 
through  the  mail,  and  participate  with  him  in  the  indignant  regret  which  he  ex 
presses  at  conduct  so  destructive  of  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  country,  and 
so  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  and  the  dictates  of  humanity  and  religion.  They 
also  concur  in  the  hope  that,  if  the  strong  tone  of  disapprobation  which  these 
unconstitutional  and  wicked  attempts  have  called  forth  does  not  arrest  them, 
the  non-slaveholding  states  will  be  prompt  to  exercise  their  power  to  suppress 
them,  as  far  as  their  authority  extends.  But,  while  they  agree  with  the  Presi 
dent  as  to  the  evil  and  its  highly  dangerous  tendency,  and  the  necessity  of  ar 
resting  it,  they  have  not  been  able  to  assent  to  the  measure  of  redress  which  he 
recommends — that  Congress  should  pass  a  law  prohibiting,  under  severe  pen 
alty,  the  transmission  of  incendiary  publications  through  the  mail,  intended  to 
instigate  the  slaves  to  insurrection. 

After  the  most  careful  and  deliberate  investigation,  they  have  been  constrain 
ed  to  adopt  the  conclusion  that  Congress  has  not  the  power  to  pass  such  a  law  ; 
that  it  would  be  a  violation  of  one  of  the  most  sacred  provisions  of  the  Consti 
tution,  and  subversive  of  reserved  powers  essential  to  the  preservation  of  the 
domestic  institutions  of  the  slaveholding  states,  and,  with  them,  their  peace  and 
security.  Concurring,  as  they  do,  with  the  President  in  the  magnitude  of  the 
evil  and  the  necessity  of  its  suppression,  it  would  hare  been  the  cause  of  deep 
regret  to  the  committee,  if  they  thought  the  difference  of  opinion,  as  to  the  right 
of  Congress,  would  deprive  the  slaveholding  states  of  any  portion  of  the  protec 
tion  which  the  measure  recommended  by  the  President  was  intended  to  afford 
them.  On  the  contrary,  they  believe  all  the  protection  intended  may  be  afford 
ed,  according  to  the  views  they  take  of  the  power  of  Congress,  without  infrin 
ging  on  any  provision  of  the  Constitution  on  one  side,  or  the  reserved  rights  of 
the  states  on  the  other. 

The  committee,  with  these  preliminary  remarks,  will  now  proceed  to  estab 
lish  the  positions  which  they  have  assumed,  beginning  with  the  first — that  the 
passage  of  a  law  would  be  a  violation  of  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution. 
In  the  discussion  of  this  point,  the  committee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  in 
quire  whether  the  right  to  pass  such  a  law  can  be  derived  from  the  power  to 
establish  postoffices  and  postroads,  or  from  the  trust  of  "  preserving  the  relation 
created  by  the  Constitution  between  the  states,"  as  supposed  by  the  President. 
However  ingenious  or  plausible  the  arguments  may  be  by  which  it  may  be  at 
tempted  to  derive  the  right  from  these  or  any  other  sources,  they  must  fall  short 
of  their  object.  The  jealous  spirit  of  liberty  which  characterized  our  ancestors 
at  the  period  when  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  forever  closed  the  door  by 
which  the  right  might  be  implied  from  any  of  the  granted  powers,  or  any  other 
source,  if  there  be  any  other.  The  committee  refer  to  the  amended  article  of 
the  Constitution,  which,  among  other  things,  provides  that  Congress  shall  pass 
no  law  which  shall  abridge  the  liberty  of  the  press — a  provision  which  inter 
poses,  as  will  be  hereafter  shown,  an  insuperable  objection  to  the  measure  rec- 


190  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ommended  by  the  President.  That  the  true  meaning  of  this  provision  may  be 
fully  comprehended,  as  bearing  on  the  point  under  consideration,  it  will  be  ne 
cessary  to  recur  briefly  to  the  history  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 

It  is  well  known  that  great  opposition  was  made  to  the  adoption  of  the  Con 
stitution.  It  was  acknowledged  on  all  sides,  at  the  time,  that  the  old  confeder 
ation,  from  its  weakness,  had  failed,  and  that  something  must  be  done  to  save 
the  country  from  anarchy  and  convulsion  ;  yet,  so  high  was  the  spirit  of  liberty 
— so  jealous  were  our  ancestors  of  that  day  of  power,  that  the  utmost  efforts 
were  necessary,  under  all  the  then  existing  pressure,  to  obtain  the  assent  of  the 
states  to  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution.  Among  the  many  objections  to  its 
adoption,  none  were  more  successfully  urged  than  the  absence  in  the  instrument 
of  those  general  provisions  which  experience  had  shown  to  be  necessary  to 
guard  the  outworks  of  liberty  :  such  as  the  freedom  of  the  press  and  of  speech, 
the  rights  of  conscience,  of  trial  by  jury,  and  others  of  like  character.  It  was 
the  belief  of  those  jealous  and  watchful  guardians  of  liberty,  who  viewed  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  with  so  much  apprehension,  that  all  these  sacred 
barriers,  without  some  positive  provision  to  protect  them,  would,  by  the  power 
of  construction,  be  undermined  and  prostrated.  So  strong  was  this  apprehen 
sion,  that  it  was  impossible  to  obtain  a  ratification  of  the  instrument  in  many  of 
the  states  without  accompanying  it  with  the  recommendation  to  incorporate  in 
the  Constitution  various  articles,  as  amendments,  intended  to  remove  this  defect, 
and  guard  against  the  danger  apprehended,  by  placing  these  important  rights 
beyond  the  possible  encroachment  of  Congress.  One  of  the  most  important  of 
these  is  that  which  stands  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  amended  articles,  and  which, 
among  other  things,  as  has  been  stated,  prohibits  the  passage  of  any  law  abridg 
ing  the  freedom  of  the  press,  and  which  left  that  important  barrier  against  pow 
er  under  the  exclusive  authority  and  control  of  the  states. 

That  it  was  the  object  of  this  provision  to  place  the  freedom  of  the  press  be 
yond  the  possible  interference  of  Congress,  is  a  doctrine  not  now  advanced  for 
the  first  time.  It  is  the  ground  taken,  and  so  ably  sustained  by  Mr.  Madison, 
in  his  celebrated  report  to  the  Virginia  Legislature,  in  1799,  against  the  alien 
and  sedition  law,  and  which  conclusively  settled  the  principle  that  Congress 
has  no  right,  in  any  form  or  in  any  manner,  to  interfere  with  the  freedom  of 
the  press.*  The  establishment  of  this  principle  not  only  overthrew  the  se 
dition  act,  but  was  the  leading  cause  of  the  great  political  revolution  which, 
in  1801,  brought  the  Republican  party,  with  Mr.  Jefferson  at  its  head,  into 
power. 

With  these  remarks,  the  committee  will  turn  to  the  sedition  act,  in  order  to 
show  the  identity  in  principle  between  it  and  the  act  which  the  message  recom 
mends  to  be  passed,,  as  far  as  it  relates  to  the  freedom  of  the  press.  Among  its 
other  provisions,  it  inflicted  punishment  on  all  persons  who  should  publish  any 
false,  scandalous,  or  malicious  writing  against  the  government,  with  intent  to 
defame  the  same,  or  bring  it  into  contempt  or  disrepute.  Assuming  this  pro 
vision  to  be  unconstitutional,  as  abridging  the  freedom  of  the  press,  which  no 
one  now  doubts,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  if,  instead  of  inflicting  pun 
ishment  for  publishing,  the  act  had  inflicted  punishment  for  circulating  through 
the  mail  for  the  same  offence,  it  would  have  been  equally  unconstitutional.  The 
one  would  have  abridged  the  freedom  of  the  press  as  effectually  as  the  other.  The 
object  of  publishing  is  circulation ;  and  to  prohibit  circulation  is,  in  effect,  to 
prohibit  publication.  They  both  have  a  common  object — the  communication 
of  sentiments  and  opinions  to  the  public  ;  and  the  prohibition  of  one  may  as 
effectually  suppress  such  communication  as  the  prohibition  of  the  other ;  and,  of 

*  The  article  is  in  the  following  words : 

"  Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exer 
cise  thereof;  or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press ;  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably 
to  assemble,  and  petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances." 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  191 

course,  would  as  effectually  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  the  press,  and  be 
equally  unconstitutional. 

But,  to  understand  more  fully  the  extent  of  the  control  which  the  right  of 
prohibiting  circulation  through  the  mail  would  give  to  the  government  over  the 
press,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  power  of  Congress  over  the  post- 
office  and  the  mail  is  an  exclusive  power.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that 
Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  this  power,  may  declare  any  road  or  navigable 
water  to  be  a  post-road;  and  that,  by  the  act  of  1825,  it  is  provided  "that  no 
stage,  or  other  vehicle  which  regularly  performs  trips  on  a  post-road,  or  on  a 
road  parallel  to  it,  shall  carry  letters."  The  same  provision  extends  to  packets, 
boats,  or  other  vessels,  on  navigable  waters.  Like  provision  may  be  extended 
to  newspapers  and  pamphlets  ;  which,  if  it  be  admitted  that  Congress  has  the  right 
to  discriminate  in  reference  to  their  character,  what  papers  shall  or  what  shall 
not  be  transmitted  by  the  mail,  would  subject  the  freedom  of  the  press  on  all 
subjects,  political,  moral,  and  religious,  completely  to  its  will  and  pleasure.  It 
would,  in  fact,  in  some  respects,  more  effectually  control  the  freedom  of  the 
press  than  any  sedition  law,  however  severe  its  penalties.  The  mandate  of  the 
government  alone  would  be  sufficient  to  close  the  door  against  circulation  through 
the  mail ;  and  thus,  at  its  sole  will  and  pleasure,  might  intercept  all  communica 
tion  between  the  press  and  the  people,  while  it  would  require  the  intervention, 
of  courts  and  juries  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  a  sedition  law,  which  experi 
ence  has  shown  are  not  always  passive  and  willing  instruments  in  the  hands  of 
government,  where  the  freedom  of  the  press  is  concerned. 

From  these  remarks,  it  must  be  apparent  that,  to  prohibit  publication  on  one 
side,  and  circulation  through  the  mail  on  the  other,  of  any  paper,  on  account  of 
its  religious,  moral,  or  political  character,  rests  on  the  same  principle ;  and  that 
each  is  equally  an  abridgment  of  the  freedom  of  the  press,  and  a  violation  of 
the  Constitution.  It  would,  indeed,  have  been  but  a  poor  triumph  for  the  cause 
of  liberty,  in  the  great  contest  of  1799,  had  the  sedition  law  been  put  down  on 
principles  that  would  have  left  Congress  free  to  suppress  the  circulation  through 
the  mail  of  the  very  publications  which  that  odious  act  was  intended  to  pro 
hibit.  The  authors  of  that  memorable  achievement  would  have  had  but  slen 
der  claims  on  the  gratitude  of  posterity,  if  their  victory  over  the  encroachment 
of  power  had  been  left  so  imperfect. 

It  will,  after  what  has  been  said,  require  but  few  remarks  to  show  that  the 
same  principle  which  applied  to  the  sedition  law  would  apply  equally  to  a  law 
punishing,  by  Congress,  such  incendiary  publications  as  are  referred  to  in  the 
message,  and,  of  course,  to  the  'passage  of  a  law  prohibiting  their  transmission 
through  the  mail.  The  principle  on  which  the  sedition  act  was  condemned  as 
unconstitutional  was  a  general  one,  and  not  limited  in  its  application  to  that  act. 
It  withdraws  from  Congress  all  right  of  interference  with  the  press,  in  any  form 
or  shape  whatever ;  and  the  sedition  law  was  put  down  as  unconstitutional,  not 
because  it  prohibited  publications  against  the  government,  but  because  it  inter 
fered  at  all  with  the  press.  The  prohibition  of  any  publication  on  the  ground 
of  its  being  immoral,  irreligious,  or  intended  to  excite  rebellion  or  insurrection, 
would  have  been  equally  unconstitutional ;  and,  from  parity  of  reason,  the  sup 
pression  of  their  circulation  through  the  mail  would  be  no  less  so. 

But,  as  conclusive  as  these  reasons  are  against  the  right,  there  are  others  not 
less  so,  derived  from  the  powers  reserved  to  the  states,  which  the  committee 
will  next  proceed  to  consider. 

The  message,  as  has  been  stated, 'recommends  that  Congress  should  pass  a 
la\v  to  punish  the  transmission  through  the  mail  of  incendiary  publications  in 
tended  to  instigate  the  slaves  to  insurrection.  It  of  course  assumes  for  Congress 
a  right  to  determine  what,  papers  are  incendiary,  and  intended  to  excite  insur 
rection.  The  question,  then,  is,  Has  Congress  such  a  right  ?  A  question  of 
vital  importance  to  the  slavehoJding  states,  as  will  appear  in  the  course  of  the 
discussion. 


192  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

After  examining  this  question  with  due  deliberation,  in  all  its  bearings,  the 
committee  are  of  opinion,  not  only  that  Congress  has  not  the  right,  but  to  admit 
it  would  be  fatal  to  the  states.  Nothing  is  more  clear  than  that  the  admission 
of  the  right,  on  the  part  of  Congress,  to  determine  what  papers  are  incendiary, 
and,  as  such,  to  prohibit  their  circulation  through  the  mail,  necessarily  involves 
the  right  to  determine  what  are  not  incendiary,  and  to  enforce  their  circulation. 
Nor  is  it  less  certain  that,  to  admit  such  a  right,  would  be  virtually  to  clothe 
Congress  with  the  power  to  abolish  slavery,  by  giving  it  the  means  of  breaking- 
down  all  the  barriers  which  the  slaveholding  states  have  erected  for  the  pro 
tection  of  their  lives  and  property.  It  would  give  Congress,  without  regard  to 
the  prohibition  laws  of  the  states,  the  authority  to  open  the  gates  to  the  flood 
of  incendiary  publications  which  are  ready  to  break  into  those  states,  and  to 
punish  all  who  dare  resist  as  criminals.  Fortunately,  Congress  has  no  such 
light.  The  internal  peace  and  security  of  the  states  are  under  the  protection 
of  the  states  themselves,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  all  authority  and  control  on 
the  part  of  Congress.  It  belongs  to  them,  and  not  to  Congress,  to  determine 
•what  is,  or  is  not,  calculated  to  disturb  their  peace  and  security ;  and,  of  course, 
in  the  case  under  consideration,  it  belongs  to  the  slaveholding  states  to  deter 
mine  what  is  incendiary  and  intended  to  incite  to  insurrection,  and  to  adopt 
such  defensive  measures  as  may  be  necessary  for  their  security,  with  unlimited 
means  of  carrying  them  into  effect,  except  such  as  may  be  expressly  inhibited 
to  the  states  by  the  Constitution.  To  establish  the  truth  of  this  position,  so  es 
sential  to  the  safety  of  those  states,  it  would  seem  sufficient  to  appeal  to  their 
constant  exercise  of  this  right  at  all  times,  without  restriction  or  question,  both 
before  and  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  But,  on  a  point  of  so  much 
importance,  which  may  involve  the  safety,  if  not  the  existence  itself,  of  an  en 
tire  section  of  the  Union,  it  will  be  proper  to  trace  it  to  its  origin,  in  order  to 
place  it  on  a  more  immovable  foundation. 

That  the  states  which  form  our  Federal  Union  are  sovereign  and  independent 
communities,  bound  together  by  a  constitutional  compact,  and  are  possessed  of 
all  the  powers  belonging  to  distinct  and  separate  states,  excepting  such  as  are 
delegated  to  be  exercised  by  the  General  Government,  is  assumed  as  unques 
tionable.  The  compact  itself  expressly  provides  that  all  powers  not  delegated 
•are  reserved  to  the  states  and  the  people.  To  ascertain,  then,  whether  the 
power  in  question  is  delegated  or  reserved,  it  is  only  necessary  to  ascertain 
"whether  it  is  to  be  found  among  the  enumerated  powers  or  not.  If  it  be  not 
among  them,  it  belongs,  of  course,  to  the  reserved  powers.  On  turning  to  the 
Constitution,  it  will  be  seen  that,  while  the  power  of  defending  the  country 
against  external  danger  is  found  among  the  enumerated,  the  instrument  is  whol 
ly  silent  as  to  the  power  of  defending  the  internal  peace  and  security  of  the 
states,  and,  of  course,  reserves  to  the  states  this  important  power,  as  it  stood 
before  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  with  no  other  limitation,  as  has  been 
stated,  except  such  as  are  expressly  prescribed  by  the  instrument  itself.  From 
what  has  been  stated,  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  right  of  a  state  to  defend  it 
self  against  internal  dangers  is  a  part  of  the  great,  primary,  and  inherent  right 
of  self-defence,  which,  by  the  laws  of  nature,  belongs  to  all  communities  ;  and 
so  jealous  were  the  states  of  this  essential  right,  without  which  their  independ 
ence  could  not  be  preserved,  that  it  is  expressly  provided  by  the  Constitution,* 
that  the  General  Government  shall  not  assist  a  state,  even  in  case  of  domestic 
violence,  except  on  the  application  of  the  authorities  of  the  state  itself:  thus  ex 
cluding,  by  a  necessary  consequence,  its  interference  in  all  other  cases. 

Having  now  shown  that  it  belongs  to  the  slaveholding  states,  whose  institu 
tions  are  in  danger,  and  not  to  Congress,  as  is  supposed  by  the  message,  to  de 
termine  what  papers  are  incendiary  and  intended  to  excite  insurrection  among 

*  See  4th  article,  4th  section,  of  the  Constitution. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  193 

the  slaves,  it  remains  to  inquire,  in  the  next  place,  what  are  the  corresponding 
duties  of  the  General  Government,  and  the  other  states,  from  within  whose  lim 
its  and  jurisdiction  their  institutions  are  attacked  :  a  subject  intimately  connect 
ed  with  that  with  which  the  committee  are  immediately  charged,  and  which, 
at  the  present  juncture,  ought  to  be  fully  understood  by  all  the  parties.  The 
committee  will  begin  with  the  first. 

It  may  not  be  entirely  useless  to  premise  that  rights  and  duties  ar$  recipro 
cal — the  existence  of  a  right  always  implying  a  corresponding  duty.  If,  con 
sequently,  the  right  to  protect  her  internal  peace  and  security  belongs  to  a  state, 
the  General  Government  is  bound  to  respect  the  measures  adopted  by  her  for 
that  purpose,  and  to  co-operate  in  their  execution,  as  far  as  its  delegated  pow 
ers  may  admit,  or  the  measure  may  require.  Thus,  in  the  present  case,  the 
slaveholding  states  having  the  unquestionable  right  to  pass  all  such  laws  as  may 
be  necessary  to  maintain  the  existing  relation  between  master  and  slave  in  those 
states,  their  right,  of  course,  to  prohibit  the  circulation  of  any  publication  or  any 
intercourse  calculated  to  disturb  or  destroy  that  relation,  is  incontrovertible.  In 
the  execution  of  the  measures  which  may  be  adopted  by  the  states  for  this  pur 
pose,  the  powers  of  Congress  over  the  mail,  and  of  regulating  commerce  with 
foreign  nations  and  between  the  states,  may  require  co-operation  on  the  part  of 
the  General  Government ;  and  it  is  bound,  in  conformity  to  the  principle  estab 
lished,  to  respect  the  laws  of  the  state  in  their  exercise,  and  so  to  modify  its 
acts  as  not  only  not  to  violate  those  of  the  states,  but,  as  far  as  practicable,  to 
co-operate  in  their  execution.  The  practice  of  the  government  has  been  in 
conformity  to  these  views. 

By  the  act  of  the  28th  of  February,  1803,  entitled  "An  act  to  prevent  the 
importation  of  certain  persons  into  certain  states,"  where,  by  the  laws  of  those 
states,  their  importation  is  prohibited,  masters  or  captains  of  ships  or  vessels  are 
forbidden,  under  severe  penalty,  "  to  import  or  bring,  or  cause  to  be  imported  or 
brought,  any  negro  or  mulatto,  or  person  of  colour,  not  being  a  native  or  citizen, 
or  registered  seaman  of  the  United  States,  or  seamen,  natives  of  countries  be 
yond  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  into  any  port  or  place  which  shall  be  situated  in 
any  state  which,  by  law,  has  prohibited,  or  shall  prohibit,  the  admission  or  im 
portation  of  such  negro,  mulatto,  or  other  person  of  colour."  This  provision 
speaks  for  itself,  and  requires  no  illustration.  It  is  a  case  in  point,  and  fully 
embraces  the  principle  laid  down.  To  the  same  effect  is  the  act  of  the  25th  of 
February,  1799,  respecting  quarantine  and  health  laws,  which,  as  belonging  to 
the  internal  police  of  the  states,  stand  on  the  same  ground.  The  act,  among 
other  things,  "  directs  the  collectors  and  all  other  revenue  officers,  the  masters 
and  crews  of  the  revenue  cutters,  and  the  military  officers  in  command  on  the 
station,  to  co-operate  faithfully  in  the  execution  of  the  quarantine  and  other  re 
strictions  which  the  health  laws  of  the  state  may  establish." 

The  principles  embraced  by  these  acts,  in  relation  to  the  commercial  inter 
course  of  the  country,  are  equally  applicable  to  the  intercourse  by  mail.  There 
may,  indeed,  be  more  difficulty  in  co-operating  with  the  states  in  the  latter  than 
in  the  former,  but  that  cannot  possibly  affect  the  principle.  Regarding  it,  then, 
as  established  both  by  reason  and  precedents,  the  committee,  in  conformity 
with  it,  have  prepared  a  bill,  and  directed  their  chairman  to  report  the  same  to 
the  Senate,  prohibiting,  under  the  penalty  of  fine  and  dismission  from  office,  any 
deputy  postmaster  in  any  state,  territory,  or  district,  from  knowingly  receiving 
and  putting  into  the  mail  any  letter,  packet,  pamphlet,  paper,  or  pictorial  repre 
sentation,  directed  to  any  postoffice  or  person  in  a  state,  territory,  or  district,  by 
the  laws  of  which  the  circulation  of  the  same  is  forbidden ;  and  also  prohibit 
ing,  under  a  like  penalty,  any  deputy  postmaster  in  said  state,  territory,  or  dis 
trict,  from  knowingly  delivering  the  same,  except  to  such  persons  as  may  be 
authorized  to  receive  them  by  the  civil  authority  of  said  state,  territory,  or  dis 
trict. 

BB 


194  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

It  remains  next  to  inquire  into  the  duty  of  the  states,  from  within  whose  lim 
its  and  jurisdiction  the  internal  peace  and  security  of  the  slaveholding  states 
are  endangered. 

In  order  to  comprehend  more  fully  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  duty,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  make  a  few  remarks  on  the  relations  which  exist  between  the 
states  of  our  Federal  Union,  with  the  rights  and  obligations  reciprocally  result 
ing  from  such  relations. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  states  which  compose  our  Federal  Union 
are  sovereign  arid  independent  communities,  united  by  a  constitutional  compact. 
Among  its  members  the  laws  of  nations  are  in  full  force  and  obligation,  except 
as  altered  or  modified  by  the  compact ;  and,  of  course,  the  states  possess,  with 
that  exception,  all  the  rights,  arid  are  subject  to  all  the  duties  which  separate 
and  distinct  communities  possess,  or  to  which  they  are  subject.  Among  these 
are  comprehended  the  obligation  which  all  states  are  under  to  prevent  their  citi 
zens  from  disturbing  the  peace  or  endangering  the  security  of  other  states  ;  and, 
in  case  of  being  disturbed  or  endangered,  the  right  of  the  latter  to  demand  of 
the  former  to  adopt  such  measures  as  will  prevent  their  recurrence  ;  and,  if  re 
fused  or  neglected,  to  resort  to  such  measures  as  its  protection  may  require. 
This  right  remains,  of  course,  in  force  among  the  states  of  this  Union,  with 
such  limitations  as  are  imposed  expressly  by  the  Constitution.  Within  their 
limits,  the  rights  of  the  slaveholding  states  are  as  full  to  demand  of  the  states 
within  whose  limits  and  jurisdiction  their  peace  is  assailed,  to  adopt  the  meas 
ures  necessary  to  prevent  the  same,  and,  if  refused  or  neglected,  to  resjort  to 
means  to  protect  themselves,  as  if  they  were  separate  and  independent  commu 
nities. 

Those  states,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  only  under  all  the  obligations  which 
independent  communities  would  be  to  adopt  such  measures,  but  also  under  the 
obligation  which  the  Constitution  superadds,  rendered  more  sacred,  if  possible, 
by  the  fact  that,  while  the  Union  imposes  restrictions  on  the  right  of  the  slave- 
holding  states  to  defend  themselves,  it  affords  the  medium  through  which  their 
peace  and  security  are  assailed.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  committee  to  in 
quire  what  those  restrictions  are,  and  what  are  the  means  which,  under  the 
Constitution,  are  left  to  the  slaveholding  states  to  protect  themselves.  The  pe 
riod  has  not  yet  come,  and  they  trust  never  will,  when  it  may  be  necessary  to 
decide  those  questions ;  but  come  it  must,  unless  the  states  whose  duty  it  is  to 
suppress  the  danger  shall  see  in  time  its  magnitude,  and  the  obligations  which 
they  are  under  to  adopt  speedy  and  effectual  measures  to  arrest  its  farther  prog 
ress.  That  the  full  force  of  this  obligation  may  be  understood  by  all  parties, 
the  committee  propose,  in  conclusion,  to  touch  briefly  on  the  movements  of  the 
Abplitionists,  with  the  view  of  showing  the  dangerous  consequences  to  which 
they  must  lead  if  not  arrested. 

Their  professed  object  is  the  emancipation  of  slaves  in  the  Southern  States, 
which  they  propose  to  accomplish  through  the  agency  of  organized  societies, 
spread  throughout  the  Lon-slaveholding  states,  arid  a  powerful  press,  directed 
mainly  to  excite  in  the  other  states  hatred  arid  abhorrence  against  the  institu 
tions  and  citizens  of  the  slaveholding  states,  by  addresses,  lectures,  and  picto 
rial  representations,  abounding  in  false  and  exaggerated  statements. 

If  the  magnitude  of  the  mischief  affords,  in  any  degree,  the  measure  by  which 
to  judge  of  the  criminality  of  a  project,  few  have  ever  been  devised  to  be  com 
pared  with  the  present,  whether  the  end  be  regarded,  or  the  means  by  which 
it  is  proposed  to  be  accomplished.  The  blindness  of  fanaticism  is  proverbial. 
With  more  zeal  than  understanding,  it  constantly  misconceives  the  nature  of 
the  object  at  which  it  aims,  and  towards  which  it  rushes  with  headlong  violence, 
regardless  of  the  means  by  which  it  is  to  be  effected.  Never  was  its  charac 
ter  more  fully  exemplified  than  in  the  present  instance.  Setting  out  with  the 
abstract  principle  that  slavery  is  an  evil,  the  fanatical  zealots  come  at  once  to 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  195 

the  conclusion  that  it  is  their  duty  to  abolish  it,  regardless  of  all  the  disasters 
which  must  follow.  Never  was  conclusion  more  false  or  dangerous.  Admit 
ting  their  assumption,  there  are  innumerable  things  which,  regarded  in  the  ab 
stract,  are  evils,  but  which  it  would  be  madness  to  attempt  to  abolish.  Thus 
regarded,  government  itself  is  an  evil,  with  most  of  its  institutions  intended  to 
protect  life  and  property,  comprehending  the  civil  as  well  as  the  criminal  and 
military  code,  which  are  tolerated  only  because  to  abolish  them  would  be  to 
increase  instead  of  diminishing  the  evil.  The  reason  is  equally  applicable  to 
the  case  under  consideration  :  to  illustrate  which,  a  few  remarks  on  slavery,  as 
it  actually  exists  in  the  Southern  States,  will  be  necessary. 

He  who  regards  slavery  in  those  states  simply  under  the  relation  of  master 
and  slave,  &s  important  as  that  relation  is,  viewed  merely  as  a  question  of  prop 
erty  to  the  slaveholding  section  of  the  Union,  has  a  very  imperfect  conception 
of  the  institution,  and  the  impossibility  of  abolishing  it  without  disasters  unex 
ampled  in  the  history  of  the  world.  To  understand  its  nature  and  importance 
fully,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  slavery,  as  it  exists  in  the  Southern  States 
(including  under  the  Southern  all  the  slaveholding  States),  involves  not  only 
the  relation  of  master  and  slave,  but  also  the  social  and  political  relations  of 
two  races,  of  nearly  equal  numbers,  from  different  quarters  of  me  globe,  and  the 
most  opposite  of  all  others  in  every  particular  that  distinguishes  one  race  of 
men  from  another.  Emancipation  would  destroy  these  relations — would  divest 
the  masters  of  their  property,  and  subvert  the  relation,  social  and  political,  that 
has  existed  between  the  races  from  almost  the  first  -settlement -of  the  Southern 
States. 

It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  committee  to  dwell  on  the  pecuniary  aspect 
of  this  vital  subject :  the  vast  amount  of  property  involved,  equal,  at  least,  to 
$950,000,000,  the  ruin  of  families  and  individuals,  the  impoverishment  and 
prostration  of  an  entire  section  of  the  Union,  and  the  fatal  blow  that  would  be 
given  to  the  productions  of  the  great  agricultural  staples,  on  which  the  com 
merce,  the  navigation,  the  manufactures,  and  the  revenue  of  the  country  almost 
entirely  depend.  As  great  as  these  disasters  would  be,  they  are  nothing  com 
pared  to  what  must  follow  the  subversion  of  the  existing  relation  between  the 
two  races,  to  which  the  committee  will  confine  their  remarks. 

Under  this  relation  the  two  races  have  long  lived  in  peace  and  prosperity, 
and,  if  not  disturbed,  would  long  continue  so  to  live.  While  the  European  race 
has  rapidly  increased  in  wealth  arid  numbers,  and,  at  the  same  time,  has  main 
tained  an  equality,  at  least  morally  and  intellectually,  with  their  brethren  of  the 
non-slaveholding  states,  the  African  race  has  multiplied  with  not  less  rapidity 
accompanied  by  great  improvement,  physically  and  intellectually,  and  a  degree 
of  comfort  which  the  labouring  class  in  few  other  countries  enjoy,  and  con 
fessedly  greatly  superior  to  what  the  free  people  of  the  same  race  possess  in 
the  non-slaveholding  states.  It  may,  indeed,  be  safely  asserted,  that  there  is 
no  example  in  history  in  which  a  savage  people,  such  as  their  ancestors  were 
when  brought  into  the  country,  have  ever  advanced  in  the  same  period  so  rap 
idly  in  numbers  and  improvement. 

To  destroy  the  existing  relations,  would  be  to  destroy  this  prosperity,  and  to 
place  the  two  races  in  a  state  of  conflict,  which  must  end  in  the  expulsion  or 
extirpation  of  one  or  the  other.  No  other  can  be  substituted  compatible  with 
their  peace  or  security.  The  difficulty  is  in  the  diversity  of  the  races.  So 
strongly  drawn  is  the  line  between  the  two  in  consequence,  and  so  strengthen 
ed  by  the  force  of  habit  and  education,  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  exist  to 
gether  in  the  same  .community,  where  their  numbers  are  so  nearly  equal  as  in 
the  slaveholding  states,  under  any  other  relation  than  that  which  now  exists. 
Social  and  political  equality  between  them  is  impossible.  No  power  on  earth 
can  overcome  the  difficulty.  The  causes  lie  too  deep  in  the  principles  of  our 
nature  to  be  surmounted.  But,  without  such  equality,  to  change  the  present 


196  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

condition  of  the  African  race,  were  it  possible,  would  be  but  to  change  the  form 
of  slavery.  It  would  make  them  the  slaves  of  the  community  instead  of  the 
slaves  of  individuals,  with  less  responsibility  and  interest  in  their  welfare  on  the 
part  of  the  community  than  is  felt  by  their  present  masters ;  while  it  would  destroy 
the  security  and  independence  of  the  European  race,  if  the  African  should  be  per 
mitted  to  continue  in  their  changed  condition  within  the  limits  of  those  states. 
They  would  loojc  to  the  other  states  for  support  and  protection,  and  would  be 
come,  virtually,  their  allies  and  dependants  ;  and  would  thus  place  in  the  hands 
of  those  states  the  most  effectual  instrument  to  destroy  the  influence  and  con 
trol  the  destiny  of  the  rest  of  the  Union. 

It  is  against  this  relation  between  the  two  races  that  the  blind  and  criminal 
zeal  of  the  Abolitionists  is  directed — a  relation  that  now  preserves  ill  quiet  and 
security  more  than  6,500,000  of  human  beings,  and  which  cannot  be  destroyed 
without  destroying  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  nearly  half  the  states  of  the 
Union,  and  involving  their  entire  population  in  a  deadly  conflict,  that  must  ter 
minate  either  in  the  expulsion  or  extirpation  of  those  who  are  the  object  of  the 
misguided  and  false  humanity  of  those  who  claim  to  be  their  friends. 

He  must  be  blind  indeed  who  does  not  perceive  that  the  subversion  of  a  re 
lation  which  must  be  followed  with  such  disastrous  consequences,  can  only  be 
effected  by  convulsions  -that  would  devastate  the  country,  burst  asunder  the 
bonds  of  the  Union,  and  ingulf  in  a  sea  of  blood  the  institutions  of  the  country. 
It  is  madness  to  suppose  that  the  slaveholding  states  would  quietly  submit  to  be 
sacrificed.  Every  consideration — interest,  duty,  and  humanity  ;  the  love  of 
country,  the  sense  of  wrong,  hatred  of  oppressors,  and  treacherous  and  faithless 
confederates,  and,  finally,  despair — would  impel  them  to  the  most  daring  and 
desperate  resistance  in  defence  of  property,  family,  country,  liberty,  and  exist 
ence. 

But  wicked  and  cruel  as  is  the  end  aimed  at,  it  is  fully  equalled  by  the 
criminality  of  the  means  by  which  it  is  proposed  to  be  accomplished.  These, 
as  has  been  stated,  consist  in  organized  societies  and  a  powerful  press,  directed 
mainly  with  a  view  to  excite  the  bitterest  animosity  and  hatred  of  the  people  of 
the  non-slaveholding  states  against  the  citizens  and  institutions  of  the  slave- 
holding  states.  It  is  easy  to  see  to  what  disastrous  results  such  means  must 
tend.  Passing  over  the  more  obvious  effects,  their  tendency  to  excite  to  insur 
rection  and  servile  war,  with  all  its  horrors,  and  the  necessity  which  such  ten 
dency  must  impose  on  the  slaveholding  states  to  resort  to  the  most  rigid  disci 
pline  and  severe  police,  to  the  great  injury  of  the  present  condition  of  the  slaves, 
there  remains  another  threatening,  incalculable  mischief  to  the  country. 

The  inevitable  tendency  of  the  means  to  which  the  Abolitionists  have  resort 
ed  to  effect  their  object  must,  if  persisted  in,  end  in  completely  alienating  the 
two  great  sections  of  the  Union.  The  incessant  action  of  hundreds  of  societies, 
and  a  vast  printing  establishment,  throwing  out  daily  thousands  of  artful  and  in 
flammatory  publications,  must  make,  in  time,  a  deep  impression  on  the  section 
of  the  Union  where  they  freely  circulate,  and  are  mainly  designed  to  have  ef 
fect.  The  well-informed  and  thoughtful  may  hold  them  in  contempt,  but  the 
young,  the  inexperienced,  the  ignorant,  and  thoughtless  will  receive  the  poison. 
In  process  of  time,  when  the  number  of  proselytes  is  sufficiently  multiplied,  the 
artful  and  profligate,  who  are  ever  on  the  watch  to  seize  on  any  means,  how 
ever  wicked  and  dangerous,  will  unite  with  the  fanatics,  and  make  their  move 
ments  the  basis  of  a  powerful  political  party,  that  will  seek  advancement  by 
diffusing,  as  widely  as  possible,  hatred  against  the  slaveholding  states.  But, 
as  hatred  begets  hatred,  and  animosity  animosity,  these  feelings  would  become 
reciprocal,  till  every  vestige  of  attachment  would  cease  to  exist  between  the 
two  sections ;  when  the  Union  and  the  Constitution,  the  offspring  of  mutual  af 
fection  and  confidence,  would  forever  perish. 

Such  is  the  danger  to  which  the  movements  of  the  Abolitionists  expose  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  197 

country.  If  the  force  of  the  obligation  is  in  proportion  to  the  magnitude  of  the 
danger,  stronger  cannot  be  imposed  than  is  at  present  on  the  states  within 
whose  limits  the  danger  originates,  to  arrest  its  farther  progress — a  duty  they 
owe,  not  only  to  the  states  whose  institutions  are  assailed,  but  to  the  Union  and 
Constitution,  as  has  been  shown,  and,  it  may  be  added,  to  themselves.  The 
sober  and  considerate  portions  of  citizens  of  the  non-slaveholding  states,  who 
have  a  deep  stake  in  the  existing  institutions  of  the  country,  would  have  little 
forecast  not  to  see  that  the  assaults  which  are  now  directed  against  the  institu 
tions  of  the  Southern  States  may  be  very  easily  directed  against  those  which 
uphold  their  own  property  and  security.  A  very  slight  modification  of  the  ar 
guments  used  against  the  institutions  which  sustain  the  property  and  security 
of  the  South  would  make  them  equally  effectual  against  the  institutions  of  the 
North,  including  banking,  in  which  so  vast  an  amount  of  its  property  and  capi 
tal  is  invested.  It  would  be  well  for  those  interested  to  reflect  whether  there 
now  exists,  or  ever  has  existed,  a  wealthy  and  civilized  community  in  which 
one  portion  did  not  live  on  the  labour  of  another  ;  and  whether  the  form  in 
which  slavery  exists  in  the  South  is  not  but  one  modification  of  this  universal 
condition ;  and,  finally,  whether  any  other,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  is  more  defensible,  or  stands  on  stronger  ground  of  necessity.  It  is  time 
to  look  these  questions  in  the  face.  Let  those  who  are  interested  remember 
that  labour  is  the  only  source  of  wealth,  and  how  small  a  portion  of  it,  in  all 
old  and  civilized  countries,  even  the  best  governed,  is  left  to  those  by  whose 
labour  wealth  is  created.  Let  them  also  reflect  how  little  volition  or  agency 
the  operatives  in  any  country  have  in  the  question  of  its  distribution — as  little, 
with  a  few  exceptions,  as  the  African  of  the  slaveholding  states  has  in  the  distri 
bution  of  the  proceeds  of  his  labour.  Nor  is  it  the  less  oppressive,  that  in  the 
one  case  it  is  effected  by  the  stem  and  powerful  will  of  the  government,  and  in 
the  other  by  the  more  feeble  and  flexible  will  of  a  master.  If  one  be  an  evil, 
so  is  the  other.  The  only  difference  is  the  amount  and  mode  of  the  exaction, 
and  distribution,  and  the  agency  by  which  they  are  effected. 


XII. 

SPEECH   ON    THE    ABOLITION    PETITIONS,    MARCH    9,    1836. 

THE  question  of  receiving  the  petitions  from  Pennsylvania  for  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  being  under  consideration, 

Mr.  Calhoun  rose  and  said :  If  we  may  judge  from  what  has  been  said, 
the  mind  of  the  Senate  is  fully  made  up  on  the  subject  of  these  petitions. 
With  the  exception  of  the  two  senators  from  Vermont,  all  who  have 
spoken  have  avowed  their  conviction,  not  only  that  they  contain  nothing 
requiring  the  action  of  the  Senate,  but  that  the  petitions  are  highly  mis 
chievous,  as  tending  to  agitate  and  distract  the  country,  and  to  endanger 
the  Union  itself.  With  these  concessions,  I  may  fairly  ask,  Why  should 
these  petitions  be  received  1  Why  receive  when  we  have  made  up  our 
mind  not  to  act  1  Why  idly  waste  our  time  and  lower  our  dignity  in  the 
useless  ceremony  of  receiving  to  reject,  as  is  proposed,  should  the  peti 
tions  be  received  1  Why,  finally,  receive  what  all  acknowledge  to  be 
highly  dangerous  and  mischievous  1  But  one  reason  has,  or  can  be  as 
signed — that  not  to  receive  would  be  a  violation  of  the  rig-hit  of  petition, 
and,  of  course,  that  we  are  bound  to  receive,  however  objectionable  and 
dangerous  the  petitions  may  be.  If  such  be  the  fact,  there  is  an  end  to 
the  question.  As  great  as  would  be  the  advantage  to  the  Abolitionists  if 
we  are  bound  to  receive,  if  it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  right  of  petition 


198  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

not  to  receive,  we  must  acquiesce.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  shall  be 
shown,  not  only  that  we  are  not  bound  to  receive,  but  that  to  receive,  on 
the  ground  on  which  it  has  been  placed,  would  sacrifice  the  constitutional 
rights  of  this  body,  would  yield  to  the  Abolitionists  all  they  could  hope 
at  this  time,  and  would  surrender  all  the  outworks  by  which  the  slave- 
holding  states  can  defend  their  rights  and  property  HERE,  then  a  unani 
mous  rejection  of  these  petitions  ought  of  right  to  follow. 

The  decision,  then,  of  the  question  now  before  the  Senate  is  reduced 
to  the  single  point,  Are  we  bound  to  receive  these  petitions  1  Or,  to  vary 
the  form  of  the  question,  Would  it  be  a  violation  of  the  right  of  petition 
not  to  receive  them  1 

When  the  ground  was  first  taken  that  it  would  be  a  violation,  I  could 
scarcely  persuade  myself  that  those  who  took  it  were  in  earnest,  so  con 
trary  was  it  to  all  my  conceptions  of  the  rights  of  this  body  and  the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  :  but  finding  it  so  earnestly  maintained,  I 
have  since  carefully  investigated  the  subject,  and  the  result  has  been  a 
confirmation  of  my  first  impression,  and  a  conviction  that  the  claim  of 
right  is  without  shadow  of  foundation.  The  question,  I  must  say,  has 
not  been  fairly  met.  Those  opposed  to  the  side  wrhich  we  support  have 
discussed  the  question  as  if  we  denied  the  right  of  petition,  when  they 
could  not  but  know  that  the  true  issue  is  not  as  to  the  existence  of  the 
right,  which  is  acknowledged  by  all,  but  its  extent  and  limits,  which  not 
one  of  our  opponents  has  so  much  as  attempted  to  ascertain.  What  they 
have  declined  doing  I  undertake  to  perform. 

There  must  be  some  point,  all  will  agree,  where  the  right  of  petition 
ends,  an4  that  of  this  body  begins.  Where  is  that  point  1  I  have  exam 
ined  this  question  carefully,  and  I  assert  boldly,  without  the  least  fear  of 
refutation,  that,  stretched  to  the  utmost,  the  right  cannot  be  extended  be 
yond  the  presentation  of  a  petition,  at  which  point  the  rights  of  this  body 
commence.  When  a  petition  is  presented,  it  is  before  the  Senate.  It 
must  then  be  acted  on.  Some  disposition  must  be  made  of  it  before  the 
Senate  can  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  any  other  subject.  This  no  one 
will  deny.  With  the  action  of  the  Senate  its  rights  commence  :  rights 
secured  by  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  which  vests  each 
house  with  the  right  of  regulating  its  own  proceedings,  that  is,  to  deter 
mine  by  fixed  rules  the  order  and  form  of  its  action.  To  extend  the  right 
of  petition  beyond  presentation,  is  clearly  to  extend  it  beyond  that  point 
where  the  action  of  the  Senate  commences,  and,  as  such,  is  a  manifest 
violation  of  its  constitutional  rights.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  limits  be 
tween  the  right  of  petition  and  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  regulate  its 
proceedings  clearly  fixed,  and  so  perfectly  defined  as  not  to  admit  of  mis 
take,  and,  I  would  add,  of  controversy,  had  it  not  been  questioned  in  this 
discussion. 

If  what  I  have  asserted  required  confirmation,  ample  might  be  found  in 
our  rules,  which  imbody  the  deliberate  sense  of  the  Senate  on  this  point, 
from  the  commencement  of  the  government  to  this  day.  Among  them, 
the  Senate  has  prescribed  that  of  its  proceedings  on  the  presentation  of 
petitions.  It  is  contained  in  the  24th  Rule,  which  I  ask  the  secretary  to 
read,  with  Mr.  Jefferson's  remarks  in  reference  to  it. 
.  "  Before  any  petition  or  memorial  addressed  to  the  Senate  shall  be  re 
ceived  and  read  at  the  table,  whether  the  same  shall  be  introduced  by  the 
President  or  a  member,  a  brief  statement  of  the  contents  of  the  petition 
or  memorial  shall  verbally  be  made  by  the  introducer." — Rule  24. 

Mr.  Jefferson's  remarks :  "  Regularly  a  motion  for  receiving  it  must  be 
made  and  seconded,  and  a  question  put  whether  it  shall  be  received ;  but  a  cry 
from  the  house  of  '  Receive,'  or  even  a  silence,  dispenses  with  the  for 
mality  of  the  question." 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  199 

Here  we  have  a  confirmation  of  all  I  have  asserted.  It  clearly  proves 
that,  when  a  petition  is  presented,  the  action  of  the  Senate  commences. 
The  first  act  is  to  receive  the  petition.  Received  by  whom  1  Not  the 
secretary,  but  the  Senate.  And  how  can  it  be  received  by  the  Senate 
but  on  a  motion  to  receive,  and  a  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  body  1  And 
Mr.  Jefferson,  accordingly,  tells  us  that,  regularly,  such  a  motion  must  be 
made  and  seconded.  'On  this  question,  then,  the  right  of  the  Senate 
begins,  and  its  right  is  as  perfect  and  full  to  receive  or  reject,  as  it  is  to 
adopt  or  reject  any  other  question,  in  any  subsequent  stage  of  its  pro 
ceedings.  When  I  add  that  this  rule  was  adopted  as  far  back  as  the  19th 
of  April,  1789,  at  the  first  session  of  the  Senate,  and  that  it  has  been  re 
tained,  without  alteration,  in  all  the  subsequent  changes  and  modifications 
of  the  rules,  we  have  the  strongest  evidence  of  the  deliberate  sense  of  this 
body  in  reference  to  the  point  under  consideration. 

I  feel  that  I  might  here  terminate  the  discussion.  I  have  shown  con 
clusively  that  the  right  of  petition  cannot  possibly  be  extended  beyond 
presentation.  At  that  point  it  is  met  by  the  rights  of  the  Senate  ;  and  it 
follows,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that,  so  far  from  being  bound  to  re 
ceive  these  petitions,  so  far  would  a  rejection  be  from  violating  the  right 
of  petition,  we  are  left  perfectly  free  to  reject  or  to  receive  at  pleasure, 
and  that  we  cannot  be  deprived  of  it  without  violating  the  rights  of  this 
body,  secured  by  the  Constitution. 

But,  on  a  question  of  such  magnitude,  I  feel  it  to  be  a  duty  to  remove 
every  difficulty  ;  and,  that  not  a  shadow  of  doubt  may  remain,  I  shall 
next  proceed  to  reply  to  the  objections  our  opponents  have  made  to  the 
grounds  I  have  taken.  At  the  head  of  these  it  has  been  urged,  again  and 
again,  that  petitioners  have  a  right  to  be  heard,  and  that  not  to  receive 
petitions  is  to  refuse  a  hearing.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  throughout 
this  discussion,  those  opposed  to  us  have  dealt  in  such  vague  generalities, 
and  ventured  assertions  with  so  little  attention  to  facts.  Why  have  they 
not  informed  us,  in  the  present  instance,  what  is  meant  by  the  right  to 
be  heard,  and  how  that  right  is  violated  by  a  refusal  to  receive  1  Had 
they  thought  proper  to  give  us  this  information,  it  would,  at  least,  have 
greatly  facilitated  my  reply;  but  as  it  is,  I  am  constrained  to  inquire  into 
the  different  senses  in  which  the  assertion  may  be  taken,  and  then  to 
show  that  in  not  one  of  them  is  the  right  of  petition  in  the  slightest  de 
gree  infringed  by  a  refusal  to  receive. 

What,  then,  is  meant  by  the  assertion  that  these  petitioners  have  a  right 
to  be  heard  1  Is  it  meant  that  they  have  a  right  to  appear  in  the  Senate 
chamber  in  person  to  present  their  petition  and  to  be  heard  in  its  defence^. 
If  this  be  the  meaning,  the  dullest  apprehension  must  see  that  the  ques 
tion  on  receiving  has  not  the  slightest  bearing  on  such  right.  If  they 
have  the  right  to  be  heard  personally  at  our  bar,  it  is  not  the  24-th  rule  of 
our  proceedings,  but  the  19th  which  violates  that  right.  That  rule  ex 
pressly  provides  that  a  motion  to  admit  any  person  whatever  within  the 
doors  of  the  Senate  to  present  a  petition  shall  be  out  of  order,  and,  of 
course,  excludes  the  petitioners  from  being  heard  in  person.  But  it  may 
i)e  meant  that  petitioners  have  a  right  to  have  their  petitions  presented 
to  the  Senate  and  read  in  their  hearing.  If  this  be  the  meaning,  the  right 
has  been  enjoyed  in  the  present  instance  to  the  fullest  extent.  The  peti 
tion  was  presented  by  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan)  in 
the  usual  mode,  by  giving  a  statement  of  its  contents,  and  on  my  call  was 
read  by  the  secretary  at  his  table. 

But  one  more  sense  can  be  attached  to  the  assertion.  It  may  be  meant 
that  the  petitioners  have  a  right  to  have  their  petitions  discussed  by  the 
Senate.  If  this  be  intended,  I  will  venture  to  say  that  there  never  was  an 


200  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

assertion  more  directly  in  the  teeth  of  facts  than  that  which  has  been  so 
frequently  made  in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  that,  to  refuse  to  receive 
the  petition,  is  to  refuse  a  hearing  to  the  petitioners.  Has  not  this  ques 
tion  heen  before  us  for  months!  Has  not  the  petition  been  discussed 
day  after  day,  fully  and  freely,  in  all  its  bearings  1  And  how,  with  these 
facts  before  us,  with  the  debates  still  ringing  in  our  ears,  any  senator  can, 
rise  in  his  place,  and  gravely  pronounce  that  to  refuse  to  receive  this  pe 
tition  is  to  refuse  a  hearing  to  the  petitioners,  to  refuse  discussion  in  the 
broadest  sense,  is  past  my  comprehension.  Our  opponents,  as  if  in  their 
eagerness  to  circumscribe  the  rights  of  the  Senate,  and  to  enlarge  those 
of  the  Abolitionists  (for  such  must  be  the  effect  of  their  course),  have 
closed  their  senses  against  facts  passing  before  their  eyes ;  and  have  en 
tirely  overlooked  the  nature  of  the  question  now  before  the  Senate,  and 
which  they  have  been  so  long  discussing. 

The  question  on  receiving  the  petition  not  only  admits  discussion,  but 
admits  it  in  the  most  ample  manner ;  more  so,  in  fact,  than  any  other, 
except  the  final  question  on  the  rejection  of  the  prayer  of  the  petition,  or 
some  tantamount  question.  Whatever  may  go  to  show  that  the  petition 
is  or  is  not  deserving  the  action  of  this  body,  may  be  freely  urged  for 
or  against  it,  as  has  been  done  on  the  present  occasion.  In  this  respect 
there  is  a  striking  difference  between  it  and  many  of  the  subsequent  ques 
tions  which  may  be  raised  after  reception,  and  particularly  the  one  made 
by  the  senator  from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy),  who  now  is  so  strenuous 
an  advocate  in  favour  of  the  right  of  the  petitioners  to  be  heard.  He 
spoke  with  apparent  complacency  of  his  course  as  it  respects  another  of 
these  petitions.  And  what  was  that  course  'I  He  who  is  now  so  eager 
for  discussion  to  give  a  hearing,  moved  to  lay  the  petition  on  the  table, 
a  motion  which  cuts  off  all  discussion. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  If  the  question  on  receiving  petitions  admits  of 
so  wide  a  scope  for  discussion,  why  not  receive  this  petition,  and  discuss 
it  at  some  subsequent  stage !  Why  not  receive,  in  order  to  reject  its 
prayer,  as  proposed  by  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan), 
instead  of  rejecting  the  petition  itself  on  the  question  of  receiving,  as  we 
propose  1  What  is  the  difference  between  the  two  \ 

I  do  not  intend  at  this  stage  to  compare,  or,  rather,  to  contrast  the  two 
courses,  for  they  admit  of  no  comparison.  My  object  at  present  is  to 
establish,  beyond  the  possibility  of  a  doubt,  that  we  are  not  bound  to  re 
ceive  these  petitions  j  and  when  that  is  accomplished,  I  will  then  show 
the  disastrous  consequences  which  must  follow  the  reception  of  the  peti 
tion,  be  the  after  disposition  what  it  may.  In  the  mean  time,  it  is  suffi 
cient  to  remark,  that  it  is  only  on  the  question  of  receiving  that  oppo 
sition  can  be  made  to  the  petition  itself.  On  all  others  the  opposition  is 
to  its  prayer.  On  the  decision,  then,  of  the  question  of  receiving  depends 
the  important  question  of  jurisdiction.  To  receive  is  to  take  jurisdic 
tion  ;  to  give  an  implied  pledge  to  investigate  and  decide  on  the  prayer, 
and  to  give  the  petition  a  place  in  our  archives,  and  become  responsible 
for  its  safe  keeping ;  and  who  votes  for  receiving  this  petition  on  the 
ground  on  which  its  reception  is  placed,  votes  that  Congress  is  bound  to 
take  jurisdiction  of  the  question  of  abolishing  slavery  both  here  and  in 
the  states  ;  gives  an  implied  pledge  to  take  the  subject  under  considera 
tion,  and  orders  the  petition  to  be  placed  among  the  public  records  for 
safe  keeping. 

But  to  proceed  in  reply  to  the  objections  of  our  opponents.  It  is  next 
urged  that  precedents  are  against  the  side  we  support.  I  meet  this  ob 
jection  Avith  a  direct  denial.  From  the  beginning  of  the  government  to 
the  commencement  of  this  session,  there  is  not  a  single  precedent  that 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  201 

justifies  the  receiving  of  these  petitions  on  the  ground  on  which  their  re 
ception  is  urged.  The  real  state  of  the  case  is,  that  we  are  not  following, 
but  making  precedents.  For  the  first  time  has  the  principle  been  assumed 
that  we  are  bound  to  receive  petitions  ;  that  we  have  no  discretion,  but 
must  take  jurisdiction  over  them,  however 'absurd,  frivolous,  mischievous, 
or  foreign  from  the  purpose  for  which  the  government  was  created.  Re 
ceive  these  petitions,  and  you  will  create  a  precedent  which  will  hereaf 
ter  establish  this  monstrous  principle.  As  yet  there  are  none.  The  case 
relied  on  by  the  senator  from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy)  is  in  no  respect 
analogous.  ,  No  question,  in  that  case,  was  made  on  the  reception  of  the 
petition.  The  petition  slipped  in  without  taking  a  vote,  as  is  daily  done 
where  the  attention  of  the  Senate  is  not  particularly  called  to  the  subject. 
The  question  on  which  the  discussion  took  place  was  on  the  reference, 
and  not  on  the  reception,  as  in  this  case  ;  but  what  is  decisive  against  the 
precedent,  and  which  I  regret  the  senator  (Mr.  Grundy)  did  not  state,  so 
that  it  might  accompany  his  remarks,  is  the  fact  that  the  petition  was  not 
for  abolishing  slavery.  The  subject  was  the  African  slave-trade  ;  and  the 
petition  simply  prayed  that  Congress  would  inquire  whether  they  might 
not  adopt  some  measure  of  interdiction  prior  to  1808,  when,  by  the  Con 
stitution,  they  would  be  authorized  to  suppress  that  trade.  I  ask  the  sec 
retary  to  read  the  prayer  of  the  petition : 

"  But  we  find  it  indispensably  incumbent  on  us,  as  a  religious  body,  as 
suredly  believing  that  both  the  true  temporal  interests  of  nations  and 
eternal  well-being  of  individuals  depend  on  doing  justly,  loving  mercy, 
and  walking  humbly  before  God,  the  creator,  preserver,  and  benefactor  of 
men,  thus  to  attempt  to  excite  your  attention  to  the  affecting  subject 
(slave-trade),  earnestly  desiring  that  the  infinite  Father  of  Spirits  may  so 
enrich  our  minds  with  his  love  and  truth,  and  so  influence  your  under 
standing  by  that  pure  wisdom  which  is  full  of  mercy  and  good  fruits,  as 
that  a  sincere  and  an  impartial  inquiry  may  take  place,  whether  it  be  not 
an  essential  part  of  the  duty  of  your  exalted  station  to  exert  upright  en 
deavours,  to  the  full  extent  of  your  power,  to  remove  every  obstruction 
to  public  righteousness,  which  the  influence  of  artifice  of  particular  per 
sons,  governed  by  the  narrow,  mistaken  views  of  self-interest,  has  occa 
sioned  ;  and  whether,  notwithstanding  such  seeming  impediments,  it  be 
not  really  within  your  power  to  exercise  justice  and  mercy,  which,  if  ad 
hered  to,  we  cannot  doubt  abolition  must  produce  the  abolition  of  the 
slave-trade." 

Now,  I  ask  the  senator,  Where  is  the  analogy  between  this  and  the  pres 
ent  petition,  the  reception  of  which  he  so  strenuously  urges  1  He  is  a 
lawyer  of  long  experience  and  of  distinguished  reputation,  and  I  put  the 
question  to  him,  On  what  possible  principle  can  a  case  so  perfectly  dis 
similar  justify  the  vote  he  intends  to  give  on  the  present  occasion]  On 
what  possible  ground  can  the  vote  of  Mr.  Madison,  to  refer  that  petition, 
on  which  he  has  so  much  relied,  justify  him  in  receiving  this  1  Does  he 
not  perceive,  in  his  own  example,  the  danger  of  forming  precedents  1  If 
he  may  call  to  his  aid  the  authority  of  Mr.  Madison,  in  a  case  so  dissim 
ilar,  to  justify  the  reception,  of  this  petition,  and  thereby  extend  the  juris 
diction  of  Congress  over  the  question  of  emancipation,  to  what  purpose, 
hereafter,  may  not  the  example  of  his  course  on  the  present  occasion  be 
perverted  1 

It  is  not  my  design  to  censure  Mr.  Madison's  course,  but  I  cannot  re 
frain  from  expressing  my  regret  that  his  name  is  not  found  associated,  on 
that  occasion,  with  the  sagacious  and  firm  representatives  from  the  South 
— Smith,  Tucker,  and  Burke  of  South  Carolina,  James  Jackson  of  Geor 
gia,  and  many  others,  who,  at  that  early  period,  foresaw  the  danger, 

Cc 


202  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  met  it  as  it  ought  ever  to  be  met  by  those  who  regard  the  peace  and 
security  of  the  slaveholding  states.  Had  he  added  the  weight  of  his  tal 
ents  and  authority  to  theirs,  a  more  healthy  tone  of  sentiment  than  that 
which  now,  unfortunately,  exists,  would  this  day  have  been  the  conse 
quence. 

Another  case  has  been  cited  to  justify  the  vote  for  reception.  I  refer 
to  the  petition  from  the  Quakers  in  1805,  which  the  senator  from  Pennsyl 
vania  (Mr.  Buchanan)  relies  on  to  sustain  him  in  receiving  the  present  pe 
tition.  What  I  have  said  in  reply  to  the  precedent  cited  by  the  senator 
from  Tennessee  applies  equally  to  this.  Like  that,  the  petition  prayed 
legislation,  not  on  abolition  of  slavery,  but  the  African  slave-trade,  over 
which  subject  Congress  then  in  a  few  years  would  have  full  jurisdiction 
by  the  Constitution,  and  might  well  have  their  attention  called  to  it  in  ad 
vance.  But,  though  their  objects  were  the  same,  the  manner  in  which 
the  petitions  were  met  was  very  dissimilar.  Instead  of  being  permitted 
to  be  received  silently,  like  the  former,  this  petition  was  met  at  the 
threshold.  The  question  of  receiving  was  made,  as  on  the  present  oc 
casion,  and  its  rejection  sustained  by  a  strong  Southern  vote,  as  the  jour 
nal  will  show.  The  secretary  will  read  the  journal : 

"  Mr.  Logan  presented  a  petition,  signed  Thomas  Morris,  clerk,  on  be 
half  of  the  meeting  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  called  Quakers, 
in  Pennsylvania,  New-Jersey,  &c.,  stating  that  the  petitioners,  from  a 
sense  of  religious  duty,  had  again  come  forward  to  plead  the  cause  of 
their  oppressed  and  degraded  fellow-men  of  the  African  race.  On  the 
question,  '  Shall  this  petition  be  received  V  it  passed  in  the  affirmative — 
yeas  19,  nays  9." 

Among  those  to  receive  the  petition  there  were  but  four  from  the 
slaveholding  states,  and  this  on  a  single  petition  praying  for  legislation  on 
a  subject  over  which  Congress  in  so  short  a  time  would  have  full  author 
ity.  What  an  example  to  us  on  the  present  occasion  !  Can  any  man 
doubt,  from  the  vote,  if  the  Southern  senators  on  that  occasion  had  been 
placed  in  our  present  situation — that,  had  it  been  their  lot,  as  it  is  ours, 
to  meet  that  torrent  of  petitions  which  is  now  poured  in  on  Congress,  not 
from  peaceable  Quakers,  but  ferocious  incendiaries — not  to  suppress  the 
African  slave-trade,  but  to  abolish  slavery,  they  would  with  united  voice 
have  rejected  the  petition  with  scorn  and  indignation]  Can  any  one  who 
&new  him  doubt  that  one  of  the  senators  from  the  South  (the  gallant  Sum- 
ter),  who,  on  that  occasion,  voted  for  receiving  the  petition,  would  have 
been  among  the  first  to  vindicate  the  interests  of  those  whom  he  rep 
resented,  had  the  question  at  that  day  been  what  it  is  on  the  present  oc 
casion'? 

We  are  next  told  that,  instead  of  looking  to  the  Constitution  in  order 
to  ascertain  what  are  the  limits  to  the  right  of  petition,  we  must  push  that 
instrument  aside,  and  go  back  to  Magna  Charta  and  the  Declaration  of 
Eights  for  its  origin  and  limitation.  We  live  in  strange  times.  It  seems 
there  are  Christians  now  more  orthodox  than  the  Bible,  and  politicians 
whose  standard  is  higher  than  the  Constitution  ;  but  I  object  not  to  tracing 
the  right  to  these  ancient  and  venerated  sources ;  I  hold  in  high  estima 
tion  the  institutions  of  our  English  ancestors.  They  grew  up  gradually, 
through  many  generations,  by  the  incessant  and  untiring  efforts  of  an  in 
telligent  and  brave  people  struggling  for  centuries  against  the  power  of 
the  crown.  To  them  we  are  indebted  for  nearly  all  that  has  been  gained 
for  liberty  in  modern  times,  excepting  what  we  have  added.  But  may  I 
not  ask  how  it  has  happened  that  our  opponents,  in  going  back  to  these 
sacred  instruments,  have  not  thought  proper  to  cite  their  provisions,  or 
to  show  in  what  manner  our  refusal  to  receive  these  petitions  can  violate 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  203 

the  right  of  petition  as  secured  by  them  ^  I  feel  under  no  obligation  to 
supply  the  omission — to  cite  what  they  have  omitted  to  cite,  or  to  prove, 
from  the  instruments  themselves,  that  to  be  no  violation  of  them  which 
they  have  not  proved  to  be  a. violation.  It  is  unnecessary.  The  practice 
of  Parliament  is  sufficient  for  my  purpose.  It  proves  conclusively  that 
it  is  no  violation  of  the  right,  as  secured  by  those  instruments,  to  refuse 
to  receive  petitions.  To  establish  what  this  practice  is,  I  ask  the  secretary 
to  read  from  Hatsel,  a  work  of  the  highest  authority,  the  several  para 
graphs  which  are  marked  with  a  pencil,  commencing  at  page  760,  under 
the  head  of  Petitions  on  Matter  of  Supply  : 

"  On  the  9th  of  April,  1694,  a  petition  was  tendered  to  the  house  re* 
lating  to  the  bill  for  granting  to  their  majesties  several  duties  upon  the 
tonnage  of  ships ;  and  the  question  being  put  that  the  petition  be  re 
ceived,  it  passed  in  the  negative." 

"  On  the  28th  of  April,  1698,  a  petition  was  offered  to  the  house  against 
the  bill  for  laying  a  duty  upon  inland  pit  coal  j  and  the  question  being 
put  that  the  petition  be  received,  it  passed  in  the  negative.  See,  also,  the 
29th  and  30th  of  June,  1698,  petitions  relating  to  the  duties  upon  Scotch 
linens,  and  upon  whale  fins  imported. —  Vid.  20th  of  April,  1698." 

"  On  the  5th  of  January,  1703,  a  petition  of  the  maltsters  of  Nottingham 
being  offered  against  the  bill  for  continuing  the  duties  on  malt,  and  the 
question  being  put  that  the  petition  be  brought  up,  it  passed  in  the  nega 
tive." 

"  On  the  21st  of  December,  1706,  Resolved,  That  this  house  will  receive 
no  petition  for  any  sum  of  money  relating  to  public  service  but  what  is 
recommended  from  the  crown.  Upon  the  llth  of  June,  1713,  this  is  de 
clared  to  be  a  standing  order  of  the  house." 

"  On  the  29th  of  March,  1707,  Resolved,  That  the  house  will  not  pro 
ceed  on  any  petition,  motion,  or  bill  for  granting  any  money,  or  for  re 
leasing  or  compounding  any  money  owing  to  the  crown,  but  in  a  com 
mittee  of  the  whole  house  ;  and  this  is  declared  to  be  a  standing  order. 
See,  also,  the  29th  of  November,  1710." 

"  On  the  23d  of  April,  1713,  Resolved,  That  the  house  will  receive  no 
petition  for  compounding  debts  to  the  crown,  upon  any  branch  of  the  rev 
enue,  without  a  certificate  from  the  proper  officer  annexed,  stating  the 
debt,  what  prosecutions  have  been  made  for  the  recovery  thereof,  and 
•what  the  petitioner  and  his  security  are  able  to  pay." 

"On  the  25th  of  March,  1715,  this  is  declared  to  be  a  standing  order. 
See  the  2d  of  March,  1735,  and  the  9th  of  January,  1752,  the  proceedings 
upon  petitions  of  this  sort." 

"  On  the  8th  of  March,  1732,  a  petition  being  offered  against  a  bill  de 
pending  for  securing  the  trade  of  the  sugar  colonies,  it  was  refused  to  be 
brought  up.  A  motion  was  then  made  that  a  committee  be  appointed  to 
search  precedents  in  relation  to  the  receiving  or  not  receiving  petitions 
against  the  imposing  of  duties ;  and  the  question  being  put,  it  passed  in 
the  negative." 

Nothing  can  be  more  conclusive.  Not  only  are  petitions  rejected,  but 
resolutions  are  passed  refusing  to  receive  entire  classes  of  petitions,  and 
that,  too,  on  the  subject  of  imposing  taxes — a  subject,  above  all  others,  in 
Delation  to  which  we  would  suppose  the  right  ought  to  be  held  most  sa 
cred,  and  this  within  a  few  years  after  the  Declaration  of  Rights.  With 
these  facts  before  us,  what  are  we  to  think  of  the  assertion  of  the  senator 
from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy),  who  pronounced  in  his  place,  in  the  bold 
est  and  most  unqualified  manner,  that  there  was  no  deliberative  body 
•which  did  not  act  on  the  principle  that  it  was  bound  to  receive  petitions  I 
That  a  member  of  his  long  experience  and  caution  should  venture  to 


204  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

make  an  assertion  so  unfounded,  is  one  among  the  many  proofs  of  the 
carelessness,  both  as  to  facts  and  argument,  with  which  this  important 
subject  has  been  examined  and  discussed  on  that  side. 

But  it  is  not  necessary  to  cross  the  Atlantic,  or  to  go  back  to  remote 
periods,  to  find  precedents  for  the  rejection  of  petitions.  This  body,  on  a 
memorable  occasion,  and  after  full  deliberation,  a  short  time  since  reject 
ed  a  petition;  and  among  those  who  voted  for  the  rejection  will  be  found 
the  names  (of  course  I  exclude  my  own), of  the  most  able  and  experienced 
members  of  the  Senate.  I  refer  to  the  case  of  resolutions  in  the  nature 
of  a  remonstrance  from  the  citizens  of  York,  Pennsylvania,  approving  the 
act  of  the  President  in  removing  the  deposites.  I  ask  the  secretary  to 
read  the  journals  on  the  occasion  : 

""The  Vice-president  communicated  a  preamble  and  a  series  of  resolu 
tions  adopted  at  a  meeting  of  the  citizens  of  York  county,  Pennsylvania, 
approving  the  act  of  the  executive  removing  the  public  money  from  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  opposed  to  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of 
said  bank ;  which  having  been  read,  Mr.  Clay  objected  to  the  reception. 
And  on  the  question,  '  Shall  they  be  received  V  it  was  determined  in  the 
negative — yeas  20,  nays  24. 

"  On  motion  of  Mr.  Preston,  the  yeas  and  nays  being  desired  by  one 
fifth  of  the  senators  present,  those  who  voted  in  the  affirmative  are, 

"  Messrs.  Benton,  Brown,  Forsyth,  Grundy,  Hendricks,  Hill,  Kane, 
King  of  Alabama,  King  of  Georgia,  Linn,  M'Keari,  Mangum,  Morris, 
Robinson,  Shepley,  Tallmadge,  Tipton,  White,  Wilkins,  Wright. 

"  Those  who  voted  in  the  negative,  are, 

"  Messrs.  Bibb,  Black,  Calhoun,  Clay,  Clayton,  Ewing,  Frelinghuysen, 
Kent,  Leigh,  Moore,  Naudain,  Poindexter,  Porter,  Prentiss,  Preston,  Rob- 
bins,  Silsbee,  Smith,  Southard,  Sprague,  Swift,  Tomlinson,  Waggaman, 
Webster." 

In  citing  this  case  it  is  not  my  intention  to  call  in  question  the  con 
sistency  of  any  member  on  this  floor  :  it  would  be  unworthy  of  the  occa 
sion.  I  doubt  not  the  vote  then  given  was  given  from  a  full  conviction, 
of  its  correctness,  as  it  will  doubtless  be  in  the  present  case,  on  whatever 
side  it  may  be  found.  My  object  is  to  show  that  the  principle  for  which 
I  contend,  so  far  from  being  opposed,  is  sustained  by  precedents,  here  and 
elsewhere,  ancient  and  modern. 

In  following  as  I  have  those  opposed  to  me,  to  Magna  Charta  and  the 
Declaration  of  Rights  for  the  origin  and  the  limits  of  the  right  of  petition, 
I  am  not  disposed,  with  them,  to  set  aside  the  Constitution.  I  assent  to 
the  position  they  assume,  that  the  right  of  petition  existed  before  the 
Constitution,  and  that  it  is  not  derived  from  it ;  but  while  I  look  beyond 
that  instrument  for  the  right,  I  hold  the  Constitution,  on  a  question  as  to 
its  extent  and  limits,  to  be  the  highest  authority.  The  first  amended  ar 
ticle  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that  Congress  shall  pass  no  law 
to  prevent  the  people  from  peaceably  assembling  and  petitioning  for  a  re 
dress  of  grievances,  was  clearly  intended  to  prescribe  the  limits  within 
which  the  right  might  be  exercised.  It  is  not  pretended  that  to  refuse 
to  receive  petitions  touches  in  the  slightest  degree  on  these  limits.  To 
suppose  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution — no,  not  the  framers,  but 
those  jealous  patriots  who  were  not  satisfied  with  that  instrument  as  it 
came  from  the  hands  of  the  framers,  and  who  proposed  this  very  provision 
to  guard  what  they  considered  a  sacred  right,  performed  their  task  so 
bunglingly  as  to  omit  any  essential  guard,  would  be  to  do  great  injustice 
to  the  memory  of  those  stern  and -sagacious  men;  and  yet  this  is  what 
the  senator  from  Tennessee  (Mr.  Grundy)  has  ventured  to  assert.  He 
said  that  no  provision  was  added  to  guard  against  the  rejection  of  petitions, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  205 

because  the  obligation  to  receive  was  considered  so  clear  that  it  was 
deemed  unnecessary  j  when  he  ought  to  have  known  that,  according  to 
the  standing  practice  at  that  time,  Parliament  was  in  the  constant  habit, 
as  has  been  shown,  of  refusing  to  receive  petitions — a  practice  which 
could  not  have  been  unknown  to  the  authors  of  the  amendment ;  and  from 
which  it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that,  in  omitting  to  provide  that  petitions 
should  be  received,  it  was  not  intended  to  comprehend  their  reception  in 
the  right  of  petition. 

I  have  now,  I  trust,  established,  beyond  all  controversy,  that  we  are  not 
bound  to  receive  these  petitions,  and  that  if  we  should  reject  them  we 
would  not  in  the  slightest  degree  infringe  the  right  of  petition.  It  is  now 
time  to  look  to  the  rights  of  this  body,  and  to  see  whether,  if  we  should 
receive  them,  when  it  is  acknowledged  that  the  only  reason  for  receiving 
is  that  we  are  bound  to  do  so,  we  would  not  establish  a  principle  which 
would  trench  deeply  on  the  rights  of  the  Senate.  I  have  already  shown 
that,  where  the  action  of  the  Senate  commences,  there  also  its  rights  to 
determine  how  and  when  it  shall  act  also  commences.  I  have  also  shown 
that  the  action  of  the  Senate  necessarily  begins  on  the  presentation  of  a 
petition  j  that  the  petition  is  then  before  the  body ;  that  the  Senate  can 
not  proceed  to  other  business  without  making  some  disposition  of  it ;  and 
that,  by  the  24th  rule,  the  first  action  after  presentation  is  on  a  question 
to  receive  the  petition.  .  To  extend  the  right  of  petition  to  the  question 
on  receiving  is  to  expunge  this  rule — to  abolish  this  unquestionable  right 
of  the  Senate,  and  that  for  the  benefit,  in  this  case,  of  the  Abolitionists. 
Their  gain  would  be  at  the  loss  of  this  body.  I  have  not  expressed  my 
self  too  strongly.  Give  the  right  of  petition  the  extent  contended  for, 
decide  that  we  are  bound  under  the  Constitution  to  receive  these  in 
cendiary  petitions,  and  the  very  motion  before  the  Senate  would  be  out 
of  order.  If  the  Constitution  makes  it  our  duty  to  receive,  we  would 
have  no  discretion  left  to  reject,  as  the  motion  presupposes.  Our  rules 
of  proceeding  must  accord  with  the  Constitution.  Thus,  in  the  case  of 
revenue  bills,  which,  by  the  Constitution,  must  originate  in  the  other  house, 
it  would  be  out  of  order  to  introduce  them  here,  and  it  has,  accordingly, 
been  so  decided.  For  like  reason,  if  we  are  bound  to  receive  petitions, 
the  present  motion  would  be  out  of  order ;  and,  if  such  be  your  opinion, 
it  is  your  duty,  as  the  presiding  officer,  to  call  me  to  order,  and  to  arrest 
all  farther  discussion  on  the  question  of  reception.  Let  us  now  turn  our 
eyes  for  a  moment  to  the  nature  of  the  right  which,  I  fear,  we  are  about 
to  abandon,  with  the  view  to  ascertain  what  must  be  the  consequence  if 
we  should  surrender  it. 

Of  all  the  rights  belonging  to  a  deliberative  body,  I  know  of  none  more 
universal,  or  indispensable  to  a  proper  performance  of  its  functions,  than 
the  right  to  determine  at  its  discretion  what  it  shall  receive,  over  what  it 
shall  extend  its  jurisdiction,  and  to  what  it  shall  direct  its  deliberation  and 
action.  It  is  the  first  and  universal  law  of  all  such  bodies,  and  extends 
not  only  to  petitions,  but  to  reports,  to  bills,  and  resolutions,  varied  only 
in  the  two  latter  in  the  form  of  the  question.  It  may  be  compared  to  the 
function  in  the  animal  economy,  with  which  all  living  creatures  are  en 
dowed,  of  selecting  through  the  instinct  of  taste  what  to  receive  or  reject, 
and  on  which  the  preservation  of  their  existence  depends.  Deprive  them 
of  this  function,  and  the  poisonous  as  well  as  the  wholesome  would  be 
indifferently  received  into  their  system.  So  with  deliberative  bodies  : 
deprive  them  of  the  essential  and  primary  right  to  determine  at  their 
pleasure  what  to  receive  or  reject,  and  they  would  become  the  passive 
receptacle,  indifferently,  of  all  that  is  frivolous,  absurd,  unconstitutional, 
immoral,  and  impious,  as  well  as  what  may  properly  demand  their  cle- 


206  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

liberation  and  action.  Establish  this  monstrous,  this  impious  principle 
(as  it  would  prove  to  be  in  practice),  and  what  must  be  the  consequence? 
To  what  would  we  commit  ourselves  1  If  a  petition  should  be  presented 
praying  the  abolition  of  the  Constitution  (which  we  are  bound  by  our 
oaths  to  protect),  according  to  this  abominable  doctrine  it  must  be  re 
ceived.  So  if  it  prayed  the  abolition  of  the  Decalogue,  or  of  the  Bible 
itself.  I  go  farther.  If  the  abolition  societies  should  be  converted  into 
a  body  of  Atheists,  and  should  ask  the  passage  of  a  law  denying  the  ex 
istence  of  the  Almighty  Being  above  us,  the  Creator  of  all,  according  to 
this  blasphemous  doctrine  we  would  be  bound  to  receive  the  petition ;  to 
take  jurisdiction  of  it.  I  ask  the  senators  from  Tennessee  and  Pennsyl 
vania  (Mr.  Grundy  and  Mr.  Buchanan),  Would  they  vote  to  receive  such 
a  petition  1  I  wait  not  an  answer.  They  would  instantly  reject  it  with 
loathing.  What,  then,  becomes  of  the  unlimited,  unqualified,  and  universal 
obligation  to  receive  petitions,  which  they  so  strenuously  maintain,  and 
to  which  they  are  prepared  to  sacrifice  the  constitutional  rights  of  this 
body'? 

I  shall  now  descend  from  these  hypothetical  cases  to  the  particular 
question  before  the  Senate.  What,  then,  must  be  the  consequences  of 
receiving  this  petition,  on  the  principle  that  we  are  bound  to  receive  it, 
and  all  similar  petitions  whenever  presented  1  I  have  considered  this 
question  calmly  in  all  its  bearings,  and  do  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  that 
to  receive  would  be  to  yield  to  the  Abolitionists  all  that  the  most  sanguine 
could  for  the  present  hope,  and  to  abandon  all  the  outworks  upon  which 
we  of  the  South  rely  for  our  defence  against  their  attacks  here. 

No  one  can  believe  that  the  fanatics,  who  have  flooded  thft  and  the 
other  house  with  their  petitions,  entertain  the  slightest  hope  that  Con 
gress  would  pass  a  law  at  this  time  to  abolish  slavery  in  this  District.  In 
fatuated  as  they  are,  they  must  see  that  public  opinion  at  the  North  is 
not  yet  prepared  for  so  decisive  a  step,  and  that  seriously  to  attempt  it 
now  would  be  fatal  to  their  cause.  What,  then,  do  they  hope  1  What  but 
that  Congress  should  take  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  of  abolishing  slavery 
— should  throw  open  to  the  Abolitionists  the  halls  of  legislation,  and  en 
able  them  to  establish  a  permanent  position  within  their  walls,  from  which 
hereafter  to  carry  on  their  operations  against  the  institutions  of  the  slave- 
holding  states  I  If  we  receive  this  petition,  all  these  advantages  will  be 
realized  to  them  to  the  fullest  extent.  Permanent  jurisdiction  would  be 
assumed  over  the  subject  of  slavery  not  only  in  this  District,  but  in  the 
states  themselves,  whenever  the  Abolitionists  might  choose  to  ask  Con 
gress,  by  sending  their  petitions  here,  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
states.  We  would  be  bound  to  receive  such  petitions,  and,  by  receiving, 
would  be  fairly  pledged  to  deliberate  and  decide  on  ttyem.  Having  suc 
ceeded  in  this  point,  a  most  favourable  position  would  be  gained.  The 
centre  of  operations  would  be  transferred  from  Nassau  Hall  to  the  Halls 
of  Congress.  To  this  common  centre  the  incendiary  publications  of  the 
Abolitionists  would  flow,  in  the  form  of  petitions,  to  be  received  and  pre 
served  among  the  public  records.  Here  the  subject  of  abolition  would  be 
agitated  session  after  session,  and  from  hence  the  assaults  on  the  prop 
erty  and  institutions  of  the  people  of  the  slaveholding  states  would  be  dis 
seminated,  in  the  guise  of  speeches,  over  the  whole  Union. 

Such  would  be  the  advantages  yielded  to  the  Abolitionists.  In  propor 
tion  to  their  gain  would  be  our  loss.  What  would  be  yielded  to  them 
would  be  taken  from  us.  Our  true  position — that  which  is  indispensable 
to  our  defence  here — is,  that  Congress  has  no  legitimate  jurisdiction  over 
the  subject  of  slavery  either  here  or  elsewhere.  The  reception  of  this 
petition  surrenders  this  commanding  position  5  yields  the  question  of  ju- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  207 

risdiction,  so  important  to  the  cause  of  abolition,  and  so  injurious  to  us ; 
compels  us  to  sit  in  silence  to  witness  the  assaults  on  our  character  and 
institutions,  or  to  engage  in  an  endless  contest  in  their  defence.  Such  a 
contest  is  beyond  mortal  endurance.  We  must,  in  the  end,  be  humbled, 
degraded,  broken  down,  and  worn  out. 

The  senators  from  the  slaveholding  states,  who,  most  unfortunately, 
have  committed  themselves  to  vote  for  receiving  these  incendiary  peti 
tions,  tell  us,  that  whenever  the  attempt  shall  be  made  to  abolish  slavery, 
they  will  join  with  us  to  repel  it.  I  doubt  not  the  sincerity  of  their  dec 
laration.  We  all  have  a  common  interest,  and  they  cannot  betray  ours 
without  betraying,  at  the  same  time,  their  own.  But  I  announce  to  them 
that  they  are  now  called  on  to  redeem  their  pledge.  The  attempt  is  NOW 
making.  The  work  is  going  on  daily  and  hourly.  The  war  is  waged,  not 
only  in  the  most  dangerous  manner,  but  in  the  only  manner  it  can  be 
waged.  Do  they  expect  that  the  Abolitionists  will  resort  to  arms,  and 
commence  a  crusade  to  liberate  our  slaves  by  force  1  Is  this  what  they 
mean  when  they  speak  of  the  attempt  to  abolish  slavery  1  If  so,  let  me 
tell  our  friends  of  the  South  who  differ  from  me,  that  the  war  which  the 
Abolitionists  wage  against  us  is  of  a  very  different  character,  and  far  more 
effective.  It  is  a  war  of  religious  and  political  fanaticism,  mingled,  on 
the  part  of  the  leaders,  with  "ambition  and  the  love  of  notoriety,  and  waged, 
not  against  our  lives,  but  our  character.  The  object  is  to  humble  and 
debase  us  in  our  own  estimation,  and  that  of  the  world  in  general }  to  blast 
our  reputation,  while  they  overthrow  our  domestic  institutions.  This  is 
the  mode  in  which  they  are  attempting  abolition  with  such  ample  means 
and  untiring  industry  ;  and  now  is  the  time  for  all  who  are  opposed  to  them 
to  meet  the  attack.  How  can  it  be  successfully  met  1  This  is  the  im 
portant  question.  There  is  but  one  way:  we  must  meet  the  enemy  on 
the  frontier — on  the  question  of  receiving ;  we  must  secure  that  important 
pass — it  is  our  Thermopylae.  The  power  of  resistance,  by  a  universal 
law  of  nature,  is  on  the  exterior.  Break  through  the  shell — penetrate 
the  crust,  and  there  is  no  resistance  within.  In  the  present  contest,  the 
question  on  receiving  constitutes  our  frontier.  It  is  the  first,  the  exterior 
question,  that  covers  and  protects  all  the  others.  Let  it  be  penetrated 
by  receiving  this  petitioa,  and  not  a  point  of  resistance  can  be  found 
within,  as  far  as  this  government  is  concerned.  If  we  cannot  maintain 
ourselves  there,  we  cannot  on  any  interior  position.  Of  all  the  questions 
that  can  be  raised,  there  is  not  one  on  which  we  can  rally  on  ground  more 
tenable  for  ourselves,  or  more  untenable  for  our  opponents,  not  excepting 
the  ultimate  question  of  abolition  in  the  states.  For  our  right  to  reject 
this  petition  is  as  clear  and  unquestionable  as  that  Congress  has  no  right 
to  abolish  slavery  in  the  states. 

Such  is  the  importance  of  taking  our  stand  immovably  on  the  question 
now  before  us.  Such  are  the  advantages  that  we  of  the  South  would 
sacrifice,  and  the  Abolitionists  would  gain,  were  we  to  surrender  that  im 
portant  position  by  receiving  this  petition.  What  motives  have  we  for 
making  so  great  a  sacrifice  1  What  advantages  can  we  hope  to  gain  that 
would  justify  us! 

We  are  told  of  the  great  advantages  of  a  strong  majority.  I  acknowl 
edge  it  in  a  good  cause,  and  on  sound  principles.  I  feel,  in  the  present 
instance,  how  much  our  cause  would  be  strengthened  by  a  strong  and  de 
cided  majority  for  the  rejection  of  these  incendiary  petitions.  If  anything 
we  could  do  here  could  arrest  the  progress  of  the  Abolitionists,  it  would 
be  such  a  rejection.  But,  as  advantageous  as  would  be  a  strong  majority 
on  sound  principles,  it  is  in  the  same  degree  dangerous  when  on  the  op 
posite — when  it  rests  on  improper  concessions  and  the  surrender  of  prin- 


208  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN*C.  CALHOUN. 

ciples,  whicrj  would  be  the  case  at  present.  Such  a  majority  must,  in  this 
instance,  be  purchased  by  concessions  to  the  Abolitionists,  and  a  surrender, 
on  our  part,  that  would  demolish  all  our  outworks,  give  up  all  our  strong- 
positions,  and  open  all  the  passes  to  the  free  admission  of  our  enemies. 
It  is  only  on  this  condition  that  we  can  hope  to  obtain  such  a  majority — 
a  majority  which  must  be  gathered  together  from  all  sides,  and  entertain 
ing  every  variety  of  opinion.  To  rally  such  a  majority,  the  senator  from 
Pennsylvania  .has  fallen  on  the  device  to  receive  this  petition,  and  imme 
diately  reject  it,  without  consideration  or  reflection.  To  my  mind,  the 
movement  looks  like  a  trick — a  mere  piece  of  artifice  to  juggle  and  de 
ceive.  :I  intend  no  disrespect  to  the  senator.  I  doubt  not  his  intention 
is  good,  and  believe  his  feelings  are  with  us ;  but  I  must  say  that  the 
course  he  has  intimated  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  worst  possible  for  the  slave- 
holding  states.  It  surrenders  all  to  Abolitionists,  and  gives  nothing  in 
turn  that  would  be  of  the  least  advantage  to  us.  Let  the  majority  for  the 
course  he  indicates  be  ever  so  strong,  can  the  senator  hope  that  it  will 
make  any  impression  on  the  Abolitionists'!  Can  he  even  hope  to  maintain 
his  position  of  rejecting  their  petitions  without  consideration  or  deliber 
ation  on  their  merits!  Does  he  not  see  that,  in  assuming  jurisdiction  by 
receiving  their  petitions,  he  gives  an  implied  pledge  to  inquire,  to  delib 
erate,  and  decide  on  them!  Experience  will  teach  him  that  we  must 
either  refuse  to  receive,  or  go  through.  I  entirely  concur  with  the  sen 
ator  from  Vermont  (Mr.  Prentiss)  on  that  point.  There  is  no  middle 
ground  that  is  tenable,  and,  least  of  all,  that  proposed  to  be  occupied  by 
the  senator  from  Pennsylvania,  and  those  who  act  with  him.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  course  he  proposes  is  calculated  to  lull  the  people  of  the  slave- 
holding  states  into  a  false  security,  under  the  delusive  impression  which 
it  is  calculated  to  make,  that  there  is  more  strength  here  against  the  Abo 
litionists  than  really  does  exist. 

But  we  are  told  that  the  right  of  petition  is  popular  in  the  North,  and 
that  to  make  an  issue,  however  true,  which  might  bring  it  in  question, 
would  weaken  our  friends  here,  and  strengthen  the  Abolitionists.  I  have 
no  doubt  of  the  kind  feelings  of  our  brethren  from  the  North  on  this 
floor ;  but  I  clearly  see  that,  while  we  have  their  feelings  in  our  favour, 
their  constituents,  right  or  wrong,  will  have  their  votes,  however  we  may 
be  affected.  But  I  assure  our  friends  that  we  would  not  do  anything 
willingly  which  would  weaken  them  at  home ;  and  if  we  could  be  assured 
that,  by  yielding  to  their  wishes  the  right  of  receiving  petitions,  they 
would  be  able  to  arrest  permanently  the  progress  of  the  Abolitionists, 
we  then  might  be  induced  to  yield  ;  but  nothing  short  of  the  certainty  of 
permanent  security  can  induce  us  to  yield  an  inch.  If  to  maintain  our 
rights  must  increase  the  Abolitionists,  be  it  so.  I  would  at  no  period  make 
the  least  sacrifice  of  principle  for  any  temporary  advantage,  and  much 
less  at  the  present.  If  there  must  be  an  issue,  now  is  our  time.  We 
never  can  be  more  united  or  better  prepared  for  the  struggle  ;  and  I,  for 
one,  would  much  rather  meet  the  danger  now  than  to  turn  it  over  to  those 
who  are  to  come  after  us. 

But,  putting  these  views  aside,  it  does  seem  to  me,  taking  a  general 
view  of  the  subject,  that  the  course  intimated  by  the  senator  from  Penn 
sylvania  is  radically  wrong,  and  must  end  in  disappointment.  The  at 
tempt  to  unite  all  must,  as  it  usually  does,  terminate  in  division  and  dis 
traction.  It  will  divide  the  South  on  the  question  of  receiving,  and  the 
North  on  that  of  rejecting,  with  a  mutual  weakening  of  both.  I  already 
see  indications  of  division  among  Southern  gentlemen  on  this  floor,  even 
in  this  stage  of  the  question.  A  division  among  them  would  give  a  great 
impulse  to  the  cause  of  abolition.  Whatever  position  the  parties  may 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  209 

take,  in  the  event  of  such  division,  one  or  the  other  would  be  considered 
more  or  less  favourable  to  the  abolition  cause,  which  could  not  fail  to  run 
it  into  the  political  struggles  of  the  two  great  parties  of  the  North.     With 
these  views,  I  hold  that  the  only  possible  hope  of  arresting  the  progress 
of  the  Abolitionists  in  that  quarter  is  to  keep  the  two  great  parties  there 
united  against  them,  which  would  be  impossible  if  they  divide  here.    The 
course  intimated  by  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  will  effect  a  division 
here,  and,  instead  of  uniting  the  North,  and  thereby  arresting  the  progress 
of  the  Abolitionists,  as  he  anticipates,  will  end  in  division  and  distraction, 
and  in  giving  thereby  a  more  powerful  impulse  to  their  cause.     I  must 
say,  before  I  close  my  remarks  in  this  connexion,  that  the  members  from 
the  North,  it  seems  to  me,  are  not   duly  sensible  of  the  deep  interest 
which  they  have  in  this  question,  not  only  as  affecting  the  Union,  but  as 
it  relates  immediately  and  directly  to  their  particular  section.     A?  great 
as  may  be  our  interests,  theirs  are  not  less.     If  the  tidecontinue-s  to  roll 
on  its  turbid  waves  of  folly  and  fanaticism,  it  must,  in  the  end,  prostrate 
in  the  North  all  the  institutions  that  uphold  their  peace  aixf  prosperity, 
and  ultimately  overwhelm  all  that  is  eminent,  morally  and  intellectually. 
I  have  now  concluded  what  I  intended  to  say  on  the  question  immedi 
ately  before  the  Senate.     If  I  have  spoken  earnestly,  it  is  because  I  feel 
the  subject  to  be  one  of  the  deepest  interest.     We  are  about  to  take  the 
first  step ;  that  must  control  all  our  subsequent  movements.     If  it  should 
be  such  as  I  fear  it  will,  if  we  receive  this  petition,  and  thereby  establish 
the  principle  that  we  are  obliged  to  receive  all  such  petitions  ;  if  we  shall 
determine  to  take  permanent  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  of  abolition, 
whenever  and  in  whatever  manner  the  Abolitionists  may  ask,  either  here 
or  in  the  states,  1  fear  that  the  consequences  \vill  be  ultimately  disastrous. 
Such  a  course  would  destroy  the  confidence  of  the  people  of  the  slave- 
holding  states  in  this  government.     W>  love  and  cherish  the  Union  :  we 
remember  with  the  kindest  feelings  our  common  origin,  with  pride  our 
common  achievements,  and  fondly  anticipate  the  common  greatness  and 
glory  that  seem  to  await  us ;  bu*  origin,  achievements,  and  anticipation 
of  coming  greatness  are  to  us  as  nothing  compared  to  this  question.     It 
is  to  us  a  vital  question.     It  involves  not  only  our  liberty,  but,  what  is 
greater  (if  to  freemen  anything  can  be),  existence  itself.     The  relation 
which  now  exists  between  the  two  races  in  the  slaveholding  states  has 
existed  for  two  centuries.     It  has  grown  with  our  growth,  and  strength 
ened  with  our  strength.     It  has  entered  into  and  modified  all  our  institu 
tions,  civil  and  political     None  other  can  be  substituted.     We  will  not, 
cannot  permit  it  to  be  destroyed.     If  we  were  base  enough  to  do  so,  we 
would  be  traitors  to  our  section,  to  ourselves,  our  families,  #nd  to  poster 
ity.     It  is  our  anxious  desire  to  protect  and  preserve  this  relation  by  the 
joint  action  of  this  government  and  the  confederated  states  of  the  Union  ; 
but  if,  instead  of  closing  the  door — if,  instead  of  denying  all  jurisdiction 
and  all  interference  in  this  question,  the  doors  of  Congress  are  to  be 
thrown  open  ;  and  if  we  are  to  be  exposed  here,  in  the  heart  of  the  Union, 
to  an  endless  attack  on  our  rights,  our  character,  and  our  institutions  ;  if 
the  other  states  are  to  stand  and  look  on  without  attempting  to  suppress 
these  attacks,  originating  within  their  borders  ;  and,  finally,  if  this  is  to 
be  our  fixed  and  permanent  condition  as  members  of  this  confederacy, 
we  will  then  be  compelled  to  turn  our  eyes  on  ourselves.     Come  what 
will,  should  it  cost  every  drop  of  blood  and  every  cent  of  property,  we 
must  defend  ourselves  ;  and  if  compelled,  we  would  stand  justified  by  all 
laws,  human  and  divine. 

If  I  feel  alarm,  it  is  not  for  ourselves,  but  the  Union  and  the  institu 
tions  of  the  country,  to  which  I  have  ever  been  devotedly  attached,  how- 

D  D 


210  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ever  calumniated  and  .slandered.  Few  have  made  greater  sacrifices  to 
maintain  them,  and  none  is  more  anxious  to  perpetuate  them  to  the  latest 
generation  ;  but  they  can  and  ought  to  be  perpetuated  only  on  the  con 
dition  that  they  fulfil  the  great  objects  for  which  they  were  created — the 
liberty  and  protection  of  these  states. 

As  for  ourselves,  I  feel  no  apprehension.  I  know  to  the  fullest  extent 
the  magnitude  of  the  danger  that  surrounds  us.  I  am  not  disposed  to  under 
estimate  it.  My  colleague  has  painted  it  truly.  But,  as  great  as  is  the 
danger,  we  have  nothing  to  fear  if  true  to  ourselves.  We  have  many  and 
great  resources  ;  a  numerous,  intelligent,  and  brave  population  ;  great  and 
valuable  staples ;  ample  fiscal  means  ;  unity  of  feeling  and  interest,  and 
an  entire  exemption  from  those  dangers  originating  in  a  conflict  between, 
labour  and  capital,  which  at  this  time  threatens  so  much  danger  to  con 
stitutional  governments.  To  these  may  be  added,  that  we  would  act  un 
der  an  imperious  necessity.  There  would  be  to  us  but  one  alternative — 
to  triumph  or  perish  as  a  people.  We  would  stand  alone,  compelled  to 
defend  life,  Character,  and  institutions.  A  necessity  so  stern  and  impe 
rious  would  develop  to  the  full  all  the  great  qualities  of  our  nature,  men 
tal  and  moral,  requisite  for  defence — intelligence,  fortitude,  courage,  and 
patriotism  ;  and  th°se,  with  our  ample  means,  and  our  admirable  mate 
rials  for  the  construction  of  durable  free  states,  would  ensure  security, 
liberty,  and  renown. 

With  these  impressions,  I  ask  neither  sympathy  nor  compassion  for 
the  slaveholding  states.  We  can  take  care  of  ourselves.  It  is  not  we, 
but  the  Union  which  is  in  danger.  It  is  that  which  demands  our  care-^- 
demands  that  the  agitation  of  this  question  shall  cease  here — that  you 
shall  refuse  to  receive  these  petitions,  and  decline  all  jurisdiction  over 
the  subject  of  abolition  in  tjvery  form  and  shape.  It  is  only  on  these 
terms  that  the  Union  can  be  safe.  We  cannot  remain  here  in  an  endless 
struggle  in  defence  of  our  character,  our  property,  and  institutions. 

I  shall  now,  in  conclusion,  make  a  single  remark  as  to  the  course  I  shall 
feel  myself  compelled  to  pursue,  should,  the  Senate,  by  receiving  this  pe 
tition,  determine  to  entertain  jurisdiction  over  the  question  of  abolition. 
Thinking  as  I  do,  I  can  perform  no  act  that  would  countenance  so  dan 
gerous  an  assumption  ;  and,  as  a  participation  in  the  subsequent  proceed 
ings  on  this  petition,  should  it  unfortunately  be  received,  might  be  so 
construed,  in  that  event  I  shall  feel  myself  constrained  to  decline  such 
participation,  and  to  leave  the  responsibility  wholly  on  those  who  may 
assume  it. 


XIII. 

SPEECH  ON  THE  BILL  TO  PROHIBIT  DEPUTY  POSTMASTERS  FROM  RECEIV 
ING  AND  TRANSMITTING  THROUGH  THE  MAIL  CERTAIN  PAPERS  THERE 
IN  MENTIONED,  APRIL  12,  1836. 

I  AM  aware,  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  how  offensive  it  is  to  speak  of  one's  self;  but 
as  the  senator  from  Georgia  on  my  right  (Mr.  King)  has  thought  proper  to  im 
pute  to  me  improper  motives,  I  feel  myself  compelled,  in  self-defence,  to  state 
the  reasons  which  have  governed  my  course  in  reference  to  the  subject  now 
under  consideration.  The  senator  is  greatly  mistaken  in  supposing  that  I  was 
governed  by  hostility  to  General  Jackson.  So  far  is  that  from  being  the  fact, 
that  I  came  here  at  the  commencement  of  the  session  with  fixed  and  settled 
principles  on  the  subject  under  discussion,  and  which,  in  pursuing-  the  course 
that  the  senator  condemns,  I  have  but  attempted  to  carry  into  effect. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  211 

As  soon  as  the  subject  of  abolition  began  to  agitate  the  South  last  summer, 
in  consequence  of  the  transmission  of  incendiary  publications  through  the  mail, 
I  saw  at  once  that  it  would  force  itself  on  the  notice  of  Congress  at  the  present 
session,  and  that  it  involved  questions  of  great  delicacy  and  difficulty.  I  im 
mediately  turned  my  attention,  in  consequence,  to  the  subject,  and,  after  due  re 
flection,  arrived  af  the  conclusion  that  Congress  could  exercise  no  direct  power 
over  it ;  and  that,  if  it  acted  at  all,  the  only  mode  in  which  it  could  act,  consist 
ently  with  the  Constitution  arid  the  rights  and  safety  of  the  slaveholding  states, 
•would  be  in  the  manner  proposed  by  this  bill.  I  also  saw  that  there  was  no 
inconsiderable  danger  in  the  excited  state  of  the  feelings  of  the  South ;  that 
the  power,  however  dangerous  and  unconstitutional,  might  be  thoughtlessly 
yielded  to  Congress,  knowing  full  well  how  apt  the  weak  and  timid  are,  in  a 
state  of  excitement  and  alarm,  to  seek  temporary  protection  in  any  quarter,  re 
gardless  of  after-consequences,  and  how  ready  the  artful  and  designing  ever  are 
to  seize  on  such  occasions  to  extend  and  perpetuate  their  power. 

With  these  impressions  I  arrived  here  at  the  beginning  of  the  session.     The 
President's  message  was  not  calculated  to  remove  my  apprehensions.     He  as 
sumed  for  Congress  direct  power  over  the  subject,  and  that  on  the  broadest, 
most  unqualified,  and  dangerous  .principles.     Knowing  the  influence  of  his  name, 
by  reason  of  his  great  patronage  and  the  rigid  discipline  of  party,  with  a  large 
portion  of  the  country,  who  have  scarcely  any  other  standard  of  Constitution, 
politics,  and  morals,  I  saw  the  full  extent  of  the  danger  of  having  these  danger 
ous  principles  reduced  to  practice,  and  I  determined  at  once  to  use  every  effort 
to  prevent  it.     The  senator  from  Georgia  will,  of  course,  understand  that  I  do 
not  include  him  in  this  subservient  portion  of  his  party.     So  far  from  it,  I  have 
always  considered  him  as  one  of  the  most  independent.     It  has  been  our  for 
tune  to  concur  in  opinion  in  relation  to  most  of  the  important  measures  which 
have  been  agitated  since  he  became  a  member  of  this  body,  two  years  ago,  at 
the  commencement  of  the  session  during  which  the  deposite  question  was  agi 
tated.     On  that  important  question,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  senator  and  myself  con 
curred  in  opinion,  at  least  as  to  its  inexpediency,  and  the  dangerous  consequen 
ces  to  which  it  would  probably  lead.     If  my  memory  serves  n?e,  we  also  agreed 
in  opinion  on  the  connected  subject  of  the  currency,  whick  was  then  incident 
ally  discussed.     We  agreed,  too,  on  the  question  of  raising  the  value  of  gold 
to  its  present  standard,  and  in  opposition  to  the  bill  fef  the  distribution  of  the 
proceeds  of  public  land,  introduced  by  the  senator  Aom  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay). 
In  recurring  to  the  events  of  that  interesting  session,  I  can  remember  but  one 
important  subject  on  which  we  disagreed,  a«d  tfiat  was  the  President's  protest. 
Passing  to  the  next,  I  find  the  same  concurrence  of  opinion  on  most  of  the  im 
portant  subjects  of  the  session.     We  agreed  on  the  question  of  executive  pat 
ronage,  on  the  propriety  of  amending  thc  Constitution  for  a  temporary  distribu 
tion  of  the  surplus  revenue,  on  the  svbject  of  regulating  the  deposites,  and  in 
support  of  the  bill  for  restricting  the  power  of  the  executive  in  making  removals 
from  office.     We  also  agreed  m  <fle  propriety  of  establishing  branch  mints  in 
the  South  and  West — a  subject  not  a  little  contested  at  the  time. 

Even  at  the  present  session  we  have  not  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  disagree 
entirely.  We  have,  it  is  true,  on  the  question  of  receiving  abolition  petitions, 
which  I  regret,  as  I  miwt  consider  their  reception,  on  the  principle  on  which  they 
were  received,  as  a  surrender  of  the  whole  ground  to  the  Abolitionists,  as  far  as 
this  government  is  concerned.  It  is  also  true  that  we  disagreed,  in  part,  in  ref 
erence  to  the  p^sent  subject.  The  senator  has  divided,  in  relation  to  it,  be 
tween  myself  and  General  Jackson.  He  has  given  his  speech  in  support  of 
his  message,  and  announced  his  intention  of  giving  his  vote  in  favour  of  my  bill. 
I  certainly  have  no  right  to  complain  of  this  division.  I  had  rather  have  his 
vote  thsn  his  speech .  The  one  will  stand  forever  on  the  records  of  the  Senate 


212  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOTJN. 

(unless  expunged)  in  favour  of  the  bill,  and  the  important  principles  on  which 
it  rests,  while  the  other  is  destined,  at  no  distant  day,  to  oblivion. 

I  now  put  to  the  senator  from  Georgia  two  short  questions.  In  the  numerous 
and  important  instances  in  which  we  have  agreed,  I  must  have  been  either  right 
or  wrong.  If  right,  how  could  he  be  so  uncharitable  as  to  attribute  my  course 
to  the  low  and  unworthy  motive  of  inveterate  hostility  t<3  General  Jackson? 
But  if  wrong,  in  what  condition  does  his  charge  against  me  place  himself,  who 
has  concurred  with  me  in  all  these  measures  ?  (Here  Mr.  King  disclaimed 
the  imputation  of  improper  motives  to  Mr.  C.)  I  am  glad  to  hear  the  gentle 
man's  disclaimer,  said  Mr.  C.,  but  I  certainly  understood  him  as  asserting  that, 
such  was  my  hostility  to  General  Jackson,  that  his  support  of  a  measure  was 
sufficient  to1  ensure  my  opposition;  and  this  he  undertook  to  illustrate  by  an 
anecdote  borrowed  from  O'Connell  and  the  pig,  which,  I  must  tell  the  senator, 
was  much  better  suited  to  the  character  of  the  Irish  mob  to  which  it  was  ori 
ginally  addressed,  than  to  the  dignity  of  the  Senate,  where  he  has  repeated  it. 

But  to  return  from  this  long  digression.  I  saw,  as  I  have  remarked,  that 
there  was  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  principles  embraced  in  the  message 
might  be  reduced  to  practice — principles  which  I  believe  to  be  dangerous  to 
the  South,  and  subversive  of  the  liberty  of  the  press.  The  report  fully  states 
what  those  principles  are,  but  it  may  not  be  useless  to  refer  to  them  briefly  on 
the  present  occasion. 

The  message  assumed  for  Congress  the  right  of  determining  what  publica 
tions  are  incendiary  and  calculated  to  excite  the  slaves  to  insurrection,  and  to 
prohibit  the  transmission  of  such  publications  through  the  mail ;  and,  of  course, 
it  also  assumes  the  right  of  deciding  what  are  not  incendiary,  and  of  enforcing 
the  transmission  of  such  through  the  mail.  But  the  senator  from  Georgia  de 
nies  this  inference,  and  treats  it  as  a  monstrous  absurdity.  I  had  (said  Mr.  C.) 
considered  it  so  nearly  intuitive,  that  I  had  not  supposed  it  necessary  in  the  re 
port  to  add  anything  in  illustration  of  its  truth ;  but  as  it  has  been  contested  by 
the  senator,  I  will  add,  in  illustration,  a  single  remark. 

The  senator  will  not  deny  that  the  right  of  determining  what  papers  are  in 
cendiary,  and  of  preventing  their  circulation,  implies  that  Congress  has  jurisdic 
tion  over  the  subject ;  that,  is,  of  discriminating  as  to  what  papers  ought  or  ought 
not  to  be  transmitted  by  the  mail.  Nor  will  he  deny  that  Congress  has  a  right, 
when  acting  within  its  acknowledged  jurisdiction,  to  enforce  the  execution  of 
its  acts  ;  and  yet  the  admission  of  these  unquestionable  truths  admits  the  con 
sequence  asserted  by  the  report,  and  so  sneered  at  by  the  senator.  But,  lest  he 
should  controvert  so  plain  a  deduction,  to  cut  the  matter  short,  I  shall  propound 
a  plain  question  to  him.  He  beiiev^s  that  Congress  has  the  right  to  say  what 
papers  are  incendiary,  and  to  prohibit  their  circulation.  Now,  I  ask  him,  if  he 
does  not  also  believe  that  it  has  the  iigj^  to  enforce  the  circulation  of  such  as 
it  may  determine  not  to  be  incendiary,  tve*  against  a  law  of  Georgia  that  might 
prohibit  their  circulation  ?  If  the  senator  should  answer  in  the  affirmative.  I 
then  would  prove  by  his  admission  the  tru\h  of  the  inference  for  which  I  con 
tend,  and  which  he  has  pronounced  to  be  so  ^bsard ;  but  if  he  should  answer  in 
the  negative,  and  deny  that  Congress  can  enforce  'A\e  circulation  againt  the  law 
of  the  state,  I  must  tell  him  he  would  place  hiiaseif  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
nullification.  He  would,  in  fact,  go  beyond.  Tlxe  Denial  would  assume  the 
right  of  nullifying  what  the  senator  himself  must,  with  his  views,  consider  a 
constitutional  act,  when  nullification  only  assumes  the  righ\  of  a  state  to  nullify 
an  unconstitutional  act. 

But  the  principle  of  the  message  goes  still  farther.  It  assumes  for  Congress 
jurisdiction  over  the  liberty  of  the  press.  The  framers  of  tlu  Constitution 
(or,  rather,  those  jealous  patriots  who  refused  to  consent  to  its  adoption  without 
amendments  to  guard  against  the  abuse  of  power)  have,  by  the  first  amended 
article,  provided  that  Congress  shall  pass  no  law  abridging  the  liberty  of  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  213 

press,  with  the  view  of  placing  the  press  beyond  the  control  of  congressional 
legislation.  But  this  cautious  foresight  would  prove  in  vain,  if  we  should  con 
cede  to  Congress  the  power  which  the  President  assumes  of  discriminating,  in 
reference  to  character,  what  publications  shall  not  be  transmitted  by  the  mail. 
It  would  place  in  the  hands  of  the  General  Government  an  instrument  more 
potent  to  control  the  freedom  of  the  press  than  the  sedition  law  itself,  as  is  fully 
established  in  the  report. 

Thus  regarding  the  message,  the  question  which  presented  itself  on  its  first 
perusal  was,  How  to  prevent  powers  so  dangerous  and  unconstitutional  from 
being  carried  into  practice  ?  To  permit  the  portion  of  the  message  relating  to 
the  subject  under  consideration  to  take  its  regular  course,  and  be  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Postoffices  and  Post-roads,  would,  I  saw,  be  the  most  certain 
way  to  defeat  what  I  had  in  view.  I  could  not  doubt,  from  the  composition  of 
the  committee,  that  the  report  would  coincide  with  the  message,  and  that  it 
would  be  drawn  up  with  all  that  tact,  ingenuity,  and  address,  for  which  the 
chairman  of  the  committee  and  the  head  of  the  postoffice  department  are  not  a 
little  distinguished.  With  this  impression,  I  could  not  but  apprehend  that  the 
authority  of  the  President,  backed  by  such  a  report,  would  go  far  to  rivet  in  the 
public  mind  the  dangerous  principles  which  it  was  my  design  to  defeat,  and 
which  could  only  be  effected  by  referring  the  portion  of  the  message  in  question 
to  a  select  committee,  by  which  the  subject  might  be  thoroughly  investigated, 
and  the  result  presented  in  a  report.  With  this  view  I  moved  the  committee, 
and  the  bill  and  report  which  the  senator  has  attacked  so  violently  are  the 
result.  -  v;  • 

These  are  the  reasons  which  governed  me  in  the  course  I  took,  and  not  the 
base  and  unworthy  motive  of  hostility  to  General  Jackson.  I  appeal  with  con 
fidence  to  my  life  to  prove  that  neither  hostility  nor  attachment  to  any  man  or 
any  party  can  influence  me  in  the  discharge  of  my  public  duties  ;  but  were  I 
capable  of  being  influenced  by  such  motives,  I  must- tell  the  senator  from  Geor 
gia,  that  I  have  not  such  regard  for  the  opinion  of  General  Jackson  as  to  permit 
his  course  to  influence  me  in  the  slightest  degree,  either  for  or  against  any 
measure. 

Having  now  assigned  the  motives  which  governed  me,  it  is  with  satisfaction 
I  add  that  I  have  a  fair  prospect  of  success.  So  entirely  are  the  principles  of 
the  message  abandoned,  that  not  a  friend  of  the  President  has  ventured,  and  I 
hazard  nothing  in  saying,  will  venture,  to  assert  them  practically,  whatever  they 
may  venture  to  do  in  argument.  They  well  know  now  that,  since  the  subject 
has  been  investigated,  a  bill  to  carry  into  effect  the  recommendation  of  the  mes 
sage  would  receive  no  support  even  from  the  ranks  of  the  administration,  de 
voted  as  they  are  to  their  chieftain. 

The  senator  from  Georgia  made  other  objections  to  the  report  besides  those 
which  I  have  thus  incidentally  noticed,  to  which  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to 
reply.  I  am  content  with  his  vote,  and  cheerfully  leave  the  report  and  his 
speech  to  abide  their  fate,  with  a  brief  notice  of  a  single  objection. 

The  senator  charges  me  with  what  he  considers  a  strange  and  unaccountable 
contradiction.  He  says  that  the  freedom  of  the  press  and  the  right  of  petition 
are  both  secured  by  the  same  article  of  the  Constitution,  and  both  stand  on  the 
same  principle  ;  yet  I,  who  decidedly  opposed  the  receiving  of  abolition  peti 
tions,  now  as  decidedly  support  the  liberty  of  the  press.  To  make  out  the  con 
tradiction,  he  assumes  that  the  Constitution  places  the  right  of  petitioners  to 
have  their  petitions  received  and  the  liberty  of  the  press  on  the  same  ground. 
I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  show  that  in  this  he  is  entirely  mistaken,  and 
that  my  course  on  both  occasions  is  perfectly  consistent.  I  take  the  senator  at 
his  word,  and  put  to  him  a  question  for  his  decision.  If,  in  opposing  the  receiv 
ing  of  the  abolition  petitions,  and  advocating  the  freedom  of  the  press,  I  have 
involved  myself  in  a  palpable  contradiction,  how  can  he  escape  a  similar  charge, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

when  his  course  was  the  reverse  of  mine  on  both  occasions  ?  Does  he  not  see 
that,  if  mine  be  contradictory,  as  he  supposes,  his  too  must  necessarily  be  so  ? 
But  the  senator  forgets  his  own  argument,  of  which  I  must  remind  him,  in  order 
to  relieve  him  from  the  awkward  dilemma  in  which  he  has  placed  himself  in 
his  eagerness  to  fix  on  me  the  charge  of  contradiction.  He  seems  not  to  recol 
lect  that,  in  his  speech  on  receiving  the  abolition  petitions,  he  was  compelled, 
to  abandon  the  Constitution,  and  to  place  the  right,  not  on  that  instrument,  as  he 
would  now  have  us  believe,  but  expressly  on  the  ground  that  the  right  existed 
anterior  to  the  Constitution,  and  that  we  must  look  for  its  limits,  not  to  the  Con 
stitution,  but  to  the  Magna,  Charta  and  the  Declaration  of  Rights. 

Having  now  concluded  what  I  intended  to  say  in  reply  to  the  senator  from 
Georgia,  I  now  turn  to  the  objections  of  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr. 
Davis),  which  were  directed,  not  against  the  report,  but  the  bill  itself.  The 
senator  confined  his  objections  to  the  principles  of  the  bill,  which  he  pronoun 
ces  dangerous  and  unconstitutional.  It  is  my  wish  to  meet  his  objections  fully, 
fairly,  and  directly.  For  this  purpose,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  an  accurate 
and  clear  conception  of  the  principles  of  the  bill,  as  it  is  impossible,  without  it, 
to  estimate  correctly  the  force  either  of  the  objections  or  the  reply.  I  am  thus 
constrained  to  restate  what  the  principles  are,  at  the  hazard  of  being  considered 
somewhat  tedious. 

The  first  and  leading  principle  is,  that  the  subject  of  slavery  is  under  the 
sole  and  exclusive  control  of  the  states  where  the  institution  exists.  It  belongs 
to  them  to  determine  what  may  endanger  its  existence,  and  when  and  how  it 
may  be  defended.  In  the  exercise  of  this  right,  they  may  prohibit  the  intro 
duction  or  circulation  of  any  paper  or  publication  which  may,  in  their  opinion, 
disturb  or  endanger  the  institution.  Thus  far  all  are  agreed.  To  this  extent 
no  one  has  questioned  the  right  of  the  states ;  not  even  the  senator  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  in  his  numerous  objections  to  the  bill. 

The  next  and  remaining  principle  of  the  bill  is  intimately  connected  with  the 
preceding,  and,  in  fact,  springs  directly  from  it.  It  assumes  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  General  Government,  in  the  exercise  of  its  delegated  rights,  to  respect 
the  laws  which  the  slaveholding  states  may  pass  in  protection  of  their  institutions  ; 
or,  to  express  it  differently,  it  is  its  duty  to  pass  such  laws  as  may  be  necessa 
ry  to  make  it  obligatory  on  its  officers  and  agents  to  abstain  from  violating  the 
laws  of  the  states,  and  to  co-operate,  as  far  as  it  may  consistently  be  done,  in 
their  execution.  It  is  against  this  principle  that  the  objections  of  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  have  been  directed,  and  to  which  I  now  proceed  to  reply. 

His  first  objection  is,  that  the  principle  is  new  ;  by  which  I  understand  him 
to  mean,  that  it  never  has,  heretofore,  been  acted  on  by  the  government.  The 
objection  presents  two  questions  :  Is  it  true  in  point  of  fact  ?  and  if  so,  what 
weight  or  force  properly  belongs  to  it  ?  If  I  am  not  greatly  mistaken,  it  will 
be  found  wanting  in  both  particulars  ;  and  that,  so  far  from  being  new,  it  has 
been  frequently  acted  on  ;  and  that  if  it  were  new,  the  fact  would  have  little  or 
no  force. 

If  our  government  had  been  in  operation  for  centuries,  and  had  been  exposed 
to  the  various  changes  and  trials  to  which  political  institutions,  in  a  long-pro 
tracted  existence,  are  exposed  in  the  vecissitudes  of  events,  the  objection,  under 
such  circumstances,  that  a  principle  has  never  been  acted  upon,  if  not  decisive,, 
would  be  exceedingly  strong  ;  but  when  made  in  reference  to  our  government, 
which  has  been  in  operation  for  less  than  half  a  centuiy,  and  which  is  so  com 
plex  and  novel  in  its  structure,  it  is  very  feeble.  We  all  know  that  new  prin 
ciples  are  daily  developing  themselves  under  our  system,  with  the  changing 
condition  of  the  country,  and,  doubtless,  will  long  continue  so  to  do  in  the  new 
and  trying  scenes  through  which  we  are  destined  to  pass.  It  may,  I  admit,  be 
good  reason  even  with  us  for  caution — for  thorough  and  careful  investigation, 
if  a  principle  proposed  to  be  acted  upon  be  new  ;  for  I  have  long  since  been 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  215 

taught  by  experience,  that  whatever  is  untried  is  to  be  received  with  caution  in. 
politics,  however  plausible.  But  to  go  farther  in  this  early  stage  of  our  politi 
cal  existence,  would  be  to  deprive  ourselves  of  means  that  might  be  indispensa 
ble  to  meet  future  dangers  and  difficulties. 

But  I  take  higher  grounds  in  reply  to  the  objection.  I  deny  its  truth  in  point 
of  fact,  and  assert  that  the  principle  is  not  new.  The  report  refers  to  two  in 
stances  in  which  it  has  been  acted  on,  and  to  which,  for  the  present,  I  shall  con 
fine  myself :  one  in  reference  to  the  quarantine  laws  of  the  states,  and  the  oth 
er  more  directly  connected  with  the  subject  of  this  bill.  I  propose  to  make  a 
few  remarks  in  reference  to  both  :  beginning  with  the  former,  with  the  view  of 
showing  that  the  principle  in  both  cases  is  strictly  analogous,  or,  rather,  identi 
cal  with  the  present. 

The  health  of  the  state,  like  that  of  the  subject  of  slavery,  belongs  exclusively 
to  the  states.  It  is  reserved,  and  not  delegated  ;  and,  of  course,  each  state  has 
a  right  to  judge  for  itself  what  may  endanger  the  health  of  its  citizens,  what 
measures  are  necessary  to  prevent  it,  and  when  and  how  such  measures  are  to 
be  carried  into  effect.  Among  the  causes  which  may  endanger  the  health  of  a 
state,  is  the  introduction  of  infectious  or  contagious  diseases  through  the  medi 
um  of  commerce.  The  vessel  returning  with  a  rich  cargo,  in  exchange  for  the 
products  of  a  state,  may  also  come  freighted  with  the  seeds  of  disease  and  death. 
To  guard  against  this  danger,  the  states  at  a  very  early  period  adopted  quaran 
tine  or  health  laws.  These  laws,  it  is  obvious,  must  necessarily  interfere  with 
the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce — a  power  as  expressly  given  as 
that  to  regulate  the  mail,  and,  as  far  as  the  present  question  is  concerned,  every 
•way  analogous  ;  and  acting,  accordingly,  on  the  principles  of  this  bill,  Congress, 
as  far  back  as  the  year  '96,  passed  an  act  making  it  the  duty  of  its  civil  and  mil 
itary  officers  to  abstain  from  the  violation  of  the  health  laws  of  the  states,  and 
to  co-operate  in  their  execution.  This  act  was  modified  and  repealed  by  that 
of  '99,  which  has  since  remained  unchanged  on  the  statute-book. 

But  the  other  precedent  referred  to  in  the  report  is  still  more  direct  and  im 
portant.  That  case,  like  the  present,  involved  the  right  of  the  slaveholding 
states  to  adopt  such  measures  as  they  may  think  proper  to  prevent  their  domes 
tic  institutions  from  being  disturbed  or  endangered.  They  may  be  endangered, 
not  only  by  introducing  and  circulating  inflammatory  publications  calculated  to 
excite  insurrection,  but  also  by  the  introduction  of  free  people  of  colour  from 
abroad,  who  may  come  as  emissaries,  or  with  opinions  and  sentiments  hostile 
to  the  peace  and  security  of  those  states.  The  right  of  a  state  to  pass  laws  to 
prevent  danger  from  publications  is  not  more  clear  than  the  right  to  pass  those 
which  may  be  necessary  to  'guard  against  this  danger.  The  act  of  1803,  to 
•which  the  report  refers  as  a  precedent,  recognises  this  right  to  the  fullest  ex 
tent.  It  was  intended  to  sustain  the  laws  of  the  states  against  the  introduction, 
of  free  people  of  colour  from  the  West  India  Islands.  The  senator  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  in  his  remarks  upon  this  precedent,  supposes  the  law  to  have  been, 
passed  under  the  power  given  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution  to  suppress  the 
slave-trade.  I  have  turned  to  the  journals  in  order  to  ascertain  the  facts,  and 
find  that  the  senator  is  entirely  mistaken.  The  law  was  passed  on  a  memorial 
of  the  citizens  of  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  and  originated  in  the  following 
facts  : 

After  the  successful  rebellion  of  the  slaves  of  St.  Domingo,  and  the  expul 
sion  of  the  French  power,  the  government  of  the  other  French  West  India 
Islands,  in  order  to  guard  against  the  danger  from  the  example  of  St.  Domingo, 
adopted  rigid  measures  to  expel  and  send  out  their  free  blacks.  In  1803,  a  brig, 
having  on  board  five  persons  of  that  description  who  were  driven  from  Guada- 
loupe,  arrived  at  Wilmington.  The  alarm  which  this  caused  gave  birth  to  the 
memorial,  and  the  memorial  to  the  act. 

I  learn  from  the  journals,  that  the  subject  was  fully  investigated  and  discuss- 


216  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ed  in  both  houses,  and  that  it  passed  by  a  very  large  majority.  The  first  sec 
tion  of  the  bill  prevents  the  introduction  of  any  negro,  mulatto,  or  mustee,  into 
any  state,  by  the  laws  of  which  they  are  prevented  from  being  introduced,  ex 
cept  persons  of  the  description  from  beyond  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  or  register 
ed  seamen,  or  natives  of  the  United  States.  The  second  section  prohibits  the 
entry  of  vessels  having  such  persons  on  board,  and  subjects  the  vessels  to  sei 
zure  and  forfeiture  for  landing,  or  attempting  to  land  them  contrary  to  the  laws 
of  the  states  ;  and  the  third  and  last  section  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  officers  of 
the  General  Government  to  co-operate  with  the  states  in  the  execution  of  their 
laws  against  their  introduction.  I  consider  this  precedent  to  be  one  of  vast  im 
portance  to  the  slaveholding  states.  It  not  only  recognises  the  right  of  those 
states  to  pass  such  laws  as  they  may  deem  necessary  to  protect  themselves 
against  the  slave  population,  and  the  duty  of  the  General  Government  to  respect 
those  laws,  but  also  the  very  important  right,  that  the  states  have  the  authority 
to  exclude  the  introduction  of  such  persons  as  may  be  dangerous  to  their  insti 
tutions  :  a  principle  of  great  extent  and  importance,  and  applicable  to  other 
states  as  well  as  slaveholding,  and  to  other  persons  as  well  as  blacks,  and 
which  may  hereafter  occupy  a  prominent  place  in  the  history  of  our  legislation. 
Having  now,  I  trust,  fully  and  successfully  replied  to  the  first  objection  of  the 
senator  from  Massachusetts,  by  showing  that  it  is  not  true  in  fact,  and  if  it 
were,  that  it  would  have  had  little  or  no  force,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  reply  to 
the  second  objection,  which  assumes  that  the  principles  for  which  I  contend 
would,  if  admitted,  transfer  the  power  over  the  mail  from  the  General  Govern 
ment  to  the  states. 

If  the  objection  be  well  founded,  it  must  prove  fatal  to  the  bill.     The  power 
over  the  mail  is,  beyond  all  doubt,  a  delegated  power ;  and  whatever  would  di 
vest  the  government  of  this  power,  and  transfer  it  to  the  states,  would  certainly 
be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution.     But  would  the  principle,  if  acted  on,  transfer 
the  power  ?     If  admitted  to  its  full  extent,  its  only  effect  would  be  to  make  it 
the  duty  of  Congress,  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  over  the  mail,  to  abstain 
from  violating  the  laws  of  the  state  in  protection  of  their  slave  property,  and  to 
co-operate,  where  it  could  with  propriety,  in  their  execution.     Its  utmost  effect 
would  then  be  a  modification,  and  not  a  transfer  or  destruction  of  the  power  ; 
and  surely  the  senator  will  not  contend  that  to  modify  a  right  amounts  either  to 
its'  transfer  or  annihilation.     He  cannot  forget  that  all  rights  are  subject  to 
modifications,  and  all,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  are  held  under  one  uni 
versal  condition — that  their  possessors  should  so  use  them  as  not  to  injure  oth 
ers.     Nor  can  he  contend  that  the  power  of  the  General  Government  over  the 
mail  is  without  modification  or  limitation.     He  himself  admits  that  it  is  subject 
to  a  very  important  modification,  when  he  concedes  that  the  government  cannot 
discriminate  in  reference  to  the  character  of  the  publications  to  be  transmitted 
by  the   mail,  without  violating  the  first  amended  article 'of  the  Constitution, 
which  prohibits  Congress  from  passing  laws  abridging  the  liberty  of  the  press. 
Other  modifications  of  the  right  might  be  shown  to  exist,  not  less  clear,  nor  of 
much  less  importance.    It  might  be  easily  shown,  for  instance,  that  the  power  over 
the  mail  is  limited  to  the  transmission  of  'intelligence,  and  that  Congress  cannot, 
consistently  with  the  nature  and  the  object  of  the  power,  extend  it  to  the  ordinary 
objects  of  transportation  without  a  manifest  violation  of  the  Constitution,  and  the 
assumption  of  a  principle  which  would  give  the  government  control  over  the 
general  transportation  of  the  country,  both  by  land  and  water.     But  if  it  be 
subject  to  these  modifications,  without  either  annihilating  or  transferring  the 
power,  why  should  the  modification  for  which  I  contend,  and  which  I  shall 
show  hereafter  to  rest  upon  unquestionable  principles,  have  such  effect  ?    That 
it  would  not,  in  fact,  might  be  shown,  if  other  proof  were  necessary,  by  a  refer 
ence  to  the  practical  operation  of  the  principle  in  the  two  instances  already  re 
ferred  to.     In  both,  the  principle  which  I  contend  for  in  relation  to  the  mail 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  217 

has  long  been  in  operation  in  reference  to  commerce,  without  the  transfer  of 
the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  commerce  to  the  states,  which  the  senator 
contends  would  be  its  effect  if  applied  to  the  mail.  So  far  otherwise,  so  little 
has  it  affected  the  power  of  Congress  to  regulate  the  commerce  of  the  country, 
that  few  persons,  comparatively,  are  aware  that  the  principle  has  been  recog 
nised  and  acted  on  by  the  General  Government. 

I  come  next  (said  Mr.  Calhoun)  to  what  the  senator  seemed  to  rely  upon  as 
his  main  objection.  He  stated  that  the  principles  asserted  in  the  report  were 
contradicted  by  the  bill,  and  that  the  latter  undertakes' to  do  indirectly  what  the 
former  asserts  that  the  General  Government  cannot  do  at  all. 

Admit  (said  Mr.  C.)  the  objection  to  be  true  in  fact,  and  what  does  it  prove, 
but  that  the  author  of  the  report  is  a  bad  logician,  and  that  there  is  error  some 
where,  but  without  proving  that  it  is  in  the  bill,  and  that  it  ought,  therefore,  to 
be  rejected,  as  the  senator  contends.  If  there  be  error,  it  may  be  in  the  report 
instead  of  the  bill,  and  till  the  senator  can  fix  it  on  the  latter,  he  cannot  avail 
himself  of  the  objection.  But  does  the  contradiction  which  he  alleges  exist  ? 
Let  us  turn  to  the  principles  asserted  in  the  report,  and  compare  them  with, 
those  of  the  bill,  in  order  to  determine  this  point. 

What,  then,  are  the  principles  which  the  report  maintains  ?  It  asserts  that 
Congress  has  no  right  to  determine  what  papers  are  incendiary,  and  calculated 
to  excite  insurrection,  and,  as  such,  to  prohibit  their  circulation,  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  that  it  belongs  to  the  states  to  determine  on  the  character  and  tendency 
of  such  publications,  and  to  adopt  such  measures  as  they  may  think  proper  to 
prevent  their  introduction  or  circulation.  Does  the  bill  deny  any  of  these  prin 
ciples  ?  Does  it  not  assume  them  all?  Is  it  not  drawn  up  on  the  supposition 
that  the  General  Governmentfchave  none  of  the  powers  denied  by  the  report,  and 
that  the  states  possess  all  for  which  it  contends  ?  How,  then,  can  it  be  said 
that  the  bill  contradicts  the  report  ?  But  the  difficulty,  it  seems,  is,  that  the 
General  Government  would  do  through  the  states,  under  the  provisions  of  the 
bill,  what  the  report  denies  that  it  can  do  directly ;  and  this,  according  to  the 
senator  from  Georgia,  is  so  manifest  and  palpable  a  contradiction,  that  he  caa 
find  no  explanation  for  my  conduct  but  an  inveterate  hostility  to  General  Jack 
son,  which  he  is  pleased  to  attribute  to  me. 

I  have,  I  trust,  successfully  repelled  already  the  imputation,  and  it  now  re 
mains  to  show  that  the  gross  and  palpable  errors  which  the  senator  perceives 
exist  only  in  his  own  imagination,  and  that,  instead  of  the  cause  he  supposes,  it 
originates,  on  his  part,  in  a  dangerous  and  fundamental  misconception  of  the  na 
ture  of  our  political  system — particularly  of  the  relation  between  the  states  and 
the  General  Government.  Were  the  states  the  agents  of  the  General  Govern 
ment,  as  the  objection  clearly  presupposes,  then  what  he  says  would  be  true,, 
and  the  government,  in  recognising  the  law  of  the  states,  would  adopt  the  acts, 
of  its  agents.  But  the  fact  is  far  otherwise.  The  General  Government  and 
the  governments  of  the  states  are  distinct  and  independent  departments  in  our, 
complex  political  system.  The  states,  in  passing  laws  in  protection  of  their, 
domestic  institutions,  act  in  a  sphere  as  independent  as  the  General  Govern 
ment  passing  laws  in  regulation  of  the  mail ;  and  the  latter,  in  abstaining  from 
violating  the  laws  of  the  states,  as  provided  for  in  the  bill,  so  far  from  making 
the  states  its  agents,  but  recognises  the  right  of  the  states,  and  performs  on  its 
part  a  corresponding  duty.  Rights  and  duties  are  in  their  nature  reciprocal* 
The  existence  of  one  presupposes  that  of  the  other,  and  the  performance  of  the 
duty,  so  far  from  denying  the  right,  distinctly  recognises  its  existence.  The 
senator,  for  example,  next  to  me  (Judge  White)  has  the  unquestionable  right 
to  the  occupation  of  his  chair,  and  I  am,  of  course,  in  duty  bound  to  abstain 
from  violating  that  right ;  but  would  it  not  be  absurd  to  say,  that  in  performing 
that  duty  by  abstaining  from  violating  his  right,  I  assume  the  right  of  occupa-r 
tion  ?  Again  :  suppose  the  very  quiet  and  peaceable  senator  from  Maine  (Mr. 

EE 


218  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Shepley),  who  is  his  next  neighbour  on  the  other  side,  should  undertake  to  oust 
the  senator  from  Tennessee,  would  it  not  be  a  strange  doctrine  to  contend  that, 
if  I  were  to  co-operate  with  the  senator  from  Tennessee  in  maintaining  pos 
session  of  his  chair,  it  would  be  an  assumption  on  my  part  of  a  right  to  the 
chair  ?  And  yet  this  is  the  identical  principle  which  the  senator  from  Georgia 
assumed,  in  charging  a  manifest  and  palpable  contradiction  between  the  bill  and 
the  report. 

But  to  proceed  with  the  objections  of  the  senator  from  Massachusetts.  He 
asserts,  and  asserts  truly,  that  rights  and  duties  are  reciprocal ;  and  that,  if  it 
be  the  duty  of  the  General  Government  to  respect  the  laws  of  the  state,  it  is  in 
like  manner  the  duty  of  the  states  to  respect  those  of  the  General  Government. 
The  practice  of  both  have  been  in  conformity  to  the  principle.  I  have  already 
cited  instances  of  the  General  Government  respecting  the  laws  of  the  states, 
and  many  might  be  shown  of  the  states  respecting  those  of  the  General  Govern 
ment. 

But  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  affirms  that  the  laws  of  the  General  Gov> 
ernment  regulating  the  mail,  and  those  of  the  government  of  the  states  prohibit 
ing  the  introduction  and  circulation  of  incendiary  publications,  may  come  into 
conflict,  and  that,  in  such  event,  the  latter  must  yield  to  the  former  ;  and  he  rests 
this  assertion  on  the  ground  that  the  power  of  the  General  Government  is  ex. 
pressly  delegated  by  the  Constitution.  I  regard  the  argument  as  wholly  incon 
clusive.  Why  should  the  mere  fact  that  a  power  is  expressly  delegated  give 
it  paramount  control  over  the  reserved  powers  ?  What  possible  superiority  can 
the  mere  fact  of  delegation  give,  unless,  indeed,  it  be  supposed  to  render  the 
right  more  clear,  and,  of  course,  less  questionable  ?  Now  I  deny  that  it  has,  in 
this  instance,  any  such  superiority.  Though  the  power  of  the  General  Govern 
ment  over  the  mail  is  delegated,  it  is  not  more  dfcar  and  unquestionable  than 
the  rights  of  the  states  over  the  subject  of  slavery — a  right  which  neither'  has, 
nor  can  be  denied.  In  fact,  I  might  take  higher  grounds,  if  higher  grounds 
•were  possible,  by  showing  that  the  rights  of  the  states  are  as  expressly  reserved 
as  those  of  the  General  Government  are  delegated  ;  for,  in  order  to  place  the 
reserved  rights  beyond  controversy,  the  tenth  amended  article  of  the  Constitu 
tion  expressly  provides,  that  all  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States,  nor 
prohibited  to  the  states,  are  reserved  to  the  states  or  the  people  ;  and,  as  the 
subject  of  slavery  is  acknowledged  by  all  not  to  be  delegated,  it  may  be  fairly 
considered  as  expressly  reserved  under  this  provision  of  the  Constitution. 

But,  while  I  deny  his  conclusion,  I  agree  with  the  senator  that  the  laws  of 
the  states  and  General  Government  may  come  into  conflict,  and  that,  if  they  do, 
one  or  the  other  must  yield  ;  the  question  is,  Which  ought  to  yield  ?  The  ques 
tion  is  one  of  great  importance.  It  involves  the  whole  merit  of  the  controversy, 
and  I  must  entreat  the  Senate  to  give  me  an  attentive  hearing  while  I  state  my 
yiews  in  relation  to  it. 

In  order  to  determine  satisfactorily  which  ought  to  yield,  it  becomes  neces 
sary  to  have  a  clear  and  full  understanding  of  the  point  of  difficulty ;  and  for 
this  purpose  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  few  preliminary  remarks. 

Properly  considered,  the  reserved  and  delegated  powers  can  never  come  into 
conflict.  The  fact  that  a  power  is  delegated  is  conclusive  that  it  is  not  re 
served  ;  and  that  it  is  not  delegated,  that  it  is  reserved,  unless,  indeed,  it  be  pro 
hibited  to  the  states.  There  is  but  a  single  exception  :  the  case  of  powers  of 
such  nature  that  they  be  exercised  concurringly  by  the  state  and  General  Gov 
ernment — such  as  the  power  of  laying  taxes,  which,  though  delegated,  may  also 
be  exercised  by  the  states.  In  illustration  of  the  truth  of  the  position  I  have 
laid  down,  I  might  refer  to  the  case  now  under  consideration.  Regarded  in 
the  abstract,  there  is  not  the  slightest  conflict  between  the  power  delegated  by 
the  Constitution  to  the  General  Government  to  establish  postoffices  and  post- 
loads,  and  that  reserved  to  the  states  over  the  subject  of  slavery.  How,  then, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  219 

•can  there  be  conflict  ?  It  occurs,  not  between  the  powers  themselves,  but  the 
laws  respectively  passed  to  carry  them  into  effect.  The  laws  of  the  state,  pro 
hibiting  the  introduction  or  circulation  of  incendiary  publications,  may  come  in 
conflict  with  the  laws  of  the  General  Government  in  relation  to  the  mail ;  and 
the  question  to  be  determined  is,  Which,  in  the  event,  ought  to  give  way  ? 

I  will  not  pretend  to  enter  into  a  full  and  systematic  investigation  of  this  high 
ly  important  question,  which  involves,  as  I  have  said,  the  merits  of  the  whole 
controversy.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary.  I  propose  to  lay  down  a  single 
principle,  which  I  hold  to  be  not  only  unquestionable,  but  decisive  of  the  ques 
tion  as  far  as  the  present  controversy  is  concerned.  My  position  is,  that,  in  de 
ciding  which  ought  to  yield,  regard  must  be  had  to  the  nature  and  magnitude 
of  the  powers  to  which  the  laws  respectively  relate.  The  low  must  yield  to 
the  high  ;  the  convenient  to  the  necessary ;  mere  accommodation  to  safety  and 
security.  This  is  the  universal  principle  which  governs  in  all  analogous  cases, 
both  in  our  social  and  political  relations.  Wherever  the  means  of  enjoying  or 
securing  rights  come  into  conflict  (rights  themselves  never  can),  this  universal 
and  fundamental  principle  is  the  one  which,  by  the  consent  of  mankind,  gov 
erns  in  all  such  cases.  Apply  it  to  the  case  under  consideration,  and  need  I 
ask  which  ought  to  yield  ?  Will  any  rational  being  say  that  the  laws  of  eleven. 
states  of  this  Union,  which  are  necessary  to  their  peace,  security,  and  very  ex 
istence,  ought  to  yield  to  the  laws  of  the  General  Government  regulating  the 
postofFice,  which,  at  best,  is  a  mere  accommodation  and  convenience,  and  this, 
when  this  government  was  formed  by  the  states  mainly  with  a  view  to  secure 
more  perfectly  their  peace  and  safety  ?  But  one  answer  can  be  given.  All 
must  feel  that  it  would  be  improper  for  the  laws  of  the  states,  in  such  case,  to 
yield  to  those  of  the  General  Government,  and,  of  course,  that  the  latter  ought 
to  yield  to  the  former.  When  I  say  ought,  I  do  not  mean  on  the  principle  of 
concession.  I  take  higher  grounds.  I  mean  under  the  obligation  of  the  Consti 
tution  itself.  That  instrument  does  not  leave  this  important  question  to  be  de 
cided  by  mere  inference.  It  contains  an  express  provision  which  is  decisive 
of  the  question.  I  refer  to  the  provision  which  invests  Congress  with  the  pow 
er  of  passing  laws  to  carry  into  effect  the  granted  powers,  and  which  express 
ly  restricts  its  power  to  laws  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  into  effect  the  dele 
gated  powers.  We  here  have  the  limitation  on  the  power  of  passing  laws. 
They  must  be  necessary  and  proper.  I  pass  the  term  necessary  with  the  sin 
gle  remark,  that,  whatever  may  be  its  true  and  accurate  meaning,  it  clearly  in 
dicates  that  this  important  power  was  granted  with  the  intention  of  being  spa 
ringly  used  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution.  I  come  to  the  term  proper  ; 
and  I  boldly  assert,  if  it  has  any  meaning  at  all — if  it  can  be  said  of  any  law 
whatever  that  it  is  not  proper,  and  that,  as  such,  Congress  has  no  constitution 
al  right  to  pass  it,  surely  it  may  be  said  of  that  which  would  abrogate,  in  fact, 
the  laws  of  nearly  half  of  the  states  of  the  Union,  and  which  are  conceded  to 
be  necessary  for  their  peace  and  safety.  If  it  be  proper  for  Congress  to  pass 
such  a  law,  what  law  could  possibly  be  improper  ?  We  have  heard  much,  of 
late,  of  state  rights.  All  parties  profess  to  respect  them,  as  essential  to  the 
preservation  of  our  liberty.  I  do  not  except  the  members  of  the  old  Federal 
party — that  honest,  high-minded,  patriotic  party,  though  mistaken  as  to  the 
principles  and  tendency  of  the  government.  But  what,  let  me  ask,  would  be 
the  value  of  state  rights,  if  the  laws  of  Congress,  in  such  cases,  ought  not  to 
yield  to  the  states  ?  If  they  must  be  considered  paramount,  whenever  they 
come  into  conflict  with  those  of  the  states,  without  regard  to  their  safety,  what 
possible  value  can  be  attached  to  the  rights  of  the  states,  and  how  perfectly  un 
meaning  their  reserved  powers  ?  Surrender  the  principle,  and  there  is  not  one 
of  the  reserved  powers  which  may  not  be  annulled  by  Congress  under  the  pre 
text  of  passing  laws  to  carry  into  effect  the  delegated  powers. 

The  senator  from  Massachusetts  next  objects,  that,  if  the  principles  of  the  bill 


220  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

be  admitted,  they  may  be  extended  to  morals  and  religion.  I  do  not  feel  bound 
to  admit  or  deny  the  truth  of  this  assertion ;  but  if  the  senator  will  show  me  a 
case  in  which  a  state  has  passed  laws  under  its  unquestionable  reserved  powers, 
in  protection  of  its  morality  or  religion,  I  would  hold  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the 
General  Government  to  respect  the  laws  of  the  states,  in  conformity  to  the  prin 
ciples  which  I  maintain. 

His  next  objection  is,  that  the  bill  is  a  manifest  violation  of  the  liberty  of  the 
press.  He  has  not  thought  proper  to  specify  wherein  the  violation  consists. 
Does  he  mean  to  say  that  the  laws  of  the  states  prohibiting  the  introduction  and 
circulation  of  papers  calculated  to  excite  insurrection,  are  in  violation  of  the 
liberty  of  the  press  ?  Does  he  mean  that  the  slaveholding  states  have  no  right 
to  pass  such  laws  ?  I  cannot  suppose  such  to  be  his  meaning ;  for  I  understood 
him,  throughout  his  remarks,  to  admit  the  right  of  the  states — a  right  which 
they  have  always  exercised,  without  restriction  or  limitation,  before  and  since 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  without  ever  having  been  questioned.  But 
if  this  be  not  his  meaning,  he  must  mean  that  this  bill,  in  making  it  the  duty 
of  the  officers  and  agents  of  the  government  to  respect  the  laws  of  the  states, 
violates  the  liberty  of  the  press,  and  thus  involves  the  old  misconception  that  the 
states  are  the  agents  of  this  government,  which  pervades  the  whole  argument 
of  the  senator,  and  to  which  I  have  already  replied. 

The  senator  next  objects  that  the  bill  makes  it  penal  on  deputy  postmasters 
to  receive  the  papers  and  publications  which  it  embraces.  I  must  say,  that  my 
friend  from  Massachusetts  (for  such  I  consider  him,  though  we  differ-in  politics) 
has  not  expressed  himself  with  his  usual  accuracy  on  the  present  occasion.  If 
he  will  turn  to  the  provisions  of  the  bill,  he  will  find  that  the  penalty  attaches 
only  in  cases  of  knowingly  receiving  and  delivering  out  the  papers  and  publi 
cations  in  question.  All  the  consequences  which  the  senator  drew  from  the 
view  which  he  took  of  the  bill  of  course  fall,  and  relieves  me  from  the  necessity 
of  showing  that  the  deputy  postmasters  will  not  be  compelled  to  resort  to  the 
espionage  into  letters  and  packages,  in  order  to  exonerate  themselves  from  the 
penalty  of  the  bill,  which  he  supposed. 

The  last  objection  of  the  senator  is,  that,  under  the  provision  of  the  bill,  every 
thing  touching  on  the  subject  of  slavery  will  be  prohibited  from  passing  through 
the  mail.  I  again  must  repeat,  that  the  senator  has  not  expressed  himself  with 
sufficient  accuracy.  The  provisions  of  the  bill  are  limited  to  the  transmission 
of  such  papers  in  reference  to  slavery  as  are  prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  slave- 
holding  states — that  is,  by  eleven  states  of  the  Union — leaving  the  circulation 
through  the  mail  without  restriction  or  qualification  as  to  all  other  papers,  and 
wholly  so  as  to  the  remaining  thirteen  states.  But  the  senator  seems  to  think 
that  even  this  restriction,  as  limited  as  it  is,  would  be  a  very  great  inconveni 
ence.  It  may,  indeed,  prove  so  to  the  lawless  Abolitionists,  who,  without  regard 
to  the  obligations  of  the  Constitution,  are  attempting  to  scatter  their  firebrands 
Throughout  the  Union.  But  is  their  convenience  the  only  thing  to  be  taken  into 
the  estimate  ?  Are  the  peace,  security,  and  safety  of  the  slaveholding  states 
nothing?  or  are  these  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  accommodation  of  the  Abolition 
ists? 

I  have  now  replied  directly,  fully,  and,  I  trust,  successfully  to  the  objections 
to  the  bill,  and  shall  close  what  I  intended  to  say  by  a  few  general  and  brief 
remarks. 

We  have  arrived  at  a  new  and  important  point  in  reference  to  the  abolition 
question.  It  is  no  longer  in  the  hands  of  quiet  and  peaceful,  but  I  cannot  add,, 
harmless  Quakers.  It  is  now  under  the  control  of  ferocious  zealots,  blinded  by 
fanaticism,  and,  in  pursuit  of  their  object,  regardless  of  the  obligations  of  religion, 
or  morality.  They  are  organized  throughout  every  section  of  the  non-slave- 
holding  states  ;  they  have  the  disposition  of  almost  unlimited  funds,  and  are  in 
possession  of  a  powerful  press,  which,  for  the  first  time,  is  enlisted  in  the  cause 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  221 

ot  abolition,  and  turned  against  the  domestic  institutions,  and  the  peace  and  se 
curity  of  the  South.  To  guard  against  the  danger  in  this  new  arid  more  men 
acing  form,  the  slaveholding  states  will  be  compelled  to  revise  their  laws 
against  the  introduction  and  circulation  of  publications  calculated  to  disturb 
ih£ir  peace  and  endanger  their  security,  and  to  render  them  far  more  full  and 
efficient  than  they  have  heretofore  been.  In  this  new  state  of  things,  the  proba 
ble  conflict  between  the  laws  which  those  states  may  think  proper  to  adopt,  and 
those  of  the  General  Government  regulating  the  mail,  becomes  far  more  impor 
tant  than  in  any  former  state  of  the  controversy ;  and  Congress  is  now  called 
upon  to  say  what  part  it  will  take  in  reference  to  this  deeply-interesting  sub 
ject.  We  of  the  slaveholding  states  ask  nothing  of  the  government  but  that  it 
should  abstain  from  violating  laws  passed  within  our  acknowledged  constitu 
tional  competency,  and  conceded  to  be  essential  to  our  peace  and  security.  I 
am  anxious  to  see  how  this  question  will  be  decided.  I  am  desirous  that  my 
constituents  should  know  what  they  have  to  expect,  either  from  this  govern 
ment  or  from  the  non-slaveholding  states.  Much  that  I  have  said  and  done 
during  the  session  has  been  with  the  view  of  affording  them  correct  information 
on  this  point,  in  order  that  they  might  know  to  what  extent  they  might  rely  upon 
others,  and  how  far  they  must  depend  on  themselves. 

Thus  far  (I  say  it  with  regret)  our  just  hopes  have  not  been  realized.  The 
Legislatures  of  the  South," backed  by  the  voice  of  their  constituents,  expressed 
through  innumerable  meetings,  have  called  upon  the  non-slaveholding  states  to 
repress  the  movements  made  within  the  jurisdiction  of  those  states  against  their 
peace  and  security.  .Not  a  step  has  been  taken  ;  not  a  law  has  been  passed,  or 
even  proposed  ;  and  I  venture  to  assert  that  none  will  be  :  not  but  what  there  is 
a  favourable  disposition  towards  us  in  the  North,  but  I  clearly  see  the  state  of 
political  parties  there  presents  insuperable  impediments  to  any  legislation  on  the 
subject.  I  rest  my  opinion  on  the  fact  that  the  non-slaveholding  states,  from  the 
elements  of  their  population,  are,  and  will  continue  to  be,  divided  and  distracted 
by  parties  of  nearly  equal  strength  ;  and  that  each  will  always  be  ready  to  seize 
on  every  movement  of  the  other  which  may  give  them  the  superiority,  without 
much  regard  to  consequences  as  affecting  their  own  states,  and  much  less  re 
mote  and  distant  sections. 

Nor  have  we  been  less  disappointed  as  to  the  proceedings  of  Congress.  Be 
lieving  that  the  General  Government  has  no  right  or  authority  over  the  subject 
of  slavery,  we  had  just  grounds  to  hope  Congress  would  refuse  all  jurisdiction 
in  reference  to  it,  in  whatever  form  it  might  be  presented.  The  very  opposite 
course  has  been  pursued.  Abolition  petitions  have  not  only  been  received  in 
both  houses,  but  received  on  the  most  obnoxious  and  dangerous  of  all  grounds — 
that  we  are  bound  to  receive  them ;  that  is,  to  take  jurisdiction  of  the  question  of 
slavery  whenever  the  Abolitionists  may  think  proper  to  petition  for  its  abolition, 
either  here  or  in  the  states. 

Thus  far,  then,  we  of  the  slaveholding  states  have  been  grievously  disappoint 
ed.  One  question  still  remains  to  be  decided — that  presented  by  this  bill.  To 
refuse  to  pass  this  bill  would  be  virtually  to  co-operate  with  the  Abolitionists — 
would  be  to  make  the  officers  and  agents  of  the  postoffice  department  in  effect 
their  agents  and  abettors  in  the  circulation  of  their  incendiary  publications  in 
violation  of  the  laws  of  the  states.  It  is  your  unquestionable  duty,  as  I  have 
demonstrably  proved,  to  abstain  from  their  violation  ;  and,  by  refusing  or  neglect 
ing  to  discharge  that  duty,  you  would  clearly  enlist  in  the  existing  controversy, 
on  the  side  of  the  Abolitionists,  against  the  Southern  States.  Should  such  be 
your  decision  by  refusing  to  pass  this  bill,  I  shall  say  to  the  people  of  the 
South,  look  to  yourselves — you  have  nothing  to  hope  from  others.  But  I  must 
tell  the  Senate,  be  your  decision  what  it  may,  the  South  will  never  abandon  the 
principles  of  this  bill.  If  you  refuse  co-operation  with  our  laws,  and  conflict 
should  ensue  between  your  and  our  law,  the  Southern  States  will  never  yield 


222  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALTIOUN 

to  the  superiority  of  yours,  We  have  a  remedy  in  our  hands,  which,  in  such 
event,  we  shall  not  fail  to  apply.  We  have  high  authority  for  asserting,  that  in 
such  cases  "  state  interposition  is  the  rightful  remedy" — a  doctrine  first  an 
nounced  by  Jefferson — adopted  by  the  patriotic  and  Republican  State  of  Ken 
tucky,  by  a  solemn  resolution  in  '98,  and  finally  carried  out  into  successful  prac 
tice  on  a  recent  occasion,  ever  to  be  remembered  by  the  gallant  state  which  I, 
in  part,  have  the  honour  to  represent.  In  this  well-tested  and  efficient  remedy, 
sustained  by  the  principles  developed  in  the  report,  and  asserted  in  this  bill,  the 
slaveholding  states  have  an  ample  protection.  Let  it  be  fixed — let  it  be  riveted 
in  every  Southern  mind,  that  the  laws  of  the  slaveholding  states  for  the  protec 
tion  of  their  domestic  institutions  are  paramount  to  the  laws  of  the  General 
Government  in  the  regulation  of  commerce  and  the  mail,  and  that  the  latter  must 
yield  to  the  former  in  the  event  of  conflict  ;  and  that,  if  the  government  should 
refuse  to  yield,  the  states  have  a  right  to  interpose,  and  we  are  safe.  With 
these  principles,  nothing  but  concert  would  be  wanting  to  bid  defiance  to  the 
movements  of  the  Abolitionists,  whether  at  home  or  abroad ;  and  to  place  our 
domestic  institutions,  and,  with  them,  our  security  and  peace,  under  our  own  pro 
tection,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  danger. 


XIV. 

SPEECH   ON   THE   RECEPTION   OF    ABOLITION   PETITIONS,   FEBRUARY,    1837. 

IF  the  time  of  the  Senate  permitted,  I  should  feel  it  to  be  my  duty  to 
call  for  the  reading  of  the  mass  of  petitions  on  the  table,  in  order  that 
\ve  might  know  what  language  they  hold  towards  the  slaveholding  states 
and  their  institutions  ;  but  as  it  will  not,  I  have  selected  indiscriminately 
from  the  pile,  two :  one  from  those  in  manuscript,  and  the  other  from  the 
printed ;  and,  without  knowing  their  contents,  will  call  for  the  reading  of 
them,  so  that  we  may  judge,  by  them,  of  the  character  of  the  whole. 

(Here  the  secretary,  on  the  call  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  read  the  two  petitions.) 

Such,  resumed  Mr.  C.,  is  the  language  held  towards  us  and  ours ;  the 
peculiar  institutions  of  the  South,  that  on  the  maintenance  of  which  the 
very  existence  of  the  slaveholding  states  depends,  is  pronounced  to  be 
sinful  and  odious,  in  the  sight  of  God  and  man  ;  and  this  with  a  systematic 
design  of  rendering  us  hateful  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  with  a  view  to  a 
general  crusade  against  us  and  our  institutions.  This,  too,  in  the  legis 
lative  halls  of  the  Union ;  created  by  these  confederated  states  for  the 
better  protection  of  their  peace,  their  safety,  and  their  respective  insti 
tutions  j  and  yet  we,  the  representatives  of  twelve  of  these  sovereign  states 
against  whom  this  deadly  war  is  waged,  are  expected  to  sit  here  in  silence, 
hearing  ourselves  and  our  constituents  day  after  day  denounced,  without 
uttering  a  word ;  if  we  but  open  our  lips,  the  charge  of  agitation  is  re 
sounded  on  all  sides,  and  we  are  held  up  as  seeking  to  aggravate  the  evil 
which  we  resist.  Every  reflecting  mind  must  see  in  all  this  a  state  of 
things  deeply  and  dangerously  diseased. 

I  do  not  belong,  said  Mr.  C.,  to  the  school  which  holds  that  aggression 
is  to  be  met  by  concession.  Mine  is  the  opposite  creed,  which  teaches 
that  encroachments  must  be  met  at  the  beginning,  and  that  those  who  act 
on  the  opposite  principle  are  prepared  to  become  slaves.  In  this  case,  in 
particular,  I  hold  concession  or  compromise  to  be  fatal.  If  we  concede 
an  inch,  concession  would  follow  concession — compromise  would  follow 
compromise,  until  our  ranks  would  be  so  broken  that  effectual  resistance 
would  be  impossible.  We  must  meet  the  enemy  on  the  frontier,  with  a 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  223 

fixed  determination  of  maintaining  our  position  at  every  hazard.  Con 
sent  to  receive  these  insulting  petitions,  and  the  next  demand  will  be  that 
they  be  referred  to  a  committee,  in  order  that  they  may  be  deliberated 
and  acted  upon.  At  the  last  session,  we  were  modestly  asked  to  receive 
them  simply  to  lay  them  on  the  table,  without  any  view  of  ulterior  action. 
I  then  told  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan),  who  strongly 
urged  that  course  in  the  Senate,  that  it  was  a  position  that  could  not  be 
maintained  ;  as  the  argument  in  favour  of  acting  on  the  petitions,  if  we 
were  bound  to  receive,  could  not  be  resisted.  I  then  said  that  the  next 
step  would  be  to  refer  the  petition  to  a  committee,  and  I  already  see  in 
dications  that  such  is  now  the  intention.  If  we  yield,  that  will  be  followed 
by  another,  and  we  would  thus  proceed,  step  by  step,  to  the  final  consum 
mation  of  the  object  of  these  petitions.  We  are  now  told  that  the  most 
effectual  mode  of  arresting  the  progress  of  abolition  is  to  reason  it  down  ; 
and  with  this  view,  it  is  urged  that  the  petitions  ought  to  be  referred  to  a 
committee.  That  is  the  very  ground  which  was  taken  at  the  last  session 
in  the  other  house  ;  but,  instead  of  arresting  its  progress,  it  has  since  ad- 
vanced  more  rapidly  than  ever.  The  most  unquestionable  right  may  be 
rendered  doubtful,  if  once  admitted  to  be  a  subject  of  controversy,  and 
that  would  be  the  case  in  the  present  instance.  The  subject  is  beyond 
the  jurisdiction  of  Congress — they  have  no  right  to  touch  it  in  any  shape 
or  form,  or  to  make  it  the  subject  of  deliberation  or  discussion. 

In  opposition  to  this  view,  it  is  urged  that  Congress  is  bound  by  the 
Constitution  to  receive   petitions   in  every  case   and  on  every  subject, 
whether  within  its  constitutional  competency  or  not.     I  hold  the  doctrine 
to  be  absurd,  and  do  solemnly  believe  that  it  would  be  as  easy  to  prove 
that  it  has  the  right  to  abolish  slavery,  as  that  it  is  bound  to  receive  peti 
tions  for  that  purpose.     The  very  existence  of  the  rule  that  requires  a 
question  to  be  put  on  the  reception  of  petitions,  is  conclusive  to  show 
that  there  is  no  such  obligation.     It  has  been  a  standing  rule  from  the 
commencement  of  the  government,  and  clearly  shows  the  sense  of  those 
who  formed  the  Constitution  on  this  point.     The  question  on  the  recep 
tion  would  be  absurd,  if,  as  is  contended,  we  are  bound  to  receive ;  but 
I  do  not  intend  to  argue  the  question ;  I  discussed  it  fully  at  the  last  ses 
sion,  and  the  arguments  then  advanced  neither  have  nor  can  be  answered. 
As  widely  as  this  incendiary  spirit  has  spread,  it  has  not  yet  infected 
this  body,   or  the   great    mass  of  the   intelligent   and  business  portion 
of  the  North ;  but  unless  it  be  speedily  stopped,  it  will  spread  and  work 
upward  till  it  brings  the  two  great  sections  of  the  Union  into  deadly  con 
flict.     This  is  not  a  new  impression  with  me.     Several  years  since,  in  a 
discussion  with  one  of  the  senators  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster), 
before  this  fell  spirit  had  showed  itself,  I  then  predicted  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  proclamation  and  the  force  bill — that  this  government  had  a  right, 
in  the  last  resort,  to  determine  the  extent  of  its  own  powers,  and  enforce 
it  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  which  was  so  warmly  maintained  by  that 
senator — would  at  no   distant   day  arouse   the  dormant  spirit  of  Aboli 
tionism  ;  I  told  him  that  the   doctrine  was  tantamount  to  the    assump 
tion  of  unlimited  power  on  the  part  of  the  government,  and  that  such 
would  be  the  impression  on  the    public  mind  in  a  large  portion  of  the 
Union.     The  consequence  would  be  inevitable — a  large  portion  of  the 
Northern  States  believed  slavery  to  be  a  sin,  and  would  believe  it  to  be 
an  obligation  of  conscience  to  abolish  it,  if  they  should  feel  themselves 
in  any  degree  responsible  for  its  continuance,  and  that  his  doctrine  would 
necessarily  lead  to  the  belief  of  such  responsibility.     I   then  predicted 
that  it  would  commence,  as  it  has,  with  this  fanatical  portion  Of  society ; 
and  that  they  would  begin  their  operation  on  the  ignorant,  the  weak,  the 


224.  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

young,  and  the  thoughtless,  and  would  gradually  extend  upward  till  they 
became  strong  enough  to  obtain  political  control,  when  he,  and  others 
holding  the  highest  stations  in  society,  would,  however  reluctant,  be 
compelled  to  yield  to  their  doctrine,  or  be  driven  into  obscurity.  But 
four  years  have  since  elapsed,  and  all  this  is  already  in  a  course  of  regu 
lar  fulfilment. 

Standing  at  the  point  of  time  at  which  we  have  now  arrived,  it  will  not 
be  more  difficult  to  trace  the  course  of  future  events  now  than  it  was  then. 
Those  who  imagine  that  the  spirit  now  abroad  in  the  North  will  die  away 
of  itself  without  a  shock  or  convulsion^  have  formed  a  very  inadequate- 
conception  of  its  real  character  ;  it  will  continue  to  rise  and  spread,  un 
less  prompt  and  efficient  measures  to  stay  its  progress  be  adopted.  Al 
ready  it  has  taken  possession  of  the  pulpit,  of  the  schools,  and,  to  a  con 
siderable  extent,  of  the  press;  those  great  instruments  by  which  the  mind 
of  the  rising  generation  will  be  formed. 

However  sound  the  great  body  of  the  non-slaveholding  states  are  at 
present,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  they  will  be  succeeded  by  those  who 
will  have  been  taught  to  hate  the  people  and  institutions  of  nearly  one 
half  of  this  Union,  with  a  hatred  more  deadly  than  one  hostile  nation 
ever  entertained  towards  another.  It  is  easy  to  see  the  end.  By  the 
necessary  course  of  events,  if  left  to  themselves,  we  must  become,  finally, 
two  people.  It  is  impossible,  under  the  deadly  hatred  which  must  spring 
tip  between  the  two  great  sections,  if  the  present  causes  are  permitted  to 
operate  unchecked,  that  we  should  continue  under  the  same  political  sys 
tem.  The  conflicting  elements  would  burst  the  Union  asunder,  as  power 
ful  as  are  the  links  which  hold  it  together.  Abolition  and  the  Union  can 
not  coexist.  As  the  friend  of  the  Union,  I  openly  proclaim  it,  and  the 
sooner  it  is  known  the  better.  The  former  may  now  be  controlled,  but 
in  a  short  time  it  will  be  beyond  the  power  of  man  to  arrest  the  course 
of  events.  We  of  the  South  will  not,  cannot  surrender  our  institutions. 
To  maintain  the  existing  relations  between  the  two  races  inhabiting  that 
section  of  the  Union  is  indispensable  to  the  peace  and  happiness  of  both. 
It  cannot  be  subverted  without  drenching  the  country  in  blood,  and  extir 
pating  one  or  the  other  of  the  races.  Be  it  good  or  bad,  it  has  grown  up 
with  our  society  and  institutions,  and  is  so  interwoven  with  them  that  to 
destroy  it  would  be  to  destroy  us  as  a  people.  But  let  me  not  be  under 
stood  as  admitting,  even  by  implication,  that  the  existing  relations  be 
tween  the  two  races,  in  the  siaveholding  states,  is  an  evil :  far  otherwise  ; 
I  hold  it  to  be  a  good,  as  it  has  thus  far  proved  itself  to  be,  to  both,  and 
will  continue  to  prove  so,  if  not  disturbed  by  the  fell  spirit  of  abolition. 
I  appeal  to  facts.  Never  before  has  the  black  race  of  Central  Africa,  from 
the  dawn  of  history  to  the  present  day,  attained  a  condition  so  civilized 
and  so  improved,  not  only  physically,  but  morally  and  intellectually.  It 
came  among  us  in  a  low,  degraded,  and  savage  condition,  and,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  generations,  it  has  grown  up  under  the  fostering  care  of 
our  institutions,  as  reviled  as  they  have  been,  to  its  present  comparative 
civilized  condition.  This,  with  the  rapid  increase  of  numbers,  is  conclu 
sive  proof  of  the  general  happiness  of  the  race,  in  spite  of  all  the  exag 
gerated  tales  to  the  contrary. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  white  or  European  race  has  not  degenerated.  It 
has  kept  pace  with  its  brethren  in  other  sections  of  the  Union  where  sla 
very  does  not  exist.  It  is  odious  to  make  comparison  ;  but  I  appeal  to 
all  sides  whether  the  South  is  not  equal  in  virtue,  intelligence,  patriotism, 
courage,  disinterestedness,  and  all  the  high  qualities  which  adorn  our  na 
ture.  I  ask  whether  we  have  not  contributed  our  full  share  of  talents 
and  political  wisdom  in  forming  and  sustaining  this  political  fabric ;  and 


< 

SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  225 


whether  we  have  not  constantly  inclined  most  strongly  to  the  side  of  1 
erty,  and  been  the  first  to  see,  and  first  to  resist,  the  encroachments  of 
power.  In  one  thing  only  are  we  inferior — the  arts  of  gain ;  we  acknowl 
edge  that  we  are  less  wealthy  than  the  Northern  section  of  this  Union, 
but  I  trace  this  mainly  to  the  fiscal  action  of  this  government,  which  has 
extracted  much  from,  and  spent  little  among  us.  Had  it  been  the  reverse — 
if  the  exaction  had  been  from  the  other  section,  and  the  expenditure  with 
us — this  point  of  superiority  would  not  be  against  us  now,  as  it  was  not  at 
the  formation  of  this  government. 

But  I  take  higher  ground.  I  hold  that,  in  the  present  state  of  civiliza 
tion,  where  two  races  of  different  origin,  and  distinguished  by  colour, 
and  other  physical  differences,  as  well  as  intellectual,  are  brought  to 
gether,  the  relation  now  existing  in  the  slaveholding  states  between  the  two 
is,  instead  of  an  evil,  a  good — a  positive  good.  1  feel  myself  called  upon 
to  speak  freely  upon  the  subject,  where  the  honour  and  interests  of  those 
I  represent  are  involved.  I  hold,  then,  that  there  never  has  yet  existed  a 
wealthy  and  civilized  society  in  which  one  portion  of  the  community  did 
not,  in  point  of  fact,  live  on  the  labour  of  the  other.  Broad  and  general 
as  is  this  assertion,  it  is  fully  borne  out  by  history.  This  is  not  the 
proper  occasion,  but,  if  it  were,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  trace  the  va 
rious  devices  by  which  the  wealth  of  all  civilized  communities  has  been 
so  unequally  divided,  and  to  show  fcy  what  means  so  small  a  share  has 
been  allotted  to  those  by  whose  labour  it  was  produced,  and  so  large  a 
share  given  to  the  non-producing  class.  The  devices  are  almost  innu 
merable,  from  the  brute  force  and  gross  superstition  of  ancient  times,  to 
the  subtle  and  artful  fiscal  contrivances  of  modern.  I  might  well  chal 
lenge  a  comparison  between  them  and  the  more  direct,  simple,  and  patri 
archal  mode  by  which  the  labour  of  the  African  race  is  among  us  com 
manded  by  the  European.  I  may  say,  with  truth,  that  in  few  countries 
so  much  is  left  to  the  share  of  the  labourer,  and  so  little  exacted  from 
him,  or  where  there  is  more  kind  attention  to  him  in  sickness  or  infirmi 
ties  of  age.  Compare  his  condition  with  the  tenants  of  the  po'or-houses 
in  the  most  civilized  portions  of  Europe — look  at  the  sick,  and  the  old 
and  infirm  slave,  on  one  hand,  in  the  midst  of  his  family  and  friends,  un 
der  the  kind  superintending  care  of  his  master  and  mistress,  and  compare 
it  with  the  forlorn  and  wretched  condition  of  the  pauper  in  the  poor- 
house.  But  I  will  not  dwell  on  this  aspect  of  the  question :  I  turn  to  the 
political ;  and  here  I  fearlessly  assert,  that  the  existing  relation  between 
the  two  races  in  the  South,  against  which  these  blind  fanatics  are  waging 
war,  forms  the  most  solid  and  durable  foundation  on  which  to  rear  free 
and  stable  political  institutions.  It  is  useless  to  disguise  the  fact.  There 
is,  and  always  has  been,  in  an  advanced  stage  of  wealth  and  civilization, 
a  conflict  between  labour  and  capital.  The  condition  of  society  in  the 
South  exempts  us  from  the  disorders  and  dangers  resulting  from  this  con 
flict  ;  and  which  explains  why  it  is  that  the  political  condition  of  the 
slaveholding  states  has  been  so  much  more  stable  and  quiet  than  those  of 
the  North.  The  advantages  of  the  former,  in  this  respect,  will  become 
more  and  more  manifest,  if  left  undisturbed  by  interference  from  without, 
as  the  country  advances  in  wealth  and  numbers.  We  have,  in  fact,  but 
just  entered  that  condition  of  society  where  the  strength  and  durability  of 
our  political  institutions  are  to  be  tested ;  and  I  venture  nothing  in  pre 
dicting  that  the  experience  of  the  next  generation  will  fully  test  how 
vastly  more  favourable  our  condition  of  society  is  to  that  of  other  sec- 
tions  for  free  and  stable  institutions,  provided  we  are  not  disturbed  by 
the  interference  of  others,  or  shall  have  sufficient  intelligence  and  spirit 
to  resist  promptly  and  successfully  such  interference.  It  rests  with  our- 

FF 


226  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

selves  to  meet  and  repel  them.  I  look  not  for  aid  to  this  government,  or 
to  the  other  states ;  not  but  there  are  kind  feelings  towards  us  on  the 
part  of  the  great  body  of  the  non-slaveholding  states ;  but,  as  kind  as  their 
feelings  may  be,  we  may  rest  assured  that  no  political  party  in  those 
states  will  risk  their  ascendency  for  our  safety.  If  we  do  not  defend  our 
selves,  none  will  defend  us  ;  if  we  yield,  we  will  be  more-and  more  pressed 
as  we  recede  j  and,  if  we  submit,  we  will  be  trampled  under  foot.  Be 
assured  that  emancipation  itself  would  not  satisfy  these  fanatics  :  that 
gained,  the  next  step  would  be  to  raise  the  negroes  to  a  social  and  polit 
ical  equality  with  the  whites  ;  and,  that  being  effected,  we  would  soon  find 
the  present  condition  of  the  two  races  reversed.  They,  and  their  Northern 
allies,  would  be  the  masters,  and  we  the  slaves ;'  the  condition  of  the 
white  race  in  the  British  West  India  Islands,  as  bad  as  it  is,  would  be  hap 
piness  to  ours  ;  there  the  mother-country  is  interested  in  sustaining  the 
supremacy  of  the  European  race.  It  is  true  that  the  authority  of  the 
former  master  is  destroyed,  but  the  African  will  there  still  be  a  slave, 
not  to  individuals,  but  to  the  community — forced  to  labour,  not  by  the  au 
thority  of  the  overseer,  but  by  the  bayonet  of  the  soldiery  and  the  rod  of 
the  civil  magistrate. 

Surrounded,  as  the  slaveholding  states  are,  with  such  imminent  perils,  I 
rejoice  to  think  that  our  means  of  defence  are  ample,  if  we  shall  prove 
to  have  the  intelligence  and  spirit  do  see  and  apply  them  before  it  is  too 
late.  All  we  want  is  concert,  to  lay  aside  all  party  differences,  and  unite 
with  zeal  and  energy  in  repelling  approaching  dangers.  Let  there  be 
concert  of  action,  and  we  shall  find  ample  means  of  security  without  re 
sorting  to  secession  or  disunion.  I  speak  with  full  knowledge  and  a  thor 
ough  examination  of  the  subject,  and,  for  one,  see  my  way  clearly.  One 
thing  alarms  me — the  eager  pursuit  of  gain  which  overspreads  the  land, 
and  which  absorbs  every  faculty  of  the  mind  and  every  feeling  of  the 
heart.  Of  all  passions,  avarice  is  the  most  blind  and  compromising — the 
last  to  see,  and  the  first  to  yield  to  danger.  I  dare  not  hope  that  anything 
I  can  say  will  arouse  the  South  to  a  due  sense  of  danger ;  I  fear  it  is  be 
yond  the  power  of  mortal  voice  to  awaken  it  in  time  from  the  fatal  secu 
rity  into  which  it  has  fallen. 


xv. 

SPEECH   ON   THE   PUBLIC   DEPOSITES,   MAY   28,    1836. 

THE  Senate  then  proceeded  to  the  consideration  of  the  bill  to  regulate  the 
deposites  of  the  public  money. 

After  some  words  from  Mr.  Wright  in  explanation,  Mr.  Calhoun  said  :  This 
bill,  which  the  senator  from  New- York  proposes  to  strike  out  in  order  to  sub 
stitute  his  amendment,  is  no  stranger  to  this  body.  It  was  reported  at  the  last 
session  by  the  Select  Committee  on  Executive  Patronage,  and  passed  the  Sen 
ate  after  a  full  and  deliberate  investigation,  by  a  mixed  vote  of  all  parties,  of 
twenty  to  twelve.  As  strong  as  is  this  presumptive  evidence  in  its  favour,  I 
would,  notwithstanding,  readily  surrender  the  bill  and  adopt  the  amendment  of 
the  senator  from  New-York,  if  I  did  not  sincerely  believe  that  it  is  liable  to 
strong  and  decisive  objections.  I  seek  no  lead  on  this  important  subject ;  my 
sole  aim  is  to  aid  in  applying  a  remedy  to  what  I  honestly  believe  to  be  a  deep 
and  dangerous  disease  of  the  body  politic  :  and  I  stand  prepared  to  co-operate 
with  any  one,  be  he  of  what  party  he  may,  who  may  propose  a  remedy,  provi 
ded  it  shall  promise  to  be  safe  and  efficient.  I,  in  particular,  am  desirous  of  co- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  227 

operating  with  the  senator  from  New-York,  not  only  because  I  desire  the  aid 
of  his  distinguished  talents,  but,  still  more,  of  his  decisive  influence  with  the 
powerful  party  of  which  he  is  so  distinguished  a  member,  and  which  now,  for 
good  or  evil,  holds  the  destiny  of  the  country  in  its  hands.  It  was  in  this  spirit 
that  I  examined  the  amendment  proposed  by  the  senator ;  and  I  regret  to  say, 
after  a  full  investigation,  I  cannot  acquiesce  in  it,  as  I  feel  a  deep  conviction 
that  it  will  be  neither  safe  nor  efficient.  So  far  from  being  substantially  the 
same  as  the  bill,  as  stated  by  the  senator,  I  cannot  but  regard  it  as  essentially 
different,  both  as  to  objects  and  means.  The  objects  of  the  bill  are,  first,  to  se 
cure  the  public  interest  as  far  as  it  is  connected  with  the  deposites  ;  and,  next-, 
to  protect  the  banks  in  which  they  are  made  against  the  influence  and  control 
of  the  executive  branch  of  this  government,  with  the  view  both  to  their  and 
the  public  interest.  Compared  with  the  bill,  in  respect  to  both,  the  proposed 
amendment  will  be  found  to  favour  the  banks  against  the  people,  and  the  exec 
utive  against  the  banks.  I  do  not  desire  the  Senate  to  form  their  opinion  on 
my  authority.  I  wish  them  to  examine  for  themselves  ;  and,  in  order  to  aid 
them  in  the  examination,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  .state,  and  briefly  illustrate,  the 
several  points  of  difference  between  the  bill  and  the  proposed  amendment,  ta 
king  them  in  the  order  in  which  they  stand  in  the  bill. 

The  first  section  of  the  bill  provides  that  the  banks  shall  pay  at  the  rate  of 
two  per  cent,  per  annum  on  the  deposites  for  the  use  of  the  public  money.  This 
provision  is  entirely  omitted  in  the  amendment,  which  proposes  to  give  to  the 
banks  the  use  of  the  money  without  interest.  That  the  banks  ought  to  pay 
something  for  the  use  of  the  public  money,  all  must  agree,  whatever  diver 
sity  of  opinion  there  may  be  as  to  the  amount.  According  to  the  last  return  of 
the  treasury  department,  there  was,  on  the  first  of  this  month,  $45,000,000  of 
public  money  in  the  thirty-six  depository  banks,  which  they  are  at  liberty  to 
use  as  their  own  for  discount  or  business,  till  drawn  out  for  disbursements,  an 
event  that  may  not  happen  for  years.  In  a  word,  this  vast  amount  is  so  much 
additional  banking  capital,  giving  the  same,  or  nearly  the  same,  profit  to  those 
institutions  as  their  permanent  chartered  capital,  without  rendering  any  other 
service  to  the  public  than  paying  away,  from  time  to  time,  the  portion  that  might 
be  required  for  the  service  of  the  government.  Assuming  that  the  banks  real 
ize  a  profit  of  six  per  cent,  on  these  deposites  (it  cannot  be  estimated  at  less), 
it  would  give,  on  the  present  amount,  nearly  three  millions  of  dollars  per  annum, 
and  on  the  probable  average  public  deposites  of  Ae  year,  upward  of  two  mill 
ions  of  dollars  ;  which  enormous  profit  is  derived  from  the  public  by  compara 
tively  few  individuals,  without  any  return  or  charge,  except  the  inconsiderable 
service  of  paying  out  the  draughts  of  the  treasury  when  presented.  But  it  is  due 
to  the  senator  to  acknowledge  that  his  amendment  is  predicated  on  the  suppo 
sition  that  some  disposition  must  be  made  of  the  surplus  revenue,  which  would 
leave  in  the  banks  a  sum  not  greater  than  would  be  requisite  to  meet  the 'cur 
rent  expenditure  :  a  supposition  which  necessarily  must  affect,  very  materially 
affect,  the  decision  of  the  question  of  the  amount  of  compensation  the  banks 
ought  to  make  to  the  public  for  the  use  of  its  funds ;  but,  let  the  disposition  be 
what  it  may,  the  omission  in  the  amendment  of  any  compensation  whatever  is, 
in  my  opinion,  wholly  indefensible. 

The  next  point  of  difference  relates  to  transfer  warrants.  The  bill  prohibits 
the  use  of  transfer  warrants,  except  with  a  view  to  disbursement,  while  the 
amendment  leaves  them,  without  regulation,  under  the  sole  control  of  the  treas 
ury  department.  To  understand  the  importance  of  this  difference,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  transfer  warrants  are  the  lever  by  which  the  whole  bank 
ing  operations  of  the  country  may  be  controlled  through  the  deposits .  By  them 
the  public  money  may  be  transferred  from  one  bank  to  another,  or  from  one  state 
or  section  of  the  country  to  another  state  or  section  ;  and  thus  one  bank  may  be 
elevated  and  another  depressed,  and  a  redundant  currency  created  in  one  state 


228  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

or  section,  arid  a  deficient  in  another ;  and,  through  such  redundancy  or  defi 
ciency,  all  the  moneyed  engagements  and  business  transactions  of  the  whole 
community  may  be  made  dependant  on  the  will  of  one  man.  With  the  present 
enormous  surplus,  it  is  difficult  to  assign  limits  to  the  extent  of  this  power.  The 
secretary,  or  the  irresponsible  agent  unknown  to  the  laws,  who,  rumour  says, 
has  the  direction  of  this  immense  power  (we  are  permitted  to  have  no  certain, 
information),  may  raise  and  depress  stocks  and  property  of  all  descriptions  at 
his  pleasure,  by  withdrawing  from  one  place  and  transferring  to  another,  to  the 
unlimited  gain  of  those  who  are  in  the  secret,  and  certain  ruin  of  those  who  are 
not.  Such  a  field  of  speculation  has  never  before  been  opened  in  any  country  ; 
a  field  so  great,  that  the  Rothschilds  themselves  might  be  tempted  to  enter  it 
with  their  immense  funds.  Nor  is  the  control  which  it  would  give  over  the  pol 
itics  of  the  country  much  less  unlimited.  To  the  same  extent  that  it  may  be 
used  to  affect  the  interests  and  the  fortunes  of  individuals,  to  the  like  extent  it 
may  be  employed  as  an  instrument  of  political  influence  and  control.  I  do  not 
intend  to  assert  that  it  has  or  will  be  so  employed ;  it  is  not  essential  at  pres 
ent  to  inquire  how  it  has  or  will  be  used.  It  is  sufficient  for  my  purpose  to 
show,  as  I  trust  I  have  satisfactorily,  that  it  may  be  so  employed.  To  guard 
against  the  abuse  of  so  dangerous  a  power,  the  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
bill  to  prohibit  the  use  of  transfer  warrants,  except,  as  stated,  for  the  purpose  of 
disbursement ;  the  omission  of  which  provision  in  the  amendment  is  a  fatal  ob 
jection  to  it  of  itself,  were  there  no  other.  But  it  is  far  from  standing  alone  : 
the  next  point  of  difference  will  be  found  to  be  not  less  striking  and  fatal. 

The  professed  object  of  both  the  bill  and  the  amendment  is  to  place  the  safe 
keeping  of  the  public  moneys  under  the  regulation  and  control  of  law,  instead 
of  being  left,  as  it  now  is,  at  the  discretion  of  the  executive.  However  strange 
it  may  seem,  the  fact  is,  nevertheless,  so,  that  the  amendment  entirely  fails  to 
effect  the  object  which  it  is  its  professed  object  to  accomplish.  In  order  that 
it  may  be  distinctly  seen  that  what  I  state  is  the  case,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
view  the  provisions  of  the  bill  and  the  amendment  in  reference  to  the  deposite 
separately,  as  they  relate  to  the  banks  in  which  the  public  funds  are  now  de 
posited,  and  those  which  may  hereafter  be  selected  to  receive  them. 

The  bill  commences  with  the  former,  which  it  adopts  as  banks  of  deposite, 
and  prescribes  the  regulations  and  conditions  on  the  observance  of  which  they 
shall  continue  such  ;  while^at  the  same  time,  it  places  them  beyond  the  con 
trol  and  influence  of  the  executive  department,  by  placing  them  under  the  pro 
tection  of  law  so  long  as  they  continue  faithfully  to  perform  their  duty  as  fiscal 
agents  of  the  government.  It  next  authorizes  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
select,  under  certain  circumstances,  additional  banks  of  deposite,  as  the  exigen 
cy  of  the  public  service  may  require,  on  which  it  imposes  like  regulations  and 
conditions,  and  places,  in  like  manner,  under  the  protection  of  law.  In  all  this 
the  amendment  pursues  a  very  different  course.  It  begins  with  authorizing  the 
secretary  to  select  the  banks  of  deposite,  and  limits  the  regulations  and  condi 
tions  it  imposes  on  such  banks  ;  leaving,  by  an  express  provision,  the  present 
banks  wholly  under  the  control  of  the  treasury  or  the  executive  department,  as 
they  now  are,  without  prescribing  any  time  for  the  selection  of  other  banks  of 
deposite,  or  making  it  the  duty  of  the  secretary  so  to  do.  The  consequence  is 
obvious.  The  secretary  "may  continue  the  present  banks  as  long  as  he  pleases  ; 
and  so  long  as  he  may  choose  to  continue  them,  the  provisions  of  the  amend 
ment,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  deposites,  will  be  a  dead  letter  ;  and  the  banks,  of 
course,  instead  of  being  under  the  control  of  the  law,  will  be  contrary,  as  I  have 
said,  to  the  professed  object  both  of  the  bill  and  amendment — subject  exclusive 
ly  to  his  will. 

The  senator  has  attempted  to  explain  this  difference,  but,  I  must  say,  very  un 
satisfactorily.  He  said  that  the  bill  prohibited  the  selection  of  other  banks  ; 
and,  as  he  deemed  others  to  be  necessary,  at  certain  important  points,  in  con- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  229 

sequence  of  the  present  enormous  surplus,  he  inserted  the  provision  authorizing 
the  selection  of  other  banks.  The  senator  has  not  stated  the  provisions  of  the 
bill  accurately :  so  far  from  not  authorizing,  it  expressly  authorizes  the  selec 
tion  of  other  banks  where  there  are  now  none  ;  but  I  presume  he  intended  to 
limit  his  remarks  to  places  where  there  are  no  existing  banks  of  deposite. 
Thus  limited,  the  fact  is  as  he  states ;  but  it  by  no  means  explains  the  extraor 
dinary  omission  (for  such  I  must  consider  it)  of  not  extending  the  regulations 
to  the  existing  banks,  as  well  as  to  those  hereafter  to  be  selected.  If  the  public 
service  requires  additional  banks  at  New- York  and  other  important  points,  in 
consequence  of  the  vast  sums  deposited  there  (as  I  readily  agree  it  does),  if  no 
disposition  is  to  be  made  of  the  surplus,  it  is  certainly  a  very  good  reason  for 
enlarging  the  provisions  of  the  bill,  by  authorizing  the  secretary  to  select  other 
banks  at  those  points  ;  but  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  comprehend  how  it  proves 
that  the  regulations  which  the  amendment  proposes  to  impose  should  be  ex 
clusively  limited  to  such  newly-selected  banks.  Nor  do  I  see  why  the  senator 
has  not  observed  the  same  rule,  in  this  case,  as  that  which  he  adopted  in  refer 
ence  to  the  compensation  the  banks  ought  to  pay  for  the  use  of  the  public  money. 
He  omitted  to  provide  for  any  compensation,  on  the  ground  that  his  amendment 
proposed  to  dispose  of  all  the  surplus  money,  leaving  in  the  possession  of  the 
banks,  a  sum  barely  sufficient  to  meet  the  current  expenditure,  for  the  use  of 
which  he  did  not  consider  it  right  to  charge  a  compensation.  On  the  same 
principle,  it  was  unnecessary  to  provide  for  the  selection  of  additional  banks 
where  there  are  now  banks  of  deposite,  as  they  would  be  ample  if  the  surplus 
was  disposed  of.  In  this  I  understood  the  senator  himself  to  concur. 

But  it  is  not  only  in  the  important  point  of  extending  the  regulations  to  the 
existing  banks  of  deposite  that  the  bill  and  the  amendment  differ.  There  is  a  stri 
king  difference  between  them  in  reference  to  the  authority  of  Congress  over  the 
banks  of  deposite  embraced  both  in  the  bill  and  the  amendment.  The  latter,  fol 
lowing  the  provision  in  the  charter  of  the  late  Bank  of  the  United  States,  authorizes 
the  secretary  to  withdraw  the  public  deposites,  and  to  discontinue  the  use  of  any 
one  of  the  banks  whenever,  in  his  opinion,  such  bank  shall  have  violated  the 
conditions  on  which  it  has  been  employed,  or  the  public  funds  are  not  safe  in 
its  vaults,  with  the  simple  restriction,  that  he  shall  report  the  fact  to  Congress. 
We  know,  from  experience,  how  slight  is  the  check  which  this  restriction  im 
poses.  It  not  only  requires  the  concurrence  of  both  houses  of  Congress  to 
overrule  the  act  of  the  secretary,  where  his  power  may  be  improperly  exerci 
sed,  but  the  act  of  Congress  itself,  intended  to  control  such  exercise  of  power, 
may  be  overruled  by  the  veto  of  the  President,  at  whose  will  the  secretary 
holds  his  place  ;  so  as  to  leave  the  control  of  the  banks  virtually  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  executive  department  of  the  government.  To  obviate  this,  the  bill 
vests  the  secretary  with  the  power  simply  of  withdrawing  the  deposites  and 
suspending  the  use  of  the  bank  as  a  place  of  deposite  ;  and  provides  that, 
if  Congress  shall  not  confirm  the  removal,  the  deposites  shall  be  returned  to  the 
bank  after  the  termination  of  the  next  session  of  Congress. 

The  next  point  of  difference  is  of  far  less  importance,  and  is  only  mentioned  as 
tending  to  illustrate  the  different  character  of  the  bill  and  the  amendment.  The 
former  provides  that  the  banks  of  deposite  shall  perform  the  duties  of  commis 
sioners  of  loans  without  compensation,  in  like  manner  as  was  the  duty  of  the 
late  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  its  branches,  under  its  charter.  Among 
these  duties  is  that  of  paying  the  pensioners — a  very  heavy  branch  of  disburse 
ment,  and  attended  with  considerable  expense,  and  which  will  be  saved  to  the 
government  under  the  bill,  but  will  be  lost  if  the  amendment  should  prevail. 

Another  difference  remains  to  be  pointed  out,  relating  to  the  security  of  the 
deposites.  With  so  large  an  amount  of  public  money  in  their  vaults,  it  is  im 
portant  th,at  the  banks  should  always  be  provided  with  ample  means  to  meet 
their  engagements.  With  this  view,  the  bill  provides  that  the  specie  in  the 


230  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

vaults  of  the  several  banks,  and  the  aggregate  of  the  balance  in  their  favour  with 
other  specie-paying  banks,  shall  be  equal  to  one  fifth  of  the  entire  amount  of 
their  notes  and  bills  in  circulation,  and  their  public  and  private  deposites — a 
sum,  as  is  believed,  sufficient  to  keep  them  in  a  sound,  solvent  condition.  The 
amendment,  on  the  contrary,  provides  that  the  banks  shall  keep  in  their  own 
vaults,  or  the  vaults  of  other  banks,  specie  equal  to  one  fourth  of  its  notes  and 
bills  in  circulation,  and  the  balance  of  its  accounts  with  other  banks  payable  on 
demand. 

I  regret  that  the  senator  has  thought  proper  to  change  the  phraseology,  and 
to  use  terms  less  clear  and  explicit  than  those  in  the  bill.  I  am  not  certain 
that  I  comprehend  the  exact  meaning  of  the  provision  in  the  amendment.  What 
is  meant  by  specie  in  the  vaults  of  other  banks  ?  In  a  general  sense,  all  depos 
ites  are  considered  as  specie ;  but  I  cannot  suppose  that  to  be  the  meaning  in 
this  instance,  as  it  would  render  the  provision  in  a  great  measure  inoperative. 
I  presume  the  amendment  means  special  deposites  in  gold  and  silver  in  other 
banks,  placed  there  for  safe  keeping,  or  to  be  drawn  on,  and  not  to  be  used  by 
the  bank  in  which  it  is  deposited.  Taking  that  to  be  the  meaning,  what  is  there 
to  prevent  the  same  sum  from  being  twice  counted  in  estimating  the  means  of 
the  several  banks  of  deposite  1  Take  two  of  them,  one  having  $100,000  in 
specie  in  its  vaults,  and  the  other  the  same  amount  in  the  vaults  of  the  other  bank, 
which,  in  addition,  has,  besides,  another  $100,000  of  its  own  ;  what  is  there  to 
prevent  the  latter  from  returning,  under  the  amendment,  $200,000  of  specie  in 
its  vaults,  while  the  former  would  return  $100,000  in  its  own  vaults,  and  an 
other  in  the  vaults  of  the  other  bank,  making,  in  the  aggregate,  between  them, 
$400,000,  when,  in  reality,  the  amount  in  both  would  be  but  $300,000? 

But  this  is  not  the  only  difference  between  the  bill  and  amendment,  in  this 
particular,  deserving  of  notice.  The  object  of  the  provision  is  to  compel  the 
banks  of  deposite  to  have,  at  all  times,  ample  means  to  meet  their  liabilities,  so 
that  the  government  should  have  sufficient  assurance  that  the  public  moneys  in 
their  vaults  would  be  forthcoming  when  demanded.  With  this  view,  the  bill 
provides  that  the  available  means  of  the  bank  shall  never  be  less  than  one  fifth 
of  its  aggregate  liabilities,  including  bills,  notes,  and  deposites,  public  and  pri 
vate  ;  while  the  amendment  entirely  omits  the  private  deposites,  and  includes 
only  the  balance  of  its  deposites  with  other  banks.  This  omission  is  the  more 
remarkable,  inasmuch  as  the  greater  portion  of  the  liabilities  of  the  deposite 
banks  must,  with  the  present  large  surplus,  result  from  their  deposites,  as  every 
one  who  is  familiar  with  banking  operations  will  readily  perceive. 

I  have  now  presented  to  the  Senate  the  several  points  of  difference  which  I 
deem  material  between  the  bill  and  the  amendment,  with  such  remarks  as  to 
enable  them  to  form  their  own  opinion  in  reference  to  the  difference,  so  that  they 
may  decide  how  far  the  assertion  is  true  with  which  I  set  out,  that,  wherever 
they  differ,  the  amendment  favours  the  banks  against  the  interests  of  the  public, 
and  the  executive  against  the  banks. 

The  senator,  acting  on  the  supposition  that  there  would  be  a  permanent  surplus 
beyond  the  expenditures  of  the  government,  which  neither  justice  nor  regard  to 
the  public  interest  would  permit  to  remain  in  the  banks,  has  extended  the  provis 
ions  of  his  amendment,  with  great  propriety,  so  as  to  comprehend  a  plan  to  with 
draw  the  surplus  from  the  banks.  His  plan  is  to  vest  the  commissioners  of  the 
sinking  fund  with  authority  to  estimate,  at  the  beginning  of  every  quarter,  the 
probable  receipts  and  expenditures  of  the  quarter ;  and  if,  in  their  opinion,  the 
receipts,  with  the  money  in  the  treasury,  should  exceed  the  estimated  expenditure 
by  a  certain  sum,  say  $5,OOC,000,  the  excess  should  be  vested  in  state  stocks ; 
and  if  it  should  fall  short  of  that  sum,  a  sufficient  amount  of  the  stocks  should 
be  sold  to  make  up  the  deficit.  We  have  thus  presented  for  consideration  the 
important  subject  of  the  surplus  revenue,  and  with  it  the  question  so  anxiously 
and  universally  asked,  What  shall  be  done  with  the  surplus  ?  Shall  it  be  ex- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN*  C.  CALHOUN.  231 

pended  by  the  government,  or  remain  where  it  is,  or  be  disposed  of  as  proposed 
by  the  senator  ?  or,  if  not,  what  other  disposition  shall  be  made  of  it  1  questions, 
the  investigation  of  which  necessarily  embraces  the  entire  circle  of  our  policy, 
and  on  the  decision  of  which  the  future  destiny  of  the  country  may  depend. 

But  before  we  enter  on  the  discussion  of  this  important  question,  it  will  be 
proper  to  ascertain  what  will  be  the  probable  available  means  of  the  year,  in 
order  that  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the  probable  surplus  which  may 
lemain,  by  comparing  it  with  the  appropriations  that  may  be  authorized. 

According  to  the  late  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  there  was  de 
posited  in  the  several  banks  a  little  upward  of  $33,000,000  at  the  termination 
of  the  first  quarter  of  the  year,  not  including  the  sum  of  about  $3,000,000  de 
posited  by  the  disbursing  agents  of  the  government.  The  same  report  stated 
the  receipts  of  the  quarter  at  about  $11,000,000,  of  which  lands  and  customs 
yielded  nearly  an  equal  amount.  Assuming  for  the  three  remaining  quarters  an 
equal  amount,  it  would  give,  for  the  entire  receipts  of  the  year,  $44.000,000. 
I  agree  with  the  senator,  that  this  sum  is  too  large.  The  customs  will  prob 
ably  average  an  amount  throughout  the  year  corresponding  with  the  receipts 
of  the  first  quarter,  but  there  probably  will  be  a  considerable  falling  off  in 
the  receipts  from  the  public  lands.  Assuming  $7,000,000  as  the  probable 
amount,  which  I  presume  will  be  ample,  the  receipts  of  the  year,  subtract 
ing  that  sum  from  $44,000,000,  will  be  $37,000,000  ;  and  subtracting  from 
that  $11,000,000,  the  receipts  of  the  first  quarter,  would  leave  $26,000,000  as 
the  probable  receipts  of  the  last  three  quarters.  Add  to  this  sum  $33,000,000, 
the  amount  in  the  treasury  on  the  last  day  of  the  first  quarter,  and  it  gives 
$59,000.000.  To  this  add  the  amount  of  stock  in  the  United  States  Bank,  which, 
at  the  market  price,  is  worth  at  least  $7,000,000,  and  we  have  $66,000,000, 
which  I  consider  as  the  least  amount  at  which  the  probable  available  means  of 
the  year  can  be  fairly  estimated.  It  will,  probably,  very  considerably  exceed 
this  amount.  The  range  may  be  put  down  at  between  $66,000,000  and 
$73,000,000,  which  may  be  considered  as  the  two  extremes  between  which  * 
the  means  of  the  year  may  vibrate.  But,  in  order  to  be  safe,  I  have  assumed 
the  least  of  the  two. 

The  first  question  which  I  propose  to  consider  is,  Shall  this  sum  be  expend 
ed  by  the  government  in  the  course  of  the  year  ?  A  sum  nearly  equal  to  the 
entire  debt  of  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  by  which  the  liberty  and  independence 
of  these  states  were  established ;  more  than  five  times  greater  than  the  expen 
diture  of  the  government  at  the  commencement  of  the  present  administration, 
— deducting  the  payments  on  account  of  the  public  debt — and  more  than  four 
times  greater  than  the  average  annual  expenditure  of  the  present  administration, 
making  the  same  deduction,  extravagant  as  its  expenditure  has  been.  The 
very  magnitude  of  the  sum  decides  the  question  against  expenditure.  It  may 
be  wasted,  thrown  away,  but  it  cannot  be  expended.  There  are  not  objects  on 
which  to  expend  it ;  for  proof  of  which  I  appeal  to  the  appropriations  already 
made  and  contemplated.  We  have  passed  the  navy  appropriations,  which,  as 
liberal  as  they  are  admitted  to  be  on  all  sides,  are  raised  only  about  $2,000,000 
compared  with  the  appropriations  of  last  year.  The  appropriations  for  fortifi-. 
cations,  supposing  the  bills  now  pending  should  pass,  will  amount  to  about 
$3,500,000,  and  would  exceed  the  ordinary  appropriations,  assuming  them  at 
$1,000,000,  which  I  hold  to  be  ample,  by  $2,500,000.  Add  a  million  for  ord 
nance,  seven  or  eight  for  Indian  treaties,  and  four  for  Indian  wars,  and  suppo 
sing  the  companies  of  the  regular  army  to  be  filled  as  recommended  by  the  war 
department,  the  aggregate  amount,  including  the  ordinary  expenditures,  would 
be  between  thirty  and  thirty-five  millions,  and  would  leave  a  balance  of  at  least 
$30,000,000  in  the  treasury  at  the  end  of  the  year. 

But  suppose  objects  could  be  devised  on  which  to  expend  the  whole  of  the 
available  means  of  the  year,  it  would  still  be  impossible  to  make  the  expendi- 


232  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ture  without  immense  waste  arid  confusion.  To  expend  so  large  an  amount,  reg 
ularly  and  methodically,  would  require  a  vast  increase  of  able  and  experienced 
disbursing  officers,  and  a  great  enlargement  of  the  organization  of  the  govern 
ment,  in  all  the  branches  connected  with  disbursements.  To  effect  such  an  en 
largement,  and  to  give  a  suitable  organization,  placed  under  the  control  of  skil 
ful  and  efficient  officers,  must  necessarily  be  a  work  of  time ;  but,  without  it, 
so  sudden  and  great  an  increase  of  expenditure  would  necessarily  be  followed 
by  inextricable  confusion  and  heavy  losses. 

But  suppose  this  difficulty  overcome,  and  suitable  objects  could  be  devised, 
would  it  be  advisable  to  make  the  expenditure  ?  Would  it  be  wise  to  draw  off 
so  vast  an  amount  of  productive  labour,  to  be  employed  in  unproductive  objects, 
in  building  fortifications,  dead  walls,  and  in  lining  the  interior  frontier  with  a 
large  military  force,  neither  of  which  would  add  a  cent  to  the  productive  power 
of  the  country  ? 

The  ordinary  expenditure  of  the  government,  under  the  present  administra 
tion,  may  be  estimated,  say  at  $18,000,000,  a  sum  exceeding  by  five  or  six 
millions  what,  in  my  opinion,  is  sufficient  for  a  just  and  efficient  administration, 
of  the  government.  Taking  eighteen  from  sixty-six  would  leave  forty-eight 
millions  as  the  surplus,  if  the  affairs  of  the  government  had  been  so  administer 
ed  as  to  avoid  the  heavy  expenditures  of  the  year,  which  I  firmly  believe,  by 
early  and  prudent  management,  might  have  been  effected.  The  expenditure  of 
this  sum,  estimating  labour  at  $20  a  month,  would  require  200,000  operatives, 
equal  to  one  third  of  the  whole  number  of  labourers  employed  in  producing  the 
great  staple  of  our  country,  which  is  spreading  wealth  and  prosperity  over  the 
land,  and  controlling,  in  a  great  measure,  the  commerce  and  manufactures  of 
the  world.  But  take  what  will  be  the  actual  surplus,  and  estimate  that  at  half 
the  sum  which,  with  prudence  and  economy,  it  might  have  been,  and  it  would 
require  the  subtraction  of  100,000  operatives  from  their  present  useful  employ 
ment,  to  be  employed  in  the  unproductive  service  of  the  government.  Would 
it,  I  again  repeat,  be  wise  to  draw  off  this  immense  mass  of  productive  labour, 
in  order  to  employ  it  in  building  fortifications  and  swelling  the  military  estab 
lishment  of  the  country  ?  Would  it  add  to  the  strength  of  the  Union,  or  give  in 
creased  security  to  its  liberty,  or  accelerate  its  prosperity  ?  the  great  objects  for 
which  the  government  was  constituted. 

To  ascertain  how  the  strength  of  any  country  may  be  best  developed,  its  pe 
culiar  state  and  condition  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  Looking  to  ours 
with  this  view,  who  can  doubt  that,  next  to  our  free  institutions,  the  main  source 
of  our  growing  greatness  and  power  is  to  be  found  in  our  great  and  astonishing 
increase  of  numbers,  wealth,  and  facility  of  intercourse  ?  If  we  desire  to  see 
our  country  powerful,  we  ought  to  avoid  any  measure  opposed  to  their  develop 
ment,  and,  in  particular,  ought  to  make  the  smallest  possible  draught,  consistent 
with  our  peace  and  security,  on  the  productive  powers  of  the  country.  Let  these 
have  the  freest  possible  play.  Leave  the  resources  of  individuals  under  their 
own  direction,  to  be  employed  in  advancing  their  own  and  their  country's  wealth, 
and  prosperity,  with  the  extraction  of  the  least  amount  required  for  the  expen 
diture  of  the  government ;  and  draw  off  not  a  single  labourer  from  his  present 
productive  pursuits  to  the  unproductive  employment  of  the  government,  except 
ing  such  as  the  public  service  may  render  indispensable.  Who  can  doubt  that 
such  a  policy  would  add  infinitely  more  to  the  power  and  strength  of  the  coun 
try  than  the  extravagant  schemes  of  spending  millions  on  fortifications  and  the 
increase  of  the  military  establishment  ? 

Let  us  next  examine  how  the  liberty  of  the  country  may  be  affected  by  the 
scheme  of  disposing  of  the  surplus  by  disbursements.  And  here. I  would  ask, 
Is  the  liberty  of  the  country  at  present  in  a  secure  and  stable  condition  ?  and, 
if  not,  by  what  is  it  endangered  ?  and  will  an  increase  of  disbursements  aug 
ment  or  dimmish  the  danger  ? 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  233 

Whatever  may  be  the  diversity  of  opinion  on  other  points,  there  is  not  an  in 
telligent  individual  of  any  party,  who  regards  his  reputation,  that  will  venture  to 
deny  that  the  liberty  of  the  country  is  at  this  time  more  insecure  and  unstable 
than  it  ever  has  been.  We  all  know  that  there  is  in  every  portion  of  the  Union, 
and  with  every  party,  a  deep  feeling  that  our  political  institutions  are  undergoing 
a  great  and  hazardous  change.  Nor  is  the  feeling  much  less  strong,  that  the 
vast  increase  of  patronage  and  influence  of  the  government  is  the  cause  of  the 
great  and  fearful  change  which  is  so  extensively  affecting  the  character  of  our 
people  and  institutions.  The  effect  of  increasing  the  expenditures  at  this  time, 
so  as  to  absorb  the  surplus,  would  be  to  double  the  number  of  those  who  live,  or 
expect  to  live,  by  the  government,  and  in  the  same  degree  augment  its  patron 
age  and  influence,  and  accelerate  that  downward  course  which,  if  not  arrested, 
must  speedily  terminate  in  the  overthrow  of  our  free  institutions. 

These  views  I  hold  to  be  decisive  against  the  wild  attempt  to  absorb  the  im 
mense  means  of  the  government  by  the  expenditures  of  the  year.  In  fact,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  individuals,  all  seem  to  regard  the  scheme  either  as  im 
practicable  or  unsafe  ;  but  there  are  others,  who,  while  they  condemn  the  at 
tempt  of  disposing  of  the  surplus  by  immediate  expenditures,  believe  it  can  be 
safely  and  expediently  expended  in  a  period  of  four  or  five  years,  on  what  they 
choose  to  call  the  defences  of  the  country. 

In  order  to  determine  how  far  this  opinion  may  be  correct,  it  will  be  neces 
sary  first  to  ascertain  what  will  be  the  available  means  of  the  next  four  or  five 
years  ;  by  comparing  which  with  what  ought  to  be  the  expenditure,  we  may 
determine  whether  the  plan  would,  or  would  not,  be  expedient.  In  making  the 
calculation,  I  will  take  the  term  of  five  years,  including  the  present,  and  which 
will,  of  course,  include  1840,  after  the  termination  of  which,  the  duties  above 
twenty  per  cent,  are  to  go  off,  by  the  provisions  of  the  Compromise  Act,  in 
eighteen  months,  when  the  revenue  is  to  be  reduced  to  the  economical  and  just 
wants  of  the  government. 

The  available  means  of  the  present  year,  as  I  have  already  shown,  will  equal, 
at  least  $66,000,000.  That  of  the  next  succeeding  four  years  (including  1840) 
may  be  assumed  to  be  twenty-one  millions  annually.  The  reason  for  this  as 
sumption  may  be  seen  in  the  report  of  the  select  committee  at  the  last  session, 
which  I  have  reviewed,  and  in  the  correctness  of  which  I  feel  increased  con 
fidence.  The  amount  may  fall  short  of,  but  will  certainly  not  exceed,  the  esti 
mate  in  the  report,  unless  some  unforeseen  event  should  occur.  Assuming, 
then,  $21,000,000  as  the  average  receipts  of  the  next  four  years,  it  will  give  an 
aggregate  of  $84,000,000,  which,  added  to  the  available  means  of  this  year, 
will  give  $150,000,000  as  the  sum  that  will  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  govern 
ment  for  the  period  assumed.  Divide  this  sum  by  five,  the  number  of  years, 
and  it  will  give  $30,000,000  as  the  average  annual  available  means  of  the 
period. 

The  next  question  for  consideration  is,  Will  it  be  expedient  to  raise  the  dis 
bursement  during  the  period  to  an  average  expenditure  of  $30,000,000  annual 
ly  ?  The  first,  and  strong  objection  to  the  scheme  is,  that  it  would  leave  in  the 
deposite  banks  a  heavy  surplus  during  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  beginning 
with  a  surplus  of  upward  of  thirty  millions  at  the  commencement  of  next  year, 
and  decreasing  at  the  rate  of  eight  or  nine  millions  a  year  till  the  termination 
ot  the  period.  But,  passing  this  objection  by,  I  meet  the  question  directly.  It 
would  be  highly  inexpedient  and  dangerous  to  attempt  to  keep  up  the  disburse 
ments  at  so  high  a  rate.  I  ask,  On  what  shall  this  money  be  expended  ?  Shall 
it  be  expended  by  an  increase  of  the  military  -establishment  1  by  an  enlarge 
ment  of  the  appropriations  for  fortifications,  ordnance,  and  the  navy,  far  beyond 
what  is  proposed  for  the  present  year  ?  Have  those  who  advocate  the  scheme 
reflected  to  what  extent  this  enlargement  must  be  carried  to  absorb  so  great  a 
sum  ?  Even  this  year,  with  the  extraordinary  expenditure  upon  Indian  treaties 

Go 


234  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  Indian  wars,  and  with  profuse  expenditure  in  every  other  branch  of  service, 
the  aggregate  amount  of  appropriations  will  not  greatly  exceed  $30,000,000, 
and  that  of  disbursements  will  not,  probably,  equal  that  sum. 

To  what  extent,  then,  must  the  appropriations  for  the  army,  the  navy,  the 
fortifications,  and  the  like,  be  carried,  in  order  to  absorb  that  sum,  especially 
with  a  declining  expenditure  in  several  branches  of  the  service,  particularly  in 
the  pensions,  which,  during  the  period,  will  fall  off  more  than  a  million  of  dol 
lars  ?  But,  in  order  to  take  a  full  view  of  the  folly  and  danger  of  the  scheme 
it  will  be  necessary  to  extend  our  view  beyond  1842,  in  order  to  form  some 
opinion  of  what  will  be  the  income  of  the  government  when  the  tariff  shall  be 
so  reduced,  under  the  Compromise  Act,  that  no  duty  shall  exceed  twenty  per 
cent,  ad  valorem.  I  know  that  any  estimate  made  at  this  time  cannot  be  con 
sidered  much  more  than  conjectural ;  but  still,  it  would  be  imprudent  to  adopt  a 
system  of  expenditure  now,  without  taking  into  consideration  the  probable  state 
of  the  revenue  a  few  years  hence. 

After  bestowing  due  reflection  on  the  subject,  I  am  of  the  impression  that 
the  income  from  the  imposts,  after  the  period  in  question,  will  not  exceed 
$10,000,000.  It  will  probably  fall  below,  rather  than  rise  above,. that  sum.  I 
assume,  as  the  basis  of  this  estimate,  that  our  consumption  of  foreign  articles 
will  not  then  exceed  $150,000,000.  We  all  know  that  the  capacity  of  the  coun 
try  to  consume  depends  upon  the  value  of  its  domestic  exports,  and  the  profits  of 
its  commerce  and  navigation.  Of  its  domestic  exports  it  would  not  be  safe  to 
assume  any  considerable  increase  in  any  article  except  cotton.  To  what  ex 
tent  the  production  and  consumption  of  this  great  staple,  which  puts  in  motion 
so  vast  an  amount  of  the  industry  and  commerce  of  the  world,  may  be  increas 
ed  between  now  and  1842,  is  difficult  to  conjecture  ;  but  I  deem  it  unsafe  to 
suppose  that  it  can  be  so  increased  as  to  extend  the  capacity  of  the  country  to 
consume  beyond  the  limits  I  have  assigned.  Assuming,  then,  the  amount  which 
I  have,  and  dividing  the  imports  into  free  and  dutiable  articles,  the  latter,  ac 
cording  to  the  existing  proportion  between  the  two  descriptions,  would  amount 
in  value  to  something  less  than  $70,000,000.  According  to  the  Compromise 
Act,  no  duty,  after  the  period  in  question,  can  exceed  twenty  per  cent.,  and  the 
rates  would  range  from  that  down  to  five  or  six  per  cent.  Taking  fifteen  per 
cent,  as  the  average,  which  would  Jbe,  probably,  full  high,  and  allowing  for  the  ex 
penses  of  collection,  the  nett  income  would  be  something  less  than  $10,000,000. 

The  income  from  public  lands  is  still  more  conjectural  than  that  from  cus 
toms.  There  are  so  many,  and  such  various  causes  in  operation  affecting  this 
source  of  the  public  income,  that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  form  even  a  con 
jectural  estimate  as  to  its  amount,  beyond  the  current  year.  But,  in  the  midst 
of  this  uncertainty,  one  fact  may  be  safely  assumed,  that  the  purchases  during 
the  last  year,  and  thus  far  this,  greatly  exceed  the  steady,  progressive  demand 
for  public  lands,  from  increased  population,  and  the  consequent  emigration  to 
the  new  states  and  territories.  Much  of  the  purchases  have  been,  unquestion 
ably,  made  upon  speculation,  with  a  view  to  resales,  and  must,  of  course,  come 
into  market  hereafter  in  competition  with  the  lands  of  the  government,  and  to 
that  extent  must  reduce  the  income  from  their  sales.  Estimating  even  the  de 
mand  for  public  lands  from  what  it  was  previous  to  the  recent  large  sales,  and 
.taking  into  estimate  the  increased  population  and  wealth  of  the  country,  I  do 
jiot  consider  it  safe  to  assume  more  than  $5,000,000  annually  from  this  branch 
.of  the  revenue,  which,  added  to  the  customs,  would  give  for  the  annual  receipts 
.between  fourteen  and  fifteen  millions  of  dollars  after  1842. 

I  now  ask  whether  it  woulcj  be  prudent  to  raise  the  public  expenditures  to 
ihe  sum  of  $30,000,000  annually  during  the  intermediate  period,  with  the 
prospect  that  they  must  be  suddenly  reduced  to  half  that  amount  ?  Who  does 
.not  see  the  fierce  conflict  which  must  follow  between  those  who  maybe  interest 
ed  in  keeping  up  the  expenditures,  and  those  who  have  an  equal  interest  against 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  235 

£n  increase  of  the  duties  as  the  means  of  keeping  them  up  ?  I  appeal  to  the 
senators  from  the  South,  whose  constituents  have  so  deep  an  interest  in  low  du 
ties,  to  resist  a  course  so  impolitic,  unwise,  and  extravagant,  and  which,  if 
adopted,  might  again  renew  the  tariff,  so  recently  thrown  off  by  such  hazard 
ous  and  strenuous  efforts,  with  all  its  oppression  and  disaster.  Let  us  remem 
ber  what  occurred  in  the  fatal  session  of  1828.  With  a  folly  unparalleled. 
Congress  then  raised  the  duties  to  a  rate  so  enormous  as  to  average  one  half 
the  value  of  the  imports,  when  on  the  eve  of  discharging  the  debt,  and  when, 
of  course,  there  would  be  no  objects  on  which  the  immense  income  from  such 
extravagant  duties  could  be  justly  and  constitutionally  expended.  It  is  ama 
zing  that  there  was  such  blindness  then  as  not  to  see  what  has  since  follow 
ed — the  sudden  discharge  of  the  debt,  and  an  overflowing  treasury,  without  the. 
means  of  absorbing  the  surplus  ;  the  violent  conflict  resulting  from  such  a  state 
of  things  ;  and  the  vast  increase  of  the  power  and  patronage  of  the  government, 
with  all  its  corrupting  consequences.  ,  We  are  now  about,  I  fear,  to  commit  an 
error  of  a  different  character  :  to  raise  the  expenditure  far  beyond  all  example, 
in  time  of  peace,  and  with  a  decreasing  revenue,  which  must,  with  equal  cer 
tainty,  bring  on  another  conflict,  not  much  less  dangerous,  in  which  the  strug 
gle  will  not  be  to  find  objects  to  absorb  an  overflowing  treasury,  but  to  devise 
means  to  continue  an  expenditure  far  beyond  the  just  and  legitimate  wants  of 
the  country.  It  is  easy  to  foresee  that,  if  we  are  thus  blindly  to  go  on  in  the 
management  of  our  affairs,  without  regard  to  the  future,  the  frequent  and  violent 
concussion  which  must  follow  from  such  folly  cannot  but  end  in  a  catastrophe 
that  will  ingulf  our  political  institutions. 

With  such  decided  objections  to  the  dangerous  and  extravagant  scheme  of 
absorbing  the  surplus  by  disbursements,  I  proceed  to  the  next  question,  Shall 
the  public  money  remain  where  it  now  is  ?  Shall  the  present  extraordinary 
state  of  things,  without  example  or  parallel,  continue,  of  a  government,  calling 
itself  free,  extracting  from  the  people  millions  beyond  what  it  can  expend,  and 
placing  that  vast  sum  in  the  custody  of  a  few  monopolizing  corporations,  selected 
at  the  sole  will  of  the  executive,  and  continued  during  his  pleasure,  to  be  used 
as  their  own  from  the  time  it  is  collected  till  it  is  disbursed  ?  To  this  question 
there  must  burst  from  the  lips  of  every  man  who  loves  his  country  and  its  insti 
tutions,  and  who  is  the  enemy  of  monopoly,  injustice,  and  oppression,  an  indig 
nant  no.  And  here  let  me  express  the  pleasure  I  feel  that  the  senator  from 
New-York,  in  moving  his  amendment,  however  objectionable  his  scheme,  has 
placed  himself  in  opposition  to  the  continuance  of  the  present  unheard-of  and 
dangerous  state  of  things ;  and  I  add,  as  a  simple  act  of  justice,  that  the  tone 
and  temper  of  his  remarks  in  support  of  his  amendment  were  characterized  by  a 
courtesy  and  liberality  which  I,  on  my  part,  shall  endeavour  to  imitate.  But 
I  fear,  notwithstanding  this  favourable  indication  in  so  influential  a  quarter,  the 
very  magnitude  of  the  evil  (too  great  to  be  concealed)  will  but  serve  to  perpetu 
ate  it.  So  great  and  various  are  the  interests  enlisted  in  its  favour,  that  I 
greatly  fear  that  all  the  efforts  of  the  wise  and  patriotic  to  arrest  it  will  prove 
unavailing.  At  the  head  of  these  stand  the  depository  banks  themselves,  with 
their  numerous  stockholders  and  officers  ;  with  their  $40,000,000  of  capital,  and 
an  equal  amount  of  public  deposites,  associated  into  one  great  combination  ex 
tending  over  the  whole  Union,  under  the  influence  and  control  of  the  treasury 
department.  The  whole  weight  of  this  mighty  combination,  so  deeply  interest 
ed  in  the  continuance  of  the  present  state  of  things,  is  opposed  to  any  change. 
To  this  powerful  combination  must  be  added  the  numerous  and  influential  body 
who  are  dependant  on  banks  to  meet  their  engagements,  and  who,  whatever 
may  be  their  political  opinions,  must  be  alarmed  at  any  change  which  may 
limit  their  discounts  and  accommodation.  Then  come  the  stock-jobbers,  a 
growing  and  formidable  class,  who  live  by  raising  and  depressing  stocks,  and 
who  behold  in  the  present  state  of  things  the  most  favourable  opportunity  of 


236  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

carrying  on  their  dangerous  and  corrupting  pursuits.  With  the  control  which 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has  over  the  banks  of  deposite,  through  transfer 
warrants,  with  the  power  of  withdrawing  the  deposites  at  pleasure,  he  may, 
whenever  he  chooses,  raise  or  depress  the  stock  of  any  bank,  and,  if  disposed 
to  use  this  tremendous  power  for  corrupt  purposes,  may  make  the  fortunes  of 
the  initiated,  and  overwhelm  in  sudden  ruin  those  not  in  the  secret.  To  the 
stock-jobbers  must  be  added  speculators  of  every  hue  and  form ;  and,  in  particu 
lar,  the  speculators  in  public  lands,  who,  by  the  use  of  the  public  funds,  are 
rapidly  divesting  the  people  of  the  noble  patrimony  left  by  our  ancestors  in  the 
public  domain,  by  giving  in  exchange  what  may,  in  the  end,  prove  to  be  broken 
credit  and  worthless  rags.  To  these  we  must  add  the  artful  and  crafty  poli 
ticians,  who  wield  this  mighty  combination  of  interests  for  political  purposes. 
I  am  anxious  to  avoid  mingling  party  politics  in  this  discussion  ;  and,  that  I  may 
not  even  seem  to  do  so,  I  shall  not  attempt  to  exhibit,  in  all  its  details,  the  fear 
ful,  and,  I  was  about  to  add,  the  overwhelming  power  which  the  present  state 
of  things  places  in  the  hands  of  those  who  have  control  of  the  government, 
and  which,  if  it  be  not  wielded  to  overthrow  our  institutions  and  destroy  all 
responsibility,  must  be  attributed  to  their  want  of  inclination,  and  not  to  their 
want  of  means. 

Such  is  the  power  and  influence  interested  to  continue  the  public  money  where 
it  is  now  deposited.  To  these  there  are  opposed  the  honest,  virtuous,  and  patri 
otic  of  every  party,  who  behold  in  the  continuance  of  the  present  state  of  things 
almost  certain  convulsion  and  overthrow  of  our  liberty.  There  would  be  found 
on  the  same  side  the  great  mass  of  the  industrious  and  labouring  portion  of  the 
community,  whose  hard  earnings  are  extracted  from  them  without  their  knowl 
edge,  were  it  not  that  what  is  improperly  taken  from  them  is  successfully  used 
as  the  means  of  deceiving  and  controlling  them.  If  such  were  not  the  case — 
if  those  who  work  could  see  how  those  who  profit  are  enriched  at  their  ex 
pense — the  present  state  of  things  would  not  be  endured  for  a  moment ;  but  as 
it  is,  I  fear  that,  from  misconception,  and  consequent  want  of  union  and  co 
operation,  things  may  continue  as  they  are,  till  it  will  be  too  late  to  apply  a 
remedy.  I  trust,  however,  that  such  will  not  be  the  fact ;  that  the  people  will 
be  roused  from  their  false  security ;  and  that  Congress  will  refuse  to  adjourn  till 
an  efficient  remedy  is  applied.  In  this  hope,  I  recur  to  the  inquiry,  What  shall 
that  remedy  be  ?  Shall  we  adopt  the  measure  recommended  by  the  senator 
from  New- York,  which,  as  has  been  stated,  proposes  to  authorize  the  commis 
sioners  of  the  sinking  fund  to  ascertain  the  probable  income  of  each  quarter, 
and,  if  there  should  be  a  probable  excess  above  $5,000,000,  to  vest  the  surplus 
in  the  purchase  of  state  stocks  ;  but,  if  there  shall  be  a  deficiency,  to  sell  so- 
much  of  the  stock  previously  purchased  as  would  make  up  the  difference  ? 

I  regret  that  the  senator  has  not  furnished  a  statement  of  facts  sufficiently  full 
to  enable  us  to  form  an  opinion  of  what  will  be  the  practical  operation  of  his 
scheme.  He  has  omitted,  for  instance,  to  state  what  is  the  aggregate  amount  of 
stocks  issued  by  the  several  states :  a  fact  indispensable  in  order  to  ascertain 
how  the  price  of  the  stocks  would  be  affected  by  the  application  of  the  surplus  to 
their  purchase.  All  who  are  in  the  least  familiar  with  subjects  of  this  kind, 
must  know  that  the  price  of  stocks  rises  proportionably  with  the  amount  of  the 
sum  applied  to  their  purchase.  I  have  already  shown  that  the  probable  surplus 
at  the  end  of  this  year,  notwithstanding  the  extravagance  of  the  appropriations, 
will  be  between  thirty  and  thirty-five  millions  ;  and  before  we  can  decide  un- 
derstandingly  whether  this  great  sum  can  with  propriety  be  applied  as  the  sen 
ator  proposes,  we  should  know  whether  the  amount  of  state  stocks  be  sufficient 
to  absorb  it,  without  raising  their  price  extravagantly  high. 

The  senator  should  also  have  informed  us,  not  only  as  to  the  amount  of  the 
stock,  but  how  it  is  distributed  among  the  states,  in  order  to  enable  us  to  deter 
mine  whether  his  scheme  would  operate  equally  between  them.  In  the  ab- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  237 

sence  of  correct  information  on  both  of  these  points,  we  are  compelled  to  use 
such  as  we  may  possess,  however  defective  and  uncertain,  in  order  to  make  up 
our  mind  on  his  amendment. 

We  all  know,  then,  that  while  several  of  the  states  have  no  stocks,  and  many 
a  very  inconsiderable  amount,  three  of  the  large  states  (Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and 
New-York)  have  a  very  large  amount,  not  less  in  the  aggregate,  if  I  am  cor 
rectly  informed,  than  thirty-five  or  forty  millions.  What  amount  is  held  by  the 
rest  of  the  states  is  uncertain,  but  I  suppose  that  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that, 
taking  the  whole,  it  is  less  than  that  held  by  those  states.  With  these  facts, 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  application  of  the  surplus,  as  proposed  to  be  ap 
plied  by  the  senator,  would  be  exceedingly  unequal  among  the  states,  and  that 
the  advantage  of  the  application  would  mainly  accrue  to  these  states.  To  most 
of  these  objections,  the  senator,  while  he  does  not  deny  that  the  application  of 
the  surplus  will  greatly  raise  the  price  of  stocks,  insists  that  the  states  issuing 
them  -will  not  derive  any  benefit  from  the  advance,  and,  consequently,  have  no 
interest  in  the  question  of  the  application  of  the  surplus  to  their  purchase. 

If  by  states  he  means  the  government  of  the  states,  the  view  of  the  senator 
may  be  correct.  They  may,  as  he  says,  have  but  little  interest  in  the  market 
value  of  their  stocks,  as  it  must  be  redeemed  by  the  same  amount,  whether  that 
be  high  or  low.  But  if  we  take  a  more  enlarged  view,  and  comprehend  the 
people  of  the  state  as  well  as  the  government,  the  argument  entirely  fails.  The 
senator  will  not  deny  that  the  holders  have  a  deep  interest  in  the  application 
of  so  large  a  sum  as  the  present  surplus  in  the  purchase  of  their  stocks.  He 
will  'not  deny  that  such  application  must  greatly  advance  the  price  ;  and,  of 
course,  in  determining  whether  the  states  having  stocks  will  be  benefited  by 
applying  the  surplus  as  he  proposes,  we  must  first  ascertain  who  are  the  hold 
ers.  Where  do  they  reside  ?  Are  they  foreigners  residing  abroad  ?  If  so, 
would  it  be  wise  to  apply  the  public  money  so  as  to  advance  the  interests  of 
foreigners,  to  whom  the  states  are  under  no  obligation  but  honestly  to  pay  to 
them  the  debts  which  they  have  contracted  ?  But  if  not  held  by  foreigners,  are 
they  held  by  citizens  of  such  states  ?  If  such  be  the  fact,  will  the  senator  deny 
that  those  states  will  be  deeply  interested  in  the  application  of  the  surplus,  as 
proposed  in  his  amendment,  when  the  effects  of  such  application  must  be,  as  is 
conceded  on  all  sides,  greatly  to  enhance  the  price  of  the  stocks,  and,  conse 
quently,  to  increase  the  wealth  of  their  citizens  1  Let  us  suppose  that,  instead 
of  purchasing  the  stocks  of  the  states  in  which  his  constituents  are  interested, 
the  senator's  amendment  had  proposed  to  apply  the  present  enormous  surplus 
to  the  purchase  of  cotton  or  slaves,  in  which  the  constituents  of  the  Southern 
senators  are  interested,  would  any  one  doubt  that  the  cotton-growing  or  slave- 
holding  states  would  have  a  deep  interest  in  the  question  ?  It  will  not  be  de 
nied  that,  if  so  applied,  their  price  would  be  greatly  advanced,  and  the  wealth 
of  their  citizens  proportionably  increased.  Precisely  the  same  effect  would  re 
sult  from  the  application  to  the  purchase  of  stocks,  with  like  benefits  to  the  citi 
zens  of  the  states  which  have  issued  large  amounts  of  stock.  The  principle  is 
the  same  in  both  cases. 

But  there  is  another  view  of  the  subject  which  demands  most  serious  consid 
eration.  Assuming,  what  will  not  be  questioned,  that  the  application  of  the  sur 
plus,  as  proposed  by  the  amendment,  will  be  very  unequal  among  the  states, 
some  having  little  or  none,  and  others  a  large  amount  of  stocks,  the  result  would 
necessarily  be  to  create,  in  effect,  the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  between 
the  states.  The  states  whose  stocks  might  be  purchased  by  the  commission 
ers  would  become  the  debtors  of  the  government ;  arid  as  the  government  would, 
in  fact,  be  but  the  agent  between  them  and  the  other  states,  the  latter  would,  in 
reality,  be  their  creditors.  This  relation  between  them  could  not  fail  to  be  pro 
ductive  of  important  political  consequences,  which  would  influence  all  the  op 
erations  of  the  government.  It  would,  in  particular,  have  a  powerful  bearing 


238  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

upon  the  presidential  election  ;  the  debtor  and  creditor  states  each  striving  to 
give  such  a  result  to  the  elections  as  might  be  favourable  to  their  respective  in 
terests  ;  the  one  to  exact,  and  the  other  to  exempt  themselves  from  the  pay 
ment  of  the  debt.  Supposing  the  three  great  states  to  which  I  have  referred, 
whose  united  influence  would  have  so  decided  a  control,  to  be  the  principal 
debtor  states,  as  would,  in  all  probability,  be  the  fact,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the 
result  would  be,  finally,  the  release  of  the  debt,  and,  consequently,  a  correspond 
ent  loss  to  the  creditor,  and  gain  to  the  debtor  states. 

But  there  is  another  view  of  the  subject  still  more  deserving,  if  possible,  of 
attention  than  either  of  those  which  have  been  presented.  It  is  impossible  not 
to  see,  after  what  has  been  said,  that  the  power  proposed  to  be  conferred  by  the 
amendment  of  the  senator,  of  applying  the  surplus  in  buying  and  selling  the 
stocks  of  the  states,  is  one  of  great  extent,  and  calculated  to  have  powerful  in 
fluence,  not  only  on -a  large  body  of  the  most  wealthy  and  influential  citizens 
of  the  states  which  have  issued  stocks,  but  on  the  states  themselves.  The 
next'  question  is,  In  whom  is  the  exercise  of  this  power  to  be  vested  ?  Where 
shall  we  find  individuals  sufficiently  detached  from  the  politics  of  the  day,  and 
whose  virtue,  patriotism,  disinterestedness,  and  firmness  can  raise  them  so  far 
above  political  and  sinister  motives  as  to  exercise  powers  so  high  and  influen 
tial  exclusively  for  the  public  good,  without  any  view  to  personal  or  political 
aggrandizement  ?  Whom  has  the  amendment  selected  as  standing  aloof  from  pol 
itics,  and  possessing  these  high  qualifications  1  Who  are  the  present  commis 
sioners  of  the  sinking  fund,  to  whom  this  high  and  responsible  trust  is  to  be 
confided  ?  At  the  head  stands  the  Vice-president  of  the  United  States,  with 
whom  the  Chief-justice  of  the  United  States,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  Attorney-general,  are  associated  ;  all  party  men> 
deeply  interested  in  the  maintenance  of  power  in  the  present  hands,  and  having 
the  strongest  motives  to  apply  the  vast  power  which  the  amendment  would  con 
fer  upon  them,  should  it  become  a  law,  to  party  purposes.  I  do  not  say  it  would 
be  so  applied  ;  but  I  must  ask,  Would  it  be  prudent,  would  it  be  wise,  would  it 
be  seemly,  to  vest  such  great  and  dangerous  powers  in  those  who  have  so 
strong  a  motive  to  abuse  it,  and  who,  if  they  should  have  elevation  and  virtue 
enough  to  resist  the  temptation,  would  still  be  suspected  of  having  used  the 
power  for  sinister  and  corrupt  purposes  ?  I  am  persuaded,  in  drawing  the 
amendment,  that  the  senator  from  New- York  has,  without  due  reflection  on  the 
impropriety  of  vesting  the  power  where  he  proposes,  inadvertently  inserted  the 
provision  which  he  has,  and  that,  on  review,  he  will  concur  with  me,  that,  should 
his  amendment  be  adopted,  the  power  ought  to  be  vested  in  others,  less  expo 
sed  to  temptation,  and,  consequently,  less  exposed  to  suspicion. 

I  have  now  stated  the  leading  objections  to  the  several  modes  of  disposing  of 
the  surplus  revenue  which  I  proposed  to  consider  ;  and  the  question  again  recurs, 
What  shall  be  done  with  the  surplus  ?  The  Senate  is  not  uninformed  of  my 
opinion  on  this  important  subject.  Foreseeing  that  there  would  be  a  large  sur 
plus,  and  the  mischievous  consequences  that  must  follow,  I  moved,  during  the 
last  session,  for  a  select  committee,  which,  among  other  measures,  reported  a 
resolution  so  to  amend  the  Constitution  as  to  authorize  the  temporary  distribu 
tion  of  the  surplus  among  the  states  ;  but  so  many  doubted  whether  there  would 
be  a  surplus  at  the  time,  that  it  rendered  all  prospect  of  carrying  the  resolution 
hopeless.  My  opinion  still  remains  unchanged,  that  the  measure  then  proposed 
was  the  best ;  but  so  rapid  has  been  the  accumulation  of  the  surplus,  even  be 
yond  my  calculation,  and  so  pressing  the  danger,  that  what  would  have  been 
then  an  efficient  remedy,  would  now  be  too  tardy  to  meet  the  danger,  and,  of 
course,  another  remedy  must  be  devised,  more  speedy  in  its  action. 

After  bestowing  on  the  subject  the  most  deliberate  attention,  I  have  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  other  so  safe,  so  efficient,  and  so  free  from  ob 
jections  as  the  one  I  have  proposed,  of  depositing  the  surplus  that  may  remain 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  239 

at  the  termination  of  the  year,  in  the  treasury  of  the  several  states,  in  the  man 
ner  provided  for  in  the  amendment.  But  the  senator  from  New- York  objects 
to  the  measure,  that  it  would,  in  effect,  amount  to  a  distribution,  on  the  ground, 
as  he  conceives,  that  the  states  would  never  refund.  He  does  not  doubt  but 
that  they  would,  if  called  on  to  refund  by  the  government ;  but  he  says  that  Con 
gress  will,  in  fact,  never  make  the  call.  He  rests  this  conclusion  on  the  sup 
position  that  there  would  be  a  majority  of  the  states  opposed  to  it.  He  admits, 
in  case  the  revenue  should  become  deficient,  that  the  Southern  or  staple  states 
would  prefer  to  refund  their  quota  rather  than  to  raise  the  imposts  to  meet  the 
deficit ;  but  he  insists  that  the  contrary  would  be  the  case  with  the  manufacturing 
states,  which  would  prefer  to  increase  the  imposts  to  refunding  their  quota,  on 
the  ground  that  the  increase  of  the  duties  would  promote  the  interests  of  manu 
factures.  I  cannot  agree  with  the  senator  that  those  states  would  assume  a  po^ 
sition  so  entirely  untenable  as  to  refuse  to  refund  a  deposite  which  their  faith 
would  be  plighted  to  return,  and  rest  the  refusal  on  the  ground  of  preferring  to 
lay  a  tax,  because  it  would  be  a  bounty  to  them,  and  would,  consequently,  throw 
the  whole  burden  of  the  tax  on  the  other  states.  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  I  can 
tell  the  senator  that,  if  they  should  take  a  course  so  unjust  and  monstrous,  he 
may  rest  assured  that  the  other  states  would  most  unquestionably  resist  the  in 
crease  of  the  imposts ;  so  that  the  government  would  have  to  take  its  choice, 
either  to  go  without  the  money,  or  call  on  the  states  to  refund  the  deposites. 
But  I  so  far  agree  with  the  senator  as  to  believe  that  Congress  would  be  very 
reluctant  to  make  the  call ;  that  it  would  not  make  it  till,  from  the  wants  of  the 
treasury,  it  should  become  absolutely  necessary ;  and  that,  in  order  to  avoid 
such  necessity,  it  would  resort  to  a  just  and  proper  economy  in  the  public  ex 
penditures  as  the  preferable  alternative.  I  see  in  this,  however,  much  good  in 
stead  of  evil.  The  government  has  long  since  departed  from  habits  of  econo 
my,  and  fallen  into  a  profusion,  a  waste,  and  an  extravagance  in  its  disburse 
ments,  rarely  equalled  by  any  free  state,  and  which  threatens  the  most  disas 
trous  consequences. 

But  I  am  happy  to  think  that  the  ground  on  which  the  objection  of  the  sena 
tor  stands  may  be  removed,  without  materially  impairing  the  provisions  of  the 
bill.  It  will  require  but  the  addition  of  a  few  words  to  remove  it,  by  giving  to 
the  deposites  all  the  advantages,  without  the  objections,  which  he  proposes  by 
his  plan.  It  will  be  easy  to  provide  that  the  states  shall  authorize  the  proper 
officers  to  give  negotiable  certificates  of  deposite,  which  shall  not  bear  interest 
till  demanded,  when  they  shall  bear  the  usual  rates  till  paid.  Such  certificates 
would  be,  in  fact,  state  stocks,  every  way  similar  to  that  in  which  the  senator 
proposes  to  vest  the  surplus,  but  with  this  striking  superiority :  that,  instead  of 
being  partial,  and  limited  to  a  few  states,  they  would  be  fairly  and  justly  appor 
tioned  among  the  several  states.  They  would  have  another  striking  advantage 
over  his.  They  would  create  among  all  the  members  of  the  confederacy,  recip 
rocally,  the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor,  in  proportion  to  their  relative  weight 
in  the  Union ;  which,  in  effect,  would  leave  them  in  their  present  relation,  and 
would,  of  course,  avoid  the  danger  that  would  result  from  his  plan,  which,  as 
has  been  shown,  would  necessarily  make  a  part  of  the  states  debtors  to  the  rest, 
with  all  the  dangers  resulting  from  such  relation. 

The  next  objection  of  the  senator  is  to  the  ratio  of  distribution  proposed  in  the 
bill  among  the  states,  which  he  pronounces  to  be  unequal,  if  not  unconstitution 
al.  He  insists  that  the  true  principle  would  be  to  distribute  the  surplus  among 
the  states  in  proportion  to  the  representation  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
without  including  the  senators,  as  is  proposed  in  the  bill,  for  which  he  relies  on 
the  fact,  that,  by  the  Constitution,  representation  and  taxation  are  to  be  appor 
tioned  in  the  same  manner  among  the  states. 

The  Senate  will  see  that  the  effect  of  adopting  the  ratio  supported  by  the 
senator  would  be  to  favour  the  large  states,  while  that  in  the  bill  will  be  more 
favourable  to  the  small. 


240  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

The  state  I  in  part  represent  occupies  a  neutral  position  between  the  two. 
She  cannot  be  considered  either  a  large  or  a  small  state,  forming,  as  she  does, 
one  twenty-fourth  part  of  the  Union  ;  and,  of  course,  it  is  the  same  to  her  which 
ever  ratio  may  be  adopted.  But  I  prefer  the  one  contained  in  my  amendment, 
on  the  ground  that  it  represents  the  relative  weight  of  the  states  in  the  govern 
ment.  It  is  the  weight  assigned  to  them  in  the  choice  of  the  President  arid 
Vice-president  in  the  electoral  college,  and,  of  course,  in  the  administration  of 
the  laws.  It  is  also  that  assigned  to  them  in  the  making  of  the  laws  by  the  ac 
tion  of  the  two  houses,  and  corresponds  very  nearly  to  their  weight  in  the  ju 
dicial  department  of  the  government,  the  judges  being  nominated  by  the  Presi 
dent  and  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  In  addition,  I  was  influenced,  in  selecting 
the  ratio,  by  the  belief  that  it  was  a  wise  and  magnanimous  course,  in  case  of 
doubt,  to  favour  the  weaker  members  of  the  confederacy.  The  larger  can  al 
ways  take  care  of  themselves ;  and,  to  avoid  jealousy  and  improper  feelings, 
ought  to  act  liberally  towards  the  weaker  members  of  the  confederacy.  To 
which  may  be  added,  that  I  am  of  the  impression  that,  even  on  the  principle  as 
sumed  by  the  senator,  that  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  ought  to  be  apportion 
ed  on  the  ratio  with  direct  taxation  (which  maybe  well  doubted),  the  ratio  which 
I  support  would  conform  in  practice  more  nearly  to  the  principle  than  that  which 
he. supports.  It  is  a  fact  not  generally  known,  that  representation  in  the  other 
house,  and  direct  taxes,  should  they  be  laid,  would  be  very  far  from  being  equal, 
although  the  Constitution  provides  that  they  should  be.  The  inequality  would 
result  from  the  mode  of  apportioning  the  representatives.  Instead  of  apportion 
ing  them  among  the  states,  as  near  as  may  be,  as  directed  by  the  Constitution, 
an  artificial  mode  of  distribution  has  been  adopted,  which,  in  its  effects,  gives  to 
the  large  states  a  greater  number,  and  to  the  small  a  less  than  that  to  which  they 
are  entitled.  I  would  refer  those  who  may  desire  to  understand  how  this  ine 
quality  is  effected,  to  the  discussion  in  this  body  on  the  apportionment  bill  un 
der  the  last  census.  So  great  is  this  inequality,  that,  were  a  direct  tax  to  be 
laid,  New- York,  for  instance,  would  have  at  least  three  members  more  than  her 
apportionment  of  the  tax  would  require.  The  ratio  which  I  have  proposed 
would,  I  admit,  produce  as  great  an  inequality  in  favour  of  some  of  the  small  states, 
particularly  the  old,  whose  population  is  nearly  stationary  ;  but  among  the  new 
and  growing  members  of  the  confederacy,  which  constitute  the  greater  portion 
of  the  small  states,  it  would  not  give  them  a  larger  share  of  the  deposites  than 
what  they  would  be  entitled  to  on  the  principle  of  direct  taxes.  But  the  objec 
tion  of  the  senator  to  the  ratio  of  distribution,  like  his  objection  to  the  condition 
on  which  the  bill  proposes  to  make  it,  is  a  matter  of  small  comparative  conse 
quence.  I  am  prepared,  in  the  spirit  of  concession,  to  adopt  either,  as  one  or 
the  other  may  be  more  acceptable  to  the  Senate. 

It  now  remains  to  compare  the  disposition  of  the  surplus  proposed  in  the  bill 
with  the  others  I  have  discussed ;  and,  unless  I  am  greatly  deceived,  it  pos 
sesses  great  advantages  over  them.  Compared  with  the  scheme  of  expending 
the  surplus,  its  advantage  is,  that  it  would  avoid  the  extravagance  and  waste 
which  must  result  from  suddenly  more  than  quadrupling  the  expenditures,  with 
out  a  corresponding  organization  in  the  disbursing  department  of  the  govern 
ment  to  enforce  economy  and  responsibility.  It  would  also  avoid  the  diversion 
of  so  large  a  portion  of  the  industry  of  the  country  from  its  present  useful  direc 
tion  to  unproductive  objects,  with  heavy  loss  to  the  wealth  and  prosperity  of  the 
country,  as  has  been  shown,  while  it  would,  at  the  same  time,  avoid  the  increase 
of  the  patronage  and  influence  of  the  government,  with  all  their  corruption  and 
danger  to  the  liberty  and  institutions  of  the  country.  But  its  advantages  would 
not  be  limited  simply  to  avoiding  the  evil  of  extravagant  and  useless  disburse 
ments.  It  would  confer  positive  benefits,  by  enabling  the  states  to  discharge 
their  debts,  and  complete  a  system  of  internal  improvements,  by  railroads  and 
canals,  which  would  not  only  greatly  strengthen  the  bonds  of  the  confederacy, 
but  increase  its  power,  by  augmenting  infinitely  our  resources  and  prosperity 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  241 

I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  compare  the  disposition  of  the  surplus  which 
is  proposed  in  the  bill  with  the  dangerous,  and,  I  must  say,  wicked  scheme  of 
leaving  the  public  funds  where  they  are,  in  the  banks  of  deposite,  to  be  loaned 
out  6y  those  institutions  to  speculators  and  partisans,  without  authority  or  con 
trol  of  law. 

Compared  with  the  plan  proposed  by  the  senator  from  New-York,  it  is  suffi 
cient,  to  prove  its  superiority,  to  say  that,  while  it  avoids  all  of  the  objections  to 
which  his  is  liable,  it  at  the  same  time  possesses  all  the  advantages,  with 
others  peculiar  to  itself.  Among  these,  one  of  the  most  prominent  is,  that  it 
provides  the  only  efficient  remedy  for  the  deep-seated  disease  which  now  af 
flicts  the  body  politic,  and  which  threatens  to  terminate  so  fatally,  unless  it  be 
speedily  and  effectually  arrested. 

All  who  have  reflected  on  the  nature  of  our  complex  system  of  government, 
and  the  dangers  to  which  it  is  exposed,  have  seen  that  it  is  susceptible,  from  its 
structure,  to  two  dangers  of  opposite  character,  one  threatening  consolidation, 
and  the  other  anarchy  and  dissolution.  From  the  beginning  of  the  government, 
•we  find  a  difference  of  opinion  among  the  wise  and  patriotic  to  which  the  gov 
ernment  was  most  exposed :  one  part  believing  that  the  danger  was  that  the 
government  would  absorb  the  reserved  powers  of  the  states,  and  terminate  in 
consolidation,  while  the  other  were  equally  confident  that  the  states  would  ab 
sorb  the  powers  of  the  government,  and  the  system  end  in  anarchy  and  disso 
lution.  It  was  this  diversity  of  opinion  which  gave  birth  to  the  two  great,  hon 
est,  and  patriotic  parties  which  so  long  divided  the  community,  and  to  the  many 
political  conflicts  which  so  long  agitated  the  country.  Time  has  decided  the 
controversy.  We  are  no  longer  left  to  doubt  that  the  danger  is  on  the  side  of 
this  government,  and  that,  if  not  arrested,  the  system  must  terminate  in  an  entire 
absorption  of  the  powers  of  the  states. 

Looking  back,  with  the  light  which  experience  has  furnished,  we  now  clearly 
see  that  both  of  the  parties  took  a  false  view  of  the  operation  of  the  system.  It 
was  admitted  by  both  that  there  would  be  a  conflict  for  power  between  the  gov 
ernment  and  the  states,  arising  from  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  those  who,  for 
the  time  being,  exercised  the  powers  of  the  government  and  the  states,  to  en 
large  their  respective  powers  at  the  expense  of  each  other,  and  which  would 
induce  each  to  watch  the  other  with  incessant  vigilance.  Had  such  proved  to 
be  the  fact,  I  readily  concede  that  the  result  would  have  been  the  opposite  to 
what  has  occurred,  and  the  Republican,  and  not  the  Federal  party,  would  have 
been  mistaken  as  to  the  tendency  of  the  system.  But  so  far  from  this  jealousy, 
experience  has  shown  that,  in  the  operation  of  the  system,  a  majority  of  the 
states  have  acted  in  concert  with  the  government  at  all  times,  except  upon  the 
eve  of  a  political  revolution,  when  one  party  was  about  to  go  out,  to  make  room 
for  the  other  to  come  in  ;  and  we  now  clearly  see  that  this  has  not  been  the  result 
of  accident,  but  that  the  habitual  operation  must  necessarily  be  so.  The  mis 
conception  resulted  from  overlooking  the  fact,  that  the  government  is  but  an 
agent  of  the  states,  and  that  the  dominant  majority  of  the  I/nion,  which  elect 
and  control  a  majority  of  the  State  Legislatures,  would  etect  also  those  who 
would  control  this  government,  whether  that  majority  rested  on  sectional  inter 
ests,  on  patronage  and  influence,  or  whatever  basis  it  might,  and  that  they  would 
use  the  power  both  of  the  General  and  State  Governments  jointly,  for  aggran 
dizement  and  the  perpetuation  of  their  power.  Regarded  in  this  light,  it  is  not 
at  all  surprising  that  the  tendency  of  the  system  is  such  as  it  has  proved  itself 
to  be,  and  which  any  intelligent  observer  now  sees  must  necessarily  terminate 
in  a  central,  absolute,  irresponsible,  and  despotic  power.  It  is  this  fatal  ten 
dency  that  the  measure  proposed  in  the  bill  is  calculated  to  counteract,  and 
which,  I  believe,  would  prove  effective  if  now  applied.  It  would  place  the 
states  in  the  relation  in  which  it  was  universally  believed  they  would  stand  to 
this  government  at  the  time  of  its  formation,  and  make  them  those  jealous  and 

HH 


242  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

vigilant  guardians  of  its  action  on  all  measures  touching  the  disbursements  and 
expenditures  of  the  government,  which  it  was  confidently  believed  they  would 
be  ;  which  would  arrest  the  fatal  tendency  to  the  concentration  of  the  entire 
power  of  the  system  in  this  government,  if  any  power  on  earth  can. 

But  it  is  objected  that  the  remedy  would  be  too  powerful,  and  would  produce 
an  opposite  and  equally  dangerous  tendency.  I  coincide  that  such  would  be 
the  danger,  if  permanently  applied ;  and,  under  that  impression,  and  believing 
that  the  present  excess  of  revenue  would  not  continue  longer,  I  have  limited 
the  measure  to  the  duration  of  the  Compromise  Act.  Thus  limited,  it  will  act 
sufficiently  long,  I  trust,  to  eradicate  the  present  disease,  without  superinducing 
one  of  an  opposite  character. 

But  the  plan  proposed  is  supported  by  its  justice,  as  well  as  these  high  con 
siderations  of  political  expediency.  The  surplus  money  in  the  treasury  is  not 
ours.  It  properly  belongs  to  those  who  made  it,  and  from  whom  it  has  been 
unjustly  taken.  I  hold  it  an  unquestionable  principle,  that  the  government  has 
no  right  to  take  a  cent  from  the  people  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  meet  its 
legitimate  and  constitutional  wants.  To  take  more  intentionally  would  be  rob 
bery  ;  and,  if  the  government  has  not  incurred  the  guilt  in  the  present  case,  its 
exemption  can  only  be  found  in  its  folly — the  folly  of  not  seeing  and  guarding 
against  a  vast  excess  of  revenue,  which  the  most  ordinary  understanding  ought 
to  have  foreseen  and  prevented.  If  it  were  in  our  power — if  we  could  ascertain 
from  whom  the  vast  amount  now  in  the  treasury  was  improperly  taken,  justice 
would  demand  that  it  should  be  returned  to  its  lawful  owners.  But,  as  that  is 
impossible,  the  measure  next  best,  as  approaching  nearest  to  restitution,  is  that 
which  is  proposed,  to  deposite  it  in  the  treasuries  of  the  several  states,  which 
will  place  it  under  the  disposition  of  the  immediate  representatives  of  the  peo 
ple,  to  be  used  by  them  as  they  may  think  fit  till  the  wants  of  the  government 
may  require  its  return. 

But  it  is  objected  that  such  a  disposition  would  be  a  bribe  to  the  people.  A 
bribe  to  the  people  !  to  return  it  to  those  to  whom  it  justly  belongs,  and  from 
whose  pockets  it  should  never  have  been  taken.  A  bribe  !  to  place  it  in  the 
charge  of  those  who  are  the  immediate  representatives  of  those  from  whom  we 
derive  our  authority,  and  who  may  employ  it  so  much  more  usefully  than  we 
can.  But  what  is  to  be  done  ?  If  not  returned  to  the  people,  it  must  go  some 
how  ;  und  is  there  no  danger  of  bribing  those  to  whom  it  may  go  ?  If  we  dis 
burse  it,  is  there  no  danger  of  bribing  the  thousands  of  agents,  contractors,  and 
jobbers,  through  whose  hands  it  must  pass,  and  in  whose  pockets,  and  those  of 
their  associates,  so  large  a  part  would  be  deposited  ?  If,  to  avoid  this,  we  leave 
it  where  it  is,  in  the  banks,  is  there  no  danger  of  bribing  the  banks  in  whose 
custody  it  is,  with  their  various  dependants,  and  the  numerous  swarms  of  specu 
lators  whict  hover  about  them  in  hopes  of  participating  in  the  spoil  ?  Is  there 
no  danger  of  'nribing  the  political  managers,  who,  through  the  deposites,  have  the 
control  of  these  banks,  and,  by  them,  of  their  dependants,  and  the  hungry  and  vo 
racious  hosts  of  ^peculators  who  have  overspread  and  are  devouring  the  land  ? 
Yes,  literally  devouring  the  land.  Finally,  if  it  should  be  vested  as  proposed 
by  the  senator  from  New- York,  is  there  "no  danger  of  bribing  the  holders  of 
state  stocks,  and,  through  them,  the  states  which  have  issued  them  ?  Are  the 
agents,  the  jobbers,  and  contractors  ;  are  the  directors  and  stockholders  of  the 
banks  ;  are  the  speculators  and  stock-jobbers ;  are  the  political  managers  and 
holders  of  state  securities,  the  only  honest  portion  of  the  community  ?  Are 
they  alone  incapable  of  being  bribed  ?  And  are  the  people  the  least  honest, 
and  most  liable  to  be  bribed  ?  Is  this  the  creed  of  those  now  in  power  ?  of 
those  who  profess  to  be  the  friends  of  the  people,  and  to  place  implicit  confi 
dence  in  their  virtue  and  patriotism  ? 

I  have  now  (said  Mr.  Calhoun)  stated  what,  in  my  opinion,  ought  to  be  done 
with  the  surplus.     Another  question  still  remains :  not  what  shall,  but  what 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  243 

will  be  done  with  the  surplus  ?     With  a  few  remarks  on  this  question,  I  shall 
conclude  what  I  intended  to  say. 

There  was  a  time,  in  the  better  days  of  the  Republic,  when  to  show  what 
ought  to  -be  done  was  to  ensure  the  adoption  of  the  measure.  Those  days  have 
passed  away,  I  fear,  forever.  A  power  has  risen  up  in  the  government  greater 
than  the  people  themselves,  consisting  of  many,  and  various,  and  powerful  in 
terests,  combined  into  one  mass,  and  held  together  by  the  cohesive  power  of 
the  vast  surplus  in  the  banks.  This  mighty  combination  will  \>e  opposed  to 
any  change  ;  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that,  such  is  its  influence,  no  measure  to 
which  it  is  opposed  can  become  a  law,  however  expedient  and  necessary,  and 
that  the  public  money  will  remain  in  their  possession,  to  be  disposed  of,  not  as 
the  public  interest,  but  as  theirs  may  dictate.  The  time,  indeed,  seems  fast  ap 
proaching,  when  no  law  can  pass,  nor  any  honour  be  conferred,  from  the  chiei 
magistrate  to  the  tide-waiter,  without  the  assent^of  this  powerful  and  interested 
combination,  which  is  steadily  becoming  the  government  itself,  to  the  utter  sub 
version  of  the  authority  of  the  people.  Nay,  I  fear  we  are  in  the  midst  of  it ; 
and  I  look  with  anxiety  to  the  fate  of  this  measure  as  the  test  whether  we  are 
or  not. 

If  nothing  should  be  done — if  the  money  which  justly  belongs  to  the  people 
be  left  where  it  is,  with  the  many  and  overwhelming  objections  to  it — the  fact 
will  prove  that  a  great  and  radical  change  has  been  effected;  that  the  govern 
ment  is  subverted  ;  that  the  authority  of  the  people  is  suppressed  by  a  union  of 
the  banks  and  executive — a  union  a  hundred  times  more  dangerous  than  that  of 
Church  and  State,  against  which  the  Constitution  has  so  jealously  guarded.  It 
would  be  the  announcement  of  a  state  of  things  from  which,  it  is  to  be  feared, 
there  can  be  no  recovery — a  state  of  boundless  corruption,  and  the  lowest  and 
basest  subserviency.  It  seems  to  be  the  order  of  Providence  that,  with  the 
exception  of  these,  a  people  may  recover  from  any  other  evil.  Piracy,  robbery, 
and  violence  of  every  description  may,  as  history  proves,  be  followed  by  vir 
tue,  patriotism,  and  national  greatness ;  but  where  is  the  example  to  be  found 
of  a  degenerate,  corrupt,  and  subservient  people,  who  have  ever  recovered  their 
virtue  and  patriotism  ?  Their  doom  has  ever  been  the  lowest  state  of  wretch 
edness  and  misery  :  scorned,  trodden  down,  and  obliterated  forever  from  the  list 
of  nations.  May  Heaven  grant  that  such  may  never  be  our  doom  ! 


XVI. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    BILL   FOR   THE   ADMISSION   OF   MICHIGAN.  JANUARY    2,   1837. 

MR.  GRUNDY  moved  that  the  previous  orders  of  the  day  be  postponed, 
for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  bill  to  admit  tie  State  of  Michigan  into 
the  Union. 

Mr.  Calhoun  was  opposed  to  the  motion  and  said,  the  documents  ac 
companying  the  bill  had  but  this  mornins  been  laid  upon  the  tables,  and 
no  time  had  been  allowed  for  even  rearing  them  over. 

Mr.  Grundy  insisted  on  his  motio*«  Of  °ne  point  he  was  fully  satis 
fied,  that  Michigan  had  a  right  to  *e  received  into  the  Union ;  on  this,  he 
presumed,  there  would  be  but  li**le  difference  of  opinion,  the  chief  diffi 
culty  having  respect  to  the  «iode  in  which  it  was  to  be  done.  There 
seemed  more  difference  of  opinion,  and  he  presumed  there  would  be 
more  debate,  touching  tb~  preamble  than  concerning  the  bill  itself;  but 
he  could  not  consent  tr  postpone  the  subject.  Congress  were  daily  pass 
ing  laws,  the  effect  of  which  pressed  immediately  upon  the  people  of 
Michigan,  and  concerning  which  they  were  entitled  to  have  a  voice  and 


244  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

a  vote  upon  this  floor  5  and,  therefore,  the  bill  for  their  admission  ought 
to  receive  the  immediate  action  of  the  Senate.  As  to  the  documents, 
they  were  not  numerous.  The  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  might 
readily  run  his  eye  over  them,  and  he  would  perceive  that  the.  facts  of 
the  case  were  easily  understood.  Indeed,  there  was  but  one  of  any  con 
sequence  respecting  which  there  was  any  controversy.  When  the  Senate 
adjourned  on  Thursday,  many  senators  had  been  prepared,  and  were  de 
sirous  to  speak,  although  the  documents  were  not  then  printed.  It  was 
the  great  principles  involved  in  the  case  which  would  form  the  subjects 
of  discussion,  and  they  could  as  well  be  discussed  now.  He  thought  the 
Senate  had  better  proceed.  One  fact  in  the  case  was  very  certain :  there  had 
been  more  votes  for  the  members  to  the  last  convention  than  for  the  first. 
How  many  more  was  a  matter  of  little  comparative  consequence.  The 
great  question  for  the  Senate  to  consider  was  this :  What  is  the  will  of 
Michigan  on  the  subject  of  entering  the  Union  1 

If  this  could  be  decided,  it  was  of  less  consequence  whether  the  bill 
should  or  should  not  expressly  state  that  the  last  convention,  and  the  as 
sent  by  it  given,  formed  the  ground  of  the  admission  of  the  state. 

Mr.  Calhoun  here  inquired  whether  the  chairman  of  the  committee  was 
to  be  understood  as  being  now  ready  to  abandon  the  preamble  1  If  the 
Judiciary  Committee  were  agreed  to  do  this,  he  thought  all  difficulty 
would  be  at  an  end. 

Mr.  Grundy  replied,  that,  as  chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Committee,  he 
had  no  authority  to  reply  to  the  inquiry,  but,  as  an  individual,  he  consid 
ered  the  preamble  as  of  little  consequence,  and  he  should  vote  for  the 
bill  whether  it  were  in  or  out.  Michigan  ought,  undoubtedly,  to  be  ad 
mitted,  and  all  the  consequences  would  result,  whether  the  preamble  were 
retained  or  not.  He  had  received  no  authority  from  the  committee  to 
consent  that  it  should  be  stricken  out.  For  himself,  he  was  settled  in  the 
belief  that  Congress  possessed  full  power  to  prescribe  the  boundaries  of 
a  territory,  and  that,  when  that  territory  passed  into  a  state,  the  right  re 
mained  still  the  same.  Congress  had  already  established  the  boundary  of 
Ohio,  and  that  settled  the  question.  He  never  had  perceived  the  necessity  of 
inserting  in  the  admission  bill  the  section  which  made  the  assent  of  Mich 
igan  to  the  boundaries  fixed  for  her  by  Congress  a  prerequisite  to  her 
admission,  because  the  disputed  boundary  line  was  fixed  by  another  bill ; 
and,  whether  the  preamble  to  this  bill  should  be  retained  or  not,  Michigan 
could  not  pass  the  line,  so  that  the  preamble  was  really  of  very  little 
consequence. 

Mr.  Calhoun  said  that,  in  inquiring  of  the  honourable  chairman  whether 
he  intended  to  aban6.on  the  preamble  of  the  bill,  his  question  had  had  re 
spect,  not  to  any  pledge  respecting  boundaries,  but  to  the  recognition  of 
the  second  convention  a*d  of  its  doings.  He  wanted  to  know  whether 
the  chairman  was  ready  to  abandon  that  principle.  He  had  examined  the 
subject  a  good  deal,  and  his  ->wn  mind  was  fully  made  up  that  Michigan 
could  not  be  admitted  on  the  giound  of  that  second  convention ;  but  the 
Senate  might  set  aside  the  whoio  of  what  had  been  done,  and  receive 
Michigan  as  she  stood  at  the  commoncement  Of  the  last  session. 

Mr.  Grundy  observed,  that  if  the  gentleman's  mind  was  fully  made  up, 
then  there  could  be  no  necessity  of  postponing  the  subject.  The  gentle 
man  has  fully  satisfied  himself,  and  now  (fcrtid  Mr.  G.)  let  us  see  if  he  can 
satisfy  us.  His  argument,  it  seems,  has  bet^  fully  matured,  and  we  are 
now  ready  to  listen  to  it.  Though  I  consider  that  there  is  no  virtue  in 
the  preamble,  and  that  the  effect  of  the  bill  will  be  the  same  whether  it 
is  stricken  out  or  retained,  yet  I  am  not  ready  to  s^y  that  I  shall  vote  to 
strike  it  out.  I  am  ready  to  hear  what  can  be  said  both  for  and  against  it. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  245 

The  question  was  now  put  on  the  motion  of  Mr.  Grundy  to  postpone 
the  previous  orders,  and  carried,  22  to  16.  So  the  orders  were  postponed, 
and  the  Senate  proceeded  to  consider  the  bill,  which  having  been  again 
read  at  the  clerk's  table,  as  follows : 

Jl  Bill  to  admit  the  State  of  Michigan  into  the  Union  upon  an  equal  footing 
with  the  original  States. 

Whereas,  in  pursuance  of  the  act  of  Congress  of  June  the  fifteenth, 
eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-six,  entitled,  "An  act  to  establish  the  northern 
boundary  of  the  State  of  Ohio,  and  to  provide  for  the  admission  of  the 
State  of  Michigan  into  the  Union,  upon  the  conditions  therein  expressed," 
a  convention  of  delegates,  elected  by  the  people  of  the  said  State  of 
Michigan,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  giving  their  assent  to  the  boundaries  of 
the  said  State  of  Michigan  as  described,  declared,  and  established  in  and 
by  the  said  act,  did,  on  the  fifteenth  of  December,  eighteen  hundred  and 
thirty-six,  assent  to  the  provisions  of  said  act :  therefore, 

Be  it  enacted,  #c.,  That  the  State  of  Michigan  shall  be  one,  and  is  here 
by  declared  to  be  one  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  admitted  into 
the  Union  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original  states,  in  all  respects 
whatever. 

SEC.  2.  JLnd  be  it  farther  enacted,  That  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in 
carrying  into  effect  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  sections  of  the  act  of 
the  twenty-third  of  June,  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-six,  entitled,  "  An 
act  to  regulate  the  deposites  of  the  public  money,"  shall  consider  the 
State  of  Michigan  as  being  one  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Calhoun  then  rose,  and  addressed  the  Senate  as  follows : 

I  have  bestowed  on  this  subject  all  the  attention  that  was  in  my  power, 
and,  although  actuated  by  a  most  anxious  desire  for  the  admission  of 
Michigan  into  the  Union,  I  find  it  impossible  to  give  my  assent  to  this 
bill.  I  am  satisfied  the  Judiciary  Committee  has  not  bestowed  upon  the 
subject  all  that  attention  which  its  magnitude  requires,  and  I  can  explain 
it  on  no  other  supposition  why  they  should  place  the  admission  on  the 
grounds  they  have.  One  of  the  committee,  the  senator  from  Ohio  on  my 
left  (Mr.  Morris),  has  pronounced  the  grounds  as  dangerous  and  revolu 
tionary  ;  he  might  have  gone  farther,  and,  with  truth,  pronounced  them 
utterly  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution. 

I  have  not  ventured  this  assertion,  as  strong  as  it  is,  without  due  reflec 
tion,  and  weighing  the  full  force  of  the  terms  I  have  used,  and  do  not 
fear,  with  an  impartial  hearing,  to  establish  its  truth  beyond  the  power 
of  controversy. 

To  understand  fully  the  objection  to  this  bill,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
should  have  a  correct  conception  of  the  facts.  They  are  few,  and  may  be 
briefly  told. 

Some  time  previous  to  the  last  session  of  Congress,  the  Territory  of 
Michigan,  through  its  Legislature,  authorized  the  people  to  meet  in  con 
vention  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  state  government.  They  met,  accord 
ingly,  and  agreed  upon  a  constitution,  which  they  forthwith  transmitted 
to  Congress.  It  was  fully  discussed  in  this  chamber,  and,  objectionable 
as  the  instrument  was,  an  act  was  finally  passed,  which  accepted  the  con 
stitution,  and  declared  Michigan  to  be  a  state  and  admitted  intt>  the 
Union,  on  the  single  condition  that  she  should,  by  a  convention  of  the 
people,  assent  to  the  boundaries  prescribed  by  the  act.  Soon  after  our 
adjournment,  the  Legislature  of  the  State  of  Michigan  (for  she  had  been 
raised  by  our  assent  to  the  dignity  of  a  state)  called  a  convention  of  the 
people  of  the  state,  in  conformity  to  the  act,  which  met,  at  the  time 


246  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

appointed,  at  Ann  Arbour.  After  full  discussion,  the  convention  with 
held  its  assent,  and  formally  transmitted  the  result  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  This  is  the  first  part  of  the  story.  I  will  now  give  the 
sequel.  Since  then,  during  the  last  month,  a  self-constituted  assembly 
met,  professedly  as  a  convention  of  the  people  of  the  state,  but  without 
the  authority  of  the  state.  This  unauthorized  and  lawless  assemblage 
assumed  the  high  function  of  giving  the  assent  of  the  State  of  Michigan 
to  the  condition  of  admission,  as  prescribed  in  the  act  of  Congress.  They 
communicated  their  assent  to  the  executive  of  the  United  States,  and  he 
to  the  Senate.  The  Senate  referred  his  message  to  the  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary,  and  that  committee  reported  this  bill  for  the  admission  of  the 
state. 

Such  are  the  facts,  out  of  which  grows  the  important  question,  Had  this 
self-constituted  assembly  the  authority  to  assent  for  the  state  1  Had  they 
the  authority  to  do  what  is  implied  in  giving  assent  to  the  condition  of 
admission  1  That  assent  introduces  the  state  into  the  Union,  and  pledges 
it,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  to  the  constitutional  compact  which  binds 
these  states  in  one  confederated  body ;  imposes  on  her  all  its  obligations, 
and  confers  on  her  all  its  benefits.  Had  this  irregular,  self-constitued  as 
semblage,  the  authority  to  perform  these  high  and  solemn  acts  of  sov 
ereignty  in  the  name  of  the  State  of  Michigan  1  She  tcould  only  come 
in  as  a  state,  and  none  could-act  or  speak  for  her  without  her  express  au 
thority  ;  and  to  assume  the  authority  without  her  sanction  is  nothing 
short  of  treason  against  the  state. 

Again :  the  assent  to  the  conditions  prescribed  by  Congress  implies  an 
authority  in  those  who  gave  it  to  supersede,  in  part,  the  Constitution  of 
the  State  of  Michigan ;  for  her  Constitution  fixes  the  boundaries  of  the 
state  as  part  of  that  instrument,  which  the  condition  of  admission  en 
tirely  alters,  and,  to  that  extent,  the  assent  would  supersede  the  Consti 
tution  ;  and  thus  the  question  is  presented,  whether  this  self-constituted 
assembly,  styling  itself  a  convention,  had  the  authority  to  do  an  act  which 
necessarily  implies  the  right  to  supersede,  in  part,  the  Constitution. 

But  farther  :  the  State  of  Michigan,  through  its  Legislature,  authorized, 
a  convention  of  the  people,  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  condition 
of  admission  should  be  assented  to  or  not.  The  convention  met,  and, 
after  mature  deliberation,  it  dissented  from  the  condition  of  admission  ;  and 
thus,  again,  the  question  is  presented,  whether  this  self-called,  self-consti 
tuted  assemblage,  this  caucus — for  it  is  entitled  to  no  higher  name — had 
the  authority  to  annul  the  dissent  of  the  state,  solemnly  given  by  a  con 
vention  of  the  people,  regularly  convoked  under  the  express  authority  of 
the  constituted  authorities  of  the  state  1 

If  all  or  any  of  these  questions  be  answered  in  the  negative — if  the  self- 
created  assemblage  of  December  had  no  authority  to  speak  in  the  name 
of  the  State  of  Michigan — if  none  to  supersede  any  portion  of  her  Con 
stitution — if  none  to  annul  her  dissent  from  the  condition  of  admission,  reg 
ularly  given  by  a  convention  of  the  people  of  the  state,  convoked  by  the 
authority  of  the  state — to  introduce  her  on  its  authority  would  be  not 
only  revolutionary  and  dangerous,  but  utterly  repugnant  to  the  principles 
of  our  Constitution.  The  question,  then,  submitted  to  the  Senate  is,  Had 
that  assemblage  the  authority  to  perform  these  high  and  solemn  acts  1 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  holds  that  this  self- 
constituted  assemblage  had  the  authority  j  and  what  is  his  reason  1  Why, 
truly,  because  a  greater  number  of  votes  were  given  for  those  who  con 
stituted  that  assemblage  than  for  those  who  constituted  the  convention 
of  the  people  of  the  state,  convened  under  its  constituted  authorities. 
This  argument  resolves  itself  into  two  questions — the  first  of  fact,  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  247 

the  second  of  principle.  I  shall  not  discuss  the  first.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  do  so.  But,  if  it  were,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  never  was  so 
important  a  fact  so  loosely  testified.  There  is  not  one  particle  of  official 
evidence  before  us.  We  have  nothing  but  the  private  letters  of  individ 
uals,  who  do  not  know  even  the  numbers  that  voted  on  either  occasion ; 
they  know  nothing  of  the  qualifications  of  voters,  nor  how  their  votes 
were  received,  nor  by  whom  counted.  Now,  none  knows  better  than  the 
honourable  chairman  himself,  that  such  testimony  as  is  submitted  to  us 
to  establish  a  fact  of  this  moment,  would  not  be  received  in  the  lowest 
magistrate's  court  in  the  land.  But  I  waive  this.  I  come  to  the  question, 
of  the  principle  involved  ;  and  what  is  it  1  The  argument  is,  that  a  greater 
number  of  persons  voted  for  the  last  convention  than  for  the  first,  and, 
therefore,  the  acts  of  the  last  of  right  abrogated  those  of  the  first  j  in 
other  words,  that  mere  numbers,  without  regard  to  the  forms  of  law  or  the 
principles  of  the  Constitution,  give  authority.  The  authority  ofnumbersy 
according  to  this  argument^  sets  aside  the  authority  of  law  and  the  Constitution. 
Need  I  show  that  such  a  principle  goes  to  the  entire  overthrow  of  our 
constitutional  government,  and  would  subvert  all  social  order  1  It  is  the 
identical  principle  which  prompted  the  late  revolutionary  and  anarchical 
movement  in  Maryland,  and  which  has  done  more  to  shake  confidence  in 
our  system  of  government  than  any  event  since  the  adoption  of  our  Con 
stitution,  but  which,  happily,  has  been  frowned  down  by  the  patriotism 
and  intelligence  of  the  people  of  that  state. 

What  was  the  ground  of  this  insurrectionary  measure,  but  that  the 
government  of  Maryland  did  not  represent  the  voice  of  the  numerical 
majority  of  the  people  of  Maryland,  and  that  the  authority  of  law  arid  the 
Constitution  was  nothing  against  that  of  numbers  1  Here  we  find  on  this 
floor,  and  from  the  head  of  the  Judiciary  Committee,  the  same  principle  re 
vived,  and,  if  possible,  in  a  worse  form ;  for,  in  Maryland,  the  anarchists 
assumed  that  they  were  sustained  by  the  numerical  majority  of  the  people 
of  the  state  in  their  revolutionary  movements  5  but  the  utmost  the  chair 
man  can  pretend  to  have  is  a  mere  plurality.  The  largest  number  of 
votes  claimed  for  the  self-created  assemblage  is  8000  j  and  no  man  will 
undertake  to  say  that  this  constitutes  anything  like  a  majority  of  the 
voters  of  Michigan ;  and  he  claims  the  high  authority  which  he  does  for 
it,  not  because  it  is  a  majority  of  the  people  of  Michigan,  but  because  it 
is  a  greater  number  than  voted  for  the  authorized  convention  of  the  peo 
ple  that  refused  to  agree  to  the  condition  of  admission.  It  may  be  shown, 
by  his  own  witness,  that  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  Michigan  greatly  ex 
ceed  8000.  Mr.  Williams,  the  president  of  the  self-created  assemblage, 
stated  that  the  population  of  that  state  amounted  to  nearly  200,000  per 
sons.  If  so,  there  cannot  be  less  than  from  20,000  to  30,000  voters,  con 
sidering  how  nearly  universal  the  right  of  suffrage  is  under  its  Constitu 
tion  ;  and  it  thus  appears  that  this  irregular,  self-constituted  meeting  did 
not  represent  the  vote  of  one  third  of  the  state  ;  and  yet,  on  a  mere  prin 
ciple  of  plurality,  we  are  to  supersede  the  Constitution  of  Michigan,  and 
annul  the  act  of  a  convention  of  the  people,  regularly  convened  under  the 
authority  of  the  government  of  the  state. 

But,  says  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan),  this  assembly 
was  not  self-constituted.  It  met  under  the  authority  of  an  act  of  Con 
gress  ;  and  that  act  had  no  reference  to  the  state,  but  only  to  the  people ; 
and  that  the  assemblage  in  December  was  just  such  a  meeting  as  that  act 
contemplated.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  discuss  the  question  whether  the 
honourable  senator  has  given  the  true  interpretation  of  the  act,  but,  if  it 
were,  I  could  very  easily  show  his  interpretation  to  be  erroneous ;  for,  if 
such  had  been,  the  intention  of  Congress,  the  act  surely  would  have  spe- 


248  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

cified  the  time  when  the  convention  was  to  be  held,  who  were  to  he  the 
managers,  who  the  voters,  and  would  not  have  left  it  to  individuals  who 
might  choose  to  assume  the  authority  to  determine  all  these  important 
points.  I  might  also  readily  show  that  the  word  "  convention"  of  the 
people,  as  used  in  law  or  the  Constitution,  always  means  a  meeting  of  the 
people  regularly  convened  by  the  constituted  authority  of  the  state,  in  their 
high  sovereign  capacity,  and  that  it  never  means  such  an  assemblage  as 
the  one  in  question.  But  I  waive  this;  I  take  higher  ground.  If  the  act 
be,  indeed,  such  as  the  senator  says  it  is,  then  I  maintain  that  it  is  utterly 
opposed  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  our  Federal  Union.  Congress 
has  no  right  whatever  to  call  a  convention  in  a  state.  It  can  call  but  one 
convention,  and  that  is  a  convention  of  the  United  States  to  amend  the 
Federal  Constitution  ;  nor  can  it  call  that,  except  authorized  by  two  thirds 
of  the  states. 

Ours  is  a  Federal  Republic — a  union  of  states.  Michigan  is  a  state ;  a 
state  in  the  course  of  admission,  and  differing  only  from  the  other  states 
in  her  federal  relations.  She  is  declared  to  be  a  state,  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  by  your  own  act.  She  can  come  into  the  Union  only  as  a  state,  and 
by  her  voluntary  assent,  given  by  the  people  of  the  state  in  convention, 
called  by  the  constituted  authority  of  the  state.  To  admit  the  State  of 
Michigan  on  the  authority  of  a  self-created  meeting,  or  one  called  by  the 
direct  authority  of  Congress,  passing  by  the  authorities  of  the  state,  would 
be  the  most  monstrous  proceeding  under  our  Constitution  that  can  be  con 
ceived  ;  the  most  repugnant  to  its  principles,  and  dangerous  in  its  conse 
quences.  It  would  establish  a  direct  relation  between  the  individual  citi 
zens  of  a, state  and  the  General  Government,  in  utter  subversion  of  the 
federal  character  of  our  system.  The  relation  of  the  citizens  to  this 
government  is  through  the  states  exclusively.  They  are  subject  to  its 
authority  and  laws  only  because  the  state  has  assented  they  should  be. 
If  she  dissents,  their  assent  is  nothing  j  on  the  other  hand,  if  she  assents, 
their  dissent  is  nothing.  It  is  through  the  state,  then,  and  through  the 
state  alone,  that  the  United  States  government  can  have  any  connexion 
with  the  people  of  a  state  ;  and  does  not,  then,  the  senator  from  Pennsyl 
vania  see,  that  if  Congress  can  authorize  a  convention  of  the  people  in 
the  State  of  Michigan  without  the  authority  of  the  state,  it  matters  not 
what  is  the  object,  it  may,  in  like  manner,  authorize  conventions  in  any 
other  state  for  whatever  purpose  it  may  think  proper  1 

Michigan  is  as  much  a  sovereign  state  as  any  other,  differing  only,  as 
I  have  said,  as  to  her  federal  relations.  If  we  give  our  sanction  to  the 
assemblage  of  December,  on  the  principle  laid  down  by  the  senator  from 
Pennsylvania,  then  we  establish  the  doctrine  that  Congress  has  power  to 
call  at  pleasure  conventions  within  the  states.  Is  there  a  senator  on  this 
floor  who  will  assent  to  such  a  doctrine  1  Is  there  one,  especially,  who 
represents  the  smaller  states  of  this  Union,  or  the  weaker  section  1  Ad 
mit  the  power,  and  every  vestige  of  state  rights  would  be  destroyed. 
Our  system  would  be  subverted,  and,  instead  of  a  confederacy  of  free  and 
sovereign  states,  we  should  have  all  power  concentrated  here,  and  this 
would  become  the  most  odious  despotism.  He,  indeed,  must  be  blind, 
who  does  not  see  that  such  a  power  would  give  the  Federal  Government 
a  complete  control  of  all  the  states.  I  call  upon  senators  now  to  arrest 
a  doctrine  so  dangerous.  Let  it  be  remembered  that,  under  our  system^ 
bad  precedents  live  forever  ;  good  ones  only  perish.  We  may  not  feel 
all  the  evil  consequences  at  once,  but  this  precedent,  once  set,  will  surely 
be  received,  and  will  become  the  instrument  of  infinite  evil. 

It  will  be  asked,  What  shall  be  done  1  Will  you  refuse  to  admit  Michi 
gan  into  the  Union  1  I  answer,  No  :  I  desire  to  admit  her  ;  and  if  the  sen- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  249 

ators  from  Indiana  and  Ohio  will  agree,  I  am  ready  now  to  admit  her  as 
she  stood  at  the  beginning  of  last  session,  without  giving  sanction  to  the 
imauthorized  assemblage  of  December. 

But  if  that  does  not  meet  their  wishes,  there  is  still  another  by  which 
she  may  be  admitted.  We  are  told  two  thirds  of  the  Legislature  and  peo 
ple  of  Michigan  are  in  favour  of  accepting  the  conditions  of  the  act  of 
last  session.  If  that  be  the  fact,  then  all  that  is  necessary  is,  that  the 
Legislature  should  call  another  convention.  All  difficulty  will  thus  be  re 
moved,  and  there  will  be  still  abundant  time  for  her  admission  at  this  ses 
sion.  And  shall  we,  for  the  sake  of  gaining  a  few  months,  give  our  as 
sent  to  a  bill  fraught  with  principles  so  monstrous  as  this! 

We  have  been  told  that,  unless  she  is  admitted  immediately,  it  will  be 
too  late  for  her  to  receive  her  proportion  of  the  surplus  revenue  under 
the  deposite  bill.  I  trust  that  on  so  great  a  question  a  difficulty  like  this 
will  have  no  weight.  Give  her  at  once  her  full  share.  I  am  ready  to  do 
so  at  once,  without  waiting  her  admission.  I  was  mortified  to  hear  on 
so  grave  a  question  such  motives  assigned  for  her  admission,  contrary  to 
the  law  and  Constitution.  Such  considerations  ought  not  to  be  present 
ed  when  we  are  settling  great  constitutional  principles.  I  trust  that  we 
shall  pass  by  all  such  frivolous  motives  on  this  occasion,  and  take  ground 
on  the  great  and  fundamental  principle  that  an  informal,  irregular,  self-con 
stituted  assembly,  a  mere  caucus,  has  no  authority  to  speak  for  a  sovereign 
state  in  any  case  whatever  ;  to  supersede  its  Constitution,  or  to  reverse  its 
dissent,  deliberately  given  by  a  convention  of  the  people  of  the  state,  reg 
ularly  convened  under  its  constituted  authority. 


XVII. 

ON   THE    SAME    SUBJECT,   JANUARY    5,    1837. 

MR.  GRUNDY,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  having 
moved  that  the  bill  to  admit  the  State  of  Michigan  into  the  Union  be  now 
read  a  third  time, 

Mr.  Calhoun  addressed  the  Senate  in  opposition  to  the  bill. 

I  have  (said  Mr.  C.)  been  connected  with  this  government  more  than 
half  its  existence,  in  various  capacities,  and  during  that  long  period  I  have 
looked  on  its  action  with  attention,  and  have  endeavoured  to  make  my 
self  acquainted  with  the  principles  and  character  of  our  political  institu 
tions  j  and  I  can  truly  say,  that  within  that  time  no  measure  has  received 
the  sanction  of  Congress  which  has  appeared  to  me  more  unconstitutional 
and  dangerous  than  the  present.  It  assails  our  political  system  in  its 
weakest  point,  and  where,  at  this  time,  it  most  requires  defence. 

The  great  and  leading  objections  to  the  bill  rest  mainly  on  the  ground 
that  Michigan  is  a  state.  They  have  been  felt  by  its  friends  to  have  so 
much  weight,  that  its  advocates  have  been  compelled  to  deny  the  fact,  as 
the  only  way  of  meeting  the  objections.  Here,  then,  is  the  main  point  at 
issue  between  the  friends  and  the  opponents  of  the  bill.  It  turns  on  a  factv 
and  that  fact  presents  the  question,  Is  Michigan  a  state  \ 

If  (said  Mr.  C.)  there  ever  was  a  party  committed  on  a  fact — if  there. 
ever  was  one  estopped  from  denying  it — that  party  is  the  present  majority 
in  the  Senate,  and  that  fact  that  Michigan  is  a  state.  It  is  the  very  party 
who  urged  through  this  body,  at  the  last  session,  a  bill  for  the  admission 
of  the  State  of  Michigan,  which  accepted  her  Constitution,  and  declared, 
in  the  most  explicit  and  strongest  terms,  that  she  was  a  state.  I  will  not 
take  up  the  time  of  the  Senate  by  reading  this  solemn  declaration.  It  has 

I  i 


250  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

frequently  been  read  during  this  debate,  and  is  familiar  to  all  who  hear 
me,  and  has  not  been  questioned  or  denied.  But  it  has  been  said  there 
is  a  condition  annexed  to  the  declaration,  with  which  she  must  comply 
before  she  can  become  a  state.  There  is,  indeed,  a  condition  ;  but  it  has 
been  shown  by  my  colleague  and  others,  from  the  plain  wording  of  the 
act,  that  the  condition  is  not  attached  to  the  acceptance  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  nor  the  declaration  that  she  is  a  state,  but  simply  to  her  admission 
into  the  Union.  I  will  not  repeat  the  argument,  but,  in  order  to  place  the 
subject  beyond  controversy,  I  shall  recall  to  memory  the  history  of  the 
last  session,  as  connected  with  the  admission  of  Michigan.  The  facts 
need  but  be  referred  to,  in  order  to  revive  their  recollection. 

There  were  two  points  proposed  to  be  effected  by  the  friends  of  the  bill 
at  the  last  session.  The  first  was  to  settle  the  controversy,  as  to  bound 
ary,  between  Michigan  and  Ohio,  and  it  was  that  object  alone  which  im 
posed  the  condition  that  Michigan  should  assent  to  the  boundary  pre 
scribed  by  the  act  as  the  condition  of  her  admission.  But  there  was  an 
other  object  to  be  accomplished.  Two  respectable  gentlemen,  who  had 
been  elected  by  the  state  as  senators,  were  then  waiting  to  take  their 
seats  on  this  floor ;  and  the  other  object  of  the  bill  was  to  provide  for 
their  taking  their  seats  as  senators  on  the  admission  of  the  state,  and  for 
this  purpose  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  positive  and  unconditional  dec 
laration  that  Michigan  was  a  state,  as  a  state  only  could  choose  senators, 
by  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  hence,  the  admission  was 
made  conditional,  and  the  declaration  that  she  was  a  state  was  made  ab 
solute,  in  order  to  effect  both  objects.  To  show  that  I  am  correct,  I  will 
ask  the  secretary  to  read  the  third  section  of  the  bill. 

[The  section  was  read,  accordingly,  as  follows: 

"  SECT.  3.  Jlnd  be  it  farther  enacted,  That,  as  a  compliance  with  the 
fundamental  condition  of  admission  contained  in  the  last  preceding  sec 
tion  of  this  act,  the  boundaries  of  the  said  State  of  Michigan,  as  in  that 
section  described,  declared,  and  established,  shall  receive  the  assent  of  a 
convention  of  delegates  elected  by  the  people  of  said  state,  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  giving  the  assent  herein  required  $  and  as  soon  as  the  assent 
herein  required  shall  be  given,  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall 
announce  the  same  by  proclamation ;  and  thereupon,  and  without  any  far 
ther  proceeding  on  the  part  of  Congress,  the  admission  of  the  said  state 
into  the  Union,  as  one  of  the  United  States  of  America,  on  an  equal  foot 
ing  with  the  original  states  in  every  respect  whatever,  shall  be  considered 
as  complete,  and  the  senators  and  representatives  who  have  been  elected 
by  the  said  state  as  its  representative  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  entitled  to  take  their  seats  in  the  Senate  and  House  of  Kepre* 
sentatives  respectively,  without  farther  delay."] 

Mr.  Calhoun  then  asked,  Does  not  every  senator  see  the  two  objects — 
the  one  to  settle  the  boundary,  and  the  other  to  admit  her  senators  to  a 
seat  in  this  body ;  and  that  the  section  is  so  worded  as  to  effect  both,  in 
the  manner  I  have  stated  1  If  this  needed  confirmation,  it  would  find  it 
in  the  debate  on  the  passage  of  the  bill,  when  the  ground  was  openly 
taken  by  the  present  majority,  that  Michigan  had  a  right  to  form  her  con 
stitution,  under  the  ordinance  of  1787,  without  our  consent,  and  that  she 
was  of  right,  and  in  fact,  a  state,  beyond  our  control. 

I  will  (said  Mr.  C.)  explain  my  own  views  on  this  point,  in  order  that 
the  consistency  of  my  course  at  the  last  and  present  session  may  be 
<clearly  seen. 

My  opinion  was,  and  still  is,  that  the  movement  of  the  people  of  Michi 
gan  in  forming  for  themselves  a  state  constitution,  without  waiting  for  the 
assent  of  Congress,  was  revolutionary,  as  it  threw  off  the  authority  of  the 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C,    CA.LHOUN.  251 

United  States  over  the  territory  ;  and  that  we  were  left  at  liberty  to  treat 
the  proceedings  as  revolutionary,  and  to  remand  her  to  her  territorial 
condition,  or  to  waive  the  irregularity,  and  to  recognise  what  was  done  as 
rightfully  done,  as  our  authority  alone  was  concerned. 

My  impression  was,  that  the  former  was  the  proper  course ;  but  I  also 
thought  that  the  act  remanding  her  back  should  contain  our  assent  in  the 
usual  manner  for  her  to  form  a  constitution,  and  thus  to  leave  her  free  to 
become  a  state.  This,  however,  was  overruled.  The  opposite  opinion 
prevailed,  that  she  had  a  perfect  right  to  do  what  she  had  done,  and  that 
she  was,  as  I  have  stated,  a  state  both  in  fact  and  right,  and  that  we  had 
no  control  over  her ;  and  our  act,  accordingly,  recognised  her  as  a  state 
from  the  time  she  had  adopted  her  Constitution,  and  admitted  her  into  the 
Union  on  the  condition  of  her  assenting  to  the  prescribed  boundaries. 
Having  thus  solemnly  recognised  her  as  a  state,  we  cannot  now  undo 
what  was  then  done.  There  were,  in  fact,  many  irregularities  in  the  pro 
ceedings,  all  of  which  were  urged  in  vain  against  its  passage  j  but  the 
presidential  election  was  then  pending,  and  the  vote  of  Michigan  was  con 
sidered  of  sufficient  weight  to  overrule  all  objections  and  correct  all  ir 
regularities.  They  were  all,  accordingly,  overruled,  and  we  cannot  now 
go  back. 

Such  was  the  course,  and  such  the  acts  of  the  majority  at  the  last 
session.  A  few  short  months  have  since  passed.  Other  objects  are  now 
to  be  effected,  and  all  is  forgotten  as  completely  as  if  they  had  never  ex 
isted.  The  very  senators  who  then  forced  the  act  through,  on  the  ground 
that  Michigan  was  a  state,  have  wheeled  completely  round,  to  serve  the 
present  purpose,  and  taken  directly  the  opposite  ground !  We  live  in 
strange  and  inconsistent  times.  Opinions  are  taken  up  and  laid  down,  as 
suits  the  occasion,  without  hesitation,  or  the  slightest  regard  to  principles 
or  consistency.  It  indicates  an  unsound  state  of  the  public  mind,  preg 
nant  with  future  disasters. 

I  turn  to  the  position  now  assumed  by  the  majority  to  suit  the  present 
occasion  ;  and,  if  I  mistake  not,  it  will  be  found  as  false  in  fact,  and  as  er 
roneous  in  principle,  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  that  maintained  at  the  last 
session.  They  now  take  the  ground  that  Michigan  is  not  a  state,  and 
cannot,  in  fact,  be  a  state  till  she  is  admitted  into  the  Union  ;  and  this  on 
the  broad  principle  that  a  territory  cannot  become  a  state  till  admitted. 
Such  is  the  position  distinctly  taken  by  several  of  the  friends  of  this  bill, 
and  implied  in  the  arguments  of  nearly  all  who  have  spoken  in  its  favour. 
In  fact,  its  advocates  had  no  choice.  As  untenable  as  it  is,  they  were 
forced  on  this  desperate  position.  They  had  no  other  which  they  could 
occupy. 

I  have  shown  that  it  is  directly  in  the  face  of  the  law  of  the  last  ses 
sion,  and  that  it  denies  the  recorded  acts  of  those  who  now  maintain  the 
position.  I  now  go  farther,  and  assert  that  it  is  in  direct  opposition  to 
plain  and  unquestionable  matter  of  fact.  There  is  no  fact  more  certain 
than  that  Michigan  is  a  state.  She  is  in  the  full  exercise  of  sovereign 
authority,  with  a  Legislature  and  a  chief  magistrate.  She  passes  laws,  she 
executes  them,  she  regulates  titles,  and  even  takes  away  life — all  on  her 
own  authority.  Ours  has  entirely  ceased  over  her,  and  yet  there  are  those 
who  can  deny,  with  all  these  facts  before  them,  that  she  is  a  state.  They 
might  as  well  deny  the  existence  of  this  hall !  We  have  long  since  as 
sumed  unlimited  control  over  the  Constitution,  to  twist  and  turn,  and  deny 
it,  as  it  suited  our  purpose  ;  and  it  would  seem  that  we  are  presumptu 
ously  attempting  to  assume  like  supremacy  over  facts  themselves,  as  if 
their  existence  or  non-existence  depended  on  our  volition.  I  speak  freely. 
The  occasion  demands  that  the  truth  should  be  boldly  uttered. 


252  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

But  those  who  may  not  regard  their  own  recorded  acts,  nor  the  plain 
facts  of  the  case,  may  possibly  feel  the  awkward  condition  in  which 
coming  events  may  shortly  place  them.  The  admission  of  Michigan  is 
not  the  only  point  involved  in  the  passage  of  this  bill.  A  question  will 
follow,  which  may  be  presented  to  the  Senate  in  a  very  few  days,  as  to 
the  right  of  Mr.  Norvell  and  Mr.  Lyon,  the  two  respectable  gentlemen 
who  have  been  elected  senators  by  Michigan,  to  take  their  seats  in  this 
hall.  The  decision  of  this  question  will  require  a  more  sudden  facing 
about  than  has  been  yet  witnessed.  It  required  seven  or  eight  months 
for  the  majority  to  wheel  about  from  the  position  maintained  at  the  last 
session  to  that  taken  at  this,  but  there  may  not  be  allowed  them  now  as 
many  days  to  wheel  back  to  the  old  position.  These  gentlemen  cannot 
he  refused  their  seats  after  the  admission  of  the  state  by  those  gentlemen 
who  passed  the  act  of  the  last  session.  It  provides  for  the  case.  I  now 
put  it  to  the  friends  of  this  bill,  and  I  ask  them  to  weigh  the  question  de 
liberately — to  bring  it  home  to  their  bosom  and  conscience  before  they 
answer — Can  a  territory  elect  senators  to  Congress  1  The  Constitution 
is  express :  states  only  can  choose  senators.  Were  not  these  gentlemen 
chosen  long  before  the  admission  of  Michigan ;  before  the  Ann  Arbour 
meeting,  and  while  Michigan  was,  according  to  the  doctrines  of  the 
friends  of  this  bill,  a  territory  1  Will  they,  in  the  face  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  which  they  are  sworn  to  support,  admit  as  senators  on  this  floor 
those  who,  by  their  own  statement,  were  elected  by  a  territory  1  These 
questions  may  soon  be  presented  for  decision.  The  majority,  who  are 
forcing  this  bill  through,  are  already  committed  by  the  act  of  last  session, 
and  I  leave  them  to  reconcile  as  they  can  the  ground  they  now  take  with 
the  vote  they  must  give  when  the  question  of  their  right  to  take  their  seats 
is  presented  for  decision. 

A  total  disregard  of  all  principle  and  consistency  has  so  entangled  this 
subject,  that  there  is  but  one  mode  left  of  extricating  ourselves  without 
trampling  the  Constitution  in  the  dust ;  and  that  is,  to  return  back  to 
where  we  stood  when  the  question  was  first  presented ;  to  acquiesce  in 
the  right  of  Michigan  to  form  a  constitution,  and  erect  herself  into  a  state, 
under  the  ordinance  of  1787 ;  and  to  repeal  so  much  of  the  act  of  the  last 
session  as  prescribed  the  condition  on  which  she  was  to  be  admitted. 
This  was  the  object  of  the  amendment  that  I  offered  last  evening,  in  order 
to  relieve  the  Senate  from  its  present  dilemma.  The  amendment  involved 
the  merits  of  the  whole  case.  It  was  too.  late  in  the  day  for  discussion, 
and  I  asked  for  indulgence  till  to-day,  that  -I  might  have  an  opportunity 
of  presenting  my  views.  Under  the  iron  rule  of  the  present  majority,  the 
indulgence  was  refused,  and  the  bill  ordered  to  its  third  reading ;  and  I 
have  been  thus  compelled  to  address  the  Senate  when  it  is  too  late  to 
amend  the  bill,  and  after  a  majority  have  committed  themselves  both  as 
to  its  principles  and  details.  Of  such  proceedings  I  complain  not.  I,  as 
one  of  the  minority,  ask  no  favours.  All  I  ask  is,  that  the  Constitution  be 
not  violated.  Hold  it  sacred,  and  I  shall  be  the  last  to  complain. 

I  now  return  to  the  assumption  that  a  territory  cannot  become  a  state 
till  admitted  into  the  Union,  which  is  now  relied  on  with  so  much  con 
fidence  to  prove  that  Michigan  is  not  a  state.  I  reverse  the  position.  I 
assert  the  opposite,  that  a  territory  cannot  be  admitted  till  she  becomes 
a  state  ;  and  in  this  I  stand  on  the  authority  of  the  Constitution  itself, 
which  expressly  limits  the  power  of  Congress  to  admitting  new  states 
into  the  Union.  But,  if  the  Constitution  had  been  silent,  he  would  indeed 
be  ignorant  of  the  character  of  our  political  system,  who  did  not  see  that 
states,  sovereign  and  independent  communities,  and  not  territories,  can 
only  be  admitted.  Ours  is  a  union  of  states,  a  Federal  Republic.  States, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  253 

vend  not  territories,  form  its  component  parts,  bound  together  by  a  solemn 
league,  in  the  form  of  a  constitutional  compact.  In  coming  into  the 
Union,  the  state  pledges  its  faith  to  this  sacred  compact :  an  act  which 
none  but  a  sovereign  and  independent  community  is  competent  to  per 
form  ;  and,  of  course,  a  territory  must  first  be  raised  to  that  condition  be 
fore  she  can  take  her  stand  among  the  confederated  states  of  our  Union. 
How  can  a  territory  pledge  its  faith  to  the  Constitution'?  It  has  no  will 
of  its  own.  You  give  it  all  its  powers,  and  you  can  at  pleasure  overrule 
.all  her  actions.  If  she  enters  as  a  territory,  the  act  is  yours,  not  hers. 
Her  consent  is  nothing  without  your  authority  and  sanction.  Can  you,  can 
Congress,  become  a  party  to  the  constitutional  compact  \  How  absurd. 
,  But  I  am  told,  if  this  be  so — if  a  territory  must  become  a  state  before  it 
can  be  admitted — it  would  follow  that  she  might  refuse  to  enter  the  Union 
after  she  had  acquired  the  right  of  acting  for  herself.  Certainly  she  may. 
A  state  cannot  be,  forced  into  the  Union.  She  must  come  in  by  her  own 
free  assent,  given  in  her  highest  sovereign  capacity  through  a  convention 
of  the  people  of  the  state.  Such  is  the  constitutional  provision  ;  and  those 
who  make  the  objection  must  overlook  both  the  Constitution  and  the  ele 
mentary  principles  of  our  government,  of  which  the  right  of  self-govern 
ment  is  the  first ;  the  right  of  every  people  to  form  their  own  government, 
and  to  determine  their  political  condition.  This  is  the  doctrine  on  which 
our  fathers  acted  in  our  glorious  Revolution,  which  has  done  more  for 
the  cause  of  liberty  throughout  the  world  than  any  event  within  the  rec 
ord  of  history,  and  on  which  the  government  has  acted  from  the  first,  as 
regards  all  that  portion  of  our  extensive  territory  that  lies  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  original  states.  Read  the  ordinance  of  1787,  and  the  various 
#cts  for  the  admission  of  new  states,  and  you  will  find  the  principle  in 
variably  recognised  and  acted  on,  to  the  present  unhappy  instance,  with 
out  any  departure  from  it,  except  in  the  case  of  Missouri.  The  admis 
sion  of  Michigan  is  destined,  I  fear,  to  mark  a  great  change  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  admission  of  new  states  ;  a  total  departure  from  the  old  usage, 
and  the  noble  principle  of  self-government  on  which  that  usage  was  found 
ed.  Everything,  thus  far,  connected  with  her  admission,  has  been  irreg 
ular  and  monstrous.  I  trust  it  is  not  ominous.  Surrounded  by  lakes 
within  her  natural  limits  (which  ought  not  to  have  been  departed  from), 
and  possessed  of  fertile  soil  and  genial  climate,  with  every  prospect  of 
wealth,  power,  and  influence,  who  but  must  regret  that  she  should  be 
ushered  into  the  Union  in  a  manner  so  irregular  and  unworthy  of  her  fu 
ture  destiny  1 

But  I  will  waive  these  objections,  constitutional  and  all.  I  will  sup 
pose,  with  the  advocates  of  the  bill,  that  a  territory  cannot  become  a  state 
till  admitted  into  the  Union.  Assuming  all  this,  I  ask  them  to  explain  to 
me  how  the  mere  act  of  admission  can  transmute  a  territory  into  a  state.  By 
\vhose  authority  would  she  be  made  a  state  1  By  ours  \  How  can  we 
make  a  state  I  We  can  form  a  territory ;  we  can  admit  states  into  the 
Union  5  but  I  repeat  the  question,  How  can  we  make  a  state  1  I  had  sup 
posed  this  government  was  the  creature  of  the  states,  formed  by  their 
authority,  and  dependant  on  their  will  for  its  existence.  Can  the  crea 
ture  form  the  creator!  If  not  by  our  authority,  then  by  whose  1  Not  by 
her  own ;  that  would  be  absurd.  The  very  act  of  admission  makes  her  a 
member  of  the  confederacy,  with  no  other  or  greater  power  than  is  pos 
sessed  by  all  the  others  ;  all  of  whom,  united,  cannot  create  a  state.  By 
what  process,  then,  by  what  authority  can  a  territory  become  a  state,  if 
not  one  before  admitted'?  Who  can  explain  1  How  full  of  difficulties, 
compared  to  the  long-established,  simple,  and  noble  process  which  has 
prevailed  to  the  present  instant !  According  to  the  old  usage,  the  Gen- 


254  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

eral  Government  first  withdraws  its  authority  over  a  certain  portion  of  its 
territory,  as  soon  as  it  has  a  sufficient  population  to  constitute  a  state. 
They  are  thus  left  to  themselves  freely  to  form  a  constitution,  and  to  ex 
ercise  the  noble  right  of  self-government.  They  then  present  their  Con 
stitution  to  Congress,  and  ask  the  privilege  (for  one  it  is  of  the  highest 
character)  to  become  a  member  of  this  glorious  confederacy  of  states. 
The  Constitution  is  examined,  and,  if  Republican,  as  required  by  the  Fed 
eral  Constitution,  she  is  admitted,  with  no  other  condition  except  such  as 
may  be  necessary  to  secure  the  authority  of  Congress  over  the  public  do 
main  within  her  limits.  This  is  the  old,  the  established  form,  instituted 
by  our  ancestors  of  the  Revolution,  who  so  well  understood  the  great 
principles  of  liberty  and  self-government.  How  simple,  how  sublime  !• 
What  a  contrast  to  the  doctrines  of  the  present  day,  and  the  precedent 
which,  I  fear,  we  are  about  to  establish !  And  shall  we  fear,  so  long  as 
these  sound  principles  are  observed,  that  a  state  will  reject  this  high  priv 
ilege — will  refuse  to  enter  this  Union  1  No,  she  will  rush  into  the  em 
brace  of  the  Union  so  long  as  your  institutions  are  worth  preserving. 
When  the  advantages  of  the  Union  shall  have  become  a  matter  of  calcu 
lation  and  doubt ;  when  new  states  shall  pause  to  determine  whether  the 
Union  is  a  curse  or  a  blessing,  the  question  which  now  agitates  us  will 
cease  to  have  any  importance. 

Having  now,  I  trust,  established,  beyond  all  controversy,  that  Michigan 
is  a  state,  I  come  to  the  great  point  at  issue — to  the  decision  of  which  all 
that  has  been  said  is  but  preparatory — Had  the  self-created  assembly  which 
met  at  Ann  Arbour  the  authority  to  speak  in  the  name  of  the  people  of 
Michigan ;  to  assent  to  the  conditions  contained  in  the  act  of  the  last  ses 
sion  ,•  to  supersede  a  portion  of  the  Constitution  of  the  state,  and  to  over 
rule  the  dissent  of  the  convention  of  the  people,  regularly  called  by  the 
constituted  authorities  of  the  state,  to  the  condition  of  admission  1  I 
shall  not  repeat  what  I  said  when  I  first  addressed  the  Senate  on  this  bill. 
We  all,  by  this  time,  know  the  character  of  that  assemblage  ;  that  it  met 
without  the  sanction  of  the  authorities  of  the  state ;  and  that  it  did  not 
pretend  to  represent  one  third  of  the  people.  We  all  know  that  the  state 
had  regularly  convened  a  convention  of  the  people,  expressly  to  take  into 
consideration  the  condition  on  which  it  was  proposed  to  admit  her  into 
the  Union,  and  that  the  convention,  after  full  deliberation,  had  declined 
to  give  its  assent  by  a  considerable  majority.  With  a  knowledge  of  all 
these  facts,  I  put  the  question,  Had  the  assembly  a  right  to  act  for  the 
state  1  Was  it  a  convention  of  the  people  of  Michigan,  in  the  true,  legal, 
and  constitutional  sense  of  that  term  1  Is  there  one  within  the  limits  of 
my  voice  that  can  lay  his  hand  on  his  breast  and  honestly  say  it  was  1 
Is  there  one  that  does  not  feel  that  it  was  neither  more  nor  less  than  a 
mere  caucus — nothing  but  a  party  caucus — of  which  we  have  the  strongest 
evidence  in  the  perfect  unanimity  of  those  who  assembled  1  Not  a  vote 
was  given  against  admission.  Can  there  be  stronger  proof  that  it  was  a 
meeting  got  up  by  party  machinery,  for  a  party  purpose  ? 

But  I  go  farther.  It  was  not  only  a  party  caucus,  for  party  purpose, 
but  a  criminal  meeting — a  meeting  to  subvert  the  authority  of  the  state,  and 
to  assume  its  sovereignty.  I  know  not  whether  Michigan  has  yet  passed 
laws  to  guard  her  sovereignty.  It  may  be  that  she  has  not  had  time  to 
enact  laws  for  this  purpose,  which  no  community  is  long  without  j  but  I 
do  aver,  if  there  be  such  an  act,  or  if  the  common  law  be  in  force  in  the 
state,  the  actors  in  that  meeting  might  be  indicted,  tried,  and  punished 
for  the  very  act  on  which  it  is  now  proposed  to  admit  the  state  into  the  Union. 
If  such  a  meeting  as  this  were  to  undertake  to  speak  in  the  name  of  South 
Carolina,  we  would  speedily  teach  its  authors  what  they  owed  to  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  255 

authority  and  dignity  of  the  state.  The  act  was  not  only  in  contempt  of 
the  authority  of  the  State  of  Michigan,  but  a  direct  insult  on  this  govern 
ment.  Here  is  a  self-created  meeting,  convened  for  a  criminal  object, 
which  has  dared  to  present  to  this  government  an  act  of  theirs,  and  to 
expect  that  we  are  to  receive  this  irregular  and  criminal  act  as  a  ful 
filment  of  the  condition  which  we  had  prescribed  for  the  admission  of  the 
state !  Yet  I  fear,  forgetting  our  own  dignity,  and  the  rights  of  Michi 
gan,  that  we  are  about  to  recognise  the  validity  of  the  act,  and  quietly  to 
submit  to  the  insult. 

The  year  1836  (said  Mr.  C.)  is  destined  to  mark  the  most  remarkable, 
change  in  our  political  institutions  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution. 
The  events  of  the  year  have  made  a  deeper  innovation  on  the  principles 
of  the  Constitution,  and  evinced  a  stronger  tendency  to  revolution,  than 
any  which  have  occurred  from  its  adoption  to  the  present  day.  Sir  (said 
Mr.  C.,  addressing  the  Vice-president),  duty  compels  me  to  speak  of  facts 
intimately  connected  with  yourself.  In  deference  to  your  feelings  as 
presiding  officer  of  the  body,  I  shall  speak  of  them  with  all  possible  re 
serve,  much  more  reserve  than  I  should  otherwise  have  done  if  you  did 
not  occupy  that  seat.  Among  the  first  of  these  events  which  I  shall  no 
tice,  is  the  caucus  of  Baltimore  ;  that,  too,  like  the  Ann  Arbour  caucus, 
has  been  dignified  with  the  name  of  the  convention  of  the  people.  This 
caucus  was  got  up  under  the  countenance  and  express  authority  of  the 
President  himself;  and  its  edict,  appointing  you  his  successor,  has  been 
sustained,  not  only  by  the  whole  patronage  and  power  of  the  government, 
but  by  his  active  personal  influence  and  exertion.  Through  its  instru 
mentality  he  has  succeeded  in  controlling  the  voice  of  the- people,  and, 
for  the  first  time,  the  President  has  appointed  his  successor  ;  and  thus 
the  first  great  step  of  converting  our  government  into  a  monarchy  has 
been  achieved.  These  are  solemn  and  ominous  facts.  No  one  who  has 
examined  the  result  of  the  last  election  can  doubt  their  truth.  It  is  now 
certain  that  you  are  not  the  free  and  unbiased  choice  of  the  people  of 
these  United  States.  If  left  to  your  own  popularity,  without  the  active 
and  direct  influence  of  the  President,  and  the  power  and  patronage  of  the 
government,  acting  through  a  mock  convention  of  the  people,  instead  of 
the  highest,  you  would,  in  all  probability,  have  been  the  lowest  of  the 
candidates. 

During  the  same  year,  the  state  in  which  this  ill-omened  caucus  con 
vened,  has  been  agitated  by  revolutionary  movements  of  the  most  alarm 
ing  character.  Assuming  the  dangerous  doctrines  that  they  were  not 
bound  to  obey  the  injunctions  of  the  Constitution,  because  it  did  not  place 
the  powers  of  the  state  in  the  hands  of  an  unchecked  numerical  major 
ity,  the  electors  belonging  to  the  party  of  the  Baltimore  caucus,  who  hao; 
been  chosen  to  appoint  the  state  senators,  refused  to  perform  the  func 
tions  for  which  they  had  been  elected,  with  the  deliberate  intention  to 
subvert  the  government  of  the  state,  and  reduce  her  to  the  territory  con 
dition,  till  a  new  government  could  be  formed.  And  now  we  have  before 
us  a  measure  not  less  revolutionary,  but  of  an  opposite  character.  In 
the  case  of  Maryland,  those  who  undertook,  without  the  authority  of 
law  or  Constitution,  to  speak  and  act  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  the 
state,  proposed  to  place  her  out  of  the  Union  by  reducing  her  from  a 
state  to  a  territory ;  but  in  this,  those  who,  in  like  manner,  undertook  to 
act  for  Michigan,  have  assumed  the  authority  to  bring  her  into  the  Union 
without  her  consent,  on  the  very  condition  which  she  had  rejected  by  a 
convention  of  the  people,  convened  under  the  authority  of  the  state.  If 
we  shall  sanction  the  authority  of  the  Michigan  caucus  to  force  a  state 
into  the  Union  without  its  assent,  why  might  we  not  here  sanction  a 


256  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

similar  caucus  in  Maryland,  if  one  had  been  called,  to  place  the  state  out 
of  the  Union  1 

These  occurrences,  which  have  distinguished  the  past  year,  mark  the 
commencement  of  no  ordinary  change  in  our  political  system.  They  an 
nounce  the.  ascendency  of  the  caucus  system  over  the  regularly  constituted  au 
thorities  of  the  country.  I  have  long  anticipated  this  event.  In  early  life 
my  attention  was  attracted  to  the  working  of  the  caucus  system.  It  was 
my  fortune  to  spend  five  or  six  years  of  my  youth  in  the  northern  por 
tion  of  the  Union,  where,  unfortunately,  the  system  has  so  long  prevailed. 
Though  young,  I  was  old  enough  to  take  interest  in  public  affairs,  and  to 
notice  the  working  of  this  odious  party  machine  ;  and  after-reflection, 
with  the  experience  then  acquired,  has  long  satisfied  me  that,  in  the 
course  of  time,  the  edicts  of  the  caucus  would  eventually  supersede  the 
authority  of  law  and  Constitution.  We  have  at  last  arrived  at  the  com 
mencement  of  this  great  change,  which  is  destined  to  go  on  till  it  has 
consummated  itself  in  the  entire  overthrow  of  all  legal  and  constitutional 
authority,  unless  speedily  and  effectually  resisted.  The  reason  is  obvi 
ous  :  for  obedience  and  disobedience  to  the  edicts  of  the  caucus,  where 
the  system  is  firmly  established,  are  more  certainly  and  effectually  re 
warded  and  punished  than  to  the  laws  and  Constitution.  Disobedience 
to  the  former  is  sure  to  be  followed  by  complete  political  disfranchise- 
ment.  It  deprives  the  unfortunate  individual  who  falls  under  its  ven 
geance  of  all  public  honours  and  emoluments,  and  consigns  him,  if  depend 
ant  on  the  government,  to  poverty  and  obscurity ;  while  he  who  bows 
down  before  its  mandates,  it  matters  not  how  monstrous,  secures  to  him 
self  the  honours  of  the  state,  becomes  rich,  and  distinguished,  and  power 
ful.  Offices,  jobs,  and  contracts  flow  on  him  and  his  connexions.  -  But 
to  obey  the  law  and  respect  the  Constitution,  for  the  most  part,  brings 
little  except  the  approbation  of  conscience — a  reward,  indeed,  high  and 
noble,  and  prized  by  the  virtuous  above  all  others,  but,  unfortunately,  little 
valued  by  the  mass  of  mankind.  It  is  easy  to  see  what  must  be  the 
end,  unless,  indeed,  an  effective  remedy  be  applied.  Are  we  so  blind  as 
not  to  see  this — why  it  is  that  the  advocates  of  this  bill,  the  friends  of  the 
system,  are  so  tenacious  on  the  point  that  Michigan  should  be  admitted 
on  the  authority  of  the  Ann  Arbour  caucus,  and  on  no  other  1  Do  we 
not  see  why  the  amendment  proposed  by  myself,  to  admit  her  by  rescind 
ing  the  condition  imposed  at  the  last  session,  should  be  so  strenuously 
opposed  ?  Why  even  the  preamble  would  not  be  surrendered,  though 
many  of  our  friends  were  willing  to  vote  for  the  bill  on  that  slight  con 
cession,  in  their  anxiety  to  admit  the  state  1 

And  here  let  me  say  that  I  listened  with  attention  to  the  speech  of  the 
senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Crittenden).  I  know  the  clearness  of  his 
understanding  and  the  soundness  of  his  heart,  and  I  am  persuaded,  in 
declaring  that- his  objection  to  the  bill  was  confined  to  the  preamble,  that 
he  has  not  investigated  the  subject  with  the  attention  it  deserves.  I  feel 
the  objections  to  the  preamble  are  not  without  some  weight ;  but  the 
true  and  insuperable  objections  lie  far  deeper  in  the  facts  of  the  case, 
which  would  still  exist  were  the  preamble  expunged.  It  is  these  which 
render  it  impossible  to  pass  this  bill  without  trampling  under  foot  the 
rights  of  the  states,  and  subverting  the  first  principles  of  our  government. 
It  would  require  but  a  few  steps  more  to  effect  a  complete  revolution, 
and  the  senator  from  North  Carolina  has  taken  the  first,  I  will  explain. 
If  you  wish  to  mark  the  first  indications  of  a  revolution,  the  commence 
ment  of  those  profound  changes  in  the  character  of  a  people  which  are 
working  beneath,  before  a  ripple  appears  on  the  surface,  look  to  the 
change  of  language:  you  will  first  notice  it  in  the 'altered  meaning  of  im- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  257 

portant  words,  and  which,  as  it  indicates  a  change  in  the  feelings  and 
principles  of  the  people,  become,  in  turn,  a  powerful  instrument  in  accel 
erating  the  change,  till  an  entire  revolution  is  effected.     The  remarks  *of 
the  senator  will  illustrate  what  I  have  said.     He  told  us  that  the  terms 
"  convention  of  the  people"  were  of  very  uncertain  meaning  and  difficult 
to  be  defined  ;  but  that  their  true  meaning  was,  any  meeting  of  the  people,  in 
their  individual  and  primary  character,  for  political  purposes.     I  know  it 
is  difficult  to  define  complex  terms,  that  is,  to  enumerate  all  the  ideas 
that  belong  to  them,  and  exclude  all  that  do  not  j  but  there  is  always,  in 
the  most  complex,  some  prominent  idea  which  marks  the  meaning  of  the 
term,  and  in  relation  to  which  there  is  usually  no  disagreement.     Thus,  ac 
cording  to  the  old  meaning  (and  which  I  had  still  supposed  was  its  legal  and 
constitutional  meaning),  a  convention  of  the  people  invariably  implied  a 
meeting  of  the  people,  either  by  themselves,  or  by  delegates  expressly 
chosen  for  the  purpose,  in  their  high  sovereign  authority,  in  expressed  con 
tradistinction  to  such  assemblies  of  individuals  in  their  private  character, 
or  having  only  derivative  authority.     It  is,  in  a  word,  a  meeting  of  the 
people  in  the  majesty  of  their  power — in  that  in  which  they  may  right 
fully  make  or  abolish  constitutions,  and  put  up  or  put  down  governments 
at  their  pleasure.    Such  was  the  august  conception  which  formerly  entered 
the  mind  of  every  American  when  the  terms  "convention  of  the  people" 
were  used.     But  now,  according  to  the  ideas  of  the  dominant  party,  as 
we  are  told  on  the  authority  of  the  senator  from  North  Carolina,  it  means 
any  meeting  of  individuals  for  political  purposes,  and,  of  course,  applies 
to  the  meeting  at  Ann  Arbour,  or  any  other  party  caucus  for  party  pur 
poses,  which  the  leaders  choose  to  designate  as  a  convention  of  the  peo 
ple.     It  is  thus  the  highest  authority  known  to  our  laws  and  Constitution 
is  gradually  sinking  to  the  level  of  those  meetings  which  regulate  the 
operation  of  political  parties,  and  through  which  the  edicts  of  their  lead 
ers  are  announced  and  their  authority  enforced  j    or,  rather,  to  speak 
more   correctly,  the  latter  are  gradually  rising  to  the  authority  of  the 
former.     When  they  come  to  be  completely  confounded ;  when  the  dis 
tinction  between  a  caucus  and  the  convention  of  the  people  shall  be  com 
pletely  obliterated,  which  the  definition  of  the  senator,  and  the  acts  of 
this  body  on  this  bill,  would  lead  us  to  believe  is  not  far  distant,  this  fair 
political  fabric  of  ours,  erected  by  the  wisdom  and  patriotism  of  our  an 
cestors,  and  once  the  gaze  and  admiration  of  the  world,  will  topple  to  the 
ground  in  ruins. 

It  has,  perhaps,  been  too  much  my  habit  to  look  more  to  the  future  and 
less  to  the  present  than  is  wise  ;  but  such  is  the  constitution  of  my  mind, 
that,  when  I  see  before  me  the  indications  of  causes  calculated  to  effect 
important  changes  in  our  political  condition,  I  am  led  irresistibly  to  trace 
them  to  their  sources,  and  follow  them  out  in  their  consequences.  Lan 
guage  has  been  held  in  this  discussion  which  is  clearly  revolutionary  in 
its  character  and  tendency,  and  which  warns  us  of  the  approach  of  the 
period  when  the  struggle  will  be  between  the  conservatives  and  the  destruc 
tives.  I  understood  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan)  as 
holding  language  countenancing  the  principle  that  the  will  of  a  mere  nu 
merical  majority  is  paramount  to  the  authority  of  law  and  Constitution. 
He  did  not,  indeed,  announce  distinctly  this  principle,  but  it  might  fairly 
be  inferred  from  what  he  said  ;  for  he  told  us,  the  latter,  where  the  Con 
stitution  gives  the  same  weight  to  a  smaller  as  to  a  greater  number,  might 
take  the  remedy  into  their  own  hand  ;  meaning,  as  I  understood  him,  that 
a  mere  majority  might,  at  their  pleasure,  subvert  the  Constitution  and 
government  of  a  state,  which  he  seemed  to  think  was  the  essence  of  De 
mocracy.  Our  little  state  has  a  Constitution  that  could  not  stand  a  day 

KK 


258  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

against  such  doctrines,  and  yet  we  glory  in  it  as  the  best  in  the  Union. 
It  is  a  Constitution  which  respects  all  the  great  interests  of  the  state, 
giving  to  each  a  separate  and  distinct  voice  in  the  management  of  its  po-  • 
litical  affairs,  by  means  of  which  the  feebler  interests  are  protected  against 
the  preponderance  of  the  greater.  We  call  our  state  a  republic,  a  com 
monwealth,  not  a  democracy  j  and  let  me  tell  the  senator  it  is  a  far  more 
popular  government  than  if  it  had  been  based  on  the  simple  principle  of 
the  numerical  majority.  It  takes  more  voices  to  put  the  machine  of  gov 
ernment  in  motion  than  those  that  the  senator  would  consider  more  pop 
ular.  It  represents  all  the  interests  of  the  state,  and  is,  in  fact,  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  people,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term,  and  not  of  the  mere 
majority,  or  the  dominant  interests. 

I  am  not  familiar  with  the  Constitution  of  Maryland,  to  which  the  sen 
ator  alluded,  and  cannot,  therefore,  speak  of  its  structure  with  confidence  j 
but  I  believe  it  to  be  somewhat  similar  in  its  character  to  our  own.  That 
it  is  a  government  not  without  its  excellence,  we  need  no  better  proof 
than  the  fact  that,  though  within  the  shadow  of  executive  influence,  it  has 
nobly  and  successfully  resisted  all  the  seductions  by  which  a  corrupt  and 
artful  administration,  with  almost  boundless  patronage,  has  tempted  to 
seduce  her  into  its  ranks. 

Looking,  then,  to  the  approaching  struggle,  I  take  my  stand  immova 
bly.  /  am  a  conservative  in  its  broadest  and  fullest  sense,  and  such  /  shall 
ever  remain,  unless,  indeed,  the  government  shall  become  so  corrupt  and  disor 
dered  that  nothing  short  of  revolution  can  reform  it.  I  solemnly  believe  that 
our  political  system  is,  in  its  purity,  not  only  the  best  that  ever  was 
formed,  but  the  best  possible  that  can  be  devised  for  us.  It  is  the  only 
one  by  which  free  states,  so  populous  and  wealthy,  and  occupying  so  vast 
an  extent  of  territory,  can  preserve  their  liberty.  Thus  thinking,  I  can 
not  hope  for  a  better.  Having  no  hope  of  a  better,  I  am  a  conservative  ; 
and,  because  I  am  a  conservative,  I  am  a  state  rights  man.  I  believe  that  in 
the  rights  of  the  states  are  to  be  found  the  only  effectual  means  of  check 
ing  the  overaction  of  this  government ;  to  resist  its  tendency  to  concen 
trate  all  power  here,  and  to  prevent  a  departure  from  the  Constitution ; 
or,  in  case  of  one,  to  restore  the  government  to  its  original  simplicity  and 
purity.  State  interposition,  or,  to  express  it  more  fully,  the  right  of  a 
state  to  interpose  her  sovereign  voice,  as  one  of  the  parties  to  our  consti 
tutional  compact,  against  the  encroachments  of  this  government,  is  the 
only  means  of  sufficient  potency  to  effect  all  this ;  and  I  am,  therefore, 
its  advocate.  I  rejoiced  to  hear  the  senators  from  North  Carolina  (Mr. 
Brown)  and  Pennsylvania  (Mr,  Buchanan)  do  us  the  justice  to  distin 
guish  between  nullification  and  the  anarchical  and  revolutionary  move 
ments  in  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  I  know  they  did  not  intend 
it  as  a  compliment,  but  I  regard  it  as  the  highest.  They  are  right.  Day 
and  night  are  not  more  different — more  unlike  in  everything.  They  are 
unlike  in  their  principles,  their  objects,  and  their  consequences. 

I  shall  not  stop  to  make  good  this  assertion,  as  I  might  easily  do.  The 
occasion  does  not  call  for  it.  As  a  conservative  and  a  state  rights  man? 
or,  if  you  will  have  it,  a  nullifier,  I  have  and  shall  resist  all  encroachments 
on  the  Constitution,  whether  it  be  the  encroachment  of  this  government 
on  the  states,  or  the  opposite — the  executive  on  Congress,  or  Congress 
on  the  executive.  My  creed  is  to  hold  both  governments,  and  all  the 
departments  of  each,  to  their  proper  sphere,  and  to  maintain  the  author 
ity  of  the  laws  and  the  Constitution  against  all  revolutionary  movements. 
I  believe  the  means  which  our  system  furnishes  to  preserve  itself  are  am 
ple,  if  fairly  understood  and  applied  ;  and  I  shall  resort  to  them,  however 
corrupt  and  disordered  the  times,  so  long  as  there  is  hope  of  reforming 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  259 

the  government.  The  result  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Disposer  of  events. 
It  is  my  part  to  do  my  duty.  Yet,  while  I  thus  openly  avow  myself -a 
conservative,  God  forbid  I  should  ever  deny  the  glorious  right  of  rebel 
lion  and  revolution.  Should  corruption  and  oppression  become  intoler 
able,  and  cannot  otherwise  be  thrown  off — if  liberty  must  perish,  or  the 
government  be  overthrown,  I  would  not  hesitate,  at  the  hazard  of  life, 
to  resort  to  revolution,  and  to  tear  down  a  corrupt  government,  that 
could  neither  be  reformed  nor  borne  by  freemen ;  but  I  trust  in  God 
things  will  never  come  to  that  pass.  I  trust  never  to  see  such  fearful 
times  j  for  fearful,  indeed,  they  would  be,  if  they  should  ever  befall  us.  It 
is  the  last  remedy,  and  not  to  be  thought  of  till  common  sense  and  the 
voice  of  mankind  would  justify  the  resort. 

Before  I  resume  my.  seat,  I  feel  called  on  to  make  a  few  brief  remarks 
on  a  doctrine  of  fearful  import,  which  has  been  broached  in  the  course 
of  this  debate — the  right  to  repeal  laws  granting  bank  charters,  and,  of 
course,  of  railroads,  turnpikes,  and  joint-stock  companies.  It  is  a  doc 
trine  of  fearful  import,  and  calculated  to  do  infinite  mischief.  There  are 
countless  millions  vested  in  such  stocks,  and  it  is  a  description  of  property 
of  the  most  delicate  character.  To  touch  it  is  almost  to  destroy  it.  But, 
while  I  enter  my  protest  against  all  such  doctrines,  I  have  been  greatly 
alarmed  with  the  thoughtless  precipitancy  (not  to  use  a  stronger  phrase) 
with  which  the  most  extensive  and  dangerous  privileges  have  been  grant 
ed  of  late.  It  can  end  in  no  good,  and,  I  fear,  may  be  the  cause  of  con 
vulsions  hereafter.  We  already  feel  the  effects  on  the  currency,  which 
no  one  competent  of  judging  but  must  see  is  in  an  unsound  condition.  I 
must  say  (for  truth  compels  me)  I  have  ever  distrusted  the  banking  sys 
tem,  at  least  in  its  present  form,  both  in  this  country  and  Great  Britain. 
It  will  not  stand  the  test  of  time ;  but  I  trust  that  all  shocks  or  sudden 
revolutions  may  be  avoided,  and  that  it  may  gradually  give  way  before 
some  sounder  and  better-regulated  system  of  credit,  which  the  growing 
intelligence  of  the  age  may  devise.  That  a  better  may  be  substituted  I 
cannot  doubt ;  but  of  what  it  shall  consist,  and  how  it  shall  finally  super 
sede  the  present  uncertain  and  fluctuating  currency,  time  alone  can  de 
termine.  All  I  can  see  is,  that  the  present  must,  one  day  or  another, 
come  to  an  end,  or  be  greatly  modified,  if  that,  indeed,  can  save  it  .from 
an  entire  overthrow.  It  has  within  itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  destruction. 


XVIII 

SPEECH   ON   THE   BILL   AUTHORIZING   AN   ISSUE   OF   TREASURY   NOTES, 
SEPTEMBER.    19,    1837. 

MR.  PRESIDENT  :  An  extraordinary  course  of  events,  with  which  all  are  too 
familiar  to  need  recital,  has  separated,  in  fact,  the  government  and  the  banks. 
What  relation  shall  they  bear  hereafter  ?  Shall  the  banks  again  be  used  as 
fiscal  agents  of  the  government  ?  Be  the  depositories  of  the  public  money  ? 
And,  above  all,  shall  their  notes  be  considered  and  treated  as  money  in  the  re 
ceipts  and  expenditures  of  the  government  ?  This  is  the  great  and  leading 
question  ;  one  of  the  first  magnitude,  and  full  of  consequences.  I  have  given 
it  my  most  anxious  and  deliberate  attention,  and  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  we. have  reached  the  period  when  the  interests  both  of  the  government 
and  the  banks  forbid  a  reunion.  I  now  propose  to  offer  my  reasons  for  this 
conclusion.  I  shall  do  it  with  that  perfect  frankness  due  to  the  subject,  to  the 
country,  and  the  position  I  occupy.  All  I  ask  is,  that  I  may  be  heard  with  a 


260  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

candour  and  fairness  corresponding  to  the  sincerity  with  which  I  shall  deliver 
my  sentiments. 

Those  who  support  a  reunion  of  the  banks  and  the  government  have  to 
overcome  a  preliminary  difficulty.  They  are  now  separated  by  operation  of 
law,  and  cannot  be  united  while  the  present  state  of  things  continues,  without 
repealing  the  law  which  has  disjoined  them.  I  ask,  Who  is  willing  to  propose 
its  repeal  ?  Is  there  any  one  who,  during  the  suspension  of  specie  payments, 
would  advocate  their  employment  as  the  fiscal  agents  of  the  government,  who 
would  make  them  the  depositories  of  the  public  revenue,  or  who  would  receive 
and  pay  away  their  notes  in  the  public  dues  ?  If  there  be  none,  then  it  results 
that  the  separation  must  continue  for  the  present,  and  that  the  reunion  must  be 
the  work  of  time,  and  depending  on  the  contingency  of  the  resumption  of  specie 
payments. 

But  suppose  this  difficulty  to  be  removed,  and  that  the  banks  were  regularly 
redeeming  their  notes,  from  what  party  in  this  body  can  the  proposition  come, 
or  by  which  can  it  be  supported,  lor  a  reunion  between  them  and  the  govern 
ment  ?  Who,  after  what  has  happened,  can  advocate  the  reunion  of  the  govern 
ment  with  the  league  of  state  banks  ?  Can  the  opposition,  who  for  years  have 
been  denouncing  it  as  the  most  dangerous  instrument  of  power,  and  efficient 
means  of  corrupting  and  controlling  the  government  and  country  ?  Can  they, 
after  the  exact  fulfilment  of  all  their  predictions  of  disastrous  consequences 
from  the  connexion,  now  turn  round  and  support  that  which  they  have  so 
long  and  loudly  condemned  ?  We  have  heard  much  from  the  opposite  side  of 
untried  experiments  on  the  currency.  I  concur  in  the  justice  of  the  censure. 
Nothing  can  be  more  delicate  than  the  currency.  Nothing  can  require  to  be 
more  delicately  handled.  It  ought  never  to  be  tampered  with,  nor  touched,  un 
til  it  becomes  absolutely  necessary.  But,  if  untried  experiments  justly  deserve 
censure,  what  condemnation  would  a  repetition  of  an  experiment  that  has  failed 
deserve  ?  An  experiment  that  has  so  signally  failed,  both  in  the  opinion  of  sup 
porters  and  opponents,  as  to  call  down  the  bitter  denunciation  of  those  who 
tried  it.  If  to  make  the  experiment  was  folly,  the  repetition  would  be  madness. 
But  if  the  opposition  cannot  support  the  measure,  how  can  it  be  expected  to 
receive  support  from  the  friends  of  the  administration,  in  whose  hands  the  ex 
periment  has  so  signally  failed  as  to  call  down  from  them  execrations  deep  and 
loud  ? 

If,  Mr.  President,  there  be  any  one  point  fully  established  by  experience 
and  reason,  I  hold  it  to  be  the  utter  incompetency  of  the  state  banks  to  furnish, 
of  themselves,  a  sound  and  stable  currency.  They  may  succeed  in  prosperous 
times,  but  the  first  adverse  current  necessarily  throws  them  into  utter  confusion. 
Nor  has  any  device  been  found  to  give  them  the  requisite  strength  and  stability 
but  a  great  central  and  controlling  bank,  instituted  under  the  authority  of  this 
government.  I  go  farther  :  if  we  must  continue  our  connexion  with  the  banks 
— if  we  must  receive  and  pay  away  their  notes  as  money,  we  not  only  have 
the  right  to  regulate,  and  give  uniformity  and  stability  to  them,  but  we  are  bound 
to  do  so,  and  to  use  the  most  efficient  means  for  that  purpose.  The  Constitu 
tion  makes  it  our  duty  to  lay  and  collect  the  taxes  and  duties  uniformly  through 
out  the  Union  ;  to  fulfil  which,  we  are  bound  to  give  the  highest  possible  equality 
of  value  throughout  every  part  of  the  country,  to  whatever  medium  it  may  be 
collected  in  ;  and  if  that  be  bank-notes,  to  adopt  the  most  effective  means  of  ac 
complishing  it,  which  experience  has  shown  to  be  a  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
This  has  been  long  my  opinion.  I  entertained  it  in  1816,  and  repeated  it,  in 
my  place  here  on  the  deposite  question,  in  1834.  The  only  alternative,  then, 
is,  disguise  it  as  you  may,  between  a  disconnexion  and  a  Bank  of  the  United 
States.  This  is  the  real  issue  to  which  all  must  come,  and  ought  now  to  be 
openly  and  fairly  met. 

But  there  are  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  National  Bank,  no  less  formidable 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  261 

than  a  reconnexion  with  the  state  banks.  It  is  utterly  impracticable,  at  pres 
ent,  to  establish  one.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  a  majority  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States  are  deliberately  and  unalterably  opposed  to  it.  At 
all  events,  there  is  a  numerous,  respectable,  and  powerful  party — I  refer  to  the 
old  State  Eights  party — who  are,  and  ever  have  been,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  government,  opposed  to  the  Bank,  and  whose  opinions,  thus  long  and  firmly 
entertained,  ought,  at  least,  to  be  so  much  respected  as  to  forbid  the  creation 
of  one  without  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution.  To  this  must  be  added  the 
insuperable  difficulty,  that  the  executive  branch  of  the  government  is  openly 
opposed  to  it,  and  pledged  to  interpose  his  veto,  on  constitutional  grounds,  should 
a  bill  pass  to  incorporate  one.  For  four  years,  at  least,  then,  it  will  be  imprac 
ticable  to  charter  a  bank.  What  must  be  done  in  the  mean  time  ?  Shall  the 
treasury  be  organized  to  perform  the  functions  which  have  been  recently  dis 
charged  by  the  banks,  or  shall  the  state  institutions  be  again  employed  until  a 
bank  can  be  created  ?  In  the  one  case,  we  shall  have  the  so  much  vilified  and 
denounced  sub-treasury,  as  it  is  called ;  and  in  the  other,  difficulties  insur 
mountable  would  grow  up  against  the  establishment  of  a  bank.  Let  the  state 
institutions  be  once  reinstated  and  reunited  to  the  government  as  their  fiscal 
agents,  and  they  will  be  found  the  first  and  most  strenuous  opponents  of  a  Na 
tional  Bank,  by  which  they  would  be  overshadowed  and  curtailed  in  their 
profits.  I  hold  it  certain,  that  in  prosperous  times,  when  the  state  banks  are  in 
full  operation,  it  is  impossible  to  establish  a  National  Bank.  Its  creation,  then, 
should  the  reunion  with  the  state  banks  take  place,  will  be  postponed  until 
some  disaster  similar  to  the  present  shall  again  befall  the  country.  But  it  re 
quires  little  of  the  spirit  of  prophecy  to  see  that  such  another  disaster  would  be 
the  death  of  the  whole  system.  Already  it  has  had  two  paralytic  strokes — the 
third  would  prove  fatal. 

But  suppose  these  difficulties  were  overcome,  I  should  still  be  opposed  to  the 
incorporation  of  a  bank.  So  far  from  affording  the  relief  which  many  an 
ticipate,  it  would  be  the  most  disastrous  measure  that  could  be  adopted.  As 
great  as  is  the  calamity  under  which  the  country  is  suffering,  it  is  nothing  to 
what  would  follow  the  creation  of  such  an  institution  under  existing  circum 
stances.  In  order  to  compel  the  state  institutions  to  pay  specie,  the  Bank  must 
have  a  capital  as  great,  or  nearly  as  great,  in  proportion  to  the  existing  institu 
tions,  as  the  late  Bank  had,  whe.n  established,  to  those  of  that  day.  This  would 
give  it  an  immense  capital,  not  much  less  than  one  hundred  millions  of  dollars, 
of  which  a  large  proportion,  say  twenty  millions,  must  be  specie.  From  what 
source  is  it  to  be  derived  ?  From  the  state  banks  ?  It  would  empty  their 
vaults,  and  leave  them  in  the  most  helpless  condition.  From  abroad,  and  Eng 
land  in  particular  ?  it  would  reproduce  that  revulsive  current  which  has  lately 
covered  the  country  with  desolation.  The  tide  is  still  running  to  Europe,  and 
if  forced  back  by  any  artificial  cause  before  the  foreign  debt  is  paid,  cannot 
but  be  followed  by  the  most  disastrous  consequences. 

But  suppose  this  difficulty  overcome,  and  the  Bank  re-established,  I  ask, 
What  would  be  the  effects  under  such  circumstances  ?  Where  would  it  find 
room  for  business,  commensurate  with  its  extended  capital,  without  crushing 
the  state  institutions,  enfeebled  by  the  withdrawal  of  their  means,  in  order  to 
create  the  instrument  of  their  oppression  ?  A  few  of  the  more  vigorous  might 
survive,  but  the  far  greater  portion,  with  their  debtors,  creditors,  and  stock 
holders,  would  be  involved  in  common  ruin.  The  Bank  would,  indeed,  give  a 
specie  currency,  not  by  enabling  the  existing  institutions  to  resume,  but  by  de 
stroying  them  and  taking  their  place. 

Those  who  take  a  different  view,  and  so  fondly  anticipate  relief  from  a  Na 
tional  Bank,  are  deceived  by  a  supposed  analogy  between  the  present  situation 
of  the  country  and  that  of  1816,  when  the  late  Bank  was  chartered,  after  the 
war  with  Great  Britain.  I  was  an  actor  in  that  scene,  and  may  be  permitted 


262  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

to  speak  in  relation  to  it  with  some  little  authority.  Between  the  two  periods 
there  is  little  or  no  analogy.  They  stand  almost  in  contrast.  In  1816,  the 
government  was  a  debtor  to  the  banks  ;  now  it  is  a  creditor  :  a  difference  of  the 
greatest  importance,  as  far  as  the  present  question  is  concerned.  The  banks 
had  over-issued,  it  is  true,  but  their  over-issues  were  to  the  government,  a  sol 
vent  and  able  debtor,  whose  credit,  held  by  the  banks  in  the  shape  of  stock,  was 
at  par.  It  was  their  excessive  issues  to  the  government  on  its  stock  which 
mainly  caused  the  suspension  ;  in  proof  of  which,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that 
the  depreciation  of  bank  paper,  compared  with  gold  and  silver,  was  about  equal  to 
the  proportion  which  the  government  stock  held  by  the  banks  bore  to  their  is 
sues.  It  was  this  excess  that  hung  on  the  market  and  depressed  the  value  of 
their  notes.  The  solution  is  easy.  The  banks  took  the  government  stock  pay 
able  in  twelve  years,  arid  issued  their  notes  for  the  same,  payable  on  demand, 
in  violation  of  the  plainest  principles  of  banking.  It  followed,  of  course,  that 
when  their  notes  were  presented  for  payment,  they  had  nothing  but  government 
stock  to  meet  them.  But  its  stock  was  at  par,  and  all  the  banks  had  to  do  was 
to  go  into  market  with  the  stock  they  held  and  take  up  their  notes  ;  and  thus 
the  excess  which  hung  upon  the  market  and  depressed  their  value  would  have 
been  withdrawn  from  circulation,  and  the  residue  would  have  risen  to  par,  or 
nearly  par,  with  gold  and  silver,  when  specie  payments  might  be'easily  resumed. 
This  they  were  unwilling  to  do.  They  were  profiting  every  way  :  by  drawing 
interest  on  the  stock,  by  discounting  on  it  as  capital,  and  by  its  continued  rise 
in  the  market.  It  became  necessary  to  compel  them  to  surrender  these  advan 
tages.  Two  methods  presented  themselves  :  one  a  bankrupt  law,  and  the  oth 
er  a  National  Bank.  I  was  opposed  to  the  former  then,  as  I  am  now.  I  re 
garded  it  as  a  harsh,  unconstitutional  measure,  opposed  to  the  rights  of  the 
states.  If  they  have  not  surrendered  the  rights  to  incorporate  banks,  its  exer 
cise  cannot  be  controlled  by  the  action  of  this  government,  which  has  no  power 
but  what  is  expressly  granted,  and  no  authority  to  control  the  states  in  the  ex 
ercise  of  their  reserved  powers.  It  remained  to  resort  to  a  National  Bank 
as  the  means  of  compulsion.  It  proved  effectual.  Specie  payments  were  re 
stored  ;  but  even  with  this  striking  advantage,  it  was  followed  by  great  pressure  in 
1818,  1819,  and  1820,  as  all  who  are  old  enough  to  remember  that  period  must 
recollect.  Such,  in  fact,  must  ever  be  the  consequence  of  resumption,  when 
forced,  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances  ;  and  such,  accordingly,  it  pro 
ved  even  in  England,  with  all  her  resources,  and  with  all  the  caution  she  used 
in  restoring  a  specie  circulation,  after  the  long  suspension  of  1797.  What,  then, 
would  be  its  effects  in  the  present  condition  of  the  country,  when  the  govern 
ment  is  a  creditor  instead  of  a  debtor  ;  where  there  are  so  many  newly-created 
banks  without  established  credit ;  when  the  over-issues  are  so  great ;  and  when 
so  large  a  portion  of  the  debtors  are  not  in  a  condition  to  be  coerced  ?  As  great 
as  is  the  tide  of  disaster  which  is  passing  over  the  land,  it  would  be  as  nothing 
to  what  would  follow,  were  a  National  Bank  to  be  established  as  the  means  of 
coercing  specie  payments. 

I  am  bound  to  speak  without  reserve  on  this  important  point.  My  opinion, 
then,  is,  that  if  it  should  be  determined  to  compel  the  restoration  of  specie  pay 
ments  by  the  agency  of  banks,  there  is  but  one  way — but  to  that  I  have  insu 
perable  objections — I  mean  the  adoption  of  the  Pennsylvania  Bank  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  as  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government.  It  is  already  in  operation, 
and  sustained  by  great  resources  and  powerful  connexions,  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  Through  its  agency  specie  payments  might  undoubtedly  be  restored, 
and  that  with  far  less  disaster  than  through  a  newly-created  bank,  but  not  with 
out  severe  pressure.  I  cannot,  however,  vote  for  such  a  measure  ;  I  cannot  agree 
to  give  a  preference  and  such  advantages  to  a  bank  of  one  of  the  members  of 
this  confederacy,  over  that  of  others — a  bank  dependant  upon  the  will  of  a  state, 
and  subject  to  its  influence  and  control.  I  cannot  consent  to  confer  such  favours 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  263 

on  the  stockholders,  many  of  whom,  if  rumour  is  to  be  trusted,  are  foreign  cap 
italists,  and  without  claim  on  the  bounty  of  the  government.  But  if  all  these, 
and  many  other  objection-s,  were  overcome,  there  is  still  one  which  I  cannot  sur 
mount. 

There  has  been,  as  we  all  know,  a  conflict  between  one  of  the  departments 
of  the  government  and  that  institution,  in  which,  in  my  opinion,  the  department 
was  the  assailant ;  but  I  cannot  consent,  after  what  has  occurred,  to  give  to  the 
Bank  a  triumph  over  the  government,  for  such  its  adoption  as  the  fiscal  agent 
of  the  government  would  necessarily  be  considered.  It  would  degrade  the 
government  in  the  eyes  of  our  citizens  and  of  the  world,  and  go  far  to  make  that 
Bank  the  government  itself. 

But  if  all  these  difficulties  were  overcome,  there  are  others,  to  me,  wholly 
insurmountable.  I  belong  to  the  State  Rights  party,  which  at  all  times,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  government  to  this  day,  has  been  opposed  to  such  an  insti 
tution,  as  unconstitutional,  inexpedient,  and  dangerous.  They  have  ever  dread 
ed  the  union  of  the  political  and  moneyed  power,  and  the  central  action  of  the 
government  to  which  it  so  strongly  tends,  and  at  all  times  have  strenuously 
resisted  their  junction.  Time  and  experience  have  confirmed  the  truth  of  their 
principles  ;  and  this,  above  all  other  periods,  is  the  one  at  which  it  would  be 
most  dangerous  to  depart  from  them.  Acting  on  them,  I  have  never  given  my 
countenance  or  support  to  a  National  Bank  but  under  a  compulsion  which  I  felt 
to  be  imperious,  and  never  without  an  open  declaration  of  my  opinion  as  unfa 
vourable  to  a  bank. 

In  supporting  the  Bank  of  1816, 1  openly  declared  that,  as  a  question  de  novo, 
I  should  be  decidedly  against  the  Bank,  and  would  be  the  last  to  give  it  my  sup 
port.  I  also  stated  that,  in  supporting  the  Bank  then,  I  yielded  to  the  necessi 
ty  of  the  case,  growing  out  of  the  then  existing  and  long-established  connexion 
between  the  government  and  the  banking  system.  I  took  the  ground,  even  at 
that  early  period,  that  so  long  as  the  connexion  existed — so  long  as  the  govern 
ment  received  and  paid  away  bank-notes  as  money — they  were  bound  to  regu 
late  their  value,  and  had  no  alternative  but  the  establishment  of  a  National  Bank. 
I  found  the  connexion  in  existence  and  established  before  my  time,  and  over 
which  I  could  have  no  control.  I  yielded  to  the  necessity  in  order  to  correct 
the  disordered  state  of  the  currency,  which  had  fallen  exclusively  under  the 
control  of  the  states.  I  yielded  to  what  I  could  not  reverse,  just  as  any  mem 
ber  of  the  Senate  now  would,  who  might  believe  that  Louisiana  was  unconsti 
tutionally  admitted  into  the  Union,  but  who  would,  nevertheless,  feel  compelled 
to  vote  to  extend  the  laws  to  that  state,  as  one  of  its  members,  on  the  ground 
that  its  admission  was  an  act,  whether  constitutional  or  unconstitutional,  which 
he  could  not  reverse. 

In  1834  I  acted  in  conformity  to  the  same  principle,  in  proposing  the  renew 
al  of  the  Bank  charter  for  a  short  period.  My  object,  as  expressly  avowed,  was 
to  use  the  Bank  to  break  the  connexion  between  the  government  and  the  bank 
ing  system  gradually,  in  order  to  avert  the  catastrophe  which  has  now  befallen 
us,  and  which  I  then  clearly  perceived.  But  the  connexion,  which  I  believed 
to  be  irreversible  in  1816,  has  now  been  broken  by  operation  of  law.  It  is  now 
an  open  question.  I  feel  myself  free  for  the  first  time  to  choose  my  course  on 
this  important  subject ;  and,  in  opposing  a  bank,  I  act  in  conformity  to  principles 
which  I  have  entertained  ever  since  I  have  fully  investigated  the  subject. 

But  my  opposition  to  a  reunion  with  the  banks  is  not  confined  to  objections 
limited  to  a  national  or  state  banks.  It  goes  beyond,  and  comprehends  others  of 
a  more  general  nature  relating  to  the  currency,  which  to  me  are  decisive.  I 
am  of  the  impression  that  the  connexion  has  a  most  pernicious  influence  over 
bank  currency ;  that  it  tends  to  disturb  that  stability  and  uniformity  of  value 
which  is  essential  to  a  sound  currency,  and  is  among  the  leading  causes  of  that 
tendency  to  expansion  and  contraction  which  experience  has  shown  is  incident 


264  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

to  bank-notes  as  a  currency.  They  are,  in  my  opinion,  at  best,  without  the  re 
quisite  qualities  to  constitute  a  currency  even  when  unconnected  with  the  gov 
ernment,  and  are  doubly  disqualified  by  reason  of  that  connexion,  which  sub 
jects  them  to  sudden  expansions  and  contractions,  and  exposes  them  to  fatal 
catastrophes,  such  as  the  present. 

I  will  explain  my  views.  A  bank-note  circulates  not  merely  on  account  of 
the  credit  of  the  institutions  by  which  it  is  issued,  but  because  government  re 
ceives  it,  like  gold  and  silver,  in  payment  of  all  its  dues,  and  thus  adds  its  own. 
credit  to  that  of  the  bank.  It,  in  fact,  virtually  endorses  on  the  note  of  every 
specie-paying  bank  "  receivable  by  government  in  its  dues."  To  understand 
how  greatly  this  adds  to  the  circulation  of  bank-notes,  we  must  remember  that 
government  is  the  great  money-dealer  of  the  country,  and  the  holder  of  immense 
public  domains  ;  and  that  it  has  the  power  of  creating  a  demand  against  every 
citizen  as  high  as  it  pleases,  in  the  shape  of  a  tax  or  duty,  which  can  be  dis 
charged,  as  the  law  now  is,  only  by  bank-notes  or  gold  and  silver.  This,  of 
course,  cannot  but  add  greatly  to  the  credit  of  bank-notes,  and  contribute  much 
to  their  circulation,  though  it  may  be  difficult  to  determine  with  any  precision 
to  what  extent.  It  certainly  is  very  great.  For  why  is  it  that  an  individual 
of  the  first  credit,  whose  responsibility  is  so  indisputable  that  his  friend,  of  equal 
credit,  endorses  his  note  for  nothing,  should  put  his  with  his  friend's,  being  their 
joint  credit,  into  a  bank,  and  take  out  the  notes  of  the  bank,  which  is,  in  fact, 
but  the  credit  of  the  bank  itself,  and  pays  six  per  cent,  discount  between  the 
credit  of  himself  and  his  friend  and  that  of  the  bank  ?  The  known  and  estab 
lished  credit  of  the  bank  may  be  one  reason,  but  there  is  another  and  powerful 
one.  The  government  treats  the  credit  ,of  the  bank  as  gold  and  silver  in  all  its 
transactions,  and  does  not  treat  the  credit  of  individuals  in  the  same  manner. 
To  test  the  truth,  let  us  reverse  the  case,  and  suppose  the  government  to  treat 
the  joint  credit  of  the  individuals  as  money,  and  not  the  credit  of  the  bank,  is  it 
not  obvious  that,  instead  of  borrowing  from  the  bank  and  paying  six  per  cent,  dis 
count,  the  bank  would  be  glad  to  borrow  from  him  on  the  same  terms  ?  From 
this  we  may  perceive  the  powerful  influence  which  bank  circulation  derives 
from  the  connexion  with  the  credit  of  the  government. 

It  follows,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  to  the  extent  of  this  influence  the 
issues  of  the  banks  expand  and  contract  with  the  expansion  and  contraction  of 
the  fiscal  action  of  the  government ;  with  the  increase  of  its  duties,  taxes,  in 
come,  and  expenditure  ;  with  the  deposites  in  its  vaults  acting  as  additional  cap 
ital,  and  the  amount  of  bank-notes  withdrawn,  in  consequence,  from  circulation  : 
all  of  which  must  directly  affect  the  amount  of  their  business  and  issues  ;  and 
bank  currency  must,  of  course,  partake  of  all  those  vibrations  to  which  the  fis 
cal  action  of  the  government  is  necessarily  exposed,  and,  when  great  and  sud 
den,  must  expose  the  system  to  catastrophes  such  as  we  now  witness.  In 
fact,  a  more  suitable  instance  cannot  be  selected,  to  illustrate  the  truth  of  what 
I  assert,  than  the  present,  as  I  shall  proceed  to  show. 

To  understand  the  causes  which  have  led  to  the  present  state  of  things,  we 
must  go  back  to  the  year  1824,  when  the  tariff  system  triumphed  in  Congress  : 
a  system  which  imposed  duties,  not  for  the  purpose  of  revenue,  but  to  encour 
age  the  industry  of  one  portion  of  the  Union  at  the  expense  of  the  other.  This 
was  followed  up  by  the  act  of  1828,  which  consummated  the  system.  It  rais 
ed  the  duties  so  extravagantly,  that  out  of  an  annual  importation  of  sixty-four 
millions,  thirty-two  passed  into  the  treasury  :  that  is,  government  took  one  half 
for  the  liberty  of  introducing  the  other.  Countless  millions  were  thus  poured 
into  the  treasury  beyond  the  wants  of  the  government,  which  became,  in  time, 
the  source  of  the  most  extravagant  expenditures.  This  vast  increase  of  receipts 
and  expenditures  was  followed  by  a  corresponding  expansion  of  the  business  of 
the  banks.  They  had  to  discount  and  issue  freely  to  enable  the  merchants  to 
pay  their  duty-bonds,  as  well  'as  to  meet  the  vastly  increased  expenditures  of 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  265 

the  government.  Another  effect  followed  the  act  of  1828,  which  gave  a  still 
farther  expansion  to  the  action  of  the  banks,  and  which  is  worthy  of  notice.  It 
turned  the  exchange  with  England  in  favour  of  this  country.  That  portion  of 
the  proceeds  of  our  exports  which,  in  consequence  of  the  high  duties,  could  no 
longer  return  with  profit  in  the  usual  articles  which  we  had  been  in  the  habit 
of  receiving  principally  from  that  country  in  exchange  for  our  exports,  returned 
in  gold  and  silver,  in  order  to  purchase  similar  articles  at  the  North.  This  was 
the  first  cause  which  gave  that  western  direction  to  the  precious  metals,  the  re 
vulsive  return  of  which  has  been  followed  by  so  many  disasters.  With  the  ex 
change  in  our  favour,  and,  consequently,  no  demand  for  gold  and  silver  abroad, 
and  the  vast  demand  for  money  attendant  on  an  increase  of  the  revenue,  almost 
every  restraint  was  removed  on  the  discounts  and  issues  of  the  banks,  especially 
in  the  Northern  section  of  the  Union,  where  these  causes  principally  operated. 
With  their  increase,  wages  and  prices  of  every  description  rose  in  proportion, 
followed,  of  course,  by  an  increasing  demand  on  the  banks  for  farther  issues. 
This  is  the  true  cause  of  that  expansion  of  the  currency  which  began  about  the 
commencement  of  the  late  administration,  but  which  was  erroneously  charged 
by  it  to  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  It  rose  out  of  the  action  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  Bank,  in  increasing  its  business,  acted  in  obedience  to  the  condi 
tion  of  things  at  the  time,  and  in  conformity  with  the  banks  generally  in  the 
same  section.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  late  administration  came  into 
power — a  juncture  remarkable  in  many  respects,  but  more  especially  in  relation, 
to  the  question  of  the  currency.  Most  of  the  causes  which  have  since  termi 
nated  in  the  complete  prostration  of  the  banks  and  the  commercial  prosperity  of 
the  country  were  in  full  activity. 

Another  cause,  about  that  time  (I  do  not  remember  the  precise  date),  began 
to  produce  powerful  effects  :  I  refer  to  the  last  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the 
Bank  of  England.  It  was  renewed  for  ten  years,  and,  among  other  provisions, 
contained  one  making  the  notes  of  that  bank  a  legal  tender  in  all  cases  except 
between  the  Bank  and  its  creditors.  The  effect  was  to  dispense  still  farther 
with  the  use  of  the  precious  metals  in  that  great  commercial  country,  which,  of 
course,  caused  them  to  flow  out  in  every  direction  through  the  various  channels 
of  its  commerce.  A  large  portion  took  their  direction  hither  ward,  and  served 
still  farther  to  increase  the  current  which,  from  causes  already  enumerated,  was 
already  flowing  so  strongly  in  this  direction,  and  which  still  farther  increased 
the  force  of  the  returning  current,  on  the  turn  of  the  tide. 

The  administration  did  not  comprehend  the  difficulties  and  dangers  which 
surrounded  it.  Instead  of  perceiving  the  true  reason  of  the  expansion  of  the 
currency,  and  adopting  the  measures  necessary  to  arrest  it,  they  attributed  it  to 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  made  it  the  cause  or  pretext  for  waging  war 
on  that  institution.  Among  the  first  acts  of  hostility,  the  deposites  were  remo 
ved,  and  transferred  to  selected  state  banks  ;  the  effect  of  which,  instead  of  resist 
ing  the  tendency  to  expansion,  was  to  throw  off  the  only  restraint  that  held  the 
banking  institutions  of  the  country  in  check,  and,  of  course,  gave  to  the  swell 
ing  tide,  which  was  destined  to  desolate  the  country,  a  powerful  impulse. 
Banks  sprung  up  in  every  direction  ;  discounts  and  issues  increased  almost 
without  limitation  ;  and  an  immense  surplus  revenue  accumulated  in  the  depos- 
ite  banks,  which,  after  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  the  most  extravagant  ap 
propriations  could  not  exhaust,  and  which  acted  as  additional  banking  capital ; 
the  value  of  money  daily  depreciated  ;  prices  rose  ;  and  then  commenced  those 
unbounded  speculations,  particularly  in  public  lands,  which  was  transferred,  by 
millions  of  acres,  from  the  public  to  the  speculators  for  worthless  bank-notes, 
till  at  length  the  swelling  flood  was  checked,  and  the  revulsive  current  burst  its 
barriers,  and  overspread  and  desolated  the  land. 

The  first  check  came  from  the  Bank  of  England,  which,  alarmed  at  the  loss 
of  its  precious  metals,  refused  to  discount  American  bills,  in  order  to  prevent  a 

L  L 


266  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

iarther  decrease  of  its  cash  means,  and  cause  a  return  of  those  which  it  had 
lost.  Then  followed  the  objectionable  manner  of  carrying  into  execution  the 
deposite  act,  which,  instead  of  a  remedial  measure,  as  it  might  have  been  if  it 
had  been  properly  executed,  was  made  the  instrument  of  weakening  the  banks, 
especially  in  the  great  commercial  metropolis  of  the  Union,  where  so  large  a 
portion  of  the  surplus  revenue  was  accumulated.  And,  finally,  the  treasury  or 
der,  which  still  farther  weakened  those  banks,  by  withdrawing  their  cash  means 
to  be  invested  in  public  lands  in  the  West. 

It  is  often  easy  to  prevent  what  cannot  be  remedied,  which  the  present  instance 
strongly  illustrates.  If  the  administration  had  formed  a  true  conception  of  the 
danger  in  time,  what  has  since  happened  might  have  then  been  averted.  The 
Bear  approach  of  the  expiration  of  the  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank  would 
have  afforded  ample  means  of  staying  the  desolation,  if  it  had  been  timely  and 
properly  used.  I  saw  it  then,  and  purposed  to  renew  the  charter  for  a  limited 
period,  with  such  modifications  as  would  have  effectually  resisted  the  increas 
ing  expansion  of  the  currency,  and,  at  the  same  time,  gradually  and  finally  wear 
out  the  connexion  between  the  Bank  and  the  government.  To  use  the  expres 
sion  I  then  used,  "  to  unbank  the  banks,"  to  let  down  the  system  easily,  and  so 
to  effect  the  separation  between  the  Bank  and  the  government,  as  to  avoid  the 
possibility  of  that  shock  which  I  then  saw  was  inevitable  without  some  such 
remedy.  The  moment  was  eminently  propitious.  The  precious  metals  were 
flowing  in  on  us  from  every  quarter ;  and  the  vigorous  measures  I  purposed  to 
adopt  in  the  renewal  of  the  charter  would  have  effectually  arrested  the  increase 
of  banks,  and  checked  the  excess  of  their  discounts  and  issues  ;  so  that  the  ac 
cumulating  mass  of  gold  and  silver,  instead  of  being  converted  into  bank  capital, 
and  swelling  the  tide  of  paper  circulation,  would  have  been  substituted  in  the 
place  of  bank-notes,  as  a  permanent  and  wholesome  addition  to  the  currency  of 
the  country. 

But  neither  the  administration  nor  the  opposition  sustained  me,  and  the  pre 
cious  opportunity  passed  unseized.  I  then  clearly  saw  the  coming  calamity 
was  inevitable,  and  it  has  neither  arrived  sooner,  nor  is  it  greater,  than  what  I 
expected. 

Such  are  the  leading  causes  which  have  produced  the  present  disordered 
state  of  the  currency.  There  are  others  of  a  minor  character,  connected  with 
the  general  condition  of  the  commercial  world,  and  the  operation  of  the  execu 
tive  branch  of  the  government,  but  which  of  themselves  would  have  produced 
but  little  effect.  To  repeat  the  causes  in  a  few  words,  the  vast  increase  which 
the  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828  gave  to  the  fiscal  action  of  the  government,  com 
bined  with  the  causes  I  have  enumerated,  gave  the  first  impulse  to  the  expan 
sion  of  the  currency.  That,  in  turn,  gave  that  extraordinary  impulse  to  over-tra 
ding  and  speculation  (they  were  effects,  and  not  causes)  which  has  finally  ter 
minated  in  the  present  calamity  It  may  thus  be  ultimately  traced  to  the  con 
nexion  between  the  banks  and  the  government ;  and  it  is  not  a  little  remarkable, 
that  the  suspension  of  specie  payments  in  1816  in  this  country,  and  in  1797  in 
Great  Britain,  was  produced  by  the  same  causes. 

There  is  another  reason  against  the  union  of  the  government  and  the  banks, 
intimately  connected  with  that  under  consideration,  which  I  shall  next  proceed 
to  state.  It  gives  an  advantage  to  one  portion  of  citizens  over  another,  that 
is  neither  fair,  equal,  nor  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  our  institutions.  That  the 
connexion  between  the  Bank  and  the  government,  the  receiving  and  paying  away 
their  notes  as  cash,  and  the  use  of  the  public  money  from  the  time  of  the  col 
lection  to  the  disbursement,  is  the  source  of  immense  profit  to  the  banks,  cannot 
be  questioned.  It  is  impossible,  as  I  have  said,  to  ascertain  with  any  precision 
to  what  extent  their  issues  and  circulation  depend  upon  it,  but  it  certainly  con 
stitutes  a  large  proportion.  A  single  illustration  may  throw  light  upon  this 
point.  Suppose  the  government  were  to  take  up  the  veriest  beggar  in  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  267 

street,  and  enter  into  a  contract  with  him,  that  nothing  should  be  received  in  its 
dues  or  for  the  sales  of  its  public  lands  in  future,  except  gold  and  silver  and  his 
promissory  notes,  and  that  he  should  have  the  use  of  the  public  funds  from  the 
time  of  their  collection  until  their  disbursement.  Can  any  one  estimate  the 
wealth  which  such  a  contract  would  confer?  His  notes  would  circulate  far 
and  wide  over  the  whole  extent  of  the  Union,  would  be  the  medium  through 
which  the  exchanges  of  the  country  would  be  performed,  and  his  ample  and  ex 
tended  credit  would  give  him  a  control  over  all  the  banking  institutions  and 
moneyed  transactions  of  the  community.  The  possession  of  a  hundred  mill-* 
ions  would  not  give  a  control  more  effectual.  1  ask,  Would  it  be  fair,  would 
it  be  equal,  would  it  be  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  our  institutions,  to  confer 
such  advantages  on  any  individual  ?  And  if  not  on  one,  would  it  be  if  confer 
red  on  any  number  ?  And  if  not,  why  should  it  be  conferred  on  any  corporate 
body  of  individuals  ?  How  can  they  possibly  be  entitled  to  benefits  so  vast, 
which  all  must  acknowledge  could  not  be  justly  conferred  on  any  number  of 
unincorporated  individuals  1 

I  state  not  these  views  with  any  intention  of  bringing  down  odium  on  bank 
ing  institutions.  I  have  no  unkind  feeling  towards  them  whatever.  I  do  not 
hold  them  responsible  for  the  present  state  of  things.  It  has  grown  up  gradu 
ally,  without  either  the  banks  or  the  community  perceiving  the  consequences 
which  have  followed  the  connexion  between  them.  My  object  is  to  state  facts 
as  they  exist,  that  the  truth  may  be  seen  in  time  by  all.  This  is  an  age  of  in 
vestigation.  The  public  mind  is  broadly  awake  upon  this  all-important  subject. 
It  affects  the  interests  and  condition  of  the  whole  community,  and  will  be  in 
vestigated  to  the  bottom.  Nothing  will  be  left  unexplored ;  and  it  is  for  the  in 
terest  of  both  the  banks  and  of  the  community  that  the  evils  incident  to  the 
connexion  should  be  fully  understood  in  time,  and  the  connexion  be  gradually 
terminated,  before  such  convulsions  shall  follow  as  to  sweep  away  the  whole 
system,  with  its  advantages  as  well  as  its  disadvantages. 

But  it  is  not  only  between  citizen  and  citizen  that  the  connexion  is  unfair 
and  unequal.  It  is  as  much  so  between  one  portion  of  the  country  and  another. 
The  connexion  of  the  government  with  the  banks,  whether  it  be  with  a  combi 
nation  of  state  banks  or  with  a  national  institution,  will  necessarily  centralize 
the  action  of  the  system  at  the  principal  point  of  collection  and  disbursement, 
and  at  which  the  mother-bank,  or  the  head  of  the  league  of  state  banks,  must 
be  located.  From  that  point,  the  whole  system,  through  the  connexion  with 
the  government,  will  be  enabled  to  control  the  exchanges  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  with  it  the  commerce,  foreign  and  domestic,  including  exports  and 
imports.  After  what  has  been  said,  these  points  will  require  but  little  illustra 
tion.  A  single  one  will  be  sufficient ;  and  I  will  take,  as  in  the  former  in 
stance,  that  of  an  individual. 

Suppose,  then,  the  government,  at  the  commencement  of  its  operation,  had 
selected  an  individual  merchant,  at  any  one  point  in  the  Union,  say  New- York, 
and  had  connected  itself  with  him,  as  it  has  with  the  banks,  by  giving  him  the 
use  of  the  public  funds  from  the  time  of  their  collection  until  their  disburse 
ment,  and  of  receiving  and  paying  away,  in  all  its  transactions,  nothing  but  his 
promissory  notes,  except  gold  and  silver  ;  is  it  not  manifest  that  a  decisive  con 
trol  would  be  given  to  the  port  where  he  resided,  over  all  the  others  ;  that  his 
promissory  notes  would  circulate  everywhere,  through  all  the  ramifications  of 
commerce ;  that  they  would  regulate  exchanges ;  that  they  would  be  the  me 
dium  of  paying  duty-bonds  ;  and  that  they  would  attract  the  imports  and  ex 
ports  of  the  country  to  the  ports  where  such  extraordinary  facilities  were  afford 
ed  ?  If  such  would  clearly  be  the  effects  in  the  case  supposed,  it  is  equally 
clear  that  the  concentration  of  the  currency  at  the  same  point,  through  the 
connexion  of  the  government  with  the  banks,  would  have  equal,  if  not  greater 
effects  ;  and  that  whether  one  general  bank  should  be  used  as  an  agent,  or  a 


268  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

league  of  banks,  which  should  have  their  centre  there.  To  other  ports  of  the 
country,  the  trifling  advantages  which  a  branch  or  deposite  bank  would  give  in 
the  safe  keeping  of  the  public  revenue  would  be  as  nothing,  compared  to  the 
losses  caused  to  their  commerce  by  centralizing  the  moneyed  action  of  the  coun 
try  at  a  remote  point.  Other  gentlemen  can  speak  for  their  own  section  ;  I 
can  speak  with  confidence  of  that  which  I  have  the  honour  in  part  to  repre 
sent.  The  entire  staple  states,  I  feel  a  deep  conviction,  banks  and  all,  would, 
in  the  end,  be  great  gainers  by  the  disseverance,  whatever  might  be  the  tempo- 
$ary  inconvenience.  If  there  be  any  other  section  in  which  the  effects  would 
be  different,  it  would  be  but  to  confirm  the  views  which  I  have  presented. 

As  connected  with  this,  there  is  a  point  well  deserving  consideration.  The 
union  between  bank  and  government  is  not  only  a  main  source  of  that  danger 
ous  expansion  and  contraction  in  the  banking  system  which  I  have  already  il 
lustrated,  but  is  also  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  that  powerful  and  almost  ir 
resistible  tendency  to  the  increase  of  banks  which  even  its  friends  see  and  de 
plore.  I  dwelt  on  this  point  on  a  former  occasion  (on  Mr.  Webster's  motion 
to  renew  the  Bank  charter  in  1833),  and  will  not  repeat  what  I  then  said.  But 
in  addition  to  the  causes  then  enumerated,  there  are  many  others  very  power 
ful,  and,  among  others,  the  one  under  consideration.  They  all  maybe  summed 
up  in  one  general  cause.  We  have  made  banking  too  profitable — far,  very  far 
too  profitable — and,  I  may  add,  influential.  One  of  the  most  ample  sources  of 
this  profit  and  influence  may  be  traced,  as  I  have  shown,  to  the  connexion 
with  the  government ;  and  is,  of  course,  among  the  prominent  causes  of  the 
strong  and  incessant  tendency  of  the  system  to  increase,  which  even  its  friends 
see  must  finally  overwhelm  either  the  banks  or  the  institutions  of  the  country. 
With  a  view  to  check  its  growth,  they  have  proposed  to  limit  the  number  of 
banks  and  the  amount  of  banking  capital  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution ; 
but  it  is  obvious  that  the  effects  of  such  an  amendment,  if  it  were  practicable, 
would  but  increase  the  profits  and  influence  of  bank  capital ;  and  that,  finally,  it 
would  justly  produce  such  indignation  on  the  part  of  the  rest  of  the  community 
against  such  unequal  advantages,  that  in  the  end,  after  a  long  and  violent  strug 
gle,  the  overthrow  of  the  entire  system  would  follow.  To  obviate  this  difficul 
ty,  it  has  been  proposed  to  add  a  limitation  upon  the  amount  of  their  business  ; 
the  effects  of  which  would  be  the  accommodation  of  favourites,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  rest  of  the  community,  which  would  be  no  less  fatal  to  the  system. 
There  can  be,  in  fact,  but  one  safe  and  consistent  remedy — the  rendering  bank 
ing,  as  a  business,  less  profitable  and  influential ;  and  the  first  and  decisive  step 
towards  this  is  a  disseverance  between  the  banks  and  the  government.  To  this 
may  be  added  some  effectual  limitation  on  the  denomination  of  the  notes  to  be 
issued,  which  would  operate  in  a  similar  manner. 

I  pass  over  other  important  objections- to  the  connexion — the  corrupting  in 
fluence  and  the  spirit  of  speculation  which  it  spreads  far  and  wide  over  the 
land.  Who  has  not  seen  and  deplored  the  vast  and  corrupting  influence  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  legislatures  to  obtain  charters,  and  the  means  necessary  to 
participate  in  the  profits  of  the  institutions  ?  This  gives  a  control  to  the  gov 
ernment  which  grants  such  favours  of  a  most  extensive  and  pernicious  charac 
ter,  all  of  which  must  continue  to  spread  and  increase,  if  the  connexion  should 
continue,  until  the  whole  community  must  become  one  contaminated  and  cor 
rupted  mass. 

There  is  another  and  a  final  reason,  which  I  shall  assign  against  the  reunion 
with  the  banks.  We  have  reached  a  new  era  with  regard  to  these  institutions. 
He  who  would  judge  of  the  future  by  the  past,  in  reference  to  them,  will  be 
wholly  mistaken.  The  year  1833  marks  the  commencement  of  this  era.  That 
extraordinary  man  who  had  the  power  of  imprinting  his  own  feelings  on  the 
community,  then  commenced  his  hostile  attacks,  which  have  left  such  effects 
behind,  that  the  war  then  commenced  against  the  banks,  I  clearly  see,  will  not 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  269 

terminate,  unless  there  be  a  separation  between  them  and  the  government ; 
until  one  or  the  other  triumphs  ;  till  the  government  becomes  the  bank',  or  the 
bank  the  government.  In  resisting  their  union,  I  act  as  the  friend  of  both.  I 
have,  as  I  have  said,  no  unkind  feeling  towards  the  banks.  I  am  neither  a  bank 
man  nor 'an  anti-bank  man.  I  have  but  little  connexion  with  them.  Many  of 
my  best  friends,  for  whom  I  have  the  highest  esteem,  have  a  deep  interest  in 
their  prosperity,  and,  as  far  as  friendship  or  personal  attachment  extends,  my 
inclination  would  be  strongly  in  their  favour.  But  I  stand  up  here  as  the  rep 
resentative  of  no  particular  interest.  I  look  to  the  whole,  and  to  the  future,  as 
well  as  the  present ;  and  I  shall  steadily  pursue  that  course  which,  under  the 
most  enlarged  view,  I  believe  to  be  my  duty.  In  1834  I  saw  the  present  crisis. 
I,  in  vain,  raised  a  warning  voice,  and  endeavoured  to  avert  it.  I  now  see, 
with  equal  certainty,  one  far  more  portentous.  If  this  struggle  is  to  go  on  ;  if 
the  banks  will  insist  upon  a  reunion  with  the  government  against  the  sense  of  a 
large  and  influential  portion  of  the  community ;  and,  above  all,  if  they  should 
succeed  in  effecting  it,  a  reflux  flood  will  inevitably  sweep  away  the  whole 
system.  A  deep  popular  excitement  is  never  without  some  reason,  and  ought 
ever  to  be  treated  with  respect ;  and  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  look  timely  into 
the  cause,  and  correct  it  before  the  excitement  shall  become  so  great  as  to  de 
molish  the  object,  with  all  its  good  and  evil,  against  which  it  is  directed. 

The  only  safe  course  for  both  government  and  banks  is  to  remain,  as  they  are, 
separated ;  each  in  the  use  of  their  own  credit,  and  in  the  management  of  their 
own  affairs.  The  less  the  control  and  influence  of  the  one  over  the  other  the 
better.  Confined  to  their  legitimate  sphere,  that  of  affording  temporary  credit 
to  commercial  and  business  men,  bank-notes  would  furnish  a  safe  and  conveni 
ent  circulation  in  the  range  of  commerce  and  business,  within  which  the  banks 
may  be  respectively  situated,  exempt  almost  entirely  from  those  fluctuations  and 
convulsions  to  which  they  are  now  so  exposed  ;  or,  if  they  should  occasionally 
be  subject  to  them,  the  evil  would  be  local  and  temporary,  leaving  undisturbed 
the  action  of  the  government  and  the  general  currency  of  the  country,  on  the 
stability  of  which  the  prosperity  and  safety  of  the  community  so  much  depend. 

I  have  now  stated  my  objections  to  the  reunion  of  the  government  and  the 
banks.  If  they  are  well  founded  ;  if  the  state  banks  are  of  themselves  incom 
petent  agents  ;  if  a  Bank  of  the  United  States  be  impracticable,  or,  if  practicable, 
would  at  this  time  be  the  destruction  of  a  large  portion  of  the  existing  banks, 
and  of  renewed  and  severe  pecuniary  distress  ;  if  it  would  be  against  the  set 
tled  conviction  of  an  old  and  powerful  party,  whose  opposition  time  cannot 
abate  ;  if  the  union  of  government  and  banks  adds  to  the  unfitness  of  their  notes 
for  circulation,  and  be  unjust  and  unequal  between  citizen  and  citizen,  and  one 
portion  of  the  Union  and  another ;  and,  finally,  if  it  would  excite  an  implacable 
and  obstinate  war,  which  could  only  terminate  in  the  overthrow  of  the  banking 
system  or  the  institutions  of  the  country — it  then  remains  that  the  only  alterna 
tive  would  be  permanently  to  separate  the  two,  and  to  reorganize  the  treasury 
so  as  to  enable  it  to  perform  those  duties  which  have  heretofore  been  performed 
by  the  banks  as  its  fiscal  agents.  This  proposed  reorganization  has  been  called 
a  sub-treasury;  an  unfortunate  word,  calculated  to  mislead  and  conjure  up  diffi 
culties  and  danger  that  do  not  in  reality  exist.  So  far  from  an  experiment,  or 
some  new  device,  it  is  only  returning  to  the  old  mode  of  collecting  and  disburs 
ing  public  money,  which,  for  thousands  of  years,  has  been  the  practice  of  all 
enlightened  people  till  within  the  last  century. 

In  what  manner  it  is  intended  to  reorganize  the  treasury  by  the  bill  reported, 
I  do  not  know.  I  have  been  too  much  engaged  to  read  it ;  and  I  can  only  say 
that,  for  one,  I  shall  assent  to  no  arrangement  which  provides  for  a  treasury 
bank,  or  that  can  be  perverted  into  one.  If  there  can  be  any  scheme  more  fatal 
than  a  reunion  with  the  banks  at  this  time,  it  would  be  such  a  project.  Nor 
will  I  give  my  assent  to  any  arrangement  which  shall  add  the  least  unnecessary 


270  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

patronage.  I  am  the  sworn  foe  to  patronage,  and  have  done  as  much  and  su5- 
fered  as  much  in  resisting  it  as  any  one.  Too  many  years  have  passed  over 
me  to  change,  at  this  late  day,  my  course  or  principles.  But  I  will  say,  that  it 
is  impossible  so  to  organize  the  treasury  for  the  performance  of  its  own  functions 
as  to  give  to  the  executive  a  tenth  part  of  the  patronage  it  will  lose  by  the  pro 
posed  separation,  which,  when  the  bill  for  the  reorganization  comes  up,  I  may 
have  an  opportunity  to  show.  I  have  ventured  this  assertion  after  much  reflec 
tion,  and  with  entire  confidence  in  its  correctness. 

But  something  more  must  be  done  besides  the  reorganization  of  the  treasury, 
Under  the  resolution  of  1816,  bank-notes  would  again  be  received  in  the  dues 
of  the  government,  if  the  Bank  should  resume  specie  payments.  The  legal,  as 
well  as  the  actual  connexion,  must  be  severed.  But  I  am  opposed  to  all  harsh 
or  precipitate  measures.  No  great  process  can  be  effected  without  a  shock 
but  through  the  agency  of  time.  I,  accordingly,  propose  to  allow  time  for  the  final 
separation  ;  and  with  this  view  I  have  drawn  up  an  amendment  to  this  bill, 
which  I  shall  offer  at  the  proper  time,  to  modify  the  resolution  of  1816,  by  pro 
viding  that  after  the  1st  of  January  next,  three  fourths  of  all  sums  due  to  the 
government  may  be  received  in  the  notes  of  specie-paying  banks ;  and  that 
after  the  1st  of  January  next  following,  one  half;  arid  after  the  1st  of  January 
next  subsequent,  one  fourth  ;  and  after  the  1st  of  January  thereafter,  nothing  but 
the  legal  currency  of  the  United  States,  or  bills,  notes,  or  paper  issued  under 
their  authority,  and  which  may  by  law  be  authorized  to  be  received  in  their  dues. 
If  the  time  is  not  thought  to  be  ample,  I  am  perfectly  disposed  to  extend  it. 
The  period  is  of  little  importance  in  my  eyes,  so  that  the  object  be  effected. 

In  addition  to  this,  it  seems  to  me  that  some  measure  of  a  remedial  character, 
connected  with  the  currency,  ought  to  be  adopted  to  ease  off  the  pressure  while 
the  process  is  going  through.  It  is  desirable  that  the  government  should  make 
as  few  and  small  demands  on  the  specie  market  as  possible  during  the  time,  so 
as  to  throw  no  impediment  in  the  way  of  the  resumption  of  specie  payments. 
With  this  view,  I  am  of  the  impression  that  the  sum  necessary  for  the  present 
wants  of  the  treasury  should  be  raised  by  a  paper,  which  should,  at  the  same 
time,  have  the  requisite  qualities  to  enable  it  to  perform  the  functions  of  a  paper 
circulation.  Under  this  impression,  I  object  to  the  interest  to  be  allowed  on 
the  treasury  notes,  which  this  bill  authorizes  to  be  issued,  on  the  very  opposite 
ground  that  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  bestows  his  approbation.  He 
approves  of  interest,  because  it  would  throw  them  out  of  circulation,  into  the 
hands  of  capitalists,  as  a  convenient  and  safe  investment ;  and  I  disapprove, 
because  it  will  have  that  effect.  I  am  disposed  to  ease  off  the  process ;  he. 
I  would  suppose,  is  very  little  solicitous  on  that  point. 

But  I  go  farther.  I  am  of  the  impression,  to  make  this  great  measure  suc 
cessful,  and  secure  it  against  reaction,  some  stable  and  safe  medium  of  circula 
tion,  to  take  the  place  of  bank-notes  in  the  fiscal  operations  of  the  government, 
ought  to  be  issued.  I  intend  to  propose  nothing.  It  would  be  impossible,  with 
so  great  a  weight  of  opposition,  to  pass  any  measure  without  the  entire  support 
of  the  administration  ;  and  if  it  were,  it  ought  not  to  be  attempted  where  so  much 
must  depend  on  the  mode  of  execution.  The  best  measure  that  could  be  devi 
sed  might  fail,  and  impose  a  heavy  responsibility  on  its  author,  unless  it  met 
with  the  hearty  approbation  of  those  who  are  to  execute  it.  I  intend,  then, 
merely  to  throw  out  suggestions,  in  order  to  excite  the  reflection  of  others  on 
a  subject  so  delicate  and  of  so  much  importance,  acting  on  the  principle  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  all,  in  so  great  a  juncture,  to  present  their  views  without  reserve. 

It  is,  then,  my  impression  that,  in  the  present  condition  of  the  world,  a  paper 
currency,  in  some  form,  if  not  necessary,  is  almost  indispensable  in  financial 
and  commercial  operations  of  civilized  and  extensive  communities.  In  many 
respects  it  has  a  vast  superiority  over  a  metallic  currency,  especially  in  great 
and  extended  transactions,  by  its  greater  cheapness,  lightness,  and  the  facility 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  271 

of  determining  the  amount.  The  great  desideratum  is,  to  ascertain  what  de 
scription  of  paper  has  the  requisite  qualities  of  being  free  from  fluctuation  in. 
value,  and  liability  to  abuse,  in  the  greatest  perfection.  1  have  shown,  I  trust, 
that  the  bank-notes  do  not  possess  these  requisites  in  a  degree  sufficiently  high 
for  this  purpose.  I  go  farther.  It  appears  to  me,  after  bestowing  the  best  re 
flection  I  can  give  the  subject,  that  no  convertible  paper,  that  is,  no  paper  whose 
credit  rests  upon  a  promise  to  pay,  is  suitable  for  currency.  It  is  the  form  of 
credit  proper  in  private  transactions  between  man  and  man,  but  not  for  a  stand 
ard  of  value  to  perform  exchanges  generally,  which  constitutes  the  appropriate 
functions  of  money  or  currency.  The  measure  of  safety  in  the  two  cases  are 
wholly  different.  A  promissory  note,  or  convertible  paper,  is  considered  safe 
so  long  as  the  drawer  has  ample  means  to  meet  his  engagements,  and,  in  pass 
ing  from  hand  to  hand,  regard  is  had  only  to  his  ability  and  willingness  to  pay. 
Very  different  is  the  case  in  currency.  The  aggregate  value  of  the  currency 
of  a  country  necessarily  bears  a  small  proportion  to  the  aggregate  value  of  its 
property.  This  proportion  is  not  well  ascertained,  and  is  probably  subject  to 
considerable  variation  in  different  countries,  and  at  different  periods  in  the  same 
country.  It  may  be  assumed  conjecturally,  in  order  to  illustrate  what  I  say,  at 
one  to  thirty.  Assuming  this  proportion  to  be  correct,  which  probably  is  not  very 
far  from  the  truth,  it  follows,  that  in  a  sound  condition  of  the  country,  where  the 
currency  is  metallic,  the  aggregate  value  of  the  coin  is  not  more  than  one  in 
thirty  of  the  aggregate  value  of  the  property.  It  also  follows  that  an  increase 
in  the  amount  of  the  currency,  by  the  addition  of  a  paper  circulation  of  no  in 
trinsic  value,  but  increases  the  nominal  value  of  the  aggregate  property  of  the 
country  in  the  same  proportion  that  the  increase  bears  to  the  whole  amount  of 
currency ;  so  that,  if  the  currency  be  doubled,  the  nominal  value  of  the  property 
will  also  be  doubled.  Hence  it  is,  that  when  the  paper  currency  of  a  country 
is  in  the  shape  of  promissory  notes,  there  is  a  constant  tendency  to  excess.  We 
look  for  their  safety  to  the  ability  of  the  drawer ;  and  so  long  as  his  means  are 
ample  to  meet  his  engagements,  there  is  no  distrust,  without  reflecting  that,  con 
sidered  as  currency,  it  cannot  safely  exceed  one  in  thirty  in  value  compared  to 
property  ;  and  the  delusion  is  farther  increased  by  the  constant  increase  in 
value  of  property  with  the  increase  of  the  notes  in  circulation,  so  as  to  main 
tain  the  same  relative  proportion.  It  follows  that  a  government  may  safely 
contract  a  debt  many  times  the  amount  of  its  aggregate  circulation  ;  but  if  it 
were  to  attempt  to  put  its  promissory  notes  in  circulation  in  amount  equal  to  its 
debts,  an  explosion  in  the  currency  would  be  inevitable.  And  hence,  with 
other  causes,  the  constant  tendency  to  an  excessive  issue  of  bank-notes  in  pros 
perous  times,  when  so  large  a  portion  of  the  community  are  anxious  to  obtain 
accommodation,  and  who  are  disappointed  when  good  negotiable  paper  is  re 
fused  by  the  banks,  not  reflecting  that  it  would  not  be  safe  to  discount  beyond  the 
limits  I  have  assigned  for  a  safe  circulation,  however  good  the  paper  offered. 

On  what,  then,  ought  a  paper  currency  to  rest  ?  I  would  say  on  demand  and 
supply  simply,  which  regulates  the  value  of  everything  else — the  constant  de 
mand  which  the  government  has  on  the  community  for  its  necessary  supplies. 
A  medium  resting  on  this  demand,  which  simply  obligates  the  government  to 
receive  it  in  all  its  dues,  to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else  except  gold  and 
silver,  and  which  shall  be  optional  with  those  who  have  demands  on  government 
to  receive  or  not,  would,  it  seems  to  me,  be  as  stable  in  its  value  as  those  metals 
themselves,  and  be  as  little  liable  to  abuse  as  the  power  of  coining.  It  would 
contain  within  itself  a  self-regulating  power.  It  could  only  be  issued  to  those 
who  had  claims  on  the  government,  and  to  those  only  with  their  consent,  and, 
of  course,  only  at  or  above  par  with  gold  and  silver,  which  would  be  its  ha 
bitual  state  ;  for,  as  far  as  the  government  was  concerned,  it  would  be  equal, 
in  every  respect,  to  gold  and  silver,  and  superior  in  many,  particularly  in  regu 
lating  the  distant  exchanges  of  the  country.  Should,  however,  a  demand  for 


272  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

gold  and  silver  from  abroad,  or  other  accidental  causes,  depress  it  temporarily, 
as  compared  with  the  precious  metals,  it  would  then  return  to  the  treasury  ;  and 
as  it  could  not  be  paid  out  during  such  depression,  its  gradual  diminution  in  the 
market  would  soon  restore  it  to  an  equality,  when  it  would  again  flow  out  into 
the  general  circulation.  Thus  there  would  be  a  constant  alternate  flux  andre- 
ilux  into  and  from  the  treasury,  between  it  and  the  precious  metals ;  but  if  at 
any  time  a  permanent  depression  in  its  value  be  possible,  from  any  cause,  the 
only  effect  would  be  to  operate  as  a  reduction  of  taxes  on  the  community,  and 
the  only  sufferer  would  be  the  government  itself.  Against  this,  its  own  interest 
•would  be  a  sufficient  guarantee. 

Nothing  but  experience  can  determine  what  amount  and  of  what  denomina 
tions  might  be  safely  issued,  but  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  country 
would  absorb  an  amount  greatly  exceeding  its  annual  income.  Much  of  its  ex 
changes,  which  amount  to  a  vast  sum,  as  well  as  its  banking  business,  would 
revolve  about  it,  and  many  millions  would  thus  be  kept  in  circulation  beyond 
the  demands  of  the  government.  It  may  throw  some  light  on  this  subject  to 
state,  that  North  Carolina,  just  after  the  Revolution,  issued  a  large  amount  of  pa 
per,  which  was  made  receivable  in  dues  to  her.  It  was  also  made  a  legal  ten 
der,  but  which,  of  course,  was  not  obligatory  after  the  adoption  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  A  large  amount,  say  between  four  and  five  hundred  thousand 
dollars,  remained  in  circulation  after  that  period,  and  continued  to  circulate  for 
more  than  twenty  years  at  par  with  gold  and  silver  during  the  whole  time,  with 
no  other  advantage  than  being  received  in  the  revenue  of  the  state,  which  was 
much  less  than  $100,000  per  annum.  I  speak  on  the  information  of  citizens 
of  that  state,  on  whom  I  can  rely. 

But  whatever  may  be  the  amount  that  can  be  circulated,  I  hold  it  clear,  that 
to  that  amount  it  would  be  as  stable  in  value  as  gold  and  silver  itself,  provided 
the  government  be  bound  to  receive  it  exclusively  with  those  metals  in  all  its 
dues,  and  that  it  be  left  perfectly  optional  with  those  who  have  claims  on  the 
government  to  receive  it  or  not.  It  will  also  be  a  necessary  condition,  that 
notes  of  too  small  a  denomination  should  not  be  issued,  so  that  the  treasury  shall 
have  ample  means  to  meet  all  demands,  either  in  gold  or  silver,  or  the  bills  of 
the  government,  at  the  option  of  those  who  have  claims  on  it.  With  these  con 
ditions,  no  farther  variation  could  take  place  between  it  and  gold  and  silver 
than  that  which  would  be  caused  by  the  action  of  commerce.  An  unusual  de 
mand  from  abroad  for  the  metals  would,  of  course,  raise  them  a  little  in  their 
relative  value,  and  depress,  relatively,  the  government  bills  in  the  same  propor 
tion,  which  would  cause  them  to  flow  into  the  treasury,  and  gold  and  silver  to 
flow  out ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  an  increased  demand  for  the  bills  in  the  do 
mestic  exchange  would  have  the  reverse  effect,  causing,  as  I  have  stated,  an 
alternate  flux  and  reflux  into  the  treasury  between  the  two,  which  would  at  all 
times  keep  their  relative  values  either  at  or  near  par. 

No  one  can  doubt  that  the  fact  of  the  government  receiving  and  paying  away 
bank-notes,  in  all  its  fiscal  transactions,  is  one  of  the  principal  sources  of  their 
great  circulation ;  and  it  was  mainly  on  that  account  that  the  notes  of  the  late 
Bank  of  the  United  States  so  freely  circulated  over  the  Union.  I  would  ask,  then, 
Why  should  the  government  mingle  its  credit  with  that  of  private  corporations  ? 
No  one  can  doubt  but  that  the  government  credit  is  better  than  that  of  any  bank — 
more  stable  and  more  safe.  Why,  then,  should  it  mix  it  up  with  the  less  perfect 
credit  of  those  institutions  ?  Why  not  use  its  own  credit  to  the  amount  of  its  own 
transactions  ?  Why  should  it  not  be  safe  in  its  own  hands,  while  it  shall  be  consid 
ered  safe  in  the  hands  of  800  private  institutions,  scattered  all  over  the  country, 
and  which  have  no  other  object  brt  their  own  private  profit,  to  increase  which,  they 
almost  constantly  extend  their  business  to  the  most  dangerous  extremes  ?  And 
why  should  the  community  be  compelled  to  give  six  per  cent,  discount  for  the  gov 
ernment  credit  blended  with  that  of  the  banks,  when  the  superior  credit  of  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  273 

government  could  be  furnished  separately,  without  discount,  to  the  mutual  ad 
vantage  of  the  government  and  the  community  ?  Why,  let  me  ask,  should  the 
government  be  exposed  to  such  difficulties  as  the  present,  by  mingling  its  credit 
with  the  banks,  when  it  could  be  exempt  from  all  such  by  using,  by  itself,  its 
own  safer  credit  ?  It  is  time  the  community,  which  has  so  deep  an  interest  in 
a  sound  and  cheap  currency,  and  the  equality  of  the  laws  between  one  portion, 
of  the  citizens  of  the  country  and  another,  should  reflect  seriously  on  these 
things,  not  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  any  interest,  but  to  correct  gradually 
disorders  of  a  dangerous  character,  which  have  insensibly,  in  the  long  course 
of  years,  without  being  perceived  by  any  one,  crept  into  the  state.  The  ques 
tion  is  not  between  credit  and  no  credit,  as  some  would  have  us  believe,  but  in 
"what  form  credit  can  best  perform  the  functions  of  a  sound  and  safe  currency. 
On  this  important  point  I  have  freely  thrown  out  rny  ideas,  leaving  it  to  this 
.body  and  the  public  to  determine  what  they  are  worth.  Believing  that  there 
might  be  a  sound  and  safe  paper  currency  founded  on  the  credit  of  the  govern 
ment  exclusively,  I  was  desirous  that  those  who  are  responsible,  and  have  the 
power,  should  have  availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  of  the  temporary  de- 
iicit  of  the  treasury,  and  the  postponement  of  the  fourth  instalment,  intended  to 
be  deposited  with  the  states,  to  use  them  as  the  means  of  affording  a  circulation 
for  the  present  relief  of  the  country  and  the  banks,  during  the  process  of  separ 
ating  them  from  the  government ;  and,  if  experience  should  justify  it,  of  furnish 
ing  a  permanent  and  safe  circulation,  which  would  greatly  facilitate  the  opera 
tions  of  the  treasury,  and  afford,  incidentally,  much  facility  to  the  commercial 
operations  of  the  country.  But  a  different  (direction  was  given,  and  when  the 
alternative  was  presented  of  a  loan,  or  the  withholding  of  the  fourth  instalment 
from  the  states,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  give  a  decided  vote  for  withholding  it.  My 
aversion  to  a  public  debt  is  deep  and  durable.  It  is,  in  my  opinion,  pernicious, 
and  is  little  short  of  a  fraud  on  the  public.  I  saw  too  much  of  it  during  the  late 
war  not  to  understand  something  of  the  nature  and  character  of  public  loans. 
Never  was  a  country  more  egregiously  imposed  on. 

Having  now  presented  my  views  of  the  course  and  the  measures  which  the 
permanent  policy  of  the  country,  looking  to  its  liberty  and  lasting  prosperity,  re 
quires,  I  come  finally  to  the  question  of  relief.  I  have  placed  this  last,  not  that 
I  am  devoid  of  sympathy  for  the  country  in  the  pecuniary  distress  which  now 
pervades  it.  No  one  struggled  earlier  or  longer  to  prevent  it  than  myself;  nor 
can  any  one  more  sensibly  feel  the  wide-spread  blight  which  has  suddenly 
blasted  the  hopes  of  so  many,  and  precipitated  thousands  from  affluence  to  pov 
erty.  The  desolation  has  fallen  mainly  on  the  mercantile  class — a  class  which 
I  have  ever  held  in  the  highest  estimation.  No  country  ever  had  a  superior 
body  of  merchants,  of  higher  honour,  of  more  daring  enterprise,  or  of  greater 
skill  and  energy.  The  ruin  of  such  a  class  is  a  heavy  calamity,  and  I  am  so 
licitous,  among  other  things,  to  give  such  stability  to  our  currency  as  to  prevent 
the  recurrence  of  a  similar  calamity  hereafter.  But  it  was  first  necessary,  in 
the  order  of  things,  that  we  should  determine  what  sound  policy,  looking  to  the 
future,  demands  to  be  done  at  the  present  juncture,  before  we  consider  the 
question  of  relief;  which,  as  urgent  as  it  may  be,  is  subordinate,  and  must  yield 
to  the  former.  The  patient  lies  under  a  dangerous  disease,  with  a  burning 
thirst  and  other  symptoms,  which  distress  him  more  than  the  vital  organs 
which  are  attacked.  The  skilful  physician  first  makes  himself  master  of  the 
nature  of  the  disease,  and  then  determines  on  the  treatment  necessary  for  the 
restoration  of  health.  This  done,  he  next  alleviates  the  distressing  symptoms 
as  far  as  is  consistent  with  the  restoration  of  health,  and  no  farther.  Such  shall 
be  my  course.  As  far  as  I  possibly  can,  consistently  with  the  views  I  entertain, 
and  what  I  believe  to  be  necessary  to  restore  the  body  politic  to  health,  I  will 
do  everything  in  my  power  to  mitigate  the  present  distress.  Farther  I  cannot  go. 

After  the  best  reflection,  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  government  can  do  but  lit- 

M  M 


274  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tie  in  the  way  of  relief ;  and  that  it  is  a  case  which  must  be  mainly  left  to  the 
constitution  of  the  patient,  who,  thank  God,  is  young,  vigorous,  and  robust,  with 
a  constitution  sufficient  to  sustain  and  overcome  the  severest  attack.  I  dread 
the  doctor  and  his  drugs  much  more  than  the  disease  itself.  The  distress  of 
the  country  consists  in  its  indebtedness,  and  can  only  be  relieved  by  payment 
of  its  debts.  To  effect  this,  industry,  frugality,  economy,  and  time  are  neces 
sary.  I  rely  more  on  the  growing  crop — on  the  cotton,  rice,  and  tobacco  of  the 
South,  than  on  all  the  projects  or  devices  of  politicians.  I  am  utterly  opposed 
to  all  coercion  by  this  government.  But  government  may  do  something  to  re 
lieve  the  distress.  It  is  out  of  debt,  and  is  one  of  the  principal  creditors  both 
of  the  banks  and  of  the  merchants,  and  should  set  an  example  of  liberal  indul 
gence.  This  I  am  willing  to  give  freely.  I  am  also  prepared  to  vote  freely 
the  use  of  government,  credit  in  some  safe  form,  to  supply  any  deficit  in  the  cir 
culation,  during  the  process  of  recovery,  as  far  as  its  financial  wants  will  per 
mit.  I  see  not  what  more  can  be  safely  done.  But  my  vision  may  be  obtuse 
upon  this  subject.  Those  who  differ  from  me,  and  who  profess  so  much  sym 
pathy  for  the  public,  seem  to  think  that  much  relief  may  be  afforded.  I  hope 
they  will  present  their  views.  I  am  anxious  to  hear  their  prescriptions,  and  I 
assure  them,  that  whatever  they  may  propose,  if  it  shall  promise  relief,  and  be 
not  inconsistent  with  the  course  which  I  deem  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
restoration  of  the  country  to  perfect  health,  shall  cheerfully  receive  my  support. 
They  may  be  more  keensighted  than  I  am  as  to  the  best,  means  of  relief,  but 
cannot  have  a  stronger  disposition  to  afford  it. 

We  have,  Mr.  President,  arrived  at  a  remarkable  era  in  our  political  history. 
The  days  of  legislative  and  executive  encroachments,  of  tariffs  and  surpluses, 
of  bank  and  public  debt,  and  extravagant  expenditure,  are  past  for  the  present. 
The  government  stands  in  a  position  disentangled  from  the  past,  and  freer  to 
choose  its  future  course  than  it  ever  has  been  since  its  commencement.  We 
are  about  to  take  a  fresh  start.  I  move  off  under  the  State  Rights  banner,  and 
go  in  the  direction  in  which  I  have  been  so  long  moving.  I  seize  the  opportunity 
thoroughly  to  reform  the  government ;  to  bring  it  back  to  its  original  principles  ; 
to  retrench  and  economize,  and  rigidly  to  enforce  accountability.  I  shall  op 
pose  strenuously  all  attempts  to  originate  a  new  debt ;  to  create  a  National 
Bank ;  to  reunite  the  political  and  money  powers  (more  dangerous  than  Church 
and  State)  in  any  form  or  shape ;  to  prevent  the  operation  of  the  compromise, 
which  is  gradually  removing  the  last  vestige  of  the  tariff  system  ;  and,  mainly, 
1  shall  use  my  best  efforts  to  give  an  ascendency  to  the  great  conservative  prin 
ciple  of  state  sovereignty,  over  the  dangerous  and  despotic  doctrine  of  consoli 
dation.  I  rejoice  to  think  that  the  executive  department  of  the  government  is 
now  so  reduced  in  power  and  means,  that  it  can  no  longer  rely  on  its  influence 
and  patronage  to  secure  a  majority.  Henceforward  it  can  have  no  hope  of  sup 
porting  itself  but  on  wisdom,  moderation,  patriotism,  and  devoted  attachment  to 
the  Constitution,  which,  I  trust,  will  make  it,  in  its  own  defence,  an  ally  in  ef 
fecting  the  reform  which  I  deem  indispensable  to  the  salvation  of  the  country 
and  its  institutions. 

I  look,  sir,  with  pride  to  the  wise  arid  noble  bearing  of  the  little  State  Rights 
party,  of  which  it  is  my  pride  to  be  a  member,  throughout  the  eventful  period 
through  which  the  country  has  passed  since  1824.  Experience  already  bears 
testimony  to  their  patriotism,  firmness,  and  sagacity,  and  history  will  do  it  jus 
tice.  In  that  year,  as  I  have  stated,  the  tariff  system  triumphed  in  the  councils 
of  the  nation.  We  saw  its  disastrous  political  bearings — foresaw  its  surpluses, 
and  the  extravagances  to  which  it  would  lead — we  rallied  on  the  election  of 
the  late  President  to  arrest  it  through  the  influence  of  the  executive  department 
of  the  government.  In  this  we  failed.  We  then  fell  back  upon  the  rights  and 
sovereignty  of  the  states  ;  and  by  the  action  of  a  small,  but  gallant  state,  and 
through  the  potency  of  its  interposition,  we  brought  the  system  to  the  ground, 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.   CALHOTJN.  275 

sustained  as  it  was  by  the  opposition  arid  the  administration,  and  by  the  whole 
power  and  patronage  of  the  government.  The  pernicious  overflow  of  the  treas 
ury,  of  which  it  was  the  parent,  could  not  be  arrested  at  once.  The  surplus 
was  seized  on  by  the  executive,  and,  by  its  control  over  the  banks,  became  the 
fruitful  source  of  executive  influence  and  encroachment.  Without  hesitation, 
Ave  joined  our  old  opponents  on  the  tariff  question,  but  under  our  own  flag,  and 
without  merging  in  their  ranks,  and  made  a  gallant  and  successful  war  against 
the  encroachments  of  the  executive.  That  terminated,  we  part  with  our  late 
allies  in  peace,  and  move  forward,  lag  or  onward  who  may,  to  secure  the  fruits 
of  our  long,  but  successful  struggle,  under  the  old  Republican  flag  of  '98,  which, 
though  tattered  and  torn,  has  never  yet  been  lowered,  and,  with  the  blessing  of 
God,  never  shall  be  with  my  consent. 


XIX. 

SPEECH   ON  HIS    AMENDMENT    TO   SEPARATE   THE    GOVERNMENT   FROM   THE   BANKS, 

OCTOBER  3,  1837. 

Mr.  PRESIDENT  :  In  reviewing  this  discussion,  I  have  been  struck  with  the 
fact,  that  the  argument  on  the  opposite  side  has  been  limited,  almost  exclu 
sively,  to  the  questions  of  relief  and  the  currency.  These  are,  undoubtedly,  im 
portant  questions,  and  well  deserving  tlie  deliberate  consideration  of  the  Sen 
ate  ;  but  there  are  other  questions  involved  in  this  issue  of  a  far  more  elevated 
character,  which  more  imperiously  demand  our  attention.  The  banks  have 
ceased  to  be  mere  moneyed  incorporations.  They  have  become  great  political 
institutions,  with  vast  influence  over  the  welfare  of  the  community ;  so  much 
so,  that  a  highly  distinguished  senator  (Mr.  C^y)  has  declared,  in  his  place, 
that  the  question  of  the  disunion  of  the  government  and  the  banks  involved  in 
its  consequences  the  disunion  of  the  states  themselves.  With  this  declaration 
sounding  in  our  ears,  it  is  time  to  look  into  the  origin  of  a  system  which  has 
already  acquired  such  mighty  influence  ;  to  inquire  into  the  causes  which  have 
produced  it,  and  whether  they  are  still  on  the  increase ;  in  what  they  will  ter 
minate,  if  left  to  themselves ;  and,  finally,  whether  the  system  is  favourable  to 
the  permanency  of  our  free  institutions  ;  to  the  industry  and  business  of  the 
country  ;  and,  above  all,  to  the  moral  and  intellectual  development  of  the  com 
munity.  I  feel  the  vast  importance  and  magnitude  of  these  topics,  as  well  as 
their  great  delicacy.  I  shall  touch  them  with  extreme  reluctance,  and  only  be 
cause  I  believe  them  to  belong  to  the  occasion,  and  that  it  would  be  a  derelic 
tion  of  public  duty  to  withhold  any  opinion,  which  I  have  deliberately  formed, 
on  the  subject  under  discussion. 

The  rise  and  progress  of  the  banking  system  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
and  curious  phenomena  of  modern  times.  Its  origin  is  modern  and  humble, 
and  §-ave  no  indication  of  the  extraordinary  growth  and  influence  which  it  was 
destined  to  attain.  It  dates  back  to  1609,  the  year  that  the  Bank  of  Amsterdam 
was  established.  Other  banking  institutions  preceded  it ;  but  they  were  insula 
ted,  and  not  immediately  connected  with  the  systems  which  have  since  sprung  up, 
and  which  may  be  distinctly  traced  to  that  bank,  which  was  a  bank  of  deposite 
— a  mere  storehouse — established  under  the  authority  of  that  great  commer 
cial  metropolis,  for  the  purpose  of  safe-keeping  the  precious  metals,  and  facili 
tating  the  vast  system,  of  exchanges  which  then  centred  there.  The  whole  sys 
tem  was  the  most  simple  and  beautiful  that  can  be  imagined.  The  depositor, 
on  delivering  his  bullion  or  coin  in  store,  received  a  credit,  estimated  at  the 
standard  value  on  the  books  of  the  bank,  and  a  certificate  of  deposite  for  the 
amount,  which  was  transferable  from  hand  to  hand,  and  entitled  the  holder  to 


276  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

withdraw  the  deposite  on  payment  of  a  moderate  fee  for  the  expense  and  hazard 
of  safe-keeping.  These  certificates  became,  in  fact,  the  circulating  medium  of 
the  community,  performing,  as  it  were,  the  hazard  and  drudgery,  while  the  pre 
cious  metals,  which  they,  in  truth,  represented,  guilder  for  guilder,  lay  quietly  in 
store,  without  being  exposed  to  the  wear  and  tear,  or  losses  incidental  to  actual 
use.  It  was  thus  a  paper  currency  was  created,  having  all  the  solidity,  safety, 
and  uniformity  of  a  metallic,  with  the  facility  belonging  to  that  of  paper.  The 
whole  arrangement  was  admirable,  and  worthy  of  the  strong  sense  and  down 
right  honesty  of  the  people  with  whom  it  originated. 

Out  of  this,  which  may  be  called  the  first  era  of  the  system,  grew  the  bank  of 
deposite,  discount,  and  circulation — a  great  and  mighty  change,  destined  to  ef 
fect  a  revolution  in  the  condition  of  modern  society.  It  is  not  difficult  to  explain 
how  the  one  system  should  spring  from  the  other,  notwithstanding  the  striking 
dissimilarity  in  features  and  character  between  the  offspring  and  the  parent.  A 
vast  sum,  not  less  than  three  millions  sterling,  accumulated  and  remained  habit 
ually  in  deposite  in  the  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  the  place  of  the  returned  certifi 
cates  being  constantly  supplied  by  new  depositors.  With  so  vast  a  standing 
deposite,  it  required  but  little  reflection  to  perceive  that  a  very  large  portion  of 
it  might  be  withdrawn,  and  that  a  sufficient  amount  would  be  still  left  to  meet 
the  returning  certificates  ;  or,  what  would  be  the  same  in  effect,  that  an  equal 
amount  of  fictitious  certificates  might  be  issued  beyond  the  sum  actually  depos- 
^  ited.  Either  process,  if  interest  be  charged  on  the  deposites  withdrawn,  or  the 
fictitious  certificates  issued,  would  be  a  near  approach  to  a  bank  of  discount. 
This  once  seen,  it  required  but  little  reflection  to  perceive  that  the  same  pro- 

Ecess  would  be  equally  applicable  to  a  capital  placed  in  bank  as  stock  ;  and  from 
.^that  the  transition  was  easy  to  issuing  bank-notes  payable  on  demand,  on  bills 
of  exchange,  or  promissory  notes,  having  but  a  short  time  to  run.  These,  com 
bined,  constitute  the  elements  of  a  bank  of  discount,  deposite,  and  circulation. 
Modern  ingenuity  and  dishonesty  would  not  have  been  long  in  perceiving  and 
turning  such  advantages  to  accost ;  but  the  faculties  of  the  plain  Belgian  was 
either  too  blunt  to  perceive,  or  his  honesty  too  stern  to  avail  himself  of  them. 
To  his  honour,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  notwithstanding  the  temptation,  the 
deposites  were  sacredly  kept,  and  that  for  every  certificate  in  circulation,  there 
was  a  corresponding  amount  in  bullion  or  coin  in  store.  It  was  reserved  for 
another  people,  either  more  ingenious  or  less  scrupulous,  to  make  the  change. 
The  Bank  of  England  was  incorporated  in  1694,  eighty-five  years  after  that 
of  Amsterdam,  and  was  the  first  bank  of  deposite,  discount,  and  circulation. 
Its  capital  was  £1,200,000,  consisting  wholly  of  government  stock,  bearing  an 
interest  of  eight  per  cent,  per  annum.  Its  notes  were  received  in  the  dues  of 
the  government,  and  the  public  revenue  was  deposited  in  the  bank.  It  was  au 
thorized  to  circulate  exchequer  bills,  and  make  loans  to  government.  Let  us 
pause  for  a  moment,  and  contemplate  this  complex  and  potent  machine,  under 
its  various  character  and  functions. 

As  a  bank  of  deposite,  it  was  authorized  to  receive  deposites,  not  simply  for 
safe-keeping,  to  be  returned  when  demanded  by  the  depositor,  but  to  ta  used 
and  loaned  out  for  the  benefit  of  the  institution,  care  being  taken  always  lo  be 
provided  with  the  means  of  returning  an  equal  amount,  when  demanded.  As 
a  bank  of  discount  and  circulation,  it  issued  its  notes  OR  the  faith  of  its  capital 
stock  and  deposites,  or  discounted  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes  back 
ed  by  responsible  endorsers,  charging  an  interest  something  greater  than  was 
authorized  by  law  to  be  charged  on  loans ;  and  thus  allowing  it,  for  the  use  of 
its  credit,  a  higher  rate  of  compensation  than  what  individuals  were  authorized 
to  receive  for  the  use  and  hazard  of  money  or  capital  loaned  out.  It  will,  per 
haps,  place  this  point  in  a  clear  light,  if  we  should  consider  the  transaction  in 
its  true  character,  not  as  a  loan,  but  as  a  mere  exchange  of  credit.  In  discount 
ing,  the  bank  takes,  in  the  shape  of  a  promissory  note,  the  credit  of  an  indi- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  277 

vidual  so  good  that  another,  equally  responsible,  endorses  his  note  for  nothing, 
and  gives  out  its  credit  in  the  form  of  a  bank-note.  The  transaction  is  obvious 
ly  a  mere  exchange  of  credit.  If  the  drawer  and  endorser  break,  the  loss  is 
the  Bank's ;  but  if  the  Bank  breaks,  the  loss  fails  on  the  community  ;  and  yet 
this  transaction,  so  dissimilar,  is  confounded  with  a  loan,  and  the  bank  per 
mitted  to  charge,  on  a  mere  exchange  of  credit,  in  which  the  hazard  of  the 
breaking  of  the  drawer  and  endorser  is  incurred  by  the  Bank,  and  that  of  the 
Bank  by  the  community,  a  higher  sum  than  the  legal  rate  of  interest  on  a  loan  ; 
in  which,  besides  the  use  of  his  capital,  the  hazard  is  all  on  the  side  of  the 
lender. 

Turning  from  these  to  the  advantages  which  it  derived  from  its  connexion 
with  the  government,  we  shall  find  them  not  less  striking.  Among  the  first  of 
these  in  importance  is  the  fact  of  its  notes  being  received  in  the  dues  of  the 
government,  by  which  the  credit  of  the  government  was  added  to  that  of  the 
Bank,  which  added  so  greatly  to  the  increase  of  its  circulation.  These,  again, 
when  collected  by  the  government,  were  placed  in  deposite  in  the  Bank  ;  thus 
giving  to  it  not  only  the  profit  resulting  from  their  abstraction  from  circulation, 
from  the  time  of  collection  till  disbursement,  but  also  that  from  the  use  of  the 
public  deposites  in  the  interval.  To  complete  the  picture,  the  Bank,  in  its  ca 
pacity  of  lender  to  the  government,  in  fact  paid  its  own  notes,  which  rested  on 
the  faith  of  the  government  stock,  on  which  it  was  drawing  eight  per  cent. ; 
so  that,  in  truth,  it  but  loaned  to  the  government  its  own  credit. 

Such  were  the  extraordinary  advantages  conferred  on  this  institution,  and  of 
which  it  had  an  exclusive  monopoly  ;  and  these  are  the  causes  which  gave  such 
an  extraordinary  impulse  to  its  growth  and  influence,  that  it  increased  in  a  lit 
tle  more  than  a  hundred  years — from  1694,  when  the  second  era  of  the  sys 
tem  commenced,  with  the  establishment  of  the  Bank  of  England,  to  1797,  when 
it  terminated— from  £1,200,000  to  nearly  £1 1,000,000,  and  this  mainly  by  the 
addition  to  its  capital  through  loans  to  the  government  above  the  profits  of  its 
annual  dividends.  Before  entering  on  the  third  era  of  the  system,  I  pause  to 
make  a  few  reflections  on  the  second. 

I  am  struck,  in  casting  my  eyes  over  it,  to  find  that,  notwithstanding  the  great 
dissimilarity  of  features  which  the  system  had  assumed  in  passing  from  a  mere 
bank  of  deposite  to  that  of  deposite,  discount,  and  circulation,  the  operation  of 
the  latter  was  confounded,  throughout  this  long  period,  as  it  regards  the  effects 
on  the  currency,  with  the  bank  of  deposite.  Its  notes  were  universally  regard 
ed  as  representing  gold  and  silver,  and  as  depending  on  that  representation  ex*  • 
clusively  for  their  circulation  ;  as  much  so  as  did  the  certificates  of  deposite  in  the 
original  Bank  of  Amsterdam.  No  one  supposed  that  they  could  retain  their 
credit  for  a  moment  after  they  ceased  to  be  convertible  into  the  metals  on  de 
mand  ;  nor  were  they  supposed  to  have  the  effect  of  increasing  the  aggregate 
amount  of  the  currency  ;  nor,  of  course,  of  increasing  prices.  In  a  word,  they 
were  in  the  public  mind  as  completely  identified  with  the  metallic  currency  as  if 
every  note  in  circulation  had  laid  up  in  the  vaults  of  the  Bank  an  equal  amount, 
pound  for  pound,  into  which  all  its  paper  could  be  converted  the  moment  it  was 
presented. 

All  this  was  a  great  delusion.  The  issues  of  the  Bank  never  did  represent, 
from  the  first,  the  precious  metals.  Instead  of  the  representatives,  its  notes 
were,  in  reality,  the  substitute  for  coin.  Instead  of  being  the  mere  drudges, 
performing  all  the  out-door  service,  while  the  coins  reposed  at  their  ease  in  the 
vaults  of  the  banks,  free  from  wear  and  tear,  and  the  hazard  of  loss  or  destruc 
tion,  as  did  the  certificates  of  deposite  in  the  original  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  they 
substituted,  degraded,  and  banished  the  coins.  Every  note  circulated  became 
the  substitute  of  so  much  coin,  and  dispensed  with  it  in  circulation,  and  thereby 
depreciated  the  value  of  the  precious  metals,  and  increased  their  consumption 
in  the  same  proportion ;  while  it  diminished  in  the  same  degree  the  supply,  by 


278  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

rendering  mining  less  profitable.  The  system  assumed  gold  and  silver  as  the 
basis  of  its  circulation  ;  and  yet,  by  the  laws  of  its  nature,  just  as  it  increased 
its  circulation,  in  the  same  degree  the  foundation  on  which  the  system  stood 
was  weakened.  The  consumption  of  the  metals  increased,  and  the  supply  di-  , 
minished.  As  the  weight  of  the  superstructure  increased,  just  in  the  same  pro 
portion  its  foundation  was  undermined  and  weakened.  Thus  the  germe  of  de 
struction  was  implanted  in  the  system  at  its  birth  ;  has  expanded  with  its  growth, 
and  must  terminate,  finally,  in  its  dissolution,  unless,  indeed,  it  should,  by  some 
transition,  entirely  change  its  nature,  and  pass  into  some  other  and  entirely  dif 
ferent  organic  form.  The  conflict  between  bank  circulation  and  metallic  (though 
not  perceived  in  the  first  stage  of  the  system,  when  they  were  supposed  to  be 
indissolubly  connected)  is  mortal ;  one  or  the  other  must  perish  in  the  struggle. 
Such  is  the  decree  of  fate  :  it  is  irreversible. 

Near  the  close  of  the  second  era,  the  system  passed  the  Atlantic,  and  took 
root  in  our  country,  where  it  found  the  soil  still  more  fertile,  and  the  climate 
more  congenial  than  even  in  the  parent  country.  The  Bank  of  North  America 
was  established  in  1781,  with  a  capital  of  $400,000,  and  bearing  all  the  fea 
tures  of  its  prototype,  the  Bank  of  England.  In  the  short  space  of  a  little  more 
than  half  a  century,  the  system  has  expanded  from  one  bank  to  about  eight  hun 
dred,  including  branches  (no  one  knows  the  exact  number,  so  rapid  the  increase), 
and  from  a  capital  of  less  than  half  a  million  to  about  $300,000,000,  without, 
apparently,  exhausting  or  diminishing  its  capacity  to  increase.  So  accelerated 
has  been  its  growth  with  us,  from  causes  which  I  explained  on  a  former  occa 
sion,*  that  already  it  has  approached  a  point  much  nearer  the  limits  beyond 
which  the  system,  in  its  present  form,  cannot  advance,  than  in  England. 

During  the  year  1797,  the  Bank  of  England  suspended  specie  payments  :  an 
event  destined,  by  its  consequences,  to  effect  a  revolution  in  public  opinion  in  re 
lation  to  the  system,  and  to  accelerate  the  period  which  must  determine  its  fate. 
England  was  then  engaged  in  that  gigantic  struggle  which  originated  in  the 
French  Revolution,  and  her  financial  operations  were  on  the  most  extended  scale, 
followed  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  action  of  the  Bank,  as  her  fiscal 
agent.  It  sunk  under  its  over-action.  Specie  payments  were  suspended. 
Panic  and  dismay  spread  through  the  land — so  deep  and  durable  was  the  im 
pression  that  the  credit  of  the  Bank  depended  exclusively  on  the  punctuality  of 
its  payments. 

In  the  midst  of  the  alarm,  an  act  of  Parliament  was  passed  making  the  notes 
of  the  Bank  a  legal  tender  ;  and,  to  the  surprise  of  all,  the  institution  proceeded 
on,  apparently  without  any  diminution  of  its  credit.  Its  notes  circulated  freely 
as  ever,  and  without  any  depreciation,  for  a  time,  compared  with  gold  and  silver  ; 
and  continued  so  to  do  for  upward  of  twenty  years,  with  an  average  diminution 
of  about  one  per  cent,  per  annum.  This  shock  did  much  to  dispel  the  delusion 
that  bank-notes  represented  gold  and  silver,  and  that  they  circulated  in  conse 
quence  of  such  representation,  but  without  entirely  obliterating  the  old  impres 
sion  which  had  taken  such  strong  hold  on  the  public  mind.  The  credit  of  its 
notes  during  the  suspension  was  generally  attributed  to  the  tender  act,  and  the 
great  and  united  resources  of  the  Bank  and  the  government. 

But  an  event  followed  of  the  same  kind,  under  circumstances  entirely  differ 
ent,  which  did  more  than  any  preceding  to  shed  light  on  the  true  nature  of  the 
system,  and  to  unfold  its  vast  capacity  to  sustain  itself  without  exterior  aid. 
"We  finally  became  involved  in  the  mighty  struggle  that  had  so  long  desolated 
Europe  and  enriched  our  country.  War  was  declared  against  Great  Britain  in 
1812,  and  in  the  short  space  of  one  year  our  feeble  banking  system  sunk  un 
der  the  increased  fiscal  action  of  government.  I  was  then  a  member  of  the 
other  house,  and  had  taken  my  full  share  of  responsibility  in  the  measures  which 

*  See  Speech  on  Mr.  Webster's  motion  to  renew  the  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank  in  1834 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  279 

liad  led  to  that  result.  I  shall  never  forget  the  sensation  which  the  suspension, 
and  the  certain  anticipation  of  the  prostration  of  the  currency  of  the  country,  as 
a  consequence,  excited  in  my  mind.  We  could  resort  to  no  tender  act ;  we  had 
no  great  central  regulating  power,  like  the  Bank  of  England  ;  and  the  credit  and 
resources  of  the  government  were  comparatively  small.  Under  such  circum 
stances,  I  looked  forward  to  a  sudden  and  great  depreciation  of  bank-notes,  and 
that  they  would  fall  speedily  as  low  as  the  old  continental  money.  Guess  my 
surprise  when  I  saw  them  sustain  their  credit,  with  scarcely  any  depreciation, 
for  a  time,  from  the  shock.  I  distinctly  recollect  when  I  first  asked  myself  the 
•question,  What  was  the  cause  ?  and  which  directed  my  inquiry  into  the  extraordi 
nary  phenomenon.  I  soon  saw  that  the  system  contained  within  itself  a  self-sus 
taining  power ;  that  there  was  between  the  banks  and  the  community,  mutually, 
the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor,  there  being  at  all  times  something  more  due  to 
the  banks  from  the  community  than  from  the  latter  to  the  former.  I  saw,  in  this""' 
reciprocal  relation  of  debts  and  credits,  that  the  demand  of  the  banks  on  the  com 
munity  was  greater  than  the  amount  of  their  notes  in  circulation  could  meet ;  and 
that,  consequently,  so  long  as  their  debtors  were  solvent,  and  bound  to  pay  at 
short  periods,  their  notes  could  not  fail  to  be  at  or  near  a  par  with  gold  and  sil 
ver.  I  also  saw  that,  as  their  debtors  were  principally  the  merchants,  they 
would  take  bank-notes  to  meet  their  bank  debts,  and  that  that  which  the  mer 
chant  and  the  government,  who  are  the  great  money-dealers,  take,  the  rest  of 
the  comimmity  would  also  take.  Seeing  all  this,  I  clearly  perceived  that  self- 
sustaining  principle  which  poised  the  system,  self-balanced,  like  some  celestial 
body,  moving  with  scarcely  a  perceptible  deviation  from  its  path,  from  the  con 
cussion  it  had  received. 

Shortly  after  the  termination  of  the  war,  specie  payments  were  coerced  with 
us  by  the  establishment  of  a  National  Bank,  and  a  few  years  afterward,  in  Great 
Britain,  by  an  act  of  Parliament.  In  both  countries  the  restoration  was  follow 
ed  by  wide-spread  distress,  as  it  always  must  be  when  effected  by  coercion ; 
for  the  simple  reason  that  banks  cannot  pay  unless  their  debtors  first  pay,  and 
that  to  coerce  the  banks  compels  them  to  coerce  their  debtors  before  they  have 
the  means  to  pay.  Their  failure  must  be  the  consequence  ;  and  this  involves 
the  failure  of  the  banks  themselves,  carrying  with  it  universal  distress.  Hence 
I  am  opposed  to  all  kinds  of  coercion,  and  am  in  favour  of  leaving  the  disease 
to  time,  with  the  action  of  public  sentiment  and  the  states,  to  which  the  banks 
are  al'one  responsible. 

But  to  proceed  with  my  narrative.  Although  specie  payments  were  restored, 
and -the  system  apparently  placed  where  it  was  before  the  suspension,  the  great 
capacity  it  proved  to  possess  of  sustaining  itself  without  specie  payments,  was 
not  forgot  by  those  who  had  its  direction.  The  impression  that  it  was  indispen 
sable  to  the  circulation  of  bank-notes  that  they  should  represent  the  precious 
metals,  was  almost  obliterated  ;  and  the  latter  were  regarded  rather  as  restrictions 
on  the  free  and  profitable  operation  of  the  system  than  as  the  means  of  its  security. 
Hence  a  feeling  of  opposition  to  gold  and  silver  gradually  grew  up  on  the  part 
of  the  banks,  which  created  an  esprit  du  corps,  followed  by  a  moral  resistance 
to  specie  payments,  if  I  may  so  express  myself,  which  in  fact  suspended,  in  a 
great  degree,  the  conversion  of  their  notes  into  the  precious  metals,  long  before 
the  present  suspension.  With  the  growth  of  this  feeling,  banking  business  as 
sumed  a  bolder  character,  and  its  profits  were  proportionably  enlarged,  and  with 
it  the  tendency  of  the  system  to  increase  kept  pace.  The  effect  of  this  soon 
displayed  itself  in  a  striking  manner,  which  was  followed  by  very  important  con 
sequences,  which  I  shall  next  explain. 

It  so  happened  that  the  charters  of  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  late  Bank 
of  the  United  States  expired  about  the  same  time.  As  the  period  approached, 
a  feeling  of  hostility,  growing  out  of  the  causes  just  explained,  which  had  ex 
cited  a  strong  desire  in  the  community,  who  could  not  participate  in  the  profits 


280  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  these  two  great  monopolies,  to  throw  off  their  restraint,  began  to  disclose  it 
self  against  both  institutions.  In  Great  Britain  it  terminated  in  breaking  down 
the  exclusive  monopoly  of  the  Bank  of  England,  and  narrowing  greatly  the  spe 
cie  basis  of  the  system,  by  making  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  England  a  legal 
tender  in  all  cases,  except  between  it  and  its  creditors.  A  sudden  and  vast  in 
crease  of  the  system,  with  a  great  diminution  of  the  metallic  basis  in  proportion, 
to  banking  transactions,  followed,  which  has  shocked  and  weakened  the  stabil 
ity  of  the  system  there.  With  us  the  result  was  different.  The  Bank  fell  un 
der  the  hostility  of  the  government.  All  restraint  on  the  system  was  removed, 
and  banks  shot  up  in  every  direction  almost  instantly,  under  the  growing  im 
pulse  which  I  have  explained,  and  which,  with  the  causes  I  stated  when  I  first 
addressed  the  Senate  on  this  question,  is  the  cause  of  the  present  catastrophe. 

With  it  commences  the  fourth  era  of  the  system,  which  we  have  just  entered 
— an  era  of  struggle,  and  conflict,  and  changes.  The  system  can  advance  no 
farther  in  our  country,  without  great  and  radical  changes.  It  has  come  to  a 
stand.  The  conflict  between  metallic  and  bank  currency,  which  I  have  shown,  ^ 
to  be  inherent  in  the  system,  has,  in  the  course  of  time,  and  with  the  progress 
of  events,  become  so  deadly  that  they  must  separate,  and  one  or  the  other  fall. 
The  degradation  of  the  value  of  the  metals,  and  their  almost  entire  expulsion, 
from  their  appropriate  sphere  as  the  medium  of  exchange  and  the  standard  of 
value,  have  gone  so  far,  under  the  necessary  operation  of  the  system,  that  they 
are  no  longer  sufficient  to  form  the  basis  of  the  widely-extended  system  of  bank 
ing.  From  the  first,  the  gravitation  of  the  system  has  been  in  one  direction — 7\ 
to  dispense  with  Ihe  use  of  the  metals ;  and  hence  the  descent  from  a  bank  of  de- 
posite  to  one  of  discount ;  and  hence,  from  being  the  representative,  their  notes  ) 
have  become  the  substitute  for  gold  and  silver ;  and  hence,  finally,  its  present  \ 
tendency  to  a  mere  paper  engine,  totally  separated  from  the  metals.  One  law< 
has  steadily  governed  the  system  throughout — the  enlargement  of  its  profits  and 
influence ;  and,  as  a  consequence,  as  metallic  currency  became  insufficient  for 
circulation,  it  has  become,  in  its  progress,  insufficient  for  the  basis  of  banking 
operations  ;  so  much  so,  that,  if  specie  payments  were  restored,  it  would  be  but 
nominal,  and  the  system  would  in  a  few  years,  on  the  first  adverse  current, 
sink  down  again  into  its  present  helpless  condition.  Nothing  can  prevent  it  but 
great  and  radical  changes,  which  would  diminish  its  profits  and  influence,  so  as 
effectually  to  arrest  that  strong  and  deep  current  which  has  carried  so  much  of 
the  wealth  and  capital  of  the  community  in  that  direction.  Without  that,  the 
system,  as  now  constituted,  must  fall ;  unless,  indeed,  it  can  form  an  alliance 
with  the  government,  and  through  it  establish  its  authority  by  law,  and  make  its 
credit,  unconnected  with  gold  and  silver,  the  medium  of  circulation.  If  the  al 
liance  should  take  place,  one  of  the  first  movements  would  be  the  establishment 
of  a  great  central  institution  ;  or,  if  that  should  prove  impracticable,  a  combina 
tion  of  a  few  selected  and  powerful  state  banks,  which,  sustained  by  the  govern 
ment,  would  crush  or  subject  the  weaker,  to  be  followed  by  an  amendment  of 
the  Constitution,  or  some  other  device,  to  limit  their  number  and  the  amount  of 
their  capital  hereafter.  This  done,  the  next  step  would  be  to  confine  and  con 
solidate  the  supremacy  of  the  system  over  the  currency  of  the  country,  which, 
would  be  in  its  hands  exclusively,  and,  through  it,  over  the  industry,  business, 
and  politics  of  the  country ;  all  of  which  would  be  wielded  to  advance  its  prof 
its  and  power. 

The  system  having  now  arrived  at  this  point,  the  great  and  solemn  duty  de 
volves  on  us  to  determine  this  day  what  relation  this  government  shall  hereafter 
bear  to  it.  Shall  we  enter  into  an  alliance  with  it,  and  become  the  sharers  of 
its  fortune  and  the  instrument  of  its  aggrandizement  and  supremacy  ?  This  is 
the  momentous  question  on  which  we  must  now  decide.  Before  we  decide,  it 
behooves  us  to  inquire  whether  the  system  is  favourable  to  the  permanency  of 
our  free  Republican  institutions,  to  the  industry  and  business  of  the  country,  and^ 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  281 

above  all,  to  our  moral  and  intellectual  development,  the  great  object  for  which 
we  were  placed  here  by  the  Author  of  our  being. 

Can  it  be  doubted  what  must  be  the  effects  of  a  system  whose  operations  have  ^ 
been  shown  to  be  so  unequal  on  free  institutions,  whose  foundation  rests  on  an 
equality  of  rights  ?  Can  that  favour  equality  which  gives  to  one  portion  of  the 
citizens  and  the  country  such  decided  advantages  over  the  other,  as  I  have  shown 
it  does  in  my  opening  remarks  1  Can  that  be  favourable  to  liberty  which  cton- 
centrates  the  money  power,  and  places  it  under  the  control  of  a  few  powerful 
and  wealthy  individuals  ?  It  is  the  remark  of  a  profound  statesman,  that  the 
revenue  is  the  state ;  and,  of  course,  those  who  control  the  revenue  control  the 
state  ;  and  those  who  can  control  the  money  power  can  control  the  revenue, 
and  through  it  the  state,  with  the  property  and  industry  of  the  country,  in  all  its 
ramifications.  Let  us  pause  for  a  moment,  and  reflect  on  the  nature  and  extent 
of  this  tremendous  power. 

The  currency  of  a  country  is  to  the  community  what  the  blood  is  to  the  hu 
man  system.  It  constitutes  a  small  part,  but  it  circulates  through  every  portion, 
and  is  indispensable  to  all  the  functions  of  life.  The  currency  bears  even  a 
smaller  proportion  to  the  aggregate  capital  of  the  community  than  what  the  blood 
does  to  the  solids  in  the  human  system.  What  that  proportion  is,  has  not  been, 
and  perhaps  cannot  be,  accurately  ascertained,  as  it  is  probably  subject  to  con 
siderable  variations.  It  is,  however,  probably  between  twenty-five  and  thirty-five 
to  one.  I  will  assume  it  to  be  thirty  to  one.  With  this  assumption,  let  us  sup 
pose  a  community  whose  aggregate  capital  is  $31,000,000  ;  its  currency  woul<£ 
be,  by  supposition,  one  million,  and  the  residue  of  its  capital  thirty  millions.  This1 
being  assumed,  if  the  currency  be  increased  or  decreased,  the  other  portion  of 
the  capital  remaining  the  same,  according  to  the  well-known  laws  of  currency, 
property  would  rise  or  fall  with  the  increase  or  decrease  ;  that  is,  if  the  cur 
rency  be  increased  to  two  millions,  the  aggregate  value  of  property  would  rise 
to  sixty  millions  ;  and,  if  the  currency  be  reduced  to  $500,000,  it  would  be  re 
duced  to  fifteen  millions.  With  this  law  so  well  established,  place  the  money 
power  in  the  hands  of  a  single  individual,  or  a  combination  of  individuals,  and 
they,  by  expanding  or  contracting  the  currency,  may  raise  or  sink  prices  at 
pleasure ;  and  by  purchasing  when  at  the  greatest  depression,  and  selling  at 
the  greatest  elevation,  may  command  the  whole  property  and  industry  of  the 
community,  and  control  its  fiscal  operations.  The  banking  system  concentrates 
and  places  this  power  in  the  hands  of  those  who  control  it,  and  its  force  in 
creases  just  in  proportion  as  it  dispenses  with  a  metallic  basis.  Never  was  an. 
engine  invented  better  calculated  to  place  the  destiny  of  the  many  in  the  hands 
of  the  few,  or  less  favourable  to  that  equality  and  independence  which  lies  at  the  ' 
bottom  of  our  free  institutions. 

These  views  have  a  bearing  not  less  decisive  on  the  next  inquiry — the  effects 
of  the  system  on  the  industry  and  wealth  of  the  country.  Whatever  may  have 
been  its  effects  in  this  respect  in  its  early  stages,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  any 
thing  more  mischievous  on  all  of  the  pursuits  of  life  than  the  frequent  and  sud 
den  expansions  and  contractions,  to  which  it  has  now  become  so  habitually  sub 
ject  that  it  may  be  considered  its  ordinary  condition.  None  but  those  in  the 
secret  know  what  to  do.  All  are  pausing  and  looking  out  to  ascertain  whether 
an  expansion  or  contraction  is  next  to  follow,  and  what  will  be  its  extent  and 
duration ;  and  if,  perchance,  an  error  be  committed — if  it  expands  when  a  con 
traction  is  expected,  or  the  reverse — the  most  prudent  may  lose  by  the  miscalcu 
lation  the  fruits  of  a  life  of  toil  and  care.  The  consequence  is,  to  discourage 
industry,  and  to  convert  the  whole  community  into  stock-jobbers  and  speculators. 
The  evil  is  constantly  on  the  increase,  and  must  continue  to  increase  just  as  tha 
banking  system  becomes  more  diseased,  till  it  shall  become  utterly  intolerable. 

But  its  most  fatal  effects  originate  in  its  bearing  on  the  moral  and  intellectual 
development  of  the  community.  The  great  principle  of  demand  and  supply  gov- 

N  N 


282  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

erns  the  moral  and  intellectual  world  no  less  than  the  business  and  commercial. 
If  a  community  be  so  constituted  as  to  cause  a  demand  for  high  mental  at 
tainments,  or  if  its  honours  arid  rewards  are  allotted  to  pursuits  that  require 
their  development,  by  creating  a  demand  for'  intelligence,  knowledge,  wisdom, 
justice,  firmness,  courage,  patriotism,  and  the  like,  they  are  sure  to  be  produced. 
But  if,  on  the  contrary,  they  be  allotted  to  pursuits  that  require  inferior  qualities, 
the  higher  are  sure  to  decay  and  perish.  I  object  to  the  banking  system,  be 
cause  it  allots  the  honours  and  rewards  of  the  community,  in  a  very  undue  pro 
portion,  to  a  pursuit  the  least  of  all  favourable  to  the  development  of  the  higher 
mental  qualities,  intellectual  or  moral,  to  the  decay  of  the  learned  professions, 
and  the  more  noble  pursuits  of  sciene,  literature,  philosophy,  and  statesmanship, 
and  the  great  and  more  useful  pursuits  of  business  and  industry.  With  the  vast 
increase  of  its  profits  and  influence,  it  is  gradually  concentrating  in  itself  most 
of  the  prizes  of  life — wealth,  honour,  and  influence,  to  the  great  disparagement 
and  degradation  of  all  the  liberal,  and  useful,  and  generous  pursuits  of  society. 
The  rising  generation  cannot  but  feel  its  deadening  influence.  The  youths 
who  crowd  our  colleges,  and  behold  the  road  to  honour  and  distinction  termina 
ting  in  a  banking-house,  will  feel  the  spirit  of  emulation  decay  within  them,  and 
will  no  longer  be  pressed  forward  by  generous  ardour  to  mount  up  the  rugged 
steep  of  science  as  the  road  to  honour  and  distinction,  when,  perhaps,  the  high 
est  point  they  could  attain,  in  what  was  once  the  most  honourable  and  influential 
of  all  the  learned  professions,  would  be  the  place  of  attorney  to  a  bank. 

Nearly  four  years  since,  on  the  question  of  the  removal  of  the  deposites, 
although  I  was  opposed  to  the  removal,  and  in  favour  of  their  restoration,  be 
cause  I  believed  it  to  be  illegal,  yet,  foreseeing  what  was  coming,  and  not 
wishing  there  should  be  any  mistake  as  to  my  opinion  on  the  banking  system, 
I  stated  here  in  my  place  what  that  opinion  was.  I  declared  that  I  had  long 
entertained  doubts,  if  doubts  they  might  be  called,  which  were  daily  increasing, 
that  the  system  made  the  worst  possible  distribution  of  the  wealth  of  the  com 
munity,  and  that  it  would  ultimately  be  found  hostile  to  the  farther  advancement 
of  civilization  and  liberty.  This  declaration  was  not  lightly  made  :  and  I  have 
now  unfolded  the  grounds  on  which  it  rested,  and  which  subsequent  events  and 
reflection  have  matured  into  a  settled  conviction. 

With  all  these  consequences  before  us,  shall  we  restore  the  broken  connex 
ion  ?  Shall  we  again  unite  the  government  with  the  system  ?  And  what  are 
the  arguments  opposed  to  these  high  and  weighty  objections?  Instead  of  meet 
ing  them  and  denying  their  truth,  or  opposing  others  of  equal  weight,  a  rabble 
of  objections  (I  can  call  them  by  no  better  name)  are  urged  against  the  separa 
tion  :  one  currency  for  the  government,  and  another  for  the  people  ;  separation 
of  the  people  from  the  government ;  taking  care  of  the  government,  and  not  the 
people  ;  and  a  whole  fraternity  of  others  of  like  character.  When  I  first  saw 
them  advanced  in  the  columns  of  a  newspaper,  I  could  not  but  smile,  in  thinking 
}iow  admirably  they  were  suited  to  an  electioneering  canvass.  They  have  a 
certain  plausibility  about  them,  which  makes  them  troublesome  to  an  opponent 
simply  because  they  are  merely  plausible,  without  containing  one  particle  of 
leason.  I  little  expected  to  meet  them  in  discussion  in  this  place  ;  but  since 
they  have  been  gravely  introduced  here,  respect  for  the  place  and  company  ex 
acts  a  passing  notice,  to  which,  of  themselves,  they  are  not  at  all  entitled. 

I  begin  with  that  which  is  first  pushed  forward,  and  seems  to  be  most  relied 
on — one  currency  for  the  government  and  another  for  the  people.  Is  it  meant 
that  the  government  must  take  in  payment  of  its  debts  whatever  the  people  take 
in  payment  of  theirs  ?  If  so,  it  is  a  very  broad  proposition,  and  would  lead  to 
important  consequences.  The  people  now  receive  the  notes  of  non-specie- 
paying  banks.  Is  it  meant  that  the  government  should  also  receive  them! 
They  receive  in  change  all  sorts  of  paper,  issued  by  we  know  not  whom. 
Mu^t  the  government  also  receive  them  ?  They  receive  the  notes  of  banks 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  283 

issuing  notes  under  five,  ten,  and  twenty  dollars.  Is  it  intended  that  the  gov 
ernment  shall  also  permanently  receive  them  ?  They  receive  bills  of  exchange. 
Shall  government,  too,  receive  them  ?  If  not,  I  ask  the  reason.  Is  it  because 
they  are  not  suitable  for  a  sound,  stable,  arid  uniform  currency  1  The  reason 
is  good ;  but  what  becomes  of  the  principle,  that  the  government  ought  to  take 
whatever  the  people  take  ?  But  I  go  farther.  It  is  the  duty  of  government 
to  receive  nothing  in  its  dues  that  it  has  not  the  right  to  render  uniform  and 
stable  in  its  value.  We  are,  by  the  Constitution,  made  the  guardian  of  the 
money  of  the  country.  For  this  the  right  of  coining  and  regulating  the  value 
of  coins  was  given,  and  we  have  no  right  whatever  to  receive  or  treat  anything 
as  money,  or  the  equivalent  of  money,  the  value  of  which  we  have  no  right  to 
regulate.  If  this  principle  be  true,  and  it  cannot  be  controverted,  I  ask,  What 
right  has  Congress  to  receive  and  treat  the  notes  of  the  state  banks  as  money  ? 
If  the  states  have  the  right  to  incorporate  banks,  what  right  has  Congress  to 
regulate  them  or  their  issues  ?  Show  me  the  power  in  the  Constitution.  If 
the  right  be  admitted,  what  are  its  limitations,  and  how  can  the  right  of  subject 
ing  them  to  a  bankrupt  law  in  that  case  be  denied  ?  If  one  be  admitted,  the 
other  follows  as  a  consequence  ;  and  yet  those  who  are  most  indignant  against 
the  proposition  of  subjecting  the  state  banks  to  a  bankrupt  law,  are  the  most 
clamorous  to  receive  their  notes,  not  seeing  that  the  one  power  involves  the 
other.  I  am  equally  opposed  to  both,  as  unconstitutional  and  inexpedient.  We 
are  next  told,  to  separate  from  the  banks  is  to  separate  from  the  people.  The 
banks,  then,  are  the  people,  and  the  people  the  banks — united,  identified,  and  in 
separable  ;  and  as  the  government  belongs  to  the  people,  it  follows,  of  course, 
according  to  this  argument,  it  belongs  also  to  the  banks,  and,  of  course,  is  bound 
to  do  their  biddings.  I  feel  on  so  grave  a  subject,  and  in  so  grave  a  body,  an 
almost  invincible  repugnance  in  replying  to  such  arguments  ;  and  I  shall  hasten 
over  the  only  remaining  one  of  the  fraternity  which  I  shall  condescend  to  notice 
with  all  possible  despatch.  They  have  no  right  of  admission  here,  and,  if  I 
were  disposed  to  jest  on  so  solemn  an  occasion.  I  should  say  they  ought  to  be 
driven  from  this  chamber,  under  the  47th  rule.*H  The  next  of  these  formidable 
objections  to  the  separation  from  the  banks  is,  that  the  government,  in  so  doing, 
takes  care  of  itself,  and  not  of  the  people.  Why,  I  had  supposed  that  the  gov 
ernment  belonged  to  the  people  ;  that  it  was  created  by  them  for  their  own  use, 
to  promote  their  interest,  and  secure  their  peace  and  liberty ;  that,  in  taking  care 
of  itself,  it  takes  the  most  effectual  care  of  the  people  ;  and  in  refusing  all  em 
barrassing,  entangling,  and  dangerous  alliances  with  corporations  of  any  de 
scription,  it  was  but  obeying  the  great  law  of  self-preservation.  But  enough  ;  I 
cannot  any  longer  waste  words  on  such  objections.  I  intend  no  disrespect  to 
those  who  have  urged  them ;  yet  these,  and  arguments  like  these,  are  mainly 
Telied  on  to  countervail  the  many  and  formidable  objections,  drawn  from  the 
highest  considerations  that  can  influence  the  action  of  governments  or  individu 
als,  none  of  which  have  been  refuted,  and  many  not  even  denied. 

The  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster)  urged  an  argument  of  a  very  / 
different  character,  but  which,  in  my  opinion,  he  entirely  failed  to  establish.  He 
asserted  that  the  ground  assumed  on  this  side  was  an  entire  abandonment  of  a 
great  constitutional  function  conferred  by  the  Constitution  on  Congress.  To 
establish  this,  he  laid  down  the  proposition,  that  £aiigr-ess  was  bound  to  take 
care  of  the  money  of  the  country.  Agreed  ;  and  with  this  view  the  Constitu 
tion  confers  on  us  the -right  of  coining  and  regulating  the  value  of  coins,  in  or 
der  to  supply  the  country  with  money  of  proper  standard  and  value ;  and  is  it 
an  abandonment  of  this  right  to  take  care,  as  this  bill  does,  that  it  shall  not  be 
expelled  from  circulation,  as  far  as  the  fiscal  action  of  this  government  extends  ? 
But  having  taken  this  unquestionable  position,  the  senator  passed  (by  what 

*  It  is  the  rule  regulating  the  admission  of  persons  in  the  lobby  of  the  Senate. 


284  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

means  lie  did  not  condescend  to  explain)  from  taking  care  of  the  money  of  the- 
country  to  the  right  of  establishing  a  currency,  and  then  to  the  right  of  estab 
lishing  a  bank  currency,  as  I  understood  him.  On  both  of  these  points  I  leave 
him  in  the  hands  of  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania  (Mr.  Buchanan),  who,  in  an 
able  and  constitutional  argument,  completely  demolished,  in  my  judgment,  the 
position  assumed  by  the  senator  from  Massachusetts.  I  rejoice  to  hear  such 
an  argument  from  such  a  quarter.  The  return  of  the  great  State  of  Pennsyl 
vania  to  the  doctrines  of  rigid  construction  and  state  rights  sheds  a  ray  of  light 
on  the  thick  darkness  which  has  long  surrounded  us. 

But  we  are  told  that  there  is  not  gold  and  silver  enough  to  fill  the  channels 
of  circulation,  and  that  prices  would  fall.  Be  it  so.  What  is  that,  compared  to 
the  dangers  which  menace  on  the  opposite  side  ?  But  are  we  so  certain  that 
there  is  not  a  sufficiency  of  the  precious  metals  for  the  purpose  of  circulation  ? 
Look  at  France,  with  her  abundant  supply,  with  her  channels  of  circulation  full 
to  overflowing  with  coins,  and  her  flourishing  industry.  It  is  true  that  our  sup 
ply  is  insufficient  at  present.  How  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  The  banking  sys 
tem  has  degraded  and  expelled  the  metals — driven  them  to  foreign  lands — 
closed  the  mines,  and  converted  their  products  into  costly  vases,  and  splendid 
utensils  and  ornaments,  administering  to  the  pride  and  luxury  of  the  opulent,  in 
stead  of  being  employed  as  the  standard  of  value,  and  the  instrument  of  making 
exchanges,  as  they  were  manifestly  intended  mainly  to  be  by  an  all-wise  Provi 
dence.  Restore  them  to  their  proper  functions,  and  they  will  return  from  their 
banishment;  the  mines  will  again  be  opened,  and  the  gorgeous  splendour  of 
wealth  will  again  reassume  the  more  humble,  but  useful,  form  of  coins. 

But,  Mr.  President,  I  am  not  driven  to  such  alternatives.  I  am  not  the  ene 
my,  but  the  friend  of  credit — not  as  the  substitute,  but  the  associate  and  the  as 
sistant  of  the  metals.  In  that  capacity,  I  hold  credit  to  possess,  in  many  re 
spects,  a  vast  superiority  over  the  metals  themselves.  I  object  to  it  in  the  form 
which  it  has  assumed  in  the  banking  system,  for  reasons  that  are  neither  light 
nor  few,  and  that  neither  have  nor  can  be  answered.  The  question  is  not* 
whether  credit  can  be  dispensed  with,  but  what  is  its  best  possible  form — the 
most  stable,  the  least  liable  to  abuse,  and  the  most  convenient  and  cheap.  I 
threw  out  some  ideas  on  this  important  subject  in  my  opening  remarks.  I  have 
heard  nothing  to  change  my  opinion.  I  believe  that  government  credit,  in  the 
form  I  suggested,  combines  all  the  requisite  qualities  of  a  credit  circulation  in 
the  highest  degree,  and  also  that  government  ought  not  to  use  any  other  credit 
but  its  own  in  its  financial  operations.  When  the  senator  from  Massachusetts 
made  his  attack  on  my  suggestions,  I  was  disappointed.  I  expected  argument, 
and  he  gave  us  denunciation.  It  is  often  easy  to  denounce,  when  it  is  hard  to 
refute  ;  and  when  that  senator  gives  denunciations  instead  of  arguments,  I  con 
clude  that  it  is  because  the  one  is  at  his  command,  and  the  other  not. 

We  are  told  the  form  I  suggested  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  old  Continental 
money — a  ghost  that  is  ever  conjured  up  by  all  who  wish  to  give  the  banks  an 
exclusive  monopoly  of  government  credit.  The  assertion  is  not  true  :  there  is 
not  the  least  analogy  between  them.  The  one  was  a  promise  to  pay  when 
there  was  no  revenue,  and  the  other  a  promise  to  receive  in  the  dues  of  gov 
ernment  when  there  is  an  abundant  revenue.  ^ 

We  are  also  told  that  there  is  no  instance  of  a  government  paper  that  did  not 
depreciate.  In  reply,  I  affirm  that  there  is  none,  assuming  the  form  I  pro 
pose,  that  ever  did  depreciate.  Whenever  a  paper  receivable  in  the  dues  of 
government  had  anything  like  a  fair  trial,  it  has  succeeded.  Instance  the  case  of 
North  Carolina,  referred  to  in  my  opening  remarks.  The  draughts  of  the  treas 
ury  at  this  moment,  with  all  their  encumbrance,  are  nearly  at  par  with  gold 
and  silver  ;  and  1  might  add  the  instance  alluded  to  by  the  distinguished  sena 
tor  from  Kentucky,  in  which  he  admits  that,  as  soon  as  the  excess  of  the  issues 
of  the  Commonwealth  Bank  of  Kentucky  were  reduced  to  the  proper  point,  its 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  285 

notes  rose  to  par.  The  case  of  Russia  might  also  be  mentioned.  In  1827,  she 
had  a  fixed  paper  circulation,  in  the  form  of  bank-notes,  but  which  were  incon 
vertible,  of  upward  of  $120,000,000,  estimated  in  the  metallic  ruble,  and  which 
had  for  years  remained  without  fluctuation,  having  nothing  to  sustain  it  but  that 
it  was  received  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  and  that,  too,  with  a  revenue  of 
only  about  $90,000,000  annually.  I  speak  on  the  authority  of  a  respectable 
traveller.  Other  instances,  no  doubt,  might  be  added,  but  it  needs  no  such 
support.  How  can  a  paper  depreciate  which  the  government  is  bound  to  re 
ceive  in  all  its  payments,  and'while  those  to  whom  payments  are  to  be  made 
are  under  no  obligation  to  receive  it  ?  From  its  nature,  it  can  only  circulate 
Avhen  at  par  with  gold  and  silver  ;  and  if  it  should  depreciate,  none  could  be  in 
jured  but  the  government. 

But  my  colleague  objects  that  it  would  partake  of  the  increase  and  decrease 
of  the  revenue,  and  would  be  subject  to  greater  expansions  and  contractions 
than  bank-notes  themselves.  He  assumes  that  government  would  increase  the 
amount  with  the  increase  of  the  revenue,  which  is  not  probable,  for  the  aid  of  its 
credit  would  be  then  less  needed ;  but  if  it  did,  what  would  be  the  effect  ?  On 
the  decrease  of  the  revenue,  its  bills  would  be  returned  to  the  treasury,  from 
which,  for  the  want  of  demand,  they  could  not  be  reissued ;  and  the  excess, 
instead  of  hanging  on  the  circulation,  as  in  the  case  of  bank-notes,  and  expo 
sing  it  to  catastrophes  like  the  present,  would  be  gradually  and  silently  with 
drawn,  without  shock  or  injury  to  any  one.  It  has  another  and  striking  advan 
tage  over  bank  circulation — in  its  superior  cheapness,  as  well  as  greater  stabili 
ty  and  safety.  Bank  paper  is  cheap  to  those  who  make  it,  but  dear,  very  dear, 
to  those  who  use  it — fully  as  much  so  as  gold  and  silver.  It  is  the  little  cost 
of  its  manufacture,  and  the  dear  rates  at  which  it  is  furnished  to  the  communi 
ty,  which  give  the  great  profit  to  those  who  have  a  monopoly  of  the  article. 
Some  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  extent  of  the  profit  by  the  splendid  palaces 
which  we  see  under  the  name  of  banking-houses,  and  the  vast  fortunes  which 
have  been  accumulated  in  this  branch  of  business  ;  all  of  which  must  ultimate 
ly  be  derived  from  the  productive  powers  of  the  community,  and,  of  course,  adds 
so  much  to  the  cost  of  production.  On  the  other  hand,  the  credit  of  govern 
ment,  while  it  would  greatly  facilitate  its  financial  operations,  would  cost  no 
thing,  or  next  to  nothing,  both  to  it  and  the  people,  and,  of  course,  would  add 
nothing  to  the  cost  of  production,  which  would  give  every  branch  of  our  indus 
try,  agriculture,  commerce,  and  manufactures,  as  far  as  its  circulation  might  ex 
tend,  great  advantages,  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

But  there  remains  another  and  great  advantage.  In  the  event  of  war,  it 
would  open  almost  unbounded  resources  to  carry  it  on,  without  the  necessity  of 
resorting  to  what  I  am  almost  disposed  to  call  a  fraud — public  loans.  I  have 
already  shown  that  the  loans  of  the  Bank  of  England  to  the  government  were 
very  little  more  than  loaning  back  to  the  government  its  own  credit ;  and  this 
is  more  or  less  true  of  all  loans,  where  the  banking  system  prevails.  It  was 
pre-eminently  so  in  our  late  war.  The  circulation  of  the  government  credit,  in 
the  shape  of  bills  receivable  exclusively  with  gold  and  silver  in  its  dues,  and 
the  sales  of  public  lands,  would  dispense  with  the  necessity  of  loans,  by  in 
creasing  its  bills  with  the  increase  of  taxes.  The  increase  of  taxes,  and,  of 
course,  of  revenue  and  expenditures,  would  be  followed  by  an  increased  de 
mand  for  government  bills,  while  the  latter  would  furnish  the  means  of  paying 
the  taxes,  without  increasing,  in  the  same  degree,  the  pressure  oia  the  commu 
nity.  This,  with  a  judicious  system  of  funding,  at  a  low  rate  of  interest,  would 
go  far  to  exempt  the  government  from  the  necessity  of  contracting  public  loans 
in  the  event  of  war. 

I  am  not,  Mr.  President,  ignorant,  in  making  these  suggestions  (I  wish  them 
to  be  considered  only  in  that  light),  to  what  violent  opposition  every  measure  of 
the  kind  must  be  exposed.  Banks  have  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  gov- 


286  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

eminent  credit,  that  they  very  naturally  conclude  they  have  an  exclusive  right 
to  it,  and  consider  the  withdrawal  of  it,  even  for  the  use  of  the  government  it 
self,  as  a  positive  injury.  It  was  my  fortune  to  take  a  stand  on  the  side  of  the 

government  against  the  banks  during  the  most  trying  period  of  the  late  war 

the  winter  of  1814  and  1815 — and  never  in  my  life  was  I  exposed  to  more  cal 
umny  and  abuse — no,  not  e^en  on  this  occasion.  It  was  my  first  lesson  on  the 
subject.  I  shall  never  forget  it.  I  propose  to  give  a  very  brief  narrative  of  the 
scenes  through  which  I  then  passed  ;  not  with  any  feeling  of  egotism,  for  I 
trust  I  am  incapable  of  that,  but  to  illustrate  the  truth  of  much  I  have  said,  and 
to  snatch  from  oblivion  not  an  unimportant  portion  of  our  financial  history.  I  ; 
see  the  senators  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster)  and  of  Alabama  (Mr. 
King),  who  were  then  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  their  places, 
and  they  can  vouch  for  the  correctness  of  my  narrative,  as  far  as  the  memory 
of  transactions  so  long  passed  will  serve. 

The  finances  of  the  country  had,  at  that  time,  fallen  into  great  confusion. 
Mr.  Campbell  had  retired  from  the  head  of  the  treasury,  and  the  late  Mr.  Dal 
las  had  succeeded — a  man  of  talents,  bold  and  decisive,  but  inexperienced  in 
the  affairs  of  the  department.  His  first  measure  to  restore  order,  and  to  furnish 
the  supplies  to  carry  on  the  war,  was  to  recommend  a  bank  of  $50,000,000,  to 
be  constituted  almost  exclusively  of  the  new  stocks  which  had  been  issued  du 
ring  the  war,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  old,  which  had  been  issued  before.  The 
proposed  bank  was  authorized  to  make  loans  to  the  government,  and  was  not 
bound  to  pay  specie  during  the  war,  and  for  three  years  after  its  termination. 

It  so  happened  that  I  did  not  arrive  here  till  some  time  after  the  commence 
ment  of  the  session,  having  been  detained  by  an  attack  of  bilious  fever.     I 
had  taken  a  prominent  part   in  the  declaration  of  the  war,  and  had  every 
motive  and  disposition  to  sustain  the   administration,  and  to  vote  every  aid 
to  carry  on  the  war.     Immediately  after  my  arrival,  I  had  a  full  conversation 
with  Mr.  Dallas,  at  his  request.     I   entertained  very  kind  feelings  towards 
him,  and  assured  him,  after  he  had  explained  his  plan,  that  I  would  give  it 
my  early  and  favourable  attention.     At  that  time  I  had  reflected  but  little  on 
the  subject  of  banking.     Many  of  my  political  friends  expressed  a  desire  that  I 
should  take  a  prominent  part  in  favour  of  the  proposed  bank.     Their  extreme 
anxiety  aroused  my  attention,  and,  being  on  no  committee  (they  had  been  ap 
pointed  before  my  arrival),  I  took  up  the  subject  for  a  full  investigation,  with 
every  disposition  to  give  it  my  support.     I  had  -not  proceeded  far  before  I  was 
struck  with  the  extraordinary  character  of  the  project :  a  bank  of  $50,000,000, 
whose  capital  was  to. consist  almost  exclusively  of  government  credit  in  the 
shape  of  stock,  and  not  bound  tQ  pay  its  debts  during  the  war,  and  for  three 
years  afterward,  to  furnish  the  government  with  loans  to  carry  on  the  war !     I 
saw  at  once  that  the  effect  of  the  arrangement  would  be,  that  government  would 
borrow  back  its  own  credit,  and  pay  six  per  cent,  per  annum  for  what  they  had 
already  paid  eight  or  nine.     It  was  impossible  for  me  to  give  it  my  support 
under  any  pressure,  however  great.     I  felt  the  difficulty  of  my  situation,  not 
only  in  opposing  the  leading  measure  of  the  administration  at  such  a  crisis,  but, 
what  was  far  more  responsible,  to  suggest  one  of  my  own,  that  would  afford 
relief  to  the  embarrassed  treasury.     I  cast  my  eyes  around,  and  soon  saw  that   -\ 
the  government  should  use  its  own  credit  directly,  without  the  intervention  of  a    / 
bank  ;  which  I  proposed  to  do  in  the  form  of  treasury  notes,  to  be  issued  in  the    > 
operations  ofrthe  government,  and  to  be  funded  in  the  subscription  to  the  stock    ' 
of  the  bank.     Treasury  notes  were,  at  that  time,  below  par,  even  with  bank  - 
paper.     The  opposition  to  them  was  so  great  on  the  part  of  the  banks,  that  they 
refused  to  receive  them  on  deposite,  or  payment,  at  par  with  their  notes  ;  while 
the  government,  on  its  part,  received  and  paid  away  notes  of  the  banks  at  par 
with  its  own.     Such  was  the  influence  of  the  banks,  and  to  such  degradation 
did  the  government,  in  its  weakness,  submit.     All  this  influence  I  had  to  en- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  287 

counter,  with  the  entire  weight  of  the  administration  thrown  into  the  same  scale. 
I  hesitated  not.  I  saw  the  path  of  duty  clearly;  and  determined  to  tread  it,  as 
sharp  and  rugged  as  it  was.  When  the  bill  came  up,  I  moved  my  amendment, 
the  main  features  of  which  were,  that,  instead  of  government  stock  already  is 
sued,  the  capital  of  the  bank  should  consist  of  funded  treasury  notes  ;  and  that, 
instead  of  a  mere  paper  machine,  it  should  be  a  specie-paying  bank,  so  as  to  be 
an  ally  instead  of  an  opponent,  in  restoring  the  currency  to  a  sound  condition 
on  the  return  of  peace.  These  were,  with  me,  indispensable  conditions.  I 
accompanied  my  amendment  with  a  short  speech  of  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes, 
and  so  overpowering  was  the  force  of  truth,  that,  notwithstanding  the  influence 
of  the  administration,  backed  by  the  money  power,  and  the  Committee  of  Ways 
and  Means,  which  was  unanimous,  with  one  exception,  as  I  understood,  my 
amendment  prevailed  by  a  large  majority  ;  but  it,  in  turn,  failed — the  opposition, 
the  adherents  of  the  administration,  and  those  who  had  constitutional  scruples, 
combining  against  it.  Then  followed  various,  but  unsuccessful,  attempts  to 
charter  a  bank.  One  was  vetoed  by  the  President,  and  another  was  lost  by  the 
casting  vote  of  the  speaker  (Mr.  Cheves).  After  a  large  portion  of  the  session 
was  thus  unsuccessfully  consumed,  a  caucus  was  called,  in  order  to  agree  on 
some  plan,  to  which  I,  and  the  few  friends  who  still  adhered  to  me  after  such 
hard  service,  were  especially  invited.  We,  of  course,  attended.  The  plan  of 
compromise  was  unfolded,  which  approached  much  nearer  to  our  views,  but 
which  was  still  objectionable  in  some  features.  I  objected,  and  required  far 
ther  concessions,  which  were  refused,  and  was  told  the  bill  could  be  pass 
ed  without  us  ;  at  which  I  took  up  my  hat  and  bade  good-night.  The  bill  was 
introduced  in  the  Senate,  and  speedily  passed  that  body.  On  the  second  read 
ing,  1  rose  and  made  a  few  remarks,  in  which  I  entreated  the  house  to  remem 
ber  that  they  were  about  to  vote  for  the  measure  against  their  conviction,  as 
had  been  frequently  expressed  ;  and  that,  in  so  doing,  they  acted  under  a  suppo 
sed  necessity,  which  had  been  created  by  those  who  expected  to  profit  by  the 
measure.  I  then  reminded  them  of  the  danger  of  acting  under  such  pressure  ; 
and  I  said  that  they  were  so  sensible  of  the  truth  of  what  I  uttered,  that,  if  peace 
should  arrive  before  the  passage  of  the  bill,  it  would  not  receive  the  support  of 
fifteen  members.  1  concluded  by  saying  that  I  would  reserve  what  I  intended 
to  say  on  the  question  of  the  passage  of  the  bill,  when  I  would  express  my 
opinion  at  length,  and  appeal  to  the  country.  My  objections,  as  yet,  had  not 
gone  to  the  people,  as  nothing  that  I  had  said  had  been  reported — such  was  my 
solicitude  to  defeat  the  bill  without  extending  our  divisions  beyond  the  walls  of 
the  house,  in  the  then  critical  condition  of  the  country.  My  object  was  to  ar 
rest  the  measure,  and  not  to  weaken  confidence  in  the  administration. 

In  making  the  supposition,  I  had  not  the  slightest  anticipation  of  peace, 
England  had  been  making  extensive  preparations  for  the  ensuing  campaign, 
and  had  made  a  vigorous  attack  on  New-Orleans,  but  had  just  been  repelled  ; 
but,  by  a  most  remarkable  coincidence,  an  opportunity  (as  strange  as  it  may 
seem)  was  afforded  to  test  the  truth  of  what  I  said.  Late  in  the  evening  of  the 
day  I  met  Mr.  Sturges,  then  a  member  of  Congress  from  Connecticut.  He  said 
that  he  had  some  information  which  he  could  not  withhold  from  me  :  that  a 
treaty  of  peace  had  been  made  ;  and  that  it  had  actually  arrived  in  New- York, 
and  would  be  here  the  next  day,  so  that  I  would  have  an  opportunity  of  test 
ing  the  truth  of  my  prediction.  He  added,  that  his  brother,  who  had  a  mercan 
tile  house  in  New-York,  had  forwarded  the  information  to  him  by  express,  and 
that  he  had  forwarded  the  information  to  connected  houses  in  Southern  cities,, 
with  direction  to  purchase  the  great  staples  in  that  quarter,  and  that,  he  wished 
me  to  consider  the  information  as  confidential.  I  thanked  him  for  the  intelli 
gence,  and  promised  to  keep  it  to  myself.  The  rumour,  however,  got  out,  and 
the  next  day  an  attempt  was  made  to  pass  through  the  bill ;  but  the  house  was 
unwilling  to  act  till  it  could  ascertain  whether  a  treaty  had  been  made.  It  ar- 


288  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

lived  in  the  course  of  the  day,  when,  on  my  motion,  it  was  laid  on  the  table  ; 
and  I  had  the  gratification  of  receiving  the  thanks  of  many  for  defeating  the  bill, 
who,  a  short  time  before,  were  almost  ready  to  cut  my  throat  for  my  perseve 
ring  opposition  to  the  measure.  An  offer  was  then  made  to  me  to  come  to  my 
terms,  which  I  refused,  declaring  that  I  would  rise  in  my  demand,  and  would 
agree  to  no  bill  which  should  not  be  formed  expressly  with  the  view  to  the 
speedy  restoration  of  specie  payments.  It  was  afterward  postponed,  on  the 
conviction  that  it  could  not  be  so  modified  as  to  make  it  acceptable  to  a  major 
ity.  This  was  my  first  lessons  on  banks.  It  has  made  a  durable  impression 
on  my  mind. 

My  colleague,  in  the  course  of  his  remarks,  said  he  regarded  this  measure 
as  a  secret  war  waged  against  the  banks.  I  am  sure  he  could  not  intend  to  at 
tribute  such  motives  to  me.  I  wage  no  war,  secret  or  open,  against  the  exist 
ing  institutions.  They  have  been  created  by  the  legislation  of  the  states,  and 
are  alone  responsible  to  the  states.  I  hold  them  not  answerable  for  the  present 
state  of  things,  which  has  been  brought  about  under  the  silent  operation  of  time, 
without  attracting  notice  or  disclosing  its  danger.  Whatever  legal  or  constitu 
tional  rights  they  possess  under  their  charters  ought  to  be  respected  ;  and,  if 
attacked,  I  would  defend  them  as  resolutely  as  I  now  oppose  the  system. 
Against  that  I  wage,  not  secret,  but  open  and  uncompromising  hostilities,  origi 
nating  not  in  opinions  recently  or  hastily  formed.  I  have  long  seen  the  true 
character  of  the  system,  its  tendency  and  destiny,  and  have  looked  forward  for 
many  years,  as  many  of  my  friends  know,  to  the  crisis  in  the  midst  of  which 
we  now  are.  My  ardent  wish  has  been  to  effect  a  gradual  change  in  the  bank 
ing  system,  by  which  the  crisis  might  be  passed  without  a  shock,  if  possible ; 
but  I  have  been  resolved  for  many  years,  that  should  it  arrive  in  my  time,  I 
would  discharge  my  duty,  however  great  the  difficulty  and  danger.  I  have  thus 
far  faithfully  performed  it,  according  to  the  best  of  my  abilities,  and,  with  the 
blessing  of  God,  shall  persist,  regardless  of  every  obstacle,  with  equal  fidelity, 
to  the  end.  > 

He  who  does  not  see  that  the  credit  system  is  on  the  eve  of  a  great  revolu 
tion,  has  formed  a  very  imperfect  conception  of  the  past  and  anticipation  of  the 
future.  What  changes  it  is  destined  to  undergo,  and  what  new  form  it  will  ulti 
mately  assume,  are  concealed  in  the  womb  of  time,  and  not  given  us  to  foresee. 
But  we  may  perceive  in  the  present  many  of  the  elements  of  the  existing  sys 
tem  which  must  be  expelled,  and  others  which  must  enter  it  in  its  renewed  form. 
In  looking  at  the  elements  at  work,  I  hold  it  certain,  that  in  the  process  there 
will  be  a  total  and  final  separation  of  the  credit  of  government  and  that  of  indi 
viduals,  which  have  been  so  long  blended.  The  good  of  society,  and  the  in 
terests  of  both,  imperiously  demand  it,  and  the  growing  intelligence  of  the  age 
will  enforce  it.  It  is  unfair,  unjust,  unequal,  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  free  insti 
tutions,  and  corrupting  in  its  consequences.  How  far  the  credit  of  govern 
ment  may  be  used  in  a  separate  form,  with  safety  and  convenience,  remains  to 
be  seen.  To  the  extent  of  its  fiscal  action,  limited  strictly  to  the  function  of 
the  collection  and  disbursement  of  its  revenue,  and  in  the  form  I  have  suggested, 
I  am  of  the  impression  it  may  be  both  safely  and  conveniently  used,  and  with 
great  incidental  advantages  to  the  whole  community.  Beyond  that  limit  I  see 
no  safety,  and  much  danger. 

What  form  individual  credit  will  assume  after  the  separation,  is  still  more  un 
certain,  but  I  see  clearly  that  the  existing  fetters  that  restrain  it  will  be  thrown 
off.  The  credit  of  an  individual  is  his  property,  and  belongs  to  him  as  much 
.as  his  land  and  houses,  to  use  it  as  he  pleases,  with  the  single  restriction, 
which  is  imposed  on  all  our  rights,  that  it  is  not  to  be  used  so  as  to  injure 
others.  What  limitations  this  restriction  may  prescribe,  time  and  experience 
will  show ;  .but,  whatever  they  may  be,  they  ought  to  assume  the  character  of 
general  laws,  obligatory  on  all  alike,  and  open  to'  all ;  and  under  the  provisions 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  289 

of  which  all  may  be  at  liberty  to  use  their  credit,  jointly  or  separately,  as  freely 
as  they  now  use  their  land  and  houses,  without  any  preference  by  special  acts, 
in  any  form  or  shape,  to  one  over  another.  Everything  like  monopoly  must  ul 
timately  disappear  before  the  process  which  has  begun  will  finally  terminate. 

I  see,  not  less  clearly,  that,  in  the  process,  a  separation  will  take  place  be 
tween  the  use  of  capital  and  the  use  of  credit.     They  are  wholly  different,  and, 
under  the  growing  intelligence  of  the  times,  cannot  much  longer  remain  con 
founded  in  their  present  state  of  combination.      They  are  as  distinct  as  a  loan 
and  an  endorsement ;  in  fact,  the  one  is  but  giving  to  another  the  use  of  our 
capital,  and  the  other  the  use  of  our  credit ;  and  yet,  so  dissimilar  are  they,  that 
we  daily  see  the  most  prudent  individuals  lending  their  credit  for  nothing,  in 
the  form  of  endorsement  or  security,  who  would  not  loan  the  most  inconsider 
able  sum  without  interest.     But  as  dissimilar  as  they  are,  they  are  completely 
confounded  in  banking  operations,  which  is  one  of  the  main  sources  of  the 
profit,  and  the  consequent  dangerous  flow  of  capital  in  that  direction.     A  bank 
idiscount,  instead  of  a  loan,  is  very  little  more,  as  I  have  shown,  than  a  mere 
exchange  of  credit — an  exchange  of  the  joint  credit  of  the  drawer  and  endorser 
of  the  note  discounted  for  the  credit  of  the  bank  in  the  shape  of  its  own  note. 
In  the  exchange,  the  bank  ensures  the  parties  to  the  note  discounted,  and  the 
community,  which  is  the  loser  if  the  bank  fails;  virtually  ensures  the  bank,-  and 
yet,  by  confounding  this  exchange  of  credit  with  the  use  of  capital,  the  bank  is 
permitted  to  charge  an  interest  for  this  exchange,  rather  greater  than  an  indi 
vidual  is  permitted  to  charge  for  a  loan,  to  the  great  gain  of  *he  bank  and  loss 
to  the  community.     I  say  loss,  for  the  community  can  nev^f  enjoy  the  great  and 
full  benefit  of  the  credit  system,  till  loans  and  credit  are  considered  as  entirely 
distinct  in  their  nature,  and  the  compensation  for  the  use  of  each  be  adjusted  to 
their  respective  nature  and  character.      Nothing  would  give  a  greater  impulse 
to  all  the  business  of  society.     The  superior  cheapness  of  credit  would  add  in 
calculably  to  the  productive  powers  of  the  community,  when  the  immense  gains 
which  are  now  made  by  confounding  them  shall  come  in  aid  of  production.    • 
Whatever  other  changes  the  credit  system  is  destined  to  undergo,  these  are 
certainly  some  which  it  must ;  but  ^hen,  and  how  the  revolution  will  end — 
whether  it  is  destined  to  be  sudden  and  convulsive,  or  gradual  and  free  from 
shock,  time  alone  can  disclose.     Much  will  depend  on  the  decision  of  the  present 
question,  and  the  course  which  the  advocates  of  the  system  will  pursue.     If  the 
separation  takes  place,  and  is  acquiesced  in  by  those  interested  in  the  system, 
the  prospect  will  be,  that  it  will  gradually  and  quietly  run  down,  without  shock 
or  convulsions,  which  i^  my  sincere  prayer  ;  but  if  not — if  the  reverse  shall  be 
insisted  on,  and,  above  all,  if  it  should  be  effected  through  a  great  political 
struggle  (it  can  onlv  so  be  effected),  the  revolution  would  be  violent  and  convul 
sive.     A  great  arki  thorough  change  must  take  place.      It  is  wholly  unavoida 
ble.      The  public  attention  begins  to  be  roused  throughout  the  civilized  world 
to  this  all-absorbing  subject.     There  is  nothing  left  to  be  controlled  but  the 
mode  and  manner,  and  it  is  better  for  all  that  it  should  be  gradual  and  quiet  than 
the  reverse.     All  the  rest  is  destiny. 

I  have  now,  Mr.  President,  said  what  I  intended,  without  reserve  or  disguise. 
In  taking  the  stand  I  have,  I  change  no  relation,  personal  or  political,  nor  alter 
any  opinion  I  have  heretofore  expressed  or  entertained.  I  desire  nothing  from  the 
government  or  the  people.  My  only  ambition  is  to  do  my  duty,  and  shall  follow 
wherever  that  may  lead,  regardless  alike  of  attachments  or  antipathies,  personal 
or  political.  I  know  full  well  the  responsibility  I  have  assumed.  I  see  clearly 
the  magnitude  and  the  hazard  of  the  crisis,  and  the  danger  of  confiding  the 
execution  of  measures  in  which  I  take  so  deep  a  responsibility,  to  those  in 
whom  I  have  no  reason  to  have  any  special  confidence.  But  all  this  deters  me 
not,  when  I  believe  that  the  permanent  interest  of  the  country  is  involved.  My 
course  is  fixed.  I  go  forward.  If  the  administration  recommend  what  I  ap- 

Oo 


290  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

prove  on  this  great  question,  I  will  cheerfully  give  my  support ;  if  not,  I  shall 
oppose ;  but,  in  opposing,  I  shall  feel  bound  to  suggest  what  I  believe  to  be  the 
proper  measure,  and  which  I  shall  be  ready  to  back,  be  the  responsibility  what 
it  may,  looking  only  to  the  country,  and  not  stopping  to  estimate  whether  the 
benefit  shall  inure  either  to  the  administration  or  the  opposition. 


XX. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    SUB-TREASURY   BILL,  FEBRUARY   15,   1838. 

I  REGARD  this  measure,  which  has  been  so  much  denounced,  as  very  little 
more  than  an  attempt  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  joint  resolution  of  1816, 
and  the  deposite  act  of  1836.  The  former  provides  that  no  notes  but  those  of 
specie-paying  banks  shall  be  received  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  and  the 
latter  that  such  banks  only  shall  be  the  depositories  of  the  public  revenues  and 
fiscal  agents  of  the  government ;  but  it  omitted  to  make  provisions  for  the  con 
tingency  of  a  general  suspension  of  specie  payments,  such  as  is  the  present. 
It  followed,  accordingly,  on  the  suspension  in  May  last,  which  totally  separated 
the  government  and  the  banks,  that  the  revenue  was  thrown  in  the  hands  of 
the  executive,  where  it  has  since  remained  under  its  exclusive  control,  without 
any  legal  provision  for  its  safe-keeping.  The  object  of  this  bill  is  to  supply 
this  omission  ;  to  lake  the  public  money  out  of  the  hands  of  the  executive  and 
place  it  under  the  custody  of  the  laws,  and  to  prevent  the  renewal  of  a  connex 
ion  which  has  proved  so  unfortunate  to. both  the  government  and  the  banks. 
But  it  is  this  measure,  originating  in  an  exigency  caused  by  our  own  acts,  and 
that  seeks  to  make  the  most  of  a  change  effected  by  operation  of  law,  instead 
of  attempting  to  innovate,  or  to  make  another  experiment,  as  has  been  errone 
ously  represented,  which  has  been  denounced  under  the  name  of  the  sub-treas 
ury  with  such  unexampled  bitterness. 

In  lieu  of  this  bill,  an  amendment  has  been  offered,  as  a  substitute,  by  the 
senator  from  Virginia  farthest  from  the  chuir  (Mr.  Rives),  which,  he  informs 
us,  is  the  first  choice  of  himself  and  those  who  agree  with  him,  and  the  second 
choice  of  those  with  whom  he  is  allied  on  this  question.  If  I  may  judge  from 
appearances,  which  can  hardly  deceive,  he  might  have  said  their  first  choice 
under  existing  circumstances ;  and  have  added,  that,  despairing  of  a  National 
Bank,  the  object  of  their  preference,  they  have  adopted  his  substitute,  as  the 
only  practical  alternative  at  present.  We  have,  then,  the  question  thus  nar 
rowed  down  to  this  bill  and  the  proposed  substitute  :  it  ic  agreed  on  all  sides, 
that  one  or  the  other  must  be  selected,  and  that  to  adopt  or  reject  the  one  is  to 
reject  or  adopt  the  other.  The  single  question,  then,  is,  Which  shall  we  choose  1 
A  deeply  momentous  question,  which  we  are  now  called  on  to  decide  in  behalf 
of  the  states  of  this  Union ;  and  on  our  decision  their  future  destmy  must  in  a 
great  degree  depend,  so  long  as  their  Union  endures. 

In  comparing  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  measures,  preparatory  to  a  decis 
ion,  I  shall  touch  very  briefly  on  the  principles  and  details  of  the  bill.  The 
former  is  well  understood  by  the  Senate  and  the  country  at  large,  and  the  latter 
has  been  so  ably  and  lucidly  explained  by  the  chairman  of  the  committee  in  his 
opening  speech,  as  to  supersede  the  necessity  of  farther  remarks  on  them  at 
this  stage  of  the  discussion.  I  propose,  then,  to  limit  myself  to  a  mere  general 
summary,  accompanied  by  a  few  brief  observations. 

The  object  of  the  bill,  as  I  have  already  stated,  is  to  take  the  public  funds  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  executive,  where  they  have  been  thrown  by  operation  of  our 
acts,  and  to  place  them  under  the  custody  of  law  ;  and  to  provide  for  a  gradual 
and  slow,  but  a  perpetual  separation  between  the  government  and  the  banks. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  291 

It  proposes  to  extend  the  process  of  separating  to  the  year  1845,  receiving  da 
ring  the  first  year  of  the  series  the  notes  of  such  banks  as  may  pay  specie,  and 
reducing  thereafter  the  amount  receivable  in  notes  one  sixth  annually,  till  the 
separation  shall  be  finally  consummated  at  the  period  mentioned. 

The  provisions  of  the  bill  are  the  most  simple  and  effectual  that  an  able  com 
mittee  could  devise.  Four  principal  receivers,  a  few  clerks,  and  a  sufficient 
number  of  agents  to  examine  the  state  of  the  public  funds,  in  order  to  see  that 
ail  is" right,  at  an  annual  charge  not  exceeding  forty  or  fifty  thousand  dollars  at 
most,  constitute  the  additional  officers  and  expenditures  required  to  perform  all 
the  functions  heretofore  discharged  by  the  banks,  as  depositories  of  the  public 
money  and  fiscal  agents  of  the  treasury.  This  simple  apparatus  will  place  the 
public  treasury  on  an  independent  footing,  and  give  to  the  government,  at  all 
times,  a  certain  command  of  its  funds  to  meet  its  engagements,  and  preserve  its 
honour  and  faith  inviolate.  If  it  be  desirable  to  separate  from  the  banks,  the 
government  must  have  some  independent  agency  of  its  own  to  keep  and  dis 
burse  the  public  revenue ;  and  if  it  must  have  such  an  agency,  none,  in  my 
opinion,  can  be  devised  more  simple,  more  economical,  more  effectual  and  safe 
than  that  provided  by  this  bill.  It  is  the  necessary  result  of  the  separation,  and 
to  reject  it,  without  proposing  a  better  (if,  indeed,  a  better  can  be),  is  to  reject 
the  separation  itself. 

I  turn,  now,  to  the  substitute.  Its  object  is  directly  the  reverse  of  that  of  the 
bill.  It  proposes  to  revive  the  league  of  state  banks,  and  to  renew  our  connex 
ion  with  them,  and  which  all  acknowledge  has  contributed  so  much  to  corrupt, 
the  community,  and  to  create  a  spirit  for  speculation  heretofore  unexampled  in 
our  history. 

The  senator,  in  offering  it,  whether  wisely  or  not,  has  at  least  acted  consistent 
ly.  He  was  its  advocate  at  first  in  1834,  when  the  alternative  was  between  it  and 
the  recharter  of  the  late  Bank  of  the  United  States.    He  then  defended  it  zealous 
ly  and  manfully  against  the  fierce  assaults  of  his  present  allies,  as  he  now  defends 
it,  when  those  who  then  sustained  him  have  abandoned  the  measure.     Whether 
wisely  or  not,  there  is  something  heroic  in  his  adherence,  and  I  commend  him  for  . 
it ;  but  I  fear  I  cannot  say  as  much  for  his  wisdom  arid  discretion.     He  acknowl 
edged,  with  all  others,  the  disasters  that  have  followed  the  first  experiment, 
but  attributes  the  failure  to  inauspicious?  circumstances,  and  insists  that  the 
measure  has  not  had  a  fair  trial.     I  grant  that  a  second  experiment  may  suc 
ceed  after  the  first  has  failed ;  but  the  senator  must  concede,  in  return,  that 
every  failure  must  necessarily  weaken  confidence,  both  in  the  experiment  and 
the  experimenter.     He  cannot  be  more  confident  in  making  this  second  trial 
than  he  was  in  the  first ;  and,  if  I  doubted  the  success  then,  and  preferred  the 
sub-treasury  to  his  league  of  banks,  he  must  excuse  me  for  still  adhering  to  my 
opinion,  and  doubting  the  success  of  his  second  trial.     Nor  ought  he  to  be  sur 
prised  that  those  who  joined  him  in  the  first  should  be  rather  shy  of  trying 
the  experiment  again,  after  having  been  blown  into  the  air,  and  burned  and  scald 
ed  by  the  explosion.     But,  i(  the  senator  has  been  unfortunate  in  failing  to  se 
cure  the  co-operation  of  those  who  aided  him  in  the  first  trial,  he  has  been  com 
pensated  by  securing  the  support  of  those  who  were  then  opposed  to  him. 
They  are  now  his  zealous  supporters.     In  contrasting  their  course  then  and 
now,  I  intend  nothing  personal.     I  make  no  charge  of  inconsistency,  nor  do  I 
intend  to  imply  it.     My  object  is  truth,  and  not  to  wound  the  feelings  of  any 
one  or  any  party.     I  know  that  to  make  out  a  charge  of  inconsistency,  not  only 
the  question,  but  all  the  material  circumstances  must  be  the  same.     A  change 
in  either  may  make  a  change  of  vote  necessary ;  and,  with  a  material  variation 
in  circumstances,  we  are  often  compelled  to  vary  our  course,  in  order  to  pre 
serve  our  principles.     In  this  case,  I  conceive  that  circumstances,  as  far  as  the 
present  allies  of  the  , senator  are  concerned,  have  materially  changed.     Then 
the  option  was  between  a  recharter  of  the  late  Bank  and  a  league  of  state  banks 


292  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

but  now  the  former  is  out  of  the  question,  and  the  option  is  between  such  a 
league  and  a  total  separation  from  the  banks.  This  being  the  alternative,  they 
may  well  take  that  which  they  rejected  in  1834,  without  subjecting  themselves 
to  the  charge  of  inconsistency,  or  justly  exposing  themselves  to  the  imputation, 
of  change  of  principle  or  opinion.  I  acquit  them,  then,  of  all  such  charges. 
They,  doubtless,  think  now  as  they  formerly  did  of  the  measure  which  they 
denounced  and  rejected,  but  which  a  change  of  circumstances  now  compels  them 
to  support.  But  in  thus  acquitting  them  of  the  charge  of  inconsistency,  they 
must  excuse  me  if  I  should  avail  myself  of  the  fact,  that  their  opinion  remains  un 
changed,  as  an  argument  in  favour  of  the  bill,  against  the  substitute.  The  choice 
is  between  them.  They  are  in  the  opposite  scales.  To  take  from  the  one  is, 
in  effect,  to  add  to  the  other ;  and  any  objection  against  the  one  is  an  argument 
equally  strong  in  favour  of  the  other.  I,  then,  do  avail  myself  of  their  many  pow 
erful  objections  in  1834  against  the  measure,  which  this  substitute  proposes  now 
to  revive.  I  call  to  my  aid  and  press  into  my  service  every  denunciation  they 
then  uttered,  and  every  argument  they  then  so  successfully  urged  against  it. 
They— no,  we  (for  I  was  then,  as  now,  irreconcilably  opposed  to  the  measure) 
charged  against  it,  and  proved  what  we  charged,  that  it  placed  the  purse  and 
the  sword  in  the  same  hands ;  that  it  would  be  the  source  of  boundless  patron 
age  and  corruption,  and  fatal,  in  its  consequences,  to  the  currency  of  the  coun 
try  ;  and  I  now  avail  myself  of  these,  and  all  other  objections  then  urged  by  us, 
in  as  full  force  against  this  substitute,  as  if  you  were  again  to  rise  in  your  pla 
ces  and  repeat  them  now ;  and,  of  course,  as  so  many  arguments,  in  effect,  in 
favour  of  the  bill ;  and  on  their  strength  I  claim  your  vote  in  its  favour,  unless, 
indeed,  still  stronger  objections  can  be  urged  against  it.  I  say  stronger,  be 
cause  time  has  proved  the  truth  of  all  that  was  then  said  against  the  measure 
now  proposed  to  be  revived  by  this  substitute.  What  was  then  prediction  is 
now  fact.  But  whatever  objections  have  been,  or  may  be  urged  against  the 
bill,  however  strong  they  may  appear  in  argument,  remain  yet  to  be  tested  by 
the  unerring  test  of  time  and  experience.  Whether  they  shall  ever  be  realized, 
must  be  admitted,  even  by  those  who  may  have  the  greatest  confidence  in  them, 
to  be  at  least  uncertain ;  and  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  and  prudence,  where  ob 
jections  are  equally  strong  against  two  measures,  to  prefer  that  which  is  yet  un 
tried  to  that  which  has  been  tried  and  failed.  Against  this  conclusion  there 
is  but  one  escape. 

It  may  be  said  that  we  are  sometimes  compelled,  in  the  midst  of  the  many 
extraordinary  circumstances  in  which  we  may  be  placed,  to  prefer  that  which  is 
of  itself  the  more  objectionable  to  that  which  is  less  so  ;  because  the  former  may 
more  probably  lead,  in  the  end,  to  some  desired  result  than  the  latter.  To  ap 
ply  the  principle  to  this  case.  It  may  be  said  that  the  substitute,  though  of 
itself  objectionable,  is  to  be  preferred,  because  it  would  more  probably  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  a  National  Bank  than  the  bill,  which  you  believe  to  be  the 
only  certain  remedy  for  all  the  disorders  that  affect  the  currency.  I  admit  the 
position  to  be  sound  in  principle,  but  It  is  one  exceedingly  bold  and  full  of  dan 
ger  in  practice,  and  ought  never  to  be  acted  on  but  in  extreme  cases,  and 
where  there  is  a  rational  prospect  of  accomplishing  the  object  ultimately  aimed 
at.  The  application  in  this  case,  I  must  think,  would  be  rashness  itself.  It 
may  be  safely  assumed,  that  the  success  of  either,  whichever  may  be  adopted, 
the  bill  or  the  substitute,  would  be  fatal  to  the  establishment  of  a  National  Bank. 
It  can  never  put  down  a  successful  measure  to  take  its  place ;  and,  of  course, 
that  which  is  most  likely  to  fail,  and  replunge  the  country  into  all  the  disasters 
of  a  disordered  currency,  is  that  which  would  most  probably  lead  to  the  restora 
tion  of  a  National  Bank ;  and  to  prefer  the  substitute  on  that  account  is,  in  fact, 
to  prefer  it  because  it  is  the  worst  of  the  two.  But  are  you  certain  that  another 
explosion  would  be  followed  by  a  bank  ?  We  have  already  had  two  ;  and  it  is 
far  more  probable  that  the  third  would  impress,  universally  and  indelibly,  on  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  293 

public  mind,  that  there  was  something  radically  and  incurably  wrong  in  the  sys 
tem  which  would  blow  up  the  whole  concern,  National  Bank  and  all. 

If  I  may  be  permitted  to  express  an  opinion,  I  would  say  you  havs  pursued 
a  course  on  this  subject  unfortunate  both  for  yourselves  arid  country.  You  are 
opposed  both  to  the  league  of  banks  and  the  sub-treasury.  You  prefer  a  Na 
tional  Bank,  and  regard  it  as  the  only  safe  and  certain  regulator  of  the  currency, 
but  consider  it,  for  the  present,  out  of  the  question,  and  are  therefore  compelled 
to  choose  between  the  other  two.  By  supporting  the  substitute,  you  will  be 
held  responsible  for  all  the  mischief  and  disasters  that  may  follow  the  revival  of 
the  pet-bank  system,  as  it  has  been  called,  with  the  almost  certain  defeat  of 
your  first  and  cherished  choice  ;  and  those  you  oppose  will  reap  all  the  benefits 
of  the  power,  patronage,  and  influence  which  it  may  place  in  their  hands,  with 
out  incurring  any  portion  of  the  responsibility.  But  that  is  not  all.  The  suc 
cess  of  the  substitute  would  be  the  defeat  of  the  bill,  which  would,  in  like  man 
ner,  place  on  you  the  responsibility  of  its  defeaj;,  and  give  those  you  oppose  all 
the  advantage  of  having  supported  it,  without  any  of  the  responsibility  that  would 
have  belonged  to  it  had  it  been  adopted.  Had  a  different  course  been  taken, 
• — had  you  joined  in  aiding  to  extend  the  custody  of  the  laws  over  the  public 
revenue  in  the  hands  of  the  executive,  where  your  own  acts  have  placed  it, 
and  for  which  you,  of  course,  are  responsible,  throwing,  at  the  same  time,  on 
those  to  whom  you  attribute  the  present  disordered  state  of  the  currency,  the 
burden  of  the  responsibility — you  would  have  stood  ready  to  profit  by  events. 
If  the  sub-treasury,  contrary  to  your  anticipation,  succeeded,  as  patriots,  you 
would  have  cause  to  rejoice  in  the  unexpected  good.  If  it  failed,  you  would 
have  the  credit  of  having  anticipated  the  result,  and  might  then,  after  a  double 
triumph  of  sagacity  and  foresight,  have  brought  forward  your  favourite  measure, 
with  a  fair  prospect  of  success,  when  every  other  had  failed.  By  not  taking 
this  course,  you  have  lost  the  only  prospect  of  establishing  a  National  Bank. 

Nor  has  your  course,  in  my  opinion,  been  fortunate  for  the  country.  Had  it 
been  different,  the  currency  question  would  have  been  decided  at  the  called 
session;  and  had  it  been  decided  then,  the  country  would  this  day  have  been 
in  a  much  better  condition  :  at  least  the  manufacturing  and  commercial  section 
to  the  North,  where  the  derangement  of  the  currency  is  felt  the  most  severely. 
The  South  is  comparatively  in  an  easy  condition. 

Such  are  the  difficulties  that  stand  in  the  way  of  the  substitute  at  the  very 
threshold.  Those  beyond  are  vastly  greater,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show. 
Its  object,  as  I  have  stated,  is  to  revive  the  league  of  state  banks  ;  and  the  first 
question  presented  for  consideration  is,  How  is  this  to  be  done — how  is  the 
league  to  be  formed  ?  how  stimulated  into  life  when  formed  ?  and  what,  after  it 
has  been  revived,  would  be  the  true  character  of  the  league  or  combination  ? 
To  answer  these  questions  we  must  turn  to  its  provisions. 

It  provides  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall  select  twenty-five  specie- 
paying  banks  as  the  fiscal  agents  of  the  government,  all  to  be  respectable  and 
substantial,  and  that  the  selection  shall  be  confirmed  by  the  joint  vote  of  the  two 
houses.  It  also  provides  that  the  shall  be  made  the  depositories  of  the  public 
money,  and  that  their  notes  shall  be  receivable  in  the  dues  of  the  government ; 
and  that,  in  turn,  for  these  advantages,  they  shall  stipulate  to  perform  certain 
duties,  and  comply  with  various  conditions,  the  object  of  which  is  to  give  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  full  knowledge  of  their  condition  and  business,  with 
the  view  to  supervise  and  control  their  acts,  as  far  as  the  interest  of  the  govern 
ment  is  concerned.  In  addition  to  these,  it  contains  other  and  important  pro 
visions,  which  I  shall  not  enumerate,  because  they  do  not  fall  within  the  scope 
of  the  objections  that  I  propose  to  urge  against  the  measure. 

Now,  I  ask,  What  does  all  this  amount  to  ?  What  but  a  proposal,  on  the  part 
of  the  government,  to  enter  into  a  contract  or  bargain  with  certain  selected  state 
banks,  on  the  terms  and  conditions  contained  ?  Have  we  the  right  to  make  such 


294  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

a  bargain  ?  is  the  first  question  ;  and  to  that  I  give  a  decided  negative,  which  I 
hope  to  place  on  constitutional  grounds  that  cannot  be  shaken.  I  intend  to  dis 
cuss  it,  with  other  questions  growing  out  of  the  connexion  of  the  government 
with  the  banks,  as  a  new  question,  for  the  first  time  presented  for  consideration 
and  decision.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  questions  growing  out  of  it,  as  long 
as  it  has  existed,  have  never  yet  been  presented  nor  investigated  in  reference 
to  their  constitutionality.  How  this  has  happened,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  ex 
plain,  preparatory  to  the  examination  of  the  question  which  I  have  proposed. 

The  union  of  the  government  and  the  banks  was  never  legally  solemnized. 
It  originated  shortly  after  the  government  went  into  operation,  not  in  any  legal 
enactment,  but  in  a  short  order  of  the  treasury  department  of  not  much  more 
than  half  a  dozen  of  lines,  as  if  it  were  a  mere  matter  of  course.  We  thus 
glided  imperceptibly  into  a  connexion,  which  was  never  recognised  by  law  till 
1816  (if  my  memory  serves),  but  which  has  produced  more  important  after- 
consequences,  and  has  had  a  greater  control  over  the  destiny  of  this  country, 
than  any  one  of  the  mighty  questions  which  have  so  often  and  deeply  agitated 
the  country.  To  it  may  be  traced,  as  their  seminal  principle,  the  vast  and  ex 
traordinary  expansion  of  our  banking  system,  our  excessive  import  duties,  un 
constitutional  and  profuse  disbursements,  the  protective  tariff,  and  its  associated 
system  for  spending  what  it  threw  into  the  treasury,  followed  in  time  by  a  vast 
surplus,  which  the  utmost  extravagance  of  the  government  could  not  dissipate, 
and,  finally,  by  a  sort  of  retributive  justice,  the  explosion  of  the  entire  banking 
system,  and  the  present  prostrated  condition  of  the  currency,  now  the  subject 
of  our  deliberation. 

How  a  measure  fraught  with  such  important  consequences  should  at  first, 
and  for  so  long  a  time,  escape  the  attention  and  the  investigation  of  the  public, 
deserves  a  passing  notice.  It  is  to  be  explained  by  the  false  conception  of  the 
entire  subject  of  banking  which,  at  that  early  period,  universally  prevailed  in 
the  community.  So  erroneous  was  it,  that  a  bank-note  was  then  identified  in 
the  mind  of  the  public  with  gold  and  silver,  and  a  deposite  in  bank  was  regarded 
as  under  the  most  safe  and  sacred  custody  that  could  be  devised.  The  origi 
nal  impression,  derived  from  the  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  where  every  note  or  cer 
tificate  in  circulation  was  honestly  represented  by  an  equal  and  specific  quantity 
sof  gold  or  silver  in  bank,  and  where  every  deposite  was  kept  as  a  sacred  trust,  to 
be  safely  returned  to  the  depositor  when  demanded,  was  extended  to  banks  of 
discount,  down  to  the  time  of  the  formation  of  our  government,  with  but  slight 
modifications.  With  this  impression,  it  is  not  at  all  extraordinary  that  the  de 
posite  of  the  revenue  in  banks  for  safe  keeping,  and  the  receipt  of  their  notes 
in  the  public  dues,  should  be  considered  a  matter  of  course,  requiring  no  higher 
authority  than  a  treasury  order ;  and  hence  a  connexion,  with  all  the  important 
questions  belonging  to  it,  and  now  considered  of  vast  magnitude,  received  so 
little  notice  till  public  attention  was  directed  to  it  by  its  recent  rupture.  This 
total  separation  from  the  system  in  which  we  now  find  ourselves  placed  for  the 
first  time,  authorizes  and  demands  that  we  shall  investigate  freely  and  fully,  not 
only  the  consequences  of  the  connexion,  but  all  the  questions  growing  out  of  it, 
more  especially  those  of  a  constitutional  character ;  and  I  shall,  in  obedience 
to  this  demand,  return  to  the  question  from  which  this  digression  has  carried  me. 

Have  we,  then,  the  right  to  make  the  bargain  proposed  ?  Have  we  the 
right  to  bestow  the  high  privileges,  I  might  say  prerogatives,  on  them  of 
being  made  the  depositories  of  the  public  revenue,  and  of  having  their  notes 
received  and  treated  as  gold  and  silver  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  and 
in  all  its  fiscal  transactions  1  Have  we  the  right  to  do  all  this  in  order  to 
bestow  confidence  in  the  banks,  with  the  view  to  enable  them  to  resume 
specie  payments  ?  What  is  the  state  of  the  case  ?  The  banks  are  deeply  in 
debted  to  the  country,  and  are  unable  to  pay ;  and  we  are  asked  to  give  them 
these  advantages  in  order  to  enable  them  to  pay  their  debts.  Can  we  grant  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  295 

boon  ?  In  answering  this  important  question,  I  begin  with  the  fact  that  our 
government  is  one  of  limited  powers.  It  can  exercise  no  right  but  what  is 
specifically  granted,  nor  pass  any  law  but  what  is  necessary  and  proper  to  carry 
such  power  into  effect.  This  small  pamphlet  (holding  it  up)  contains  the  Con 
stitution.  Its  grants  of  power  are  few  and  plain,  and  I  ask  gentlemen  to  turn 
to  it  and  point  out  the  power  that  authorizes  us  to  do  what  is  proposed  to  be 
done,  or  to  show  that  the  passage  of  this  substitute  is  necessary  to  carry  any 
of  the  granted  powers  into  effect.  If  neither  can  be  shown,  what  is  proposed 
cannot  be  constitutionally  done  ;  and  till  it  is  specifically  pointed  out,  I  am  war 
ranted  in  believing  that,  it  cannot  be  shown. 

Our  reason  is  often  confounded  by  a  mere  name.  An  act,  in  the  minds  of 
many,  may  become  of  doubtful  constitutional  authority  when  applied  to  a  bank, 
which  none  would  for  a  moment  hesitate  to  pronounce  grossly  unconstitutional 
when  applied  to, an  individual.  To  free  ourselves  from  this  illusion,  I  ask. 
Could  this  government  constitutionally  bestow  on  individuals,  or  a  private  asso 
ciation,  the  advantages  proposed  to  be  bestowed  on  the  selected  banks,  in  order 
to  enable  them  to  pay  their  debts  ?  Is  there  one  who  hears  me,  who  would 
venture  to  say  yes,  even  in  the  case  of  the  most  extensive  merchant  or  mercan 
tile  concern,  such  as  some  of  those  in  New- York  or  New-Orleans,  at  the  late 
suspension,  whose  embarrassments  involved  entire  sections  in  distress  ?  But, 
if  not,  on  what  principle  can  a  discrimination  be  made  in  favour  of  the  banks  ? 
They  are  local  institutions,  created  by  the  states  for  local  purposes,  composed, 
like  private  associations,  of  individual  citizens,  on  whom  the  acts  of  the  state 
cannot  confer  a  particle  of  constitutional  right  under  this  Constitution  that  does 
not  belong  to  the  humblest  citizen.  So  far  from  it,  if  there  be  a  distinction,  it 
is  against  the  banks.  They  are  removed  farther  from  the  control  of  this  gov 
ernment  than  trie  individual  citizens,  who,  by  the  Constitution,  are  expressly- 
subject  to  the  direct  action  of  this  government  in  many  instances,  while  the 
state  banks,  as  constituting  a  portion  of  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  states, 
and  resting  on  their  reserved  rights,  are  entirely  beyond  our  control ;  so  much 
so  as  not  to  be  the  subject  of  a  bankrupt  law,  although  the  authority  to  pass 
one  is  expressly  granted  by  the  Constitution. 

On  what  possible  ground,  then,  can  the  right  in  question  be  placed,  unless, 
indeed,  on  the  broad  principle  that  these  local  institutions,  intended  for  state 
purposes,  have  been  so  extended,  and  have  so  connected  themselves  with  the 
general  circulation  and  business  of  the  country,  as  to  affect  the  interest  of  the 
whole  community,  so  as  to  make  it  the  right  and  duty  of  Congress  to  regulate 
them ;  or,  in  short,  on  the  broad  principle  of  the  general  welfare  ?  There  is 
none  other  that  I  can  perceive  ;  but  this  would  be  to  adopt  the  old  and  exploded 
principle,  at  all  times  dangerous,  but  pre-eminently  so  at  this  time,  when  such 
loose  and  dangerous  conceptions  of  the  Constitution  are  abroad  in  the  land.  If 
the  argument  is  good  in  one  case,  it  is  good  in  all  similar  cases.  If  this  gov 
ernment  may  interfere  with  any  one  of  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  states,  on 
the  ground  of  promoting  the  general  welfare,  it  may  with  others.  If  it  may  be 
stow  privileges  to  control  them,  it  may  also  appropriate  money  for  the  same 
purpose  ;  and  thus  a  door  might  be  opened  to  an  interference  with  state  in 
stitutions,  of  which  we  of  a  certain  section  ought  at  this  time  to  be  not  a  little 
jealous. 

The  argument  might  be  pushed  much  farther.  We  not  only  offer  to  confer 
great  and  important  privileges  on  the  banks  to  be  selected,  but,  in  turn,  ask  them 
to  stipulate  to  comply  with  certain  conditions,  the  object  of  which  is  to  bring 
them  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  this  government.  It  might  be  asked, 
Where  is  the  right  to  purchase  or  assume  such  supervision  gr  control  ?  It 
might  be  repeated,  that  they  are  state  institutions,  incorporated  solely  for  state 
purposes,  and  to  be  entirely  under  state  control,  and  that  all  supervision  on  our 
part  is  in  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  states.  It  might  be  argued  that  such  su- 


296  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

pervision  or  control  is  calculated  to  weaken  the  control  of  the  states  over  their 
own  institutions,  and  to  render  them  less  subservient  to  their  peculiar  and  local 
interests,  for  the  promotion  of  which  they  were  established,  and  too  subservient 
to  other,  and,  perhaps,  conflicting  interests,  which  might  feel  but  little  sympathy 
with  those  of  the  states.  But  I  forbear.  Other,  and  not  less  urgent  objections 
claim  my  attention.  To  dilate  too  much  on  one  would  necessarily  sacrifice  the 
claim  of  others. 

I  next  object  that,  whatever  may  be  the  right  to  enter  into  the  proposed  bar 
gain,  the  mode  in  which  it  is  proposed  to  make  it  is  clearly  unconstitutional,  if 
I  rightly  comprehend  it.  I  am  not  certain  that  I  do  ;  but,  if  I  understand  it  right 
ly,  the  plan  is,  for  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  select  twenty-five  state  banks, 
as  described  in  the  substitute,  which  are  to  be  submitted  to  the  two  houses,  to 
be  confirmed  or  rejected  by  their  joint  resolutions,  without  the  approval  of  the 
President ;  in  the  same  mode  as  they  would  appoint  a  chaplain,  or  establish  a 
joint  rule  for  the  government  of  their  proceedings. 

In  acting  on  the  joint  resolution,  if  what  I  suppose  be  intended,  each  house 
would  have  the  right,  of  course,  to  strike  from  it  the  name  of  any  bank  and  in 
sert  another,  which,  would,  in  fact,  vest  in  the  two  houses  the  uncontrollable 
right  of  making  the  selection.  Now  if  this  be  the  mode  proposed,  as  I  infer 
from  the  silence  of  the  mover,  it  is  a  plain  and  palpable  violation  of  the  Consti 
tution.  The  obvious  intention  is  to  evade  the  veto  power  of  the  executive, 
which  cannot  be  without  an  infraction  of  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  drawn  up  with  the  utmost  care,  and  intended  to  prevent  the  possibility  of 
evasion.  It  is  contained  in  the  1st  article,  7th  section,  and  the  last  clause, 
which  I  ask  the  secretary  to  read : 

["  Every  order,  resolution,  or  vote,  to  which  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate 
and  House  of  Representatives  may  be  necessary  (except  on  a  question  of  adjourn 
ment),  shall  be  presented  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  ;  and  before  the 
same  shall  take  effect,  shall  be  approved  by  him,  or,  being  disapproved  by  him, 
shall  be  repassed  by  two  thirds  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
according  to  the  rules  and  limitations  prescribed  in  the  case  of  a  bill."] 

Nothing  can  be  more  explicit  or  full.  It  is  no  more  possible  to  evade  the 
executive  veto,  on  any  joint  vote,  than  on  the  passage  of  a  bill.  The  veto  was 
vested  in  him  not  only  to  protect  his  own  powers,  but  as  an  additional  guard  to 
the  Constitution.  I  am  not  the  advocate  of  executive  power,  which  I  have 
been  often  compelled  to  resist  of  late,  when  extended  beyond  its  proper  limits, 
as  I  shall  ever  be  prepared  to  do  when  it  is.  Nor  am  I  the  advocate  of  legis 
lative  or  judicial.  I  stand  ready  to  protect  all,  within  the  sphere  assigned  by 
the  Constitution,  and  to  resist  them  beyond.  To  this  explicit  and  comprehen 
sive  provision  of  the  Constitution,  in  protection  of  the  veto,  there  is  but  a  single 
exception,  resulting,  by  necessary  implication,  from  another  portion  of  the  in 
strument,  not  less  explicit,  which  authorizes  each  house  to  establish  the  rules 
of  its  proceedings.  Under  this  provision  the  two  houses  have  full  and  uncon 
trollable  authority  within  the  limits  of  their  respective  walls,  and  over  those  sub 
ject  to  their  authority,  in  their  official  character.  To  that  extent  they  may  pass 
joint  votes  and  resolutions,  without  the  approval  of  the  executive ;  but  beyond 
that,  without  it  they  are  powerless. 

There  are  in  this  case  special  reasons  why  his  approval  should  not  be  eva 
ded.  The  President  is  at  the  head  of  the  administrative  department  of  the  gov 
ernment,  and  is  especially  responsible  for  its  good  management.  In  order  to 
hold  him  responsible,' he  ought  to  have  due  power  in  the  selection  of  its  agents, 
and  proper  control  over  their  conduct.  These  banks  would  be  by  far  the  most 
powerful  and  influential  of  all  the  agents  of  the  government,  and  ought  not  to  be 
selected  without  the  concurrence  of  the  executive.  If  this  substitute  should  be 
adopted,  and  the  provision  in  question  be  regarded  such  as  I  consider  it,  there 
3an  be  no  doubt  what  must  be  the  fate  of  the  measure.  The  executive  will  be 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  297 

bound  to  protect,  by  the  intervention  of  its  constitutional  right,  the  portion  of 
power  clearly  allotted  to  that  department  by  that  instrument,  which  would  make 
it  impossible  for  it  to  become  a  law  with  the  existing  division  in  the  two 
houses. 

I  have  not  yet  exhausted  my  constitutional  objections.  I  rise  to  higher  and  to 
broader,  applying  directly  to  the  very  essence  of  this  substitute.  I  deny  your  right 
to  make  a  general  deposite  of  the  public  revenue  in  a  bank.  More  than  half 
of  the  errors  of  life  may  be  traced  to  fallacies  originating  in  an  improper  use  of 
words ;  and  among  not  the  least  mischievous  is  the  application  of  this  word  to 
bank  transactions,  in  a  sense  wholly  different  from  its  original  meaning.  Ori 
ginally  it  meant  a  thing  placed  in  trust,  or  pledged  to  be  safely  and  sacredly 
kept,  till  returned  to  the  depositor,  without  being  used  by  the  depositary  while 
in  his  possession.  All  this  is  changed  when  applied  to  a  deposite  in  bank. 
Instead  of  returning  the  identical  thing,  the  bank  is  understood  to  be  bound  to 
return  only  an  equal  value  ;  and  instead  of  not  having  the  use,  it  is  understood 
to  have  the  right  to  loan  it  out  on  interest,  or  to  dispose  of  it  as  it  pleases,  with 
the  single  condition,  that  an  equal  amount  be  returned  when  demanded,  which, 
experience  has  taught  is  not  always  done.  To  place,  then,  the  public  money 
in  deposite  in  bank,  without  restriction,  is  to  give  the  free  use  of  it,  and  to  al 
low  them  to  make  as  much  as  they  can  out  of  it  between  the  time  of  fleposite 
and  disbursement.  Have  we  such  a  right  ?  The  money  belongs  to  the  people 
— collected  from  them  for  specific  purposes,  in  which  they  have  a  general  in 
terest — and  for  that  only ;  and  what  possible  right  can  we  have  to  give  such 
use  of  it  to  certain  selected  corporations  ?  I  ask  for  the  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution  that  authorizes  it.  I  ask  if  we  could  grant  the  use,  for  similar  purpo 
ses,  to  private  associations  or  individuals  ?  Or,  if  not  to  them,  to  individual  of 
ficers  of  the  government ;  for  instance,  to  the  four  principal  receivers  under  this 
bill,  should  it  pass.  And  if  this  cannot  be  done,  that  the  distinction  be  point 
ed  out. 

If  these  questions  be  satisfactorily  answered,  I  shall  propound  others  still 
more  difficult.  I  shall  then  ask,  If  the  substitute  should  become  a  law,  and 
the  -twenty-five  banks  be  selected,  whether  they  would  not,  in  fact,  be  the  treas 
ury  ?  And  if  not,  I  would  ask,  Where  would  be  the  treasury  ?  But  if  they 
would  be  the  treasury,  I  would  ask,  If  public  money  in  bank  would  not  be  in 
the  treasury  ?  And  if  so,  how  can  it  be  drawn  from  it  to  be  lent  for  the  purpose 
of  trade,  speculation,  or  any  other  use  whatever,  against  an  express  provision  of 
the  Constitution  ?  Yes,  as  express  as  words  can  make  it.  I  ask  the  secretary 
to  read  the  1st  article,  9th  section,  and  the  clause  next  to  the  last. 

["  No  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the  treasury  but  in  consequence  of  appro 
priations  made  by  law  ;  and  a  regular  statement  and  account  of  the  receipts 
and  expenditures  of  all  public  money  shall  be  published  from  time  to  time."] 

How  clear  !  How  explicit !  No  money  to  be  drawn  from  the  treasury  but 
in  consequence  of  appropriations  made  by  law  ;  that  is,  the  object  on  which  the 
expenditure  is  to  be  made,  to  be  designated  by  law,  and  the  sum  allotted  to  ef 
fect  it,  specified ;  and  yet  we  have  lived  in  the  daily  and  habitual  violation  of 
this  great  fundamental  provision,  from  almost  the  beginning  of  our  political  ex 
istence  to  this  day.  Behold  the  consequences  !  It  has  prostrated  and  ingulfed 
the  very  institutions  which  have  enjoyed  this  illicit  favour,  and  tainted,  above 
all  other  causes,  the  morals  and  politics  of  the  whole  country.  Yes,  to  this 
must  be  traced,  as  one  of  the  main  causes,  the  whole  system  of  excessive  reve 
nue,  excessive  expenditure,  and  excessive  surpluses  ;  and  to  them,  especially 
the  last,  the  disastrous  overthrow  of  ^ue  banks  and  the  currency,  and  the  un 
exampled  degeneracy  of  public  and  private  morals,  which  have  followed.  We 
have  suffered  the  affliction  :  may  the  blessing  which  follows  chastisement,  when 
its  justice  is  confessed,  come  in  due  season. 

But  I  take  still  higher  ground.     I  strike  at  the  root  of  the  mischief.     I  deny 

PP 


298  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  right  of  this  government  to  treat  bank-notes  as  money  in  its  fiscal  transac 
tions.  On  this  great  question  I  never  have  before  committed  myself,  though 
not  generally  disposed  to  abstain  from  forming  or  expressing  opinions.  In  all 
instances  in  which  a  National  Bank  has  come  in  question,  I  have  invariably 
taken  my  ground,  that  if  the  government  has  the  right  to  receive  and  treat  bank 
notes  as  money,  it  had  the  right,  and  was  bound,  under  the  Constitution,  to 
regulate  them  so  as  to  make  them  uniform  and  stable  as  a  currency.  The  rea 
sons  for  this  opinion  are  obvious,  and  have  been  so  often  and  fully  expressed 
on  former  occasions,  that  it  would  be  useless  to  repeat  them  now  ;  but  I  never 
-•*  examined  fully  the  right  of  receiving,  or  made  up  my  mind  on  it,  till  since  the 
catastrophe  in  May  last,  which,  as  I  have  said,  entirely  separated  the  govern 
ment  from  the  banks.  Previous  to  that  period,  it  was  an  abstract  question,  with 
no  practical  bearing  ;  as  much  so  as  is  now  the  constitutional  right  of  admitting 
Louisiana  into  the  Union.  Things  are  now  altered.  The  connexion  is  dis 
solved,  and  it  has  become  a  practical  question  of  the  first  magnitude. 

The  mover  of  the  substitute  assumed  as  a  postulate,  that  this  government  had 
a  right  to  receive  in  its  dues  whatever  it  might  think  proper.  I  deny  the  posi 
tion  in  toto.  It  is  one  that  ought  not  to  be  assumed,  and  cannot  be  proved,  and 
which  is  opposed  by  powerful  objections.  The  genius  of  our  Constitution  is 
opposed  *to  the  assumption  of  power.  Whatever  power  it  gives  is  expressly 
granted  ;  and  if  proof  were  wanted,  the  numerous  grants  of  powers  far  more 
obvious,  and  apparently  much  more  safe  to  be  assumed  than  the  one  in  question, 
would  afford  it.  I  shall  cite  a  few  striking  instances. 

If  any  powers  might  be  assumed,  one  would  suppose  that  of  applying  money 
to  pay  the  debts  of  the  government,  and  borrowing  it  to  carry  on  its  operations, 
would  be  among  them;  yet  both  are  expressly  provided  for  by  the  Constitution. 
Again,  to  Congress  is  granted  the  power  to  declare  war  and  raise  armies  and 
navies  ;  yet  the  power  to  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and  to  make 
rules  for  the  regulation  of  the  army  and  navy,  are  not  left  to  assumption,  as  ob 
vious  as  they  are,  but  are  given  by  express  grant.  With  these,  and  other  in 
stances  not  less  striking,  which  might  be  added,  it  is  a  bold  step  to  assume, 
without  proof,  the  far  less  obvious  power  of  the  government  receiving  whatever 
it  pleases  in  its  dues  as  money.  Such  an  assumption  would  be  in  direct  con 
flict  with  the  great  principle  which  the  State  Rights  party,  with  which  the  sen 
ator  (Mr.  Rives)  classes  himself,  have  ever  adopted  in  the  construction  of  the 
Constitution.  But,  if  the  former  cannot  be  assumed,  it  would  be  in  vain  to  at 
tempt  to  prove  that  it  has  been  granted,  or  that  it  is  necessary  and  proper  to 
carry  any  of  the  granted  powers  into  effect.  No  such  attempt  has  been  made, 
nor  can  be  with  success.  On  the  contrary,  there  are  strong  objections  to  the 
power,  which,  in  my  opinion,  cannot  be  surmounted. 

If  once  admitted,  it  would  lead,  by  consequence,  to  a  necessary  interference 
with  individual  and  state  concerns  never  contemplated  by  the  Constitution.  Let 
us,  for  instance,  suppose  that,  acting  on  the  assumption  of  the  senator,  the  gov 
ernment  should  choose  to  select  tobacco  as  an  article  to  be  received  in  pay 
ment  of  its  dues,  which  would  be  as  well  entitled  to  it  as  any  other  product, 
and  in  which  the  senator's  constituents  are  so  much  interested.  Does  he  not 
see  the  consequences  ?  In  order  to  make  its  taxes  uniform,  which  it  is  bound 
to  do  by  the  Constitution,  and  which  cannot  be  done  unless  the  medium  in 
v/hich  it  is  paid  is  so,  the  government  would  have  to  assume  a  general  control 
over  the  great  staple  in  question  ;  to  regulate  the  weight  of  the  hogshead  or 
package  ;  to  establish  inspections  under  its  own  officers  in  order  to  determine 
the  quality,  and  whatever  else  might  be  necessary  to  make  the  payments  into 
the  treasury  uniform.  So,  likewise,  if  the  still  greater  staple,  cotton,  be-  select 
ed.  The  weight  of  the  bale,  the  quality  of  the  cotton,  and  its  inspection,  would 
all  necessarily  fall  under  the  control  of  the  government ;  and  does  not  the  sena 
tor  see  that  the  exercise  of  a  power  that  must  lead  to  such  consequences — con- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  299 

sequences  so  far  beyond  the  sphere  assigned  to  this  government  by  the  Consti 
tution — must  be  unconstitutional  ?  Nor  does  the  objection  extend  only  to  these 
and  other  staple  articles.  It  applies  with  equal,  if  not  greater  force,  to  receiv 
ing  the  notes  of  state  banks,  as  proposed  by  the  substitute,  in  the  dues  of  the 
government  and  the  management  of  its  fiscal  concerns.  It  must  involve  the 
government  in  the  necessity  of  controlling  and  regulating  state  banks,  as  this 
substitute  abundantly  proves,  as  well  as  the  whole  history  of  our  connexion 
with  them  ;  and  it  has  been  shown  that  banks  are  at  least  as  far  removed  from 
the  control  of  this  government  as  the  cultivators  of  the  soil,  or  any  other  class 
of  citizens.  To  this  I  might  add  another  objection,  not  less  strong,  that  for  the 
government  to  receive  and  treat  bank-notes  as  money  in  its  dues,  would  be  in 
direct  conflict,  in  its  effect,  with  the  important  power  conferred  expressly  on. 
Congress  of  coining  money  .and  regulating  the  value  thereof ;  but  as  this  will 
come  in  with  more  propriety  in  answer  to  an  argument  advanced  by  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster),  I  shall  now  state  his  argument,  and  reply 
to  it. 

He  asserted  again  and  again,  both  now  and  at  the  extra  session,  that  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  government  not  only  to  regulate,  but  to  furnish  a  sound  curren 
cy.  Indeed,  it  is  the  principal  argument  relied  on  by  the  senator  in  opposition 
to  the  bill,  which,  he  says,  abandons  this  great  duty.  Now,  if  by  currency  be 
meant  gold  and  silver  coins,  there  will  be  but  little  difference  between  him  and 
myself.  To  that  extent  the  government  has  a  clear  and  unquestionable  right 
by  express  grant ;  but  if  he  goes  farther,  and  intends  to  assert  that  the  govern 
ment  has  the  right  to  make  bank-notes  a  currency,  which  it  is  bound  to  regulate, 
then  his  proposition  is  identical  in  effect,  though  differently  expressed,  with  that 
of  the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives),  and  all  the  arguments  I  have  urged 
against  it  are  equally  applicable  to  his.  I  hold,  on  my  part,  that  the  power  of 
the  government  on  this  subject  is  limited  to  coining  money  and  regulating  its 
value,  and  punishing  the  counterfeiting  of  the  current  coins — that  is,  of  the 
coins  made  current  by  law,  the  only  money  known  to  the  Constitution.  It  is 
time  to  make  a  distinction  between  money,  or  currency,  if  you  please — between 
that  which  will  legally  pay  debts,  and  mere  circulation,  which  has  its  value 
from  its  promise  to  be  paid  in  the  former,  and  under  which  classification,  bank 
notes,  as  well  as  bills  or  promissory  notes  of  individuals,  fall.  These  are  all  in 
their  nature  private  and  local,  and  cannot  be  elevated  to  the  level  of  currency, 
or  money,  in  the  fiscal  transactions  of  government,  without  coming  into  conflict, 
more  or  less,  with  the  object  of  the  Constitution  in  vesting  the  power  of  coining 
money  and  regulating  its  value  in  Congress,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show. 

It  will  hardly  be  questioned  that  the  object  was  to  fix  a  standard,  in  order  to 
furnish  to  the  Union  a  currency  of  uniform  and  steady  value,  and  was  therefore 
united  in  the  same  sentence  with  the  kindred  power  to  fix  the  standard  of 
weights  and  measures,  the  objects  being  similar.  Now,  if  our  experience  has 
proved  anything,  it  has  amply  shown  that  so  long  as  the  government  is  connect 
ed  with  the  banks,  and  their  notes  received  in  its  transactions  as  money,  so 
long  it  is  impossible  to  give  anything  like  stability  to  the  standard  of  value  ;  and 
that  the  power  of  coining  and  regulating  the  coins  becomes,  in  a  great  measure, 
a  mere  nullity.  Every  dollar  issued  in  bank-notes",  when  it  is  made  the  substi 
tute  for  money,  drives  out  of  circulation  more  or  less  of  the  precious  metals ; 
and  when  the  issue  becomes  exorbitant,  gold  and  silver  almost  entirely  disap 
pear,  as  our  experience  at  this  time  proves.  The  effects  ^,re  analogous  to 
alloying  or  clipping  the  coin,  as  far  as  stability  of  standard  is  concerned ;  and 
it  would  be  not  less  rational  to  suppose  that  such  a  power  on  the  part  of  indi 
viduals  would  be  consistent  with  a  uniform  and  stable  currency,  than  to  sup 
pose  the  receiving  and  treating  bank-notes  as  a  substitute  for  money  by  the 
government  would  be.  The  only  check  or  remedy  is  to  restrict  them  to  their 
proper  sphere,  to  circulate  in  common  with  bills  of  exchange  or  other  private 


300  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  local  paper,  for  the  convenience  of  business  arid  trade.  So  far  from  such  a 
course  operating  injuriously  on  the  people,  or  from  being  liable  to  the  charge  of 
forming  one  currency  for  the  people  and  another  for  the  government,  as  has  been 
so  often  and  with  such  effect  repeated,  it  is  the  very  reverse.  Government,  by 
refusing  to  receive  bank-notes,  as  it  is  bound  to  do,  would,  in  fact,  furnish  a  choice 
to  the  people,  to  take  either  money  or  notes  at  their  pleasure.  The  demand  of 
the  government  will  always  keep  a  plentiful  supply  of  the  former  in  the  country, 
so  as  to  afford  the  people  a  choice ;  while  the  opposite  would  expel  the  money, 
and  leave  no  option  to  them  but  to  take  bank-notes,  or  worse,  as  at  present. 

I  have  now  shown  how  it  is  proposed  to  form  the  league  of  banks,  and  have 
presented  the  constitutional  impediments  that  stand  in  the  way.  These  are 
numerous  and  strong ;  so  much  so,  that  they  ought  to  be  irresistible  with  all, 
except  the  latitudinous  in  construction ;  but  I  cannot  expect  they  will  produce 
their  full  effect.  I  know  too  well  the  force  of  long-entertained  impressions, 
however  erroneous,  to  be  sanguine — how  strongly  the  mind  rebels  against  the 
expulsion  of  the  old  and  the  admission  of  new  opinions.  Yet  in  this  case, 
where  we  clearly  see  how  gradually  and  silently  error  crept  in  under  the  dis 
guise  of  words,  applied  to  new  and  totally  different  ideas,  without  exciting  notice 
or  alarm ;  and  when  we  have  experienced  such  deep  disasters  in  consequence 
of  parting  from  the  plain  intent  and  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  I  cannot  but 
hope  that  all  who  believe  that  the  success  of  the  government  depends  on  a  rigid 
adherence  to  the  Constitution,  will  lay  aside  all  previous  impressions,  taken  up 
without  reflection,  and  give  to  the  objections  their  due  weight. 

I  come  now  to  the  next  point,  to  show  how  this  league  is  to  be  revived  or 
stimulated  into  life.  Till  this  can  be  done,  the  substitute,  should  it  become  a 
law,  would  be  a  dead  letter.  The  selection  is  to  be  made  from  specie-paying 
banks.  None  but  such  can  receive  the  public  deposites,  or  have  their  notes 
received  in  the  dues  of  the  government.  There  are  none  such  now.  The 
whole  banking  system  lies  inanimate,  and  must  be  vivified  before  it  can  be 
reunited  with  the  government.  No  one  is  bold  enough  to  propose  a  union  with 
this  lifeless  mass.  How,  then,  is  the  extinguished  spark  to  be  revivified  ?  How 
is  the  breath  of  life,  the  Promethean  fire,  to  be  breathed  into  the  system. anew  ? 
is  the  question.  This  is  the  task. 

The  mover  tells  us  that  it  must  be  the  work  of  the  government.  He  says 
that  it  is  bound  to  aid  the  banks  to  resume  payments,  and  for  that  purpose 
ought  to  hold  out  to  them  some  adequate  inducement.  He  tells  us  that  they 
have  been  long  preparing,  and  had  made  great  efforts,  but  can  go  no  farther ; 
have  rolled  the  round,  huge  rock  almost  to  the  summit,  but  unless  the  govern 
ment  put  forth  its  giant  arm,  and  give  the  last  push,  it  will  recoil  and  rush  down 
the  steep  to  the  bottom,  and  all  past  labour  be  lost.  Now,  what  is  this  adequate 
inducement  ?  What  this  powerful  stimulus,  which  it  is  proposed  the  govern 
ment  should  apply,  in  order  to  enable  the  banks  to  accomplish  this  Herculean 
task  ?  The  substitute  shall  answer. 

It  proposes  to  fix  the  1st  of  July  next  for  the  period  of  resumption ;  .and,  as 
the  inducement  to  resume,  it  proposes  to  select  twenty-five  of  the  most  respecta 
ble  and  solid  out  of  the  resuming  banks  to  be  depositories  of  the  public  moneys 
and  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government,  as  has  been  already  stated.  It  also  pro 
poses — and  this  is  the  stimulus,  the  essence  of  the  whole — to  make  the  notes  of 
such  banks  as  may  resume  on  or  before  that  day  exclusively  receivable  in  the 
public  dues.  He'Ve  is  a  quid  pro  quo ;  something  proposed  to  be  done,  for 
which  something  is  to  be  given.  We  tell  the  banks  plainly,  If  you  resume,  we, 
on  our  part,  stipulate  to  make  twenty-five  of  you  our  fiscal  agents  and  deposi 
tories  of  the  revenue  ;  "and  we  farther  stipulate,  that  those  who  resume  by  the 
time  fixed,  shall  have  the  exclusive  privilege,  forever,  of  having  their  notes  re 
ceivable  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  in  common  with  gold  and  silver.  If 
the  banks  perform  their  part,  we  shall  be  bound  in  honour  and  good  faith  to 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  301 

perform  ours.     It  would  be  a  complete  contract,  as  obligatory  as  if  signed, 
sealed,  and  delivered.     Such  is  the  inducement. 

The  next  question  is,  Will  it  be  adequate  ?  Yes,  abundantly  adequate.  The 
battery  is  strong  enough  to  awaken  the  dead  to  life  ;  the  consideration  sufficient 
to  remunerate  the  banks  for  whatever  sacrifice  they  may  be  compelled  to  make 
in  order  to  resume  payment.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  value  of  these  high 
privileges,  or  prerogatives,  as  I  might  justly  call  them.  They  are  worth  mill 
ions.  If  you  were  to  enter  into  a  similar  contract  with  an  individual,  I  doubt 
not  that  he  could  sell  out  in  open  market  for  at  least  thirty,  forty,  or  fifty  mill 
ions  of  dollars.  I  do,  then,  the  mover  the  justice  to  say,  that  his  means  are  am 
ple  to  effect  what  he  proposes.  As  difficult  as  is  the  work  of  resumption — and 
difficult  it  will  turn  out  to  be  when  tried — the  inducement  will  prove  all-sufficient. 
But  the  resumption,  however  desirable,  may  be  purchased  too  dearly  ;  and  such 
would  prove  to  be  the  case,  should  the  project  succeed.  Not  only  is  the  offer 
too  great,  but  the  mode  of  effecting  it  is  highly  objectionable.  Its  operation 
would  prove  not  less  disastrous  than  the  bargain  has  been  shown  to  be  uncon 
stitutional,  which  I  shall  now  proceed  to  establish. 

The  offer  will  have  a  double  effect.  It  will  act  as  a  powerful  stimulus  to  re 
sumption,  but  will  act,  at  the  same  time,  with  equal  force  to  excite  a  struggle 
among  the  banks,  not  only  to  resume  themselves,  but  to  prevent  others  from  re 
suming.  The  reason  is  clear.  The  advantage  to  each  will  increase  as  the 
number  of  the  resuming  banks  decreases ;  and,  of  course,  the  great  point  of 
contest  among  the  strong  will  be  to  restrict  the  proffered  prize  to  the  smallest 
number.  The  closer  the  monopoly  the  greater  the  profits.  In  this  struggle,  a 
combination  of  a  few  powerful  and  wealthy  banks,  the  most  respectable  and 
solid,  as  designated  in  the  substitute,  will  overthrow  and  trample  down  the  res 
idue.  Their  fall  will  spread  desolation  over  the  land.  Whatever  may  be  the 
fate  of  others  in  this  desperate  contest,  there  is  one  in  relation  to  which  no 
doubt  can  be  entertained — I  refer  to  the  United  States  Bank  of  Pennsylvania, 
a  long  name,  and  a  misnomer ;  and  which,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  but  with  no 
personal  disrespect  to  the  distinguished  individual  at  its  head,  I  shall  call  Mr. 
Biddle's  bank.  That,  at  least,  will  be  one  of  the  winners,  one  of  the  twenty- 
five  to  whom  the  prize  will  be.  assigned.  Its  vast  resources,  its  wealth  and  in 
fluential  connexions,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  the  skill  and  ability  of  the  offi 
cer  at  its  head,  and,  what  is  less  honourable,  the  great  resource  it  holds  in  the 
notes  of  the  late  United  States  Bank,  of  which  more  than  six  millions  have  been 
put  into  circulation,  in  violation,  to  say  the  least,  of  a  trust,  constituting  more 
than  five  sixths  of  all  its  circulation,  and  which  it  is  not  bound  to  pay,  with  the 
still  greater  amount  on  hand,  making,  in  the  whole,  more  than  twenty-six  mill 
ions,  and  which  may  be  used  in  the  same  way,  if  not  prevented,  would  place  it  be 
yond  all  doubt  among  the  victors.  He  starts  without  proper  weights,  and  will 
lead  the  way  from  the  first.  Who  the  others  may  be  is  uncertain  ;  this  will  de 
pend  mainly  upon  his  good-will  and.  pleasure.  It  may  be  put  down  as  certain, 
whoever  they  may  be,  that  they  will  be  powerful  and  influential,  and  not  unfa 
vourable  to  his  interest  or  aggrandizement.  But  the  mischievous  effect  will  not 
be  limited  to  this  deathlike  struggle,  in  which  so  many  must  fall  and  be  crush 
ed,  that  might  otherwise  weather  the  storm.  The  forced  resumption,  for  such 
it  will  be  in  effect,  would  be  followed  by  wide-spread  desolation.  It  is  easy 
to  sink  to  suspension,  but  hard  to  return  to  resumption.  Under  the  most  fa 
vourable  circumstances,  and  when  conducted  most  leisurely  and  cautiously,  the 
pressure  must  be  severe  ;  but,  if  coerced  or  precipitated  by  bankrupt  laws  or 
temptations  such  as  this,  it  will  be  ruinous.  To  make  it  safe  and  easy  must 
be  the  work  of  time.  Government  can  do  but  little.  The  disease  originates  in 
excessive  indebtedness,  and  the  only  remedy  is  payment  or  reduction  of  debts. 
It  is  estimated  that,  when  the  banks  suspended  payments,  the  community  was 
indebted  to  them  the  enormous  sum  of  $475,000,000.  To  reduce  this  within 


302  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  proper  limits  is  not  the  work  of  a  few  days,  and  can  be  but  little  aided  by 
us.  The  industry  and  the  vast  resources  of  the  country,  with  time,  are  the  only 
remedies  to  be  relied  on  for  the  reduction  ;  and  to  these,  with  the  state  legisla 
tures,  and  the  public  opinion,  the  resumption  must  be  left.  To  understand  the 
subject  fully,  we  must  look  a  little  more  into  the  real  cause  of  the  difficulty. 

This  enormous  debt  was  incurred  in  prosperous  times.  The  abundant  means 
of  the  banks,  from  the  surplus  revenue  and  a  combination  of  other  causes,  indu 
ced  them  to  discount  freely.  This  increased  the  circulation,  and  with  its  in 
crease  its  value  depreciated,  and  prices  rose  proportionably.  With  this  rise, 
enterprise  and  speculation  seized  the  whole  community,  and  every  one  expect 
ed  to  make  a  fortune  at  once  ;  and  this,  in  turn,  gave  a  new  impulse  to  discounts 
and  circulation,  till  the  swelling  tide  bursted  its  barriers  and  deluged  the  land. 
Then  began  the  opposite  process  of  absorbing  the  excess.  If  it  had  been  pos 
sible  to  return  it  back  to  the  banks,  the  sources  from  which  it  flowed,  through 
its  debtors,  the  speculating,  enterprising,  and  business  portion  of  the  communi 
ty,  the  mischief  would  have  been  in  a  great  measure  avoided.  But  circulation 
had  flowed  off  into  other  reservoirs — those  of  the  moneyed  men  and  bankers, 
who  hoard  when  prices  are  high,  and  buy  when  they  are  low.  The  portion  thus 
drawn  off  and  held  in  deposite,  either  in  banks  or  the  chests  of  individuals,  was 
as  effectually  lost,  as  far  as  the  debtors  of  the  banks  were  concerned,  as  if  it 
had  been  burned.  The  means  of  payment  was  thus  diminished ;  prices  fell  in 
proportion,  and  the  pressure  increased  as  they  fell.  Though  the  amount  in  cir 
culation  be  greatly  reduced,  yet  the  banks  are  afraid  to  discount,  lest,  on  re 
sumption,  the  hoarded  mass  of  deposites  held  by  individuals  or  other  banks 
should  be  let  loose,  and,  in  addition  to  what  might  be  put  into  circulation  should 
discounts  be  made,  would  cause  another  inundation,  to  be  followed  by  another 
suspension.  How  is  this  difficulty  to  be  safely  surmounted,  but  by  unlocking 
the  hoarded  means  ?  And  how  is  that  to  be  done  without  deciding  the  curren 
cy  question?  This  is  the  first  and  necessary  step.  That  done,  all  will  be  able 
to  calculate  and  determine  what  to  do.  The  period  of  inaction  and  uncertainty 
would  cease,  and  that  of  business  revive.  Funds  that  are  now  locked  up  would 
be  brought  again  into  operation,  and  the  channels  of  circulation  be  replenished 
in  the  only  mode  that  can  be  done  with  safety.  Thus  thinking,  I  am  now,  and 
have  been  from  the  first,  in  favour  of  an  early  decision,  and  averse  to  all  coer 
cion,  or  holding  out  temptation  to  resume ;  leaving  the^  disease  to  the  gradual 
and  safe  operation  of  time,  with  as  little  tampering  as  possible.  In  the  mean 
time,  I  hold  it  to  be  unwise  to  cease  discounting,  and  to  adopt  an  indiscriminate 
system  of  curtailment.  Its  effects  are  ruinous  to  the  business  of  the  country, 
and  calculated  to  retard  rather  than  to  accelerate  a  resumption.  The  true  sys 
tem,  I  would  say,  would  be  to  discount  business  paper  as  freely  as  usual,  and 
curtail  gradually  permanent  debts.  The  former  would  revive  business,  and 
would  increase  the  debts  to  the  banks  less  than  it  would  increase  the  ability  of 
the  community  to  pay  them. 

Having  now  shown  how  this  league  or  combination  of  banks  is  to  be  formed 
and  revived,  with  the  difficulties  in  the  way,  it  remains  to  determine  what  will 
be  the  true  character  and  nature  of  the  combination  when  formed.  It  will  con 
sist  of  state  banks  retaining  their  original  powers,  that  of  discounting  and  all, 
without  being  in  the  slightest  degree  impaired.  To  these  the  substitute  pro 
poses  to  make  important  additions  :  to  receive  their  notes  as  gold  and  silver  in 
the  public  dues,  to  give  them  the  use  of  the  public  deposites,  and  to  organize 
and  blend  the  whole  into  one,  as  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government,  to  be  pla 
ced  under  the  immediate  supervision  and  control  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury.  Now,  what  does  all  this  amount  to  ?  Shall  I  name  the  word — be  not 
startled :  A  BANK — a  government  bank — the  most  extensive,  powerful,  and 
dangerous  that  ever  existed.  This  substitute  would  be  the  act  of  incorpora 
tion  ;  and  the  privileges  it  confers,  so  much  additional  banking  capital,  increas- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  303 

ing  immensely  its  powers,  and  giving  it  an  unlimited  control  over  the  business 
and  exchanges  of  the  country. 

The  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives)  was  right  in  supposing  that  this  new- 
trial  of  the  experiment  would  be  made  under  very  different  circumstances  from 
the  first,  and  would  have  a  different  termination.  That,  too,  like  this,  was  a 
bank — a  government  bank— as  distinguished  from  the  late  Bank,  to  which  it 
was  set  up  as  a  rival,  and  was  at  the  time  constantly  so  designated  in  debate. 
But  circumstances  now  are  indeed  different,  very  different,  and  so  would  be  the 
result  of  the  experiment.  This  bank  would  not  be  the  same  rickety  concern 
as  the  former.  That  ended  in  anarchy,  and  this  would  end  in  despotism.  I 
will  explain. 

The  former  failed  not  so  much  in  consequence  of  the  adverse  circumstances 
of  the  times,  or  any  essential  defect  in  the  system,  as  from  the  want  of  a  head 
— a  common  sensorium,  to  think,  to  will,  and  decide  for  the  whole — which  was 
indispensably  necessary  to  ensure  concert,  and  give  unity  of  design  and  exe 
cution.  A  head  will  not  be  wanting  now.  Mr.  Biddle's  bank  will  supply  the 
defect.  His  would  be  not  only  one  of  the  resuming  banks,  as  I  have  shown, 
but  would  also  be  one  of  the  twenty-five  to  be  selected.  If  there  should  be 
the  temerity  to  omit  it,  the  present  project  would  share  the  fate  of  its  predeces^ 
sor.  Mr.  Biddle's  bank,  at  the  head  of  those  excluded,  would  be  an  overmatch 
for  the  selected,  in  skill,  capital,  and  power,  and  the  whole  league  would  in 
evitably  be  overthrown.  But,  if  selected,  the  position  of  his  bank  in  the  league 
would  be  certain.  Its  vast  capital,  its  extensive  connexions,  its  superior  au 
thority,  and  his  skill,  abilities,  and  influence,  would  place  it  at  the  head,  to 
think  and  act  for  the  whole-.  The  others  would  be  as  dependant  on  his  as  the 
branches  of  the  late  bank  were  on  the  mother  institution.  The  whole  would 
form  one  entire  machine,  impelled  by  a  single  impulse,  and  making  a  perfect 
contrast  with  its  predecessor  in  the  unity  and  energy  of  its  operations. 

Nor  would  its  fate  be  less  dissimilar.  Anarchy  was  inscribed  on  the  first 
from  the  beginning.  Its  deficiency  in  the  great  and  essential  element  to  en 
sure  concert  was  radical,  and  could  not  be  remedied.  Its  union  with  the  gov 
ernment  could  not  supply  it,  nor  avert  its  destiny.  But  very  different  would  be 
the  case  of  the  present.  Add  its  intimate  union  with  the  government,  for 
which  the  substitute  provides,  to  its  other  sources  of  power,  and  it  would  be 
come  irresistible.  The  two,  government  and  bank,  would  unite  and  constitute 
a  single  power ;  but  which  would  gain  the  ascendency — whether  the  govern 
ment  would  become  the  bank,  or  the  bank  the  government — is  neither  certain 
nor  material ;  for,  whichever  it  might  be,  it  would  form  a  despotic  money-cracy 
(if  I  may  be  permitted  to  unite  an  English  and  a  Greek  word)  altogether  irre 
sistible. 

It  is  not  a  little  surprising  that  the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives),  whose 
watchful  jealousy  could  detect,  as  he  supposed,  the  embryo  of  a  government 
bank  in  the  bill,  should  overlook  this  regular  incorporation  of  one  by  his  own 
substitute.  Out  of  the  slender  materials  of  treasury  warrants,  and  draughts  to  pay 
public  creditors,  or  transfer  funds  from  place  to  place,  as  the  public  service 
might  require,  and  four  principal  receivers  to  keep  the  public  money,  he  ha& 
conjured  up,  with  the  aid  of  a  vivid  imagination,  a  future  government  bank, 
which,  he  told  us,  with  the  utmost  confidence,  would  rise  like  a  cloud,  at  first 
as  big  as  a  hand,  but  which  would  soon  darken  all  the  horizon.  Now,  it  is 
not  a  little  unfortunate  for  his  confident  predictions,  that  these  seminal  princi 
ples  from  which  the  bank  is  to  spring  have  all  existed,  from  the  commence 
ment  of  our  government,  in  full  force,  except  the  four  receivers,  without  show 
ing  the  least  tendency  to  produce  the  result  he  anticipates.  Not  only  ours,  but 
every  civilized  government,  has  the  power  to  draw  treasury  warrants  and  trans 
fer  draughts  ;  nor  has  the  power  in  a  single  instance  terminated  in  a  bank.  Nor 
can  the  fact  that  the  money  is  to  be  kept  by  receivers  contribute  in  the  least 


304  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

to  produce  one.  The  public  funds  in  their  hands  will  be  as  much  beyond  the 
control  of  the  executive  as  it  was  in  the  vaults  of  the  banks.  But,  to  shorten 
discussion,  I  would  ask,  How  can  there  be  a  bank  without  the  power  to  dis 
count  or  to  use  the  deposites  ?  and  out  of  which  of  the  provisions  of  the  bill 
could  the  treasury  by  any  possibility  obtain  either,  under  its  severe  penalties, 
which  prohibits  the  touching  of  the  public  money,  except  on  warrants  or  draughts, 
drawn  by  those  having  authority  in  due  form,  and  for  the  public  service. 

But  the  danger  which  an  excited  imagination  anticipates  hereafter  from  the 
bill  would  exist  in  sober  reality  under  the  substitute.  There  it  would  require 
neither  fancy  nor  conjecture  to  create  one.  It  would  exist  with  all  its  facul 
ties  and  endowments  complete — discount,  deposites,  and  all — with  immense 
means,  guided  by  a  central  and  directing  head,  and  blended  and  united  with 
the  government,  so  as  to  form  one  great  mass  of  power.  What  a  contrast 
with  the  bill !  How  simple  and  harmless  the  one,  with  its  four  principal  re 
ceivers,  twice  as  many  clerks,  and  five  inspectors,  compared  with  this  complex 
and  mighty  engine  of  power !  And  yet  there  are  many,  both  intelligent  and 
patriotic,  who  oppose  the  bill  and  support  the  substitute,  on  the  ground  that  the 
former  would  give  more  patronage  and  power  than  the  latter !  How  strange 
and  wonderful  the  diversity  of  the  human  mind ! 

So  far  from  being  true,  the  very  fact  of  the  separation  of  the  government 
from  the  banks,  provided  for  in  the  bill,  would,  of  itself,  be  the  most  decisive 
blow  that  could  be  given  against  government  patronage,  and  the  union  of  the 
two  the  most  decisive  in  its  favour.  When  their  notes  are  received  in  the 
public  dues  as  cash,  and  the  public  money  deposited  in  their  vaults,  the  banks  be 
come  the  allies  of  the  government  on  all  questions  connected  with  its  fiscal  action 
The  higher  its  taxes  and  duties,  the  greater  its  revenue  and  expenditure :  and 
the  larger  its  surplus,  the  more  their  circulation  and  business,  and,  of  course,  the 
greater  their  profit ;  and  hence,  on  all  questions  of  taxation  and  disbursements, 
and  the  accumulation  of  funds  in  the  treasury,  their  interest  would  throw  them 
on  the  side  of  the  government,  and  against  the  people. 

All  this  is  reversed  when  separated.  The  higher  the  taxation  and  disburse 
ments,  and  the  larger  the  surplus,  the  less  would  be  their  profit ;  and  their  in 
terest,  in  that  case,  would  throw  them  with  the  people,  and  against  the  govern 
ment.  The  reason  is  obvious.  Specie  is  the  basis  of  banking  operations,  and 
the  greater  the  amount  they  can  command  the  greater  will  be  their  business  and 
profits  ;  but  when  the  government  is  separated  from  them,  and  collects  and  pays 
away  its  dues  in  specie  instead  of  their  notes,  it  is  clear  that  the  higher  the  tax 
es  and  disbursements,  and  the  greater  the  surplus  in  the  treasury,  the  more  spe 
cie  will  be  drawn  from  the  use  of  the  banks,  and  the  less  will  be  left  as  the  ba 
sis  of  their  operations ;  and,  consequently,  the  less  their  profit.  Every  dollar 
withdrawn  from  them  would  diminish  their  business  fourfold  at  least;  and 
hence  a  regard  to  their  own  interest  would  inevitably  place  them  on  the  side 
to  which  I  have  assigned  them. 

The  effects  on  the  politics  of  the  country  would  be  great  and  salutary.  The 
weight  of  the  banks  would  be  taken  from  the  side  of  the  tax-consumers,  where 
it  has  been  from  the  commencement  of  the  government,  and  placed  on  the  side 
of  the  tax-payers.  This  great  division  of  the  community  necessarily  grows  out 
of  the  fiscal  action  of  the  government.  Take  taxation  and  disbursement  togeth 
er,  and  it  will  always  be  found  that  one  portion  of  the  community  pays  into  the 
treasury,  in  the  shape  of  taxes,  more  than  it  receives  back  in  that  of  disburse 
ments,  and  that  another  receives  back  more  than  it  pays.  The  former  are  the 
tax-payers,  and  the  latter  the  consumers — making  the  great,  essential,  and  con 
trolling  division  in  all  civilized  communities.  If,  with  us,  the  government  has 
been  thrown  on  the  side  of  the  consumers,  as  it  has.  it  must,  in  a  considerable 
degree,  be  attributed  to  its  alliance  with  the  banks,  whose  influence  has  been, 
in  consequence,  at  all  times  steadily  and  powerfully  on  that  side.  It  is  to  this 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  305 

mischievous  and  unholy  alliance  that  may  be  traced  the  disasters  which  have 
befallen  us,  and  the  great  political  degeneracy  of  the  country.  Hence  the  pro 
tective  system  ;  hence  its  associated  and  monstrous  system  of  disbursements  ; 
hence  the  collection  of  more  money  from  the  people  than  the  government  could 
require  ;  hence  the  vast  and  corrupting  surpluses  ;  hence  legislative  and  execu 
tive  usurpations ;  and,  finally,  hence  the  prostration  of  the  currency,  and  the 
disasters  which  give  rise  to  our  present  deliberations.  Revive  this  fatal  con 
nexion — adopt  this  substitute,  and  all  this  train  of  evils  will  again  follow,  with  re 
doubled  disasters  and  corruption.  Refuse  the  connexion— adopt  this  bill,  and 
all  will  be  reversed,  and  we  shall  have  some  prospect  of  restoring  the  Consti 
tution  and  country  to  their  primitive  simplicity  and  purity.  The  effect  of  the 
refusal  on  the  patronage  of  the  government  would  be  great  and  decisive.  Burke 
has  wisely  said,  that  the  "  revenue  is  the  state  in  modern  times."  Violence 
and  coercion  are  no  longer  the  instruments  of  government  in  civilized  commu 
nities.  Their  reign  is  past.  Everything  is  now  done  by  money.  It  is  not 
only  the  sinew  of  war,  but  of  politics,  over  A*hich,  in  the  form  of  patronage,  it 
exercises  almost  unlimited  control  Just  as  the  revenue  increases  or  dimin 
ishes,  almost  in  the  same  proportion  is  patronage  increased  or  diminished. 

But  admit,  for  a  moment,  that  neither  the  separation  nor  the  connexion  would 
have  any  sensible  effect  to  increase  or  diminish  the  revenue,  and  that  it  would 
be  of  the  same  amount,  whether  the  bill  or  substitute  should  be  adopted,  yet, 
even  on  that  supposition,  the  patronage  of  the  latter  would  be  a  hundred  fold 
greater  than  the  former.  In  estimating  the  amount  of  patronage  of  any  meas 
ure,  three  particulars  must  be  taken  into  the  calculation  :  the  number  of  persons 
•who  may  be  affected  by  it,  their  influence  in  the  community,  and  the  extent  of 
the  control  exercised  over  them.  It  will  be  found,  on  comparison,  that  the  sub 
stitute  combines  aH  these  elements  in  a  far  greater  degree  than  the  bill,  as  I 
shall  now  proceed  to  show.  I  begin  with  the  number. 

The  bill  provides,  as  has  been  stated,  for  four  principal  receivers,  eight  or 
ten  clerks,  and  a  suitable  number  of  agents  to  act  as  inspectors,  making,  in  the 
whole,  say  25  individuals.  These  would  constitute  the  only  additional  officers 
to  keep  and  disburse  the  public  money.  The  substitute,  in  addition  to  the  offi 
cers  now  in  service,  provides  for  the  selection  of  25  banks,  to  be  taken  from  the 
most  powerful  and  influential,  and  which  would  have,  on  an  average,  at  the  least 
100  officers  and  stockholders  each,  making,  in  the  aggregate,  2500  persons 
who  would  be  directly  interested  in  the  banks,  and,  of  course,  under  the  influ 
ence  of  the  government. 

As  to  the  relative  influence  of  the  officers  and  the  selected  banks  over  the 
community,  every  impartial  man  must  acknowledge  that  the  preponderance 
would  be  greater  on  the  side  of  the  latter.  Admitting  the  respectability  of  the 
receivers  and  other  officers  provided  for  in  the  bill,  and  the  officers  and  stock 
holders  of  the  banks  to  be  individually  the  same,  still  the  means  of  control  at 
the  disposition  of  the  former  would  be  as  nothing  compared  to  that  of  the  latter. 
They  would  not  touch  a  cent  of  public  money.  Their  means  would  be  limited 
to  their  salary,  which  would  be  too  small  to  be  felt  in  the  community.  Very 
different  would  be  the  case  with  the  officers  and  stockholders  of  the  banks. 
They,  of  all  persons,  are  by  far  the  most  influential  in  the  community.  A 
greater  number  depend  on  them  for  accommodation  and  favour,  and  the  success 
of  their  business  and  prospects  in  life,  than  any  other  class  in  society ;  and 
this  would  be  especially  true  of  the  banks  connected  with  the  government. 

It  only  remains,  now,  to  compare  the  extent  of  the  control  that  may  be  exer 
cised  by  the  government  over  the  two,  in  order  to  complete  the  comparison  ; 
and  here,  again,  the  preponderance  will  be  found  to  be  strikingly  on  the  same 
side.  The  whole  amount  of  expenditure,  under  the  bill,  would  not  exceed 
$30,000  or  $40,000  annually,  at  the  very  farthest,  and  this  constitutes  the 
whole  amount  of  control  which  the  government  can  exercise,  There  would  be 


306  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

no  perquisites,  no  contracts,  jobs,  or  incidental  gains.  The  offices  and  salaries 
would  be  all.  To  that  extent  those  who  may  hold  them  would  be  dependant 
on  the  government,  and  thus  far  they  may  be  controlled.  How  stands  the  ac 
count  on  the  other  side?  What  value  shall  be  put  on  the  public  deposites  in 
the  banks  ?  What  on  the  receivability  of  their  notes  as  cash  by  the  govern 
ment?  What  on  their  connexion  with  the  government  as  their  fiscal  agent, 
which  w,ouid  give  so  great  a  control  over  the  exchanges  and  business  of  the 
country?  How  many  millions  shall  these  be  estimated  at,  and  how  insig 
nificant  must  the  paltry  sum  of  $30,000  or  $40,000  appear  to  those  countless 
millions  held,  under  the  provisions  of  the  substitute,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  gov 
ernment  ! 

Having  now  finished  the  comparison  as  to  the  relative  patronage  of  the  two 
measures,  I  shall  next  compare  them  as  fiscal  agents  of  the  government ;  and 
here  let  me  say,  at  the  outset,  that  the  discussion  has  corrected  an  error  which 
I  once  entertained.  I  had  supposed  that  the  hazard  of  keeping  the  public  mon 
ey  under  the  custody  of  officers  of  the  government  would  be  greater  than  ia 
bank.  The  senators  from  New-Hampshire  and  Connecticut  (Messrs.  Hubbart? 
and  Niles)  have  proved  from  the  record,  that  the  hazard  is  on  the  other  side, 
and  that  we  have  lost  more  by  the  banks  than  by  the  collecting  and  disbursing 
officers  combined.  What  can  be  done  to  increase  the  security  by  judicious  se 
lection  of  officers  and  proper  organization  is  strongly  illustrated  by  the  fact,, 
stated  by  the  chairman  (Mr.  Wright)  in  his  opening  speech,  that  in  the  war 
department  there  has  been  no  loss  for  15  years— from  1821  to  1836 — on  an 
expenditure  certainly  not  less  than  $100,000,000.  I  take  some  pride  in  this 
result  of  an  organization  which  I  originated  and  established,  when  Secretary  of 
War,  against  a  formidable  opposition. 

As  to  the  relative  expense  of  the  two  agencies,  that  of  th«  bill,  as  small  as  it 
is,  if  we  are  to  judge  by  appearances,  is  the  greatest ;  but  if  by  facts,  the  substi 
tute  would  be  much  the  most  so,  provided  we  charge  it  with  all  the  advantages 
which  the  banks  would  derive  from  their  connexion  with  the  government,  as 
ought  in  fairness  to  be  done,  as  the  whole  ultimately  comes  out  of  the  pockets 
of  the  people. 

In  a  single  particular  the  banks  have  the  advantage  as  fiscal  agents.  They 
would  be  the  more  convenient.  To  this  they  are  entitled,  and  I  wish  to  with 
hold  from  them  no  credit  which  they  may  justly  claim.  ,<4j  ; 

The  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives)  appeared  to  have  great  apprehension 
that  the  collection  of  the  public  dues  in  specie  might  lead  to  hoarding.  He 
may  dismiss  his  fears  on  that  head.  It  is  not  the  genius  of  modern  and  civil 
ized  governments  to  hoard ;  and  if  it  were,  the  banks  will  take  care  that  there 
shall  be  no  extraordinary  accumulation  of  cash  in  the  treasury.  Pass  the  bill, 
and  I  underwrite  that  we  shall  never  have  again  to  complain  of  a  surplus.  It 
would  rarely,  if  ever,  in  peace  and  settled  times,  exceed  three  or  four  millions  at 
the  outside.  Nor  is  his  apprehension  that  hoarding  of  specie  would  lead  to 
war  less  groundless.  The  danger  is  in  another  quarter.  War  is  the  harvest 
of  banks,  when  they  are  connected  with  government.  The  vast  increase  of 
revenue  and  expenditures,  and  the  enormous  public  loans,  which  necessarily 
inure  mainly  to  their  advantage,  swell  their  profits  in  war  to  the  utmost  limits. 
But  separate  them  from  government,  and  war  would  then  be  to  them  a  state  of 
famine,  for  reasons  which  must  be  apparent  after  what  has  been  said,  which 
would  throw  their  weight  on  the  side  of  peace,  and  against  war;  just  as  cer 
tainly  as  I  have  shown  that  the  separation  would  throw  it  on  the  side  of  tax 
payers,  and  against  the  tax-consumers. 

I  come,  now,  to  the  comparison  of  the  effects  of  the  two  measures  on  the 
currency  of  the  country.  In  this  respect,  the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives) 
seemed  to  think  that  his  substitute  would  have  a  great  superiority  over  the  bill, 
but  his  reasons  were  to  me  wholly  unsatisfactory.  If  we  are  to  judge  from  ex- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  307 

perience,  it  ought  to  be  pronounced  to  be  the  worst  possible  measure.  It  has 
been  in  operation  but  twice  (each  for  but  a  few  years)  since  the  commence 
ment  of  the  government,  and  it  has  so  happened  that  the  only  two  explosions 
of  the  currency  occurred  during  those  periods.  But,  without  relying  on  these 
disastrous  occurrences,  we  have  seen  enough  to  satisfy  the  most  incredulous 
>hat  there  are  great  and  radical  defects  in  our  bank  circulation,  which  no  remedy 
heretofore  applied  has  been  able  to  remove.  It  originates  in  the  excess  of  pa 
per  compared  to  specie,  and  the  only  effective  cure  is  to  increase  the  latter  and 
reduce  the  former  ;  and  this  the  substitute  itself  impliedly  acknowledges,  by  pro 
posing  a  remedy  that  would  prove  wholly  inoperative.  It  proposes  that,  after  a 
certain  period  mentioned,  none  of  the  banks  to  be  selected  should  issue  notes 
under  ten  dollars.  The  effects  would  clearly  be,  not  a  diminution  of  the  circu 
lation  of  small  notes,  but  a  new  division  of  the  banking  business,  in  which  the 
issue  of  large  notes  would  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  selected  banks,  and  the  small 
to  the  others,  without  restricting  in  the  least  the  aggregate  amount  of  paper 
circulation. 

But  what  the  substitute  would  fail  to  do,  the  bill  would  effectually  remedy. 
None  doubt  but  the  separation  from  the  banks  would  greatly  increase  the  pro 
portion  of  specie  to  paper ;  but  the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Rives)  appre 
hends  that  its  operation  would  be  too  powerful,  so  much  so,  in  fact,  as  to  destroy 
the  banks.  His  argument  is,  that  specie  would  be  always  at  a  premium,  arid 
that  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  banks  to  do  business  so  long  as  th?;  was 
the  case.  His  fears  are  groundless.  What  he  dreads  would  be  but  a  temporary 
evil.  The  very  fact  that  specie  would  bear  a  premium  would  have  ^he  double 
effect  to  diminish  paper  circulation  and  increase  the  importation  of  specie,  till 
an  equilibrium  between  the  two  would  be  restored,  when  they  ^ould  be  at  par. 
At  what  point  this  would  be  effected  is  a  little  uncertain ;  hit  the  fear  is,  that 
with  our  decreasing  revenue,  instead  of  the  specie  being  increased  to  excess, 
it  would  not  be  increased  sufficiently  to  give  the  desired  stability  to  the  cur 
rency. 

In  this  connexion,  the  senator  urged,  an  objection  against  the  bill,  which  I 
regard  as  wholly  groundless.  He  said  that  the  psympiit  of  the  dues  of  the  gov 
ernment  in  specie  would  create  a  double  demand :  a  domestic,  as  well  as  a 
foreign,  the  effects  of  which  would  be  to  ip~rea.<*3  greatly  its  fluctuations  :  and 
so  deeply  was  he  impressed  with  the  ide*,  tb*t  he  drew  a  vivid  picture  of  its 
alternate  flow  from  the  coast  to  the  interior.  <tnd  from  North  to  South,  and  back 
again.  All  this  is  the  work  of  imagination.  The  effect  would  be  directly  the 
reverse.  The  more  numerous  tte  demands  the  less  the  fluctuation ;  so  much 
so,  that  the  greatest  stability  would  be  where  it  exclusively  performed  the  func 
tion  of  circulation,  and  where  each  individual  must  keep  a  portion  to  meet  his 
daily  demands.  This  is  so  obvious,  that  I  shall  not  undertake  to  illustrate  it. 

But  the  superiority  of  the  bill  over  the  substitute  would  not  be  limited  only  to 
a  more  favourable  proportion  between  specie  and  paper.  It  would  have  another 
important  advantage,  that  cannot  be  well  over-estimated  :  it  would  make  a  prac 
tical  distinction  between  currency  and  circulation — between  the  currency  of  the 
country  and  private  and  local  circulation,  under  which  head  bank  paper  would 
be  comprehended.  The  effocts  would  be,  to  render  a  general  explosion  of  the 
circulation  almost  impossible.  Whatever  derangements  might  occur  would  be 
local,  and  confined  to  some  one  particular  commercial  sphere ;  and  even  within 
its  limits  there  would  be  a  sound  currency  to  fall  back  on,  not  partaking  of  the 
shock,  and  which  would  greatly  diminish  the  intensity  and  duration  of  the  dis 
tress.  In  the  mean  time,  the  general  business  and  finances  of  the  country 
would  proceed,  almost  without  feeling  the  derangement. 

With  a  few  remarks  on  the  comparative  effects  of  the  two  measures  on  the 
industry  and  business  of  the  country,  I  shall  conclude  the  comparison.  What 
has  been  said  on  their  relative  effects  on  the  currency  goes  far  to  decide  the 
question  of  their  relative  effects  on  business  and  industry. 


308  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

I  hold  a  sound  and  stable  currency  to  be  among  the  greatest  encouragements 
to  industry  and  business  generally ;  and  an  unsound  and  fluctuating  one,  n-ow 
expanding  and  now  contracting,  so  that  no  honest  man  can  tell  what  to  do,  as 
among  the  greatest  discouragements.  The  dollar  and  the  eagle  are  the  meas 
ure  of  value,  as  the  yard  and  the  bushel  are  of  quantity ;  and  what  would  we 
think  of  the  incorporation  of  companies  to  regulate  the  latter — to  expand  or 
contract,  to  shorten  or  lengthen  them  at  pleasure,  with  the  privilege  to  sell  by 
the  contracted  or  shortened,  and  buy  by  the  expanded  or  lengthened  ?  Is  it 
not  seen  that  it  would  place  the  whole  industry  and  business  of  the  country 
under  the  control  of  such  companies  ?  But  it  would  not  more  certainly  effect 
it  than  a  similar  control  possessed  by  the  money  institutions  of  the  country 
over  the  measure  of  value.  But  I  go  farther,  and  assert  confidently,  that  the 
excess  of  paper  currency,  as  well  as  its  'unsteadiness,  is  unfavourable  to  the  in 
dustry  and  business  of  the  country.  It  raises  the  price  of  everything,  and,  con 
sequently,  increases  the  price  of  production  and  consumption ;  and  is,  in  the 
end,  hostile  to  every  branch  of  industry. 

I  hold  that  specie  and  paper  have  each  their  proper  sphere  :  the  latter  for 
large  and  distant  transactions,  and  the  former  for  all  others ;  and  that  the  near 
er  our  circulation  approaches  gold  and  silver,  consistently  with  convenience, 
the  better  for  the  industry  and  the  business  of  the  country.  The  more  specie 
the  better,  till  that  point  is  reached.  When  attained,  it  would  combine,  in  the 
greatest  possible  degree,  soundness  and  facility,  and  would  be  favourable  to  the 
productive  classes  universally ;  I  mean  men  of  business,  planters,  merchants, 
and  manufacturers,  as  well  as  operatives.  It  would  be  particularly  favourable 
to  the  South.  Our  great  staples  are  cash  articles  everywhere  ;  and  it  was  well 
remarked  by  the  senator  from  Mississippi  (Mr.  Walker),  at  the  extra  session,  that 
we  sold  at  cash  ptices  and  bought  at  paper  prices  ;  that  is,  sold  low  and  bought 
high.  The  manufacturing,  commercial,  and  navigating  interests  would  also 
feel  its  beneficial  effec*.  It  would  cheapen  productions,  and  be  to  manufactu 
rers  in  lieu  of  a  prott^tivt  tariff.  Its  effects  would  be  to  enable  them  to  meet 
foreign  competition,  noi  by  raising  prices  by  high  duties,  but  by  enabling  them 
to  sell  as  cheap  or  cheaper  than  the  foreigner," which  would  harmonize  every 
interest,  and  place  our  maihifacfcires  on  the  most  solid  basis.  It  is  the  only 
mode  by  which  the  foreign  racket  can  ever  be  commanded ;  and  commanded 
it  would  be,  with  a  sound  and  moderately  expanded  currency.  Our  ingenuity, 
invention,  and  industry  are  equal  v>  those  of  any  people ;  and  all  our  manu 
facturers  want  is  a  sound  currency  a^d  aiv  even  chance,  to  meet  competition 
with  success  everywhere,  at  home  or  abroad.  But  with  a  bloated  and  fluctua 
ting  paper  circulation  this  will  be  impossible.  Among  its  many  drawbacks,  it 
levies  an  enormous  tax  on  the  community. 

I  have  already  stated  that  the  community  is  estima^d  to  have  been  indebted 
to  the  banks  $475,000,000  at  the  suspension  of  specie  payments.  The  inter 
est  on  this  sum,  estimated  at  six  per  cent,  (it  ought  to  be  higher),  would  give 
an  annual  income  to  those  institutions  of  upward  of  thirty  miiUons  •  and  this  is 
the  sum  yearly  paid  by  the  community  for  bank  accommodation*,  to  the  excess 
of  which  we  owe  our  bloated  and  unstable  circulation.  Never  vas  a  circu 
lation  so  worthless  furnished  at  so  dear  a  rate.  «  How  much  of  this  vast  in 
come  may  be  considered  as  interest  on  real  capital  it  is  difficult  to  estimate ; 
but  it 'would,  I  suppose,  be  ample  to  set  down  ten  millions  to  that  head,  which 
would  leave  upward  of  twenty  millions  annually  as  the  profits  derived  from 
banking  privileges,  over  and  above  a  fair  compensation  for  the  capital  invested, 
which  somebody  must  pay,  and  which  must  ultimately  fall  on  the  industry  and 
business  of  the  country.  But  this  enormous  expansion  of  the  system  is  not  as 
tonishing,  so  great  is  the  stimulus  applied  to  its  growth.  Ingenious  men  of 
other  ages  devoted  themselves  in  vain  to  discover  the  art  of  converting  the  ba 
ser  metals  into  gold  and  silver  •  but  we  have  conferred  on  a  portion  of  the  com- 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  309 

munity  an  art  still  higher — of  converting  paper,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  into 
the  precious  metals  ;  and  ought  we  to  be  surprised  that  an  article  so  cheap  to 
the  manufacturers,  and  so  dear  to  the  rest  of  the  community,  should  be  so  great 
ly  over-supplied,  and  without  any  reference  to  the  interest  or  to  the  wants  of 
the  community  ? 

If  we  are  to  believe  the  senator  from  Virginia,  and  others  on  the  same  side, 
we  owe  almost  all  our  improvements  and  prosperity  to  the  banking  system  ;  and 
if  it  should  fail,  the  age  of  barbarism  would  again  return.  I  had  supposed  that 
the  bases  of  our  prosperity  were  our  free  institutions,  the  wide-spread  and  fer 
tile  region  we  occupy,  and  the  hereditary  intelligence  and  energy^  of  the  stock 
from  which  we  are  descended ;  but  it  seems  that  all  these  go  for  nothing,  and 
that  the  banks  are  everything.  I  make  no  war  on  them.  All  I  insist  on  is,  that 
the  government  shall  separate  from  them,  which  I  believe  to  be  indispensable, 
for  the  reasons  I  have  assigned  both  now  and  formerly.  But  I  cannot  concur  in 
attributing  to  them  our  improvements  and  prosperity.  That  they  contributed  to 
give  a  strong  impulse  to  industry  and  enterprise  in  the  early  stages  of  their  op 
eration,  I  doubt  not.  Nothing  is  more  stimulating  than  an  expanding  and  de 
preciating  currency.  It  creates  a  delusive  appearance  of  prosperity,  which  puts 
everything  in  motion.  Every  one  feels  as  if  he  was  growing  richer  as  prices 
rise,  and  that  he  has  it  in  his  power,  by  foresight  and  exertion,  to  make  his  for 
tune.  But  it  is  the  nature  of  stimulus,  moral  as  Well  as  physical,  to  excite  at 
first,  and  to  depress  afterward.  The  draught  which  at  first  causes  unnatural 
excitement  and  energy,  is  sure  to  terminate  in  corresponding  depression  and 
weakness  ;  nor  is  it  less  certain  that  the  stimulus  of  a  currency,  expanding  be 
yond  its  proper  limits,  follows  the  same  law-  We  have  had  the  exhilaration, 
and  the  depression  has  succeeded.  We  have  had  the  pleasure  of  getting  drunk, 
and  now  experience  the  pain  of  becoming  sober.  The  good  is  gone,  and  the 
evil  has  succeeded ;  and,  on  a  fair  calculation,  the  latter  will  be  found  to  be 
greater  than  the  former.  Whatever  impulse  the  banking  system  was  calculated 
to  give  to  our  improvement  and  prosperity,  has  already  been  given  ;  and  the 
reverse  effects  will  hereafter  follow,  unless  the  system  should  undergo  great  and 
radical  changes ;  the  first  step  towards  which  would  be  the  adoption  of  the 
measure  proposed  by  this  bill. 

I  have,  Mr.  President,  finished  what  I  intended  to  say.  I  have  long  antici 
pated  the  present  crisis,  but  did  not,  until  1837,  expect  its  arrival  in  my  time. 
When  I  saw  its  approach,  I  resolved  to  do  my  duty,  be  the  consequences  to  me 
what  they  might ;  and  I  offer  my  thanks  to  the  Author  of  my  being,  that  he  has 
given  me  the  resolution  and  opportunity  of  discharging  what  I  honestly  believe 
to  be  my  duty  in  reference  to  this  great  subject. 

How  the  question  will  be  decided  is  acknowledged  to  be  doubtful,  so  nearly 
are  the  two  houses  supposed  to  be  divided ;  but  whatever  may  be  its  fate  now, 
I  have  the  most  perfect  confidence  in  its  final  triumph.  The  public  attention 
is  roused.  The  subject  will  be  thoroughly  investigated,  and  I  have  no  fears  but 
the  side  I  support  will  prove  to  be  the  side  of  truth,  justice,  liberty,  civilization, 
and  the  advancement  of  moral  and  intellectual  improvement. 


XXI.     < 

SPEECH   IN   REPLY  TO   MR.  CLAY,  ON  THE  SUB-TREASURY  BILL,  MARCH   10,   1838. 

I  RISE  to  fulfil  a  promise  I  made  some  time  since,  to  notice  at  my  leisure 
the  reply  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky  farthest  from  me  (Mr.  Clay),  to 
my  remarks  when  I  first  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  subject  now  under 
discussion. 


310  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

On  comparing-  with  care  the  reply  with  the  remarks,  I  am  at  a  loss  to 
determine  whether  it  is  the  most  remarkable  for  its  omissions  or  mis- 
statements.  Instead  of  leaving  not  a  hair  on  the  head  of  my  arguments, 
as  the  senator  threatened  (to  use  his  not  very  dignified  expression),  he 
has  not  even  attempted  to  answer  a  large,  and  not  the  least  weighty  por 
tion  j  and  of  that  which  he  has,  there  is  not  one  fairly  stated  or  fairly  an 
swered.  I  speak  literally,  and  without  exaggeration  ;  nor  would  it  be  dif 
ficult  to  make  good  to  the  letter  what  I  assert,  if  I  could  reconcile  it  to 
myself  to  consume  the  time  of  the  Senate  in  establishing  a  long  series 
of  negative  propositions,  in  which  they  could  take  but  little  interest,  how- 
ever  important  they  may  be  regarded  by  the  senator  and  myself.  To 
avoid  so  idle  a  consumption  of  the  time,  I  propose  to  present  a  few  in 
stances  of  his  misstatements,  from  which  the  rest  may  be  inferred  ;  and, 
that  I  may  not  be  suspected  of  having  selected  them,  I  shall  take  them  in 
the  order  in  which  they  stand  in  his  reply. 

The  Senate  will  recollect,  that  when  the  senator  from  Virginia  farthest 
from  me  (Mr.  Rives)  introduced  his  substitute,  he  accompanied  it  with 
the  remark  that  it  was  his  first  choice,  and  the  second  choice  of  those 
who  are  allied  with  him  on  this  occasion.  In  noticing  this  remark,  I 
stated,  that  if  I  might  judge  from  appearances,  which  could  scarcely  de 
ceive  one,  the  senator  might  have  said  not  only  the  second,  but,  under 
existing  circumstances,  it  was  their  first  choice  ;  and  that,  despairing  of  a 
bank  for  the  present,  they  would  support  his  substitute.  Assuming  this 
inference  to  be  correct,  I  stated  that  the  question  was  narrowed  down,  in 
fact,  to  the  bill  and  substitute,  of  which  one  or  the  other  must  be  selected. 
The  senator  from  Kentucky,  in  his  reply,  omitted  all  these  qualifications, 
and  represented  me  as  making  the  absolute  assertion  that,  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  there  was  no  other  alternative  but  the  bill  or  the  substitute, 
and  then  gravely  pointed  out  two  others — to  do  nothing,  or  adopt  a  Na 
tional  Bank,  as  if  I  could  possibly  be  ignorant  of  what  wras  so  obvious. 
After  he  had  thus  replied,  not  to  what  I  really  said,  but  his  own  misstate- 
ment  of  it,  as  if  to  make  compensation,  he  proceeded  in  the  same  breath 
to  confirm  the  truth  of  what  I  did  say,  by  giving  his  support  to  the  sub 
stitute,  which  he  called  a  half-way  house,  where  he  could  spend  some 
pleasant  hours.  Nothing  is  more  easy  than  to  win  such  victories. 

Having  inferred,  as  has  turned  out  to  be  the  fact,  that  there  was  no 
other  alternative  at  present  but  the  bill  and  substitute,  I  next  showed  the 
embarrassment  to  which  the  gentleman  opposite  to  me  would  be  involved 
from  having,  four  years  ago,  on  the  question  of  the  removal  of  the  de- 
posites,  denounced  a  league  of  state  banks  similar  to  that  proposed  to  be 
revived  by  the  substitute.  After  enlarging  on  this  point,  I  remarked,  that 
if  I  might  be  permitted  to  state  my  opinion,  the  gentlemen  had  taken  a 
course  on  this  subject  unfortunate  for  themselves  and  the  country — un 
fortunate  for  them,  for,  let  what  would  come,  they  would  be  responsible. 
If  the  bill  was  lost,  theirs  would  be  the  responsibility  ;  if  the  substitute  was 
carried,  on  them  the  responsibility  would  fall ;  and  if  nothing  was  done, 
it  would  be  at  their  door ;  and  unfortunate  for  the  country,  because  it  had 
prevented  the  decision  of  the  question  at  the  extra  session,  which  \vould 
not  have  failed  to  put  an  early  termination  to  the  present  commercial  and 
pecuniary  embarrassment.  This  the  senator,  in  his  reply,  met  by  sta 
ting  that  I  had  called  on  him  and  his  friends  to  follow  my  lead  j  and  thus 
regarding  it,  he  made  it  the  pretext  of  some  ill-natured  personal  remarks, 
which  I  shall  notice  hereafter.  I  never  dreamed  of  making  such  a  call ; 
and  what  I  said  cannot  be  tortured,  by  the  force  of  construction,  to  bear 
a  meaning  having  the  least  semblance  to  it. 

After  making  these  preliminary  remarks,  I  took  up  the  substitute,  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  311 

showed  that  it  proposed  to  make  a  bargain  with  the  banks.  I  then 
stated  the  particulars  and  the  conditions  of  the  proposed  bargain  ;  that  its 
object  was  to  enable  the  banks  to  pay  their  debts,  and  for  that  purpose  it 
proposed  to  confer  important  privileges  ;  to  give  them  the  use  of  the  pub 
lic  funds  from  the  time  of  deposite  to  disbursement,  and  to  have  their 
notes  received  as  cash  in  the  dues  of  the  government.  I  then  asked  if 
we  had  a  right  to  make  such  a  bargain.  The  senator,  leaving  out  all 
these  particulars,  represented  me  as  saying  that  the  government  had  no 
right  to  make  a  bargain  with  the  banks ;  and  then  undertakes  to  involve 
me  in  an  inconsistency  in  supporting  the  bill,  because  it  proposes  to  bar 
gain  with  the  banks  for  the  use  of  their  vaults  as  a  place  of  safe-keeping 
for  the  public  money ;  as  if  there  was  a  possible  analogy  between  the  two 
cases.  Nothing  is  more  easy  than  to  refute  the  most  demonstrative  ar 
gument  in  this  way.  Drop  an  essential  part  of  the  premises,  and  the 
most  irresistible  conclusion,  of  course,  fails. 

In  the  same  summary  and  easy  mode  of  replying  to  my  arguments,  the 
senator  perverted  my  denial  that  the  government  had  a  right  to  receive 
bank-notes  as  cash,  into  the  assertion  that  it  had  no  right  to  receive  any 
thing  but  cash  j  and  then  accuses  me  with  inconsistency,  because  I  voted, 
at  the  extra  session,  for  the  bill  authorizing  the  receipt  of  treasury  notes 
in  the  dues  of  the  government ;  as*  if  any  one  ever  doubted  that  it  could 
receive  its  own  paper,  or  securities,  in  payment  of  its  own  debts.  Such 
are  the  misstatements  of  the  senator,  taken  in  their  regular  order  as  they 
stand  in  his  reply,  and  they  present  a  fair  specimen  of  what  he  chooses 
to  consider  an  answer  to  my  argument.  There  is  not  one  less  unfairly 
stated,  or  unfairly  met,  than  the  instances  I  have  cited. 

The  senator  presented  two  difficulties  in  reply  to  what  I  said  against 
receiving  bank-notes  by  the  government,  which  demand  a  passing  notice 
before  I  dismiss  this  part  of  the  subject.  He  objected,  first,  that  it  was 
contrary  to  the  provision  of  the  bill  itself,  which  authorizes  the  receipts 
of  the  notes  of  specie-paying  banks  for  a  limited  time.  To  answer  this 
objection,  it  will  be  necessary  to  advert  to  the  object  of  the  provision. 
By  the  provisions  of  the  joint  resolutions  of  1816,  the  notes  of  specie- 
paying  banks  are  made  receivable  in  the  dues  of  the  government ;  and, 
of  course,  on  the  resumption  of  specie  payments,  barik-notes  would  again 
be  received  by  the  government  as  heretofore,  without  limitation  as  to 
time,  unless  some  provision  be  adopted  to  prevent  it.  In  a  word,  the 
government,  though  wholly  separated,  in  fact,  at  present  from  the  banks, 
is  not  so  by  law ;  and  the  object  of  the  provision  is  to  effect  a  permanent 
separation  in  law  and  in  fact.  This  it  proposes  to  do  by  a  gradual  repeal 
of  the  joint  resolution  of  1816,  in  order  to  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  any 
injurious  effects  to  the  community  or  the  banks.  The  senator,  in  making 
his  objection,  overlooks  the  broad  distinction  between  the  doing  and  un 
doing  of  an  unconstitutional  act.  There  are  some  unconstitutional  acts 
that  are  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  be  undone ;  such,  for  instance,  as 
the  admission  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union,  admitting  it  to  be  unconstitu 
tional,  which  I  do  not.  There  are  others  which  cannot  be  undone  sud 
denly  without  wide-spread  distress  and  ruin  ;  such  as  the  protective  tariff, 
which,  accordingly,  the  Compromise  Act  allowed  upward  of  eight  years 
for  the  gradual  repeal.  Such,  also,  is  the  case  under  consideration, 
which,  under  the  provisions  of  the  bill,  would  be  effected  in  seven  years. 
In  all  such  cases,  I  hold  it  to  be  not  only  clearly  constitutional  for  Con 
gress  to  make  a  gradual  repeal,  but  its  duty  to  do  so  ;  otherwise  it  would 
be  often  impossible  to  get  clear  of  an  unconstitutional  act  short  of  a  rev 
olution. 

His  next  objection  was,  that  the  reasons  which  would  make  the  receipt 


312  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  bank-notes  unconstitutional,  would  also  make  the  China  trade  so,  which 
he  represented  as  absorbing  a  large  portion  of  the  specie  of  the  country. 
There  is  no  analogy  whatever  between  the  two  cases.  The  very  object 
of  specie  is  to  carry  on  trade,  and  it  would  be  idle  to  attempt  to  regulate 
the  distribution  and  fluctuation  which  result  from  its  operation.  Expe 
rience  proves  that  all  attempts  of  the  kind  must  either  prove  abortive  or 
mischievous.  In  fact,  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  law,  that  the  more  uni 
versal  the  demand  for  specie,  and  the  less  that  demand  is  interrupted,  the 
more  steady  and  uniform  its  value,  and  the  more  perfectly,  of  course,  it 
fulfils  the  great  purpose  of  circulation,  for  which  it  was  intended.  There 
are,  however,  not  a  few  who,  taking  a  different  view,  have  thought  it  to 
be  the  duty  of  the  government  to  prohibit  the  exportation  of  specie  to 
China,  on  the  very  ground  which  the  senator  assumes,  and  I  am  not  cer 
tain  but  that  he  himself  has  been  in  favour  of  the  measure. 

But  the  senator  did  not  restrict  himself  to  a  reply  to  my  arguments. 
He  introduced  personal  remarks,  which  neither  self-respect,  nor  a  regard 
to  the  cause  I  support,  will  permit  me  to  pass  without  notice,  as  adverse 
as  I  am  to  all  personal  controversies.  Not  only  my  education  and  dis 
position,  but,  above  all,  my  conception  of  the  duties  belonirig  to  the  sta 
tion  I  occupy,  indisposes  me  to  such  controversies.  We  are  sent  here, 
not  to  wrangle  or  indulge  in  personal  afouse,  but  to  deliberate  and  decide 
on  the  common  interests  of  the  states  of  this  Union,  as  far  as  they  have 
been  subjected  by  the  Constitution  to  our  jurisdiction.  Thus  thinking 
and  feeling,  and  having  perfect  confidence  in  the  cause  I  support,  I  ad 
dressed  myself,  when  1  was  last  up,  directly  and  exclusively  to  the  rea 
son  of  the  body,  carefully  avoiding  every  remark  which  had  the  least  per 
sonal  or  party  bearing.  In  proof  of  this,  I  appeal  to  you,  senators,  my 
witnesses  on  this  occasion.  But  it  seems  that  no  caution  on  my  part 
could  prevent  what  I  was  so  anxious  to  avoid.  The  senator,  having  no 
pretext  to  give  a  personal  direction  to  the  discussion,  made  a  premedi 
tated  and  gratuitous  attack  on  me.  I  say  having  no  pretext,  for  there  is 
not  a  shadow  of  foundation  for  the  assertion  that  I  called  on  him  and  his 
party  to  follow  my  lead,  at  which  he  seemed  to  take  offence,  as  I  have 
already  shown.  I  made  no  such  call,  or  anything  that  could  be  construed 
into  it.  It  would  have  been  impertinent,  in  the  relation  between  myself 
and  his  party,  at  any  stage  of  this  question  ;  and  absurd  at  that  late  period, 
when  every  senator  had  made  up  his  mind.  As  there  was,  then,  neither 
provocation  nor  pretext,  what  could  be  the  motive  of  the  senator  in  making 
the  attack'?  It  could  not  be  to  indulge  in  the  pleasure  of  personal  abuse, 
the  lowest  and  basest  of  all  our  passions,  and  which  is  so  far  beneath  the  dig 
nity  of  J;he  senator's  character  and  station.  Nor  could  it  be  with  the  view 
to  intimidation.  The  senator  knows  me  too  long  and  too  well  to  make  such 
an  attempt.  I  am  sent  here  by  constituents  as  respectable  as  those  he 
represents,  in  order  to  watch  over  their  peculiar  interests,  and  take  care 
of  the  general  concern  ;  and  if  I  were  capable  of  being  deterred  by  any 
one,  or  any  consequence,  in  discharging  my  duty,  from  denouncing  what 
I  regard  as  dangerous  or  corrupt,  or  giving  a  decided  and  zealous  sup 
port  to  what  I  think  right  and  expedient,  I  would,  in  shame  and  confu 
sion,  return  my  commission  to  the  patriotic  and  gallant  state  I  represent, 
to  be  placed  in  more  resolute  and  trustworthy  hands. 

If,  then,  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these  be  the  motive,  what,  I 
again  repeat,  can  it  be  1  In  casting  my  eyes  over  the  whale  surface,  I 
can  see  but  one — which  is,  that  the  senator,  despairing  of  the  sufficiency 
of  his  reply  to  overthrow  my  arguments,  had  resorted  to  personalities,  in 
the  hope,  with  their  aid,  to  effect  what  he  could  not  accomplish  by  main 
strength.  He  well  knows  that  the  force  of  an  argument  on  moral  or  po- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  31 3~ 

Jitical  subjects  depends  greatly  on  the  character  of  him  who  advanced  it; 
and  that,  to  cast  suspicion  on  his  motive,  or  to  shake  confidence  in  his  un 
derstanding,  is  often  the  most  effectual  mode  to  destroy  its  force.  Thus 
viewed,  his  personalities  may  be  fairly  regarded  as  constituting  a  part 
of  his  reply  to  my  argument ;  and  we,  accordingly,  find  the  senator  throw 
ing  them  in  front,  like  a  skilful  general,  in  order  to  weaken  my  arguments 
before  he  brought  on  his  main  attack.  In  repelling,  then,  his  personal 
attacks,  I  also  defend  the  cause  which  I  advocate.  It  is  against  that  his 
blows  are  aimed,  and  he  strikes  at  it  through  me,  because  he  believes  his 
blows  will  be  the  more  effectual. 

Having  given  this  direction  to  his  reply,  he  has  imposed  on  me  a  double 
duty  to  repel  his  attacks — duty  to  myself  and  the  cause  I  support.  I  shall 
not  decline  its  performance  $  and  when  it  is  discharged,  I  trust  I  shall 
have  placed  my  character  as  far  beyond  the  darts  which  he  has  hurled  at 
it  as  my  arguments  have  proved  to  be  above  his  abilities  to  reply  to  them. 
In  doing  this,  I  shall  be  compelled  to  speak  of  myself.  No  one  can  be 
more  sensible  than  I  am  how  odious  it  is  to  speak  of  one's  self.  I  shall 
endeavour  to  confine  myself  within  the  limits  of  the  strictest  propriety ; 
but  if  anything  should  escape  me  that  may  wound  the  most  delicate  ear, 
the  odium  ought,  in  justice,  to  fall,  not  on  me,  but  the  senator  who,  by 
his  unprovoked  and  wanton  attack,  has  imposed  on  me  the  painful  neces 
sity  of  speaking  of  myself. 

The  leading  charge  of  the  senator — that  on  which  all  others  depend, 
and  which,  being  overthrown,  they  fall  to  the  ground — is,  that  I  have  gone 
over  $  have  left  his  side,  and  joined  the  other.  By  this  vague  and  indef 
inite  expression,  I  presume  he  meant  to  imply  that  I  had  either  changed 
my  opinion,  or  abandoned  my  principles,  or  deserted  my  party.  If  he  did 
not  mean  one  or  all ;  if  I  have  changed  neither  opinions,  principles,  nor 
party,  then  the  charge  meant  nothing  deserving  notice.  But  if  he  in 
tended  to  imply,  what  I  have  presumed  he  did,  I  take  issue  on  the  fact — 
I  meet  and  repel  the  charge.  It  happened  fortunately  for  me,  fortunately 
for  the  cause  of  truth  and  justice,  that  it  was  not  the  first  time  that  I  had 
offered  my  sentiments  on  the  question  now  under  consideration.  There 
is  scarcely  a  single  point  in  the  present  issue  on  which  I  did  not  expli 
citly  express  my  opinion  four  years  ago,  in  my  place  here,  when  the  re 
moval  of  the  deposites,  and  the  questions  connected  with  it,  were  under 
discussion — so  explicitly  as  to  repel  effectually  the  charge  of  any  change 
on  my  part,  and  to  make  it  impossible  for  me  to  pursue  any  other  course 
but  what  I  have  without  involving  myself  in  gross  inconsistency.  I  in 
tend  not  to  leave  so  important  a  point  to  rest  on  my  bare  assertion. 
What  I  assert  stands  on  record,  which  I  now  hold  in  my  possession,  and 
intend,  at  the  proper  time,  to  introduce  and  read.  But,  before  I  do  that, 
it  will  be  proper  I  should  state  the  questions  now  at  issue,  and  my  course 
in  relation  to  them ;  so  that,  having  a  clear  and  distinct  perception  of 
them,  you  may,  senators,  readily  and  satisfactorily  compare  and  deter 
mine  whether  my  course  on  the  present  occasion  coincides  with  the  opin 
ions  I  then  expressed. 

There  are  three  questions,  as  is  agreed  by  all,  involved  in  the  present 
issue :  Shall  we  separate  the  government  from  the  banks,  or  shall  we  re 
vive  the  league  of  state  banks,  or  create  a  National  Bank  1  My  opinion? 
and  course  in  reference  to  each  are  well  known.  1  prefer  the  separation, 
to  either  of  the  others ;  and,  as  between  the  other  two,  I  regard  a  Na* 
tional  Bank  as  a  more  efficient  and  a  less  corrupting  fiscal  agent  than  u. 
league  of  state  banks.  It  is  also  well  known  that  I  have  expressed  my 
self  on  the  present  occasion  hostile  to  the  banking  system  as  it  exists, 
and  against  the  constitutional  power  of  making  a  bank,  unless  on  the  as- 

R  R 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

sumption  that  we  have  the  right  to  receive  and  treat  bank-notes  as  cash 
in  our  fiscal  operations,  which  I,  for  the  first  time,  have  denied  on  the 
present  occasion.  Now,  I  entertained  and  expressed  all  these  opinions, 
on  a  different  occasion,  four  years  ago,  except  the  right  of  receiving  bank- 
•notes,  in  regard  to  which  I  then  reserved  my  opinion  ;  and  if  all  this  should 
be  fully  and  clearly  established  by  the  record,  from  speeches  delivered 
and  published  at  the  time,  the  charge  of  the  senator  must,  in  the  opinion 
of  all,  however  prejudiced,  sink  to  the  ground.  I  am  now  prepared  to 
introduce  and  have  the  record  read.  I  delivered  two  speeches  in  the 
session  of  1833-34,  one  on  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  the  other 
on  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  late  Bank.  I  ask  the 
secretary  to  turn  to  the  volume  lying  before  him,  and  read  the  three 
paragraphs  marked  in  my  speech  on  the  deposites.  I  will  thank  him  to 
raise  his  voice  and  read  slowly,  so  that  he  may  be  distinctly  heard ;  and 
I  must  ask  you,  senators,  to  give  your  attentive  hearing,  for  on  the  coin 
cidence  between  my  opinions  then  and  my  course  now,  my  vindication 
against  this  unprovoked  and  groundless  charge  rests. 

["  If  (said  Mr.  C.)  this  was  a  question  of  bank  or  no  bank  j  if  it  involved 
the  existence  of  the  banking-  system,  it  would  indeed  be  a  great  question 
— one  of  the  first  magnitude  ;  and,  with  my  present  impression,  long  en 
tertained  and  daily  increasing,  I  would  hesitate,  long  hesitate,  before  I 
would  be  found  under  the  banner  of  the  system.  I  have  great  doubts  (if 
doubts  they  maybe  called)  as  to  the  soundness  and  tendency  of  the  whole 
system,  in  all  its  modifications.  I  have  great  fears  that  it  will  be  found 
hostile  to  liberty  and  the  advance  of  civilization  ;  fatally  hostile  to  liberty 
in  our  country,  where  the  system  exists  in  its  worst  and  most  dangerous 
form.  Of  all  institutions  affecting  the  great  question  of  the  distribution 
of  wealth — a  question  least  explored,  and  the  most  important  of  any  in 
the  whole  range  of  political  economy — the  banking  institution  has,  if  not 
the  greatest,  among  the  greatest,  and,  I  fear,  most  pernicious  influence  on 
the  mode  of  distribution.  Were  the  question  really  before  us,  I  would 
not  shun  the  responsibility,  great  as  it  might  be,  of  freely  and  fully  offer 
ing  my  sentiments  on  these  deeply-important  points ;  but  as  it  is,  I  must 
content  myself  with  the  few  remarks  which  I  have  thrown  out. 

"  What,  then,  is  the  real  question  which  now  agitates  the  country  1  I 
answer,  it  is  a  struggle  between  the  executive  and  legislative  departments 
of  the  government ;  a  struggle,  not  in  relation  to  the  existence  of  the 
•Lank,  but  which,  Congress  or  the  President,  should  have  the  power  to 
•create  a  bank,  and  the  consequent  control  over  the  currency  of  the  coun 
try.  This  is  the  real  question.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  This 
league,  this  association  of  banks,  created  by  the  executive,  bound  to 
gether  by  its  influence,  united  in  common  articles  of  association,  vivified 
and  sustained  by  receiving  the  deposites  of  the  public  money,  and  having 
their  notes  converted,  by  being  received  everywhere  by  the  treasury, 
into  the  common  currency  of  the  country,  is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
•a  Bank  of  the  United  States,  the  Executive  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as 
distinguished  from  that  of  Congress. 

"  However  it  might  fail  to  perform  satisfactorily  the  useful  functions 
of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  incorporated  by  law,  it  would  outstrip 
it,  far  outstrip  it,  in  all  its  dangerous  qualities :  in  extending  the  power, 
the  influence,  and  the  corruption  of  the  government.  It  is  impossible 
to  conceive  any  institution  more  admirably  calculated  to  advance  these 
objects.  Not  only  the  selected  banks,  but  the  whole  banking  institutions 
of  the  country,  and,  with  them,  the  entire  money  power,  for  the  purposes 
-of  speculation,  peculation,  and  corruption,  would  be  placed  under  the 
control  of  the  executive.  A  system  of  menaces  and  promises  would  be 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  315 

established :  of  menaces  to  the  banks  in  possession  of  the  deposites,  but 
which  might  not  be  entirely  subservient  to  executive  views,  and  of  prom 
ises  of  future  favours  to  those  who  may  not  as  yet  enjoy  its  favours. 
Between  the  two,  the  banks  would  be  left  without  influence,  honour,  or 
honesty,  and  a  system  of  speculation  and  stock-jobbing  would  commence 
unequalled  in  the  annals  of  our  country. 

"  So  long  as  the  question  is  one  between  a  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
incorporated  by  Congress,  and  that  system  of  banks  which  has  been  cre 
ated  by  the  will  of  the  executive,  it  is  an  insult  to  the  understanding  to 
discourse  on  the  pernicious  tendency  and  unconstitutionality  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States.  To  bring  up  that  question  fairly  and  legitimately, 
you  must  go  one  step  farther — you  must  divorce  the  government  and  the 
banking  system.  You  must  refuse  all  connexion  with  banks.  You  must 
neither  receive  nor  pay  away  bank-notes ;  you  must  go  back  to  the  old 
system  of  the  strong  box,  and  of  gold  and  silver.  If  you  have  a  right  to 
receive  bank-notes  at  all — to  treat  them  as  money  by  receiving  them  in 
your  dues,  or  paying  them  away  to  creditors — you  have  a  right  to  create 
a  bank.  Whatever  the  government  receives  and  treats  as  money  is 
money ;  and  if  it  be  money,  then  they  have  the  right,  under  the  Consti 
tution,  to  regulate  it.  Nay,  they  are  bound,  by  a  high  obligation,  to  adopt 
the  most  efficient  means,  according  to  the  nature  of  that  which  they  have 
recognised  as  money,  to  give  to  it  the  utmost  stability  and  uniformity  of 
value.  And  if  it  be  in  the  shape  of  bank-notes,  the  most  efficient  means 
of  giving  those  qualities  is  a  Bank  of  the  United  States,  incorporated  by 
Congress.  Unless  you  give  the  highest  practical  uniformity  to  the  value 
of  bank-notes — so  long  as  you  receive  them  in  your  dues  and  treat  them 
as  money,  you  violate  that  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  provides 
that  taxation  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States.  There  is 
no  other  alternative.  I  repeat,  you  must  divorce  the  government  entirely 
from  the  banking  system,  or,  if  not,  you  are  bound  to  incorporate  a  bank, 
as  the  only  safe  and  efficient  means  of  giving  stability  and  uniformity  to 
the  currency.  And  should  the  deposites  not  be  restored,  and  the  present 
illegal  and  unconstitutional  connexion  between  the  executive  and  the 
league  of  banks  continue,  I  shall  feel  it  my  duty,  if  no  one  else  moves,  to 
introduce  a  measure  to  prohibit  government  from  receiving  or  touching 
bank-notes  in  any  shape  whatever,  as  the  only  means  left  of  giving  safety 
and  stability  to  the  currency,  and  saving  the  country  from  corruption  and 
ruin." 

Such  were  my  sentiments,  delivered  four  years  ago,  on  the  question  of 
the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  now  standing  on  record;  and  I  now 
call  your  attention,  senators,  while  they  are  fresh  in  your  minds,  and  be 
fore  other  extracts  are  read,  to  the  opinions  I  then  entertained  and  ex 
pressed,  in  order  that  you  may  compare  them  with  those  that  I  have  ex 
pressed,  and  the  course  I  have  pursued  on  the  present  occasion.  In  the 
first  place,  I  then  expressed  myself  explicitly  and  decidedly  against  the 
banking  system,  and  intimated,  in  language  too  strong  to  be  mistaken, 
that,  if  the  question  was  then  bank  or  no  bank,  as  it  now  is,  as  far  as 
government  is  concerned,  I  would  not  be  found  on  the  side  of  the  bank. 
Now,  I  ask,  I  appeal  to  the  candour  of  all,  even  the  most  prejudiced,  is 
there  anything  in  all  this  contradictory  to  my  present  opinions  or  course  1 
On  the  contrary,  having  entertained  and  expressed  these  opinions,  could 
I  at  this  time,  when  the  issue  I  then  supposed  is  actually  presented,  have 
gone  against  the  separation  without  gross  inconsistency  I  Again  :  I  then 
declared  myself  to  be  utterly  opposed  to  a  combination  or  league  of  state 
banks,  as  being  the  most  efficient  and  corrupting  fiscal  agent  the  govern 
ment  could  select,  and  more  objectionable  than  a  Bank  of  the  United 


316  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

States.  I  again  appeal,  is  there  a  sentiment  or  a  word  in  all  this  contra 
dictory  to  what  I  have  said  or  done  on  the  present  occasion  1  So  far 
otherwise,  is  there  not  a  perfect  harmony  and  coincidence  throughout, 
which,  considering  the  distance  of  time  and  the  difference  of  the  occasion, 
is  truly  remarkable,  and  this  extending  to  all  the  great  and  governing 
questions  now  at  issue  1 

But  the  removal  of  the  deposites  was  not  the  only  question  discussed 
at  that  remarkable  and  important  session.  The  charter  of  the  United 
States  Bank  was  then  about  to  expire.  The  senator  from  Massachusetts 
nearest  me  (Mr.  Webster),  then  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  on  Finance, 
suggested,  in  his  place,  that  he  intended  to  introduce  a  bill  to  renew  the 
charter.  I  clearly  perceived  that  the  movement,  if  made,  would  fail ;  and 
that  there  was  no  prospect  of  doing  anything  to  arrest  the  danger  ap 
proaching,  unless  the  subject  was  taken  up  on  the  broad  question  of  the 
currency ;  and  that,  if  any  connexion  of  the  government  with  the  banks 
could  be  justified  at  all,  it  must  be  in  that  relation.  I  am  not  among 
those  who  believe  that  the  currency  was  in  a  sound  condition  when  the 
deposites  were  removed  in  1834.  I  then  believed,  and  experience  has 
proved  I  was  correct,  that  it  was  deeply  and  dangerously  diseased  ;  and 
that  the  most  efficient  measures  were- necessary  to  prevent  the  catas 
trophe  which  has  since  befallen  the  circulation  of  the  country.  There 
was  then  not  more  than  one  dollar  in  specie,  on  an  average,  in  the  banks, 
including  the  United  States  Bank  and  all,  for  six  of  bank-notes  in  circu 
lation,  and  not  more  than  one  in  eleven  compared  to  the  liabilities  of  the 
banks,  and  this  while  the  United  States  Bank  was  in  full  and  active  oper 
ation,  which  proves  conclusively  that  its  charter  ought  not  to  be  re 
newed,  if  renewed  at  all,  without  great  modifications.  I  saw,  also,  that 
the  expansion  of  the  circulation,  great  as  it  then  was,  must  still  farther 
increase  ;  that  the  disease  lay  deep  in  the  system ;  that  the  terms  on 
which  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  England  was  renewed  would  give  a 
western  direction  to  specie,  which,  instead  of  correcting  the  disorder,  by 
substituting  specie  for  bank-notes  in  our  circulation,  would  become  the 
basis  of  new  banking  operations  that  would  greatly  increase  the  swelling 
tide.  Such  were  my  conceptions  then,  and  I  honestly  and  earnestly  en 
deavoured  to  carry  them  into  effect,  in  order  to  prevent  the  approaching 
catastrophe. 

The  political  and  personal  relations  between  myself  and  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster)  were  then  not  the  kindest.  We  stood 
in  opposition,  at  the  preceding  session,  on  the  great  question  growing  out 
of  the  conflict  between  the  state  I  represented  and  the  General  Govern 
ment,  which  could  not  pass  away  without  leaving  unfriendly  feelings  on  both 
sides  ;  but,  where  duty  is  involved,  I  am  not  in  the  habit  of  permitting 
my  personal  relations  to  interfere.  In  my  solicitude  to  avert  coming 
dangers,  I  sought  an  interview,  through  a  common  friend,  in  order  to  com 
pare  opinions  as  to  the  proper  course  to  be  pursued.  We  met,  and  con 
versed  freely  and  fully,  but  parted  without  agreeing.  I  expressed  to  him 
my  deep  regret  at  our  disagreement,  and  informed  him  that,  although  I 
could  not  agree  with  him,  I  would  throw  no  embarrassment  in  his  way, 
but  should  feel  it  to  be  my  duty,  when  he  made  his  motion  to  introduce 
a  bill  to  renew  the  charter  of  the  Bank,  to  express  my  opinion  at  large 
on  the  state  of  the  currency,  and  the  proper  course  to  be  pursued,  which 
I  accordingly  did.  On  that  memorable  occasion  I  stood  almost  alone. 
One  party  supported  the  league  of  state  banks,  and  the  other  the  United 
States  Bank,  the  charter  of  which  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr. 
Webster)  proposed  to  renew  for  six  years.  Nothing  was  left  me  but 
to  place  myself  distinctly  before  the  country  on  the  ground  I  occupied, 


SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C.    CALHOTTN.  317 

which  I  did,  fully  and  explicitly,  in  the  speech  I  delivered  on  the  occasion. 
In  justice  to  myself,  I  ought  to  have  every  word  of  it  read  on  the  pres 
ent  occasion.  It  would  of  itself  be  a  full  vindication  of  my  course. 
I  stated  and  enlarged  on  all  the  points  to  which  I  have  already  referred; 
objected  to  the  recharter  as  proposed  by  the  mover,  and  foretold  that 
what  has  since  happened  would  follow,  unless  something  effectual  was 
done  to  prevent  it.  As  a  remedy,  I  proposed  to  use  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States  as  a  temporary  expedient,  fortified  with  strong  guards,  in 
order  to  resist  and  turn  back  the  swelling  tide  of  circulation.  With  this 
view,  I  proposed  to  prohibit  the  issue  of  any  note  under  ten  dollars  at 
first,  and,  after  a  certain  interval,  under  twenty  j  and  to  refuse  to  receive 
the  notes  of  any  bank  that  issued  notes  under  five  dollars,  or  that  re 
ceived  the  notes  of  any  bank  that  issued  less,  in  order  to  make  a  total 
separation  between  the  banks  that  should  refuse  to  discontinue  the  issue 
of  small  notes  and  the  others,  in  the  hope  that  the  influence  of  the  latter, 
with  the  voice  of  the  community,  would  ultimately  compel  a  discontinu 
ance.  I  proposed  that  the  charter,  with  these  and  other  provisions  that 
might  be  devised  by  a  committee  appointed  for  the  purpose,  should  be 
renewed  for  twelve  years,  two  years  longer  than  the  Bank  of  England 
had  been,  in  order  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  experience  and  wisdom 
of  that  great  and  enlightened  nation.  All  this  I  proposed,  expressly 
on  the  ground  of  undoing  the  system,  gradually  and  slowly,  until  a  total 
disconnexion  should  be  effected,  if  experience  should  show  that  it  could 
be  carried  to  that  extent.  My  object  was  double — to  get  clear  of  the  sys 
tem,  and  to  avert  the  catastrophe  which  has  since  befallen  us,  and  which 
I  then  saw  was  approaching. 

To  prove  all  this,  I  again  refer  to  the  record.  If  it  shall  appear  from  it 
that  my  object  was  to  disconnect  the  government,  gradually  and  cau 
tiously,  from  the  banking  system,  and  with  that  view,  and  that  only,  I 
proposed  to  use  the  United  States  Bank  for  a  short  time,  and  that  I  ex 
plicitly  expressed  the  same  opinions  then  as  I  now  have  on  almost  every 
point  connected  with  the  system,  I  shall  not  only  have  vindicated  my 
character  from  the  charge  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky,  but  shall  do 
more,  much  more,  to  show  that  I  did  all  an  individual,  standing  alone,  as 
I  did,  could  do,  to  avert  the  present  calamities,  and,  of  course,  am  free 
from  all  responsibility  for  what  has  since  happened.  I  have  shortened 
the  extracts  as  far  as  was  possible  to  do  myself  justice,  and  have  left  out 
much  that  ought,  of  right,  to  be  read  in  my  defence,  rather  than  to  weary 
the  Senate.  I  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  command  attention  to  reading 
of  documents;  but  I  trust  that  this,  where  justice  to  a  member  of  the 
body,  whose  character  has  been  assailed  without  the  least  provocation, 
will  form  an  exception.  The  extracts  are  numbered,  and  I  will  thank  the 
secretary  to  pause  at  the  end  of  each,  unless  otherwise  desired. 

[The  secretary  here  read  the  following  extract : 

"After  a  full  survey  of  the  whole  subject,  I  see  none,  I  can  conjec 
ture  no  means  of  extricating  the  country  from  its  present  danger,  and 
to  arrest  its  farther  increase,  but  a  bank,  the  agency  of  which,  in  some 
form  or  under  some  authority,  is  indispensable.  The  country  has  been 
brought  into  the  present  diseased  state  of  the  currency  by  banks,  and 
must  be  extricated  by  their  agency.  We  must,  in  a  word,  use  a  bank  to 
unbank  the  banks,  to  the  extent  that  may  be  necessary  to  restore  a  safe 
and  stable  currency  ;  just  as  we  apply  snow  to  a  frozen  limb  in  order  to 
restore  vitality  and  circulation,  or  hold  up  a  burn  to  the  flame  to  extract  the 
inflammation.  All  must  see  that  it  is  impossible  to  suppress  the  banking 
system  at  once.  It  must  continue  for  a  time.  Its  greatest  enemies,  and 
the  advocates  of  an  exclusive  specie  circulation,  must  make  it  a  part  of 


318  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  CU  CALHOUN. 

their  system  to  tolerate  the  banks  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  period.  To 
suppress  them  at  once  would,  if  it  were  possible,  work  a  greater  revolu 
tion — a  greater  change  in  the  relative  condition  of  the  various  classes  of 
the  community,  than  would  the  conquest  of  the  country  by  a  savage  ene 
my.  What,  then,  must  be  done  1  I  answer,  a  new  and  safe  system  must 
gradually  grow  up  under  and  replace  the  old ;  imitating,  in  this  respect, 
the  beautiful  process  we  sometimes  see  of  a  wounded  or  diseased  part  in 
a  living  organic  body  gradually  superseded  by  the  healing  process  of 
nature."] 

After  having  so  expressed  myself,  which  clearly  shows  that  my  object 
was  to  use  the  bank  for  a  time  in  such  a  manner  as  to  break  the  con 
nexion  with  the  system  without  a  shock  to  the  country  or  currency,  I 
then  proceeded  and  examined  the  question,  whether  this  could  be  best 
accomplished  by  the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank, 
or  through  a  league  of  state  banks.  After  concluding  what  I  had  to  say 
on  that  subject,  in  my  deep  solicitude  I  addressed  the  three  parties  in  the 
Senate  separately,  urging  such  motives  as  I  thought  best  calculated  to 
act  on  them,  and  pressing  them  to  join  me  in  the  measure  suggested,  in 
order  to  avert  approaching  danger.  I  began  with  my  friends  of  the  State 
Eights  party,  and  with  the  administration.  I  have  taken  copious  extracts 
from  the  address  to  the  first,  which  will  clearly  prove  how  exactly  my 
opinion,  then  and  now,  coincides  on  all  questions  connected  with  the  banks. 
I  now  ask  the  secretary  to  read  the  extract  numbered  two. 

["Having  now  stated  the  measure  necessary  to  apply  the  remedy,  I  am 
thus  brought  to  the  question,  Can  the  measure  succeed'?  which  brings  up 
the  inquiry  of  how  far  it  may  be  expected  to  receive  the  support  of  the 
several  parties  which  compose  the  Senate,  and  on  which  I  shall  next  pro 
ceed  to  make  a  few  remarks. 

"  First,  then,  Can  the  State  Rights  party  give  it  their  support  1  that  party 
of  which  I  am  proud  of  being  a  member,  and  for  which  I  entertain  so 
strong  an  attachment — the  stronger  because  we  are  few  among  many. 
In  proposing  this  question,  I  am  not  ignorant  of  their  long-standing  con 
stitutional  objection  to  the  Bank,  on  the  ground  that  this  was  intended  to 
be,  as  it  is  usually  expressed,  a  hard-money  government — a  government 
whose  circulating  medium  was  intended  to  consist  of  the  precious  metals, 
and  for  which  object  the  power  of  coining  money  and  regulating  the  value 
thereof  was  expressly  conferred  by  the  Constitution.  I  know  how  long 
and  how  sincerely  this  opinion  has  been  entertained,  and  under  how  many 
difficulties  it  has  been  maintained.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  attempt  to 
change  an  opinion  so  firmly  fixed,  but  I  may  be  permitted  to  make  a  few 
observations,  in  order  to  present  what  appears  to  me  to  be  the  true  ques 
tion  in  reference  to  this  constitutional  point — in  order  that  we  may  fully 
comprehend  the  circumstances  under  which  we  are  placed  in  reference 
to  it.  With  this  view,  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  inquire  whether,  in 
conferring  the  power  to  coin  money  and  to  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
the  Constitution  intended  to  limit  the  power  strictly  to  coining  money 
and  regulating  its  value,  or  whether  it  intended  to  confer  a  more  general 
power  over  the  currency  j  nor  do  I  intend  to  inquire  whether  the  word 
coin  is  limited  simply  to  the  metals,  or  may  be  extended  to  other  sub 
stances,  if,  through  a  gradual  change,  they  may  become  the  medium  of 
the  general  circulation  of  the  world. 

"  The  very  receipt  of  bank-notes,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  in  its 
dues,  would,  it  is  conceded,  make  them  money  as  far  as  the  government 
may  be  concerned,  and,  by  a  necessary  consequence,  would  make  them,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  currency  of  the  country.  I  say  nothing  of  the  positive 
provisions  in  the  Constitution  which  declare  that '  all  duties,  imposts,  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  319 

excises  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States,'  which  cannot  be, 
unless  that  in  which  they  are  paid  should  also  have,  as  nearly  as  prac 
ticable,  a  uniform  value  throughout  the  country.  To  effect  this,  where 
bank-notes  are  received,  the  banking  power  is  necessary  and  proper  with 
in  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution;  and,  consequently,  if  the  government 
has  the  right  to  receive  bank-notes  in  its  dues,  the  power  becomes  con 
stitutional.  Here  lies  (said  Mr.  C.)  the  real  constitutional  question  :  Has 
the  government  a  right  to  receive  bank-notes,  or  not  1  The  question  is 
not  upon  the  mere  power  of  incorporating  a  bank,  as  it  has  been  com 
monly  argued  ;  though,  even  in  that  view,  there  would  be  as  great  a  con 
stitutional  objection  to  any  act  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  or  any  other 
branch  of  the  government,  which  should  unite  any  association  of  state 
banks  into  one  system,  as  the  means  of  giving  the  uniformity  and  stability 
to  the  currency  which  the  Constitution  intends  to  confer.  The  very  act 
of  so  associating  or  incorporating  them  into  one,  by  whatever  name  called, 
or  by  whatever  department  performed,  would  be,  in  fact,  an  act  of  incor 
poration. 

"  But  (said  Mr.  C.)  my  object,  as  I  have  stated,  is  not  to  discuss  the 
constitutional  questions,  nor  to  determine  whether  the  Bank  be  constitu 
tional  or  not.  It  is,  I  repeat,  to  show  where  the  difficulty  lies — a  diffi 
culty  which  I  have  felt  from  the  time  I  first  came  into  the  public  service. 
I  found  then,  as  now,  the  currency  of  the  country  consisting  almost  en 
tirely  of  bank-notes.  I  found  the  government  intimately  connected  with 
the  system,  receiving  bank-notes  in  its  dues,  ana!  paying  them  away,  under 
its  appropriations,  as  cash.  The  fact  was  beyond  my  control ;  it  existed 
long  before  my  time,  and  without  my  agency ;  and  I  was  compelled  to 
act  on  the  fact  as  it  existed,  without  deciding  on  the  many  questions 
which  I  have  suggested  as  connected  with  this  subject,  and  on  many  of 
which  I  have  never  yet  formed  a  definite  opinion.  No  one  can  pay  less 
regard  to  precedent  than  I  do,  acting  here  in  my  representative  and  de 
liberative  character,  on  legal  or  constitutional  questions ;  but  I  have  felt, 
from  the  beginning,  the  full  force  of  the  distinction  so  sensibly  taken  by 
the  senator  from  Virginia  (Mr.  Leigh)  between  doing  and  undoing  an  act, 
and  which  he  so  strongly  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  purchase  of  Lou 
isiana.  The  constitutionality  of  that  act  was  doubted  by  many  at  the 
time,  and,  among  others,  by  its  author  himself;  yet  he  would  be  consid 
ered  a  madman  who,  coming  into  political  life  at  this  late  period,  should 
now  seriously  take  up  the  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  the  purchase, 
and,  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  unconstitutional,  should  propose 
to  rescind  the  act,  and  eject  from  the  Union  two  flourishing  states  and  a 
growing  territory."] 

^  I  next  ask  the  attention  of  the  senators,  especially  from  the  Northern 
States,  while  the  secretary  reads  the  short  address  to  the  opposition,  that 
they  may  see  how  distinctly  I  foresaw  what  was  coming,  and  how  anx 
ious  I  was  to  avert  the  calamity  that  has  fallen  on  the  section  where  I 
anticipated  it  would.  I  ask  the  secretary  to  read  the  extract  numbered 
three. 

["  I  next  address  myself  to  the  members  of  the  opposition,  who  princi 
pally  represent  the  commercial  and  manufacturing  portions  of  the  coun 
try,  where  the  banking  system  has  been  the  farthest  extended,  and  where 
a  larger  portion  of  the  property  exists  in  the  shape  of  credit  than  in  any 
other  section ;  arid  to  whom  a  sound,  stable  currency  is  most  necessary, 
and  the  opposite  most  dangerous.  You  have  no  constitutional  objection; 
to  you  it  is  a  mere  question  of  expediency ;  viewed  in  this  light,  can  you 
vote  for  the  proposed  measure'?  a  measure  designed  to  arrest  the  ap 
proach  of  events  which  I  have  demonstrated  must,  if  not  arrested,  create 


320  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

convulsions  and  revolutions  j  and  to  correct  a  disease  which  must,  if  not 
corrected,  subject  the  currency  to  continued  agitations  and  fluctuations, 
and  in  order  to  give  that  permanence,  stability,  and  uniformity,  which  are 
so  essential  to  your  prosperity.  To  effect  this  may  require  some  dimi 
nution  on  the  profits  of  banking,  some  temporary  sacrifice  of  interest ; 
but,  if  such  should  be  the  fact,  it  will  be  compensated  in  more  than  a  hun 
dred-fold  proportion,  by  increased  security  and  durable  prosperity.  If 
the  system  must  advance  in  the  present  course  without  a  check,  and  if 
explosion  must  follow,  remember  that  where  you  stand  will  be  the  crater  ; 
should  the  system  quake,  under  your  feet  the  chasm  will  open  that  will 
ingulf  your  institutions  and  your  prosperity."] 

I  regret  to  trespass  on  the  patience  of  the  Senate,  but  I  wish,  in  justice 
to  myself,  to  ask  their  attention  to  one  more,  which,  though  not  imme 
diately  relating  to  the  question  under  consideration,  is  not  irrelevant  to 
my  vindication.  I  not  only  expressed  my  opinions  freely  in  relation  to 
the  currency  and  the  Bank,  in  the  speech  from  which  such  copious  ex 
tracts  have  been  read,  but  had  the  precaution  to  define  my  political  posi 
tion  distinctly  in  reference  to  the  political  parties  of  the  day,  and  the 
course  I  would  pursue  in  relation  to  each.  I  then,  as  now,  belonged  to 
the  party  to  which  it  is  my  glory  ever  to  have  been  attached  exclusively; 
and  avowed,  explicitly,  that  I  belonged  to  neither  of  the  two  parties,  op 
position  or  administration,  then  contending  for  superiority,  which  of  itself 
ought  to  go  far  to  repel  the  charge  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky,  that  I 
have  gone  over  from  one  party  to  the  other.  The  secretary  will  read  the 
last  extract. 

["  I  am  the  partisan,  as  I  have  said,  of  no  class,  nor,  let  me  add,  of  any 
political  party.  I  am  neither  of  the  opposition  nor  of  the  administration. 
If  I  act  with  the  former  in  any  instance,  it  is  because  I  approve  of  their 
course  on  the  particular  occasion ;  and  I  shall  always  be  happy  to  act 
with  them  when  I  do  approve.  If  I  oppose  the  administration  ;  if  I  desire 
to  see  power  change  hands,  it  is  because  I  disapprove  of  the  general 
course  of  those  in  authority  ;  because  they  have  departed  from  the  prin 
ciples  on  which  they  came  into  office  ;  because,  instead  of  using  the  im 
mense  power  and  patronage  put  into  their  hands  to  secure  the  liberty  of 
the  country  and  advance  the  public  good,  they  have  perverted  them  into 
party  instruments  for  personal  objects.  But  mine  has  not  been,  nor  will 
it  be,  a  systematic  opposition.  Whatever  measure  of  theirs  I  may  deem 
right,  I  shall  cheerfully  support,  and  I  only  desire  that  they  shall  afford 
me  more  frequent  occasions  for  support,  and  fewer  for  opposition,  than 
they  have  heretofore  done."] 

Such,  senators,  are  my  recorded  sentiments  in  1834.  They  are  full  and 
explicit  on  all  the  questions  involved  in  the  present  issue,  and  prove,  be 
yond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  I  have  changed  no  opinion,  abandoned 
no  principle,  nor  deserted  any  party.  I  stand  now  on  the  ground  I  stood 
on  then ;  and,  of  course,  if  my  relations  to  the  two  opposing  parties  are 
changed — if  I  now  act  with  those  that  I  then  opposed,  and  oppose  those 
with  whom  I  then  acted,  the  change  is  not  in  me.  I,  at  least,  have  stood 
still.  In  saying  this,  I  accuse  none  of  changing.  I  leave  others  to  ex 
plain  their  position  now  and  then,  if  they  deem  explanation  necessary. 
But,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  state  my  opinion,  I  would  say  that  the 
change  is  rather  in  the  questions  and  the  circumstances  than  in  the  opin 
ions  or  principles  of  either  of  the  parties.  The  opposition  were  then, 
and  are  now,  National  Bank  men  ,•  and  the  administration,  in  like  man 
ner,  were  anti-national  bank,  and  in  favour  of  a  league  of  state  banks ; 
•while  I  preferred  then,  as  now,  the  former  to  the  latter,  and  a  divorce 
from  banks  to  either.  When  the  experiment  of  the  league  failed,  the  ad- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  321 

ministration  were  reduced  to  the  option  between  a  National  Bank  and  a 
divorce.  They  chose  the  latter,  and  such,  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt, 
would  have  been  their  choice  had  the  option  been  the  same  four  years 
ago.  Nor  have  I  any  doubt,  had  the  option  been  then  between  a  league  of 
banks  and  divorce,  the  opposition  then,  as  now,  would  have  been  in  favour 
of  the  league.  In  all  this  there  is  more  apparent  than  real  change.  As 
to  myself,  there  has  been  neither.  If  I  acted  with  the  opposition  and  op 
posed  the  administration  then,  it  was  because  I  was  openly  opposed  to 
the  removal  of  the  deposites  and  the  league  of  banks,  as  I  now  am ;  and 
if  I  now  act  with  the  latter  and  oppose  the  former,  it  is  because  I  am  now, 
as  then,  in  favour  of  a  divorce,  and  opposed  to  either  a  league  of  state 
banks  or  a  National  Bank,  except,  indeed,  as  the  means  of  effecting  a  di 
vorce  gradually  and  safely.  What,  then,  is  my  offence  ^  What  but  re 
fusing  to  abandon  my  first  choice,  the  divorce  from  the  banks,  because 
the  administration  has  selected  it,  and  of  going  with  the  opposition  for  a 
National  Bank,  to  which  I  have  been,  and  am  still  opposed  !  That  is  all ; 
and  for  this  I  am  charged  with  going  over — leaving  one  party  and  joining 
the  other. 

Had  some  guardian  angel,  Mr.  President,  whispered  in  my  ear  at  the 
time,  "Be  cautious  what  you  say;  this  question  will  not  terminate  here; 
four  years  hence  it  will  be  revived  under  very  different  circumstances, 
when  your  principles  and  duty  will  compel  you  to  act  with  those  you 
now  oppose,  and  oppose  those  with  whom  you  now  act,  and  when  you 
will  be  charged  with  desertion  of  principles/'  I  could  not  have  guarded 
myself  more  effectually  than  I  have  done.  Yet,  in  the  face  of  all  this,  the 
senator  has  not  only  made  the  charge,  but  has  said  in  his  place,  that  he 
heard,  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  at  the  extra  session,  that  1  was  opposed 
to  a  National  Bank !  I  could  place  the  senator  in  a  dilemma  from  which 
there  is  no  possibility  of  escape.  I  might  say  to  him,  you  have  either 
forgot  or  not  what  I  said  in  1834.  If  you  have  not,  how  can  you  justify 
yourself  in  making  the  charge  you  have'?  But  if  you  have — if  you  have 
forgot  what  is  so  recent,  and  what,  from  the  magnitude  of  the  question 
and  the  importance  of  the  occasion,  was  so  well  calculated  to  impress  itself 
on  your  memory,  what  possible  value  can  be  attached  to  your  recollection 
or  opinions  as  to  my  course  on  more  remote  and  less  memorable  occa 
sions,  on  which  you  have  undertaken  to  impeach  my  conduct  1  He  may 
take  his  choice. 

Having  now  established,  by  the  record,  that  I  have  changed  no  opinion, 
abandoned  no  principle,  nor  deserted  any  party,  the  charge  of  the  senator, 
with  all  the  aspersions  with  which  he  accompanied  it,  falls  prostrate  to 
the  earth.  Here  I  might  leave  the  subject  and  close  my  vindication.  But 
I  choose  not.  I  shall  follow  the  senator  up,  step  by  step,  in  his  unprovoked, 
and,  I  may  now  add,  groundless  attack,  with  blows  not  less  decisive  and 
victorious. 

The  senator  next  proceeded  to  state  that,  in  a  certain  document  (if  he 
named  it  I  did  not  hear  him),  I  assigned,  as  the  reason  why  I  could  not 
join  in  the  attack  on  the  administration,  that  the  benefit  of  the  victory 
would  not  inure  to  myself  or  my  party,  or,  as  he  explained  himself,  be 
cause  it  would  not  place  myself  and  them  in  power.  I  presume  he  refer 
red  to  a  letter  in  answer  to  an  invitation  to  a  public  dinner  offered  me  by 
my  old  and  faithful  friends  and  constituents  of  Edgefield,  in  approbation 
of  my  course  at  the  extra  session. 

[Mr.  Clay :  "  I  do."] 

The  pressure  of  domestic  engagements  would  not  permit  me  to  accept 
their  invitation  ;  and,  in  declining  it,  I  deemed  it  due  to  them  and  myself  to 
explain  my  course,  in  its  political  and  party  bearing,  more  fully  than  I  had 

Ss 


322  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

done'  in  debate.  They  had  a  right  to  know  my  reasons,  and  I  expressed 
myself  with  the  frankness  due  to  the  long  and  uninterrupted  confidence 
that  had  ever  existed  between  us. 

Having  made  these  explanatory  remarks,  I  now  proceed  to  meet  the 
assertion  of  the  senator.  I  again  take  issue  on  the  fact.  I  assigned  no 
such  reason  as  the  senator  attributes  to  me.  I  never  dreamed  nor  thought 
of  such  a  one ;  nor  can  any  force  of  construction  extort  it  from  what  I 
said.  No :  my  object  was  not  power  or  place,  either  for  myself  or  party. 
It  was  far  more  humble  and  honest.  It  was  to  save  ourselves  and  our 
principles  from  being  absorbed  and  lost  in  a  party  more  numerous  and 
powerful,  but  differing  from  us  on  almost  every  principle  and  question  of 
policy. 

When  the  suspension  of  specie  payments  took  place  in  May  last  (not 
unexpected  to  me)^I  immediately  turned  my  attention  earnestly  to  the 
event,  considering  it  as  one  pregnant  with  great  and  lasting  conse 
quences.  Reviewing  the  whole  ground,  I  saw  nothing  to  change  in  the 
opinions  and  principles  I  had  avowed  in  1834,  and  I  determined  to  carry 
them  out  as  far  as  circumstances  and  my  ability  would  enable  me.  But 
I  saw  that  my  course  must  be  influenced  by  the  position  which  the  two 
great  contending  parties  might  take  in  reference  to  the  question.  I  did 
not  doubt  that  the  opposition  would  rally  either  on  a  National  Bank  or  a 
combination  of  state  banks,  with  Mr.  Biddle's  at  the  head,  but  I  was 
wholly  uncertain  what  course  the  administration  would  adopt,  and  re 
mained  so  until  the  message  of  the  President  was  received  and  read  by 
the  secretary  at  his  table.  When  I  saw  he  went  for  a  divorce.  I  never 
hesitated  a  moment.  Not  only  my  opinions  and  principles,  long  en 
tertained,  and,  as  I  have  shown,  fully  expressed  years  ago,  but  the  high 
est  political  motives,  left  me  no  alternative.  I  perceived,  at  once,  that 
the  object,  to  accomplish  which  we  had  acted  in  concert  with  the  oppo 
sition,  had  ceased  ;  executive  usurpations  had  come  to  an  end  for  the 
present ;  and  that  the  struggle  with  the  administration  was  no  longer  for 
power,  but  to  save  themselves.  I  also  clearly  saw,  that  if  we  should  unite 
with  the  opposition  in  their  attack  on  the  administration,  the  victory  over 
them,  in  the  position  they  occupied,  would  be  a  victory  over  us  and  our 
principles.  It  required  no  sagacity  to  see  that  such  would  be  the  result. 
It  was  as  plain  as  day.  The  administration  had  taken  position,  as  I  have 
shown,  on  the  very  ground  I  occupied  in  1834,  and  which  the  whole 
State  Rights  party  had  taken,  at  the  same  time,  in  the  other  house,  as  its 
journals  will  prove.  The  opposition,  under  the  banner  of  the  Bank,  were 
moving  against  them,  for  the  very  reason  that  they  had  taken  the  ground 
they  did. 

Now,  I  ask,  What  would  have  been  the  result  if  we  had  joined  in  the 
attack  1  No  one  can  now  doubt  that  the  victory  over  those  in  power 
would  have  been  certain  and  decisive,  nor  would  the  consequences  have 
been  the  least  doubtful.  The  first  fruit  would  have  been  a  National  Bank. 
The  principles  of  the  opposition,  and  the  very  object  of  the  attack,  would 
have  necessarily  led  to  that.  We  would  have  been  not  only  too  feeble 
to  resist,  but  would  have  been  committed  by  joining  in  the  attack  with  its 
avowed  object  to  go  for  one,  while  those  who  supported  the  administra 
tion  would  have  been  scattered  to  the  winds.  We  should  then  have  had  a 
bank — that  is  clear  ;  nor  is  it  less  certain  that  in  its  train  there  would 
have  followed  all  the  consequences  which  have,  and  ever  will  follow, 
when  tried — high  duties,  overflowing  revenue,  extravagant  expenditures, 
large  surpluses  ;  in  a  word,  all  those  disastrous  consequences  which  have 
well  near  overthrown  our  institutions,  and  involved  the  country  in  its 
present  difficulties.  The  influence  of  the  institution,  the  known  princi- 


*  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  323 

pies  and  policy  of  the  opposition,  and  the  utter  prostration  of  the  adminis 
tration  party,  and  the  absorption  of  ours,  would  have  led  to  these  results 
as  certainly  as  we  exist. 

I  now  appeal,  senators,  to  your  candour  and  justice,  and  ask,  Could  I, 
having  all  these  consequences  before  me,  with  my  known  opinions,  and 
that  of  the  party  to  which  I  belong,  and  to  which  only  I  owe  fidelity, 
have  acted  differently  from  what  I  did  1  Would  not  any  other  course  have 
justly  exposed  me  to  the  charge  of  having  abandoned  my  principles  and 
party,  with  which  I  am  now  accused  so  unjustly  1  Nay,  would  it  not 
have  been  worse  than  folly — been  madness  in  me  to  have  taken  any 
other  ?  And  yet,  the  grounds  which  I  have  assumed  in  this  exposition 
are  the  very  reasons  assigned  in  my  letter,  and  which  the  senator  has  per 
verted,  most  unfairly  and  unjustly,  into  the  pitiful,  personal,  and  selfish 
reason  which  he  has  attributed  to  me.  Confirmative  of  what  I  say,  I 
again  appeal  to  the  record.  The  secretary  will  read  the  paragraph  marked 
in  my  Edgefield  letter,  to  which,  I  presume,  the  senator  alluded. 

["  As  soon  as  I  saw  this  state  of  things,  I  clearly  perceived  that  a  very 
important  question  was  presented  for  our  determination,  which  we  were 
compelled  to  decide  forthwith — Shall  we  continue  pur  joint  attack  with 
the  nationals  on  those  in  power,,  in  the  new  position  which  they  have 
been  compelled  to  occupy  1  It  was  clear,  with  our  joint  forces,  we  could 
utterly  overthrow  and  demolish  them,  but  it  was  not  less  clear  that  the 
victory  would  inure,  not  to  us,  but  exclusively  to  the  benefit  of  our  allies 
and  their  cause.  They  were  the  most  numerous  and  powerful,  and  the 
point  of  assault  on  the  position  which  the  party  to  be  assaulted  had  taken 
in  relation  to  the  banks  would  have  greatly  strengthened  the  settled  prin 
ciples  and  policy  of  the  national  party,  and  weakened,  in  the  same  degree, 
ours.  They  are,  and  ever  have  been,  the  decided  advocates  of  a  National 
Bank,  and  are  now  in  favour  of  one  with  a  capital  so  ample  as  to  be  suf 
ficient  to  control  the  state  institutions,  and  to  regulate  the  currency  and 
exchanges  of  the  country.  To  join  them,  with  their  avowed  object,  in 
the  attack  to  overthrow  those  in  power,  on  the  ground  they  occupied 
against  a  bank,  would,  of  course,  not  only  have  placed  the  government 
and  country  in  their  hands  without  opposition,  but  would  have  committed 
us,  beyond  the  possibility  of  extrication,  for  a  bank,  and  absorbed  our 
party  in  the  ranks  of  the  National  Republicans.  The  first  fruits  of  the 
victory  would  have  been  an  overshadowing  National  Bank,  with  an  im 
mense  capital,  not  less  than  from  fifty  to  a  hundred  millions,  which  would 
have  centralized  the  currency  and  exchanges,  and  with  them  the  com 
merce  and  capital  of  the  country,  in  whatever  section  the  head  of  the  in 
stitution  might  be  placed.  The  next  would  be  the  indissoluble  union  with 
political  opponents,  whose  principles  and  policy  are  so  opposite  to  ours, 
and  so  dangerous  to  our  institutions,  as  well  as  oppressive  to  us."] 

I  now  ask,  Is  there  anything  in  this  extract  which  will  warrant  the  con 
struction  that  the  senator  has  attempted  to  force  on  it  1  Is  it  not  mani 
fest  that  the  expression  on  which  he  fixes,  that  the  victory  would  inure, 
not  to  us,  but  exclusively  to  the  benefit  of  the  opposition,  alludes  not  to 
power  or  place,  but  to  principle  and  policy  1  Can  words  be  more  plain  1 
What,  then,  becomes  of  all  the  aspersions  of  the  senator,  his  reflections 
about  selfishness  and  the  want  of  patriotism,  and  his  allusions  and  illus 
trations  to  give  them  force  and  effect  1  They  fall  to  the  ground,  without 
deserving  a  notice,  with  his  groundless  accusation. 

But,  in  so  premeditated  and  indiscriminate  an  attack,  it  could  not  be 
expected  that  my  motives 'would  entirely  escape,  and  we  accordingly  find 
the  senator  very  charitably  leaving  it  to  time  to  disclose  my  motive  for 
going  over.  Leave  it  to  time  to  disclose  my  motive  for  going  over !  I, 


324:  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

who  have  changed  no  opinion,  abandoned  no  principle,  and  deserted  no 
party;  I,  who  have  stood  still  and  maintained  my  ground  against  every 
difficulty,  to  be  told  that  it  is  left  to  time  to  disclose  my  motive  !  The 
imputation  sinks  to  the  earth,  with  the  groundless  charge  on  which  it 
rests.  I  stamp  it,  with  scorn,  in  the  dust.  I  pick  up  the  dart,  which  fell 
harmless  at  my  feet.  I  hurl  it  back.  What  the  senator  charges  on  me 
unjustly,  he  has  actually  done.  He  went  over  on  a  memorable  occasion, 
and  did  not  leave  it  to  time  to  disclose  his  motive. 

The    senator  next  tells  us  that  I  bore  a  character  for  stern  fidelity, 
which  he  accompanied  with  remarks  implying  that  I  had  forfeited  it  by 
my  course  on  the  present  occasion.     If  he  means  by  stern  fidelity  a  de 
voted  attachment  to  duty  and  principle,  which  nothing  can  overcome,  the 
character  is  indeed  a  high  one,  and,  I  trust,  not  entirely  unmerited.     I 
have,  at  least,  the  authority  of  the  senator  himself  for  saying  that  it  be 
longed  to  me  before  the  present  occasion,  and  it  is,  of  course,  incumbent 
on  him  to  show  that  I  have  since  forfeited  it.     He  will  find  the  task  a 
Herculean  one.     It  would  be  by  far  more  easy  to  show  the  opposite — that, 
instead  of  forfeiting,  I  have  strengthened  my  title  to  the  character ;  in 
stead  of  abandoning  any  principles,  I  have  firmly  adhered  to  them,  and 
that,  too,  under  the  most  appalling  difficulties.     If  I  were  to  select  an  in 
stance  in  the  whole  course  of  my  life  on  which,  above  all  others,  to  rest 
my  claim  to  the  character  which  the  senator  attributed  to  me,  it  would 
be  this  very  one,  which  he  has  selected  to  prove  that  I  have  forfeited  it. 
I  acted  with  the  full  knowledge  of  the  difficulties  I  had  to  encounter,  and 
the  responsibility  I  must  incur.     I  saw  a  great  and  powerful  party,  prob 
ably  the  most  powerful  in  the  country,  eagerly  seizing  on  the  catastrophe 
which  had  befallen  the    currency,  and  the  consequent   embarrassments 
that  followed,  to  displace  those  in  power,  against  whom  they  had  been 
long  contending.     I  saw  that,  to  stand  between  them  and  their  object,  I 
must  necessarily  incur  their   deep  and  lasting  displeasure.     I  also  saw 
that,  to  maintain  the  administration  in  the  position  they  had  taken,  to 
separate  the  government  from  the  banks,  I  would  draw  down  on  me,  with 
the  exception  of  some  of  the  Southern  banks,  the  whole  weight  of  that 
extensive,  concentrated,  and  powerful  interest — the  most  powerful  by  far 
of  any  in  the  whole   community  ;   and  thus  I  would  unite   against  me  a 
combination  of  political  and  moneyed  influence  almost  irresistible.     Nor 
was  this  all.     I  could  not  but  see  that,  however  pure  and  disinterested 
my  motives,  and  however  consistent  my  course  with  all  I  had  evor  said 
or  done,  I  should  be  exposed  to  the  very  charges  and  aspersions  which  I 
am  now  repelling.     The  ease  with  which  they  could  be  made,  and  the 
temptation  to  make  them,  I  saw  were   too   great  to  be  resisted  by  the 
'party  morality  of  the  day,  as  groundless  as  I  have  demonstrated  them  to 
be.     But  there  was  another  consequence  that  I  could  not  but  foresee,  far 
more  painful  to  me  than  all  others.     I  but  too  clearly  saw  that,  in  so  sud 
den  and  complex  a  juncture,  called  on  as  I  was  to  decide  on  my  course 
instantly,  as  it  were,  on  the  field  of  battle,  without  consultation  or  ex 
plaining  my  reasons,  I  would  estrange  for  a  time  many  of  my  political 
friends,  who  had  passed  through  with  me  so  many  trials  and  difficulties, 
and  for  whom  I. feel  a  brother's  love.     But  I  saw  before  me  the  path  of 
duty ;  and,  though  rugged,  and  hedged  on  all  sides  with  these  and  many 
other  difficulties,  I  did  not  hesitate  a  moment  to  take  it.     Yes,  alone,  as 
the  senator  sneeringly  says.     After  I  had  made  up  my  mind  as  to  my  course, 
in  a  conversation  with  a  friend  about  the  responsibility  I  would  assume, 
he  remarked  that  my  own  state  might  desert  me.     I  replied  that  it  was 
not  impossible  ;  but  the  result  has  proved  that  I  under-estimated  the  intel 
ligence  and  patriotism  of  my  virtuous  and  noble  state.     I  ask  her  pardon 


.  ^  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  325 

for  the  distrust  implied  in  my  answer  ;  but  I  ask,  with  assurance  it  will  be 
granted,  on  the  grounds  I  shall  put  it — that,  in  being  prepared  to  sacrifice 
her  confidence,  as  dear  to  me  as  light  and  life,  rather  than  disobey,  on 
this  great  question,  the  dictates  of  my  judgment  and  conscience,  I  proved 
myself  not  unworthy  of  being  her  representative. 

But  if  the  senator,  in  attributing  to  me  stern  fidelity,  meant,  not  devo 
tion  to  principle,  but  to  party,  and  especially  the  party  of  which  he  is  so 
prominent  a  member,  my  answer  is,  that  I  never  belonged  to  his  party, 
nor  owed  it  any  fidelity;  and,  of  course,  could  forfeit,  in  reference  to  it, 
£  no  character  for  fidelity.  It  is  true,  we  acted  in  concert  against  what  we 
•  believed  to  be  the  usurpations  of  the  executive ;  and  it  is  true  that,  during 
the  time,  I  saw  much  to  esteem  in  those  with  whom  I  acted,  and  con 
tracted  friendly  relations  with  many,  which  I  shall  not  be  the  first  to 
forget.  It  is  also  true  that  a  common  party  designation  was  applied  to 
the  opposition  in  the  aggregate,  not,  however,  with  my  approbation ;  but 
it  is  no  less  true  that  it  was  universally  known  that  it  consisted  of  two 
distinct  parties,  dissimilar  in  principle  and  policy,  except  in  relation  to 
the  object  for  which  they  had  united:  the  National  Republican  party,  and 
the  portion  of  the  State  Rights  party  which  had  separated  from  the  ad 
ministration,  on  the  ground  that  it  had  departed  from  the  true  principles 
of  the  original  party.  That  I  belonged  exclusively  to  that  detached  portion, 
and  to  neither  the  opposition  nor  administration  party,  I  prove  by  my  ex 
plicit  declaration,  contained  in  one  of  the  extracts  read  from  my  speech 
on  the  currency  in  1834*.  That  the  party  generally,  and  the  state  which 
I  represent  in  part,  stood  aloof  from  both  of  the  parties,  may  be  estab 
lished  from  the  fact  that  they  refused  to  mingle  in  the  party  and  political 
contests  of  the  day.  My  state  withheld  her  electoral  vote  in  two  succes 
sive  presidential  elections ;  and,  rather  than  bestow  it  on  either  the 
senator  from  Kentucky,  or  the  distinguished  citizen  whom  he  opposed, 
in  the  first  of  those  elections,  she  threw  her  vote  on  a  patriotic  citizen 
of  Virginia,  since  deceased,  of  her  own  politics,  but  who  was  not  a  can 
didate  5  and,  in  the  last,  she  refused  to  give  it  to  the  worthy  senator  from 
Tennessee  near  me  (Judge  White),  though  his  principles  and  views  of 
policy  approached  so  much  nearer  to  hers  than  that  of  the  party  to  which 
the  senator  from  Kentucky  belongs.  But,  suppose  the  fact  was  otherwise, 
and  that  the  two  parties  had  blended  so  as  to  form  one,  and  that  I  owed 
to  the  united  party  as  much  fidelity  as  I  do  to  that  to  which  I  exclusively 
belonged  ;  even  on  that  supposition,  no  conception  of  party  fidelity  could 
have  controlled  my  course  on  the  present  occasion.  I  am  not  among 
those  who  pay  no  regard  to  party  obligations ;  on  the  contrary,  I  place 
fidelity  to  party  among  the  political  virtues,  but  I  assign  to  it  a  limited 
sphere.  I  confine  it  to  matters  of  detail  and  arrangement,  and  to  minor 
questions  of  policy.  Beyond  that,  on  all  questions  involving  principles, 
or  measures  calculated  to  affect  materially  the  permanent  interests  of  the 
country,  I  look  only  to  God  and  country. 

And  here,  Mr.  President,  I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  to  declare 
my  present  political  position,  so  that  there  may  be  no  mistake  hereafter. 
I  belong  to  the  old  Republican  State  Rights  party  of  1798.  To  that,  and 
that  alone,  I  owe  fidelity,  and  by  that  I  shall  stand  through  every  change, 
and  in  spite  of  every  difficulty.  Its  creed  is  to  be  found  in  the  Kentucky 
Resolutions,  and  Virginia  Resolutions  and  Report ;  and  its  policy  is  to  con 
fine  the  action  of  this  government  within  the  narrowest  limits  compatible 
with  the  peace  and  security  of  these  states,  and  the  objects  for  which  the 
Union  was  expressly  formed.  I,  as  one  of  the  party,  shall  support  all  who 
support  its  principles  and  policy,  and  oppose  all  who  oppose  them.  I  have 
given,  and  shall  continue  to  give,  the  administration  a  hearty  and  sincere 


326  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

support  on  the  great  question  now  under  discussion ;  because  I  regard  it 
as  in  strict  conformity  to  our  creed  and  policy,  and  shall  do  everything 
in  my  power  to  sustain  them  under  the  great  responsibility  which  they 
have  assumed.  But  let  me  tell  those  who  are  more  interested  in  sustain 
ing  them  than  myself,  that  the  danger  which  threatens  them  lies  not  here, 
but  in  another  quarter.  This  measure  will  tend  to  uphold  them,  if  they 
stand  fast  and  adhere  to  it  with  fidelity.  But,  if  they  wish  to  know  where 
the  danger  is,  let  them  look  to  the  fiscal  department  of  the  government. 
I  said,  years  ago,  that  we  were  committing  an  error  the  reverse  of  the 
great  and  dangerous  one  that  was  committed  in  1828,  and  to  which  we 
owe  our  present  difficulties,  and  all  we  have  since  experienced.  Then, 
we  raised  the  revenue  greatly,  when  the  expenditures  were  about  to  be 
reduced  by  the  discharge  of  the  public  debt ;  and  now,  we  have  doubled 
the  disbursements,  when  the  revenue  is  rapidly  decreasing:  an  error  which, 
although  probably  not  so  fatal  to  the  country,  will  prove,  if  immediate  and 
vigorous  measures  be  not  adopted,  far  more  so  to  those  in  power.  The 
country  will  not,  and  ought  not,  to  bear  the  creation  of  a  new  debt  be 
yond  what  may  be  temporarily  necessary  to  meet  the  present  embarrass 
ment  j  and  any  attempt  to  increase  the  duties  must  and  ought  to  prove 
fatal  to  those  who  may  make  it,  so  long  as  the  expenditures  may,  by  econ 
omy  and  accountability,  be  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  revenue. 

But  the  senator  did  not  confine  his  attack  to  my  conduct  and  motives 
in  reference  to  the  present  question.  In  his  eagerness  to  weaken  the 
cause  I  support,  by  destroying  confidence  in  me,  he  made  an  indiscrimi 
nate  attack  on  my  intellectual  faculties,  which  he  characterized  as  meta 
physical,  eccentric,  too  much  of  genius,  and  too  little  common  sense,  and, 
of  course,  wanting  a  sound  and  practical  judgment. 

Mr.  President,  according  to  my  opinion,  there  is  nothing  of  which  those 
who  are  endowed  with  superior  mental  faculties  ought  to  be  more  cau 
tious  than  to  reproach  those  with  their  deficiency  to  whom  Providence 
has  been  less  liberal.  The  faculties  of  our  mind  are  the  immediate  gift 
of  our  Creator,  for  which  we  are  no  farther  responsible  than  for  their 
proper  cultivation,  according  to  our  opportunities,  and  their  proper  appli 
cation  to  control  and  regulate  our  actions.  Thus  thinking,  1  trust  I  shall 
be  the  last  to  assume  superiority  on  my  part,  or  reproach  any  one  with 
inferiority  on  his ;  but  those  who  do  not  regard  the  rule  when  applied  to 
others,  cannot  expect  it  to  be  observed  when  applied  to  themselves.  The 
critic  must  expect  to  be  criticized,  and  he  who  points  out  the  faults  of 
others,  to  have  his  own  pointed  out. 

I  cannot  retort  on  the  senator  the  charge  of  being  metaphysical.  I 
cannot  accuse  him  of  possessing  the  powers  of  analysis  and  generalization, 
those  higher  faculties  of  the  mind  (called  metaphysical  by  those  who  do 
not  possess  them)  which  decompose  and  resolve  into  their  elements  the 
complex  masses  of  ideas  that  exist  in  the  world  of  mind,  as  chemistry 
does  the  bodies  that  surround  us  in  the  material  world  ;  and  without  which 
those  deep  and  hidden  causes  which  are  in  constant  action,  and  producing 
such  mighty  changes  in  the  condition  of  society,  would  operate  unseen 
and  undetected.  The  absence  of  these  higher  qualities  of  mind  is  con 
spicuous  throughout  the  whole  course  of  the  senator's  public  life.  To 
this  it  may  be  traced  that  he  prefers  the  specious  to  the  solid,  and  the 
plausible  to  the  true.  To  the  same  cause,  combined  with  an  ardent  tem 
perament,  it  is  owing  that  we  ever  find  him  mounted  on  some  popular 
and  favourite  measure,  which  he  whips  along,  cheered  by  the  shouts  of 
the  multitude,  and  never  dismounts  till  he  has  rode  it  down.  Thus,  at 
one  time  we  find  him  mounted  on  the  protective  system,  which  he  rode 
down  ;  at  another,  on  internal  improvement ;  and  now  he  is  mounted  on 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  327 

a  bank,  which  will  surely  share  the  same  fate,  unless  those  who  are  im 
mediately  interested  shall  stop  him  in  his  headlong  career.  It  is  the  fault 
of  his  mind  to  seize  on  a  few  prominent  and  striking  advantages,  and  to 
pursue  them  eagerly,  without  looking  to  consequences.  Thus,  in  the  case 
of  the  protective  system,  he  was  struck  with  the  advantages  of  manufac 
tures;  and,  believing  that  high  duties  was  the  proper  mode  of  protecting 
them,  he  pushed  forward  the  system,  without  seeing  that  he  was  enriching 
one  portion  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of  the  other  j  corrupting  the 
one  and  alienating  the  other ;  and,  finally,  dividing  the  community  into 
two  great  hostile  interests,  which  terminated  in  the  overthrow  of  the 
system  itself.  So,  now,  he  looks  only  to  a  uniform  currency,  and  a  bank 
as  a  means  of  securing  it,  without  once  reflecting  how  far  the  banking 
system  has  progressed,  and  the  difficulties  that  impede  its  farther  prog 
ress  ;  that  banking  and  politics  are  running  together,  to  their  mutual  de 
struction  ;  and  that  the  only  possible  mode  of  saving  his  favourite  system 
is  to  separate  it  from  the  government. 

To  the  defects  of  understanding  which  the  senator  attributes  to  me,  I 
make  no  reply.  It  is  for  others,  and  not  me,  to  determine  the  portion  of 
understanding  which  it  has  pleased  the  Author  of  my  being  to  bestow  on 
me.  It  is,  however,  fortunate  for  me,  that  the  standard  by  which  I  shall 
be  judged  is  not  the  false,  prejudiced,  and,  as  I  have  shown,  unfounded 
opinion  which  the  senator  has  expressed,  but  my  acts.  They  furnish 
materials,  neither  few  nor  scant,  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  my  mental 
faculties.  I  have  now  been  more  than  twenty-six  years  continuously  in 
the  service  of  this  government,  in  various  stations,  and  have  taken  part  in 
almost  all  the  great  questions  which  have  agitated  this  country  during 
this  long  and  important  period.  Throughout  the  whole  I  have  never  fol 
lowed  events,  but  have  taken  my  stand  in  advance,  openly  and  freely, 
avowing  my  opinions  on  all  questions,  and  leaving  it  to  time  and  experi 
ence  to  condemn  or  approve  my  course.  Thus  acting,  I  have  often,  and 
on  great  questions,  separated  from  those  with  whom  I  usually  acted ;  and 
if  I  am  really  so  defective  in  sound  and  practical  judgment  as  the  senator 
represents,  the  proof,  if  to  be  found  anywhere,  must  be  found  in  such  in 
stances,  or  where  I  have  acted  on  my  sole  responsibility.  Now,  I  ask,  In 
which  of  the  many  instances  of  the  kind  is  such  proof  to  be  found  1  It  is 
not  my  intention  to  call  to  the  recollection  of  the  Senate  all  such ;  but 
that  you,  senators,  may  judge  for  yourselves,  it  is  due,  in  justice  to  my 
self,  that  I  should  suggest  a  few  of  the  most  prominent,  which  at  the  time 
were  regarded  as  the  senator  now  considers  the  present ;  and  then,  as 
now,  because,  where  duty  is  involved,  I  would  not  submit  to  party  tram 
mels. 

I  go  back  to  the  commencement  of  my  public  life,  the  war  session,  as 
it  was  usually  called,  of  1812,  when  I  first  took  my  seat  in  the  other 
house,  a  young  man  without  experience  to  guide  me,  and  I  shall  select, 
as  the  first  instance,  the  navy.  At  that  time,  the  administration  and  the 
party  to  which  1  was  strongly  attached  were  decidedly  opposed  to  this 
important  arm  of  service.  It  was  considered  anti-republican  to  support 
it ;  but  acting  with  my  then  distinguished  colleague,  Mr.  Cheves,  who  led 
the  way,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  give  it  my  hearty  support,  regardless  of 
party  ties.  Does  this  instance  sustain  the  charge  of  the  senator  1 

The  next  I  shall  select  is  the  restrictive  system  of  that  day  ;  the  em 
bargo,  the  Non-importation  and  Non-intercourse  Acts.  This,  too,  was  a 
party  measure,  which  had  been  long  and  warmly  contested,  and,  of  course, 
the  lines  of  party  well  drawn.  Young  and  inexperienced  as  I  was,  I  saw 
its  defects,  and  resolutely  opposed  it,  almost  alone  of  my  party.  The 
second  or  third  speech  I  made,  after  I  took  my  seat,  was  in  open  denim- 


328  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

elation  of  the  system ;  and  I  may  refer  to  the  grounds  I  then  assumed, 
the  truth  of  which  have  been  confirmed  by  time  and  experience,  with  pride 
and  confidence.  This  will  scarcely  be  selected  by  the  senator  to  make 
good  his  charge. 

I  pass  over  other  instances,  and  come  to  Mr.  Dallas's  bank  of  1814-15. 
That,  too,  was  a  party  measure.  Banking  was  then  comparatively  but 
little  understood,  and  it  may  seem  astonishing,  at  this  time,  that  such  a 
project  should  ever  have  received  any  countenance  or  support.  It  pro 
posed  to  create  a  bank  of  $50,000,000,  to  consist  almost  entirely  of  what 
was  called  then  the  war  stocks  ;  that  is,  the  public  debt  created  in  carry 
ing  on  the  then  war.  It  was  provided  that  the  bank  should  not  pay  spe 
cie  during  the  war,  and  for  three  years  after  its  termination,  for  carrying 
on  which  it  was  to  lend  the  government  the  funds.  In  plain  language, 
the  government  was  to  borrow  back  its  own  credit  from  the  bank,  and 
pay  to  the  institution  six  per  cent,  for  its  use.  I  had  scarcely  ever  be 
fore  seriously  thought  of  banks  or  banking,  but  I  clearly  saw  through  the 
operation,  and  the  danger  to  the  government  and  country  ;  and,  regardless 
of  party  ties  or  denunciations,  I  opposed  and  defeated  it  in  the  manner  I 
explained  at  the  extra  session.  I  then  subjected  myself  to  the  very  charge 
which  the  senator  now  makes  ;  but  time  has  done  me  justice,  as  it  will  in 
the  present  instance. 

Passing  the  intervening  instances,  I  come  down  to  my  administration 
of  the  war  department,  where  I  acted  on  my  own  judgment  and  respon 
sibility.  It  is  known  to  all  that  the  department,  at  the  time,  was  perfectly 
disorganized,  with  not  much  less  than  $50,000,000  of  outstanding  and  un 
settled  accounts,  and  the  greatest  confusion  in  every  branch  of  service. 
Though  without  experience,  I  prepared,  shortly  after  I  went  in,  the  bill 
for  its  organization,  and  on  its  passage  I  drew  up  the  body  of  rules  for 
carrying  the  act  into  execution,  both  of  which  remain  substantially  un 
changed  to  this  day.  After  reducing  the  outstanding  accounts  to  a  few 
millions,  and  introducing  order  and  accountability  in  every  branch  of  ser 
vice,  and  bringing  down  the  expenditure  of  the  army  from  four  to  two 
and  a  half  millions  annually,  without  subtracting  a  single  comfort  from 
either  officer  or  soldier,  I  left  the  department  in  a  condition  that  might 
well  be  compared  to  the  best  in  any  country.  If  I  am  deficient  in  the 
qualities  which  the  senator  attributes  to  me,  here  in  this  mass  of  details 
and  business  it  ought  to  be  discovered.  Will  he  look  to  this  to  make  good 
his  charge  1 

From  the  war  department  I  was  transferred  to  the  chair  which  you  now 
occupy.  How  I  acquitted  myself  in  the  discharge  of  its  duties,  I  leave  it 
to  the  body  to  decide,  without  adding  a  word.  The  station,  from  its 
leisure,  gave  me  a  good  opportunity  to  study  the  genius  of  the  prominent 
measure  of  the  day,  called  then  the  American  System,  of  which  I  profited. 
I  soon  perceived  where  its  errors  lay,  and  how  it  would  operate.  1  clearly 
saw  its  desolating  effects  in  one  section,  and  corrupting  influence  in  the 
other;  and  when  I  saw  that  it  could  not  be  arrested  here,  I  fell  back  on 
my  own  state,  and  a  blow  was  given  to  a  system  destined  to  destroy  our 
institutions,  if  not  overthrown,  which  brought  it  to  the  ground.  This 
brings  me  down  to  the  present  time,  and  where  passions  and  prejudices 
are  yet  too  strong  to  make  an  appeal  with  any  prospect  of  a  fair  and  im 
partial  verdict.  1  then  transfer  this,  and  all  my  subsequent  acts,  including 
the  present,  to  the  tribunal  of  posterity,  with  a  perfect  confidence  that 
nothing  will  be  found,  in  what  I  have  said  or  done,  to  impeach  my  integ 
rity  or  understanding. 

I  have  now,  senators,  repelled  the  attacks  on  me.  I  have  settled  the 
account  and  cancelled  the  debt  between  me  and  my  accuser.  I  have  not 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  329 

sought  this  controversy,  nor  have  I  shunned  it  when  forced  on  me.  I  have 
acted  on  the  defensive,  and  if  it  is  to  continue,  which  rests  with  the  sena 
tor,  I  shall  throughout  continue  so  to  act.  I  know  too  well  the  advan 
tage  of  my  position  to  surrender  it.  The  senator  commenced  the  con 
troversy,  and  it  is  but  right  that  he  should  be  responsible  for  the  direc 
tion  it  shall  hereafter  take.  Be  his  determination  what  it  may,  I  stand 
prepared  to  meet  him. 


XXII. 

SPEECU  IN  REPLY  TO  MR.  WEBSTER  ON  THE  SUB-TREASURY  BILL,  MARCH  22,  1838. 

MR.  PRESIDENT  :  After  having  addressed  the  Senate  twice,  I  should  owe  an 
apology,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  for  again  intruding  myself  on  its  pa 
tience.  But,  after  what  fell  from  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  nearest  to  me 
(Mr.  Webster),  the  other  day,  the  greater  part  of  which  was  not  only  directed 
against  my  arguments,  but  at  me  personally,  I  feel  that  my  silence,  and  not  my 
notice  of  his  remarks,  would  require  an  apology.  And  yet,  notwithstanding  I 
am  thus  constrained  again  to  address  the  Senate,  I  fear  it  will  be  impossible  to 
avoid  exciting  some  impatience,  fatigued  and  exhausted  as  it  must  be  by  so  long 
a  discussion  ;  to  prevent  which,  as  far  as  practicable,  I  shall  aim  at  as  much 
brevity  as  possible,  consistently  with  justice  to  myself  and  the  side  I  support. 

The  senator's  speech  was  long  and  multifarious,  consisting  of  many  parts, 
which  had  little  or  no  connexion  with  the  question  under  consideration.  For 
the  sake  of  brevity  and  distinctness,  I  propose  to  consider  it  under  four  heads. 
First,  his  preliminary  discourse,  which  treated  at  large  of  credits  and  banks, 
with  very  little  reference  to  the  subject.  Next,  his  arguments  on  the  question, 
at  issue  ;  and  that  to  be  followed  by  his  reply  to  my  arguments  at  this  and  the 
extra  session  ;  and,  finally,  his  conclusion,  which  was  appropriated  wholly  to 
personal  remarks,  and  a  comparison  between  his  and  my  public  course,  without 
having  the  slightest  relation  either  to  the  subject  or  anything  I  had  said  in  the 
debate,  but  which  the  senator  obviously  considered  as  the  most  important  por 
tion  of  his  speech.  He  devoted  one  day  almost  wholly  to  it,  and  delivered  him 
self  with  an  earnestness  and  vehemence  which  clearly  manifested  the  impor 
tance  which  he  had  attached  to  it.  I  shall,  as  in  duty  bound,  pay  my  respects 
first  to  that  which  so  manifestly  occupied  the  highest  place  in  his  estimation, 
though  standing  at  the  bottom  in  the  order  of  his  remarks. 

The  senator  opened  this  portion  of  his  speech  with  much  courtesy,  accom 
panied  by*  many  remarks  of  respect  arid  regard,  which  I  understood  to  be  an  in 
timation  that  he  desired  the  attack  he  was  about  to  make  to  be  attributed  to  po 
litical,  and  not  personal  motives.  I  accept  the  intimation,  and  shall  meet  him 
in  the  sense  he  intended.  Indeed,  there  never  has  been  between  the  senator 
and  myself  the  least  personal  difference,  nor  has  a  word  having  a  personal 
bearing  ever  passed  between  us  in  debate  prior  to  the  present  occasion,  with 
in  my  recollection,  during  the  long  period  we  have  been  in  public  life,  except 
on  the  discussion  of  the  Force  Bill  and  Proclamation ;  which,  considering  how 
often  we  have  stood  opposed  on  deep  and  exciting  questions,  may  be  regarded 
as  not  a  little  remarkable.  But  our  political  relations  have  not  been  on  as  good 
a  footing  as  our  personal.  He  seems  to  think  that  we  had  harmonized  not 
badly  till  1824,  when,  according  to  his  version,  I  became  too  sectional  for  him 
to  act  any  longer  with  me ;  but  which  I  shall  hereafter  show  originated  in  a 
very  different  cause.  My  impression,  I  must  say,  is  different,  very  different 
from  that  of  the  senator.  From  the  commencement  of  our  public  life  to  the 
present  time,  we  have  differed  on  almost  all  questions  involving  the  principles 

TT 


330  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  the  government  and  its  permanent  policy,  with  the  exception  of  a  short  inter 
val,  while  I  was  in  the  war  department,  when  the  senator  agreed  with  the  South 
on  the  protective  system  and  some  other  measures.  I  do  not  consider  our  cas 
ual  concert  during  the  last  few  years  of  the  late  administration,  when  we  were 
both  opposed  to  the  executive  power,  as  constituting  an  exception.  It  was  un 
derstood  that  we  both  adhered  to  our  principles  and  views  of  policy  without  the 
least  surrender,  and  our  personal  relations  were  formal  and  cold  during  the 
whole  period.  In  fact,  we  moved  in  entirely  different  spheres.  We  differed 
in  relation  to  the  origin  and  character  of  the  government,  the  principles  on 
which  it  rested,  and  the  policy  it  ought  to  pursue  ;  and  I  could  not  at  all  sym 
pathize  with  the  grave  and  deep  tone  with  which  the  senator  pronounced  our 
final  separation,  as  he  was  pleased  to  call  it,  and  which,  in  my  opinion,  would 
liave  been  much  more  appropriate  to  the  separation  of  those  who  had  been  long 
and  intimately  united  in^the  support  of  the  same  principles  and  policy,  than  to 
the  slight  and  casual  relations,  personal  and  political,  which  had  existed  be 
tween  us.  rv^v 

Setting,  then,  aside  all  personal  motives,  I  may  well  ask,  What  political  grief, 
•what  keen  disappointment  is  it,  which  at  this  time  could  induce  him  to  make 
the  attack  he  has  on  me,  and,  I  might  add,  in  the  manner  in  which  he  made  it  ? 
The  senator  himself  shall  answer  the  question.  He  has  unfolded  the  cause  of 
his  grief,  and  pointed  to  the  source  of  his  disappointment.  He  told  us  that 
"  victory  wras  within  reach,  and  my  co-operation  only  was  wanted  to  prostrate 
forever  those  in  power."  These  few  words  are  a  volume.  They  disclose  all. 
Yes,  victory  was  within  reach,  the  arm  outstretched,  the  hand  expanded  to  seize 
it,  and  I  would  not  co-operate.  Hence  the  grief,  hence  the  keen  disappoint 
ment,  and  hence  the  waters  of  bitterness  that  have  rolled  their  billows  against 
me.  And  what  a  victory !  Not  simply  the  going  out  of  one  party  and  the 
coming  in  of  another ;  not  merely  the  expulsion  of  the  administration,  and  the 
induction  of  the  opposition  ;  but  a  great  political  revolution,  carrying  with  it  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  government  and  a  permanent  change  of  policy. 
It  would  have  brought  in,  not  only  the  senator  and  his  party,  but  their  political 
creed,  as  announced  by  him  in  the  discussion  on  the  Proclamation  and  Force 
Bill,  with  which  he  now  taunts  those  in  power — a  fact  to  be  noted  and  remem 
bered.  He,  the  champion  of  those  measures,  against  whom  I  contended  foot 
to  foot  for  one  entire  session,  now  casts  up  to  me,  that  in  refusing  to  co-operate 
"with  him,  I  protect  the  party  in  power,  not  a  small  portion  of  whom,  I  have  good 
reason  to  believe,  were  drawn  by  the  adverse  current  of  the  times  reluctantly 
from  their  own  principles  to  the  support  of  those  measures,  and  with  it  the  sen 
ator  and  his  principles.  Yes,  I  repeat,  it  would  have  brought  in  the  senator 
and  his  consolidation  doctrines,  which  regard  this  government  as  one  great  Na 
tional  Republic,  with  the  right  to  construe  finally  and  conclusively  the  extent 
of  its  own  powers,  and  to  enforce  its  construction  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet ; 
doctrines  which  at  a  blow  sweep  away  every  vestige  of  state  rights,  and  re 
duce  the  states  to  mere  petty  and  dependant  corporations.  It  would  also  have 
brought  in  his  policy — bank,  tariff,  and  all.  Even  now,  when  victory  is  still  un 
certain,  the  senator  announces  the  approach  of  the  period  when  he  shall  move 
the  renewal  of  the  protective  system :  a  precious  confession,  that  dropped  out 
in  the  heat  of  discussion. 

[Mr.  Webster  :  "  No,  I  spoke  deliberately."] 

So  much,  then,  the  worse.  That  justifies  all  I  have  said  and  done ;  that 
proves  my  foresight  and  firmness,  and  will  open  the  eyes  of  thousands,  espe 
cially  in  the  South,  who  have  heretofore  doubted  the  correctness  of  my  course 
on  this  question. 

'The  victory  would  not  only  have  been  complete  had  I  co-operated,  but  it 
would  also  have  been  permanent.  The  portion  of  the  State  Rights  party  with 
which  I  acted  would  have  been  absorbed — yes,  absorbed  ;  it  is  the  proper  word, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  331 

and  I  use  it  in  spite  of  the  sarcasm  of  the  senator.  The  other  would  have  been 
scattered  and  destroyed,  and  the  senator  and  his  party,  and  their  principles  and 
policy,  would  have  been  left  undisputed  masters  of  the  field,  unresisted  and  ir 
resistible.  The  first  fruits  of  the  victory  would  have  been  the  reunion  of  the 
political  and  money  power — a  wedded  union,  never  more  to  be  dissolved.  The 
tariff  would  have  been  renewed — I  may  now  speak  positively,  after  the  declara 
tion  of  the  senator — to  be  again  followed  by  an  overflowing  revenue,  profuse  and 
corrupt  expenditures,  heavy  surplus,  and  overwhelming  patronage,  which  would 
have  closed  the  door  to  wealth  and  distinction  to  all  who  refused  to  bend  the 
knee  at  the  shrine  of  the  combined  powers.  All  this  was  seen  and  fully  com 
prehended  by  the  senator  ;  and  hence  again,  I  repeat,  his  deep  grief,  his  keen 
disappointment,  and  his  attacks  on  me  for  refusing  to  co-operate. 

The  senator  must  have  known  that,  in  refusing,  I  acted  on  principles  and 
opinions  long  entertained  and  fully  declared  years  ago.  In  my  reply  to  his  as 
sociate  in  this  joint  war  on  me,  in  which  I  am  attacked  at  once  in  front  and  rear, 
I  demonstrated,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Senate,  the  truth  of  what  I  assert  so 
completely,  that  the  senator's  associate  did  not  even  attempt  a  denial.  And 
yet,  such  is  the  depth  of  the  senator's  grief  and  disappointment,  that  it  hurried 
him  to  a  repetition  of  exploded  charges,  which,  in  his  cooler  moments,  he  must 
know  to  be  unfounded.  He  repeated  the  stale  and  refuted  charge  of  a  somer 
set,  of  going  over,  and  of  being  struck  with  a  sudden  thought ;  and  summoned 
up  all  his  powers  of  irony  and  declamation,  of  which  he  proved  himself  to  be  a 
great  master  on  the  occasion,  to  make  my  Edgefield  letter,  in  which  I  assigned 
my  reason  for  refusing  to  co-operate,  ridiculous.  I  see  in  all  this  but  the  dis 
appointed  hopes  of  one  who  had  fixed  his  gaze  intensely  on  power  that  had 
eluded  his  grasp,  and  who  sought  to  wreak  his  resentment  on  him  who  had  re 
fused  to  put  the  splendid  prize  in  his  hands.  He  resorted  to  ridicule,  because 
it  was  the  only  weapon  that  truth  and  justice  left  him.  He  well  knows  how 
much  deeper  are  the  wounds  that  they  inflict  than  the  slight  punctures  that  the 
pointed,  but  feeble,  shafts  of  ridicule  leave  behind  ;  and  he  used  the  more  harm 
less  weapon  only  because  he  could  not  command  the  more  deadly.  That  is  in 
my  hand.  I  brandish  it  in  his  eyes.  It  is  the  only  one  I  need,  and  I  intend  to 
use  it  freely  on  this  occasion. 

After  pouring  out  his  wailing  in  such  doleful  tones  because  I  would  not  co 
operate  in  placing  him  and  his  party  in  power,  and  prostrating  my  own,  the  sen 
ator  next  attacks  me  because  I  stated  in  my  Edgefield  letter,  as  I  understood 
him,  that  I  rallied  on  General  Jacksen  with  the  view  of  putting  down  the  tariff 
by  executive  influence.  I  have  looked  over  that  letter  with  care,  and  can  find 
no  such  expression.  [Mr.  Webster  :  "  It  was  used  at  the  extra  session."]  I  was 
about  to  add,  that  I  had  often  used  it,  and  cannot  but  feel  surprised  that  the  sen 
ator  should  postpone  the  notice  of  it  till  this  late  period,  if  he  thought  it  deserv 
ing  reply.  Why  did  he  not  reply  to  it  years  ago,  when  I  first  used  it  in  debate  ? 
But  the  senator  asked  what  I  meant  by  executive  influence.  Did  I  mean  his 
veto  ?  He  must  have  asked  the  question  thoughtlessly.  He  must  know  that 
the  veto  can  only  apply  to  bills  on  their  passage,  and  could  not  possibly  be  used 
in  case  of  existing  laws,  such  as  the  tarifY  acts.  He  also  asked  if  there  was 
concert  in  putting  down  the  tariff  between  myself  and  the  present  chief  magis 
trate.  I  reply  by  asking  him  a  question,  to  which,  as  a  New-England  man,  he 
cannot  object.  He  has  avowed  his  determination,  in  a  certain  contingency, 
which  he  thinks  is  near,  that  he  will  move  the  renewal  of  the  tariff.  I  ask,  Is 
there  concert  on  that  point  between  him  and  his  associate  in  this  attack? 
And,  finally,  he  asks  if  I  disclosed  my  motives  then.  Yes :  I  am  not  in  the 
habit  of  disguising  them.  I  openly  and  constantly  avowed  that  it  was  one  of 
my  leading  reasons  in  supporting  General  Jackson,  because  I  expected  he  would 
use  his  influence  to  effect  a  gradual,  but  thorough  reduction  of  the  tariff,  that 
would  reduce  the  system  to  the  revenue  point ;  and  when  I  saw  reason  to  doubt 


332  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

whether  he  would  accomplish  what  I  deem  so  important,  I  did  not  wait  the 
event  of  his  election,  but  moved  openly  and  boldly  in  favour  of  state  interposition 
as  a  certain  remedy,  which  would  not  fail  to  effect  the  reduction,  in  the  event 
he  should  disappoint  me. 

The  senator,  after  despatching  my  letter,  concluded  his  speech  by  volunteer 
ing  a  comparison  between  his  and  my  public  character,  not  very  flattering  to 
me,  but  highly  complimentary  to  himself.  He  represented  me  as  sectional ;  in 
the  habit  of  speaking  constantly  of  the  unconstitutional  and  oppressive  opera 
tions  of  the  tariff,  which  he  thought  very  unpatriotic ;  of  having  certain  sinister 
objects  in  view  in  calling  on  the  South  to  unite,  and  of  marching  off  under  the 
State  Rights  banner,  while  he  paints  himself  in  the  most  glowing  and  opposite 
colours.  There  is,  Mr.  President,  no  disputing  about  taste ;  such  are  the  ef 
fects  of  a  difference  of  organization  and  education,  that  what  is  offensive  to  one 
is  often  agreeable  to  another.  According  to  my  conception,  nothing  can  be 
more  painful  than  to  pronounce  .our  own  praise,  particularly  in  contrast  with 
another,  even  when  forced  to  do  so  in  self-defence ;  but  how  one  can  rise  in 
his  place  when  neither  his  motive  nor  his  conduct  is  impeached,  and  when 
there  is  nothing  in  the  question  or  previous  discussion  that  could  possibly  jus 
tify  it,  and  pronounce  a  eulogy  on  himself,  which  a  modest  man  would  blush 
to  pronounce  on  a  Washington  or  a  Franklin  to  his  face,  is  to  me  utterly  in 
comprehensible.  But  if  the  senator,  in  pronouncing  his  gorgeous  piece  of  au 
tobiography,  had  contented  himself  in  simply  proclaiming,  in  his  deep  tone,  to 
the  Senate  and  the  assembled  multitude  of  spectators,  that  he  came  into  Con 
gress  as  the  representative  of  the  American  people  ;  that  if  he  was  born  for  any 
good,  it  was  for  the  good  of  the  whole  people,  and  the  defence  of  the  Constitu 
tion  ;  that  he  habitually  acted  as  if  acting  in  the  eyes  of  the  framers  of  the  Con 
stitution  ;  that  it  would  be  easier  to  drive  these  pillars  from  their  bases  than  to 
drive  or  seduce  him  from  his  lofty  purpose ;  that  he  would  do  nothing  to  weak 
en  the  brotherly  love  between  these  states,  and  everything  that  they  should  re 
main  united,  beneficially  and  thoroughly,  forever,  I  would  have  gazed  in  silent 
wonder  without  uttering  a  word  at  the  extraordinary  spectacle,  and  the  happy 
self-delusion  in  which  he  seems  to  exist.  But  when  he  undertook,  not  only  to 
erect  an  image  to  himself,  as  an  object  of  self-adoration,  but  to  place  alongside 
of  it  a  carved  figure  of  myself,  with  distorted  limbs  and  features,  to  heighten 
and  render  more  divine  his  own  image,  he  invited,  he  challenged,  nay,  he  com 
pelled  me  to  inquire  into  the  high  qualities  which  he  arrogates  to  himself,  and 
the  truth  of  the  comparison  which  he  has  drawn  between  us.  If  the  inquiry 
should  excite  some  reminiscences  not  very  agreeable  to  the  senator,  or  disturb 
the  happy  self-delusion  in  which  he  reposes,  he  must  not  blame  me,  but  his 
own  self-sufficiency  and  boasting  at  my  expense. 

"  Know  yourself"  is  an  ancient  maxim,  the  wisdom  of  which  I  never  before 
so  fully  realized.  How  imperfectly  even  the  talented  and  intelligent  know 
themselves  !  Our  understanding,  like  our  eyes,  seems  to  be  given,  not  to  see  our 
own  features,  but  those  of  others.  How  diffident  we  ought  to  be  of  any  favour 
able  opinion  that  we  may  have  formed  of  ourselves  !  That  one  of  the  distin 
guished  abilities  of  the  senator,  and  his  mature  age,  should  form  so  erroneous 
an  opinion  of  his  real  character,  is  indeed  truly  astonishing.  I  do  not  deny 
that  he  possesses  many  excellent  qualities.  My  object  is  truth,  and  I  intend 
neither  to  exaggerate  nor  detract.  But  I  must  say  that  the  character  which  he 
attributes  to  himself  is  wholly  unlike  that  which  really  belongs  to  him.  So  far 
from  that  universal  and  ardent  patriotism  which  knows  neither  place  nor  person, 
that  he  ascribes  to  himself,  he  is,  above  all  the  distinguished  public  men  with 
whom  I  am  acquainted,  remarkable  for  a  devoted  attachment  to  the  interest,  the 
institutions,  and  the  place  where  Providence  has  cast  his  lot.  I  do  not  cen 
sure  him  for  his  local  feelings.  The  Author  of  our  being  never  intended  that 
creatures  of  our  limited  faculties  should  embrace  with  equal  intenseness  of  af- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  333 

fection  the  remote  and  the  near.  Such  an  organization  would  lead  us  con 
stantly  to  intermeddle  with  what  we  would  but  imperfectly  understand,  and  of 
ten  to  do  mischief  where  we  intended  good.  But  the  senator  is  far  from  being 
liable  to  such  a  charge.  His  affections,  instead  of  being  too  wide  and  bound 
less,  are  too  concentrated.  As  local  as  his  attachment  is,  it  does  not  embrace 
all  within  its  limited  scope.  It  takes  in  but  a  class  even  there — powerful,  in 
fluential,  and  intelligent,  but  still  a  class  which  influences  and  controls  all  his 
actions,  and  so  absorbs  his  affections  as  to  make  him  overlook  large  portions  of 
the  Union,  of  which  I  propose  to  give  one  or  two  striking  illustrations. 

I  must,  then,  remind  the  senator  that  there  is  a  vast  extent  of  our  wide-spread 
Union,  which  lies  south  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  distinguished  by  its  pecu 
liar  soil,  climate,  situation,  institutions,  and  productions,  which  he  has  never 
encircled  within  the  warm  embraces  of  his  universal  patriotism.  As  long  as 
he  has  been  in  public  life,  he  has  not,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  given  a 
single  vote  to  promote  its  interest,  or  done  an  act  to  defend  its  rights.  I  wish 
not  to  do  him  injustice.  If  I  could  remember  a  single  instance,  I  would  cite  it ; 
but  I  cannot,  in  casting  my  eyes  over  his  whole  course,  call  to  mind  one.  As 
boundless  arid  ardent,  then,  as  is  his  patriotism,  according  to  his  own  account, 
it  turns  out  that  it  is  limited  by  metes  and  bounds,  that  exclude  nearly  one  half 
of  the  whole  Union ! 

But  it  may  be  said  that  this  total  absence  of  all  manifestation  of  attachment 
to  an  entire  section  of  the  Union  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  want  of  an  ardent 
desire  to  promote  its  interest  and  security,  but  of  occasion  to  exhibit  it.  Unfor 
tunately  for  the  senator,  such  an  excuse  is  without  foundation.  Opportunities 
are  daily  and  hourly  offering.  The  section  is  the  weakest  of  the  two,  and  its 
peculiar  interest  and  institutions  expose  it  constantly  to  injustice  arid  oppression, 
which  afford  many  and  fine  opportunities  to  display  that  generous  and  noble  pa 
triotism  which  the  senator  attributes  to  himself,  and  which  delights  in  taking  the 
side  of  the  assailed  against  the  assailant.  Even  now,  at  this  moment,  there  is  an 
opportunity  which  one  professing  such  ardent  and  universal  attachment  to  the 
whole  country  as  the  senator  professes  would  greedily  embrace.  A  war  is 
now,  and  has  been  systematically  and  fiercely  carried  on,  in  violation  of  the 
Constitution,  against  a  long-standing  and  widely-extended  institution  of  that 
section,  that  is  indispensable,  not  only  to  its  prosperity,  but  to  its  safety  and  ex 
istence,  and  which  calls  loudly  on  every  patriot  to  raise  his  voice  and  arm  in 
its  defence.  How  has  the  senator  acted  ?  Has  he  raised  his  mighty  arm  in 
defence  of  the  assailed,  or  thundered  forth  his  denunciation  against  the  assail 
ants  ?  These  are  searching  questions.  They  test  the  truth  of  his  universal 
and  boasted  attachment  to  the  whole  country ;  and  in  order  that  the  Senate  may 
compare  his  acts  with  his  professions,  I  propose  to  present  more  fully  the  facts 
of  the  case,  and  his  course. 

It  is  well  known,  then,  that  the  section  to  which  I  refer  is  inhabited  by  two 
races,  from  different  continents,  and  descended  from  different  stocks  ;  and  that 
they  have  existed  together  under  the  present  relation  from  the  first  settlement 
of  the  country.  It  is  also  well  known  that  the  ancestors  of  the  senator's  con 
stituents  (I  include  the  section)  brought  no  small  portion  of  the  ancestors  of  the 
African,  or  inferior  race,  from  their  native  home  across  the  ocean,  and  sold  them 
as  slaves  to  the  ancestors  of  our  constituents,  and  pocketed  the  price,  and  prof 
ited  greatly  by  the  traffic.  It  is  also  known,  that  when  the  Constitution  was 
formed,  our  section  felt  much  jealousy  lest  the  powers  which  it  conferred 
should  be  used  to  interfere  with  the  relations  existing  between  the  two  races ; 
to  allay  which,  and  induce  our  ancestors  to  enter  the  Union,  guards,  that  were 
deemed  effectual  against  the  supposed  danger,  were  insertedxin  the  instrument. 
It  is  also  known  that  the  product  of  the  labour  of  the  inferior  race  has  furnished 
the  basis  of  our  widely-extended  commerce  and  ample  revenue,  which  has 
supported  the  government,  and  diffused  wealth  and  prosperity  through  the  other 


334  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

section.  This  is  one  side  of  the  picture.  Let  us  now  turn  and  look  at  the 
other. 

How  has  the  other  section  acted  ?  I  include  not  all,  nor  a  majority.  We 
have  had  recent  proof,  during  the  discussion  of  the  resolutions  I  offered  at  the 
commencement  of  the  session,  to  what  great  extent  just  and* patriotic  feelings 
exist  in  that  quarter,  in  reference  to  the  subject  under  consideration.  I  then 
narrow  the  question,  and  ask,  How  has  the  majority  of  the  senator's  constituents 
acted,  and  especially  a  large  portion  of  his  political  supporters  and  admirers  ? 
Have  they  respected  the  title  to  our  property,  which  we  trace  back  to  their  an 
cestors,  and  which,  in  good  faith  and  equity,  carries  with  it  an  implied  warranty, 
that  binds  them  to  defend  and  protect  our  rights  to  the  property  sold  us  ? 
Have  they  regarded  their  faith  plighted  to  us  on  entering  into  the  constitutional 
compact  which  formed  the  Union,  to  abstain  from  interfering  with  our  property, 
and  to  defend  and  protect  us  in  its  quiet  enjoyment  ?  Have  they  acted  as  those 
ought  who  have  participated  so  largely  in  the  profits  derived  from  our  labour  ? 
No ;  they  are  striving  night  and  day,  in  violation  of  justice,  plighted  faith,  and 
the  Constitution,  to  divest  us  of  our  property,  to  reduce  us  to  the  level  of  those 
whom  they  sold  to  us  as  slaves,  and  to  overthrow  an  institution  on  which  our 
safety  depends. 

I  come  nearer  home.  How  has  the  senator  himself  acted  1  He  who  has 
such  influence  and  weight  with  his  constituents,  and  who  boasts  of  his  univer 
sal  patriotism  and  brotherly  love  and  affection  for  the  whole  Union  ?  Has  he 
raised  his  voice  to  denounce  this  crying  injustice,  or  his  arm  to  arrest  the  blow 
of  the  assailant,  which  threatens  to  dissever  the  Union,  and  forever  alienate 
one  half  of  the  community  from  the  other  ?  Has  he  uttered  a  word  in  condem 
nation  of  violated  faith,  or  honour  trampled  in  the  dust  ?  No  ;  he  has  sat  quiet 
ly  in  his  place,  without  moving  a  ringer  or  raising  his  voice.  Without  raising- 
his  voice  did  I  say?  I  mistake.  His  voice  has  been  raised,  not  for  us,  but 
for  our  assailants.  His  arm  has  been  raised,  not  to  arrest  the  aggressor,  but  to 
open  the  doors  of  this  chamber,  in  order  to  give  our  assailants  an  entrance  here, 
•where  they  may  aim  the  most  deadly  blow  against  the  safety  of  the  Union,  and 
our  tranquillity  and  security.  He  has  thrown  the  mantle,  not  of  protection,  over 
the  Constitution,  but  over  the  motive  and  character  of  those  whose  daily  avoca 
tion  is  to  destroy  every  vestige  of  brotherly  love  between  these  states,  and  to 
convert  the  Union  into  a  curse  instead  of  a  blessing.  He  has  done  more. 
The  whole  Senate  have  seen  him  retire  from  his  seat  to  avoid  a  vote  on  one  of 
the  resolutions  that  I  moved,  with  a  view  to  rally  the  patriotic  of  every  portion  of 
the  community  against  this  fell  spirit,  which  threatens  to  dissolve  the  Union, 
and  turn  the  brotherly  love  and  affection  in  which  it  originated  into  deadly  hate  ; 
which  was  so  obviously  true  that  he  could  not  vote  against  it,  but  which  he  dodg 
ed,  rather  than  throw  his  weight  on  our  side,  and  against  our  assailants.  And 
yet,  while  these  things  are  fresh  in  our  recollection,  notorious,  known  to  all,  the 
senator  rises  in  his  place,  and  proclaims  aloud  that  he  comes  in  as  the  repre 
sentative  of  the  United  States ;  that,  if  he  was  born  for  any  good,  it  was  for  the 
good  of  the  whole  people,  and  the  defence  of  the  Constitution  ;  that  he  always 
acts  as  if  under  the  eyes  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  ;  that  it  would  be  easier 
to  drive  these  pillars  from  their  bases  than  him  from  his  lofty  purpose  ;  that  he 
will  do  nothing  to  destroy  the  brotherly  love  between  these  states,  and  every 
thing  that  the  Union  may  exist  forever,  beneficially  and  thoroughly  for  all ! 
What  a  contrast  between  profession  and  performance  !  What  strange  and  extra^ 
ordinary  self-delusion. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  instance.  There  is  another,  in  which  the  contrast  be 
tween  the  course  of  the  senator  and  his  lofty  pretension  of  unbounded  and  ar 
dent  patriotism  is  not  less  astonishing.  I  refer  to  the  protective  tariff,  and  his 
memorable  and  inconsistent  course  in  relation  to  it. 

Its  history  may  be  told  in  a  few  words.     It  rose  subsequent  to  the  late  war 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  335 

with  Great  Britain.  The  senator's  associate  in  this  attack  was  its  leading  sup 
porter  and  author.  Its  theory  rested  on  the  principle,  that  all  articles  which 
could  be  made  in  our  country  should  be  protected ;  and  it  was  an  axiom  of  the 
system,  that  its  perfection  consisted  in  prohibiting  the  introduction  of  all  such 
articles  from  abroad.  To  give  the  restrictions  on  commerce  necessary  to  effect 
its  object  a  plausible  appearance,  they  were  said  to  be  for  the  protection  of  home 
industry,  and  the  system  itself  received  the  imposing  name  of  the  American 
System.  Its  effects  were  desolating  in  the  staple  states.  The  heavy  duties 
imposed  on  their  foreign  exchanges  left  scarcely  enough  to  the  planter  to  feed 
and  clothe  his  slaves  and  educate  his  children,  while  wealth  and  prosperity 
bloomed  around  the  favoured  portion  of  the  Union. 

The  senator  was  at  first  opposed  to  the  system.  As  far  back  as  the  autumn 
of  1820,  he  delivered  a  speech  to  the  citizens  of  Boston,  in  Faneuil  Hall,  in 
opposition  to  it,  in  which  he  questioned  its  constitutionality,  and  denounced  its 
inequality  and  oppression. 

His  speech  was  followed  by  a  series  of  resolutions  imbodying  the  substance 
of  what  he  had  said,  and  which  received  the  sanction  of  himself  and  constitu 
ents,  who,  at  that  time,  were  less  interested  in  manufactures  than  in  commerce 
and  navigation,  which  suffered  in  common  with  the  great  staple  interests  of  the 
South.  I  ask  the  secretary  to  read  the  resolutions  : 

["  Resolved,  That  no  objection  ought  ever  to  be  made  to  any  amount  of  taxes 
equally  apportioned,  and  imposed  for  the  purpose  of  raising  revenue  necessary 
for  the  support  of  government ;  but  that  taxes  imposed  on  the  people  for  the 
sole  benefit  of  any  class  of  men,  are  equally  inconsistent  with  the  principles  of 
our  Constitution,  and  with  sound  judgment. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  supposition  that  until  the  supposed  tariff,  or  some  simi 
lar  measure,  be  adopted,  we  are,  and  shall  be  dependant  on  foreigners  for  the 
means  of  subsistence  and  defence,  is,  in  our  opinion,  altogether  fallacious  and 
fanciful,  and  derogatory  to  the  character  of  the  nation. 

"  Resolved,  That  high  bounties  on  such  domestic  manufactures  as  are  prin 
cipally  benefited  by  that  tariff,  favour  great  capitalists  rather  than  personal  in 
dustry,  or  the  owners  of  small  capitals,  and  therefore  that  we  do  not  perceive 
its  tendency  to  promote  national  industry. 

"  Resolved,  That  we  are  equally  incapable  of  discovering  its  beneficial  ef 
fects  on  agriculture,  since  the  obvious  consequence  of  its  Adoption  would  be,  that 
the  farmer  must  give  more  than  he  now  does  for  all  he  buys,  and  receive  less 
for  all  he  sells. 

"  Resolved,  That,  in  our  opinion,  the  proposed  tariff,  and  the  principles  on 
which  it  is  avowedly  formed,  would,  if  adopted,  have  a  tendency,  however  dif 
ferent  may  be  the  motives  of  those  who  recommend  them,  to  diminish  the  in 
dustry,  impede  the  prosperity,  and  corrupt  the  morals  of  the  people."] 

What  can  be  more  explicit  or  decided  ?  They  hold  the  very  sentiments  and 
language  which  I  have  so  often  held  on  this  floor.  That  very  system  was  then 
pronounced  to  be  unconstitutional,  unequal,  and  oppressive,  and  corrupting  in 
its  effects,  by  the  senator  and  his  constituents,  for  pronouncing  which  now  he 
accuses  me  of  being  sectional,  and  holding  language  having  a  mischievous  ef 
fect  on  the  rising  generation. 

Four  years  after  this,  in  April,  1824,  the  senator  delivered  another  speech 
against  the  system,  in  reply  to  the  then  speaker,  and  now  his  associate  on  this 
occasion,  in  which  he  again  denounced  the  inequality  and  oppression  of  the 
system  with  equal  force,  in  one  of  the  ablest  arguments  ever  delivered  on  the 
subject,  and  in  which  he  completely  demolished  the  reasons  of  his  then  oppo 
nent.  But  an  event  was  then  fast  approaching  which  was  destined  to  work  a 
mighty  and  sudden  revolution  in  his  views  and  feelings.  A  few  months  after, 
the  presidential  election  took  place  ;  Mr.  Adams  was  elected  by  the  co-opera 
tion  of  the  author  of  the  American  System,  and  the  now  associate  of  the  sena- 


336  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALKOUN. 

tor.  Those  who  had  been  enemies  came  together.  New  political  combina 
tions  were  formed,  and  the  result  was  a  close  alliance  between  the  East  and 
the  West,  of  which  that  system  formed  the  basis.  A  new  light  bursted  in  on 
the  senator.  A  sudden  thought  struck  him,  but  not  quite  as  disinterested  as 
that  of  the  German  sentimentalist.  He  made  a  complete  somerset,  heels  over 
head  ;  went  clear  over ;  deserted  the  free-trade  side  in  a  twinkling,  and  joined 
the  restrictive  policy,  and  then  cried  out  that  he  could  no  longer  act  with  me, 
whom  he  had  left  standing  where  he  had  just  stood,  because  I  was  too  section 
al  !  At  once  everything  the  senator  had  ever  said  or  done  was  forgotten — en 
tirely  expunged  from  the  tablets  of  his  memory.  His  whole  nature  was  changed 
in  an  instant,  and  thereafter  no  measure  of  protection  was  too  strong  for  his 
palate.  With  a  few  contortions  and  slight  choking,  he  even  gulped  down,  a  few 
years  after,  the  bill  of  abomination — the  tariff  of  1828 — a  measure  which  raised 
the  duties  so  high  as  to  pass  one  half  of  the  aggregate  amount  in  value  of  the 
whole  imports  into  the  public  treasury.  I  desire  it  to  be  noted  and  remembered 
that,  out  of  an  importation  of  sixty-four  millions  of  dollars,  including  every  de 
scription  of  imports,  the  free  and  dutied  articles,  the  government  took  for  its 
share  thirty-two  millions  under  the  tariff  of  1828  ;  and  that  the  senator,  yes,  he, 
the  defender  of  the  Constitution  and  equal  protector  of  every  section  and  inter 
est,  voted  for  that  measure,  notwithstanding  his  recent  denunciation  of  the  sys 
tem  as  unconstitutional,  unequal,  and  oppressive  !  But  he  did  more,  and  things 
still  more  surprising,  as  the  sequel  will  show. 

The  protective  tariff  did  not  change  the  character  of  its  operation  with  the 
change  of  the  senator.  Its  oppressive  and  corrupting  effects  grew  with  its 
growth,  till  the  burden  became  intolerable  under  the  tariff  of  1828.  Desolation 
spread  itself  over  the  entire  staple  region.  Its  commercial  cities  were  de 
serted.  Charleston  parted  with  its  last  ship,  and  grass  grew  in  her  once  busy 
streets.  The  political  condition  of  the  country  presented  a  prospect  not  less 
dreary.  A  deep  and  growing  conflict  between  the  two  great  sections  agitated 
the  whole  country,  and  a  vast  revenue,  beyond  its  most  extravagant  wants,  gave 
the  government,  especially  the  executive  branch,  boundless  patronage  and  power, 
which  were  rapidly  changing  the  character  of  the  government,  and  spreading 
corruption  far  and  wide  through  every  condition  of  society.  Something  must 
be  done,  and  that  promptly.  Every  hope  of  reformation,  or  change  through  this 
government,  had  vanished.  The  absorbing  force  of  the  system  had  drawn  into 
its  support  a  fixed  majority  in  the  community,  which  controlled,  irresistibly, 
every  department  of  the  government.  But  one  hope  was  left  short  of  revolu 
tion,  and  that  was  in  the  states  themselves,  in  their  sovereign  capacity  as  par 
ties  to  the  constitutional  compact.  Fortunately  for  the  country  and  our  institu 
tions,  one  of  the  members  of  the  Union  was  found  bold  enough  to  interpose  her 
sovereign  authority,  and  declare  the  protective  tariff  that  had  caused  all  this 
mischief,  and  threatened  so  much  more,  to  be  unconstitutional,  and  therefore 
pull  and  void,  and  of  no  effect  within  her  limits  ;  and  thus  an  issue  was  formed, 
which  brought  events  to  a  crisis. 

We  all  remember  what  followed.  The  government  prepared  to  assert  by 
force  its  usurped  powers.  The  Proclamation  was  issued,  and  the  war  message 
and  Force  Bill  followed,  and  the  state  armed  to.maintain  her  constitutional  rights. 
How,  now,  I  ask,  did  the  senator  act  in  this  fearful  crisis ;  he  who  had,  but  a 
short  time  before,  pronounced  the  system  to  be  unconstitutional,  unequal,  unjust, 
and  oppressive  ?  Did  he  feel  any  sympathy  for  those  who  felt  and  thought  as 
he  did  but  a  brief  period  before  ?  Did  he  make  any  allowance  for  their  falling 
into  the  same  errors  (if  such  he  then  considered  them)  into  which  he  himself  had 
fallen  1  Did  he  show  that  ardent  devotion  to  preserve  the  brotherly  love  be 
tween  the  members  of  the  Union  he  now  so  boastingly  professes  ?  Did  he, 
who  calls  himself  the  defender  of  the  Constitution,  feel  any  compunction  in  re 
sorting  to  force  to  execute  laws  which  he  had  pronounced  to  be  in  violation  of 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  337 

the  Constitution  ?    Did  he,  who  manifested  such  deep  distrust  of  those  in  power, 
who  had  been  foremost  in  proclaiming  their  usurpations,  and  calling  on  the 
patriotic  of  all  parties  to  oppose  them,  show  any  dread  in  clothing  the  President 
with  unlimited  power  to  crush  one  of  the  members  of  the  Union,  and  which, 
after  accomplishing  that,  might  be  so  readily  turned  to  crush  the  liberty  of  all  ? 
Quite  the  reverse.    A  sudden  thought  again  struck  him.     He  again,  in  a  twink 
ling,  forgot  the  past,  and  rushed  over  into  the  arms  of  power,  and  took  his  posi 
tion  in  the  front  rank,  as  the  champion  of  the  most  violent  measures,  to  enforce 
laws  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  which  he  had  pronounced  unconstitutional, 
unjust,  and  oppressive !  and  this,  too,  at  the  hazard  of  civil  war,  and  the  mani 
fest  danger  of  subverting  the  Constitution  and  liberties  of  the  country  ;  refusing 
all  terms  of  adjustment,  and  resisting  to  the  last,  with  violence,  the  bill  which 
compromised  and  settled  the  conflict !    And  yet,  with  all  this  fresh  in  the  recol 
lection  of  himself  and  all  present,  he  can  rise  in  his  place  and  proclaim  himself 
the  universal  patriot ;  the  defender  of  the  Constitution  and  benefactor  of  every 
portion  of  the  Union ;  the  man  who  has  done  everything  to  preserve  brotherly 
love  between  its  members,  and  who  is  ready  to  make  every  sacrifice  to  make  it 
beneficial  to  all  the  parties  ! 

But  what  is  more  extraordinary,  what  is  truly  wonderful  and  astonishing,  is, 
while  these  words  were  on  his  tongue,  he,  in  the  same  breath,  with  a  full  knowl 
edge  of  all  the  disastrous  consequences  which  have,  arid  must  necessarily  follow 
the  renewal  of  the  protective  system,  should  declare  that  he  anticipates  the 
speedy  arrival  of  the  time  when  he  will  again  undertake  to  revive  the  system ! 
More  cannot  be  added.  The  contrast  between  the  senator's  course  and  the 
character  which  he  ascribes  to  himself  cannot  be  rendered  more  striking.  I 
shall  not  add  another  instance,  as  many  of  them  as  are  at  my  command.  A 
volume  could  not  more  conclusively  prove  how  unfounded  are  his  pretensions 
to  that  lofty,  universal,  and  ardent  patriotism  which  he  claims  for  himself,  and 
how  strong  the  delusion  under  which  he  is  in  regard  to  his  true  character. 

Let  us  now  turn  and  inquire  what  has  been  my  course;  I,  whom  he  repre 
sents  as  sectional,  whose  course  he  pronounces  to  be  unfriendly  to  the  Union, 
because  I  now  call  the  protective  system  unconstitutional  and  oppressive  ;  who, 
he  intimates,  desires  to  unite  the  South  for  no  patriotic  purpose,  and  represents 
as  going  off  under  the  State  Rights  banner.  And  here,  Mr.  President,  let  me 
say,  I  put  in  no  claim  to  the  lofty  destiny  to  which  the  senator  says  he  was 
born.  Instead  of  coming  here,  like  the  senator,  as  the  representative  of  the 
whole  people,  I  appear  in  the  more  humble  character  of  the  representative  of  one 
of  the  states  of  this  Union,  sent  here  to  watch  over  her  particular  interests, 
and  to  promote  the  general  interest  of  all,  as  far  as  the  Constitution  has  con 
ferred  power  upon  us,  and  as  it  can  be  done  without  oppression  to  the  parts. 
These  are  my  conceptions  of  my  representative  character,  with  the  trust  con 
fided  to  me,  and  the  duties  attached  to  it,  which  I  endeavour  to  discharge  with 
industry,  fidelity,  and  all  the  abilities  which  it  has  pleased  my  Creator  to  confer 
on  me.  Instead  of  falling  short  of  what  I  profess,  I  trust  my  public  life,  if  ex 
amined  with  candour,  will  show  that  I  have  ever  so  interpreted  my  duty  to  my 
state  as  to  permit  it  in  no  instance  to  interfere  with  the  just  claims  of  the  Union. 
It  is  my  good  fortune  to  represent  a  state  which  holds  her  character  far  above 
Jher  interest,  and  which  claims  the  first  place,  when  a  sacrifice  is  to  be  made 
for  the  safety  and  happiness  of  all,  and  would  hold  me  to  strict  account  if,  in 
representing  her  interest,  I  should  /brget  what  is  due  to  her  honour  among  her 
confederates.  All  her  acts  prove  that  she  is  as  liberal  in  making  concessions, 
when  demanded  by  the  common  good,  as  she  is  prompt  and  resolute  to  resist 
aggression  to  promote  the  interest  of  others  at  her  expense.  Acting  in  the 
same  spirit,  as  her  representative,  I  have  never  failed  to  meet  and  repel  aggres 
sions,  while,  I  trust,  I  have  on  no  occasion  been  unmindful  of  her  honour,  and 
the  general  interests  of  the  whole  Union.  Having  made  these  remarks,  I  shall 

U  u 


338  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  c.  CALHOUN. 

now  proceed  to  show  that,  as  humble  as  my  pretensions  are,  and  as  sectional 
and  unpatriotic  as  he  has  thought  proper  to  represent  me,  my  course  for  lib 
erality  and  a  just  regard  to  the  interest  of  every  portion  of  the  Union  will  not 
suffer  in  comparison  with  his,  as  lofty  as  are  his  pretensions, 

In  making  the  inquiry  I  have  into  the  course  of  the  senator  in  \-elation  to  the 
section  to  which  I  belong,  I  called  on  him  to  point  out  a  single  instance,  with 
all  his  boasted  patriotism,  in  which  he  had  given  a  vote  to  promote  its  interests, 
or  done  an  act  to  defend  its  rights  ;  but  now,  when  the  inquiry  is  into  my  course 
in  relation  to  his  section,  I  propose  to  reverse  the  question,  and  to  apply  to  my 
self  a  much  more  severe  test  than  I  did  to  him.  I  ask,  then,  From  what  meas 
ure,  calculated  to  promote  the  interests  of  his  section,  have  I  ever  withheld  my 
support,  except,  indeed,  the  protective  tariff,  and  certain  appropriations,  which, 
according  to  my  mode  of  construing  the  Constitution,  I  regard  as  unconstitu 
tional,  and  would,  of  course,  be  bound  to  oppose,  wherever  the  benefit  should 
fall  ?  I  call  on  the  senator  to  point  out  a  single  instance  ;  and,  if  he  desires  it, 
I  will  yield  him  the  floor,  in  order  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  do  so.  Will 
the  senator  call,  on  his  part,  for  instances  in  which  I  have  supported  the  inter 
est  of  his  section  ?  I  can  point  to  numerous :  to  rny  early  and  constant  sup 
port  of  the  navy  ;  to  my  resistance  to  the  system  of  embargoes,  Non-importation 
and  Non-intercourse  Acts ;  to  my  generous  course  in  support  of  manufactures 
that  sprung  up  during  the  war,  in  which  my  friends  think  I  went  too  far ;  to  the 
liberal  terms  on  which  the  tariff  controversy  was  settled,  and  the  fidelity  with 
which  I  have  adhered  to  it ;  and  to  the  system  of  fortifications  for  the  defence 
of  our  harbours,  which  I  projected  and  commenced,  and  which  is  so  important 
to  the  two  great  interests  of  commerce  and  navigation,  in  which  his  section  has 
so  deep  a  stake.  To  which  I  might  add  many  more  ;  but  these  are  sufficient 
for  one,  represented  as  so  sectional,  against  the  blank  list  of  the  senator  in  rela 
tion  to  my  section,  with  all  his  claim  to  ardent  nnd  universal  patriotism.  If  we 
turn  to  the  West,  my  course  will  at  least  bear  comparison  with  his  for  liberality 
towards  that  great  and  growing  section  of  our  country.  To  pass  over  other  in 
stances,  I  ask  him  what  measure  of  his  can  be  compared  with  the  cession  I 
have  proposed  of  the  public  lands  to  the  new  states  on  the  liberal  conditions 
proposed  ?  It  is  a  measure  above  all  others  calculated  to  promote  their  interest, 
to  elevate  their  character,  to  terminate  their  political  dependance,  and  to  raise 
them  to  a  complete  equality  with  the  old  states  for  the  mutual  benefit  of  us  and 
them,  but  which,  sectional  as  I  am  represented  to  be,  proved  too  liberal  for  the 
senator,  with  all  bis  wide-extended  and  ardent  attachment  to  the  whole  Union. 

But  it  seems  that  I  mean  something  very  sinister  in  my  call  on  the  South  to 
unite,  and  the  senator  very  significantly  asks  me  what  is  meant.  I  have  nothing 
to  disguise,  and  will  readily  answer.  If  he  would  look  at  home,  and  open  his 
eyes  to  the  systematic  and  incessant  attacks  made  on  our  peace  and  quiet  by 
his  constituents — if  he  would  reflect  on  his  threat  to  renew  the  system  of  op 
pression  from  which  we  have  freed  ourselves  with  such  difficulty  and  danger — 
and  bear  in  mind  that  we  are  the  weaker  section,  and,  without  union  among  our 
selves,  cannot  resist  the  danger  that  surrounds  us — he  will  see  that  there  is 
neither  mystery  nor  danger  in  the  call.  I  go  farther.  Our  union  is  not  only 
necessary  to  our  safety  and  protection,  but  is  also  to  the  successful  operation  of 
our  system.  We  constitute  the  check  to  its  over-action ;  and,  as  experience 
proves,  we  are  the  only  power  through  which,  when  disordered,  reformation  can 
be  peaceably  effected.  Our  union  is  dangerous  to  none,  and  salutary  to  all. 
The  machine  never  works  well  when  the  South  is  divided,  nor  badly  when  it 
is  united. 

The  senator  next  tells  us  that  I  declared  I  would  march  off  under  the  State 
Rights  banner,  which  he  seized  on  to  impugn  my  patriotism  and  to  boast  of  his 
own.  It  is  an  easy  task,  by  misstating  or  garbling,  to  distort  the  most  elevated 
or  correct  sentiment.  In  this  case,  the  senator,  by  selecting  a  single  member 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.     CALIIOUN.  339 

of  the  sentence,  and  throwing  a  strong  emphasis  on  "  off,"  gave  a  meaning  di 
rectly  the  opposite  of  representing  me  as  abandoning  the  cause  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  country,  and  himself  as  being  their  champion,  which,  it  seems,  was 
sufficient  for  his  purpose.  The  declaration  is  taken  from  my  opening  speech  at 
the  extra  session  ;  and,  that  the  Senate  may  judge  for  itself,  I  shall  give  the  en 
tire  passage  : 

"  We  are  about  to  take  a  fresh  start.  I  move  off  under  the  State  Rights  ban 
ner,  and  go  in  the  direction  in  which  I  have  been  so  long  moving.  I  seize  the 
^opportunity  thoroughly  to  reform  the  government ;  to  bring  it  back  to  its  origi 
nal  principles  ;  to  retrench,  economize,  and  rigidly  to  enforce  accountability.  I 
shall  oppose  strenuously  all  attempts  to  originate  a  new  debt,  to  create  a  Na 
tional  Bank,  to  reunite  the  political  and  money  power  (more  dangerous  than 
Church  and  State)  in  any  form  or  shape." 

This  is  what  I  did  declare,  and  which  the  senator  represents  as  deserting  the 
Constitution  and  country  ;  and  this  is  the  way  I  am  usually  answered.  I  know 
not  whether  I  have  greater  cause  to  complain  or  rejoice  at  the  fact  that  there  is 
scarcely  an  argument  or  a  sentiment  of  mine  which  is  attempted  to  be  met,  that 
is  not  garbled  or  misstated.  If  I  have  reason  to  complain  of  the  injustice,  I 
have,  at  the  same  time,  the  pleasure  to  reflect  that  it  is  a  high  implied  compli 
ment  to  the  truth  and  correctness  of  what  I  say. 

There  still  remains  an  important  chapter  to  complete  the  comparison  between 
the  public  character  of  the  senator  and  myself ;  I  mean  the  part  which  we  took  in 
the  late  war  between  Great  Britain  and  this  country.  I  intended  at  one  time  to 
enter  on  it,  and  to  trace  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  war,  with  its  various  vicis 
situde  of  disasters  and  victories,  and  the  part  which  the  senator  and  his  political 
associates  acted  at  that  important  period  ;  but  these  are  bygone  events,  belong 
ing  to  the  historian,  in  whose  hands  I  am  content  to  leave  them,  and  shall  not 
recur  to  them  unless  the  senator  should  provoke  me  hereafter  by  a  renewal  of 
his  attack. 

Having  now  despatched  the  personalities  of  the  senator,  I  turn,  next,  to  his 
argument,  which,  as  I  have  stated,  consists  of  three  parts  :  the  preliminary  dis 
course  on  credit  and  banks  ;  the  discussion  of  the  question  at  issue  ;  and  the  re 
ply  to  my  remarks  at  this  and  the  extra  session.  I  shall  consider  each,  as  I 
have  begun,  in  the  reverse  order.  The  argument  of  the  senator  is,  indeed,  so 
miscellaneous  and  loosely  connected,  that  it  is  a  matter  of  but  little  importance 
in  what  order  it  is  considered. 

When  he  announced  his  intention  to  reply  to  my  remarks,  both  at  this  and 
the  extra  session,  I  anticipated  that  they  would  be  met  fully,  if  not  satisfactori 
ly,  point  by  point.  Guess,  then,  my  surprise  on  finding  him  pass  by,  without 
even  attempting  an  answer  to  the  numerous  objections  which  I  made  to  the 
union  of  the  political  and  money  power,  as  affecting  the  morals,  the  politics,  the 
currency,  the  industry,  and  prosperity  of  the  count/y,  which,  if  the  fourth  part 
be  true,  is  decisive  of  the  question,  and  noticing  but  two  out  of  the  long  list  in 
his  reply.  If  we  may  judge  of  the  strength  of  those  which  he  has  passed  over 
by  his  inconclusive  answer  (as  I  shall  presently  show)  to  the  two  which  he  se 
lected,  my  argument  may  be  pronounced  to  be  impregnable.  I  shall  begin  with 
his  reply  to  my  remarks  at  the  present  session. 

It  will  be  remembered,  among  other  objections  against  the  connexion  with  the 
banks,  I  ur-ged  that  the  government  had  no  right  to  make  a  general  deposite  in 
bank,  or  receive  the  notes  of  banks  in  the  public  dues.  I  placed  the  first  on 
the  ground  that,  when  public  money  was  placed  in  deposite  in  banks,  and  pass 
ed  to  the  credit  of  the  government,  it  was,  if  ever,  in  the  treasury ;  and  that  it 
could  not  be  drawn  out  and  used  for  any  purpose,  unless  under  an  appropriation 
made  by  law,  without  violating  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  which 
provides  that  no  money  should  be  drawn  out  of  the  treasury  but  in  consequence 
of  appropriation  by  law.  I  then  urged,  that  to  place  money  in  general  deposite 


340  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CAtHOUN. 

in  banks,  with  the  implied  understanding  always  attached  to  such  transactions, 
that  they  should  have  the  right  to  draw  it  out  and  use  it  as  they  please  till  call 
ed  for  by  the  government,  was  a  manifest  violation  of  this  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution. 

In  support  of  the  other  objection  against  receiving  bank-notes  in  the  public 
dues,  I  laid  down  the  known  and  fundamental  rule  of  construction  on  all  ques 
tions  touching  the  powers  of  this  government,  that  it  had  no  right  to  exercise 
any  but  such  as  are  expressly  given  by  the  Constitution,  or  that  may  be  neces 
sary  to  carry  into  effect  the  granted  powers.  I  then  insisted  that  no  such  pow 
er  was  granted,  nor  was  its  exercise  necessary  to  carry  any  granted  power  into 
effect ;  and  concluded,  that  the  power  could  not  be  exercised  unless  compre 
hended  under  one  or  the  other  head.  To  which  I  added  the  farther  objection, 
that  if  we  had  the  right  to  receive  the  notes  of  state  banks  in  our  dues  as  cash, 
it  would  necessarily  involve  the  right  of  taking  them  under  our  control  and  reg 
ulation,  which  would  bring  this  government  necessarily  into  conflict  with  the 
reserved  rights  of  the  states  ;  and  to  this  I  added,  that  the  receipt  of  bank-notes 
by  the  government  tended  to  expel  gold  and  silver  from  circulation,  and  depre 
ciate  and  render  their  value  more  fluctuating,  and,  of  course,  could  not  be  rec 
onciled  with  the  object  of  the  express  power  given  to  Congress  to  coin  money 
and  regulate  the  value  thereof,  to  which  it  is  as  repugnant  in  its  effects  as  the 
debasing  or  the  clipping  the  current  coin  would  be.  I  at  the  same  time  con 
ceded  that  the  practice  of  the  government  had  been  opposite  from  the  commence 
ment.  Such  are  my  reasons,  and  how  have  they  been  met  1 

The  senator  commenced  by  stating  that  he  would  consider  the  two  objections 
together,  as  they  were  connected  ;  but,  instead  of  that,  he  never  uttered  anoth 
er  word  in  relation  to  the  right  of  making  a  general  deposite.  That  was  sur 
rendered  without  an  attempt  to  meet  my  objections,  which,  at  least,  proved  his 
discretion.  He  next  undertook  to  show  that  precedents  were  in  favour  of  re 
ceiving  bank-notes,  which  I  had  conceded,  and  no  one  disputed.  Among  other 
things,  he  stated  I  was  the  first  to  authorize  the  receiving  of  bank-notes  by  law, 
and,  in  proof,  referred  to  my  amendment  to  the  joint  resolution  of  1816,  which 
authorizes  the  receipt  of  the  notes  of  specie-paying  banks  in  the  dues  of  the 
government.  He  stated  that  the  resolution,  as  proposed  by  himself,  provided 
that  nothing  but  gold  and  silver  and  the  notes  of  the  United  States  Bank  should 
be  received,  and  that  my  amendment  extended  it  to  the  notes  of  state  banks. 
This  is  all  true,  but  is  not  the  whole  truth.  He  forgot  to  inform  the  Senate  that, 
at  the  time,  the  notes  of  non-specie-paying  banks,  as  well  as  specie-paying,  were 
received  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  and  that  my  amendment  limited,  instead 
of  enlarging,  the  existing  practice.  He  also  forgot  to  state  that,  without  my 
amendment,  the-notes  of  the  United  States  Bank  would  have  been  exclusively 
received  in  the  public  does,  and  that  I  was  unwilling  to  bestow  a  monopoly  of 
such  immense  value  on  that  institution,  which  would  have  been  worth  ten  times 
the  amount  of  the  bonus  it  ga,ve  for  its  charter. 

After  bestowing  much  time  to  establish  what  none  denied,  the  senator  at 
length  came  to  the  argument ;  and  what  do  you  suppose  were  the  convincing 
reasons  he  urged  against  my  positions  ?  Why,  simply  that  he  had  no  time  to 
reply  to  them !  with  which,  and  the  erroneous  assertion  that  I  had  denied  that 
the  government  could  exercise  any  incidental  power,  he  passed  over  all  the 
weighty  objections  I  had  urged  against  the  constitutionality  of  receiving  and 
treating  bank-notes  as  cash  in  the  public  dues.  It  was  thus  he  met  the  only 
argument  he  attempted  to  answer  of  the  many  and  strong  ones  which  I  have 
urged  in  support  of  my  opinion  on  this  important  question,  and  to  which  he  pro 
posed  to  make  a  formal  reply. 

I  shall  next  notice  the  reply  he  attempted  to  my  remarks  at  the  late  session. 
And  here,  again,  he  selected  a  single  argument,  and  to  which  his  answer  was 
not  less  inconclusive  and  unsatisfactory  than  to  that  which  I  have  just  consider- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  341 

ed.  Among  other  objections  to  the  union  of  the  government  with  the  banks,  I 
stated  that  it  would  tend  to  centralize  the  circulation  and  exchanges  of  the  coun 
try  ;  to  sustain  which,  I  showed  that  no  small  portion  of  the  credit  and  circula 
tion  of  the  banks  depended  on  the  public  deposites,  and  the  fact  that  the  govern 
ment  received  and  treated  their  notes  as  cash  in  its  dues.  I  then  showed  that 
it  was  that  portion  which  pre-eminently  gave  a  control  over  the  circulation  and 
exchanges  of  the  country.  In  illustration,  I  asked,  if  the  government,  when  it 
first  went  into  operation,  had  selected  a  merchant  of  New- York,  and  entered 
into  a  contract  with  him  that  he  should  have  the  free  use  of  the  public  revenue 
from  the  time  it  was  collected  till  it  was  disbursed,  and  that  nothing  but  his  prom 
issory  notes,  except  gold  and  silver,  should  be  received  in  the  public  dues, 
whether  it  would  not  give  him  a  great  and  decided  control  over  the  circulation 
and  exchanges  of  the  country,  accompanied  with  advantages  to  the  port  where 
he  resided,  over  all  others.  I  next  asked,  whether  the  location  of  a  Bank  of 
the  United  States  at  the  same  place,  with  the  same  privileges,  would  not  give 
equal  control  and  advantages ;  nay,  much  greater  ;  as,  in  addition,  it  would 
concentrate  at  the  same  place  an  immense  amount  of  capital  collected  from  ev 
ery  portion  of  the  country. 

Such  was  my  argument,  which  th§  senator,  months  after  it  was  delivered, 
undertakes  to  controvert ;  but,  I  must  say,  for  my  life  I  could  not  understand  his 
reasons.  He  lost  his  usual  clearness,  and  became  vague  and  obscure,  as  any 
one  must  who  attempts  to  refute  what  is  so  perfectly  evident.  To  escape  from 
his  difficulty,  he,  with  his  usual  address,  confounded  what  I  had  said  on  an 
other  subject  with  another  point,  which  he  thought  more  easily  answered,  and 
against  which  he  directed  his  attack.  He  stated  that  I  proposed  a  government 
paper,  and  that  my  notion  is,  that  all  the  paper  that  circulates  should  be  gov 
ernment  paper ;  and  then  insisted  that  it  would  be  the  union  of  the  political  and 
money  power,  and  would  do  more  to  centralize  the  currency  and  exchanges 
than  the  connexion  of  the  government  with  the  banks. 

Now,  unfortunately  for  the  senator,  I  proposed  no  such  thing,  and  expressed 
no  notion  of  the  kind,  nor  anything  like  it.  He  may  search  every  speech  I 
have  delivered  at  this  and  the  extra  session,  and  he  can  find  nothing  to  justify 
his  assertion.  To  put  this  beyond  all  dispute,  I  will  quote  what  I  did  say,  and 
the  only  thing  that  I  ever  did  that  could  afford  him  even  a  pretext  for  his  asser 
tions.  The  extracts  are  taken  from  my  remarks  at  the  extra  session. 

*'  I  intend  to  propose  nothing.  It  would  be  impossible,  with  so  great  a  weight 
of  opposition,  to  pass  any  measure  without  the  entire  support  of  the  administration ; 
and,  if  it  were,  it  ought  not  to  be  attempted  when  so  much  must  depend  on  the 
mode  of  execution.  The  best  measure  that  could  be  devised  might  fail,  and  im 
pose  a  heavy  responsibility  on  its  author,  unless  it  met  with  the  hearty  appro 
bation  of  those  who  are  to  execute  it.  I,  then,  intend  merely  to  throw  out  sug 
gestions,  in  order  to  excite  the  reflections  of  others,"  &c. 

"  Believing  that  there  might  be  a  sound  and  safe  paper  currency  founded  oa 
the  credit  of  the  government  exclusively,  I  was  desirous  that  those  who  are  re 
sponsible  and  have  the  power,  should  have  availed  themselves  of  the  opportu 
nity  of  the  temporary  deficit  in  the  treasury,  and  the  postponement  of  the  fourth 
instalment  intended  to  be  deposited  with  the  states,  to  use  them  as  the  means 
of  affording  a  circulation  for  the  present  relief  of  the  country  and  the  banks,  du 
ring  the  process  of  separating  them  from  the  government"  &c. 

Here  is  not  a  word  about  proposing  ;  on  the  contrary,  I  expressly  stated  I 
proposed  nothing ;  that  I  but  threw  out  suggestions  for  reflection.  Instead  of 
excluding  all  paper  from  circulation,  I  suggested  the  use,  not  of  treasury  notes, 
as  he  stated,  or  any  other  paper  containing  a  promise  to  pay  money,  but  sim 
ply  one  which  should  contain  a  promise  to  be  received  in  the  dues  of  the  gov 
ernment  ;  and  that,  too,  only  to  the  extent  necessary  to  meet  the  temporary  de 
ficit  of  the  treasury,  and  to  alleviate  the  process  of  separating  from  the  banks ; 


342  SPEECHES  Of!  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  this  he  has  arbitrarily  construed  and  perverted  to  suit  his  purpose,  in  the 
manner  I  have  shown. 

It  is  a  great  misfortune  that  there  should  be  brought  into  this  chamber  the 
habits  contracted  at  the  bar,  where  advocates  contend  for  victory,  without  being 
scrupulous  about  the  means ;  while  here  the  only  object  ought  to  be  truth  and 
the  good  of  the  country.  All  other  considerations  ought  to  be  forgotten  within 
these  walls,  and  the  only  struggle  ought  to  be  to  ascertain  what  is  truth,  arid  cal 
culated  to  promote  the  honour  and  happiness  of  the  community.  Great  individ 
ual  injustice  is  done  by  such  misstatements  of  arguments.  The  senator's  speech 
will  be  published  and  circulated  in  quarters  where  my  correction  of  his  state 
ments  will  never  reach,  and  thousands  will  attribute  opinions  to  me  that  I  nev 
er  uttered  nor  entertained. 

The  suggestions  which 'he  has  so  perverted  have  been  a  favourite  topic  of 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  senator,  but  he  has  never  yet  stated  nor  met  what  I 
really  said  truly  and  fairly ;  and,  after  his  many  and  unsuccessful  attempts  to 
show  what  I  suggested  to  be  erroneous,  I  now  undertake  to  affirm  positively, 
and  without  the  least  fear  that  I  can  be  answered,  what  heretofore  I  have  but  sug 
gested — that  a  paper  issued  by  government,  with  the  simple  promise  to  receive 
it  in  all  its  dues,  leaving  its  creditors  to  take  it  or  gold  and  silver,  at  their  op 
tion,  would,  to  the  extent  that  it  would  circulate,  form  a  perfect  paper  circula 
tion,  which  could  not  be  abused  by  the  government ;  that  would  be  as  steady  and 
uniform  in  value  as  the  metals  themselves  ;  and  that  if,  by  possibility,  it  should 
depreciate,  the  loss  would  fall,  not  on  the  people,  but  on  the  government  itself; 
for  the  only  effect  of  depreciation  wo\ftd  be  virtually  to  reduce  the  taxes,  to  pre 
vent  which  the  interest  of  the  government  would  be  a  sufficient  guarantee.  I 
shall  not  go  into  the  discussion  now,  but  on  a  suitable  occasion  I  shall  be  able 
to  make  good  every  word  I  have  uttered.  I  would  be  able  to  do  more — to  prove 
that  it  is  within  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  use  such  a  paper,  in 
the  management  of  its  finances,  according  to  the  most  rigid  rule*  of  construing 
the  Constitution ;  and  that  those,  at  least,  who  think  that  Congress  can  author 
ize  the  notes  of  private  state  corporations  to  be  received  in  the  public  dues,  are 
estopped  from  denying  its  right  to  receive  its  own  paper.  If  it  can  virtually  en 
dorse  by  law,  on  the  notes  of  specie-paying  banks,  "  Receivable  in  payment  of  the 
public  dues,"  it  surely  can  order  the  same  words  to  be  written  on  a  blank  piece 
of  paper. 

Such  is  the  character  of  the  paper  I  suggested,  and  which  the  senator  says 
would  do  more  to  centralize  the  circulation  and  exchlnges  than  the  union  of  the 
government  and  the  banks,  which,  however,  he  signally  failed  to  prove.  That 
it  would  have  a  greater  tendency  than  the  exclusive  receipt  in  its  dues  of  gold 
and  silver,  I  readily  acknowledge,  and  to,  that  extent  I  think  it  objectionable; 
for  I  do  not  agree  with  the  senator  that  there  should  be  some  one  great  empo 
rium,  which  should  have  control  of  the  commerce,  currency,  and  exchanges  of 
the  Union.  I  hold  it  desirable  in  neither  a  political  nor  commercial  point  of 
view,  and  to  be  contrary  to  the  genius  of  our  institutions  and  the  spirit  of  the 
Constitution,  which  expressly  provides,  among  other  things,  that  no  preference 
shall  be  given  to  the  ports  of  one  state  over  another.  But  that  a  receivable 
paper,  such  as  I  suggested,  would  have  a  greater,  or  as  great  tendency  to  cen 
tralize  the  commerce  and  currency  of  the  country  as  the  union  with  the  banks, 
I  utterly  deny ;  and,  if  I  had  no  other  reason,  the  vehement  opposition  of  the 
senator,  who  approves  of  such  tendency,  would  be  conclusive  ;  but  there  are 
others  that  are  decisive. 

The  centralizing  tendency  of  such  a  paper  would  result  exclusively  from  the 
facility  it  would  afford  to  remittance  from  distant  portions  of  the  Union,  in  which 
respect  it  would  stand  just  on  a  par  with  bank-notes  when  received  in  the  dues 
of  the  public  ;  while  the  latter  would,  in  addition,  give  to  the  favoured  port 
•where  the  mother-bank  might  be  located  (or 'the  head  of  the  league  of  state 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  343 

banks),  the  immense  profits  from  the  use  of  the  public  deposites,  and  the  still 
greater  from  having  their  notes  received  in  government  dues.  The  two  united 
would  afford  unbounded  facilities  in  the  payment  of  custom-house  bonds,  and 
give  millions  of  profit  annually,  derived  exclusively  from  the  use  of  govern 
ment  credit.  This  great  facility  and  vast  increase  of  profit  would  give  a  great 
and  decided  advantage  to  the  commerce  of  the  section  where  the  head  of  the 
system  might  be  located,  and  which,  in  a  great  measure,  accounts  for  the  de 
cay  of  the  commerce  of  the  South,  where  there  were  no  banks  when  this  gov 
ernment  was  established,  arid  which,  of  course,  gave  to  the  other  section  ex 
clusively  all  the  benefit  derived  from  the  connexion.  If  specie  had  from  the  first 
been  exclusively  received  in  the  public  dues,  the  present,  commercial  inequali 
ty  would  never  have  existed ;  and,  I  may  add,  it  never  will  cease  till  we  return 
to  the  constitutional  currency.  What  the  senator  has  said  as  to  the  union  of 
the  political  and  money  powers,  and  the  tendency  to  extravagance  from  the  use 
of  treasury  notes  and  their  depreciation,  is  so  clearly  inapplicable  to  the  de 
scription  of  paper  I  suggested,  that  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  waste  words 
in  reply  to  it. 

Having  now  repelled  his  reply  to  my  remarks  at  this  and  the  extra  session,  I 
shall  next  proceed  to  notice  his  argument  on  the  question  under  discussion, 
•which,  extraordinary  as  it  may  seem,  constitutes  by  far  the  most  meager  and 
inconsiderable  portion  of  his  speech.  The  structure  he  reared  with  so  much 
labour  is  composed  of  a  little  centre  building,  of  some  twenty  or  thirty  feet 
square,  with  an  extended  wing  on  each  side,  and  a  huge  portico  in  front.  I 
Lave,  I  trust,  effectually  demolished  the  wings,  and  propose  next  to  go  through 
the  same  process  with  the  centre  building. 

As  long  as  was  the  speech,  it  contained  but  three,  or.  at  the  utmost,  four  ar 
guments,  directly  applicable  to  the  question  under  discussion  ;  of  which  two 
have  again  and  again  been  repeated  by  him  every  time  he  has  addressed  the 
Senate  ;  another  was  drawn  from  an  argument  of  mine  in  favour  of  the  bill,  which 
the  senator  has  misstated,  and  pressed  into  his  service  against  it ;  and  the  other 
is  neither  altogether  new,  nor  very  well  founded,  nor,  from  its  character,  of  much, 
force.  I  shall  begin  with  it. 

The  senator  objected  to  the  collection  of  the  public  dues  in  gold  and  silver, 
because,  as  he  conceives,  it  would  be  exceedingly  inconvenient ;  in  proof  of 
which,  and  in  order  to  present  as  strong  a  picture  as  possible,  he  went  into  mi 
nute  calculations  and  details.  He  first  supposed  that  the  average  peace  reve 
nue  would  be  equal  to  thirty  millions  annually,  and  the  average  deposites  to 
twenty-one.  He  then  estimated  that  this  vast  sum  would  have  to  be  counted 
at  least  five  times  in  the  year,  and  then  estimated  that  it  would  require  eight 
hundred  thousand  dollars  to  be  counted  daily,  which  would  require  a  host  of 
officers,  in  his  opinion,  to  perform  the  task.  The  answer  to  all  this  is  easy. 
In  the  first  place,  the  senator  has  over-estimated  the  average  receipts  by  at  least 
one  hundred  per  cent.  Fifteen  millions  ought  to  be  much  nearer  the  truth  than 
thirty.  Even  that  I  regard  as  exceeding  what  the  expenditure  ought  to  be ; 
and  I  venture  to  assert,  that  no  administration  which  expends  more  on  an  aver 
age  for  the  next  few  years  can  maintain  itself,  unless  there  should  be  some  un 
expected  demand  on  the  treasury.  In  the  next  place,  twenty-one  millions  is 
at  least  five  times  too  large  for  the  average  deposites.  Should  this  bill  pass, 
three  millions  would  be  much  nearer  the  truth.  We  shall  hear  no  more  of  sur 
pluses  when  the  revenue  is  collected  in  gold  and  silver.  This  would  make  a 
great  deduction  in  his  estimate  of  the  trouble  and  labour  in  counting.  But  I  give 
the  senator  his  own  estimate,  and  ask  him  if  he  never  heard  of  other  and  short* 
er  modes  than  counting  of  ascertaining  the  amount  in  coins.  Does  he  not 
know  that  it  can  be  ascertained  with  as  much  certainty  and  exactness  by  weight 
as  by  counting,  and  with  more  despatch,  when  the  amount  is  large,  in  coins 
than  in  his  favourite  bank-notes  ?  If  I  am  not  misinformed,  it  is  the  mode 


344  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

adopted  at  the  English  Exchequer,  and  it  is  done  with  the  greatest  possible 
promptitude  by  experienced  individuals,  so  that  his  formidable  objection  van 
ishes. 

But  the  senator  next  tells  us  that  I  stated,  in  my  remarks,  that  the  bill,  should 
it  pass,  would  place  the  banks  and  the  government  in  antagonist  relation  to  each 
other,  which  he  considers  as  a  very  weighty  objection  to  it.  I  again  must 
correct  his  statement.  I  made  no  such  remark  ;  I,  indeed,  said,  when  the  banks 
were  connected  with  the  government,  they  had  a  direct  interest  in  increasing 
its  fiscal  action.  The  greater  the.  revenue  and  expenditures,  and  the  larger  the 
surplus,  the  greater  would  be  their  profit ;  but,  when  they  were  separated,  the 
reverse  would  take  place.  That  the  greater  amount  of  gold  and  silver  collected 
and  withdrawn  from  circulation,  the  less  would  be  left  for  banking  operations, 
and,  of  course,  the  less  their  profit ;  and  that,  in  one  case,  they  would  be  the  allies, 
and.  in  the  other,  the  opponents  of  the  government,  as  far  as  its  fiscal  action  was 
concerned  ;  or,  to  express  it  more  concisely,  when  united  with  the  government, 
they  would  be  on  the  side  of  the  tax-consumers,  and,  when  separated,  on  that  of 
the  tax-payers.  Such  were  my  remarks  ;  and  I  now  ask,  Is  it  not  true  ?  Can. 
any  one  deny  it  ?  Or,  admitting  its  truth,  can  its  importance  be  disputed  ?  Were 
there  no  other  reasons  in  favour  of  the  bill,  I  would  consider  this  of  itself  de 
cisive.  It  would  be  almost  impossible  to  preserve  our  free  institutions  with  the- 
weight  of  the  entire  banking  system  thrown  on  the  side  of  high  taxes  and  ex 
travagant  disbursements,  or  to  destroy  it  if  thrown  into  the  opposite  scale. 

But  the  senator  regards  the  expression  of  tax-consumers  and  tax-payers  as 
mere  catch-words,  of  dangerous  import,  and  tending  to  divide  society  into  the 
hostile  parties  of  rich  and  poor.  I  take  a  very  different  view.  I  hold  that  the 
fiscal  action  of  the  government  must  necessarily  divide  the  community  into  the 
two  great  classes  of  tax-payers  and  tax-consumers.  Take  taxation  and  dis 
bursements  together,  and  it  is  unavoidable  that  one  portion  of  the  community 
must  pay  into  the  treasury,  in  the  shape  of  taxes,  more  than  they  receive  back 
in  disbursements,  and  another  must  receive  more  than  they  pay.  This  is  the 
great  disturbing  principle  in  all  government^,  especially  those  that  are  free, 
around  which  all  other  causes  of  political  divisions  and  distractions  finally  rally. 
Were  it  otherwise — if  the  interest  of  every  portion  and  class  of  the  community 
was  the  same  in  reference  to  taxation  and  disbursements,  nothing  would  be 
more  easy  than  to  establish  and  preserve  free  institutions ;  but  as  it  is,  it  is  the 
most  difficult  of  all  tasks,  as  history  and  experience  prove.  This  principle  of 
disorder  lies  deep  in  the  nature  of  men  and  society,  and  extends  equally  to  pri 
vate  associations  as  to  political  communities.  There  will  necessarily  spring 
up  in  both  a  stockholding  arid  direction  interest ;  the  latter  of  which,  without 
wise  provisions  and  incessant  vigilance,  will  absorb  the  former,  of  which  the 
winding  up  of  many  a  bank  will  prove. 

The  two  remaining  arguments  of  the  senator  have  been  often  asserted,  and 
as  often  refuted,  and  I  shall  despatch  them  with  a  few  words.  He  tells  us,  as 
he  has  often  done,  that  we  are  bound  to  regulate  the  currency  ;  and  that  the 
Constitution  has  given  to  Congress  the  express  power  to  regulate  it,  with  many 
other  expressions  of  similar  import.  It  is  manifest  that  the  whole  argument 
turns  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  currency.  If  by  it  is  meant  the  current 
coin  of  the  United  States,  no  one  can  doubt  that  Congress  has  the  right  to  reg 
ulate  it.  The  power  is  expressly  given  by  the  Constitution,  which  says,  in  so 
many  words,  that  it  shall  have  power  to  coin  4  money  and  regulate  the  value 
thereof;  but  if  it  is  intended  to  include  bank-notes,  as  must  be  the  intention  of 
the  senator,  there  is  no  such  express  power  given  in  the  Constitution.  It  is  a 
point  to  be  proved,  and  not  assumed  ;  and  every  attempt  of  the  senator  to  prove 
it  has  ended  in  signal  failure.  He  has  not,  and  cannot  meet  the  answer  which 
he  received  from  the  senator  from  Pennsylvania,  at  the  extra  session ;  and  his 
repetition  of  the  assertion,  after  so  decisive  an  answer,  serves  but  to  prove  how 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  345 

much  more  easy  it  often  is  to  refute  an  argument  than  to  silence  him  who  ad 
vanced  it.  But  I  do  not  despair  even  of  silencing  the  senator.  There  is  one 
whose  authority  on  this  point  I  am  sure  he  must  respect :  I  mean  himself. 
When  the  bill  granting  a  charter  to  the  late  United  States  Bank  was  under 
discussion  in  the  other  house,  in  1816,  he  then  took  the  opposite  side,  and  ar 
gued  with  great  force  against  the  very  right  for  which  he  now  so  obstinately 
contends.  He  then  maintained  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  were  hard- 
money  men ;  that  currency  meant  the  current  coin  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  Congress  has  no  right  to  make  any  other.  But  the  senator  shall  speak  for 
himself;  and,  that  he  may  be  heard  in  his  own  words,  I  shall  read  an  extract 
from  his  speech  delivered  at  the  time  : 

"  Mr.  Webster  first  addressed  the  house.  He  regretted  the  manner  in  which 
this  debate  had  been  commenced,  on  a  detached  feature  of  the  bill,  and  not  ar 
question  affecting  the  principle ;  and  expressed  his  fears  that  a  week  or  two> 
would  be  lost  in  the  discussion  of  this  question  to  no  purpose,  inasmuch  as  it 
might  ultimately  end  in  the  rejection  of  the  bill.  He  proceeded  to  reply  to  the  ar 
guments  of  the  advocates  of  the  bill.  It  was  a  mistaken  idea,  he  said,  which  he 
had  heard  uttered  on  this  subject,  that  we  were  about  to  reform  the  national  cur 
rency.  No  nation  had  a  better  currency,  he  said,  than  the  United  States  ;  there 
was  no  nation  which  had  guarded  its  currency  with  more  care  ;  for  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution,  and  those  who  enacted  the  early  statutes  on  this  subject, 
were  hard-money  men  ;  they  had  felt,  and  therefore  duly  appreciated,  the  evils  of 
a  paper  medium ;  they,  therefore,  sedulously  guarded  the  currency  of  the  United. 
States  from  debasement.  The  legal  currency  of  the  United  States  was  gold  and 
silver  coin ;  this  was  a  subject  in  regard  to  which  Congress  had  run  into  no 
folly. 

•;  What,  then,  he  asked,  was  the  present  evil  ?  Having  a  perfectly  sound  na 
tional  currency,  and  the  government  having  no  power,  in  fact,  to  make  anything 
else  current  but  gold  and  silver,  there  had  grown  up  in  different  states  a  currency 
of  paper  issued  by  banks,  setting  out  with  the  promise  to  pay  gold  and  silver, 
which  they  had  been  wholly  unable  to  redeem  ;  the  consequence  was,  that  there 
was  a  mass  of  paper  afloat,  of  perhaps  fifty  millions,  which  sustained  no  imme 
diate  relation  to  the  legal  currency  of  the  country — a  paper  which  will  not  enable 
any  man  to  pay  money  he  owes  to  his  neighbour,  or  his  debts  to  the  government. 
The  banks  had  issued  more  money  than  they  could  redeem,  and  the  evil  was 
severely  felt,  &c.  Mr.  W.  declined  occupying  the  time  of  the  house  to  prove 
that  there  was  a  depreciation  of  the  paper  in  circulation ;  the  legal  standard, 
of  value  was  gold  and  silver ;  the  relation  of  paper  to  it  proved  its  state,  and 
the  rate  of  its  depreciation.  Gold  and  silver  currency,  he  said,  was  the  law  of 
the  land  at  home,  and  the  law  of  the  world  abroad;  there  could,  in  the  present, 
state  of  the  world,  be  no  other  currency.  In  consequence  of  the  immense  paper 
issues  having  banished  specie  from  circulation,  the  government  had  been  obli 
ged,  in  direct  violation  of  existing  statutes,  to  receive  the  amount  of  their  taxes 
in  something  which  was  not  recognised  by  law  as  the  money  of  the  country, 
and  which  was,  in  fact,  greatly  depreciated,  &c.  This  was  the  evil." 

What  can  be  more  decisive  ?  What  more  pointed  ?  They  are  the  very  doc 
trines  which  he  is  in  the  daily  habit  of  denouncing  under  the  name  of  Loco-foco. 
The  senator  may  hereafter  be  regarded  as  the  father  of  the  party,  and  I  deem 
it  not  a  little  unnatural  that  he  should  be  so  harsh  and  cruel  to  his  offspring. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  I  then  advocated  the  opposite  side.  Be  it  so,  and  it 
follows  that  his  authority  and  mine  stand  as  opposing  qualities  on  the  opposite 
sides  of  an  equation  ;  and  I  feel  confident  that  the  senator  will  readily  admit 
that  his  will,  at  least,  be  sufficient  to  destroy  mine. 

I  readily  acknowledge  that  my  opinion,  after  the  lapse  of  upward  of  twenty 
years,  with  the  light  which  experience  in  this  long  period  has  shed  on  the 
banking  system,  has  undergone  considerable  changes.  It  would  be  strange  if 

Xx 


M6  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

it  had  not.  I  see  more  clearly  now  than  I  did  the  true,  character  of  the  sys 
tem,  and  its  dangerous  tendency ;  but  I  owe  it  to  myself,  and  the  truth  of  the 
cause,  to  say  I  was,  even  at  that  early  period,  far  from  being  its  advocate,  and 
would  then  have  been  opposed  to  the  system  had  it  been  a  new  question.  But 
I  then  regarded  the  connexion  between  the  government  and  the  banks  indisso 
luble,  and  acquiesced  in  a  state  of  things  that  I  could  not  control,  and  which  I 
considered  as  established.  The  government  was  then  receiving  the  notes  of 
non-specie-paying  banks  in  its  dues,  to  its  own  discredit,  and  heavy  loss  to  its 
creditors.  The  only  practical  alternative  was  at  that  period  between  a  league 
of  state  banks  and  a  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  the  fis-cal  agent  of  the  gov 
ernment.  I  preferred  then,  as  I  now  do,  the  latter  to  the  former,  as  more  effi 
cient,  and  not  a  whit  more  unconstitutional ;  and,  if  I  now  were  again  placed 
in  the  same  state  of  things  that  I  then  was,  with  all  my  present  feelings  and 
views,  I  could  hardly  have  acted  differently  from  what  I  then  did. 

The  senator  greatly  mistakes  in  supposing  that  I  feel  any  disposition  to  re 
pudiate  or  retract  what  I  then  said.  So  far  from  it,  I  have,  I  think,  just  cause 
to  be  proud  of  the  remarks  I  made  on  the  occasion.  It  put  the  question  of  the 
bank,  for  the  first  time,  on  its  true  basis,  as  far  as  this  government  is  concern 
ed,  and  the  one  on  which  it  has  ever  since  stood  ;  which  is  no  small  compli 
ment  to  one  then  so  inexperienced  as  myself.  All  I  insist  on  is,  that  the  report 
contains  but  a  very  hasty  sketch — a  mere  outline,  as  the  reporter  himself  says 
— of  my  remarks,  in  which  four  fifths  are  omitted,  and  that  it  would  be  doing  me 
great  injustice  to  regard  it  as  containing  a  full  exposition  of  my  views.  But,  as 
brief  as  it  is,  what  is  reported  cannot  be  read,  in  a  spirit  of  fairness,  without 
seeing  that  I  regarded  the  question  at  the  time  as  a  mere  practical  one,  to  be 
decided,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  without  involving  the  higher 
questions  which,  now  that  the  connexion  between  the  government  and  the 
banks  is  broken,  come  rightfully  into  discussion.  At  that  time  the  only  ques 
tion,  as  I  expressly  stated,  was,  not  whether  we  should  be  connected  with  the 
bank,  for  that  was  existing  in  full  force,  but  whether  it  was  most  advisable,  ad 
mitting  the  existence  of  the  connexion,  that  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the 
separate  states,  should  exercise  the  power  of  banking.  I  have  made  these  re 
marks,  not  that  I  regard  the  question  of  consistency,  after  so  great  a  change  of 
circumstances,  of  much  importance,  but  because  I  desire  to  stand  where  truth 
and  justice  place  me  on  this  great  question. 

The  last  argument  of  the  senator  on  the  question  at  issue  was  drawn  from 
the  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  gives  to  Congress  the  right  to  regulate 
commerce,  and  which,  he  says,  involves  the  right  and  obligation  to  furnish  a 
sound  circulating  medium.  The  train  of  his  reasoning,  as  far  as  I  could  com 
prehend  it,  was,  that  without  a  currency  commerce  could  not  exist,  at  least  to 
any  considerable  extent,  and,  of  course,  there  would  be  nothing  to  regulate  ; 
and,  therefore,  unless  Congress  furnished  a  currency,  its  power  of  regulating 
commerce  would  become  a  mere  nullity  ;  and  from  which  he  inferred  the  right 
and  obligation  to  furnish  not  only  a  currency,  but  a  bank  currency  !  Whatever 
may  be  said  of  the  soundness  of  the  reasoning,  all  must  admit  that  his  mode  of 
construing  the  Constitution  is  very  bold  and  novel.  To  what  would  it  lead  ? 
The  same  clause  in  that  instrument  which  gives  Congress  the  right  to  coin 
money  and  regulate  the  value  thereof,  gives  it  also  the  kindred  right  to  fix  the 
standard  of  weights  and  measures.  They  are  just  as  essential  to  the  existence 
of  Congress  as  the  currency  itself.  The  yard  and  the  bushel  are  not  less  impor 
tant  in  the  exchange  of  commodities  than  the  dollar  and  the  eagle  ;  and  the  very 
train  of  reasoning  which  would  make  it  the  right  and  duty  of  the  government 
to  furnish  the  one,  would  make  it  equally  so  to  furnish  the  other.  Again  :  com 
merce  cannot  exist  without  ships  and  other  means  of  transportation.  Is  the  gov 
ernment  also  bound  to  furnish  them  ?  Nor  without  articles  or  commodities  to  be 
exchanged,  such  as  cotton,  rice,  tobacco,  and  the  various  products  of  agriculture 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  347 

and  manufactures.  Is  it  also  bound  to  furnish  them  ?  Nor  these,  in  turn,  with 
out  labour  ;  and  must  that,  too,  be  furnished  ?  If  not,  I  ask  the  senator  to  make 
the  distinction.  Where  will  he  draw  the  line,  and  on  what  principles  ?  Does 
he  not  see  that,  according  to  this  mode  of  construction,  the  higher  powers 
granted  in  the  Constitution  would  carry  all  the  inferior,  and  that  this  would 
become  a  government  of  unlimited  powers  ?  Take,  for  instance,  the  war  power, 
and  apply  the  same  mode  of  construction  to  it,  and  what  power  would  there  be 
that  Congress  could  not  exercise — nay,  be  bound  to  exercise  ?  Intelligence, 
morals,  wealth,  numbers,  currency,  all  are  important  elements  of  power,  and 
may  become  so  to  the  defence  of  the  Union  and  safety  of  the  country ;  and,  ac 
cording  to  the  senator's  reasoning,  the  government  would  have  the  right,  and 
would  be  in  duty  bound  to  take  charge  of  the  schools,  the  pulpits,  the  industry, 
the  population,  as  well  as  the  currency  of  the  country ;  and  these  would  com 
prehend  the  entire  circle  of  legislation,  and  leave  the  state  governments  as  use 
less  appendages  of  the  system. 

Having  now,  I  trust,  taken  down  to  the  ground  the  little  centre  building,  with 
its  four  apartments,  nothing  remains  of  the  entire  structure  but  the  huge  portico 
in  front,  and  on  which  I  shall  next  commence  the  work  of  demolition.  The 
senator  opened  his  discourse  on  credits  and  banks  by  asserting  that  bank  credit 
was,  in  truth  and  reality,  so  much  capital  actually  added  to  the  community.  I 
waive  the  objection,  that  neither  credit  nor  the  banking  system  is  involved  in 
the  question ;  and  that  those  who  are  opposed  to  the  union  of  the  political  and 
moiiey  power  oppose  that  union  with  other  reasons,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  un 
favourable  to  a  full  development  of  the  credit  system,  and  dangerous  to  the  banks 
themselves,  which  they  believe  can  only  be  saved  from  entire  destruction  by 
the  separation ;  and  it  follows,  of  course,  all  that  he  said  in  relation  to  them  is 
either  a  begging  of  the  question  or  irrelevant.  But,  assuming  what  he  said  to 
be  applicable,  I  shall  show  that  it  is  either  unfounded  in  fact  or  erroneous  in 
conclusion. 

So  far  from  agreeing  with  the  senator,  that  what  he  calls  bank  credit  is  so 
much  real  capital  added  to  the  country,  I  hold  the  opposite — that  banks  do  not 
add  a  cent  of  capital  or  credit.  Regarded  strictly,  the  credit  of  banks  is  limit 
ed  to  the  capital  actually  paid  in.  This,  usually,  is  the  only  sum  for  which  the 
stockholders  are  liable  ;  and,  without  what  are  called  banking  privileges,  they 
would  not  have  a  cent  of  credit  beyond  that  amount.  But  the  capital  subscribed 
and  paid  is  not  created  by  the  banks.  It  is  drawn  out  of  the  general  fund  of 
the  country.  Now,  I  ask,  What  constitutes  its  credit  beyond  its  capital  ?  In 
the  first  place,  and  mainly,  it  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  both  General  and 
State  Governments  receive  and  treat  bank-notes  as  cash,  and  thereby,  to  the 
extent  of  their  fiscal  action,  virtually  give  them  the  use  of  their  credit.  It  is  an. 
existing  credit,  belonging  to  them  exclusively,  and  is  neither  created  nor  in 
creased  by  permitting  the  banks  to  use  it.  In  the  next  place,  the  deposites 
with  the  banks,  both  public  and  private,  add  a  large  amount  to  their  credit ;  but 
this,  again,  is  either  the  property  or  credit  of  the  government  and  individuals, 
which  they  are  permitted  to  use,  and  which  they  neither  create  nor  increase. 
Finally,  notes  and  bonds,  or  other  credits  discounted  by  the  banks,  make  up 
their  credit,  which  are  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  credit  of  the  drawers  and 
endorsers,  on  which  the  banks  do  business.  They  take  in  the  paper  or  credit 
of  others,  payable  at  a  given  day,  deduct  the  interest  in  advance,  and  give  out 
their  own  credit  or  notes,  payable  on  demand,  without  interest;  that  is,  the 
credit  of  their  own  paper  rests  on  the  credit  of  the  paper  discounted  or  taken 
in  exchange,  which  credit  they  neither  create  nor  increase.  In  a  word,  all 
their  credit  beyond  the  capital  actually  paid  in  is  but  the  credit  of  the  public 
or  individuals,  on  which,  by  what  are  called  banking  privileges,  they  are  permit 
ted  to  do  business  and  make  profit ;  and,  so  far  from  creating  credit  or  capital, 
they,  in  fact,  add  not  a  cent  of  capital  or  credit  to  that  which  previously  existed. 


348  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

But  the  senator  next  tells  us  that  there  is  three  hundred  millions  of  banking 
capital  in  the  Union,  and  that  it  is  real  bona  fide  solid  capital,  as  much  so  as  the 
plantations  of  the  South.  This  is  certainly  news  to  me.  I  had  supposed  that 
this  vast  amount  was  little  more  than  a  fictitious  mass  of  credit  piled  on  credit, 
in  the  erection  of  which  but  little  specie  or  real  capital  was  used ;  and  that, 
when  a  new  bank  was  created,  the  wheelbarrow  was  put  in  motion  to  roll  the 
specie  from  the  old  to  the  new  institution,  till  it  got  fully  under  way,  when  it 
was  rolled  back  again.  But  it  seems  that  all  this  is  a  mistake  ;  that  the  whole 
capital  is  actually  paid  in  cash,  and  is  as  solid  as  terra  firma  itself.  This  cer 
tainly  is  a  bold  assertion,  in  the  face  of  facts  daily  occurring.  There  have 
been,  if  I  mistake  not.  four  or  five  recent  bank  explosions  in  the  senator's  own 
town,  in  which  the  whole  vanished  into  thin  air,  leaving  nothing  behind  but 
ruin  and  desolation.  What  has  become  of  that  portion  of  his  solid  capital  ? 
Did  the  senator  ever  hear  of  a  plantation  thus  exploding  and  vanishing  ?  And 
I  would  be  glad  to  know  how  large  a  portion  of  his  three  hundred  millions  of 
solid  capital  will  finally  escape  in  the  same  way  ?  A  few  years  may  enable  us 
to  answer  this  question. 

The  senator  next,  by  way  of  illustration,  undertook  to  draw  a  distinction  be 
tween  bank  credit  and  government  credit,  or  public  stocks,  in  which  he  was 
not  very  successful.  It  would  be  no  difficult  task  to  prove  that  they  both  rest 
substantially  on  debt,  and  that  the  government  stock  may  be,  and  is  to  a  great 
extent,  actually  applied  in  the  same  mode  as  bank  credit  in  the  use  of  exchanges 
and  business.  It  in  fact  constitutes,  to  a  great  extent,  the  very  basis  of  banking 
operation  ;  but,  after  having  occupied  the  Senate  so  long,  it  would  be  unreason 
able  to  consume  their  time  on  what  was  introduced  as  a  mere  illustration. 

The  senator  next  undertook  to  prove  the  immense  advantage  of  banking  in 
stitutions.  He  asked,  What  would  be  done  with  the  surplus  capital  of  the  coun 
try,  if  it  could  not  be  invested  in  bank  stocks  ?  In  this  new  arid  growing  coun 
try,  with  millions  on  millions  of  lands  of  the  best  quality  still  lying  unimproved  ; 
with  vast  schemes  of  improvements,  constantly  requiring  capital ;  with  the  im 
mense  demand  for  labour  for  every  branch  of  business,  the  last  question  I  ever 
expected  to  hear  asked  is  that  propounded  by  the  senator.  I  had  supposed  the 
great  difficulty  was  to  find  capital,  and  not  how  to  dispose  of  it,  and  that  this 
difficulty  had  been  one  of  the  main  reasons  assigned  in  favour  of  the  banking 
system. 

The  next  benefit  he  attributed  to  the  system  was  the  vast  amount  of  lands 
which  had  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  public  into  that  of  individuals  of  late, 
which  he  estimated,  during  the  last  three  years,  at  thirty-six  millions  of  acres, 
forming  a  surface  equal  in  extent  to  England,  and  which,  he  stated,  would  rise 
in  value  greatly,  in  consequence  of  their  passing  into  private  hands.  That  this 
immense  transfer  has  been  effected  by  the  banks,  I  admit ;  but  that  it  is  to  be 
considered  an  advantage  to  the  country,  I  certainly  never  expected  to  hear  ut 
tered  anywhere,  especially  on  this  floor,  and  by  one  so  intelligent  as  the  sen 
ator.  I  had  supposed  it  was  infinitely  better  for  the  community  at  large,  and 
particularly  for  those  not  in  affluent  circumstances,  that  the  lands  should  remain 
in  possession  of  the  government  than  of  speculators,  till  wanted  for  settlement ; 
and  that  one  of  the  most  decided  objections  to  our  banking  system  is,  that  it  be 
comes  the  instrument  of  making  such  immense  transfers  whenever  the  currency 
becomes  excessive.  This  is  a  point  not  without  interest,  and  I  must  ask  the 
Senate  to  bear  with  me  while  I  pause  for  a  few  moments  to  explain  it. 

The  effect  of  an  expanding  currency  is  to  raise  prices,  and  to  put  speculation 
in  motion.  He  who  buys,  in  a  short  time  seems  to  realize  a  fortune,  and  every 
one  is  on  the  look-out  to  make  successful  investments  ;  and  thus  prices  receive 
a  constant  upward  impulse,  with  the  exception  of  the  public  lands,  the  price  of 
which  is  fixed  at  $1  25,  excepting  such  as  are  sold  at  public  auction.  The  rise 
of  other  landed  property  soon  creates  a  new  demand  for  the  public  lands,  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  349 

speculation  commences  its  giant  operations  in  that  quarter.  Vast  purchases  are 
35iade,  and  the  revenue  of  the  government  increases  in  proportion  to  the  increased 
sales.  The  payment  is  made  in  bank-notes,  and  these  pass  from  the  land-offices 
to  the  deposite  banks,  and  constitute  a  large  surplus  for  new  banking  facilities 
and  accommodations.  Applicants  from  all  quarters  press  in  to  partake  of  the 
rich  harvest,  and  the  notes  repass  into  the  hands  of  speculators,  to  be  reinvested 
in  the  purchase  of  public  lands.  They  again  pass  through  the  hands  of  re 
ceivers,  and  thence  to  the  banks,  and  again  to  the  speculators ;  and  every  revo 
lution  of  the  wheel  increases  the  swelling  tide,  which  sweeps  away  millions  of 
the  choicest  acres  from  the  government  to  the  monopolizers  for  bank-notes, 
•which,  in  the  end,  prove  as  worthless  as  the  paper  on  which  they  are  written. 
Had  this  process  not  been  arrested  by  the  Deposite  Act  of  1836,  and  had  the 
banks  avoided  an  explosion,  in  a  short  time  the  whole  of  the  public  domain,  the 
precious  inheritance  of  the  people  of  this  Union  and  their  descendants,  would 
have  passed  through  the  same  process  with  the  thirty-six  millions  of  acres 
which  the  senator  so  highly  commends.  What  took  place  then  will  again  take 
place  at  the  very  next  swell  of  the  paper  tide,  unless,  indeed,  this  bill  should 
become  a  law,  which  would  prove  an  effectual  check  against  its  recurrence. 

The  senator  next  attributes  our  extraordinary  advance  in  improvement  and 
prosperity  to  the  banking  system.  He  puts  down  as  nothing  our  free  institu 
tions  ;  the  security  in  which  the  people  enjoy  their  rights,  the  vast  extent  of 
our  country,  and  the  fertility  of  its  soil,  and  the  energy,  industry,  and  enterprise- 
of  the  stock  from  which  we  are  descended.  All  these,  it  seems,  are  as  dust. 
The  banks  are  everything,  and  without  them  we  would  have  been  but  little  ad 
vanced  in  improvement  or  prosperity.  It  is  much  more  easy  to  assign  our  pros 
perity  to  the  banking  system  than  to  prove  it.  That  in  its  early  stages  it  con 
tributed  to  give  an  impulse  to  industry  and  improvement,  I  do  not  deny  ;  but  that, 
in  its  present  excess,  it  impedes  rather  than  promotes  either,  I  hold  to  be  cer 
tain.  That  we  are  not  indebted  to  it  for  our  extraordinary  advance  and  im 
provements,  wholly  or  mainly,  there  is  an  argument  which  I  regard  as  decisive. 
Before  the  Revolution  we  had  no  banks,  and  yet  our  improvement  and  pros 
perity,  all  things  considered,  were  as  great  anterior  to  it  as  since,  whether  we 
xegard  the  increase  of  population  or  wealth.  At  that  time  not  a  bank-note  was 
to  be  seen,  and  the  whole  circulation  consisted  either  of  gold  and  silver,  or  the 
colonial  paper  money,  which  all  now,  and  especially  the  senator,  consider  so 
worthless.  Had  the  senator  lived  during  that  period,  he  might,  with  equal 
plausibility,  have  attributed  all  the  improvement  and  prosperity  of  the  country  to 
the  old  colonial  paper  money,  as  he  now  does  to  the  banks  ;  and  have  denounced 
any  attempt  to  change  or  improve  it  as  an  overthrow  of  the  credit  system,  as 
warmly  as  he  now  does  the  separation  of  the  government  from  the  banks.  I  tell 
the  senator  that  the  time  is  coming  when  his  present  defence  of  the  banking 
system,  as  it  is  now  organized,  will  be  considered  as  extraordinary  as  we  now 
would  regard  a  defence  of  the  old  and  exploded  system  of  colonial  paper  money. 
He  seems  not  to  see  that  the  system  has  reached  a  point  where  great  changes 
are  unavoidable,  and  without  which  the  whole  will  explode.  The  state  of  its 
manhood  and  vigour  has  passed,  and  it  is  now  far  advanced  in  that  of  decrepi 
tude.  The  whole  system  must  be  reformed,  or  it  must  perish  in  the  natural 
course  of  events.  The  first  step  towards  its  renovation  is  the  measure  he  de 
nounces  in  such  unmeasured  terms — the  separation  from  the  government ;  and 
the  next  a  separation  between  discount  and  circulation.  The  two  are  incom 
patible  ;  and  so  long  as  they  are  united,  those  frequent  vicissitudes  of  contractions 
and  expansions,  to  which  bank  circulation  is  so  subject,  and  which  is  rapidly 
bringing  it  into  discredit,  must  continue  to  increase  in  frequency  and  intensity,  till 
it  shall  become  as  completely  discredited  as  Continental  money. 

The  senator  seems  not  to  be  entirely  unaware  of  the  danger  to  which  the 
system  is  exposed  from  its  frequent  vibrations  and  catastrophes.     He  tells  us, 


350  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

by  way  of  apology,  that  had  it  not  been  for  the  specie  circular,  the  present  catas 
trophe  would  not  have  occurred.  That  it  hastened  it,  I  do  not  in  the  least 
doubt ;  but  that  we  should  have  escaped  without  it,  I  wholly  deny.  The  causes 
of  the  explosion  lay  deep — far  beneath  the  circulars,  and  nothing  but  the  most 
efficient  measures,  during  the  session  immediately  after  the  removal  of  the  de- 
posites,  could  have  prevented  it.  That  was  the  crisis,  which,  having  passed 
without  doing  anything,  what  has  since  followed  was  inevitable.  But  admit 
ting  what  he  says  to  be  true,  what  a  .picture  of  the  system  does  it  exhibit  I 
How  frail  how,  unstable  must  it  be,  when  a  single  act  of  the  executive  could 
bring  it  to  the  ground,  and  spread  ruin  over  the  country !  And  shall  we  again 
renew  our  connexion  with  such  a  system,  so  liable,  from  the  slightest  cause,  to 
such  disasters  ?  Does  it  not  conclusively  show  that  there  is  some  deep  and 
inherent  defect  in  its  very  constitution,  which  renders  it  too  unsafe  to  confide 
in  without  some  radical  and  thorough  reform  ? 

The  senator  himself  seems  conscious  of  this.  He  entered  into  the  question 
of  its  expansions  and  contractions,  and  suggested  several  remedies  to  correct  an 
evil  which  none  can  deny,  and  which  all  must  see,  if  not  corrected,  must  end 
in  the  final  overthrow  of  the  system.  He  told  us  that  the  remedy  was  to  be 
found  in  the  proportion  between  bullion  and  circulation,  and  that  the  proper  rule 
to  enforce  the  due  proportion  between  the  two  was,  when  exchange  was 
against  us,  for  the  banks  to  curtail.  I  admit  that  the  disease  originates  in  the 
undue  proportion,  not  between  bullion  and  circulation,  but  between  it  and  the 
liabilities  of  the  banks,  including  deposites  as  well  as  circulation  (the  former  is 
even  more  important  than  the  latter),  and  that  the  remedy  must  consist  in  en 
forcing  that  proportion.  But  two  questions  here  present  themselves  :  What  is 
that  due  proportion  ?  and  how  is  it,  under  our  system  of  banking,  to  be  enfor 
ced  ?  There  is  one  proportion  which  we  know  to  be  safe  ;  and  that  is  when,  for 
every  dollar  of  liability,  there  is  a  dollar  in  bullion  or  specie  ;  but  this  would 
bring  us  back  again  to  the  old,  honest,  and  substantial  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  so 
much  abused  by  all  the  advocates  of  banks  of  discount.  If  that  proportion  be 
transcended — if  we  admit  two  or  three  to  one  to  be  the  due  proportion,  or  any 
other  that  would  make  banking  more  profitable  and  eligible  than  the  mere  loan 
ing  of  money,  or  other  pursuits  of  society,  the  evil  under  which  we  now  suffer 
would  continue.  Too  much  capital  would  continue  to  flow  into  banking,  to  be 
again  followed  by  the  excess  of  the  system,  with  all  its  train  of  disasters.  But 
admit  that  such  would  not  be  the  fact,  how  are  we  to  compel  the  twenty-six 
states  of  this  Union  to  enforce  the  due  proportion,  all  of  which  exercise  the 
right  of  establishing  banks  at  pleasure,  and  on  such  principles  as  they  may 
choose  to  adopt  ?  It  can  only  be  done  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution ; 
and  is  there  any  one  so  wild  and  visionary  as  to  believe  that  there  is  the  least 
prospect  of  such  an  amendment  ?  Let  gentlemen  who  acknowledge  the  defect, 
before  they  insist  on  a  reunion  with  a  system,  acknowledged  to  be  exposed,  as 
as  it  now  stands,  to  such  frequent  and  dangerous  vicissitudes,  first  apply  a  rem 
edy  and  remove  the  defect,  and  then  ask  for  our  co-operation. 

But  the  senator  tells  us  that  the  means  of  enforcing  the  due  proportion  is  to 
be  found  in  the  regulation  of  the  exchanges  ;  and  for  this  purpose  the  only  rule 
necessary  to  be  observed  is  to  curtail  when  exchanges  are  against  us,  and  as  a 
counterpart,  I  suppose,  to  enlarge  when  in  our  favour.  How  much  dependance 
is  to  be  put  on  this  rule,  we  have  a  strong  illustration  in  the  late  catastrophe, 
under  which  the  country  is  now  suffering.  The  exchanges  remained  in  our 
favour  till  the  very  last ;  and  before  the  rule,  on  which  the  senator  so  confi 
dently  relies,  could  be  applied,  the  shock  was  felt  and  the  banks  ingulfed ;  and 
this  will  ever  be  the  case,  when  preceded  by  a  general  expansion  in  the  com 
mercial  world,  such  as  preceded  the  late. 

The  cause  of  that  commenced  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  origina 
ted  mainly  in  the  provisions  on  which  the  recharter  of  the  Bank  of  England 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  351 

was  renewed,  which  greatly  favoured  extension  of  banking  operations  in  a 
country  which  may  be  considered  as  the  centre  of  the  commercial  system  of 
the  world.  The  effect  of  these  provisions  was  a  depreciation  of  the  value  of 
gold  and  silver  there,  and  their  consequent  expulsion  to  other  countries,  and 
especially  to  ours,  which  turned  the  exchange  with  England  in  our  favour  ;  and 
which,  in  combination  with  other  causes,  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  the 
expiration  of  the  charter  of  the  late  Bank  of  the  United  States,  was  followed  by 
a  great  corresponding  expansion  of  our  banking  system.  The  result  of  this 
state  of  things  was  a  great  increase  of  the  liabilities  of  the  banks  compared 
with  their  specie  in  both  countries,  which  laid  the  train  for  the  explosion.  The 
Bank  of  England  first  took  the  alarm,  and  began  to  prepare  to  meet  the  threat 
ened  calamity.  It  was  unavoidable,  and  the  onry  question  was,  where  it  should 
fall.  The  weakness  of  our  system,  and  the  comparative  strength  of  theirs,  turn 
ed  the  shock  on  ours,  but  of  the  approach  of  which  the  exchanges  gave,  as  I 
have  stated,  no  indications  almost  to  the  last  moment.  And  even  then,  so  arti 
ficial  are  exchanges,  and  so  liable  to  be  influenced  by  other  causes  besides  the 
excess  of  currency  on  one  side  and  the  deficit  on  the  other,  after  it  began  to 
show  unfavourable  indications,  we  all  remember  that  a  single  individual,  at  the 
head  of  a  state  institution,  I  mean  Mr.  Biddle,  by  appearing  in  New- York,  and 
bringing  into  market  bonds  on  England  drawn  on  time,  turned  the  current,  and 
restored  the  exchange.  All  this  conclusively  proves,  that  when  there  is  a  gen 
eral  expansion  (the  most  dangerous  of  all),  exchanges  give  no  indication  of  the 
approach  of  danger,  and,  of  course,  their  regulation,  on  which  the  senator  relies, 
affords  no  protection  against  it. 

I  might  go  farther,  and  show  that  at  no  time  is  it  to  be  relied  on  as  the  index 
of  the  relative  expansion  or  contraction  in  different  countries,  and  that  it  is  lia 
ble  to  be  influenced  by  many  circumstances  besides  those  to  which  I  have  al 
luded,  some  of  which  are  fleeting,  and  others  more  permanent.  It  presupposes 
the  perfect  fluidity  of  currency,  and  that  it  is  not  liable  to  be  obstructed  or  im 
peded  by  natural  or  artificial  causes  in  its  ebbs  and  flows ;  which  is  far  from 
being  true,  as  I  have  already  shown  in  the  instance  of  Mr.  Biddle's  operation 
preceding  the  late  shock.  In  fact,  it  may  be  laid  down  as  a  rule,  that  where 
the  currency  consists  of  convertible  paper,  resting  on  a  gold  and  silver  basis,  the 
small  portion  of  specie  which  may  be  required  to  uphold  the  whole  has  its  flu 
idity  obstructed  by  so  many  and  sucli  powerful  causes  as  to  afford  no  certain 
criterion  of  the  relative  expansion  of  the  currency  between  it  and  other  coun 
tries,  and,  of  course,  afford  no  certain  rule  of  regulating  banking  operations. 
The  subject  is  one  that  would  require  more  time  to  discuss  than  1  can  bestow 
on  the  present  occasion ;  but  of  its  truth  we  have  a  strong  illustration  in  the 
state  of  things  preceding  the  late  shock,  when,  as  I  have  stated,  the  exchanges 
remained  favourable  to  the  banks,  while  the  vast  amount  of  our  imports,  and  the 
unusual  character  of  many  of  the  articles  imported,  clearly  indicated  that  our 
currency  was  relatively  greatly  expanded  compared  with  those  countries  with 
which  we  have  commercial  relations. 

To  correct  the  defects  of  the  system,  the  senator  must  go  much  deeper. 
The  evil  lies  in  its  strong  tendency  to  increase ;  and  that,  again,  in  the  extra 
ordinary  and  vast  advantages  which  are  conferred  on  it  beyond  all  other  pur 
suits  of  the  community,  which,  if  not  diminished,  must  terminate  in  its  utter  de 
struction,  or  an  entire  revolution  in  our  social  and  political  system.  It  is  not 
possible  that  the  great  body  of  the  community  will  patiently  bear  that  the  cur 
rency,  which  ought  to  be  the  most  stable  of  all  things,  should  be  the  most  fluc 
tuating  and  uncertain ;  and  that,  too,  in  defiance  of  positive  provisions  in  the 
Constitution,  which  all  acknowledge  were  intended  to  give  it  the  greatest  pos 
sible  stability. 


352  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

XXIII. 

SPEECH   ON    THE   BILL    TO   PREVENT   THE    INTERFERENCE    OF   CERTAIN   FEDERAL 
OFFICERS    IN    ELECTIONS,   FEBRUARY   22,    1839. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said:  I  belong,  Mr.  President,  to  that  political  school 
which  regards  with  a  jealous  eye  the  patronage  of  this  government,  and 
believes  that  the  less  its  patronage  the  better,  consistently  with  the  ob 
jects  for  which  the  government  was  instituted.  Thus  thinking,  I  have 
made  no  political  move  of  any  importance,  for  the  last  twelve  or  thirteen 
years,  which  had  not  for  its  object,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  reduction 
of  patronage.  But,  notwithstanding  this,  I  cannot  bring  my  mind  to  sup 
port  this  bill,  decidedly  as  1  approve  of  its  object.  Among  other  diffi 
culties,  there  is  a  constitutional  objection  which  I  cannot  surmount,  and 
which  I  shall,  without  farther  remark,  proceed  to  state  and  consider. 

This  bill  proposes  to  inflict  the  penalty  of  dismission  on  a  large  class 
of  the  officers  of  this  government  who  shall  electioneer,  or  attempt  to 
control  or  influence  the  election  of  public  functionaries  either  of  the 
General  or  State  Governments,  without  distinguishing  between  their  offi 
cial  and  individual  character  as  citizens  $  and  the  question  is,  Has  Con 
gress  the  constitutional  right  to  pass  such  a  law!  That,  again,  involves 
a  prior,  and  still  more  general  question :  Has  this  government  the  author 
ity  to  interfere  with  the  electoral  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the  states  1 

In  considering  this  general  question,  I  shall  assume,  in  the  first  place, 
what  none  will  deny,  that  it  belongs  to  the  states  separately  to  determine 
who  shall,  and  who  shall  not,  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage ;  and,  in  the 
second,  that  it  belongs  to  them,  in  like  manner,  to  regulate  that  right ,-  that 
is,  to  pass  all  laws  that  may  be  necessary  to  secure  its  free  exercise  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  prevent  its  abuse  on  the  other.  I  iiext  advance  the 
proposition,  which  no  one  in  the  least  conversant  with  our  institutions,  or 
familiar  with  the  Constitution,  will  venture  to  question,  that,  as  far  as 
citizens  are  concerned,  this  right  belongs  solely  to  the  states,  to  the  entire  ex 
clusion  of  the  General  Government,  which  can  in  no  wise  touch  or  interfere 
with  it  without  transcending  the  limits  of  the  Constitution.  Thus  far 
there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion. 

But  a  citizen  may  be  also  an  officer  of  this  government,  which  brings 
tip  the  question,  Has  it  the  right  to  make  it  penal  for  him  to  use  his  offi 
cial  power  to  control  or  influence  elections  !  Can  it,  for  instance,  make 
it  penal  in  a  collector  or  other  officer  who  holds  a  bond,  in  his  official 
character,  on  a  citizen,  to  threaten  to  enforce  it  if  he  should  refuse  to 
vote  for  his  favourite  candidate  1  I  regard  this  proposition  as  not  less 
clear  than  the  preceding.  Whenever  the  government  invests  an  indi 
vidual  with  power  which  may  be  used  to  the  injury  of  others  or  the  pub 
lic,  it  is  manifest  that  it  not  only  has  the  right,  but  that  it  is  in  duty 
bound  to  prevent  its  abuse,  as  far  as  practicable.  But  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  a  citizen  does  not  cease  to  be  one  in  becoming  a  federal 
officer.  This  government  must,  accordingly,  take  special  care,  in  sub 
jecting  him  to  penalties  for  the  abuse  of  his  official  powers,  that  it  does 
not  interfere  in  any  wise  with  his  private  rights  as  a  citizen,  and  which 
are,  as  has  been  stated,  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  states.  But 
no  such  care  is  taken  either  in  this  bill  or  the  substitute  proposed  by  its 
author.  Neither  makes  any  distinction  whatever  between  the  official  find 
private  acts  of  the  officer  as  a  citizen.  The  broadest  and  most  comprehen 
sive  terms  are  used,  comprehending  and  subjecting  all  acts,  without  dis 
crimination  as  to  character,  to  the  proposed  penalty.  Under  its  pro- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  353 

visions,  if  an  officer  should  express  an  opinion  of  any  candidate,  say  of 
a  president,  who  was  a  candidate  for  re-election,  whether  favourable  or 
unfavourable,  or  to  whisper  an  opinion  relating  to  his  administration, 
whether  good  or  bad,  he  would  subject  himself  to  the  penalty  of  this  bill, 
as  certainly  as  if  he  had  brought  the  whole  of  his  official  power  to  bear 
directly  on  the  freedom  of  election.  That  a  bill,  containing  such  broad 
and  indiscriminate  provisions,  transcends  the  powers  of  Congress,  and 
violates  in  the  officer  the  electoral  rights  of  the  citizen,  held  under  the 
authority  of  his  state,  and  guarantied  by  the  provision  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  which  secures  the  freedom  of  speech  to  all,  is  too  clear,  after  what 
has  been  said,  to  require  additional  illustration.  It  cannot  pass  without 
enlarging  the  power  of  the  government  by  the  abridgment  of  the  rights 
of  the  citizen. 

But  it  may  be  replied,  that  these  are  instances  where  the  government 
has  subjected  its  officers  to  penalties  for  acts  of  a  private  character,  over 
which  the  Constitution  has  given  it  no  control.  Such,  undoubtedly,  is  the 
fact,  and  its  right  to  do  so,  in  the  instances  referred  to  in  the  discussion, 
cannot  be  denied ;  but  all  such  cases  are  distinguished  from  that  under 
consideration  by  lines  too  broad  to  be  mistaken.  In  all  of  them,  the  acts 
prohibited  were,  in  the  first  place,  such  as  were  incompatible  with  the 
official  duties  enjoined;  as  in  the  case  of  the  prohibition  of  commissaries 
to  purchase  or  deal  in  articles  similar  to  those  that  are  made  their  official 
duty  to  purchase,  in  order  to  prevent  fraud  on  the  public.  And  in  the 
next,  the  acts  prohibited  involved  only  civil  rights,  belonging  to  the  officer 
as  an  individual,  and  not  political  rights,  which  belong  to  him  as  a  citizen. 
The  former  he  may  yield  at  pleasure,  without  discredit  or  disgrace,  but 
the  latter  he  cannot  surrender  without  debasing  himself,  and  giving  up  a 
sacred  trust  vested  in  him,  by  the  state  of  which  he  is  a  member,  for  the 
common  good ;  nor  can  this  government  demand  its  surrender  without 
transcending  its  powers,  and  infringing  the  rights  of  the  states  and  their 
citizens. 

It  may  also  be  said  that,  in  most  cases,  it  would  be  impossible  to  dis 
tinguish  between  the  official  and  the  political  acts  of  the  officer,  so  as  to 
subject  the  former  to  penal  restraints,  without  interfering  with  the  latter  ; 
and  that  it  would,  in  practice,  render  ineffective  the  admitted  right  of  the 
government  to  punish  its  officers  for  the  abuse  of  their  official  powers. 
It  may  be  so,  but  little  or  no  evil  can  result.  Whatever  defect  of  right 
this  government  may  labour  under  in  such  cases,  is  amply  made  up  by 
the  plenary  power  of  the  states,  which  has  an  unlimited  control  over  the 
electoral  rights  of  its  citizens,  whether  officers  of  this  government  or  not. 
To  them  the  subject  may  be  safely  confided.  It  is  they  who  are  partic 
ularly  interested  in  seeing  that  a  right  so  sacred  shall  not  be  abused,  nor 
the  freedom  of  election  be  impaired.  We  must  not  forget  that  states  and 
the  people  of  the  states  are  our  constituents  and  superiors,  and  we  but 
their  agents ;  and  that,  if  the  right  in  question  be  abused,  or  the  freedom 
of  election  be  impaired,  it  is  they,  and  not  we,  who  must  mainly  suffer, 
and  who,  of  course,  are  the  best  judges  of  the  evil  and  the  remedy.  If 
the  policy  of  the  states  demands  it,  they  may  impose  whatever  restraint 
they  please  on  the  federal  officers  within  their  respective  limits,  in  order 
to  guard  against  their  control  or  influence  in  elections,  and,  if  it  be  neces 
sary,  to  divest  them  entirely  of  the  right  of  suffrage.  To  those  who  are 
so  much  more  interested  and  competent  to  judge  and  act  on  this  subject 
than  we  are,  I  am  for  leaving  the  decision  as  to  what  ought  to  be  done, 
and  the  application  of  the  remedy.  Entertaining  these  views,  I  am  forced 
to  the  conclusion  that  this  bill  is  unconstitutional,  and,  if  there  were  no 
other  reason  to  oppose  its  passage,  I  should  be  compelled  to  vote  against  it. 

Y  Y 


354  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

But  there  are  others  sufficiently  decisive  to  compel  me  to  withhold  my 
support,  were  it  possible  to  remove  the  constitutional  objection.  So  far 
from  restricting  the  patronage  of  the  President,  should  the  bill  become  a 
law,  it  would,  if  I  mistake  not,  greatly  increase  his  influence.  He  has 
now  the  almost  unlimited  power  of  removing  the  officers  of  this  govern 
ment  :  a  power,  the  abuse  of  which  has  been  the  subject  of  much,  and,  in 
my  opinion,  of  just  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  chamber  to  which  the 
mover  of  this  bill  belongs,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  calculated  to  increase 
unduly  the  power  and  influence  of  that  department  of  the  government. 
Now,  what  is  the  remedy  this  bill  proposes  for  that  evil  1  To  put  re'stric- 
tions  on  the  removing  power]  The  very  reverse.  To  make  it  the  duty^ 
as  it  is  now  the  right  of  the  President,  to  remove  ;  and,  in  discharging  this 
high  duty,  he  is  made  the  sole  judge,  without  limitation  or  appeal.  The 
fate  of  the  accused  would  be  exclusively  in  his  hand,  whether  charged 
with  the  offence  of  opposing  or  supporting  his  administration.  Can  any 
one,  the  least  conversant  with  party  morals,  or  the  working  of  the  human 
heart,  doubt  how  the  law  would  be  executed!  Is  it  not  certain  that  it 
would  be  most  rigidly  enforced  against  all  officers  who  should  venture  to 
oppose  him,  either  in  the  Federal  or  State  Governments,  with  a  corre 
sponding  indulgence  and  lenity  towards  those  who  supported  him  1  A. 
single  view,  without  prolonging  the  discussion,  will  decide.  Should  there 
be  a  president  of  such  exalted  virtue  and  patriotism  as  to  make  no  dis 
crimination  between  friend  and  foe,  the  law  would  be  perfectly  useless  j 
but  if  not,  it  would  be  made  the  pretext  for  indiscriminate  removal  of  all 
who  may  refuse  to  become  his  active  and  devoted  partisans  5  and  it  would 
thus  prove  either  useless,  or  worse  than  useless. 

With  the  object  which  the  mover  of  the  bill  has  in  view,  it  seems  to 
me  he  ought  to  take  the  very  opposite  course  ;  and,  instead  of  making  it 
the  duty  of  the  President  to  remove,  he  ought  to  impose  restrictions  on 
the  power  of  removal,  or  to  divest  him  entirely  of  it.  Place  the  office 
holders,  with  their  yearly  salaries,  beyond  the  reach  of  the  executive 
power,  and  they  would  in  a  short  time  be  as  mute  and  inactive  as  this 
bill  proposes  to  make  them.  Their  voice,  I  promise,  would  then  be 
scarcely  raised  at  elections,  or  their  persons  be  faund  at  the  polls. 

But  suppose  the  immediate  ofoject  of  the  bill  accomplished,  and  the 
office-holders  rendered  perfectly  silent  and  passive,  it  might  even  then  be 
doubted  whether  it  would  cause  any  diminution  in  the  influence  of  patron 
age  over  elections.  It  would,  indeed,  greatly  reduce  the  influence  of  the 
office-holders.  .  They  would  become  the  most  insignificant  portion  of  the 
community,  as  far  as  elections  were  concerned.  But  just  in  the  same 
proportion  as  they  might  sink,  the  no  less  formidable  corps  of  office-seek 
ers  would  rise  in  importance.  The  struggle  for  power  between  the  ins 
and  the  outs  would  not  abate  in  the  least,  in  violence  or  intensity,  by  the 
silence  or  inactivity  of  the  office-holders,  as  the  amount  of  patronage,  the 
stake  contended  for,  would  remain  undiminished.  Both  sides,  those  in 
and  those  out  of  power,  would  turn  from  the  passive  and  silent  body  of 
incumbents,  and  court  the  favour  of  the  active  corps  that  panted  to  sup 
plant  them  ;  and  the  lesult  would  be  an  annual  sweep  of  the  former,  after 
every  election,  to  mak^  room  to  reward  the  latter,  and  that  on  whichever 
side  the  scale  of  victory  might  turn.  The  consequence  would  be  rotation 
with  a  vengeance.  The  wheel  would  turn  round  with  such  velocity  that 
anything  like  a  stable  system  of  policy  would  be  impossible.  Each  tem 
porary  occupant  that  might  be  thrown  into  office  by  the  whirl,  would 
seize  the  moment  to  make  the  most  of  his  good  fortune  before  he  might 
be  displaced  by  his  successor,  and  a  system  (if  such  it  might  be  called) 
would  follow  not  less  corrupting  than  unstable. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  355 

With  these  decisive  objections,  I  cannot  give  my  support  to  the  bill ; 
but  I  wish  it  to  be  distinctly  understood  that,  in  withholding  it,  I  neither 
retract  nor  modify  any  sentiment  I  have  expressed  in  relation  to  the  pat 
ronage  of  this  government.  I  have  looked  over,  since  the  commence 
ment  of  this  discussion,  the  report  I  made  as  chairman  of  a  select  com 
mittee  on  the  subject  in  1835,  and  which  has  been  so  frequently  referred 
to  in  debate  by  those  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  chamber,  and  I  find 
nothing  which  I  would  omit  if  I  had  now  to  draw  it,  but  much  which 
time  and  reflection  would  induce  me  to  add,  to  strengthen  the  grounds  I 
then  assumed.  There  is  not  a  sentence  in  it  incompatible  with  the  views 
I  have  presented  on  the  present  occasion. 

I  might  here,  Mr.  President,  terminate  my  remarks,  as  far  as  this  bill 
is  concerned;  but  as  the  general  question  of  patronage  is  at  all  times  one 
of  importance  under  our  system  of  government,  and  especially  so,  in  my 
opinion,  at  this  present  juncture,  I  trust  that  I  shall  be  indulged  in  offer 
ing  my  opinion  somewhat  more  at  large  in  reference  to  it. 

If  it  be  desirable  to  reduce  the  patronage  of  the  government  (and  I 
hold  it  to  be  eminently  so),  we  must  strike  at  the  source — the  root,  and 
not  the  branches.  It  is  the  only  way  that  will  not,  in  the  end,  prove  falla 
cious.  The  main  sources  of  patronage  may  be  found  in  the  powers,  the 
revenue,  and  the  expenditures  of  the  government ;  and  the  first  and  neces 
sary  step  towards  its  reduction  is  to  restrict  the  powers  of  this  government 
within  the  rigid  limits  prescribed  by  the  Constitution.  Every  extension  of  its 
powers  beyond  would  bring  within  its  control  subjects  never  intended 
to  be  placed  there,  followed  by  increased  patronage,  and  augmented  ex 
penditure  and  revenue. 

We  must,  in  the  next  place,  take  care  not  to  call  the  acknowledged 
powers  of  the  government  into  action  beyond  the  limits  which  the  com 
mon  interest  may  render  necessary,  nor  to  pervert  them  into  means  of 
doing  what  it  was  never  intended  by  the  Constitution  we  should  have  the 
right  to  do.  Of  all  the  sources  of  power  and  influence,  the  perversion, 
of  the  powers  of  the  government  has  proved,  in  practice,  the  most  fruit 
ful  and  dangerous  ;  of  which  our  political  history  furnishes  many  exam 
ples,  especially  in  reference  to  the  money  power,  as  will  appear  in  the 
course  of  my  remarks. 

After  restricting  the  powers  of  the  government  within  proper  limits, 
the  next  important  step  would  be  to  bring  down  the  income  and  expen 
ditures  to  the  smallest  practicable  amount.  It  is  a  primary  maxim  under 
our  system,  to  collect  no  more  money  than  is  necessary  to  the  economi 
cal  and  constitutional  wants  of  the  government.  We  have,  in  fact,  no 
right  to  collect  a  cent  more.  Nothing  can  tend  more  powerfully  to  cor 
rupt  public  and  private  morals,  or  to  increase  the  patronage  of  the  gov 
ernment,  than  an  excessive  or  surplus  revenue,  as  recent  and  sad  experi 
ence  has  abundantly  proved.  Nor  is  it  less  important  to  restrict  the  ex 
penditures  within  the  income.  It  is,  in  fact,  indispensable  to  a  restricted 
revenue,  as  the  increase  of  the  former  must,  in  the  end,  lead  to  an  in 
crease  of  the  latter.  Nor  must  an  exact  administration,  and  a  rigid  ac 
countability  in  every  department  of  the  government,  be  neglected.  It  is 
among  the  most  efficient  means  of  keeping  down  patronage  and  corrup 
tion,  as  well  as  the  revenue  and  expenditures,  just  as  the  opposite  is 
among  the  most  prolific  source  of  both. 

It  is  thus,  and  thus  only,  that  we  can  reduce  effectually  the  patronage 
of  the  government  to  the  least  amount  consistent  with  the  discharge  of 
the  few  but  important  duties  with  which  it  is  charged,  and  render  it, 
what  the  Constitution  intended  it  should  be,  a  cheap  and  simple  govern 
ment,  instituted  by  the  states  for  their  mutual  security,  and  more  perfect 


356  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

protection  of  their  liberty  and  tranquillity.  It  is  the  way  pointed  out  by 
Jefferson  and  his  associates  of  the  Virginia  school,  which  has  ever  been 
distinguished  for  its  jealous  opposition  to  patronage,  as  the  bane  of  our 
political  system,  as  is  so  powerfully  illustrated  in  the  immortal  documents 
so  frequently  referred  to  in  this  duscussion — the  report  to  the  Virginia 
Legislature  on  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Law,  in  the  year  1799. 

But  there  is,  and  ever  has  been  from  the  first,  another  and  opposing 
school,  that  regarded  patronage  with  a  very  different  eye,  not  as  a  bane, 
but  as  an  essential  ingredient,  without  which  the  government  would  be 
impracticable  ;  and  whose  leading  policy  is,  to  enlist  in  its  favour  the 
more  powerful  classes  of  society,  through  their  interest,  as  indispensable 
to  its  support.  If  we  cannot  take  lessons  from  this  school  on  the  ques 
tion  of  reduction  of  patronage,  we  may  at  least  learn,  what  is  of  vast  im 
portance  to  be  known,  how,  and  by  what  means  this  school  has  reared  up 
a  system,  which  has  added  so  vastly  to  the  power  and  patronage  of  the 
government,  beyond  what  was  contemplated  by  its  framers,  as  to  alarm 
its  wisest  and  best  friends  for  its  fate.  With  the  view  of  furnishing  this 
information,  so  intimately  connected  with  the  object  of  these  remarks,  I 
propose  to  give  a  very  brief  and  rapid  narrative  of  the  rise  and  progress 
of  that  system. 

At  the  head  of  this  school  stands  the  name  of  Hamilton,  than  which 
there  is  none  more  distinguished  in  our  political  history.  He  is  the  per 
fect  type  and  impersonation  of  the  National  or  Federal  school  (I  use 
party  names  with  reluctance,  and  only  for  the  sake  of  brevity),  as  Jeffer 
son  is  of  the  State  Rights  Republican  school.  They  were  both  men  of 
eminent  talent,  ardent  patriotism,  great  boldness,  and  comprehensive  and 
systematic  understanding.  They  were  both  men  who  fixed  on  a  single 
object  far  ahead,  and  converged  all  their  powers  towards  its  accomplish 
ment.  The  difference  between  them  is,  that  Jefferson  had  more  genius, 
Hamilton  more  abilities ;  the  former  leaned  more  to  the  side  of  liberty, 
and  his  great  rival  more  to  that  of  power.  They  both  have  impressed 
themselves  deeply  on  the  movements  of  the  government ;  but,  as  yet, 
Hamilton  far  more  so  than  Jefferson,  though  the  impression  of  the  latter 
is  destined  in  the  end,  as  I  trust,  to  prove  the  more  durable  of  the  two. 

It  has  been  the  good  fortune  of  the  school  of  which  Mr.  Jefferson  is  the 
head  to  imbody  their  principles  and  doctrines  in  written  documents  (the 
report  referred  to,  and  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Resolutions),  which  are 
the  acknowledged  creed  of  the  party,  and  may  at  all  times  be  referred  to 
in  order  to  ascertain  what  they  are  in  fact.  The  opposite  school  has  left 
no  such  written  and  acknowledged  creed,  but  the  declaration  and  acts 
of  its  great  leader  leave  little  doubt  as  to  either  its  principles  or  doctrines. 
In  tracing  them,  a  narrative  of  his  life  and  acts  need  not  be  given.  It  will 
suffice  to  say,  that  he  entered  early  in  life  into  the  army  of  the  Revolu 
tion,  and  became  a  member  of  the  military  family  of  Washington,  whose 
confidence  he  gained  and  retained  to  the  last.  He  next  appeared  in  the 
convention  which  framed  the  Constitution,  where,  with  his  usual  boldness, 
he  advocated  a  President  and  Senate  for  life,  and  the  appointment,  by  this 
government,  of  the  governors  of  the  states,  with  a  veto  on  state  laws. 
These  bold  measures  failing,  he  retired  from  the  convention,  it  is  said,  in 
disgust ;  but  afterward,  on  more  mature  reflection,  became  the  zealous 
and  able  advocate  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  He  saw,  as  he 
thought,  in  a  scheme  of  government  which  conferred  the  unlimited  power 
of  taxing  and  declaring  war,  the  almost  unbounded  source  of  power,  in 
resolute  and  able  hands  ;  hence  his  declaration,  that  though  the  gov 
ernment  was  weak  in  its  organization,  it  would,  when  put  in  action,  find 
the  means  of  supporting  itself:  a  profound  reflection,  proving  that  he 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  357 

clearly  saw  how  to  make  it,  in  practice,  what  his  movements  in  the  Con 
vention  had  failed  to  accomplish  in  its  organization.  Nor  has  he  left  it 
in  doubt  as  to  what  were  the  means  on  which  he  relied  to  effect  his  ob 
ject.  We  all  recollect  the  famous  assertion  of  the  elder  Adams,  that  the 
"  British  Constitution,"  restored  to  its  original  principles,  and  freed  from 
corruption,  was  the  wisest  and  best  ever  formed  by  naan ;  and  Hamilton's 
reply,  that  the  British  Constitution,  freed  from  corruption,  would  be  im 
practicable,  but,  with  its  corruption,  was  the  best  that  ever  existed.  To 
realize  what  was  intended  by  this  great  man,  it  must  be  understood  that 
he  meant  not  corruption  in  its  usual  sense  of  bribery.  He  was  too  able 
and  patriotic  to  resort  to  such  means,  or  to  the  petty  policy  of  this  bill. 
Either  of  these  modes  of  operation  was  on  too  small  a  scale  for  him. 
Like  all  great  and  comprehensive  minds,  he  acted  on  masses,  without 
much  regard  to  individuals.  He  meant  by  corruption  something  far 
more  powerful  and  comprehensive ;  that  policy  which  systematically 
favoured  the  great  and  powerful  classes  of  society,  with  the  view  of 
binding  them,  through  their  interest,  to  the  support  of  the  government. 
This  was  the  single  object  of  his  policy,  and  to  which  he  strictly  and 
resolutely  adhered  throughout  his  career,  but  which,  whether  suited  or 
not  to  the  British  system  of  government,  is,  as  time  has  shown,  uncon 
genial  and  dangerous  to  ours. 

After  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
treasury  department,  a  position  which  gave  full  scope  to  his  abilities,  and 
placed  ample  means  at  his  disposal  to  rear  up  the  system  he  meditated. 
Well  and  skilfully  did  he  use  them.  His  first  measure  was  the  adoption 
of  the  funding  system,  on  the  British  model;  and  on  this  the  two  schools, 
which  have  ever  since,  under  one  form  or  another,  divided  the  country, 
and  ever  will  divide  it,  so  long  as  the  government  endures,  came  into 
conflict.  They  were  both  in  favour  of  keeping  the  public  faith,  but  differed 
as  to  the  mode  of  assuming  the  public  debt,  and  the  amount  that  ought 
to  be  assumed.  The  policy  of  Hamilton  prevailed.  The  amount  as 
sumed  was  about  $80,000,000,  a  v#st  sum  for  a  country  so  impoverished, 
and  with  a  population  so  inconsiderable  as  we  then  had.  The  creation 
of  the  system,  and  the  assumption  of  so  large  a  debt,  gave  a  decided  and 
powerful  impulse  to  the  government,  in  the  direction  in  which  it  has  since 
continued  to  move,  almost  constantly. 

This  was  followed  by  a  measure  adopted  on  his  own  responsibility,  and 
in  the  face  of  law,  but  which,  though  at  the  time  it  attracted  little  atten 
tion  or  opposition,  has  proved  the  most  powerful  of  all  the  means  em 
ployed  in  rearing  up  and  maintaining  his  favourite  system.  I  refer  to 
the  treasury  order  directing  the  receipt  of  bank-notes  in  the  dues  of  the 
government,  and  which  was  the  first  link  of  that  unconstitutional  and  un 
holy  alliance  between  this  government  and  the  banks  that  has  been  fol 
lowed  by  such  disastrous  consequences.  I  have,  Mr.  President,  been  ac 
cused  of  extravagance  in  asserting  that  this  unholy  connexion  with  the 
paper  system  was  the  great  and  primary  cause  of  almost  every  departure 
from  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  and  of  the  dangers  to  which  the 
government  has  been  exposed.  I  am  happy  to  have  it  in  my  "power  to 
show  that  I  do  not  stand  alone  in  this  opinion.  Our  attention  has  lately 
been  attracted,  by  one  of  the  journals  of  this  city,  to  a  pamphlet  contain 
ing  the  same  sentiment,  published  as  far  back  as  1794 ;  the  author  of 
which  was  one  of  the  profoundest  and  purest  statesmen  to  whom  our 
country  has  ever  given  birth,  but  who  has  not  been  distinguished  in  pro 
portion  to  his  eminent  talent  and  ardent  patriotism.  In  confirmation  of 
what  I  assert,  I  will  thank  the  senator  from  North  Carolina  near  me  (Mr. 
Strange)  to  read  a  paragraph  taken  from  the  pamphlet,  which  contains 


358  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

expressions  as  strong  as  any  I  have  ever  used  in  reference  to  the  point  in 
question. 

Mr.  Strange  read  as  follows  : 

"  Funding  and  banking  systems  are  indissolubly  connected  with  every 
commercial  and  political  question  by  an  interest  generally  at  enmity  with 
the  common  good.  In  the  great  cases  of  peace  and  war,  of  fleets  and 
armies,  and  of  taxation  and  navigation,  their  cries  will  forever  resound 
throughout  the  continent.  Whereas,  the  undue  bias  of  public  officers  is 
bounded  by  known  salaries,  and  persons  not  freeholders  are  hardly,  if  at 
all,  distinguishable  from  the  national  interest.  One  observation  is  ad 
duced  in  proof  of  this  doctrine.  Paper  fraud,  knowing  the  restiffness 
of  liberty  when  oppressed,  is  under  an  impulse  to  strengthen  itself  by  alli 
ances  with  legislative  corruption,  with  a  military  force,  and  with  similar  for 
eign  systems.  War  with  Britain  can  be  turned  by  it  to  great  account.  In 
case  of  victory,  a  military  apparatus,  united  to  it  by  large  arrears,  and  an 
aversion  to  being  disbanded,  will  be  on  one  hand.  In  case  of  defeat, 
paper  will  constitute  an  engine  of  government  analogous  to  the  English 
system.  Can  Republicanism  safely  intrust  a  legislative  paper  junto  with  the 
management  of  such  a  war  1  If  it  does,  no  prophetic  spirit  is  necessary 
to  foretell  that  paper  will  be  heaped  upon  liberty,  from  the  same  design 
with  which  mountains  were  heaped  upon  the  giants  by  the  dissolute  junto 
of  Olympus." 

The  next  movement  he  made  was  the  boldest  of  the  whole  series. 
The  union  of  the  government  with  the  paper  system  was  not  yet  com 
plete.  A  central  control  was  wanting,  in  order  to  give  to  it  unity  of  ac 
tion  and  a  full  development  of  its  power  and  influence.  This  he  sought 
in  a  National  Bank,  with  a  capital  of  $10,000,000,  to  be  composed  princi 
pally  of  the  stock  held  by  the  public  creditors ;  thus  binding  more 
strongly  to  the  government  that  already  powerful  class,  by  giving  them, 
through  its  agency,  increased  profit,  and  a  decided  control  over  the  cur 
rency,  exchanges,  and  the  business  transactions  of  the  country.  On  the 
question  of  chartering  the  bank,  the  £reat  battle  was  fought  between  the 
two  schools.  The  contest  was  long  and  obstinate,  but  victory  ultimately 
declared  in  favour  of  the  national  Federal  school. 

The  leader  of  that  school  was  not  content  with  these  great  achieve 
ments.  His  bold  and  ardent  mind  was  not  of  a  temper  to  stop  short  or 
the  end  at  which  he  aimed.  His  next  movement  was  to  seize  on  the 
money  power ;  and  he  put  forth  able  reports,  in  which  he  asserted  the 
broad  principle,  that  Congress  was  under  no  other  constitutional  restriction 
in  the  use  of  the  public  money  but  the  general  we/fare,  and  that  it  might  be 
appropriated  to  any  purpose  whatever  believed  to  be  calculated  to  pro 
mote  the  general  interest,  and  as  freely  to  the  objects  not  enumerated  as 
those  that  were  specified  in  the  Constitution.  To  this  he  added  another, 
and,  perhaps,  more  dangerous  assumption  of  power — that  the  taxing 
power,  which  was  granted  expressly  to  raise  revenue,  might  be  used  as 
a  protective  power  for  the  encouragement  of  manufactures,  or  any  other 
branch  of  industry  which  Congress  might  choose  to  foster  ;  and  thus  it 
was,  in  fact,  perverted  from  a  revenue  to  a  penal  power,  through  which 
the  entire  capital  and  industry  of  the  Union  might  be  controlled.  Con 
gress  was  not  prepared,  at  that  early  stage,  to  follow  so  bold  a  lead ;  but 
the  seed  was  sown  by  a  skilful  hand,  to  sprout  when  the  proper  season 
arrived. 

When  he  retired  from  office,  no  controlling  mind  was  left  to  perfect  the 
system  which  he  had  commenced  with  such  consummate  skill  and  suc 
cess  ;  and  shortly  after,  under  the  administration  of  the  elder  Adams,  the 
Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  and  the  quasi  war  with  France,  as  it  was  called, 


SPEECHES  OP  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  359 

followed  the  violent  and  precipitate  measures  of  less  sagacious  and  power 
ful  minds,  and  which,  in  their  reaction,  expelled  their  authors  from  power, 
and  raised  Jefferson  to  the  presidency. 

He  came  in  as  a  reformer ;  but,  with  the  most  ardent  desire  and  the 
highest  capacity  to  effect  a  reformation,  he  could  do  little  to  change  the 
direction  which  his  rival  had  impressed  at  the  outset  on  the  political 
machine.  Econdmy,  indeed,  was  introduced,  and  the  expenditures  re 
duced,  but  the  ligatures  which  united  the  government  with  the  paper  sys 
tem  were  too  strong  to  be  bursted.  The  funded  debt,  though  greatly  re 
duced  by  him,  could  not  be  extinguished.  The  charter  of  the  United 
States  Bank  had  still  half  its  term  to  run,  and  the  use  of  banks  and  bank 
notes  in  the  fiscal  transactions  of  the  government  had  taken  too  strong 
a  hold  to  be  superseded  at  once.  In  the  mean  time,  the  agitation  caused 
by  the  gigantic  conflict  between  France  and  England  reached  our  distant 
and  peaceful  shores,  and  the  administration  was  almost  exclusively  occu 
pied  in  efforts  to  prevent  aggressions  on  our  rights,  and  preserve  our  neu 
trality.  To  effect  that,  every  expedient  was  attempted ;  negotiation,  em 
bargo,  non-importation,  and  non-intercourse,  but  in  vain.  War  followed, 
and  with  it  all  hopes  of  carrying  out  the  reform  contemplated  by  Jeffer 
son  when  he  came  into  power  failed. 

When  peace  arrived,  the  country  was  deeply  in  debt.  Capital  and  in 
dustry  had  taken  new  directions  in  consequence  of  the  long  interruption 
of  our  foreign  commerce,  and  the  public  attention  was  completely  diverted 
from  the  questions  which  had  brought  into  conflict  the  two  great  political 
schools,  and  which  had  so  long  divided  the  country. 

The  season  had  now  arrived  when  the  seed  which  had  been  so  skilfully 
sowed  by  Hamilton,  as  has  been  stated,  began  to  germinate,  and  soon 
shot  forth  with  the  most  vigorous  growth.  Duties  came  to  be  imposed 
without  regard  to  revenue,  and  money  appropriated  without  reference  to 
the  granted  powers.  Tariff  followed  tariff  in  rapid  succession,  carrying  in 
their  train  a  profusion  of  expenditures  on  harbours,  roads,  canals,  pensions, 
and  a  host  of  others,  comprehending  objects  of  almost  every  description. 
In  such  rapid  succession  did  the  protective  duties  follow,  that  in  1828, 
in  the  short  space  of  twelve  years  after  the  termination  of  the  late  war, 
they  reached  the  enormous  amount  of  nearly  one  half  of  the  aggregate 
value  of  the  entire  imports,  after  deducting  the  reshipments.  Beyond 
this  point  the  system  never  advanced,  and  fortunately  for  the  country  it 
did  not.  Had  it  continued  its  progress  a  few  years  longer,  the  enormous 
patronage  which  it  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  chief  magistrate  would 
have  terminated  our  form  of  government,  by  enabling  him  to  nominate 
his  successor,  or  by  plunging  the  country  into  a  revolution,  to  be  fol 
lowed  by  disunion  or  despotism,  as  was  foretold  would  be  the  conse 
quence  in  the  report  to  the  Legislature  of  Virginia,  so  often  referred  to, 
if  the  system  it  reprobated  were  carried  out  in  practice.  But,  happily, 
with  the  tariff  of  1828  the  reaction  commenced,  and  has  been  ever  since 
progressing.  How,  or  by  whom  it  was  commenced,  and  has  been  urged 
forward  to  the  present  point,  this  is  not  the  proper  occasion  to  state.  All  I 
propose  now  is  to  state  its  progress,  and  mark  the  point  at  which  it  has 
arrived. 

The  first  step  of  this  retrograde  movement  was  the  overthrow  of  the 
administration  of  the  younger  Adams.  He  came  into  power  on  the  ex 
treme  principles  and  doctrines  of  the  Federal  national  school,  and  on  them 
he  placed  the  hope  of  maintaining  his  elevation.  For  the  truth  of  this 
assertion  I  appeal  to  his  inaugural  address,  and  his  messages  to  the  two 
houses  at  the  openings  of  the  annual  sessions  ;  and  to  expel  his  administra 
tion  from  power  was,  of  course,  a  preliminary  and  indispensable  step  to- 


360  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

wards  the  restoration  of  the  principles  and  doctrines  of  the  opposite 
school ;  and,  fortunately,  this  was  effected  by  a  decided  majority  at  the 
expiration  of  his  first  term. 

The  next  step  was  the  final  discharge  of  the  funded  debt ;  and  for  this 
important  step,  at  so  early  a  period,  the  country  is  indebted  principally  to 
a  friend,  now,  unfortunately,  no  more — -the  amiable,  the  talented,  the  patri 
otic  Lowndes — the  author  of  that  simple,  but  effective  measure,  the  Sink 
ing  Fund  Act,  passed  shortly  after  the  termination  of  the  late  war. 

But  the  most  formidable  of  all  the  obstacles,  the  source  of  the  vast 
and  corrupting  surplus,  with  its  host  of  extravagant  and  unconstitutional 
expenditures — the  protective  tariff — still  remained  in  full  force,  and  ob 
structed  any  farther  progress  in  the  reaction  that  had  commenced.  By 
what  decided  and  bold  measures  it  was  overcome  is  well  known  to  all, 
and  need  not  be  told  on  this  occasion.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that,  after  a 
long  and  desperate  struggle,  the  controversy  terminated  in  the  Compromise 
Act,  which  abandoned  the  protective  principle,  and  has,  I  trust,  closed  for 
ever  what  has  proved  in  this  government  a  most  prolific  source  of  power, 
patronage,  and  corruption. 

The  next  step  in  the  progress  was  the  overthrow  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States — the  centre  and  soul  of  the  paper  system — a  step  that  may 
justly  be  regarded  as  not  inferior  to  any  other  in  the  whole  series.  That 
was  followed  by  the  Deposite  Act  of  1836,  which  transferred  to  the  treas 
uries  of  the  states  the  vast  surplus  which  continued  to  flow  in  upon  us, 
notwithstanding  the  great  reduction  under  the  Compromise  Act.  This 
decisive  measure  disburdened  our  surcharged  treasury,  and  has  forced 
on  this  government  the  necessity  of  retrenchment  and  economy,  and  there 
by  has  greatly  strengthened  and  accelerated  the  reaction.  So  necessary 
is  the  reduction  of  the  income  to  reform,  that  I  am  disposed  to  regard  it 
as  a  political  maxim  in  free  states,  that  an  impoverished  treasury,  once  in 
a  generation  at  least,  is  almost  indispensable  to  the  preservation'of  their 
institutions  and' liberty. 

The  next  stage  in  the  progress  was  the  suspension  of  the  connexion, 
between  the  government  and  the  banks,  in  consequence  of  the  suspension, 
of  specie  payments.  This  occasion  afforded  an  opportunity  to  strike  the 
first  blow  against  that  illegitimate  and  unholy  alliance.  It  was  given  de 
cidedly,  boldly,  and  vigorously,  but  still  with  only  partial  success.  The 
interest  in  favour  of  maintaining  the  connexion  was  too  powerful  to  be 
overcome  at  once ;  but,  though  not  broken,  the  tie  is  greatly  weakened, 
and  nothing  now  is  wanting  to  sever  forever  this  fatal  knot  but  to  follow 
up  what  has  already  been  done  by  persevering  and  energetic  blows. 

This  is  the  point  to  which  the  reaction  has  already  reached ;  and  the 
question  now  to  be  considered  is,  To  what  point  ought  it  to  be  urged,  and 
what  are  the  intermediate  obstacles  to  be  overcome  1  I  arn,  for  myself, 
prepared  to  answer.  I  have  no  concealment.  My  aim  is  fixed.  It  is  no 
less  than  to  turn  back  the  government  to  where  it  was  when  it  com 
menced  its  operation  in  1789 ;  to  obliterate  all  the  intermediate  measures 
originating  in  the  peculiar  principles  and  policy  of  the  school  to  which  I 
am  opposed,  and  which  experience  has  proved  to  be  so  dangerous  and 
uncongenial  to  our  system  ;  to  take  a  fresh  start,  a  new  departure,  on  the 
State  Rights  Republican  tack,  as  was  intended  by  the  framers  of  the  Con 
stitution.  That  is  the  point  at  which  I  have  aimed  for  more  than  twelve 
years,  and  towards  which  I  have  persisted,  during  the  whole  period,  to 
urge  my  way,  in  defiance  of  opposing  difficulties,  dangers,  and  discourage 
ments,  and  from  which  nothing  shall  drive  me  (while  in  public  life)  till 
the  object  at  which  I  aim  is  accomplished.  By  far  the  most  formidable 
difficulties  are  already  surmounted.  Those  that  remain  are  comparatively- 
insignificant. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  361 

Among  these,  the  most  important,  by  far,  is  to  separate  the  govern 
ment  from  the  banks,  but  which,  after  the  blows  the  connexion  has  re 
ceived,  will  require  not  much  more  than  unyielding  firmness  and  perse 
verance.  This  done,  the  great  work  of  freeing  the  government  entirely 
from  the  paper  system,  on  which  Hamilton  laid  the  foundation  of  his  whole 
system,  will  have  been  achieved. 

The  next  is  to  carry  out,  in  the  revision  of  the  tariff,  which  must  take 
place  at  the  next  or  succeeding  session,  the  provisions  of  the  Compromise 
Act,  that  there  shall  be  no  duty  laid  but  what  may  be  necessary  to  the  eco 
nomical  and  constitutional  wants  of  the  government.  Should  this  be  ac 
complished,  there  will  be  an  end  to  the  protective  system,  with  all  the 
evil  that  followed,  and  must  ever  follow,  in  its  train.  Nor  can  I  believe, 
after  what  we  have  experienced,  and  what  has  been  said  during  this  ses 
sion,  that  there  will  be  any  insuperable  difficulty  in  effecting  an  object  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the  Union. 

Having  freed  the  government  from  the  paper  and  protective  systems, 
the  next  step  in  importance  is,  to  put  a  final  stop  to  internal  improve 
ments,  the  construction  and  improvement  of  harbours,  and  the  extrava 
gant  waste  on  what  we  are  pleased  to  call  the  pension  system,  but  which 
has  departed  from  every  principle  justly  belonging  to  such  a  system.  No 
government  was  ever  before  burdened  with  an  expenditure  so  absurd  and 
monstrous.  It  confounds  all  distinctions  between  the  deserving  and  un 
deserving,  and  yearly  draws  millions  from  the  treasury  without  any  just 
claim  on  the  public  bounty,  and  ought  to  be  both  arrested  and  reformed. 

A  single  step  more  brings  the  government  to  the  destined  point — I 
mean  a  thorough  reformation  in  the  administrative  department  of  the 
government.  I  doubt  not  but  that  every  branch  needs  reform.  There 
are,  doubtless,  numerous  defalcations  in  addition  to  those  brought  to- 
light.  The  fault  has  been  more  in  that  system  (a  brief  narrative  of  which 
I  have  given)  than  in  those  who  have  been  charged  with  the  administration, 
of  the  government.  For  years  money  was  as  dirt.  The  treasury  was 
oppressed  with  it,  and  the  only  solicitude  was,  how  to  get  clear  of  what 
was  considered  a  useless  burden.  Hence  the  vast  increase  of  expendi 
tures  j  hence  the  loose  and  inattentive  administration  of  our  fiscal  con 
cerns  ;  hence  the  heavy  defalcations.  Nor  are  these  remarks  confined  to 
the  executive  department  of  the  government ;  they  apply  to  all,  to  the  two 
houses  of  Congress  as  well  as  to  other  branches.  But  there  is  no  longer 
a  surplus.  The  treasury  is  exhausted,  and  the  work  of  retrenchment, 
economy,  and  accountability  is  forced  on  us.  Reform  in  the  fiscal  action 
of  the  government  can  no  longer  be  delayed,  and  I  rejoice  that  such  is 
the  fact.  Economy  and  accountability  are  virtues  belonging  to  free  and 
popular  governments,  and  without  which  they  cannot  long  endure.  The 
assertion  is  pre-eminently  true  when  applied  to  this  government,  and 
hence  the  prominent  place  they  occupy  in  the  creed  of  the  State  Rights 
and  Republican  school. 

Having  taken  these  steps,  every  measure  of  prominence  originating  in. 
the  principles  or  policy  of  the  national  Federal  school  will  become  oblit 
erated,  and  the  government  will  have  been  brought  back,  after  the  lapse 
of  fifty  years,  to  the  point  of  original  departure,  when  it  may  be  put  on 
its  new  tack.  To  guard  against  a  false  steerage  thereafter,  one  impor 
tant  measure,  in  addition  to  those  enumerated,  will  be  indispensable — to 
place  the  new  states,  as  far  as  the  public  domain  is  concerned,  in  a  con 
dition  as  independent  of  the  government  as  the  old.  It  is  as  much  due 
to  them  as  it  is  indispensable  to  accomplish  the  great  object  in  view. 
Tl*e  public  domain  within  these  states  is  too  great  a  stake  to  be  left  un 
der  the  control  of  this  government.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  vast 

Zz 


362  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

addition  it  makes  to  its  power  and  patronage,  and  the  controlling  and 
corrupting  influence  which  it  may  exercise  over  the  presidential  election, 
and,  through  that,  the  strong  impulse  it  may  receive  in  a  wrong  direction. 
Till  it  is  removed,  there  can  be  no  assurance  of  a  successful  and  safe 
steerage,  even  if  every  other  sinister  influence  should  be  removed. 

It  would  be  presumptuous  in  me,  Mr.  President,  to  advise  those  who 
are  charged  with  the  administration  of  the  government  what  course  to 
adopt ;  but,  if  they  would  hear  the  voice  of  one  who  desires  nothing  for 
himself,  and  whose  only  wish  is  to  see  the  country  prosperous,  free,  and 
happy,  I  would  say  to  them,  you  are  placed  in  the  most  remarkable  junc 
ture  that  has  ever  occurred  since  the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment.  By  seizing  the  opportunity,  you  may  bring  the  vessel  of  state 
to  a  position  where  she  may  take  a  new  tack,  and  thereby  escape  all  the 
shoals  and  breakers  into  the  midst  of  which  a  false  steerage  has  run  her, 
and  bring  her  triumphantly  into  her  destined  port  with  honour  to  your 
selves  and  safety  to  those  on  board.  Take  your  stand  boldly  j  avow 
your  object  j  disclose  your  measures,  and  let  the  people  see  clearly  that 
you  intend — what  Jefferson  designed  to  do,  but,  from  adverse  circum 
stances,  could  not  accomplish — to  reverse  the  measures  originating  in 
principles  and  policy  uncongenial  to  our  political  system — to  divest  the 
government  of  all  undue  patronage  and  influence — to  restrict  it  to  the  few 
great  objects  intended  by  the  Constitution — in  a  word,  to  give  a  complete 
ascendency  to  the  good  old  Virginia  school  over  its  antagonist,  which 
time  and  experience  have  proved  to  be  dangerous  to  our  system  of  govern 
ment — and  you  may  count  with  confidence  on  their  support,  without  look 
ing  to  other  means  of  success.  Should  the  government  take  such  a 
course  at  this  propitious  moment,  our  free  and  happy  institutions  may  be 
perpetuated  for  generations  ;  but,  if  a  different,  short  will  be  their  duration. 

On  this  question  of  patronage  let  me  add,  in  conclusion,  that,  according 
to  my  conception,  the  great  and  leading  err9r  in  Hamilton  and  his  school 
originated  in  a  mistake  as  to  the  analogy  between  ours  and  the  British 
system  of  government.  If  we  were  to  judge  by  their  outward  form,  there 
is,  indeed,  a  striking  analogy  between  them  in  many  particulars;  but,  if 
we  look  within,  at  their  spirit  and  genius,  never  were  two  free  govern 
ments  so  perfectly  dissimilar.  They  are,  in  fact,  the  very  opposites. 
Of  all  free  governments  that  ever  existed — no,  I  will  enlarge  the  propo 
sition — of  all  governments  that  ever  existed,  free  or  despotic,  the  British 
government  can  bear  the  largest  amount  of  patronage,  the  greatest  exac 
tion  and  pressure  on  the  people,  without  changing  its  character  or  run 
ning  into  revolution.  The  greater,  in  fact,  its  patronage,  the  stronger  it 
is,  till  the  pressure  begins  to  crush  the  mass  of  population  with  its  super 
incumbent  weight.  But  directly  the  opposite  is  the  case  with  ours.  Of 
all  governments  that  ever. existed,  it  can  stand  under  the  least  patronage, 
in  proportion  to  the  population  and  wealth  of  the  country,  without  chan 
ging  its  character  or  the  hazard  of  a  revolution.  I  have  not  made  these 
assertions  lightly.  They  are  the  result  of  much  reflection,  and  can  be 
sustained  by  conclusive  reasons  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  two  gov 
ernments  ;  but  this  is  not  the  proper  occasion  to  discuss  the  subject. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  363 


XXIV. 

SPEECH  ON  THE  REPORT  OF  MR.  GRUNDY,  OF  TENNESSEE,  IN  RELATION  TO  THE 
ASSUMPTION  OF  THE  DEBTS  OF  THE  STATES  BY  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT,  FEB 
RUARY  5,  1840. 

ON  Mr.  Grundy's  report  in  relation  to  the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the 
states  by  the  Federal  Government,  Mr.  Calhoun  said : 

When  I  have  heard  it  asserted,  again  and  again,  in  this  discussion,  that  this 
report  was  uncalled  for ;  that  there  was  no  one  in  favour  of  the  assumption  of 
state  debts  ;  and  that  the  resolutions  were  mere  idle,  abstract  negatives,  of  no  sort 
of  importance,  I  could  not  but  ask  myself,  If  all  this  be  so,  why  this  deep  ex 
citement  ?  why  this  ardent  zeal  to  make  collateral  issues  ?  and,  above  all,  why 
the  great  anxiety  to  avoid  a  direct  vote  on  the  resolutions  ?  To  these  inquiries 
I  could  find  but  one  solution  ;  and  that  is,  disguise  it  as  you  may,  there  is,  in 
reality,  at  the  bottom,  a  deep  and  agitating  question.  Yes,  there  is  such  a  ques 
tion.  The  scheme  of  assuming  the  debts  of  the  states  is  no  idle  fiction.  The 
evidence  of  its  reality,  and  that  it  is  now  in  agitation,  bursts  from  every  quarter, 
within  and  without  these  walls,  on  this  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  ;  not, 
indeed,  a  direct  assumption,  for  that  would  be  too  absurd ;  and  harmless,  be 
cause  too  absurd ;  but  in  a  form  far  more  plausible  and  dangerous — an  assump 
tion  in  effect,  by  dividing  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  among 
the  states. 

I  shall  not  stop  to  show  that  such  distribution,  under  existing  circumstances, 
with  the  deep  indebtedness  and  embarrassment  of  many  of  the  states,  would  be, 
in  reality,  an  assumption.  We  all  know  that,  without  such  indebtedness  and 
embarrassment,  the  scheme  of  distribution  would  not  have  the  least  chance  for 
adoption,  and  that  it  would  be  perfectly  harmless,  and  cause  no  excitement ; 
but  plunged,  as  the  states  are,  in  debt,  it  becomes  a  question  truly  formidable, 
and  on  which  the  future  politics  of  the  country  are  destined  for  years  to  turn. 
If,  then,  the  scheme  should  be  adopted,  it  must  be  by  the  votes  of  the  indebted 
states,  in  order  to  aid  their  credit  and  lighten  their  burden  ;  and  who  is  so  blind 
as  not  to  see  that  it  would  be  in  truth,  what  I  have  asserted  it  to  be  in  effect, 
to  that  extent  an  assumption  of  their  debts  ? 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  real  question  at  issue,  which  has  caused  all  this  ex 
citement  and  zeal :  a  question  pregnant  with  the  most  important  consequences, 
immediate  and  remote.  What  I  now  propose  is,  to  trace  rapidly  and  briefly 
some  of  the  more  prominent  which  would  result  from  this  scheme,  should  it  ever 
become  a  law. 

The  first  and  most  immediate  would  be  to  subtract  from  the  treasury  a  sum 
equal  to  the  annual  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands.  I  do  not  intend 
to  examine  the  constitutional  question  whether  Congress  has  or  has  not  the 
right  to  make  the  subtraction,  and  to  divide  the  proceeds  among  the  states.  It 
is  not  necessary.  The  committee  have  conclusively  shown  that  it  has  no  such 
power  ;  that  it  holds  the  public  domain  in  trust  for  the  states  in  their  federal  ca 
pacity  as  members  of  the  Union,  in  aid  of  their  contribution  to  the  treasury ; 
and  that  to  denationalize  the  fund  (if  I  may  use  the  expression),  by  distributing 
it  among  the  states  for  their  separate  and  individual  uses,  would  be  a  manifest 
violation  of  the  trust,  and  wholly  unwarranted  by  the  Constitution.  Passing, 
then,  by  the  constitutional  question,  I  intend  to  restrict  my  inquiry  to  what 
would  be  its  fiscal  and  moneyed  effects. 

Thus  regarded,  the  first  effect  of  the  subtraction  would  be  to  cause  an  equal 
deficit  in  the  revenue.  I  need  not  inform  the  Senate  that  there  is  not  a  surplus 
cent  in  the  treasury ;  that  the  most  rigid  economy  will  be  necessary  to  meet 
.the  demands  on  it  during  the  current  year ;  that  the  revenue,  so  far  from  being 


364  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

on  the  increase,  must  be  rapidly  reduced,  under  existing  laws,  in  the  next  two 
years  ;  and  that  every  dollar  withdrawn,  by  subtracting  the  proceeds  of  the  pub 
lic  lands,  must  make  a  corresponding  deficit.  We  are  thus  brought  to  the  ques 
tion.  What  would  be  the  probable  annual  amount  of  the  deficit,  and  how  is  it  to 
be  supplied  ? 

The  receipts  from  the  sales  of  the  public  lands,  I  would  suppose,  may  be  safe 
ly  estimated  at  five  millions  of  dollars  at  least,  on  an  average,  for  the  next  ten 
or  fifteen  years.  They  were  about  six  millions  the  last  year.  The  first  three 
quarters  gave  within  a  fraction  of  five  and  a  half  millions.  The  estimate  for 
this  year  is  three  and  a  half  millions,  making  the  average  of  the  two  years  but 
little  short  of  five  millions.  If,  with  these  data,  we  cast  our  eyes  back  on  the 
last  ten  or  fifteen  years,  we  shall  come  to  the  conclusion,  taking  into  considera 
tion  our  great  increase  of  population  and  wealth,  and  the  vast  quantity  of  public 
lands  held  by  the  government,  that  the  average  I  have  estimated  is  not  too  high. 
Assuming,  then,  that  the  deficit  would  be  five  millions,  the  next  inquiry  is,  How 
shall  it  be  supplied  ?  There  is  but  one  way  :  a  corresponding  increase  of  the 
duties  on  imports.  We  have  no  other  source  of  revenue  but  the  postoffice.  No 
one  would  think  of  laying  it  on  that,  or  to  raise  the  amount  by  internal  taxes. 
The  result,  then,  thus  far,  would  be  to  withdraw  from  the  treasury  five  millions 
of  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  to  be  distributed  among  the 
states,  and  to  impose  an  equal  amount  of  duty  on  imports  to  make  good  the  de 
ficit.  Now,  I  would  ask,  What  is  the  difference,  regarded  as  a  fiscal  transac 
tion,  between  withdrawing  that  amount  for  distribution,  and  imposing  a  similar 
amount  of  duties  on  the  imports  to  supply  its  place,  and  that  of  leaving  the  pro 
ceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  lands  in  the  treasury,  and  imposing  an  equal  amount 
of  duties  for  distribution  ?  It  is  clearly  the  same  thing,  in  effect,  to  retain  the 
proceeds  of  the  public  lands  in  the  treasury  and  to  impose  the  duties  for  distri 
bution,  or  to  distribute  the  proceeds,  and  thereby  force  the  imposition  of  the  du 
ties  to  supply  the  place. 

It  is,  then,  in  reality,  a  scheme  to  impose  five  millions  of  additional  duties  on 
the  importations  of  the  country,  to  be  distributed  among  the  states ;  and  I  now 
ask,  Where  is  the  senator  who  will  openly  avow  himself  an  advocate  of  such  a 
scheme  ?  I  put  the  question  home,  solemnly,  to  those  on  the  opposite  side,  Do 
you  not  believe  that  such  a  scheme  would  be  unconstitutional,  unequal,  unjust, 
and  dangerous  ?  And  can  you,  as  honest  men,  do  that  in  effect,  by  indirect 
means,  which,  if  done  directly,  would  be  clearly  liable  to  every  one  of  those  ob 
jections  ? 

I  have  said  such  would  be  the  case,  regarded  as  a  fiscal  transaction.  In  a 
political  point  of  view,  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  land 
would  be  the  worst  of  the  two.  It  would  create  opposing  and  hostile  relations 
between  the  old  and  new  states  in  reference  to  the  public  domain.  Heretofore 
the  conduct  of  the  government  has  been  distinguished  by  the  greatest  liberality, 
not  to  say  generosity,  towards  the  new  states,  in  the  administration  of  the  pub 
lic  lands.  Adopt  this  scheme,  and  its  conduct  will  be  the  reverse.  Whatever 
might  be  granted  to  them,  would  subtract  an  equal  amount  from  the  sum  to  be 
distributed.  An  austere  and  rigid  administration  would  be  the  result,  followed 
by  hostile  feelings  on  both  sides,  that  would  accelerate  the  conflict  between 
them  in  reference  to  the  public  domain  :  a  conflict  advancing  but  too  fast  by  the 
natural  course  of  events,  and  which  any  one,  in  the  least  gifted  with  foresight, 
must  see,  come  when  it  will,  would  shake  the  Union  to  the  centre,  unless  pre 
vented  by  wise  and  timely  concession. 

Having  shown  that  the  scheme  is,  in  effect,  to  impose  duties  for  distribution, 
the  next  question  is,  On  whom  will  they  fall  ?  I  know  that  there  is  a  great  di 
versity  of  opinion  as  to  who,  in  fact,  pays  the  duties  on  imports.  I  do  not  in 
tend  to  discuss  that  point.  We  of  the  staple  and  exporting  states  have  long  set 
tled  the  question  for  ourselves,  almost  unanimously,  from  sad  experience.  We 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  365 

know  how  ruinously  high  duties  fell  on  us  ;  how  they  desolated  our  cities  and 
exhausted  our  section.  We  also  know  how  rapidly  we  have  been  recovering 
as  they  have  been  going  off,  in  spite  of  all  the  difficulties  of  the  times,  and.  the 
distracted  and  disordered  state  of  the  currency.  It  is  now  a  fixed  maxim  with 
us,  that  there  is  not  a  whit  of  difference,  as  far  as  we  are  concerned,  between 
an  export  and  import  duty — between  paying  toll  going  out  or  returning  in — or 
going  down  to  market  or  returning  back.  If  this  be  true,  of  which  we  have  no 
doubt,  it  is  a  point  of  no  little  importance  to  us  of  the  staple  states  to  know  what 
portion  of  the  duties  will  fall  to  our  lot  to  pay.  We  furnish  about  three  fourths 
of  the  axports,  with  about  two  fifths  of  the  whole  population.  Four  fifths  of 
five  millions  is  four  millions,  which  would  be  the  measure  of  our  contribution ; 
and  two  fifths  of  five  millions  is  two  millions,  which  would  be  our  share  of  the 
distribution ;  that  is  to  say,  for  every  two  dollars  we  would  receive  under  this 
notable  scheme,  we  would  pay  four  dollars  to  the  fund  from  which  it  would  be 
derived. 

I  now  ask,  What  does  it  amount  to,  but  making  the  income  of  the  states,  to 
the  amount  of  five  millions  annually,  common  property,  to  be  distributed  among 
them,  according  to  numbers,  or  some  such  ratio,  without  the  least  reference  to 
their  respective  contribution  ?  And  what  is  that  but  rank  agrarianism — agra- 
rianism  among  the  states  ?  To  divide  the  annual  income  is  as  much  agrarian- 
ism  as  to  divide  property  itself;  and  would  be  as  much  so  divided  among  twen 
ty-six  states,  as  among  twenty-six  individuals.  Let  me  admonish  the  members 
opposite,  if  they  really  apprehend  the  spirit  of  agrarianism  as  much  as  might  be 
inferred  from  their  frequent  declarations,  not  to  set  the  fatal  example  here,  in 
their  legislative  capacity.  Remember,  there  is  but  one  step  between  dividing 
the  income  of  the  states  and  that  of  individuals,  and  between  partial  and  a  gen 
eral  distribution. 

Proceeding  a  step  farther  in  tracing  consequences,  another  question  presents 
itself :  On  what  articles  shall  the  duties  be  laid  ?  On  the  free  or  the  dutied  ar 
ticles  ?  Shall  they  be  laid  for  revenue  or  for  protection  ?  Is  it  not  obvious  that 
so  large  an  amount  as  five  millions,  equal  to  one  third  of  the  present  income 
from  that  source,  and  probably  not  much  less  than  one  half  what  it  will  be  at 
the  end  of  two  years,  cannot  be  raised  without  rousing  from  its  slumber  the  tar 
iff  question,  with  all  its  distraction  and  danger?  Should  that,  however,  not  be 
the  case,  there  is  another  consequence  connected  with  this,  that  cannot  fail  to 
rouse  it,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  explain. 

The  act  of  distributing  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  among  the  states,  of  it 
self,  as  well  as  the  amount  to  be  distributed,  will  do  much  to  resuscitate  their 
credit.  It  is  the  desired  result,  and  the  leading  motive  for  the  act.  Five  mill 
ions  annually  (the  amount  assumed),  on  a  pledge  of  the  public  domain,  would, 
of  itself,  be  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  loan  of  ninety  or  a  hundred  millions  of  dol 
lars,  if  judiciously  managed.  But  suppose  that  only  one  half  should  be  applied, 
as  the  means  of  negotiating  loans  abroad,  in  order  to  complete  the  old  or  to  com 
mence  new  works  of  improvement,  or  other  objects.  I  ask,  What  would  be  the 
effect  on  our  imports,  of  negotiating  a  loan  in  England,  or  elsewhere  in  Europe, 
of  forty  or  fifty  millions,  in  the  course  of  the  next  year  or  two  ?  Can  any  one 
doubt,  from  past  experience  ?  We  all  know  the  process.  Very  little  gold  or 
silver  is  ever  seen  in  these  negotiations.  A  credit  is  obtained,  and  that  placed 
in  bank  there,  or  with  wealthy  bankers.  Bills  are  drawn  on  this  country,  and 
then  sold  to  merchants.  These  are  transmitted  to  Europe,  and  the  proceeds 
returned  in  goods,  swelling  the  tide  of  imports  in  proportion  to  the  amount. 
The  crash  of  our  manufactures  follows,  and  that,  in  turn,  by  denunciations 
against  over-importing  and  over-trading,  in  which  those  who  have  been  most 
active  in  causing  it  are  sure  to  join,  but  will  take  special  care  to  make  not  the 
least  allusion  to  the  real  source  whence  it  flows.  And  can  it  be  doubted, 
that  with  the  increase  of  the  cause,  the  clamour  for  protection  will  increase,  un- 


366  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOTJN. 

til,  with  united  voices,  the  friends  of  the  system  would  demand  its  renewal  1  If 
to  this  we  add,  that,  under  the  Compromise  Act,  the  tariff  must  be  revived  and  re 
modelled,  who  can  look  at  such  a  concurrence  of  powerful  causes  without  see 
ing  that  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  prevent  the  revival  of  the  protective 
system,  should  the  scheme  of  distribution  be  adopted  ?  I  hazard  nothing  in  as 
serting  that  the  renewal  would  certainly  follow  ;  and,  as  this  would  be  one  of 
the  most  prominent  and  durable  consequences  of  that  scheme,  I  propose  to  con 
sider  it  fully,  in  its  most  important  bearings. 

One  of  the  most  striking  features  of  tLe  system  is  its  tendency  to  increase. 
Let  it  be  once  recognised,  and  let  the  most  moderate  duties  be  laid  for  protec 
tion — but  put  the  system  in  motion,  and  its  course  would  be  onward,  onward,  by 
an  irresistible  impulse,  as  I  shall  presently  show  from  past  experience  ;  and 
hence  the  necessity  of  vigilance,  and  a  determined  resistance  to  every  course 
of  policy  that  may,  by  possibility,  lead  to  its  renewal.  This  tendency  to  increase 
results  from  causes  inherent  and  inseparable  from  the  system,  and  has  evinced 
itself  by  the  fact,  that  every  tariff  for  protection  has  invariably  disappointed  its 
friends  in  the  protection  anticipated,  and  has  been  followed  periodically,  after 
short  intervals,  by  a  demand  for  another  tariff  with  increased  duties,  to  afford  the 
protection  vainly  anticipated  from  its  predecessor.  Such  has  been  the  result 
throughout,  from  1816  to  1828,  when  the  first  and  last  protective  tariffs  were 
laid,  which  I  propose  now  to  show,  by  a  very  brief  historical  sketch  of  the  rise 
and  progress  of  the  system. 

The  late  war,  with  the  embargo  and  other  restrictive  measures  that  preceded 
it,  almost  expelled  our  commerce  from  the  ocean,  and  diverted  a  vast  amount 
of  capital  that  had  been  employed  in  it  to  manufactures.  Such  was  the  cause 
that  led  to  the  system.  After  the  termination  of  the  war,  there  was,  on  the  part 
of  Congress  and  the  country,  the  kindest  feeling  towards  the  manufacturing  in 
terest,  accompanied  by  a  strong  desire  so  to  adjust  the  duties  (indispensable  to 
meet  the  expenses  of  government,  and  to  pay  the  public  debt)  as  to  afford  them 
ample  protection.  The  manufacturers  were  consulted,  and  the  act  of  1816  was 
modelled  to  their  wishes.  They  regarded  it  as  affording  sufficient  and  perma 
nent  protection ;  and  I,  in  my  then  want  of  experience  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
system,  did  not  dream  that  we  would  hear  any  more  of  tariff,  till  it  would  be 
come  necessary  to  readjust  the  duties,  after  the  discharge  of  the  public  debt. 
Vain  expectation !  Two  years  had  not  passed  away  before  the  manufacturers 
were  as  clamorous  as  ever  for  additional  protection ;  and,  to  meet  their  wishes, 
new  duties  were  laid  from  time  to  time,  with  the  same  result ;  but  the  clamour 
still  returned,  till  1824,  when  the  tariff  of  that  year  passed,  which  was  believed 
on  all  sides  to  be  ample,  and  was  considered,  like  that  of  1816,  to  be  a  final 
adjustment  of  the  question.  It  was  under  this  impression  that  the  South  acqui 
esced  (reluctantly)  in  the  very  high  duties  it  imposed.  The  late  General 
Hayne,  then  a  distinguished  member  of  this  body,  took  a  very  active  part 
against  it ;  and  I  well  remember,  after  its  passage,  that  he  consoled  himself 
with  the  belief  that,  though  oppressive,  it  would  be  the  last.  His  expectation, 
proved  as  vain  as  mine  in  1816.  Before  two  years  had  passed,  we  were  again 
besieged  with  the  cry  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  protection ;  and  in  the  summer 
of  1827,  a  large  convention  of  manufacturers  from  all  parts  was  held  at  Harris- 
burg,  in  Pennsylvania,  to  devise  a  new  and  more  ample  scheme  of  protection, 
to  be  laid  before  Congress  at  the  next  session.  That  movement  ended  in  the 
adoption  of  the  tariff  of  1828,  which,  in  order  to  make  sure  work,  went  far  be 
yond  all  its  predecessors  in  the  increase  of  duties.  They  were  raised  on  the 
leading  articles  of  consumption  from  forty  to  fifty  per  cent,  above  former  duties, 
as  high  as  they  were.  I  speak  conjecturally,  without  any  certain  data.  In. 
less  than  three  years,  even  that  enormous  rise  proved  to  be  insufficient,  as  I 
shall  presently  show,  and  would  certainly  have  been  followed  by  new  demands 
for  protection,  had  not  the  small  but  gallant  state  I  represent  arrested  its  far- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  36T 

ther  progress — no,  that  is  not  strong  enough — brought  the  system  to  the  ground, 
against  the  resistance  of  the  administration  and  opposition — never,  I  trust,  to 
rise  again. 

The  fact  disclosed  by  this  brief  historical  sketch  is,  that  there  is  a  constant 
tendency  to  increase  in  the  protective  system  ;  and  that  every  increase  of  duty, 
however  high,  requires  periodically,  after  a  short  interval,  an  additional  increase. 
This,  as  I  have  stated,  is  not  accidental,  but  is  the  result  of  causes  inherent  in 
the  system  itself,  in  the  present  condition  of  our  country.  It  originates  in  the 
fact,  that  every  increase  of  protection  is  necessarily  followed  by  an  expansion, 
of  the  currency,  which  expansion  must  continue  to  enlarge  till  the  increased 
price  of  production,  in  consequence,  shall  become  equal  to  the  increased  duty7 
and  when  the  importation  of  the  articles  prohibited  may  again  take  place  with 
profit.  That  is  the  principle  ;  and  as  it  is  essential  to  the  peace  and  prosperi 
ty  of  the  country  that  it  should  be  clearly  understood,  I  intend  to  establish  its 
truth  beyond  doubt  or  cavil ;  and  for  that  purpose,  shall  begin  with  the  tariff  of 
1828,  the  last  and  by  far  the  boldest  of  the  series,  with  the  view  of  illustrating, 
in  its  case,  the  operation  of  the  principle.  I  entreat  the  Senate  to  give  me  its 
fixed  attention.  The  principle,  well  understood,  will  shed  a  flood  of  light  on 
the  past  and  present  difficulties  of  the  country,  and  guide  us  in  safety  in  our  fu 
ture  course. 

To  give  a  clear  conception  of  the  operation  of  the  tariff  of  1828,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  premise  that  it  comprehended  all  the  leading  articles  of  consump 
tion  that  could  be  manufactured  in  our  country,  amounting  in  value  to  not  much 
less  than  one  half  of  the  whole  of  the  imports  ;  that  the  duties  on  these  articles 
were  increased  enormously,  as  has  been  stated — say  not  less  than  forty  or  fifty 
per  cent. ;  that  the  average  domestic  exports  at  the  time  were  not  much  short  of 
sixty  millions  of  dollars,  and  the  imports  for  consumption  about  the  same  ;  that 
the  revenue  from  the  imports  was  about  half  that  sum  ;  and  that,  of  the  exports, 
about  three  fourths  consisted  of  the  great  agricultural  staples  of  the  South. 
What,  then,  with  these  facts,  must  have  been  its  necessary  operations  on  the 
currency  of  the  manufacturing  states  ?  We  export  to  import.  It  is  impossible 
to  continue  to  export  for  any  considerable  length  of  time  without  a  correspond 
ing  return  of  imports.  It  would  be  to  give  away  our  labour  for  nothing.  Our 
exports,  then,  continuing  at  an  average  of  sixty  millions,  in  what,  under  the 
operation  of  the  tariff  of  1828,  must  the  corresponding  imports  to  the  same 
amount  return?  Not,  certainly,  to  the  same  extent  as  before  its  .passage,  in  the 
articles  on  which  it  had  so  greatly  increased  the  duties  ?  Its  object  in  raising 
them  was  to  give  our  manufacturers  the  home  market,  by  excluding  the  foreign 
articles  of  the  same  description.  If  it  failed  in  that,  it  failed  in  accomplishing 
any  good  whatever,  and  became  an  unmixed  evil,  without  benefit  to  any  one. 
The  return,  then,  of  imports,  must  have  been  principally  in  articles  on  which 
the  duties  were  not  raised  as  far  as  the  consumption  of  the  country  would  war 
rant,  and  the  balance,  after  paying  what  was  due  abroad  in  gold  and  silver. 
The  first  effect,  then,  must  have  been  to  turn  the  foreign  exchange  in  our 
favour :  a  most  important  consequence  connected  with  the  increase  of  gold  and 
silver  in  relation  to  the  currency.  The  next  must  have  been  to  turn  the  domes 
tic  exchanges  still  more  strongly  against  the  staple  states,  and  in  favour  of  the 
manufacturing.  To  understand  this  portion  of  the  operation,  I  must  again  re 
peat,  that  the  object  of  the  tariff  was  to  cut  off  the  consumption  of  the  foreign 
articles,  in  order  that  they  should  be  supplied  by  our  own  manufactures.  The 
necessary  consequence  of  this  must  have  been  to  diminish  the  demand  abroad, 
and  to  increase  it  in  the  manufacturing  states,  and  thereby  to  turn  the  influx  of 
gold  and  silver  to  that  point,  in  order  to  purchase  the  supplies  there,  which  we 
have  been  in  the  habit  of  obtaining  from  abroad.  These  causes,  combined,  must 
have  had  the  effect  of  adding  greatly  to  the  capacity  of  the  banks  in  that  quarter 
to  extend  their  discounts  and  accommodations,  and  with  it  the  circulation  of 


368  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

their  notes.  With  a  growing  supply  of  specie,  and  the  exchange  favourable  in 
every  direction,  as  must  have  been  the  case,  there  is  no  limit  to  the  business 
of  banks,  nor  are  they  slow  to  perceive  or  to  act  on  such  favourable  circum 
stances.  Nor  must  we  overlook  another  powerful  cause  in  operation,  the  fiscal 
action  of  the  government,  through  the  operation  of  which  the  vast  sums  collect 
ed  under  such  high  duties  were  transferred  to  the  same  quarter,  to  be  applied  in 
discharge  of  the  public  debt,  and  disbursed  on  the  innumerable  objects  of  ex 
penditure  there. 

Under  the  operation  of  such  powerful  causes,  there  could  not  but  be  a  vast 
and  sudden  expansion  of  the  currency  where  they  were  in  such  great  activity, 
and  with  that  expansion  a  corresponding  increase  of  prices  and  the  cost  of  pro 
duction.  Nor  could  this  state  of  things  cease  till  the  increased  cost  of  produc 
tion  became  equal  to  the  duty  imposed  for  protection.  At  that  point,  and  not 
before,  must  specie  cease  to  flow  in,  and  the  exchange  to  be  favourable ;  but 
when  reached,  the  tide  must  turn,  importations  of  the  protected  articles  would 
recommence,  specie  flow  out,  and  exchanges  become  adverse.  This  must  be 
so  obvious,  that  it  would  only  darken  to  attempt  to  make  it  more  clear.  With 
the  turn  of  the  tide  the  banks  must  contract,  and  pecuniary  embarrassment  and 
distress  follow.  Such,  under  the  operation  of  the  causes  assigned,  must  be  the 
result,  for  reasons  which  appear  to  me  irresistible.  But,  sir,  I  do  not  mean  to 
leave  so  important  a  point  to  the  mere  force  of  argument,  however  clear  and 
certain.  I  intend  to  prove  by  incontestable  authority  of  documents,  such  was, 
in  fact,  exactly  the  result.  I  intend  to  place  the  principle  laid  down,  as  I  have 
said,  beyond  doubt  or  cavil. 

The  first  authority  I  shall  adduce  is  from  the*  report  of  a  Committee  of  the 
House,  made  in  February,  1832,  by  Campbell  P.  White,  the  chairman,  then  a 
member  from  the  city  of  New-York.  The  report  is  evidently  drawn  with  great 
care,  and  by  one  familiar  with  the  subject,  and  has  the  advantage  of  being  on 
another  subject  (the  currency),  without  any  reference  to  the  tariff  or  protective 
system,  and  evidently  without  any  knowledge  of  its  operation.  Hear,  then, 
what  the  report  says  : 

"  The  recent  export  of  specie  has  swept  away  the  delusive  colouring  given  to 
the  actual  result  of  production  in  1829,  1830,  and  the  early  part  of  1831.  Real 
estate  appreciated  greatly ;  local  stocks  commanded  unheard-of  prices  ;  ware 
houses  and  dwellings  were  improved  and  embellished,  and  money  was  so  abun 
dant,  that  it  could  readily  be  obtained  to  any  amount  upon  promissory  notes. 
How  changed  is  the  general  aspect  of  things  within  a  few  months  ?  All  our 
solid  possessions  and  means  of  industry  remain,  land  continues  to  be  equally 
productive,  labour  is  recompensed  with  its  usual  reward ;  the  seasons  have  not 
been  unfriendly.  Whence,  then,  this  lamentable  change  in  our  affairs  ?  Why 
this  great  scarcity  of  money ;  depreciation  in  value  of  all  commodities,  and  of 
all  property ;  great  commercial  distress,  and  absolute  impossibility  with  many 
solvent  persons  to  discharge  their  just  debts,  so  speedily  and  grievously  suc 
ceeding  the  gratifying  and  prosperous  picture  which  was  so  lately  presented  ?" 

What  a  confirmation  of  the  deductions  of  reason,  both  in  the  swelling  tide  of 
prosperity  and  the  turning  ebb  of  adversity.  The  sketch  of  the  latter  is  not 
unsuited  to  the  present  time  ;  good  seasons,  and  productive  years,  and  every 
element,  apparently,  of  plenty  and  prosperity,  and  yet  deep  and  wide-spread 
distress ;  though  at  that  time  there  had  been  no  removal  of  deposites,  nor  had 
the  sub-treasury  been  heard  of,  to  which  gentlemen  are  now  disposed  to  at 
tribute  all  the  calamities  which  afflict  the  country. 

The  author  of  the  report  could  give  no  satisfactory  answer  to  his  question, 
whence  all  this  sudden  and  unlooked-for  calamity ;  but  he  has  furnished  us 
with  the  means  of  tracing  it  clearly  to  the  tariff  of  1828.  It  went  into  opera- 

*  Document  278,  House  of  Representatives. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  369 

tion  on  tlie  1st  of  September  of  that  year,  and  the  next  year  felt  the  swelling, 
but  delusive  tide  of  an  expanding  currency  ;  the  exchange  turned  in  our  favour  ; 
gold  and  silver,  following  the  impulse,  flowed  in ;  banks  began  to  enlarge  their 
discounts  and  circulation.  It  continued  to  swell  with  a  stronger  and  stronger 
current  through  all  the  subsequent  year,  and  the  first  part  of  the  next,  nearly 
three  years,  according  to  the  usual  period,  when  it  began  to  ebb ;  and  then 
followed  the  reverse  scene,  so  feelingly  described  by  the  author,  and  which  to 
him  appeared  so  unexpected  and  unaccountable.  It  was  at  this  point,  had  not 
the  movements  in  the  South  arrested  the  farther  progress  of  the  system,  that 
there  would  have  been  another  clamour  for  additional  duties.  The  distress,  as 
usual,  would  have  been  attributed  to  over-importation,  and  that  to  the  want  of 
adequate  protection,  and  in  1832  (the  usual  period  of  four  years  having  inter 
vened),  another  protective  tariff  would  have  been  inflicted,  to  be  followed  by 
the  same  train  of  consequences,  and  with  equal  disappointment  to  its  authors. 

Now,  sir,  to  show  that  the  flowing  in  of  the  precious  metals,  in  consequence 
of  the  tariff  of  1828,  is  not  a  mere  assumption,  I  have  extracted  from  the  public 
documents,  for  the  years  1829  and  1830,  the  imports  and  exports  of  gold  and 
silver,  which  I  hold  in  my  hand.  The  import  in  J829  was  $7,403,612,  and 
the  export  $4,3 11, 134,  making  an  excess  of  imports  over  exports  of  $3,092,478  ; 
and  for  1830,  $8,155,964  against  $1,241,622,  making  an  excess  of  imports  of 
$6,914,342;  making,  in  the  two  years,  an  excess  of  imports  of  $10,006,810. 
By  turning  to  the  report  already  cited,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  estimated  amount 
of  specie  in  the  country  on  the  1st  of  January,  1830,  was  but  $25,000,000,  of 
which  $5,000,000  were  in  circulation,  and  $20,000,000  in  the  vaults  of  the 
banks ;  so  that  the  addition  to  the  specie  in  the  two  years  was  forty  per  cent, 
on  the  whole  amount. 

It  now  remains  to  be  shown  what  was  the  effect  of  this  great  proportional 
increase  of  specie,  and  the  favourable  state  of  the  exchange  which  it  indi 
cates,  on  the  banks  in  the  manufacturing  states.  The  report  will  furnish  the 
information,  not  fully,  but  enough  to  satisfy  every  reasonable  man.  It  gives 
the  following  statement  of  the  amount  of  bank-notes  in  circulation  in  1830  and  . 
1832,  respectively,  in  the  states  of  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  New- York, 
and  Pennsylvania,  including  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  which  will  show 
the  vast  increase  in  the  short  space  of  two  years. 

Here  Mr.  C.  read  the  following  statement : 

Relative  increase  of  circulation 
in  two  years. 

65  per  ct. 
100       " 
40       " 
20       " 
67       « 

$38,000,000      $56,500,000 

These  are,  it  will  be  borne  in  mind,  the  principal  manufacturing  states.  In 
the  period  of  two  years,  we  find  their  bank  circulation,  taken  in  the  aggregate, 
expanded  from  thirty-eight  to  fifty-six  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars,  making  an 
f  increase  of  sixteen  and  a  half  millions,  equal  to  forty-four  per  cent.  But  this 
falls  far  short  of  the  actual  increase.  The  year  1829  is  not  included.  It  must 
have  been  one  of  great  expansion,  as  the  import  of  specie  greatly  exceeded  its 
exports ;  which,  with  the  favourable  state  of  the  exchange  implied,  must  have 
greatly  increased  the  business  of  the  banks  and  the  circulation  of  their  notes. 
The  reverse  must  have  been  the  case  in  1832,  which  is  included,  as  we  know  by 
the  report  itself,  that  that  year,  and  the  latter  part  of  the  preceding,  were  a  period 
of  severe  contraction.  If  a  return  could  be  had  of  1829, 1830,  and  the  early  part 

A  AA 


1830. 

1832. 

Massachusetts, 

$4,730,000 

$7,700,000 

Rhode  Island, 

670,000 

1,340,000 

New-  York, 

10,000,000 

14,100,000 

Pennsylvania, 

7,300,000 

8,760,000 

Bank  U.  States, 

15,300,000 

24,600,000 

370  SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C.    CALHOtJN. 

of  1831, 1  venture  nothing  in  asserting  that  we  should  find  the  comparison,  com 
pared  with  1828,  the  year  of  the  tariff,  far  greater  in  proportion. 

That  there  is  no  mistake  in  attributing  this  great  expansion  to  the  tariff,  might 
be  farther  shown,  if  additional  proof  were  necessary  after  such  conclusive  evi 
dence,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  assign  any  other  adequate  cause. 
As  far  as  can  be  seen,  there  was  no  other  cause  in  operation,  political  or  com 
mercial,  that  could  have  produced  the  results.  It  was  a  period  of  profound 
peace,  and  the  exports  and  imports  of  the  country  steady  to  an  unusual  degree. 

Should  doubt,  however,  still  remain  in  the  mind  of  any  one  after  all  this  ac 
cumulation  of  evidence,  I  will  next  call  the  attention  of  the  Senate  to  a  fact 
which  must  be  conclusive  with  all  disposed  to  receive  the  truth.  By  turning 
to  the  table  showing  the  extent  of  bank  circulation  in  1830  and  1832  in  the 
four  states  already  referred  to,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  expansion  was  greater 
or  less,  just  as  the  states,  respectively,  were  more  or  less  manufacturing.  It 
will  not  be  doubted  that  Rhode  Island  is  the  most  manufacturing  of  the  four, 
and  we  accordingly  find  there  the  greatest  expansion  ;  and  that  for  the  simple 
reason,  that  there  the  causes  assigned  must  have  been  in  the  state  of  the  great 
est  activity.  Her  bank  circulation  doubled  in  the  short  space  of  two  years,  as 
appears  by  the  table.  Massachusetts  is  the  next ;  and  we  find  hers  is  the  next 
highest,  being  sixty-five  per  cent.  New- York  is  still  less  so,  and  hers  is  but 
forty  per  cent. ;  and  Pennsylvania,  the  least  of  the  four,  had,  excluding  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  increased  only  twenty  per  cent.  If  the  statement 
had  extended  farther  South,  and  taken  in  the  staple  states,  I  venture  little  in 
making  the  assertion  that,  instead  of  expansion,  their  bank  circulation  would,  for 
the  same  period,  have  been  found  in  the  opposite  state,  for  the  reverse  reason. 
It  will  be  seen  that  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  had  expanded  sixty-seven  per 
cent.  This  great  increase,  compared  to  the  local  banks  of  Pennsylvania,  may 
probably  be  attributed  partly  to  loans  negotiated  farther  East,  and  not  improba 
bly  because  her  accommodations  were  somewhat  enlarged,  from  causes  con 
nected  with  her  efforts,  at  the  time,  to  obtain  a  renewal  of  her  charter. 

I  trust  that  I  have  now  established,  to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  the  Senate, 
the  truth  of  the  great  principle  which  has  been  laid  down — that  every  increase 
of  protective  duties  is  necessarily  followed,  in  the  present  condition  of  our 
country,  by  an  expansion  of  the  currency,  which  must  continue  to  increase  till 
the  increased  price  of  production,  caused  by  the  expansion,  shall  be  equal  to 
the  duty  imposed,  when  a  new  tariff  will  be  required.  Assuming,  then,  the 
principle  as  incontrovertible,  it  follows  that  the  natural  tendency  of  the  protect 
ive  system  is  to  expand,  in  seeking  to  accomplish  its  object,  till  it  terminates 
in  explosion.  It  would  be  easy  to  show,  from  what  has  already  been  stated, 
that  this  tendency  must  cominue  till  the  exports  shall  be  so  reduced  as  to  be 
barely  sufficient  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  country  for  the  articles  not  included 
in  the  protection ;  as  it  must  be  obvious,  so  long  as  they  exceed  that  amount, 
so  long  must  specie  continue  to  be  imported,  and  the  exchange  to  be  in  our 
favour,  till  the  protection  is  broken  down  by  the  expansion  of  the  currency. 

The  consummation,  therefore,  of  the  system  must  be  one  of  two  things — ex 
plosion,  or  the  reduction  of  the  exports,  so  as  -not  to  exceed  the  amount  of  the 
unprotected  articles  ;  but  either  termination  must  prove  disastrous  to  the  system  ; 
the  former  by  a  sudden  and  violent  overthrow,  and  the  latter  by  the  impoverish 
ment  of  customers,  and  raising  up  of  rivals  as  they  ceased  to  be  customers.  To 
have  a  just  conception  of  its  operation  in  this  particular,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
bear  in  mind,  that  the  South  and  the  West  are  the  great  consumers  of  the  prod 
ucts  of  the  North  and  East ;  and  that  the  capacity  of  the  South  to  consume 
depends  on  her  great  agricultural  staples  almost  exclusively,  and  that  their  sale 
and  consumption  depend  mainly  on  the  foreign  market.  What,  then,  would  be 
the  effect  of  reducing  her  exports  to  the  point  indicated,  say  to  forty  or  fifty  mill 
ions  of  dollars  ?  Most  certainly,  to  diminish  her  capacity  to  consume  the  prod- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  371 

uc!s  of  the  North  and  East  in  the  same  proportion,  followed  by  a  correspond 
ing  diminution  of  the  revenue,  and  the  commerce  and  navigation  of  the  coun 
try.  But  the  evil  would  not  end  there,  as  great  as  it  would  be.  It  would  have 
an  equal  or  greater  effect  on  the  consumption  of  the  West.  That  great  and 
growing  section  is  the  provision  portion  of  the  Union.  Her  wide  and  fertile 
region  gives  her  an  unlimited  capacity  to  produce  grain  and  stock  of  every  de 
scription ;  and  these,  for  the  most  part,  find  their  market  in  the  staple  states. 
Cut  off  their  exports,  and  their  market  would  be  destroyed ;  and  with  it  the 
means  of  the  West,  to  a  great  extent,  for  carrying  on  trade  with  the  Northern 
and  Eastern  States.  To  the  same  extent,  they,  and  the  staple  states,  would  be 
compelled  to  produce  their  own  supplies ;  and  would  thus,  from  consumers,  be 
converted  into  rivals  with  the  other  section. 

How  much  wiser  for  all  would  be  the  opposite  system  of  low  duties,  with  the 
market  of  the  world  opened  to  our  great  agricultural  staples  ?  The  effects  would 
be  a  vast  increase  of  our  exports,  with  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  capacity 
to  consume  on  the  part  of  the  South  and  West,  making  them  rich  and  content 
ed  customers,  instead  of  impoverished  and  discontented  rivals  of  the  other  sec 
tion.  It  is  time  that  this  subject  should  be  regarded  in  its  true  light.  The 
protective  system  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  war  on  the  exports.  I  again 
repeat,  if  we  cannot  import,  we  cannot  long  export ;  and  just  as  we  cut  off  or 
burden  the  imports,  to  the  same  extent  do  we,  in  effect,  cut  off  and  burden  the 
exports.  This  I  have  long  seen,  and  shall  now  proceed  to  prove,  by  reference 
to  the  public  documents,  that  my  assertion  is  sustained  by  facts.  The  table  of 
exports  shows  that  during  the  seven  years,  from  1824  to  1831,  our  domestic 
exports  remained  nearly  stationary,  notwithstanding  the  great  increase  of  our 
population  during  that  period.  Your  statute-book  will  show  that  during  the 
same  period  the  protective  system  was  in  its  greatest  vigour.  The  first  relax 
ation  took  place  in  December,  1830,  under  the  act  of  the  20th  of  May  of  the 
same  year,  which  made  a  great  deduction  in  the  duties  on  coffee  and  tea.  I 
shall  now  turn  to  the  table,  and  give  the  exports  of  domestic  articles  for  those 
years,  beginning  with  1824. 

Here  Mr.  C.  read  the  folowing  statement : 

In  1824  the  domestic  exports  were  $50,649,500 

1825  "  "  "  66,944,745 

1826  "  «  "  53,055,710 

1827  «  "  "  58,921,691 

1828  "  "  "  56,669,669 

1829  «  '•  "  55,700,193 

1830  "  "  «  59,462,029 

If  we  take  the  average  of  the  first  three  and  the  last  of  these  years,  we  shall 
find  that  the  former  is  a  million  and  a  half  greater  than  the  latter,  showing  an 
actual  falling  off,  instead  of  an  increase,  to  that  extent  in  our  exports. 

With  1831,  the  reduction  of  duties  commenced  on  the  articles  mentioned; 
and  in  December,  1833,  the  first  great  reduction  took  place  under  the  Compro 
mise  Act.  I  shall  turn  to  the  same  table,  beginning  with  1831,  and  read  a 
statement  of  the  exports  for  the  eight  years  under  the  approach  to  the  free-trado 
system.  It  is  but  an  approach.  I  invite  special  attention  to  the  rapid  rise  after 
the  great  reduction  in  December,  1833. 

In  1831  the  domestic  exports  were  $61,277,057 

1832  "  "  "  63,137,470 

1833  "  "  "  70,317,698 

1834  "  "  "  81,034,162 

1835  "  "  "  101,189,082 

1836  "  "  "  106,916,680 

1837  .«  "  "  95,564,414 

1838  "  "  "  96,033,821 


372  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

How  rapid  the  rise  just  as  the  weights  are  removed !  The  increase,  since 
the  great  reduction  in  1833,  has  nearly  doubled  the  average  exports  compared 
with  the  average  of  the  seven  tariff  years  preceding  1831,  and  would  have  quite 
doubled  them,  had  not  the  expanded  and  deranged  condition  of  the  currency, 
and  the  consequent  embarrassment  of  commerce,  prevented  it. 

But  what  will  appear  still  more  extraordinary  to  those  who  have  not  reflect 
ed  on  the  operation  of  the  protective  system,  is  the  great  increase  of  the  ex 
ports  of  our  domestic  manufactures,  as  the  duties  go  off,  following,  in  that  re 
spect,  the  same  law  that  regulates  the  exports  of  the  great  agricultural  staples. 
It  is  a  precious  fact  that  speaks  volumes,  and  which  demands  the  serious  con 
sideration  of  the  manufacturing  portion  of  the  Union.  I  well  remember  the 
sanguine  expectations  of  the  friends  of  the  system,  of  the  great  increase  of  the 
exports  of  domestic  manufactures  which  they  believed  would  follow  the  tariff 
of  1828.  Well,  we  now  have  the  result  of  experience  under  that  act,  and  also 
under  that  of  a  partial  approach  to  free  trade,  and  the  result  is  exactly  the  re 
verse  of  the  anticipations  of  the  friends  and  advocates  of  protection.  So  far 
from  increasing,  under  the  tariff  of  1828,  the  exports  of  manufactured  articles 
actually  diminished,  while  they  have  rapidly  increased  just  as  they  have  gone 
off. 

But  the  table  of  exports  shall  speak  for  itself.  During  the  four  years,  under 
the  tariff  of  1824,  that  is,  from  that  year  to  1829,  when  the  tariff  of  1828  went 
into  operation,  the  exports  of  domestic  manufactures  gradually  declined  from 
$5,729,797,  in  the  year  1825,  to  $5,548,354'in  the  year  1828.  From  that  time 
it  steadily  declined,  under  the  tariff  of  1828,  each  succeeding  year  showing  a 
falling  off  compared  with  the  preceding,  till  1833,  declining,  throughout  the  pe 
riod,  from  $5,412,320  in  1829,  to  $5,050,633  in  1832,  and  showing  an  aggre 
gate  falling  off,  during  the  whole  tariff  regime  of  eight  years,  from  1825  to  1832, 
of  nearly  $700,000.  At  this  point  we  enter  on  the  relaxation  of  the  system ; 
and  there  has  been  an  onward  move,  with  but  little  vibration,  throughout  the 
whole  period,  till  the  present  time.  The  last  year  we  have  is  1838,  when  the 
exports  exceeded  any  preceding  year.  They  amounted  to  $8,397,078,  being 
an  increase,  during  the  six  years  of  the  reduction  of  duties,  of  $3,346,445, 
against  a  falling  off,  in  the  preceding  eight  years  of  protection,  of  $700,000  : 
an  increase  of  sixty-five  per  cent,  in  six  years,  and  this  in  the  midst  of  all  the 
embarrassment  of  commerce,  and  expansion,  and  derangement  of  the  currency, 
and,  let  me  add,  what  has  been  so  much  dreaded  by  the  friends  of  manufactures, 
the  mighty  increase  of  the  exports  of  our  great  agricultural  staples  during  the 
same  period :  a  clear  proof  that,  under  the  free-trade  system,  the  one  does  not 
interfere  with  the  other.  Let  no  friend  of  manufactures  suppose  that  this  inter 
esting  result  is  accidental.  It  is  the  operation  of  fixed  laws,  steady  and  immu 
table  in  their  course,  as  I  shall  hereafter  show. 

Now,  sir,  I  feel  myself,  with  these  facts,  warranted  in  asserting  that,  if  the 
deranged  state  of  the  currency  had  not  interfered,  the  great  manufacturing  in 
terest  would  have  gone  on  in  a  flourishing  condition  during  the  whole  period 
of  the  reduction  under  the  Compromise  Act,  proving  thereby,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  all,  the  fallacy  of  the  protective  system.  Any  supposed  loss,  from  the  re 
duction  of  duties,  would  have  been  much  more  than  made  up  by  the  increased 
ability  of  the  South  and  West  to  consume,  and  the  rapidly  growing  importance 
of  the  foreign  market. 

But  I  have  not  yet  done  with  the  system.  It  has  additional  and  heavy  sins 
to  answer  for.  The  tariff  of  1828  is  the  source  in  which  has  originated  that 
very  derangement  of  the  currency  which  so  greatly  embarrasses,  at  this  time, 
the  very  interest  it  was  intended  to  protect,  as  well  as  all  other  branches  of  in 
dustry.  Bold  as  is  the  assertion-,  I  am  prepared  to  establish  it  to  the  letter. 

It  has  already  been  proved  that  the  great  expansion  of  the  currency  in  1829, 
1830,  and  1831,  was  the  immediate  effect  of  the  tariff  of  1828.  It  remains  to 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  373 

be  shown  that  the  cause  of  the  still  greater  and  longer  continued  expansion 
which  has  terminated  in  the  overthrow  of  the  banking  system,  and  the  deep 
and  almost  universal  distress  of  the  country,  may  be  clearly  traced  back  to  the 
same  source.  To  do  this,  we  must  return  to  the  year  1832,  and  trace  the  chain 
of  events  to  this  time.  In  that  year  the  public  debt  was  finally  discharged. 
The  vast  revenue  which  had  been  poured  into  the  treasury  by  the  tariff' of  '1828, 
and  which  had  accelerated  the  payment  of  the  public  debt,  could,  after  its  dis 
charge,  no  longer  be  absorbed  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  of  the  government, 
and  a  surplus  began  to  accumulate  in  the  treasury.  The  late  Bank  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  was  then  the  fiscal  agent  of  the  government,  and  the  depository  of  its 
revenue.  Its  growing  amount,  and  prospects  of  great  future'increase,  began  to 
•  act  on  the  cupidity  of  many  of  the  leading  state  banks,  arid  some  of  the  great 
brokers  of  New- York.  Hence  their  war  against  that  institution  ;  and  hence, 
also,  the  removal  of  the  deposites.  The  late  President  I  believe  to  have  been 
really  hostile  to  the  Bank  on  principle  ;  but  there  would  have  been  little  or  no 
motive  to  remove  them,  had  it  not  been  for  their  growing  importance,  and  the 
hostility  which  the  desire  of  possessing  them  had  excited.  They  were  remo 
ved,  and  placed  in  the  vaults  of  certain  state  banks.  To  this  removal  and  de- 
posite  in  the  state  banks,  the  members  over  the  way  are  in  the  habit  of  attribu 
ting  all  the  disorders  of  the  currency  which  have  since  followed.  Now  I  ask, 
in  the  first  place,  Is  it  not  certain,  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  surplus  revenue,  the 
deposites  would  not  have  been  removed  ?  And,  in  the  second,  would  there 
have  been  a  surplus  had  it  not  been  for  the  tariff  of  1828  ? 

Again :  Is  it  not  equally  cjear  that  it  was  the  magnitude  of  the  surplus,  and 
not  the  removal,  of  itself,  that;  caused  the  after  derangement  and  disorder  ?  If 
the  surplus  had  been  but  two  or  three  millions,  the  ordinary  sum  in  deposite,  it 
would  have  been  of  little  importance  where  it  was  kept,  whether  in  the  vaults 
of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  or  those  of  the  states  ;  but  involving,  as  it 
did,  fifty  millions  and  more,  it  became  a  question  of  the  highest  importance.  I 
again  ask,  To  what  is  this  great  surplus  to  be  attributed  but  to  the  same  cause  ? 
Yes,  sir,  the  tariff  of  1828  caused  the  surplus,  and  the  surplus  the  removal  and  all 
the  subsequent  disasters  in  the  currency,  aggravated,  it  is  true,  by  being  deposit 
ed  in  the  state  banks  ;  but  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  disaster  would  have  been 
much  less  had  they  not  been  removed.  Be  that,  however,  as  it  may,  it  is  not 
material,  as  I  have  shown  that  that  surplus  itself  was  the  motive  for  the  removal. 
We  all  remember  what  occurred  after  the  removal.  The  surplus  poured  into 
the  treasury  by  millions,  in  the  form  of  bank-notes.  The  withdrawal  from  cir 
culation,  and  locking  up  in  the  vaults  of  the  deposite  banks,  so  large  an  amount, 
created  an  immense  vacuum,  to  be  replenished  by  repeating  the  issues,  which 
gave  to  the  banks  the  means  of  unbounded  accommodations.  Speculation  now 
commenced  on  a  gigantic  scale ;  prices  rose  rapidly,  and  one  party,  to  make 
the  removal  acceptable  to  the  people,  urged  the  new  depositories  to  discount 
freely  ;  while  the  other  side  produced  the  same  effect  by  censuring  them  for  not 
affording  as  extensive  accommodations  as  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  would 
have  done,  had  the  revenue  been  left  with  it.  Madness  ruled  the  hour.  The 
whole  community  was  intoxicated  with  imaginary  prospects  of  realizing  im 
mense  fortunes.  With  the  increased  rise  of  prices  began  the  gigantic  specula 
tions  in  the  public  domain,  the  price  of  which,  being  fixed  by  law,  could  not 
partake  of  the  general  rise.  To  enlarge  the  room  for  their  operations,  I  know 
not  how  many  millions  (fifty,  I  should  suppose,  at  least,  of  the  public  revenue) 
were  sunk  in  purchasing  Indian  lands,  at  their  fee  simple  price  nearly,  and  re 
moving  tribe  after  tribe  to  the  West,  at  enormous  cost ;  thus  subjecting  millions 
on  millions  of  the  choicest  public  lands  to  be  seized  on  by  the  keen  and  greedy 
speculator.  The  tide  now  swelled  with  irresistible  force.  From  the  banks 
the  deposites  passed  by  discounts  into  the  hands  of  the  land  speculators ;  from 
them  into  the  hands  of  the  receivers,  and  thence  to  the  banks ;  and  again  and 


374  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

again  repeating  the  same  circle,  and  at  every  evolution  passing  millions  of 
acres  of  the  public  domain  from  the  people  into  the  hands  of  speculators,  for 
worthless  rags.  Had  this  state  of  things  continued  much  longer,  every  acre  of 
the  public  lands  worth  possessing  would  have  passed  from  the  government. 
At  this  stage  the  alarm  took  place.  The  revenue  was  attempted  to  be  squan 
dered  by  the  wildest  extravagance  ;  resolutions  passed  this  body  calling  on 
the  departments  to  know  how  much  they  could  spend,  and  much  resentment 
was  felt  because  they  could  not  spend  fast  enough.  The  Deposite  Act  was 
passed  and  the  Treasury  Circular  issued,  but,  as  far  as  the  currency  was  con 
cerned,  in  vain.  The  explosion  followed,  and  the  banks  fell  in  convulsions,  to  be 
resuscitated  for  a  moment,  but  to  fall  again  from  a  more  deadly  stroke,  under 
which  they  now  lie  prostrate. 

I  have  now  presented,  rapidly,  the  unbroken  chain  of  events  up  to  the  prolif 
ic  source  of  our  disasters,  and  down  to  the  present  time.  In  addition  to  the 
causes  originating  directly  in  the  tariff  of  1828,  there  were  several  collateral 
powerful  ones,  which  have  contributed  to  the  present  prostrated  condition  of  the 
currency  and  the  banks,  but  which  would  have  been  comparatively  harmless  of 
themselves.  Among  these  was  the  important  change  in  the  charter  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  at  the  last  renewal,  about  the  time  our  surplus  revenue  began 
to  accumulate,  by  which  its  notes  were  made  a  legal  tender  in  all  cases  except 
between  the  Bank  and  its  creditors.  The  obvious  effect  of  this  modification 
was  to  diminish  the  demand  for  specie  in  that  great  mart  of  the  world,  and,  in 
consequence,  must  have  tended  powerfully  to  keep  the  exchange  with  us  in  an 
easy  condition  while  the  tide  of  circulation  was  rapidly  rising  to  a  dangerous 
height.  But  there  was  another  cause  which  contributed  still  more  powerfully 
to  the  same  result :  I  refer  to  the  great  loans  negotiated  abroad  by  states  and 
corporations.  To  these  I  add  the  operation  of  the  United  States  Bank  of 
Pennsylvania,  the  direct  object  of  which,  in  some  of  its  more  prominent  trans 
actions,  was  to  prevent  the  exchange  from  becoming  adverse  to  us. 

By  the  operation  of  these  causes  combined,  the  exchanges  were  kept  easy 
for  years,  notwithstanding  the  vast  expansion  which  our  circulation  had  attain 
ed,  from  the  powerful  action  of  the  more  direct  causes  to  which  I  have  adverted. 
The  stroke  was  delayed,  but  not  averted,  and  fell  but  the  heavier  and  more  fa 
tally  because  delayed.  And  where  did  it  fall,  when  it  came,  most  heavily? 
Where  the  measure  which  caused  it  originated — on  the  heads  of  its  projectors. 
Behold  how  error,  folly,  and  vice,  in  the  ways  of  an  inscrutable  Providence, 
turn  back  on  their  authors. 

It  is  full  time  for  the  North,  and  more  especially  for  New-England,  to  pause 
and  ponder.  If  they  would  hear  the  voice  of  one  who  has  ever  wished  them 
well,  1  would  say  that  the  renewal  of  the  protective  system  would  be  one  of  the 
greatest  calamities  that  could  befall  you.  Whatever  incidental  good  could  be 
derived  from  it,  you  have  already  acquired.  It  would,  if  .renewed,  prove  a  pure, 
unadulterated  evil.  The  very  reverse  is  your  true  policy.  The  great  question 
for  you  to  decide  is,  how  to  command  the  foreign  market.  The  home  market, 
of  itself,  is  too  scanty  for  your  skill,  your  activity,  your  energy,  your  unequalled 
inventive  powers,  your  untiring  industry,  your  vastly  increased  population,  and 
accumulated  capital.  Without  the  foreign  market,  your  unexampled  march  to 
wealth  and  improvement  must  come  to  a  stand.  How,  then,  are  you  to  obtain 
command  of  the  foreign  market?  That  is  the  vital  question. 

The  first  and  indispensable  step  is  a  thorough  reformation  of  the  currency. 
Without  a  solid,  stable,  and  uniform  currency,  you  never  can  fully  succeed.  The 
present  currency  is  incurably  bad.  It  is  impossible  to  give  it  solidity  or  stabili 
ty.  A  convertible  bank  currency,  however  well  regulated,  is  subject  to  violent 
and  sudden  changes,  which  must  forever  unfit  it  to  be  the  standard  of  value. 
It  is  by  far  the  most  sensitive  of  all  to  every  change,  commercial  or  political, 
foreign  or  domestic  ;  as  may  be  readily  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  ordinary 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  375 

action  of  foreign  exchanges  on  such  currency.  For  this  purpose,  let  us  assume 
that  our  ordinary  circulating  medium,  when  exchanges  are  easy,  amounts  to 
$100,000,000,  consisting,  as  it  does,  of  convertible  bank  paper.  Let  us  sup 
pose  that  it  is  all  issued  by  what  are  called  sound  specie-paying  banks,  with  a 
circulation  of  three  dollars  of  paper  for  one  dollar  in  specie,  which  is  regarded 
as  constituting  safe  banking.  Next,  suppose  exchange  abroad  turns  against  us, 
to  the  amount  of  $10,000,000.  Is  it  not  clear  that,  instead  of  reducing  the  cir 
culation  by  that  amount,  that  is,  to  $90,000,000,  which  it  would  do  if  it  con 
sisted  only  of  specie,  it  would  be  reduced  three  times  the  amount :  that  is,  to 
$70,000,000  ?  Let  us  now  suppose  the  exchange  to  turn  the  other  way,  from 
this  point  of  depression,  and  to  be  kept  flowing  in  that  direction  till  it  came  to 
be  $10,000,000  in  our  favour,  instead  of  that  amount  against  us.  The  result 
would  be.  under  the  operation  of  the  same  law,  not  to  increase  our  circulation 
to  $110,000,000  only,  which  would  be  the  case  if  consisting  of  specie,  but  to 
$130,000,000;  making  a  difference' between  the  extreme  points  of  depression 
and  elevation  of  $60,000,000 — more  than  equal  to  one  half  of  the  usual  amount  of 
circulation  by  supposition,  with  a  corresponding  increase  of  prices — instead  of 
$20,000,000,  equal  only  to  a  fifth,  and  with  but  a  proportional  effect  on  prices. 
A  change  the  other  way,  from  the  extreme  point  of  elevation  to  that  of  extreme 
depression,  would  cause  the  reverse  effect.  I  hold  it  certain  that  no  honest 
industry,  pursued  with  the  view  to  moderate  and  steady  profit,  can  be  safe  in 
the  midst  of  such  sudden  and  violent  vicissitudes — vicissitudes  as  if  from  sum 
mer  to  winter,  and  from  winter  to  summer,  without  the  intervention  of  fall  or 
spring.  Such  great  and  sudden  changes  in  the  standard  of  value  must  be  par 
ticularly  fatal  with  us,  with  our  moderately  accumulated  capital,  compared  to 
the  effect  on  the  greater  accumulation  abroad,  in  older  countries.  In  stating  the 
case  supposed,  I  have  assumed  numbers  at  random,  without  pretending  to  ac 
curacy  as  applied  to  our  country,  simply  to  illustrate  the  principle.  The  actual 
vibration  may  be  greater  or  less  than  that  supposed,  but  in  every  country  where 
bank  circulation  prevails  it  must  be  greater  and  greater,  just  in  proportion  to 
the  extent  of  its  prevalence. 

For  this  diseased  state  of  your  currency  there  is  but  one  certain  remedy — 
to  return  to  the  currency  of  the  Constitution.  Read  that  instrument,  and  hear 
what  it  says.  "  Congress  shall  coin  money  and  regulate  the  value  thereof;  no 
state  shall  emit  bills  of  credit,  or  make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  a  legal  tend 
er."  Here  are  positive  and  negative  provisions  :  a  grant  of  power  to  Congress, 
and  a  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  states  in  reference  to  the  currency.  Can 
you  doubt  that  the  object  was  to  give  to  Congress  the  control  of  the  currency  ? 
What  else  is  the  meaning  "  to  regulate"  the  value  thereof?  Can  you  doubt  that 
the  currency  was  intended  to  be  specie  ?  What  else  is  the  meaning  "  to  coin 
money  ?"  Can  you  doubt,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  was  the  intention  that  the 
states  should  not  supersede  the  currency  which  Congress  was  authorized  to  es 
tablish  1  What  else  is  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  that  they  shall  not  issue 
bills  of  credit,  or  make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  a  legal  tender  ?  Can  we 
doubt,  finally,  that  the  country  is  not  in  the  condition  that  the  Constitution  in 
tended,  as  far  as  the  currency  is  concerned  ?  Does  Congress,  in  point  of  fact, 
regulate  the  currency  ?  No.  Does  it  supply  a  coin  circulation  1  No.  Do 
the  states,  in  fact,  regulate  it?  Yes.  Does  it  consist  of  paper  issued  by  the 
authority  of  the  states  ?  Yes.  Is  this  paper,  in  effect,  a  legal  tender?  Yes. 
It  has  expelled  the  currency  of  the  Constitution,  and  we  are  compelled  to  take 
it  or  nothing.  Well,  then,  as  the  currency  is  in  an  unconstitutional  condition, 
the  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  the  Constitution  has  failed  to  effect  what  it  in 
tended,  as  far  as  the  currency  is  concerned ;  but  whether  it  has  failed  by  mis 
construction,  or  the  want  of  adequate  provisions,  is  not  yet  decided.  Thus 
much,  however,  is  clear,  that  it  is  through  the  agency  of  bank  paper  that  it  has 
failed,  and  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred  on  Congress  over  the  currency 


o/O  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

has  been  superseded.  But  for  that,  the  power  of  Congress  over  the  currency 
would  have  been  this  day  in  full  force,  and  the  currency  itself  in  a  constitutional 
condition.  Nor  is  it  less  clear  that  the  Constitution  cannot  be  restored  while 
the  cause  which  has  superseded  it  remains ;  and  this  presents  the  great  ques 
tion,  How  can  it  be  removed?  I  do  not  intend  to  discuss  it  on  this  occasion. 
I  shall  only  say  that  the  task  is  one  of  great  delicacy  and  difficulty,  requiring 
much  wisdom  and  caution,  and  in  the  execution  of  which  precipitation  ought 
to  be  carefully  avoided ;  but  when  executed,  then,  and  not  till  then,  shall  we 
have  the  solid,  stable,  and  uniform  currency  intended  by  the  Constitution,  and 
which  is  indispensable,  not  only  to  the  full  success  of  our  manufactures,  and  all 
other  branches  of  productive  industry,  but  also  to  the  safety  of  our  free  institu 
tions. 

The  next  indispensable  step  to  secure  to  the  manufacturers  the  foreign  mar 
ket  is  low  duties,  and  light  burdens  on  productions ;  yes,  as  low  and  light  as 
the  wants  of  the  government  will  permit.  •  The  less  the  burden — the  freer  and 
broader  the  scope  given  to  the  products  of  our  manufactures — the  better  for 
them.  Above  all,  avoid  the  renewal  of  the  protective  system.  It  would  be 
fatal,  as  far  as  the  foreign  market  is  concerned. 

Its  hostile  effects  I  have  already  shown  from  the  table  of  exports,  and  shall 
now,  by  a  few  brief  remarks,  prove  that  it  must  be  so.  Passing  by  other  rea 
sons,  I  shall  present  but  one,  but  that  one  is  decisive.  It  has  been  shown  that 
the  effect  of  the  protective  system  is  to  expand  the  currency  in  the  manufactu 
ring  sections,  until  the  increased  price  of  production  shall  become  equal  to  the 
duty  imposed  for  protection,  when  the  importation  of  the  protected  articles  must 
again  take  place  ;  that  is  to  say,  that  its  effects  are  to  enable  foreign  manufac 
turers  to  meet  ours  in  our  own  country,  under  the  disadvantage  of  paying  high 
additional  duties.  How,  then,  with'that  result,  would  it  be  possible  for  our  man 
ufacturers  to  meet  the  foreign  fabrics  of  the  same  description  abroad,  where  there 
can  be  no  duty  to  protect  them  ?  There  can  be  no  answer.  The  reason  is  de 
cisive. 

I  do  not  wish,  in  what  I  have  said,  to  be  considered  the  advocate  of  low  wa 
ges.  I  am  in  favour  of  high  wages  ;  and  agree  that,  the  higher  the  wages,  the 
stronger  the  evidence  of  prosperity ;  provided  (and  that  is  the  important  point) 
they  are  so  naturally,  by  the  effectiveness  of  industry,  and  not  in  consequence 
of  an  inflated  currency,  or  any  artificial  regulation.  When  I  say  the  effective 
ness  of  industry,  I  mean  to  comprehend  whatever  is  calculated  to  make  the  la 
bour  of  one  country  more  productive  than  that  of  others.  I  take  into  consider 
ation  skill,  activity,  energy,  invention,  perfection  of  instruments  and  means,  me 
chanical  and  chemical ;  abundance  of  capital,  natural  and  acquired  ;  facility  of 
intercourse  and  exchanges,  internal  and  external ;  and,  in  a  word,  whatever  may 
add  to  the  productiveness  of  labour.  High  wages,  when  attributable  to  these, 
is  the  certain  evidence  of  productiveness,  and  is,  on  that  account,  and  that  only, 
the  evidence  of  prosperity.  It  is  easily  understood.  Just  as  such  labour  would 
command,  when  compared  with  the  less  productive,  a  greater  number  of  pounds 
of  sugar  or  tea,  a  greater  quantity  of  clothing  or  food,  in  the  same  proportion 
would  it  command  more  specie,  that  is,  higher  wages  for  a  day's  work.  But, 
sir,  here  is  the  important  consideration :  high  wages  from  such  a  cause  require 
no  protection — no,  not  more  than  the  high  wages  of  a  man  against  the  low  wa 
ges  of  a  boy,  of  man  against  women,  or  the  skilful  and  energetic  against  the 
awkward  and  feeble.  On  the  contrary,  the  higher  such  wages,  the  less  the  pro 
tection  required.  Others  may  demand  protection  against  it — not  it  against  oth 
ers.  The  very  demand  of  protection,  then,  is  but  a  confession  of  the  want  of 
effectiveness  of  labour  (from  soine  cause)  on  the  side  that  makes  it ;  but,  as  a 
general  rule,  it  will  turn  out  that  protection,  in  most  cases,  is  a  mere  fallacy ; 
certainly  so  when  its  effects  are  an  artificial  expansions  of  the  currency.  So 
far  are  high  wages  from  being  the  evidence  of  prosperity  in  such  cases,  or,  in 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  377 

fact,  whenever  caused  by  high  protection,  high  taxes,  or  any  other  artificial 
cause,  it  is  the  evidence  of  the  very  reverse,  and  always  indicates  something 
wrong,  and  a  tendency  to  derangement  and  decay. 

Having  arrived  at  this  conclusion,  I  will  now  hazard  the  assertion,  that  in 
no  country  on  earth  is  labour,  taking  it  all  in  all,  more  effective  than  ours,  and 
especially  in  the  Northern  and  Eastern  portions.  What  people  can  excel  our 
Northern  and  New-England  brethren  in  skill,  invention,  activity,  energy,  per 
severance,  and  enterprise  ?  In  what  portion  of  the  globe  will  you  find  a  posi 
tion  more  favourable  to  a  free  ingress  and  egress,  and  facility  of  intercourse, 
external  and  internal,  through  the  broad  limits  of  our  wide-spread  country — a 
region  surpassed  by  none,  taking  into  consideration  extent  and  fertility  ?  Where 
will  you  find  such  an  abundant  supply  of  natural  capital,  the  gift  of  a  kind  Prov 
idence  ;  lands  cheap,  plenty,  and  fertile  ;  water  power  unlimited  ;  and  the  supply 
of  fuel,  and  the  most  useful  of  metals,  iron,  almost  without  stint  ?  It  is  true,  in 
accumulated  capital,  the  fruits  of  past  labour,  through  a  long  succession  of  ages, 
not  equal  to  some  other  countries,  but  even  in  that  far  from  being  deficient,  and 
to  whatever  extent  deficient,  would  be  more  than  compensated  by  the  absence 
of  all  restrictions,  and  the  lightness  of  the  burden  imposed  on  labour,  should  our 
government,  state  and  general,  wisely  avail  itself  of  the  advantages  of  our  situ 
ation.  If  these  views  be  correct,  there  is  no  country  where  labour,  if  left  to 
itself,  free  from  restriction,  would  be  more  effective,  and  where  it  would  com 
mand  greater  abundance  of  every  necessary  and  comfort,  or  higher  wages  ;  and 
where,  of  course,  protection  is  less  needed.  Instead  of  an  advantage,  it  must, 
in  fact,  prove  an  impediment.  It  is  high  time,  then,  that  the  shackles  should 
be  thrown  off  industry,  and  its  burden  lightened,  as  far  as  the  just  wants  of  the 
government  may  possibly  admit.  We  have  arrived  at  the  manhood  of  our  vig 
our.  Open  the  way — remove  all  restraints — take  off  the  swaddling  cloth  that 
bound  the  limbs  of  infancy,  and  let  the  hardy,  intelligent,  and  enterprising  sons 
of  New-England  march  forth  fearlessly  to  meet  the  world  in  competition,  and 
she  will  prove,  in  a  few  years,  the  successful  rival  of  Old  England.  The  for 
eign  market  once  commanded,  all  conflicts  between  the  different  sections  and 
industry  of  the  country  would  cease.  It  is  better  for  us  and  you  that  our  cot 
ton  should  go  out  in  yarn  and  goods  than  in  the  raw  state  ;  and  when  that  is 
done,  the  interests  of  all  the  parts  of  this  great  confederacy — North,  East,  South, 
and  West — with  every  variety  of  its  pursuits,  would  be  harmonized,  but  not  till 
then. 

If  the  course  of  policy  I  advocate  be  wise  as  applied  to  manufactures,  how 
much  more  strikingly  so  must  it  be  when  to  the  other  two  great  interests  of  that 
section,  commerce  and  navigation  ?  I  pass  the  former,  and  shall  conclude  what 
I  intended  to  say  on  this  point  with  a  few  remarks  applicable  to  the  latter. 
Navigation  (I  mean  that  employed  in  our  foreign  trade)  is  essentially  our  out 
side  interest,  exposed  to  the  open  competition  of  all  the  world.  It  has  met,  and 
met  successfully,  the  competition  of  the  lowest  wages,  not  only  without  protec 
tion,  but  with  heavy  burdens  on  almost  every  article  that  enters  into  the  outfit, 
the  rigging,  and  construction  of  our  noble  vessels,  the  timber  excepted.  If,  with 
such  onerous  burdens,  it  has  met  in  successful  rivalry  the  navigation  of  all  other 
countries,  what  an  impulse  it  would  receive  if  the  load  that  bears  down  its 
springs  were  removed!  and  what  immense  additions  that  increased  impulse 
would  give,  not  only  to  our  wealth,  but  to  the  means  of  national  influence  and 
safety,  where  only  we  can  be  felt,  and  in  the  quarter  from  which  only  external 
danger  is  to  be  apprehended  ! 

I  have  now,  Mr.  President,  concluded  what  I  proposed  to  say  when  I  rose 
to  address  the  Senate.  I  have  limited  my  remarks  to  the  prominent  conse 
quences,  in  a  pecuniary  and  fiscal  view,  which  would  result  should  the  scheme 
of  assumption  be  adopted.  There  are  higher  and  still  more  important  conse 
quences,  which  I  have  not  attempted  to  trace  ;  I  mean  the  effects,  morally  and 

B  B  B 


378  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

politically,  as  resulting  from  those  which  I  have  traced,  and  presented  to  the  Sen 
ate.  This,  I  hope,  may  be  done  by  some  other  senator  in  the  course  of  the 
discusion.  But  I  have  said  enough  to  show  that  the  scheme  which  these  reso 
lutions  are  intended  to  condemn  ought  to  be  avoided,  as  the  most  fatal  poison 
and  the  most  deadly  pestilence.  It  is,  in  reality,  but  a  scheme  of  plunder.  Let 
blood  be  lapped,  and  the  appetite  will  be  insatiable. 

But  the  states  are  deeply  in  debt,  and  it  may  be  asked,  What  shall  be  done  ? 
I  know  that  they  are  in  debt — deeply  in  debt.  I  deplore  it.  Yes,  in  debt,  1 
am  not  afraid  to  assert  it,  in  many  instances,  for  the  most  idle  projects,  got  up 
and  pursued  in  the  most  thoughtless  manner.  Nor  am  I  ignorant  how  deep 
pecuniary  embarrassments,  whether  of  states  or  individuals,  blunt  every  feeling 
of  honest  pride  and  deaden  the  sense  of  justice  ;  but  I  do  trust  that  there  is  not 
a  member  of  this  great  and  proud  confederacy  so  lost  to  every  feeling  of  self- 
respect  and  sense  of  justice  as  to  desire  to  charge  its  individual  debts  on  the 
common  fund  of  the  Union,  or  to  impose  them  on  the  shoulders  of  its  more  pru 
dent  associates  ;  or,  let  me  add,  to  dishonour  itself,  and  the  name  of  an  Ameri 
can,  by  refusing  to  pay  the  foreigner  what  it  justly  owes.  Let  the  indebted 
states  remember,  in  time,  that  there  is  but  one  honest  mode  of  paying  its  debts — 
stop  all  farther  increase,  and  impose  taxes  to  discharge  what  they  owe.  There 
is  not  a  state,  even  the  most  indebted,  with  the  smallest  resources,  that  has  not 
ample  resources  to  meet  its  engagements.  For  one,  I  pledge  myself;  South 
Carolina  is  also  in  debt.  She  has  spent  her  thousands  in  wasteful  extrava 
gance  on  one  of  the  most  visionary  schemes  that  ever  entered  into  the  head  of 
a  thinking  man.  I  dare  say  this  even  of  her ;  I,  who  on  this  floor  stood  up  to 
defend  her  almost  alone  against  those  who  threatened  her  with  fire  and  sword, 
but  who  now  are  so  squeamish  about  state  rights  as  to  be  shocked  to  hear  it 
asserted  that  a  state  was  capable  of  extravagant  and  wasteful  expenditures. 
Yes,  I  pledge  myself  that  she  will  pay  punctually  every  dollar  she  owes,  should 
it  take  the  last  cent,  without  inquiring  whether  it  was  spent  wisely  or  foolishly. 
Should  I  in  this  be  by  possibility  mistaken — should  she  tarnish  her  unsullied 
honour,  and  bring  discredit  on  our  common  country  by  refusing  to  redeem  her 
plighted  faith  (which  I  hold  impossible),  deep  as  is  my  devotion  to  her,  and 
mother  as  she  is  to  me,  I  would  disown  her. 


xxv. 

SPEECH    ON  HIS    RESOLUTIONS    IN    REFERENCE    TO    THE    CASE    OF    THE    EN 
TERPRISE,  MARCH   13,   1840. 

THE  following  resolutions,  submitted  by  Mr.  Calhoun  on  the  4th  inst.,  were 
taken  up  for  consideration  : 

"  Resolved,  That  a  ship  or  a  vessel  on  the  high  seas,  in  time  of  peace,  en 
gaged  in  a  lawful  voyage,  is,  according  to  the  laws  of  nations,  under  the  exclu 
sive  jurisdiction  of  the  state  to  which  her  flag  belongs  ;  as  much  so  as  if  con 
stituting  a  part  of  its  own  domain. 

"  Resolved,  That  if  such  ship  or  vessel  should  be  forced,  by  stress  of  weather, 
or  other  unavoidable  cause,  into  the  port  of  a  friendly  power,  she  would,  under 
the  same  laws,  lose  none  of  the  rights  appertaining  to  her  on  the  high  seas  ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  she,  and  her  cargo  and  persons  on  board,  with  their  "prop 
erty,  and  all  the  rights  belonging  to  their  personal  relations,  as  established  by 
the  laws  of  the  state  to  which  they  belong,  would  be  placed  under  the  protec 
tion  which  the  laws  of  nations  extend  to  the  unfortunate  under  such  circum 
stances. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  brig  Enterprise,  which  was  forced  unavoidably,  by  stress 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  379 

ot  weather,  into  Port  Hamilton,  Bermuda  Island,  while  on  a  lawful  voyage  on 
the  high  seas,  from  one  port  of  the  Union  to  another,  comes  within  the  princi 
ples  embraced  in  the  foregoing  resolutions  ;  and  that  the  seizure  and  detention 
of  the  negroes  on  board,  by  the  local  authority  of  the  island,  was  an  act  in  vio 
lation  of  the  laws  of  nations,  and  highly  unjust  to  our  own  citizens,  to  whom 
they  belong." 

The  resolutions  having  been  read, 

Mr.  Calhoun  said :  The  case  referred  to  in  these  resolutions  is  one  of  the 
three  which  have  been  for  so  long  a  period  a  subject  of  negotiation  between  our 
government  and  that  of  Great  Britain,  without,  however,  receiving  the  attention 
which,  in  my  opinion,  is  due  to  the  importance  of  the  principle  involved.  The 
other  two  were  those  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium.  In  order  to  have  a  clear 
understanding  of  the  bearing  of  these  resolutions,  and  the  principles  they  em 
brace,  it  will  be  necessary  to  give  a  brief  narrative  of  each  of  these  cases. 

The  Comet  is  the  first  in  order  of  time.  She  sailed  from  this  District  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  year  1830,  destined  for  New-Orleans,  having,  among  other 
things,  a  number  of  negroes  on  board.  Her  papers  were  regular,  and  her  voy 
age  in  all  respects  lawful.  She  was  stranded  on  one  of  the  false  keys  of  the 
Bahama  Islands,  opposite  to  the  coast  of  Florida,  and  almost  in  sight  of  our  own 
shores.  The  persons  on  board,  including  the  negroes,  were  taken  by  the 
wreckers,  against  the  remonstrance  of  the  captain  and  owners,  into  Nassau, 
New-Providence,  where  the  negroes  were  forcibly  seized  and  detained  by  the 
local  authorities. 

The  case  of  the  Encomium  is  in  almost  every  particular  similar.  It  occurred 
in  1834.  She  sailed  from  Charleston,  destined,  also,  for  New-Orleans,  with  ne 
groes  on  board,  on  a  voyage  in  like  manner  lawful,  was  stranded  near  the  same 
place,  taken  in  the  same  way,  into  the  same  port,  where  the  negroes  were  also 
forcibly  seized  and  detained  by  the  local  authorities.  It  so  happens  that  I  am 
personally  acquainted  with  the  owners  of  the  negroes  in  this  case.  They  were 
citizens  of  North  Carolina,  of  high  respectability,  one  of  them  recently  presi 
dent  of  the  state  Senate,  and  their  negroes  were  shipped  for  New-Orleans  with 
the  view  of  emigration  and  permanent  settlement  in  one  of  the  Southwestern 
States. 

The  other  is  the  case  of  the  Enterprise,  referred  to  in  the  resolutions.  She 
sailed,  in  1835,  from  this  District,  destined  for  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  and, 
like  the  others,  on  a  lawful  voyage,  with  regular  papers.  She  was  forced,  un 
avoidably,  by  stress  of  weather,  into  Port  Hamilton,  Bermuda  Island,  where  the 
negroes  on  board  were,  in  like  manner,  forcibly  seized  and  detained  by  the  lo 
cal  authorities. 

The  owners  of  the  negroes,  after  applying  in  vain  to  the  local  authorities  for 
their  surrender,  made  application  to  the  government  for  redress  of  injury ;  and 
the  result,  after  ten  years'  negotiation,  is,  that  the  British  government  has  agreed 
to  compensate  the  owners  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium,  on  the  ground  that 
these  cases  occurred  before  the  act  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  her  colonies 
had  gone  into  operation,  and  refused  compensation  in  the  case  of  the  Enter 
prise,  because  it  occurred  afterward. 

Such  are  the  material  facts,  drawn  from  the  correspondence  itself,  and  ad 
mitted  in  the  course  of  the  negotiation.  What  I  propose,  in  the  first  place,  is, 
to  show  that  the  principle  on  which  compensation  was  allowed  in  the  cases  of 
the  Comet  and  Encomium,  embraces  also  that  of  the  Enterprise ;  that  no  dis 
crimination  whatever  can  be  made  between  them ;  and  that,  in  attempting  to 
make  a  discrimination,  the  British  minister  has  assumed  the  very  point  in  con 
troversy,  or,  to  express  it  in  more  familiar  language,  has  begged  the  question. 
I  shall  rest  my  argument  exclusively  on  the  admissions  necessarily  involved  in 
the  two  cases,  without  looking  to  any  other  authority.  They  will  be  found,  if 
I  do  not  greatly  mistake,  ample  of  themselves  for  my  purpose. 


380  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

What,  then,  is  the  principle  necessarily  involved,  in  allowing  compensation 
in  those  cases  ?  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  show  that  the  allowance  was  not  a 
mere  act  of  gratuity  to  our  citizens.  No  one  will  suspect  that.  It  was.  on  the 
contrary,  reluctantly  yielded,  after  years  of  negotiation,  only  on  the  conviction 
that  the  rights  of  our  citizens  in  the  negroes  could  no  longer  be  disputed,  and. 
of  course,  the  injustice  of  their  seizure  and  detention.  This  brings  me  to  a 
question  of  vital  importance  in  this  discussion,  to  which  I  must  ask  the  Senate 
to  give  me  its  fixed  attention  ;  and  that  is,  On  what  did  this  right  of  our  citizens 
to  the  negroes  rest  ?  Not,  certainly,  on  the  British  laws,  either  expressed  or 
implied.  So  far  otherwise,  they  expressly  prohibited,  in  the  broadest  and  most 
unqualified  terms,  persons  from  being  brought  in  or  retained  as  slaves,  under 
heavy  penalty  and  forfeiture  of  property  ;  declared  the  persons  offending  to  be 
felons,  and  subjected  them  to  be  transported  beyond  sea,  or  to  be  confined  and 
kept  at  hard  labour  for  a  term  of  years.*  But  one  answer  can  be  given  to  the 
question :  that  it  rested  on  the  laws  of  their  own  country.  It  was  only  by  them 
that  they  could  possibly  have  a  right  to  the  negroes.  And  here  we  meet  the 
vital  question,  How  is  it  that  a  right  resting  on  our  laws  should  be  valid  and 
respected  within  the  limits  of  the  British  dominion,  against  the  express  prohibi 
tion  of  an  act  of  Parliament  ? 

The  answer  can  only  be  found  in  the  principles  embraced  in  the  first  and 
second  of  these  resolutions.  The  former  affirms  the  acknowledged  principle 
that  a  ship  or  vessel  on  the  high  seas,  in  time  of  peace,  and  engaged  in  a  law 
ful  voyage,  is,  by  the  law  of  nations,  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  state 
to  which  her  flag  belongs  ;  and  the  second,  that  if  forced  by  stress  of  weather, 
or  other  unavoidable  cause,  into  a  port  of  a  friendly  power,  she  would  lose  none 
of  the  rights  appertaining  to  her  on  the  high  seas ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  she, 
with  her  cargo  and  persons  on  board,  including  their  property,  and  all  the  rights 
belonging  to  their  personal  relations,  would  be  placed  under  the  protection 
which  the  law  of  nations  extends  to  the  unfortunate  in  such  cases. 

It  is  on  this  solid  basis  that  the  rights  of  our  citizens  rested.  The  laws  of 
nations,  by  their  paramount  authority,  overruled,  in  those  cases,  the  municipal 
laws  of  Great  Britain,  even  within  her  territorial  limits  ;  and  it  was  to  their  au 
thoritative  voice  that  her  government  yielded  obedience  in  compensating  our 
citizens  for  the  violation  of  rights  placed  under  their  sacred  protection. 

Having  now  established  the  principle  necessarily  implied  in  the  allowance 
of  compensation  in  the  cases  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium,  it  will  be  an  easy 
task  to  show  that  it  equally  embraces  the  case  of  the  Enterprise.  It  is  admit 
ted  by  the  British  minister  that  there  is  no  other  distinction  between  it  and  the 
other  two,  except  that  it  occurred  after,  and  the  others  before  the  act  abolishing 
slavery  in  the  colonies  went  into  operation ;  and  it  must,  of  course,  be  equally 
comprehended  in  the  principles  embraced  in  the  first  and  second  resolutions, 
in  virtue  of  which  compensation  was  made,  as  has  been  shown  ;  unless,  indeed, 
that  act  had  the  effect  of  preventing  it,  which  I  shall  now  show  it  could  not,  ac 
cording  to  the  law  of  nations. 

A  simple  but  decisive  view  will  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose.  I  have  just 
shown  that  the  act  of  Parliament  for  abolishing  the  slave-trade,  although  it  ex 
pressly  prohibited  the  introduction  of  slaves  within  the  limits  of  the  British  ter 
ritory,  or  detaining  them  in  that  condition  when  brought  in,  so  far  from  overru 
ling,  were  overruled  by  the  principles  embraced  in  these  resolutions.  If  that 
act  did  not  overrule  the  laws  of  nations  in  those  cases,  how,  I  ask,  could  the 
act  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  colonies  overrule  them  in  a  case  in  every 
essential  circumstance  acknowledged  to  be  the  same  ?  Can  a  possible  reason 
be  assigned  ?  The  authority  by  which  the  two  were  enacted  is  the  same,  and 
the  one  as  directly  applicable  to  the  case  as  the  other.  If,  indeed,  there  be  a 

*  See  act  to  amend  and  consolidate  the  laws  relating  to  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade,  5th  sec., 
4c.,  p.  113,  6  vol.,  Evan's  Statutes. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  381 

difference,  the  one  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade  is,  of  the  two,  the  most 
applicable .  That  act  directly  prohibits  the  introduction  of  slaves  within  the 
British  dominion  in  the  most  unqualified  manner,  or  the  retaining  them,  when  in 
troduced,  in  that  condition  ;  while  the  object  of  the  act  for  the  abolition  of  sla 
very  in  the  colonies  was  to  emancipate  those  who  were  such  under  the  author 
ity  of  the  British  laws.  It  is  true  it  abolishes  slavery  in  the  British  dominions, 
but  that  is  no  more  than  had  previously  been  done,  as  far  as  slaves  brought  into 
her  dominions  were  concerned,  by  the  act  for  abolishing  the  slave-trade.  And  yet 
we  see  that  act  was  overruled  by  the  law  of  nations,  in  the  case  of  the  Comet 
and  Encomium.  How,  then,  is  it  possible,  that  of  two  laws,  enacted  by  the 
same  authority,  both  being  equally  applicable,  the  one,  when  applied  to  the  same 
case,  should  be  overruled  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  the  other  overrule  it  ?  It  is 
clear  that  it  is  impossible  ;  and  that,  if  the  one  cannot  divest  the  rights  of  our 
citizens,  neither  can  the  other  ;  and,  of  course,  that  the  principle  on  which  com 
pensation  was  allowed  in  the  cases  of  the  Encomium  and  the  Comet,  equally 
embraces  that  of  the  Enterprise.  Both  acts  were,  in  truth,  but  municipal  laws  ; 
and,  as  such,  neither  could  overrule  the  laws  of  nations,  nor  divest  our  citizens 
of  their  rights  in  the  case  under  consideration.  In  the  nature  of  things,  the  laws 
of  nations,  which  have  for  their  object  the  regulation  of  the  intercourse  of  states, 
must  be  paramount  to  municipal  laws,  where  their  provisions  happen  to  come 
into  conflict.  If  not,  they  would  be  without  authority.  If  this  be  so,  there  can 
be  no  discrimination  between  the  three  cases,  and  all  ought  to  be  allowed ;  or, 
if  not,  none  ;  and,  in  that  case,  our  citizens  would  have  no  just  claim  for  com 
pensation  in  either.  It  follows  that  the  principle  which  embraces  one  embra 
ces  all.  There  can  be  no  just  distinction  between  them  ;  and  I  shall  next  pro 
ceed  to  show  that,  in  attempting  to  make  a  distinction  where  there  is  no  differ 
ence,  the  British  negotiator  has  been  compelled  to  assume  the  very  point  in 
controversy  between  the  two  governments.  In  doing  this,  I  propose  to  follow 
his  argument  step  by  step,  ahd  prove  the  truth  of  my  assertion  at  each  step. 

He  sets  out  with  laying  down  the  rule  by  which  he  asserts  that  those  claims 
should  be  decided,  which,  he  says,  "  is,  that  those  claimants  must  be  considered 
entitled  to  compensation  who  were  lawfully  in  possession  of  their  slaves  within 
the  British  territory,  and  who  were  disturbed  in  their  legal  possession  of  those 
slaves  by  functionaries  of  the  British  government."  I  object  not  to  the  rule. 
If  our  citizens  had  no  right  to  their  slaves  at  any  time  after  they  entered  the 
British  territory — that  is,  if  the  mere  fact  of  entering  extinguished  all  right  to 
them  (for  that  is  the  amount  of  the  rule) — they  could,  of  course,  have  no  claim 
on  the  British  government,  for  the  plain  reason  that  the  local  authority,  in  seiz 
ing  and  detaining  the  negroes,  seized  and  detained  what,  by  supposition,  did 
not  belong  to  them.  That  is  clear  enough  ;  but  let  us  see  the  application :  it 
is  given  in  a  few  words.  He  says,  "  Now  the  owners  of  the  slaves  on  board 
the  Enterprise  never  were  lawfully  in  possession  of  those  slaves  within  the 
British  territory ;"  assigning  for  reason,  "  that,  before  the  Enterprise  arrived  at 
Bermuda,  slavery  had  been  abolished  in  the  British  Empire" — an  assertion 
which  I  shall  show,  in  a  subsequent  part  of  my  remarks,  to  be  erroneous.  From 
that,  and  that  alone,  he  comes  to  the  conclusion,  "  that  the  negroes  on  board  the 
Enterprise  had,  by  entering  within  the  British  jurisdiction,  acquired  rights  which 
the  local  courts  were  bound  to  protect."  Such  certainly  would  have  been  the 
case  if  they  had  been  brought  in,  or  entered  voluntarily.  He  who  enters  volun 
tarily  the  territory  of  another  state,  tacitly  submits  himself,  with  all  his  rights, 
to  its  laws,  and  is  as  much  bound  to  submit  to  them  as  its  citizens  or  subjects. 
No  one  denies  that ;  but  that  is  not  the  present  case.  They  entered  not  volun 
tarily,  but  from  necessity ;  and  the  very  point  at  issue  is,  whether  the  British 
municipal  laws  could  divest  their  owners  of  property  in  their  slaves  on  entering 
British  territory,  in  cases  such  as  the  Enterprise,  when  the  vessel  has  been 
forced  into  their  territory  by  necessity,  through  an  act  of  Providence,  to  save 


382  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  lives  of  those  on  board.  We  deny  that  they  can,  and  maintain  the  opposite 
ground  :  that  the  law  of  nations,  in  such  cases,  interposes  and  protects  the  ves 
sel  and  those  on  board,  with  their  rights,  against  the  municipal  laws  of  the  state, 
to  which  they  have  never  submitted,  and  to  which  it  would  be  cruel  and  inhu 
man,  as  well  as  unjust,  to  subject  them.  Such  is  clearly  the  point  at  issue  be 
tween  the  two  governments ;  and  it  is  not  less  clear  that  it  is  the  very  point 
assumed  by  the  British  negotiator  in  the  controversy. 

He  felt,  in  assuming  his  ground,  that  the  general  principle  was  against  him, 
according  to  which,  the  municipal  laws  yield  to  the  laws  of  nations  in  such 
case  ;  and,  in  order  to  take  himself  out  of  its  operation,  he  attempted  to  make  a 
distinction  equally  novel  and  untenable.  He  asserts  "  that  there  is  a  distinc 
tion  between  laws  bearing  on  the  personal  liberty  of  man  and  laws  bearing  upon 
the  property  which  man  may  claim  in  irrational  animals  or  inanimate  things ;" 
and  concedes  "  that  if  a  ship,  containing  such  animals  or  things,  were  driven 
by  stress  of  weather  into  a  foreign  port,  it  would  be  highly  unjust  that  the  own 
er  should  be  stripped  of  what  belongs  to  him,  through  the  application  of  the  mu 
nicipal  law  of  the  state  to  which  he  had  not  voluntarily  submitted  himself." 
Yes,  it  would  be  both  unjust  and  inhuman ;  and  because  it  would  be  so,  it  is 
contrary  to  the  law  of  nations,  which  is  but  the  rules  of  justice  and  humanity 
applied  to  the  intercourse  of  nations ;  and  therefore  it  is  that  it  interposes  in 
cases  like  the  present,  and  places  under  its  protection  the  rights  of  the  unfortu 
nate,  even  against  the  municipal  laws  of  the  place. 

But  he  asserts  that  the  principle  does  not  extend  to  the  cases  in  which  rights 
of  property  in  persons  are  concerned  (for  such  must  be  the  meaning,  or  it  is 
wholly  irrelevant  to  the  question  at  issue),  because  "  there  are  three  parties  to 
the  transaction — the  owner  of  the  cargo,  the  local  authority,  and  the  alleged 
slave  ;  and  the  third  party  is  no  less  entitled  than  the  first  to  appeal  to  the  local 
authority  for  such  protection  as  the  law  of  the  land  may  afford  him."  This  is 
the  position  on  which  the  British  negotiator  main!/  rests  his  argument ;  and  if 
this  fails,  the  whole  must  fall  to  the  ground,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see,  from 
what  he  says  of  two  parties  appealing  to  the  lo^al  authority,  that  he  tacitly  puts 
aside  the  law  of  nations,  and  assumes  the  parties  to  be  under  the  municipal 
law  of  the  place ;  and,  also,  that  those  laws,  and  not  the  law  of  nations,  are 
the  standard  by  which  their  rights  are  to  be  judged  ;  but  is  it  not  manifest  that 
this  is  an  assumption,  in  another  form,  of  the  point  in  controversy  ?  Against  it, 
unsustained,  and  unsustainable,  by  authority  or  reason,  I  shall  oppose  what,  to 
him,  must  be  the  highest  authority — that  of  the  British  government  itself— in 
the  cases  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium,  backed  by  unanswerable  reasons. 

If  the  distinction  be  true  at  all,  between  property  in  persons  and  properfy  in 
things,  or  irrational  animals,  it  was,  to  the  full,  as  applicable  to  those  cases  as 
it  is  to  that  of  the  Enterprise.  In  them  the  right  of  property  in  persons  was  in 
volved,  and  the  three  parties  included,  to  the  same  extent  as  in  that.  Nor  was 
personal  liberty  less  concerned.  As  far  as  British  laws  could  affect  the  rights 
of  our  citizens,  the  negroes  belonging  to  the  Comet  and  Encomium  were  as  free 
as  those  belonging  to  the  Enterprise.  An  act  of  Parliament,  as  has  been  shown, 
forbade  their  introduction,  and  forfeited  the  rights  of  their  owners,  thereby  ma 
king  them  free  with  rights  to  maintain,  as  far  as  British  legislation  could  make 
them  so  ;  and  yet,  after  full  and  mature  investigation  and  reflection  for  the  space 
of  ten  years,  it  was  admitted  that  the  same  rule  applied  to  them  which,  it  is  con 
ceded,  would  apply  in  similar  cases  to  property  in  things  or  irrational  animals. 
Now  I  ask,  If  the  act  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade,  which  directly  forbids 
the  introduction  of  negroes  as  slaves,  and  forfeits  the  rights  of  their  owners,  did 
not,  as  we  have  seen,  justify  the  distinction  in  the  cases  of  the  Comet  and  Enco 
mium,  now  attempted  to  be  made  between  the  two  descriptions  of  property,  how 
could  the  act  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  justify  it  in  the  case  of  the  Enterprise  ? 
In  the  former,  there  were  all  the  parties,  with  their  respective  rights,  just  the 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  3S3 

same  as  in  the  latter ;  and  if  the  local  authorities  were  not  bound  to  recognise 
and  protect  the  negroes  in  the  one  case,  why,  I  ask,  were  they  in  the  other  ? 
Can  a  satisfactory  answer  be  given  1  And  if  not,  what  becomes  of  the  dis 
tinction,  with  all  its  consequences,  attempted  to  be  deduced  from  it  ? 

The  British  negotiator,  as  if  conscious  of  the  weakness  of  the  position,  at 
tempts  immediately  to  fortify  it.  He  says,  "  If,  indeed,  a  municipal  law  be 
made  which  violates  the  laws  of  nations,  a  question  of  another  kind  may  arise. 
But  the  municipal  law  which  forbids  slavery  is  no  violation  of  the  laws  of  na 
tions.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  in  strict  harmony  with  the  laws  of  nations ;  and, 
therefore,  when  slaves  are  liberated  according  to  such  municipal  law,  there  is 
no  wrong  done,  and  there  can  be  no  compensation  granted  :"  a  position  pregnant 
with  meaning,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  but  I  must  say,  like  all  his  others,  a 
mere  assumption  of  the  point  at  issue,  expressed  in  vague  and  indefinite  lan 
guage. 

If,  in  asserting  that  a  municipal  law  abolishing  slavery  is  not  a  violation  of 
the  laws  of  nations,  it  is  meant  that  it  is  not  a  violation  of  those  laws  for  a  state 
to  abolish  slavery  which  exists  under  its  authority,  it  may  be  readily  admitted, 
without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  our  citizens  in  the  case  in  question,  though  it 
is  a  little  remarkable  that  the  British  government  allowed  compensation  to 
their  own  subjects  by  this  very  act  under  which  slavery  was  abolished — author 
ity  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  assertion  that  no  compensation  can  be  granted 
when  the  act  is  applied  to  the  case  of  our  citizens,  forced,  without  their  con 
sent,  into  its  territory. 

But  if,  instead  of  that,  it  be  meant  that  all  municipal  laws  not  in  violation  of 
the  laws  of  nations  are  valid  against  those  laws,  when  they  come  in  conflict 
with  them,  how  can  the  distinction,  attempted  to  be  drawn  between  the  rights 
of  property  in  things  or  irrational  animals,  and  in  persons,  be  justified  ?  or  how 
can  the  allowance  of  compensation  in  the  cases  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium 
be  explained  ?  I  put  the  question,  Was  the  law  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave- 
trade  a  violation  of  the  laws  of  nations  ?  And  if  not  a  violation,  as  it  certainly 
was  not,  how  came  compensation  to  be  granted  in  those  cases  ?  Can  an  an 
swer  be  given  ?  And  if  not,  what  becomes  of  the  distinction  attempted  to  be 
taken  ? 

But  another  meaning  may  be  intended — that  it  was  no  violation  of  the  law 
of  nations  to  extend  the  act  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  British  territories 
to  cases  such  as  the  Enterprise.  If  that  is  intended,  it  would  be  like  all  the 
other  distinctions  which  have  been  attempted — but  an  assumption  of  the  point 
in  controversy. 

I  have  now  stated,  in  his  own  words,  every  argument  advanced  by  the  Brit 
ish  negotiator  to  sustain  the  distinction  which  he  has  attempted  between  the 
cases  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium  and  that  of  the  Enterprise,  and  have,  I  trust, 
established,  beyond  controversy,  that  there  is  no  rational  ground  whatever  for 
the  distinction.  When  again  pressed  on  the  subject  by  our  minister,  who  was 
not  satisfied  with  his  arguments,  he  assumed  the  broad  ground  that  Great  Brit 
ain  had  the  right  to  forbid  the  recognition  of  slavery  within  her  territory  ;  and 
as  our  claim  was  inconsistent  with  such  right,  it  could  not  be  allowed,  and  on 
this  closed  the  correspondence.  It  is  easy  to  see,  if  she  has  such  right,  in  the 
broad  and  unqualified  sense  in  which  it  is  laid  down,  and  applied  to  the  case  in 
question,  it  extends  to  all  rights  whatever,  whether  it  be  right  of  property  in 
things  and  irrational  animals,  or  growing  out  of  personal  relations,  whether 
founded  in  consent  or  not.  All  are  either  the  creatures  of  positive  enactments, 
or  subject  to  be  regulated  and  controlled  by  municipal  laws ;  and  she  has  just 
the  same  right  to  prohibit  the  recognition  of  any  one,  or  all  of  those  rights  with 
in  her  territory,  as  the  one  in  question.  But  who  can  doubt  that  such  prohibi 
tion,  if  extended  to  cases  of  distress  such  as  the  Enterprise,  would  be  a  most 
flagrant  violation  of  the  laws  of  nations,  as  understood  and  acted  on  by  all  civil- 


384  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ized  nations,  and  even  as  admitted  and  acted  on  by  herself  in  the  cases  of  the 
Comet  and  Encomium  1 

To  us  this  is  not  a  mere  abstract  question,  nor  one  simply  relating  to  the  free 
use  of  the  high  seas.  It  comes  nearer  home.  It  is  one  of  free  and  safe  passage 
from  one  port  to  another  of  our  Union  ;  as,  much  so  to  us  as  a  question  touch 
ing  the  free  and  safe  use  of  the  channels  between  England  and  Ireland  on  the 
one  side,  and  the  opposite  coast  of  the  Continent  on  the  other,  would  be  to 
Great  Britain.  To  understand  its  deep  importance  to  us,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  island  of  Bermuda  lies  but  a  short  distance  off  our  coast,  and  that 
the  channel  between  the  Bahama  Islands  and  Florida  is  not  less  than  two  hun 
dred  miles  in  length,  and  on  an  average  not  more  than  fifty  wide  ;  and  that  through 
this  long,  narrow,  and  difficult  channel,  the  immense  trade  between  our  ports  on 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Atlantic  coast  must  pass,  which,  at  no  distant  pe 
riod,  will  constitute  more  than  half  of  the  trade  of  the  Union.  The  principle 
set  up  by  the  British  government,  if  carried  out  to  its  full  extent,  would  do 
much  to  close  this  all-important  channel,  by  rendering  it  too  hazardous  for  use. 
She  has  only  to  give  an  indefinite  extension  to  the  principle  applied  to  the  case 
of  the  Enterprise,  and  the  work  would  be  done  ;  and  why  has  she  not  as  good 
a  right  to  apply  it  to  a  cargo  of  sugar  or  cotton  as  to  the  slaves  who  produced  it  1 

I  have  now,  I  trust,  established,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Senate,  what  I  pro 
posed  when  I  commenced — that  the  principle  on  which  compensation  was  al 
lowed  in  the  cases  of  the  Comet  and  Encomium,  equally  embraces  that  of  the 
Enterprise  ;  that  no  just  distinction  can  be  made  between  them ;  and  that  the 
British,  negotiator,  in  attempting  to  make  a  distinction,  was  forced  to  assume  the 
point  in  controversy.  And  here  I  might  conclude  my  remarks,  as  far  as  these 
resolutions  are  concerned ;  but  there  are  other  questions  connected  with  this 
subject,  not  less  important,  which  demand  attention,  and  which  I  shall  now  pro 
ceed  to  consider. 

It  is  impossible  to  read  the  correspondence  between  the  two  governments 
without  the  impression  that  the  question  involved  in  the  negotiation  was  one  of 
deep  embarrassment  to  the  British  ministry.  The  great  length  of  the  negotia 
tion,  considering  the  simplicity  and  paucity  of  the  points  involved,  the  long  de 
lay  before  an  answer  could  be  had  at  all,  and  the  manifest  embarrassment  in 
making  the  distinction  between  the  cases  allowed  and  the  one  rejected,  plainly 
indicate  that  there  was  some  secret,  unseen  difficulty  in  the  way,  not  directly 
belonging  to  the  questions  involved  in  the  cases.  What  was  that  difficulty  ? 
If  I  mistake  not,  it  will  be  found  in  the  condition  of  things  in  England,  and  es 
pecially  in  reference  to  those  in  power.  It  is  my  wish  to  do  the  ministry  am 
ple  justice,  as  I  believe  they  were  desirous  of  doing  us  ;  but  it  is  not  to  be  dis 
guised  that  there  was  no  small  difficulty  in  the  way,  from  the  state  of  things 
under  which  they  acted,  and  which  I  shall  next  explain. 

The  present  Whig  ministry  held,  and  still  hold  their  power,  as  is  well  known, 
by  a  precarious  tenure.  Their  party  is,  in  fact,  in  a  minority,  arid  can  only 
support  themselves  against  the  powerful  party  in  opposition  by  such  adven 
titious  aid  as  can  be  conciliated.  Among  the  subdivisions  of  party  in  Great 
Britian,  the  Abolition  interest  is  one  of  no  little  power,  and  it  will  be  seen  at 
once  that  the  question  involved  in  the  negotiation  is  one  in  reference  to  which 
they  would  have  no  little  sensibility.  Like  all  other  fanatics,  they  have  little 
regard  either  to  reason  or  justice,  where  the  object  of  their  enthusiasm  is  con 
cerned.  To  do  us  justice,  without  offending  such  a  party,  in  such  a  case,  was  no 
easy  task  ;  and  to  offend  them,  without  losing  the  ascendency  of  their  party 
and  the  reins  of  government,  was  almost  impossible.  The  ministry  had  to  act 
under  these  conflicting  considerations  ;  and  I  intend  no  disrespect  in  saying 
that  the  desire  of  conciliating  so  strong  a  party,  and  thereby  retaining  place, 
when  opposed  to  the  demands  of  justice,  could  not  be  without  its  weight.  The 
course,  accordingly,  taken,  was  such  as  might  have  been  anticipated  from  these 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  385 

opposing  motives.  To  satisfy  our  urgent  claim  for  justice,  compensation  was 
allowed  in  two  of  the  cases  ;  arid,  to  avoid  offending  a  powerful  and  zealous  par 
ty,  a  distinction  was  taken  between  them  and  the  other,  the  effects  of  which 
would  be  to  close  the  door  against  future  demands  of  the  kind.  I  mean  not  to 
say  that  deliberate  and  intentional  injustice  was  done  ;  but  simply,  that  these 
conflicting  causes,  which  it  is  obvious,  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  must 
have  been  in  operation,  would,  by  a  natural  and  an  unseen  bias,  lead  to  that  re 
sult. 

But  another  question  of  far  greater  magnitude,  growing  out  of  the  foregoing, 
presents  itself  for  consideration  :  To  what  must  that  result  finally  lead,  if  Great 
Britain  should  persist  in  the  decision  which  it  has  made  ?  I  hold  it  impossible 
for  her  to  maintain  the  position  she  has  taken.  She  must  abandon  it  as  un 
tenable,  and  take  one  of  two  other  positions  :  either  that  her  municipal  laws  are 
paramount  to  the  law  of  nations,  when  they  come  into  conflict ;  or  that  slavery 
— the  right  of  man  to  hold  property  in  man — is  against  the  law  of  nations.  It 
is  only  on  the  one  or  other  of  these  suppositions  that  the  act  for  abolishing 
slavery  can  have  the  force  she  attributes  to  it. 

The  former  she  cannot  take,  without  virtually  abolishing  the  entire  system 
of  international  laws.  She  could  not  think  of  assuming  that  her  municipal 
laws  were  paramount,  without  admitting  those  of  other  states  also  to  be  so ; 
which  would  be  to  annul  the  system,  and  substitute  in  its  place  universal  vio 
lence,  discord,  and  conflict.  This  would  force  her  on  the  other  alternative, 
which,  if  it  were  true,  would  give  her  a  solid  foundation  for  the  rejection  of 
our  claim,  on  the  incontestable  principle  that  the  laws  of  nations  would  not  en 
force  that  which  violates  themselves.  Nor  are  there  wanting  indications,  in 
the  correspondence  (to  some  of  which  I  have  alluded),  that  the  position  she 
has  taken  in  reference  to  the  Enterprise  is  but  preliminary  to  the  adoption  of 
that  alternative.  There  are,  however,  many  difficulties  to  be  got  over  before 
she  can  openly  take  it. 

It  would  require,  in  the  first  place,  no  small  share  of  effrontery  for  a  nation 
which  has  been  the  greatest  slave-dealer  on  earth  ;  a  nation  which  has  dragged 
a  greater  number  of  Africans  from  their  native  shores  to  people  her  possessions,, 
and  to  sell  to  others,  and  which  forced  our  ancestors  to  purchase  slaves  from 
her  against  their  remonstrance,  while  colonies  (not,  improbably,  the  ancestors 
of  the  owners  of  those  slaves  to  purchase  the  ancestors  of  the  slaves,  for  which 
she  now  refuses  compensation) — it  would,  I  repeat,  require  no  small  effrontery 
to  turn  round  and  declare  that  she  neither  had,  nor  could  have,  the  right  to  the 
property  she  sold  us  ;  nor  could  we,  without  deep  crime,  retain  possession.  We 
all  know  what  such  conduct  would  be  called  among  individuals,  without,  indeed, 
being  followed  by  a  tender  back  of  the  purchase  money,  with  ample  compen 
sation  for  damages ;  and  there  is  no  good  reason  why  it  should  be  called  by  a 
less  harsh  epithet  when  applied  to  the  conduct  of  nations. 

Sut  there  is  another  difficulty.  The  arowal  of  the  principle  would  place  her 
in  conflict  with  all  the  authorities  on  the  law  of  nations,  and  the  custom  of  all 
ages,  past  and  present,  and  would  bring  her  into  collision  with  all  nations, 
whose  institutions  would  be  outlawed  by  the  avowal ;  and  what,  perhaps,  she 
would  most  regard,  it  would  put  her  in  conflict  with  herself.  Yes,  she  wha 
refused  to  compensate  our  citizens  for  property  unjustly  seized  and  detained 
j»  under  her  authority,  on  the  ground  that  she  had  forbade  the  recognition  of 
slavery  in  her  territory,  had  then,  and  has  at  this  day,  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  slaves  in  the  most  wretched  condition,  held  by  her  subjects  in  her  Eastern 
possessions  ;  and  worse,  by  herself.  With  all  her  boast,  she  is  a  slaveholder,. 
and  hires  out  and  receives  hire  for  slaves.  I  speak  on  high  authority — the 
Asiatic  Journal  for  1838,  printed  in  her  own  metropolis. 

Here  the  secretary  read  the  following  extracts  from  page  221 : 

"  GOVERNMENT  OF  SLAVES  IN  MALABAR. — We  know  that  there  is  not  a  ser- 

C  cc 


3S6  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

vant  of  government  in  the  South  of  India  who  is  not  intimately  acquainted  with 
the  alarming  fact,  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  his  fellow-creatures  are  fettered 
down  for  life  to  the  degraded  destiny  of  slavery.  We  know  that  these  unfortu 
nate  beings  are  not,  as  is  the  case  in  other  countries,  serfs  of  the  soil,  and  inca 
pable  of  being  transferred,  at  the  pleasure  of  their  owners,  from  one  estate  to 
another.  No  :  they  are  daily  sold,  like  cattle,  by  one  proprietor  to  another ;  the 
husband  is  separated  from  the  wife,  and  the  parent  from  the  child.  They  are 
loaded  with  every  indignity ;  the  utmost  possible  quantity  of  labour  is  exacted 
from  them,  and  the  most  meager  fare  that  human  nature  can  possibly  subsist  on 
is  doled  out  to  support  them.  The  slave  population  is  composed  of  a  great 
variety  of  classes  :  the  descendants  of  those  who  have  been  taken  prisoners  in 
time  of  war,  persons  who  have  been  kidnapped  from  the  neighbouring  states, 
people  who  have  been  born  under  such  circumstances  as  that  they  are  consid 
ered  without  the  pale  of  the  ordinary  castes  ;  and  others  who  have  been  smug 
gled  from  the  coast  of  Africa,  torn  from  their  country  and  their  kindred,  and 
destined  to  a  more  wretched  lot,  and,  as  will  be  seen,  to  a  more  enduring  cap 
tivity  than  their  brethren  of  the  Western  world.  Will  it  be  believed,  that  gov 
ernment  itself  participates  in  this  description  of  property  ;  that  it  actually  holds 
possession  of  slaves,  and  lets  them  out  for  hire  to  the  cultivators  of  the  country, 
the  rent  of  a  whole  family  being  two  fanams,  or  half  a  rupee  per  annum  ?" 

But  why  dwell  on  these  comparatively  few  slaves  ?  The  whole  of  Hindos- 
tan,  with  the  adjacent  possessions,  is  one  magnificent  plantation,  peopled  by 
more  than  one  hundred  millions  of  slaves,  belonging  to  a  company  of  gentlemen 
in  England,  called  the  East  India  Company,  whose  power  is  far  more  unlimit 
ed  and  despotic  than  that  of  any  Southern  planter  over  his  slaves :  a  power 
upheld  by  the  sword  and  bayonet,  exacting  more,  and  leaving  less,  by  far,  of  the 
product  of  their  labour  to  the  subject  race  than  is  left  under  our  own  system, 
with  much  less  regard  to  their  comfort  in  sickness  and  age.  This  vast  system 
of  servitude  carries  with  itself  the  elements  of  increase  :  not,  it  is  true,  by  the 
African  slave-trade,  but  by  means  not  less  inhuman,  that  of  organizing  the  sub 
ject  race  into  armies,  and  exhausting  their  strength  and  life  in  reducing  all 
around  to  the  same  state  of  servitude. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  the  East  India  Company  is  but  a  department  of  the 
British  government,  through  which  it  exercises  its  control,  and  holds  in  sub 
jection  that  vast  region.  Be  it  so.  I  stickle  not  for  nice  distinctions.  But 
how  stands  the  case  under  this  aspect  ?  If  it  be  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature, 
or  nations,  for  man  to  hold  man  in  subjection  individually,  is  it  not  equally  con 
trary  for  a  body  of  men  to  hold  another  in  subjection  ?  And  if  that  be  true,  is 
it  not  as  much  so  for  one  nation  to  hold  another  in  subjection  ?  If  man  indi 
vidually  has  an  absolute  right  to  self-government,  have  not  men  aggregated  into 
states,  or  nations,  an  equal  right  ?  If  there  be  a  difference,  is  not  the  right  the 
more  perfect  in  a  people,  or  nation,  than  in  the  individuals  who  compose  it  ? 
And  is  not  the  subjection  of  one  people  to  another  usually  accompanied  with 
at  least  as  much  abuse,  cruelty,  and  oppression,  as  that  of  one  individual  to 
another  ?  Is  it  possible  to  make  a  distinction  which  shall  justify  the  one  and 
condemn  the  other?  And  if  not,  what  right,  then,  I  ask,  has  Great  Britain  to 
hold  India  in  subjection,  if  it  be  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature  or  nations  for 
one  man  to  hold  another  in  subjection  ?  Or,  what  right  to  hold  Canada,  or  her 
numerous  subject  colonies,  all  over  the  globe  ?  Or,  to  come  nearer  to  the  point, 
in  what  light  does  it  place  her  boasted  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  West  Indies  ? 
What  has  she,  in  reality,  done  there,  but  to  break  the  comparatively  mild  and 
guardian  authority  of  the  master,  and  to  substitute  in  its  phce  her  own  direct 
and  unlimited  power?  What  but  to  replace  the  overseer  by  the  army,  the 
sheriff,  the  constable,  and  the  tax-collector  ?  Has  she  made  her  slaves  free  ? 
given  them  the  right  of  self-government  ?  Is  it  not  mockery  to  call  their  pres 
ent  subject  condition  freedom  ?  What  would  she  call  it  if  it  were  hers — if,  by 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  387 

some  calamity  to  her  and  the  civilized  world,  she  should  fall  under  similar  sub 
jection  to  France,  or  some  other  power  ?  Would  she  call  that  freedom,  or  the 
most  galling  and  intolerable  slavery  ? 

But  I  approach  near  home.  I  cross  the  Atlantic,  passing  unnoticed  subju 
gated  Ireland,  with  her  eight  millions  of  people,  and  only  ninety  thousand  vo 
ters,  and  placing  myself  on  the  boasted  shores  of  England  herself,  I  ask,  How 
will  the  principle  work  there  ? 

It  was  estimated  by  Burke,  if  my  memory  serves  me,  shortly  before  the  be 
ginning  of  this  century,  that  the  British  public,  estimating  as  such  all  who  ex 
ercised  influence  over  the  government,  did  not  exceed  200,000  individuals. 
Since  then  it  has,  no  doubt,  greatly  increased  by  the  extension  of  the  right  of 
suffrage  and  other  causes.  Say  that  it  has  trebled  or  quadrupled,  and,  to  be 
liberal,  that  it  amounts  to  seven  or  eight  hundred  thousand.  In  this  small  por 
tion,  then,  is  vested  the  supreme  control  and  dominion  over  the  twenty-five 
millions,  which  constitute  the  population  of  the  British  Isles.  If,  then,  it  be 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature  or  nations  for  man  to  hold  man  in  subjection, 
or  one  nation  another,  how  can  a  small  part  or  class  of  a  community  hold  the 
rest?  Or  on  what  principle,  according  to  that  maxim,  can  these  few  hundred 
thousands  hold  so  many  millions  ?  If  the  right  of  self-government  forbids  the 
subjection  of  one  man  to  another,  does  it  not  equally  forbid  that  of  a  small  por 
tion  of  the  community  over  the  residue  ?  And  if  so,  must  not  the  maxim  termi 
nate  in  the  utter  overthrow  of  the  present  political  and  social  system  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  rest  of  Europe  ? 

What  a  picture  is  presented  to  the  mind  in  contemplating  the  present  state 
of  things  in  England !  We  behold  a  small  island  in  the  German  Ocean  under 
the  absolute  control  of  a  few  hundred  thousand  individuals,  holding  in  unlimited 
subjection  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  million?  of  human  beings,  dis 
persed  over  every  part  of  the  globe,  making  not  less  than  two  hundred  to  each 
of  the  dominant  class ;  and  yet  that  class  propagating  a  maxim,  with  more  than 
missionary  zeal,  that  strikes  at  the  foundation  of  this  mighty  power!  I  would 
say  to  her,  and  other  powers  impelled  by  \&e  madness,  You  are  attempting 
what  will  prove  impossible.  You  lay  down  a  maxim  which  you  would  limit  in 
its  application,  so  as  to  suit  your  own  safety  and  convenience.  Vain  hope  in 
this  inquiring  and  investigating  age.  You  cannot  make  a  monopoly  of  a  principle 
so  as  to  vend  it  for  your  own  benefit.  It  will  be  carried  oflt  to  its  ultimate  re 
sults,  when  its  reaction  will  be  terrific  on  your  social  and  political  condition. 
Already  it  begins  to  show  its  fruits.  The  subject  mass  of  your  population,  un 
der  the  name  of  Chartists,  are  now  clamouring  for  the  benefit  of  the  maxim,  as 
applied  to  themselves.  They  demand  practically,  in  their  case,  the  benefit  of 
the  principle  you  propagate  at  a  distance ;  and  for  so  doing,  are  cut  down  with 
out  mercy.  My  object  is  not  to  censure  the  course  adopted  towards  them.  It 
is  not  for  me  to  judge  what  your  safety  may  require.  I  am  simply  showing  that 
the  maxim  on  which  you  profess  to  act  in  relation  to  the  West  India  colonies, 
and  which  you  must  apply  to  our  case,  in  order  to  sustain  your  decision,  begins 
to  be  applied  to  your  own  at  home.  It  is  only  the  beginning.  Already  it  is 
passing  into  a  higher  and  more  intellectual  class,  who  are  applying  it  to  the 
present  social  and  political  condition  of  Europe.  A  body  of  men,  not  incon 
siderable  either  for  numbers  or  talents,  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  and  par 
ticularly  in  France,  are  busy  in  making  such  application.  They  are  men  not 
of  a  character  to  stop  short,  or  be  intimidated  by  final  results.  Already  they 
proclaim  that  social  or  political  slavery — that  which  results  from  the  subjection 
of  the  great  mass  of  society  to  the  small  governing  class,  is  worse  than  domes 
tic  slavery — that  which  exists  within  the  Southern  portion  of  our  Union,  in  its 
mildest  and  most  mitigated  form.  In  illustration,  I  will  read  an  extract  from 
the  Paris  correspondent  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  said  to  be  Mr.  Walsh, 
taken  from  the  work  of  the  Abbe  La  Mennais : 


,388  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

"  The  abbe  exclaims,  '  In  good  sooth,  I  am  not  in  the  least  astonished  that 
so  many,  viewing  only  the  material  side  of  things,  and  the  present  separated 
from  the  future,  should,  in  the  midst  of  our  boasted  civilization,  regret  the  an 
cient  domestic  slavery.  Thirty-three  millions  of  Frenchmen,  true  serfs  of  this 
era,  crouch  igriominiously  under  the  domination  of  two  hundred  thousand  priv 
ileged  masters,  and  supreme  dispensers  of  their  lot.  Such  is  the  fruit  of  our 
struggles  for  half  a  century.  Slaves,  arise  and  break  your  chains  !  let  them  no 
longer  degrade  in  you  the  name  of  man !  Eighteen  centuries  of  Christianity 
have  elapsed,  and  we  still  live  under  the  pagan  system.' " 

To  this  I  add  another  extract,  taken  from  another  of  the  public  journals,  which 
will  give  some  idea  what  are  the  fruits  of  slavery  in  the  form  so  vehemently  de 
nounced  by  the  abbe  : 

"  ENGLAND  AND  IRELAND. — It's  enough  to  make  one's  heart  bleed,  if  all  were 
true  in  the  winter  pictures  drawn  of  the  starved,  suffering  condition  of  the  peas 
antry  in  the  bogs — their  cabins  inundated  with  rains  and  mud — the  bodies  of 
the  labourers  saturated  with  wet,  sleeping  on  fireless  hearths,  and  peat  at  the  ex 
orbitant  price  of  a  penny  a  sod — too  exorbitant  to  cook  the  very  few  potatoes 
they  may  have.  Parallel  to  these  scenes,  the  English  operatives  are  stated  to 
be  reduced  to  dire  extremity ;  and  around  these  dark  and  gloomy  spots  we  have 
narratives  of  the  luxurious  and  voluptuous  life  led  by  the  favoured  few  of  the 
gentry  and  nobility." 

If  such  is  the  condition  of  what  the  abbe  calls  "  the  serfs  of  this  era"  in  the 
most  civilized  country  in  Europe,  well  may  our  domestic  slave,  in  the  midst 
of  plenty,  and  under  the  guardian  care  of  a  master,  identified  with  him  in  inter 
est,  rejoice  at  his  comparative  happy  condition.  The  exaggerated  picture  drawn 
by  the  most  infuriated  Abolitionist  can  find  nothing  in  the  whole  region  of  the 
South  to  equal  this  picture  of  misery  and  want ;  and  yet  it  is  Great  Britain, 
wherein  such  a  contrast  of  wretchedness  and  voluptuousness  exists,  that  wages 
such  unrelenting  hostility  against  domestic  slavery  !  She  wars  against  herself. 
The  maxim  she  now  pushes  against  others  will,  in  turn,  be  pushed  against  her. 
She  is  preparing  the  way  for  universal  discord  within  and  without.  The  move 
ment  began  with  Wilberforce,  and  other  misguided  men  like  him,  who,  although 
humane  and  benevolent,  looked  at  the  surface  of  things,  with  little  knowledge 
of  the  springs  of  human  action,  or  the  principles  on  which  the  existing  social 
and  political  fabric  of  Europe  rests  ;  and,  I  may  add,  like  all  other  enthusiasts, 
without  much  regard  as  to  the  means  employed  in  accomplishing  a  favourite 
object. 

There  never  before  existed  on  this  globe  a  nation  that  presented  such  a  spec 
tacle  as  Great  Britain  does  at  this  moment.  She  seems  to  be  actuated  by  the 
most  opposite  and  conflicting  motives.  While  apparently  actuated  by  so  much 
zeal,  on  this  side  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  in  the  cause  of  humanity  and  lib 
erty,  she  appears  to  be  actuated,  on  the  other  side,  by  a  spirit  of  conquest  and 
domination  not  surpassed  by  Rome  in  the  haughtiest  dayb  of  the  Republic. 
She  has  just  subjected,  and  added  to  her  vast  empire  in  the  East,  the  country 
between  India  and  Persia ;  and  is  at  this  moment,  if  we  are  to  believe  recent 
accounts,  preparing  an  extensive  expedition  against  the  oldest  of  nations,  con 
taining  a  population  not  less  than  a  fourth  of  the  human  race — a  nation  that 
has  lived  through  generations  of  nations,  and  which  was  old  and  civilized  be 
fore  the  governments  of  Western  Europe  came  into  existence  ;  I  need  scarcely 
say  I  refer  to  China.  Let  me  add  to  her  other  claims  to  respect  and  venera 
tion,  that,  of  all  despotic  governments,  it  seems  to  me  (judging  from  the  scanty 
evidence  we  have  of  a  people  so  secluded)  it  is  the  wisest  and  most  parental. 
And  for  what,  if  we  may  behave  report,  is  Great  Britain  about  to  wage  war 
against  this  venerable  and  peaceful  people  ?  To  force  on  them  the  use  of  opi 
um,  the  product  of  her  slaves  on  her  Hindu  plantation,  against  the  resistance  of 
the  Chinese  government.  And  what  is  the  extent  and  character  of  this  trade  ? 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOCN.  389 

It  is  calculated  it  would  have  reached  the  last  year,  had  it  not  been  interrupted, 
forty  thousand  chests,  or  more  than  live  millions  of  pounds,  worth  about  twenty 
millions  of  dollars  ;  sufficient,  by  estimate,  to  supply  thirteen  or  fourteen  millions 
of  opium  smokers,  and  to  cause  a  greater  destruction  of  life  annually  than  the 
aggregate  number  of  negroes  in  the  British  West  India  colonies,  whose  condi 
tion  has  been  the  cause  of  so  much  morbid  sympathy.  It  is  against  the  trade 
in  this  pernicious  and  poisonous  drug,  carried  on  by  fraud  and  smuggling,  that 
the  Chinese  government  has  taken  the  most  energetic  and  decisive  measures, 
as  it  was  called  to  do  by  the  highest  consideration  of  policy  and  humanity.  Of 
all  deaths,  none  is  more  wretched  than  that  occasioned  by  this  seductive,  but 
fatal  drug.  The  subject  slowly  expires,  with  all  the  powers  and  functions  of 
mind  and  body  completely  exhausted,  a  spectacle  odious  to  behold. 

Such  is  the  trade  which,  it  is  said,  the  expedition  is  intended  to  enforce, 
against  the  decrees  of  the  Chinese  government.  The  rumour,  I  hope,  is  ground 
less.  I  hope,  for  the  honour  of  England,  for  the  honour  of  modern  civilization, 
and  the  Christian  name,  that  its  object  is  far  different ;  and  that,  instead  of  en 
forcing  a  traffic  so  abominable,  it  is  intended  to  co-operate  with  the  wise  and 
humane  policy  of  the  Chinese  government  in  suppressing  it ;  and  that,  so  far 
from  aiding  smugglers  and  ruffians,  it  is  intended  to  seize  and  punish  them 
as  they  deserve.  If,  however,  rumour  should  prove  true,  what  a  contrast  it 
would  exhibit  between  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  in  that  and  this  quarter  of 
the  globe !  There  we  find  her  extending  her  power  and  dominion,  regardless 
of  justice  or  humanity ;  while  here  we  find  her  in  the  depth  of  sympathy  for  a 
band  of  negroes,  brought  into  our  ports  under  a  suspicion  of  murder  and  piracy, 
intermeddling  in  their  behalf  with  our  own  and  the  Spanish  governments,  and 
that,  too,  at  the  solicitation  of  an  abolition  society  of  her  own  subjects  !  Strange 
sis  this  may  seem,  it  is  true.  I  hold  in  my  hand  evidence  of  the  fact,  which  I 
request  the  secretary  to  read. 

The  secretary  then  read  the  following : 

_  "  Foreign  Office,  London,  December  23,  1839. 

"  SIR — With  reference  to  the  memorial  of  the  Glasgow  Emancipation  Soci 
ety,  dated  the  25th  of  October  last,  on  behalf  of  the  negroes  who  took  posses 
sion  of  the  Amistad,  and  were  subsequently  carried  to  New-London,  in  the  Uni 
ted  States  of  America,  I  am  directed  by  Viscount  Palmerston  to  state  to  you, 
for  the  information  of  the  above-mentioned  society,  that  his  lordship  has  direct 
ed  her  majesty's  minister  at  Washington  to  interpose  his  good  offices  in  their 
behalf,  in  order  that  they  may  be  restored  to  liberty ;  and  his  lordship  has  far 
ther  instructed  her  majesty's  charge  d'affaires  at  Madrid  to  call  upon  the  Span 
ish  government  to  issue  immediately  strict  orders  to  the  authorities  of  Cuba, 
that,  if  the  request  of  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington  is  complied  with,  the 
negroes  in  question  may  be  put  in  possession  of  their  liberties. 

"  Her  majesty's  charge  d'affaires  at  Madrid  has  likewise  been  instructed  to 
urge  the  Spanish  government  to  cause  the  laws  against  the  slave-trade  to  be  en 
forced  against  Messrs.  Ruiz  and  Montez,  and  against  all  other  Spanish  subjects 
concerned  in  the  transaction  in  question. 

"  I  arn,  sir,  your  most  obedient,  humble  servant, 

"W.  Fox  STRANGWAYS. 

"  WM.  P.  PATTON,  Esq.,  &c.,  Glasgow." 

Yes,  strange  ways  indeed,  if  it  might  be  permitted,  on  so  grave  an  occasion, 
to  allude  to  a  name.  Strange  ways — making  millions  of  slaves  in  one  hemi 
sphere — forcing,  by  fire  and  sword,  the  poisonous  product  of  their  labour  on  an 
old  and  civilized  people,  while,  in  another,  interposing,  in  a  flood  of  sympathy, 
in  behalf  of  a  band  of  barbarous  slaves,  with  hands  imbrued  with  blood !  I  trust 
such  officious  intermeddling  will  be  met  as  it  deserves.  Has  it  come  to  this, 
that  we  cannot  touch  a  subject  connected  with  an  African  without  the  inter- 


390  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ference  of  another  government,  at  the  solicitation  of  a  foreign  society,  instiga 
ted,  no  doubt,  by  a  foreign  faction  among  ourselves  ?  I  mean  not  a  faction  of 
foreigners,  but  of  our  own  people,  who,  in  their  fanatical  zeal,  have  lost  every 
feeling  belonging  to  an  American,  and  transferred  their  allegiance  to  a  foreign 
power. 

In  making  these  remarks,  I  have  not  been  actuated  by  feelings  of  hostility 
towards  Great  Britain.  My  motive  is  far  different.  With  all  her  faults,  I  ad 
mire  and  esteem  her  for  many  and  great  qualities.  My  desire  is  peace.  It  is 
the  wish  of  the  civilized  world,  and  I  would  regard  war  between  the  two  kin 
dred  people  as  among  the  greatest  of  calamities.  But  justice  is  indispensable 
to  peace  among  nations.  Our  maxim  ought  to  be,  neither  to  do,  nor  submit  to 
wrong — to  ask  for  nothing  but  justice,  and  to  accept  nothing  less ;  but  never 
disturb  peaceful  relations  till  every  means  of  obtaining  justice  has  been  tried  in 
vain.  I  have,  in  this  case,  acted  in  that  spirit.  I  believe,  solemnly,  that  jus 
tice  has  been  withheld.  To  prove  that  has  been  my  object.  I  trust  I  have 
done  it  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Senate.  I  also  believe  that  justice  has  been 
withheld  on  grounds  utterly  untenable,  and  which,  if  persisted  in,  must  lead,  in 
the  end,  to  the  avowal  of  a  principle,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  that  must 
strike  a  fatal  blow  at  the  peace  of  the  two  countries  ;  and,  in  its  reaction,  on 
the  social  and  political  condition  of  Great  Britain  and  the  rest  of  Europe.  Thus 
believing,  I  have  attempted  to  point  to  some  of  the  disastrous  consequences 
which  must  follow,  with  the  view  of  rousing  attention  to  the  question  at  issue 
between  the  two  governments  in  the  case  under  consideration,  in  order  to  ob 
tain  redress  of  injury.  If,  in  making  my  remarks,  I  have  assailed  her,  it  is  be 
cause  we  have  been  assailed,  as  I  conceive,  in  assuming  the  principle  on  which 
justice  has  been  withheld. 

The  immediate  object  I  had  for  introducing  these  resolutions  was  to  take  the 
sense  of  the  Senate  on  the  subject  to  which  they  refer  ;  and  which  embraces 
a  principle  vital  to  us  of  the  South,  and  of  deep  interest  to  the  rest  of  the  Union. 
My  conviction  is  strong  that  we  have  justice  on  our  side  ;  and  I  wish  to  afford 
to  our  brethren  in  the  other  sections  an  opportunity  of  exhibiting  a  proof  of  their 
attachment  to  the  common  interest,  by  sustaining  a  cause  where  we  are  partic 
ularly  concerned,  as  we  did,  at  the  last  session,  by  sustaining  unanimously  one 
where  they  were.* 

I  have  no  particular  wish  as  to  the  mode  of  disposing  of  the  resolutions.  All 
I  desire  is  a  direct  vote  on  them  ;  but  I  am  indifferent  whether  they  shall  be 
first  referred  and  reported  on,  or  be  discussed  and  decided  on  without  reference 
I  leave  the  Senate  to  decide  which  course  shall  be  adopted. 


XXVI. 

SPEECH    ON   THE    BANKRUPT   BILL,    JUNE    2,    1840. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said:  It  was  impossible  to  listen  to  this  discussion  without 
being  struck  with  the  difficulty  of  the  subject,  and  the  number  and  delicacy  of 
the  questions  involved.  The  relation  of  creditor  and  debtor  was,  indeed,  the 
all-pervading  one  in  our  country,  and  ought  not  to  be  touched  without  much  de 
liberation  and  caution.  This  bill,  and  the  amendment  proposed,  taken  together, 
embrace  this  universal  relation,  almost  to  its  utmost  extent  and  minutest  rami 
fication,  and  ought  to  be  examined  with  corresponding  care  and  attention. 

I  was  at  first  inclined  to  favour  the  bill ;  but  the  discussion  and  reflection  have 
brought  me  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  unconstitutional,  and  therefore  could  not 
receive  my  support,  if  there  were  no  other  objection.  The  power  of  Congress 

*  Referring  to  the  case  of  Maine. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  391 

is  restricted,  by  the  Constitution,  to  establishing  laws  on  the  subject  of  bank 
ruptcies.  That  is  the  limit  of  its  power.  It  cannot  go  an  inch  beyond,  on  the  sub 
ject  of  this  bill,  without  violating  the  Constitution.  Thus  far  all  must  be  agreed. 
After  full  and  deliberate  investigation,  I  cannot  regard  this  bill  as  one  on  the 
subject  of  bankruptcy.  It  relates,  in  my  opinion,  to  another,  but  connected,  sub 
ject,  not  embraced  in  the  Constitution — that  of  insolvency,  miscalled  voluntary 
bankruptcy,  as  I  hope  to  be  able  to  establish. 

In  order  to  understand  the  ground  on  which  my  opinion  rests,  it  will  be  ne 
cessary  to  premise — what  none  have  denied,  or  can  deny — that,  at  the  time  of 
the  formation  of  the  Constitution,  there  existed,  both  in  this  country  and  in  Eng 
land,  from  which  we  derived  our  laws,  two  separate  systems  of  laws,  growing 
out  of  the  relation  of  creditor  and  debtor :  the  one  known  as  the  system  of  bank 
ruptcy,  and  the  other  of  insolvency.  The  two  systems  had  existed  together  in 
England  for  centuries,  and  in  this  country  from  an  early  period  of  our  colonial 
governments.  It  would  be  useless  to  waste  the  time  of  the  Senate  in  accumu 
lating  proof  of  a  fact  beyond  controversy.  This  very  bill,  arid  the  only  one 
ever  passed  by  Congress  on  the  subject  of  bankruptcy,  bear  internal  evidence 
of  the  fact.  The  decisions  of  judges  recognise  the  distinction,  and  elementary 
works  place  them  under  distinct  heads,  and  in  separate  chapters.  The  distinc 
tion  is  one  neither  of  form  nor  accident.  The  two  systems,  in  commercial 
communities,  naturally  grow  up  out  of  the  relation  of  creditor  and  debtor,  but 
originate  in  different  motives,  and  have  different  objects,  which  give  different 
character  and  genius  to  the  two. 

The  system  of  insolvent  laws  grew  out  of  the  debtor  side  of  the  relation,  and 
originated  in  motives  of  humanity  for  the  unfortunate  but  honest  debtor,  depri 
ved  of  the  means  of  paying  his  debts  by  some  of  the  various  unforeseen  acci 
dents  of  life,  and,  in  consequence,  exposed  to  the  oppression  of  unfeeling  cred 
itors.  Their  object  is  to  relieve  him  from  the  power  of  his  creditors,  on  an 
honest  surrender  of  all  his  property  for  their  benefit. 

Very  different  are  the  motives  and  objects  in  which  the  laws  of  bankruptcy 
originated.  They  grew  out  of  the  creditor  side  of  the  relation,  and  form  a  por 
tion  of  the  mercantile  or  commercial  code  of  laws.  Their  leading  object  is  to 
strengthen  the  system  of  commercial  credit,  with  the  view  of  invigorating  and 
extending  commercial  enterprise ;  and  we  accordingly  find  that  the  system 
commenced  in  the  commercial  Republic  of  Venice,  and  has  been  confined  ex 
clusively,  as  far  as  my  knowledge  extends,  to  commercial  communities.  Though 
growing  out  of  the  same  relation,  and  to  that  extent  connected,  the  two  are  as 
different  in  genius  and  character  as  the  different  aspects  of  the  relation  out  of 
which  they  grow,  The  one  looks  to  credit  and  the  creditor  interest,  and  the 
other  to  the  debtor,  and  the  obligations  of  humanity  towards  him  when,  with 
out  demerit  on  his  part,  he  is  utterly  deprived  of  the  means  of  meeting  his  en 
gagements. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  insolvent  system,  in  its  humanity  for  the  debtor,  is 
not  unmindful  of  the  interest  of  the  creditor ;  and  the  bankrupt  system,  in  guard 
ing  the  interest  of  credit  and  creditors,  does  not  forget  that  of  the  debtor.  But 
this,  though  it  has,  to  a  certain  extent,  blended  the  two,  and  caused  some  con 
fusion  in  practice,  cannot  obliterate  the  essential  and  broad  distinction  between 
them.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  with  my  object,  to  trace  the  history  of  the  legisla 
tion  in  relation  to  them,  in  this  country  and  England,  with  the  judicial  decisions, 
in  order  to  show  that  the  two  systems,  though  blended  and  confounded  in  part, 
have,  nevertheless,  retained  their  distinctive  features.  It  is  enough  for  me  that 
there  were,  when  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  two  separate  systems,  known 
both  to  our  laws  and  the  English,  such  as  I  have  described. 

I  next  assert,  that  the  members  of  the  Convention  that  framed  the  Constitu 
tion  could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  there  were  two  such  systems, 
known  by  the  names  of  bankrupt  and  insolvent  laws.  The  Convention  abounded 


392  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

with  able  lawyers,  many  of  whom  were  among  the  most  distinguished  and  in 
fluential  members  of  the  body,  and  could  not  but  be  as  perfectly  familiar  with 
the  whole  subject  as  we  now  are,  after  this  long  and  able  discussion. 

Now  sir,  I  ask,  Is  it  to  be  supposed  that,  if  they  intended  to  delegate  to  Con 
gress  power  over  both  systems,  these  able  and  cautious  men,  so  familiar  with 
the  distinction  between  them,  would  not  have  included  both  by  name  ?  And  is 
it  not  conclusive,  that  in  not  doing  so,  and  in  limiting  the  grant  to  bankruptcy 
alone,  that  it  was  their  intention  to  grant  that  only,  to  the  exclusion  of  insolven 
cy  ?  Do  we  riot  feel  that,  if  we  were  framing  a  constitution,  with  our  present 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  that  such  would  be  our  course  ?  If  we  intended  to 
grant  both,  would  we  not  insert  both  ?  And  would  not  the  insertion  of  bank 
ruptcy  only  be  intended  to  exclude  insolvency  ?  The  conclusion  appears  ir 
resistible.  How  is  it  met  ?  By  admitting  (for  it  cannot  be  denied)  that  such 
would  be  the  case  if  the  words  of  the  Constitution  are  to  be  taken  in  their  le 
gal  sense  ;  but  it  is  asserted  that  our  Constitution  was  made  for  the  people  at 
large  ;  and  on  this  assumption  it  is  inferred  that  it  ought  to  be  interpreted,  in  all 
cases,  according  to  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  words  used,  and  not  in  their  le 
gal  sense.  Having  arrived  at  this  conclusion,  it  is  next  contended  that,  accord 
ing  to  their  ordinary  sense,  bankruptcy  and  insolvency  are  convertible  terms, 
arid  of  the  same  meaning  ;  and  it  is  thence  inferred  that  the  framers  of  the  Con 
stitution  intended  to  comprehend  both  under  the  former. 

I  might  well  deny  both  the  premises  and  conclusion.  It  might  be  easily 
shown  that  in  many  cases  the  words  of  the  Constitution  must,  and  have  been, 
constantly  taken  in  their  legal  sense  ;  and  that,  according  to  the  established  rules 
of  construction,  they  ought  to  be  so  taken  in  this.  It  might  be  also  shown  that 
they  are  not  convertible  in  common  use  ;  that  insolvency  is  the  general  term, 
and  includes  bankruptcy.  But  I  deem  all  this  unnecessary.  I  admit,  for  the 
sake  of  argument,  both  premises»and  conclusion,  but  deny  the  application.  Ta 
ken  unconnected  with  other  words,  insolvency  and  bankruptcy  may  be  admitted 
to  have  the  same  meaning,  and  that  the  one  may  stand  for  the  other ;  but,  that 
is  not  this  case.  In  the  Constitution,  bankruptcy  stands  in  connexion  with  law  ; 
which,  attaching  itself  to  it,  fixes  its  meaning.  Now,  sir,  I  assert,  however  the 
terms  bankruptcy  and  insolvency  may  be  confounded,  standing  alone,  no  one — 
no,  not  the  most  uninformed,  confounds  bankrupt  laws  with  insolvent  laws. 
They  never  call  the  insolvent  laws  of  the  states  bankrupt  laws.  They  may 
not  be  able  to  draw  the  distinction  with  any  precision,  but  they  know  that  they 
are  not  the  same. 

But  admit  that  there  is  doubt.  I  ask,  What  is  the  rule  of  interpretation  to  be 
applied  to  the  Constitution  in  case  of  doubt ?  It  is  a  fundamental  principle,  that 
Congress  has  no  right  to  exercise  any  power  whatever  that  is  not  granted  by 
the  Constitution.  To  do  so  would  be  an  act  of  usurpation,  and,  if  knowingly 
done,  a  violation  of  oath.x  Hence,  in  cases  of  doubt,  it  is  a  just  caution  to  take 
the  words  in  their  limited  sense,  and  not  their  broad  and  comprehensive — a 
rule  at  all  times  considered  as  essential  to  the  safety  of  the  Constitution  by  those 
of  the  State  Rights  creed.  Apply  it  to  this  case, 'and  the  controversy  ceas 
es.  Let  me  add,  that  there  are  few  subjects  in  reference  to  which  it  is  more 
necessary  to  apply  the  most  rigid  rules  of  construction  than  to  that  of  the  all- 
pervading  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor.  It  is  one  on  which  the  slightest  en 
croachment  is  dangerous,  and  might,  in  its  consequences,  draw  into  the  vortex 
of  this  government  the  whole  of  that  vast  relation  in  its  fullest  extent,  and  with 
it  the  entire  money  transactions  of  the  Union,  as  will  be  manifest  in  the  sequel. 

If,  after  what  has  been  said,  doubts  should  still  exist,  they  may  be  removed 
by  turning  to  another  provision  of  the  Constitution,  standing  in  close  connexion 
with  this.  I  have  said  that  the  bankrupt  system  grew  out  of  the  commercial 
policy,  and  made  a  part  of  it.  The  provision  I  refer  to  is  that  which  grants  to 
Congress  the  power  of  regulating  commerce.  This  grant  carried  with  it  several 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  393 

others,  as  connected  powers  ;  such  as  that  of  coining  money  and  regulating 
the  value  thereof;  fixing  a  uniform  standard  of  weights  arfd  measures  ;  and  we 
accordingly  find  these,  with  the  power  of  establishing  the  laws  of  bankruptcy, 
all  grouped  together,  and  following,  in  close  connexion,  the  parent  power  of 
regulating  commerce  ;  just  where  we  would  expect  to  find  it,  regarded  in  the 
light  I  do,  but  not  if  taken  in  the  broader  and  more  general  sense  of  insolvency, 
in  which  it  would  comprehend  far  more  than  what  relates  to  trade,  and  what, 
under  our  system,  belongs  to  the  mass  of  local  and  particular  powers  reserved  to 
the  states. 

So  irresistible  does  the  conclusion  at  which  I  have  arrived  appear  to  me, 
that  I  have  been  forced  to  inquire  how  it  is  that  any  one  in  favour  of  a  strict 
construction  of  the  Constitution  could  come  to  a  different,  and  can  find  but  one 
explanation.  We  are  in  the  midst  of  great  pecuniary  embarrassment,  suddenly 
succeeding  a  period  of  several  years  of  an  opposite  character.  There  are  thou 
sands  who,  but  a  short  time  since,  regarded  themselves  as  rich,  now  reduced 
to  poverty,  with  a  weight  of  debt  bearing  them  down,  from  which  they  can  never 
expect  to  extricate  themselves  without  the  interposition  of  government.  The 
prevailing  opinion  is,  that  the  legislatures  of  the  states  can  apply  no  remedy 
beyond  the  discharge  of  the  person,  and  that  there  is  no  other  power  which 
can  give  a  discharge  against  debts,  and  relief  from  the  burden,  but  Congress. 
That  so  large  and  enterprising  a  portion  of  our  citizens  should  be  reduced  to  so 
hopeless  a  condition,  makes  a  strong  appeal  to  our  feelings,  of  which  I  am  far 
from  being  insensible.  It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that,  under  the  influence  of 
such  feelings,  judgment  should  yield  to  sympathy ;  and  that,  under  the  impres 
sion  there  is  no  other  remedy,  one  should  be  sought  in  a  loose  and  unsafe  con 
struction  of  the  Constitution  ;  and  hence  the  broad  construction  contended  for. 
I  appeal  to  the  candour  of  my  State  Rights  friend,  who  differs  from  me  on  this 
occasion,  if  what  I  state  is  not  the  true  explanation.  If  I  mistake  not,  it  might 
be  safely  asserted  that  there  is  not  one  among  them  who  would  yield  the  power 
to  this  government,  if  he  believed  the  state  legislature  could  apply  a  remedy. 
I,  on  my  part,  neither  assert  nor  deny  that  they  can  ;  but  I  do  assert  that,  if 
the  states  cannot  discharge  the  debt,  neither  can  Congress. 

I  hold  it  clear,  if  by  discharging  the  debt  be  meant  releasing  the  obligation 
of  a  contract,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  that  neither  this  government  nor 
that  of  any  of  the  states  possesses  such  a  power.  The  obligation  of  a  contract 
belongs  not  to  the  civil  or  political  code,  but  to  the  moral.  It  is  imposed  by  an 
authority  higher  than  human,  and  can  be  discharged  by  no  power  under  heaven 
without  the  assent  of  him  to  whom  the  obligation  is  due.  It  is  binding  on  con 
science  itself.  If  a  discharged  debtor  had  in  his  pocket  the  discharges  of  every 
government  on  earth,  he  would  not  be  an  honest  man  should  he  refuse  to  pay 
his  debts,  if  ever  in  his  power.  In  this  sense,  this  government  is  just  as  pow 
erless  to  discharge  a  debt  as  the  most  inconsiderable  state  in  the  Union. 

But  the  subject  may  be  viewed  in  a  different  light.  It  may  be  meant  that 
government  is  not  bound  to  lend  its  aid  to  a  hard  and  griping  creditor  in  the 
cruel  attempt  to  coerce  the  honest  but  unfortunate  debtor,  who  has  lost  his  all, 
to  pay  his  debts,  when  it  is  utterly  beyond  his  power.  Certainly  not ;  and,  in 
that  sense,  every  government  has  the  right  to  discharge  the  debt,  as  well  as  the 
person.  They  both  stand  on  the  same  ground.  It  is  a  question  of  mere  discre 
tion  when,  and  in  what  manner,  the  government  will  give  its  aid  to  enforce  the 
demand  of  the  creditor ;  but,  thus  regarded,  state  legislatures  are  just  as  com 
petent  to  discharge  the  debt,  under  their  insolvent  laws,  or,  in  the  absence  of 
our  legislation,  under  their  bankrupt  laws,  as  Congress  itself.  In  proof  of  what 
is  asserted,  I  might  cite  the  laws  of  many  of  the  states,  and  my  own  among 
others,  which  discharge  the  debt,  as  well  as  the  person,  as  far  as  the  suing 
creditors  are  concerned — the  constitutionality  of  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  has 
never  been  questioned.  It  would,  indeed,  be  a  violent  and  unreasonable  pre- 

DDD 


394  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

sumption  to  suppose  that,  in  granting  the  right  to  establish  laws  of  bankruptcy, 
the  states  intended  "to  leave  Congress  free  to  discharge  the  debt,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  imposed  on  themselves  an  obligation  to  forbear  the  exercise  of  the 
same  power  in  the  case  of  insolvency  or  bankruptcy,  should  Congress  decline 
to  exercise  the  power  granted.  Nor  can  such  be  the  intention  of  the  provision 
in  the  Constitution  which  prohibits  the  states  from  passing  laws  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts.  The  history  of  the  times  amply  proves  that  the  prohi 
bition  was  intended  to  apply  to  stay  laws,  and  others  of  a  similar  description, 
which  state  legislatures  had  been  in  the  habit  of  passing,  in  periods  like  the 
present,  when  a  sudden  contraction  of  our  always  unstable  currency  had  suc 
ceeded  a  wide  expansion,  and  when  large  portions  of  the  community,  with 
ample  means,  found  themselves  unable  to  meet  their  debts,  but  who,  with  in 
dulgence,  would  be  able  to  meet  all  demands.  The  objects  of  all  these  laws 
were  either  to  afford  time,  or  to  protect  the  debtor  against  the  hardship  of  pay 
ing  the  same  nominal  amount,  but  in  reality  a  much  greater,  in  consequence  of 
a  change  in  the  standard  of  value,  resulting  from  a  contraction  of  the  currency. 
As  plausible  as  was  the  object,  experience  had  proved  it  to  be  destructive  of 
credit  and  injurious  to  the  community,  and  hence  the  prohibition.  To  extend 
it  beyond,  and  give  a  construction  which  would  compel  the  states,  whether 
they  would  or  not,  to  lend  their  aid  to  the  merciless  creditor,  who  would  re 
duce  to  despair  an  innocent,  but  unfortunate  debtor,  without  benefit  to  himself, 
and  thereby  to  render  him  a  burden  to  himself  and  society,  would  be  abhorrent 
to  every  feeling  of  humanity  and  principle  of  sound  policy.  It  is  impossible 
for  me  to  believe  that  such  was  the  intention  of  the  Constitution.  Nor  can  I 
be  reconciled  to  a  construction  which  must  have  the  effect  of  enlarging  the 
power  of  this  government,  and  contracting  those  of  the  states,  in  relation  to  the 
delicate  and  all-pervading  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor,  by  throwing  on  the 
side  of  the  former  the  powerful  consideration  of  humanity  and  sympathy  for  a 
large  and  unfortunate  portion  of  the  community. 

Having  now  established,  I  trust,  satisfactorily,  that  the  framers  of  the  Con 
stitution,  in  restricting  the  power  of  Congress  to  establishing  laws  of  bank 
ruptcy,  intended  to  exclude  those  of  insolvency,  it  remains  to  be  shown  that 
this  bill  belongs  to  the  latter  class,  and  is,  therefore,  unconstitutional.  And 
here  I  might  shift  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  other  side,  and  demand  of  them 
to  prove  that  it  is  a  bankrupt,  and  not  an  insolvent  bill.  They  who  claim  to 
exercise  a  power  under  this  government  are  bound  to  exhibit  the  grant,  and  to 
prove  that  the  power  proposed  to  be  exercised  is  within  its  limits — to  show,  in 
this  case,  what  a  law  of  bankruptcy  is — how  far  its  limits  extend — that  this  bill 
does  not  go  beyond ;  and,  in  particular,  that  it  does  not  cover  the  ground  be 
longing  to  the  connected  power  of  insolvency  reserved  to  the  states.  Till  that 
is  done,  they  have  no  right  to  expect  our  votes  in  its  favour.  The  task  is  im 
possible.  Every  feature  of  the  bill  bears  the  impress  of  insolvency.  The 
arguments  urged  for  and  against  it  demonstrate  it.  Have  its  advocates  utter 
ed  a  word,  in  urging  its  passage,  in  favour  of  credit  or  creditors  ?  On  the  con 
trary,  have  not  their  warm  and  eloquent  appeals  been  in  behalf  of  the  unfortu 
nate  and  honest  debtors,  who  have  been  reduced  to  hopeless  insolvency  by  the 
embarrassment  of  the  times  ?  And  has  it  not  been  attacked  on  the  ground  that 
it  would  be  ruinous  to  credit,  and  unjust  and  oppressive  to  creditors  ?  Every 
word  uttered  on  either  side  proves  that  it  belongs  to  the  class  of  insolvent 
laws,  and  is,  therefore,  unconstitutional.  As  such,  it  cannot  receive  my  sup 
port,  were  it  free  from  other  objections. 

But  as  decidedly  as  I  am  opposed  to  the  bill.  I  am  still  more  so  to  the  amend 
ment  proposed  as  a  substitute  by  the  minority  of  the  committee.  It  contains  a 
provision  in  favour  of  insolvent  debtors  similar  to  that  of  the  bill,  and  is,  of 
course,  liable  to  the  same  objections.  But  it  goes  much  farther,  and  provides 
for  a  comprehensive  system  of  compulsory  bankruptcy,  as  it  is  called ;  that  is, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  395 

as  I  understand  it,  bankruptcy  as  intended  by  the  Constitution.  As  far  as  the 
provisions  of  this  portion  of  the  bill  are  limited  to  individuals,  I  admit  its  consti 
tutionality,  but  object  to  it  on  the  broad  ground  of  expediency. 

It  is  impossible  for  any  one  to  doubt,  who  will  examine  the  history  of  our 
legislation,  that  there  must  be  some  powerful  objection  to  the  passage  of  laws 
of  bankruptcy  by  Congress.  No  other  proof  is  needed  than  the  fact,  that 
although  the  government  has  been  in  operation  for  more  than  half  a  century, 
and  the  power  is  unquestionable,  yet,  in  that  long  period,  notwithstanding  the 
numerous  and  strenuous  efforts  that  have  been  made,  but  a  single  act  has 
passed ;  and  that,  though  limited  to  five  years,  was  repealed  before  the  expira 
tion  of  the  time.  If  we  inquire  into  the  cause,  we  shall  find  it,  in  part  at  least, 
in  the  genius  of  our  institutions  and  the  character  of  our  people,  which  are  ab 
horrent  to  whatever  is  arbitrary  or  harsh  in  legislation,  than  which  there  is 
none,  in  its  wide  range,  more  so  than  the  laws  of  bankruptcy.  They  give  the 
creditors  the  most  summary  and  efficient  process  against  the  debtors,  of  which 
we  may  be  satisfied  by  looking  into  the  provisions  of  this  amendment.  On  the 
mere  suspicion  of  insolvency  or  fraud,  one  or  more  creditors,  to  whom  not  less 
than  five  hundred  dollars  is  due,  may  take  out  a  process  of  bankruptcy  against 
the  debtor,  by  applying  to  a  judge  of  the  Federal  Court ;  and  on  his  order,  with 
out  jury,  he  may  be  divested  of  his  property,  and  the  whole  of  his  estate  placed 
in  the  hands  of  assignees,  with  authority  to  wind  up  and  settle  his  affairs,  and 
distribute  the  proceeds  among  his  creditors. 

But,  as  repugnant  as  a  process  so  summary  and  arbitrary  is  to  the  genius  and 
character  of  our  institutions  and  people,  there  is  another  objection  connected 
with  our  currency  still  stronger.  It  has  been  the  misfortune  of  our  country  at 
all  times,  with  the  exception  of  some  short  intervals,  to  be  cursed  with  an 
unsound  and  unstable  paper  currency,  subject  to  sudden  and  violent  expan 
sions  and  contractions.  It  belongs  to  such  currency,  in  the  period  of  its  ex 
pansion,  to  excite  a  universal  spirit  of  enterprise  and  speculation,  particularly 
in  a  country  so  new  and  rapidly  increasing,  and  of  such  vast  capacity  for  in 
crease  as  ours.  Universal  indebtedness  is  the  result,  followed,  on  the  contrac 
tion,  by  wide-spread  embarrassment,  reducing  thousands  to  hopeless  insolvency, 
and  leaving  a  still  greater  number,  though  possessed  of  ample  property  to  pay 
their  debts  in  ordinary  times,  without  money,  or  the  means  of  getting  it,  to  meet 
the  demands  against  them.  What  can  be  imagined  more  oppressive,  unjust,  or 
cruel,  than  to  place,  at  such  a  period,  such  a  power  in  the  hands  of  hard  and 
grasping  creditors  ? 

Now,  sir,  we  are  in  the  midst  of  such  a  one — a  period  of  almost  unexampled 
contraction,  following  one  remarkable  above  all  others  for  the  extent  and  dura 
tion  of  the  expansion;  for  the  universality  and  boldness  of  speculation,  and  the 
extent  and  severity  of  the  embarrassment  which  has  followed.  Such  is  the 
period  selected  to  arm  the  creditors  against  the  debtors,  with  the  harsh  sum 
mary  and  arbitrary  power  of  a  bankrupt  law — a  period,  such  as  the  states  in 
former  times  interposed,  with  stay  laws,  valuation  laws,  and  others  of  like 
description,  to  save  the  debtor  struggling  against  an  adverse  current,  and  who, 
if  allowed  time,  could  save  himself  and  family  from  poverty.  This  amendment 
proposes  to  reverse  this  humane  but  misguided  policy,  and,  instead  of  inter 
posing  in  favour  of  the  embarrassed  but  solvent  debtors,  to  arm  their  creditors 
with  more  powerful  means  to  crush  them.  I  say  misguided  policy.  I  will  not 
call  it  unjust.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  a  strong  principle  of  justice  at  the 
bottom  in  favour  of  interposing  at  such  a  period  as  the  present,  if  it  could  be 
done  on  principles  of  sound  policy.  The  condition  in  which  so  large  a  portion 
of  our  people  now  find  themselves,  in  debt,  with  ample  means  of  discharging 
all  they  owe  if  time  be  allowed,  but  incapable  of  immediate  payment,  is  much 
less  their  fault  than  that  of  the  improvident  legislation  of  the  states,  counte 
nanced  by  this  government,  and  by  which  the  solid  and  stable  currency  of  the 


396  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Constitution  has  been  expelled,  and  an  unsound,  vacillating  one  of  bank-notes 
substituted  in  its  place,  incapable  of  discharging  debts.  By  its  sudden,  violent, 
and  unexpected  fluctuations,  alternately  raising  and  depressing  prices,  tempting 
at  the  one  period  to  contract  debts,  and  leaving  debtors  at  the  other  without  the 
means  of  paying,  the  whole  country,  even  the  cautious  and  prudent,  has  become 
involved  in  debt  and  embarrassment.  To  this  cause  may  be  traced  the  present 
condition  of  the  country,  and  the  many  similar  ones  through  which  the  country 
has  of  late  so  frequently  passed,  in  which  few  are  out  of  debt;  and  of  the  in 
debted,  though  few  are  actually  insolvent,  but  a  small  portion  could  pay  their 
debts,  if  demanded  in  legal  currency.  And  shall  we,  who  are,  at  least  in  part, 
responsible  for  such  a  state  of  things,  at  such  a  period,  when  the  debtors  are 
so  much  at  the  mercy  of  the  creditors,  reversing  the  ill-judged  but  humane 
policy  wisely  prohibited  to  the  states  by  the  Constitution,  of  interposing  in  fa 
vour  of  the  debtors,  arm  the  creditors  with  new  and  extraordinary  powers  of 
enforcing  their  demands  ?  Who  is  there  that  does  not  feel  that  it  would  be 
impolitic,  cruel,  and  unjust  ?  But  it  is  only  at  such  periods  that  bankrupt  laws 
are  proposed  ;  and  is  it  at  all  wonderful  that  the  instinctive  feelings  of  the  com 
munity,  have  so  steadily  and  strongly  resisted  their  adoption? 

On  110  occasion  has  there  been  stronger  cause  for  resistance  than  the  present, 
for  on  none  would  such  a  law  be  more  impolitic  and  cruel ;  and  such,  if  I  may 
judge  from  the  discussion,  is  the  feeling  of  this  body.  Standing  alone,  and 
limited  to  individuals,  I  doubt  whether  the  portion  of  the  amendment  under  im 
mediate  consideration  would  receive  a  single  vote,  although  it  is  the  only  part 
which  is  clearly  and  unquestionably  within  the  limits  of  the  Constitution.  It 
may,  then,  well  be  asked,  If  it  is  without  supporters,  why  is  it  inserted  ?  But 
one  answer  can  be  given :  because  it  is  felt,  as  obnoxious  as  it  is,  to  be  indis 
pensable  to  the  passage  of  the  provisions  connected  with  it.  One  portion  of 
the  Senate  is  so  intent  on  passing  the  part  in  favour  of  insolvent  debtors,  that 
they  are  willing  to  take  with  it  the  compulsory  portion  in  favour  of  creditors ; 
while  another,  from  a  strong  desire  to  include  corporations,  are  willing  to  com 
prehend  the  other  provisions,  though  they  denounce  the  provisions  in  favour  of 
insolvent  debtors,  standing  alone,  as  fraudulent,  unjust,  and  unconstitutional. 
It  is  thus  the  two  extremes  unite  in  favour  of  a  measure  that  neither  would 
support  alone ;  and  a  feature  of  the  bill,  obnoxious  of  itself,  but  constitutional, 
is  made  to  buoy  up  other  portions,  which,  if  not  clearly  unconstitutional,  to  say 
the  least,  are  of  doubtful  constitutionality. 

Let  me  say  to  those  who  represent  the  portion  of  the  Union  where  the  indebt- 
ness  is  the  greatest,  and  who,  on  that  account,  favour  the  provisions  for  the  re 
lief  of  the  insolvent,  that  the  operation  of  the  amendment,  should  it  pass,  will 
disappoint  them.  The  part  in  favour  of  the  debtors  may,  indeed,  throw  off  the 
burden  from  many  who  are  now  hopelessly  insolvent,  and  restore  their  useful 
ness  to  themselves  and  society  ;  but  the  other  provisions  will  reduce  a  far  great 
er  number  to  insolvency,  who  might  otherwise  struggle  through  their  embar 
rassments,  with  a  competency  left  for  the  support  of  themselves  and  families. 
I  cannot  be  mistaken.  Should  the  amendment,  as  it  now  stands,  become  a  law, 
instead  of  relieving,  it  would  crush  the  indebted  portion  of  the  Union.  In  or 
der  to  make  good  the  assertion,  I  shall  now  turn  to  the  novel  and  important  pro 
vision  which  places  certain  corporations,  and  banks  among  them,  under  this 
compulsory  process. 

I  am  not  the  apologist  of  banks  or  corporations  generally,  nor  am  I  the  advo 
cate  of  chartered  privileges.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  not  a  member  of  the  body 
more  deeply  impressed  with  the  evils  of  the  banking  system,  as  now  modified, 
or  more  opposed  to  grants  of  privileges  to  one  portion  of  the  community  at  the 
expense  of  the  rest.  My  opinions  on  these  points  have  not  been  recently  or 
hastily  formed.  I  long  since  embraced  them,  after  much  reflection  and  obser 
vation,  and  am  prepared  to  assert  and  maintain  them  on  all  proper  occasions. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  397 

But,  sir,  I  am  not  to  be  caught  by  words :  I  have  too  much  experience  for  that. 
It  is  in  vain  that  I  am  told  that  this  is  a  contest  between  corporations  and  indi 
viduals — the  artificial,  legal  person,  called  a  body  politic,  and  the  individual 
man,  as  formed  by  his  ^Creator.  All  this  is  lost  on  me.  I  look  not  to  where 
the  blow  is  professedly  aimed,  but  beyond,  where  it  must  fall.  The  corporate 
ideal  thing  at  which  it  is  said  to  be  directed  is  intangible,  and  without  the  ca 
pacity  of  hearing,  seeing,  or  feeling  ;  but  there  are  beneath  thousands  on  thou 
sands,  not  shadows,  but  real,  sensitive  human  beings,  on  whom  the  blow  will 
fall  with  vengeance.  Before  we  act,  let  us  look  at  things  as  they  really  are, 
and  not  as  we  may  imagine  them  in  the  fervour  of  debate. 

The  states  have,  by  an  unwise  and  dangerous  legislation,  centralized  in  banks 
and  other  corporations,  to  a  very  great  extent,  the  relation  of  creditor  and  debt 
or.  Were  I  to  assert  that  these  central  points  could  not  be  touched  without 
touching,  at  the  same  time,  that  wide-spread  and  all-pervading  relation,  in  its 
minutest  and  remotest  ramification,  I  would  scarcely  express  myself  too  strong 
ly.  To  subject  them  to  this  measure  would,  then,  be  to  subject  to  it,  in  reali 
ty,  almost  the  entire  relation  of  creditor  and  debtor.  It  would  be  bankrupting 
by  wholesale— a  prompt  and  forced  settlement  of  the  aggregate  indebtedness 
of  the  country,  under  all  the  pressue  of  existing  pecuniary  embarrassments,  made 
manifold  greater  by  the  measure  itself. 

In  order  that  the  Senate  may  have  some  idea  how  vast  and  comprehensive 
the  measure  is,  I  will  give  a  statement  from  the  paper  in  my  hand,  which  con. 
tains  the  most  recent  account  we  have  of  the  number  and  condition  of  the  banks. 

There  were,  then,  by  estimation,  on  the  first  of  January  last,  upward  of  nine 
hundred  banks,  including  branches,  with  a  capital  of  upward  of  three  hundred 
and  fifty  millions,  having  debts  due  to  them  of  more  than  four  hundred  and  sixty 
millions,  and  by  them  of  more  than  two.  hundred  and  seventy  millions,  making 
the  aggregate  indebtedness,  to  and  by  them,  upward  of  seven  hundred  and  ten 
millions  of  dollars,  with  a  supply  of  specie  but  little  exceeding  thirty-three  mill 
ions.  By  including  the  banks,  this  vast  amount  of  indebtedness,  concentrated 
in  the  banking  system,  would  be  subject  to  the  operation  of  the  law,  should  the 
measure  be  adopted.  But  the  amendment  extends  far  beyond,  and  takes  in  all 
corporations  for  manufacturing,  commercial,  insurance,  or  trading  purposes  ;  or 
which  issue,  pay  out,  or  emit  bills,  draughts,  or  obligations,  with  the  intention  of 
circulating  them  as  a  substitute  for  money ;  which  would  add  to  the  indebted 
ness  brought  within  its  operations  hundreds  of  millions  more.  Never  was  a 
scheme  of  bankruptcy  so  bold  and  comprehensive  adopted,  or  even  proposed, 
before  :  no,  not  in  England  itself,  where  the  power  of  Parliament  is  omnipotent, 
and  where  the  system  has  been  in  operation  for  three  centuries. 

Such  is  the  measure  proposed  to  be  adopted  at  such  a  period  as  this,  when 
there  is  a  universal  and  intense  pecuniary  embarrassment — when  one  half  of 
the  banks  have  suspended  payments,  and  when  their  available  means  of  meet 
ing  their  debts  are  so  scanty.  At  such  a  period,  and  under  such  circumstances, 
any  creditor  or  creditors,  to  whom  a  bank  or  other  corporation  may  owe  not 
less  than  five  hundred  dollars,  may  demand  payment ;  and  if  not  paid  in  fifteen 
days,  may  take  out  process  of  bankruptcy,  on  application  to  the  federal  courts, 
and  place  the  corporation,  with  all  its  debts,  credits,  and  assets,  in  the  hands 
of  trustees,  to  be  wound  up,  and  the  proceeds  distributed  among  its  creditors. 
I  venture  nothing  in  asserting  that  one  half  of  the  banks,  in  numbers,  and 
amount  of  capital,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  other  corporations,  might  be  forth 
with  placed  in  commission,  should  the  measure  be  adopted  ;  which,  including 
debts,  credits,  capital,  and  assets,  would  amount  at  least  to  seven  or  eight  hun 
dred  millions  ;  all  to  be  converted  into  cash,  and  distributed  among  those  enti 
tled  to  it.  How  is  this  to  be  done  ?  Where  is  the  cash  to  be  had  at  such  a 
period  as  this,  particularly  when  one  half  of  the  banks  would  be  closed,  and 
their  notes,  equalling  one  half  of  the  present  scanty  supply  of  currency,  would 


398  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

cease  to  circulate  ?     What  sacrifices,  what  insolvencies,  what  beggary,  what 
frauds,  what  desolation  and  ruin  would  follow ! 

But  would  the  calamity  fall  with  equal  vengeance  on  all  the  land,  or  would 
there  be  some  favoured,  exempted  portion,  while  desolation  would  overshadow 
the  residue  ?  Let  the  document*  which  I  hold  answer.  It  is  a  communica 
tion  from  the  President,  transmitting  a  report  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  this  body,  dated  the  8th  of  January  last,  containing  a  list  of  the  suspended 
and  non-suspended  banks  of  last  year,  arranged  according  to  states,  beginning 
with  Maine.  I  find,  on  turning  to  the  document,  that  there  are  nine  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  banks,  including  branches,  in  the  Union  ;  of  which  five  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  are  in  New-England  and  New-York.  Of  this  number,  but  sev 
en  are  suspended,  if  Rhode  Island  be  excepted.  Her  banks  all  suspended,  but 
I  understand  have  since  resumed.  The  senator  near  me  from  that  state  (Mr. 
Knight)  can  answer  whether  such  is  the  fact. 

[Mr.  Knight  assented.] 

There  are,  then,  sir,  in  New-England  and  New- York  five  hundred  and  thirty- 
one  banks  which  are  not  suspended,  and  but  seven  that  are.  Now,  sir,  if  we 
cross  the  Hudson,  and  cast  our  eyes  South  and  West,  we  shall  find  the  oppo 
site  state  of  things.  We  shall  find  there  four  hundred  and  twenty-one  banks,  of 
which  three  hundred  and  sixty-eight  suspended  in  whole  or  part,  and  fifty-three 
not.  It  is  probable  that  the  present  proportion  is  still  more  unfavourable. 

Can  we  doubt,  with  these  facts,  where  the  storm  will  rage  with  all  its  deso 
lating  fury  ?  Is  there  any  one  so  credulous  as  to  believe  that  any  one  of  the 
suspended  banks  throughout  that  vast  region,  or  many  of  the  non-suspended, 
under  the  panic  which  the  passage  of  the  act  would  cause,  could  meet  their 
debts,  and  thereby  escape  the  penalties  of  the  act?  And,  if  not,  is  there  any 
one  here  prepared  to  place  at  once  all  the  banks  south  and  west  of  New-York, 
with  few  exceptions,  in  the  hands  of  assignees,  under  the  jurisdiction  and  con 
trol  of  the  federal  courts  ?  Is  there  any  willing  that  their  doors  should  be  all 
at  once  closed ;  their  notes  cease  to  circulate ;  their  affairs  wound  up  ;  their 
debts  to  and  from  them  to  be  forthwith  collected  ;  their  property  and  assets  con 
verted  into  money  by  federal  officers,  acting  under  federal  authority,  and  all  that 
might  be  left  from  plunder,  fraud,  and  forced  sales,  distributed  among  creditors  ? 
And  how,  I  ask,  is  so  mighty  a  concern,  amounting,  in  the  aggregate,  certainly 
to  not  less  than  five  or  six  hundred  millions  of  dollars,  to  be  at  once  wound  up  ? 
Where  is  the  money  to  be  found  to  pay  the  debts  to  and  from  the  banks,  and 
to  purchase  the  vast  amount  of  property  held  by  them  and  their  debtors,  which 
must  be  brought  at  once  under  the  hammer  ?  Where  found,  after  their  notes 
have  ceased  to  circulate  (as  they  would,  as  soon  as  process  of  bankruptcy  is  ta 
ken  out  against  them),  and  before  specie  could  come  in  to  supply  their  place  ? 
Were  it  possible  to  carry  through  the  measure,  it  would  spread  unheard-of  de 
struction  and  desolation  through  the  vast  portion  of  the  Union  on  which  the 
blow  would  fall ;  such  as  the  marching  of  hostile  armies  from  one  extremity  to 
another,  the  sweep  of  tornadoes,  the  outpouring  of  floods,  or  the  withholding 
from  the  parched  and  thirsty  earth  the  fertilizing  droppings  of  the  clouds,  would 
give  but  a  faint  conception.  But  it  would  be  impossible.  If  you  were  to  adopt 
the  measure,  you  would  ordain  what  would  not,  could  not,  be  executed.  Pub 
lic  indignation  would  paralyze  the  hand  of  the  grasping  creditor  stretched  to 
execute  it,  and  sweep  your  act  from  the  statute-book  ere  it  could  be  enforced. 

I  turn  now  from  the  immediate  effects  of  the  measure,  were  it  possible  to 
carry  it  into  effect,  to  inquire  what  would  be  its  permanent,  if  adopted.  Its  first 
effect,  after  the  desolating  storm  had  passed  over,  would  be  to  centralize  the 
control  over  all  the  banks  that  might  be  spared,  or  thereafter  chartered,  in  the 
banks  located  where  the  public  revenue  would  be  principally  collected  and  dis- 

*  No.  72  of  the  Senate,  present  session. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  399 

bursed  ;  and  where  that  would  be  I  need  not  say.  The  reason  is  obvious. 
The  fiscal  action  of  the  government  would  keep  the  exchanges  steadily  and  per 
manently  in  its  favour.  Now,  sir,  every  man  of  business  knows  that  the  banks 
located  at  the  point  where  exchanges  are  permanently  favourable  can  control 
those  where  they  are  unfavourable.  The  reason  is  obvious.  The  former  can 
draw  on  the  latter  with  profit ;  and,  through  their  draughts,  command  their  specie 
or  notes  at  pleasure,  while  the  reverse  is  the  case  with  the  latter.  Hence,  the 
consequence  would  be  control  on  one  side  and  dependance  on  the  other,  in 
creasing  with  the  increasing  amount  of  collection  and  disbursements,  which, 
by  their  absorbing  character,  would  draw  with  them  the  imports  and  exports, 
with  an  increased  control  over  the  exchanges.  Add  to  this  the  power  which 
this  measure  would  place  in  the  hands  of  the  banks  at  the  favoured  points,  and 
I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting  that  it  would  at  all  times  be  in  their  power  to  crush, 
by  a  sudden  and  unexpected  run,  the  banks  elsewhere,  which  might  incur  their 
displeasure,  with  greater  ease,  and  more  effectually,  than  the  late  United  States 
Bank,  in  its  most  palmy  days,  ever  could. 

The  next  permanent  effect  would  be,  to  place  the  whole  banking  system  un 
der  the  control  of  this  government.  It  would  hold  over  the  banks  the  power 
of  life  and  death.  The  process  of  bankruptcy  against  an  incorporation  is  but 
another  name  for  its  death-warrant.  It  would  givejfcidth  the  power  of  destroy 
ing,  that  of  regulating  them,  without  regard  to  their  chartered  rights.  The  same 
bold  construction  that  would  authorize  Congress  to  subject  them  to  a  bankrupt 
law,  would  give  it  the  power  to  determine  at  pleasure  what  shall  or  shall  not 
constitute  acts  of  bankruptcy ;  by  which  it  might  limit  the  extent  of  their  busi 
ness,  fix  the  proportion  of  specie  to  liability,  and  make  it  a  condition  for  one 
dollar  in  circulation,  there  should  be  a  dollar  in  their  vaults.  The  possession 
of  such  a  power  would  give  Congress  more  unlimited  control  over  the  banks 
than  that  which  the  states  that  incorporated  them  possess,  or  which  you  would 
possess  over  a  Bank  of  the  United  States  chartered  by  yourselves.  Your  pow 
er  over  such  an  institution,  and  the  states  over  their  own  banks,  would  be  lim 
ited  by  the  acts  of  incorporation  ;  while  yours  over  the  banks  of  the  states,  with 
the  bankrupt  power  in  your  hands,  would  be  without  any  other  limitation  except 
your  discretion. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  complete  subjugation  of  the  state  banks  to  your  will 
would  be  the  result  of  such  unlimited  control ;  and  not  less  easy  that,  with  their 
subjugation,  the  conflict  between  this  government  and  the  banks  would  cease,  to 
be  followed  by  a  close  and  perpetual  alliance.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  govern 
ments  to  wage  war  with  whatever  is  opposed  to  its  will,  and  to  take  under  pro 
tection  that  which  it  has  subdued  ;  nor  would  the  banks  be  found  to  be  an  ex 
ception.  They  would  be  forced  to  conciliate  the  good-will  of  the  government, 
on  which  both  their  safety  and  profit  would  depend  ;  and  in  no  way  could  they 
more  effectually  do  that  than  by  upholding  its  power  and  authority.  They 
would  be  thus  forced,  by  the  .strongest  appeals  to  both  their  fear  and  hope,  into 
the  political  arena,  with  their  immense  power  and  influence,  and  to  take  an  ac 
tive  and  decided  part  in  all  the  party  strifes  of  the  day,  throwing  their  weight 
always  on  the  side  which  their  safety  and  profit  might  dictate.  The  end  would 
be  the  very  reverse  of  that  for  which  we,  who  are  in  favour  of  a  divorce  of  gov 
ernment  and  banks,  have  been  contending  for  the  last  three  years.  Instead  of 
divorce,  there  would  be  union ;  instead  of  excluding  the  banks  from  the  politi 
cal  struggles  of  the  day,  they  would  be  forced  to  be  active  and  zealous  partisans 
in  self-defence ;  and,  instead  of  leaving  the  banks  to  the  control  of  the  states, 
from  which  they  derive  their  charters,  you  would  assume  over  them  a  control 
more  powerful  and  unlimited  than  has  ever  been  before  exercised  over  them  by 
this  government,  either  through  the  pet-banks  or  a  National  Bank.  This  control 
would  be  the  greatest  at  the  principal  points  of  collection  and  disbursement — 
the  very  point  where  that  of  the  local  banks  would  be  the  greatest  over  all  oth- 


400  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ers.  It  follows  that  the  government  would  have  the  most  decisive  and  complete 
control  over  those  that  would  control  all  others  ;  and,  by  lending  their  power 
ful  aid  and  influence  to  maintain  their  control,  would,  in  reality,  control  the 
whole  banking  system  ;  thus  making,  in  effect,  the  banks  at  the  favoured  points 
the  National  Bank,  and  the  rest  virtually  but  branches.  If  to  this  we  add  the 
control  which  it  would  give  over  the  other  and  powerful  corporations  enumera 
ted  in  the  amendment,  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  the  measure,  if  adopted, 
would  do  more  to  increase  the  power  of  this  government,  and  diminish  that  of 
the  states — to  strengthen  the  cause  of  consolidation,  and  weaken  that  of  state 
rights — than  any  which  has  ever  been  assumed  by  Congress. 

Having  pointed  out  the  consequences,  I  now  demand,  in  the  name  of  the 
Constitution,  what  right  has  Congress  to  extend  a  bankrupt  act  over  the  incor 
porated  institutions  of  the  states,  and  thereby  seize  on  this  immense  power? 
The  burden  of  proof  is  on  those  who  claim  the  right,  and  not  on  us,  who  op 
pose  it.  I  repeat,  ours  is  a  government  of  limited  powers  ;  and  those  who  claim 
to  exercise  a  power  must  show  the  grant — a  clear  and  certain  grant,  in  case 
of  a  power  so  pregnant  with  consequences  as  this. 

I  ask,  then,  those  who  claim  this  power,  On  what  grounds  do  they  place  it  ? 
Do  they  rest  it  on  the  nature  of  the  power,  as  being  peculiarly  applicable  to 
banks,  and  the  other  corpo^tions  proposed  to  be  embraced  ?  If  so,  frail  is  the 
foundation.  Never  was  power  more  unsuited  to  its  object — so  much  so,  that 
language  itself  has  to  be  forced  and  perverted  to  make  it  applicable.  Taking 
corporations  in  their  proper  sense,  as  bodies  politic,  and  there  is  scarcely  a  sin 
gle  portion  of  the  whole  process,  beginning  with  the  acts  of  bankruptcy,  and 
extending  to  the  final  discharge,  applicable  to  them.  What  one  of  the  numer 
ous  acts  of  bankruptcy  can  they  commit  ?  Can  they  depart  from  the  state,  or 
be  arrested,  or  be  imprisoned,  or  escape  from  prison,  or,  in  a  word,  commit  any 
one  of  the  acts  without  which  an  individual  cannot  be  made  a  bankrupt  ?  No  ; 
but  they  may  stop  payment,  and  thereby  subject  themselves  to  the  act.  True  ;  but 
how  is  the  process  to  be  carried  through  ?  The  provision  requires  the  bank 
rupt  to  be  sworn  :  can  you  swear  corporations  ?  It  requires  divers  acts  to  be 
done  by  the  bankrupt,  under  the  penalty  of  imprisonment :  can  you  imprison  a 
corporation  ?  It  directs  a  discharge  to  be  given  to  the  bankrupt,  which  ex 
empts  his  person  and  future  acquisitions  :  can  a  corporation  receive  the  benefit 
of  such  discharge  ?  No  :  the  process  itself  is  the  dissolution,  the  death  of  the 
corporation.  It  is  thus  that  language  is  forced,  strained,  and  distorted,  in  order 
to  bring  a  power  so  inapplicable  to  the  subject  to  bear  on  corporations.  It 
would  be  just  as  rational  to  include  corporations  in  insolvent  laws,  which  none 
has  been,  as  yet,  so  absurd  as  to  think  of  doing. 

The  right,  then,  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  nature  of  the  power.  On  what, 
then,  can  it  stand  ?  On  precedents  ?  I  admit  that  if,  at  the  period  of  the  adop 
tion  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  the  practice  to  include  corporations  in  acts  of 
bankruptcy,  it  would  go  far  to  establish  that  it  was  intended  by  the  Constitution 
to  include  them.  But  the  reverse  is  the  fact.  As  long  as  the  system  has  been 
in  operation,  there  is  not  a  case  where  a  corporation  was  ever  included,  either 
in  England,  this  country,  or  any  other,  as  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  nor  ever 
proposed  to  be.  The  attempt  in  this  case  is  a  perfect  novelty,  without  prece 
dent  or  example  ;  and  all  the  force  which  it  is  acknowledged  the  practice  of 
including  them  would  have  given  in  favour  of  the  right,  is  thus  thrown  with  a 
weight  equally  decisive  against  it. 

But  we  have  not  yet  approached  the  real  difficulty.  If  the  power  was  ever 
so  appropriate,  and  the  only  one  that  was — if  precedents  were  innumerable — it 
would  only  prove  that  this  government  would  have  the  right  of  applying  the 
power  to  incorporations  of  its  own  creating.  It  coiild  not  go  an  inch  beyond, 
and  would  leave  the  great  difficulty  untouched — the  right  of  Congress  to  include 
estate  corporations  in  an  act  of  bankruptcy  passed  by  its  authority!  Where 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  401 

is  such  a  power  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution  ?  It  seems  to  be  forgotten  that 
this  and  the  state  governments  are  co-ordinate  governments,  emanating  from 
the  same  authority,  and  making  together  one  complex,  but  harmonious  and  beau 
tiful  system,  in  which  each,  within  its  allotted  sphere,  is  independent  and  coequal 
with  the  other.  If  one  has  a  right  to  create,  the  other  cannot  have  the  right  to 
destroy.  The  principle  has  been  carried  so  far,  that  in  the  case  of  the  State 
of  Maryland  and  M'Colough,  the  Supreme  Court,  after  elaborate  argument, 
decided  that  a  state,  in  the  exercise  of  its  undoubted  right  of  taxing,  could  not 
tax  a  Branch  Bank  of  the  United  States,  located  in  its  limits,  on  the  ground  that 
the  right  of  taxing,  in  such  case,  involved  the  right  of  destroying.  Admit,  then, 
Congress  had  the  right  to  include  corporations  of  its  own  creation,  still,  accord 
ing  to  the  principle  thus  recognised,  it  could  not  include  those  created  by  the 
states,  unless,  indeed,  the  fundamental  principle  of  our  system,  admitted  even 
by  the  extreme  consolidation  school  of  politics,  that  each  government  is  co 
equal  and  independent  within  its  sphere,  should  be  denied,  and  the  absolute 
sovereignty  of  this  government  be  assumed.  If,  then,  the  states  have  a  right 
to  create  banks,  and  other  corporations  enumerated  in  the  amendment,  it  follows 
that  Congress  has  not  the  right  to  destroy  them  ;  nor,  of  course,  to  include  them 
in  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  the  very  operation  of  which,  when  applied  to  corpora 
tions,  is  to  destroy.  But  whether  they  have  or  have  not  the  right,  belongs  not 
to  Congress  to  decide.  The  right  of  the  separate  legislatures  of  the  states  to 
decide  on  their  reserved  powers  is  as  perfect  as  that  of  Congress  to  decide  on 
the  delegated.  Each  must  judge  for  itself  in  carrying  out  its  powers.  To 
deny  this,  would  be  virtually  to  give  a  veto  to  Congress  over  the  acts  of  the 
state  legislatures — a  power  directly  refused  by  the  Convention,  though  anxious 
ly  pressed  by  the  national  party  in  that  body. 

Such  and  so  conclusive  is  the  argument  against  the  right ;  and  how  has  it 
been  met  ?     We  are  told  that  the  states  have  greatly  abused  the  power  of  in 
corporation.     I  admit  it.  •  The  power  has  been  sadly  and  dangerously  abused. 
I  stand  not  here  to  defend  banks  or  other  incorporations-,  or  to  justify  the  states 
in  granting  charters.     No :  my  object  is  far  different     I  have  risen  to  defend 
the  Constitution,  and  to  resist  the  inroads  on  the  Bights  of  the  states.     In  the 
discharge  of  that  duty,  I  ask,  Can  the  abuse  of  tb-  right  of  granting  bank  or  oth 
er  charters  give  you  the  right  to  destroy  or  reflate  them  ?     Are,  you  ready  to 
admit  the  same  rule,  as  applied  to  your  own  powers  ?     Have  the  state  legis 
latures  abused  their  powers  more  than  Congress  has  its  powers  ?     Has  it  not 
abused,  and  grossly  abused,  its  powers  of  laying  taxes  and  appropriating  mon 
ey  ?     And  what  assurance  is  there,  vrth  these  examples  before  us,  that  Con 
gress  would  not  equally  abuse  the  rght  of  controlling  state  corporations,  which 
is  so  eagerly  sought  to  be  vested  in  it  by  some  ?     But  we  are  also  told  that 
bank  paper — worthless,  irredeemable  bank  paper — has  deranged  the  currency, 
and  ought  to  be  suppressed.     I  admit  the  fact.     I  acknowledge  the  mischief, 
but  object  to  the  remedy,  apd  the  right  of  applying  it.     I  go  farther.     If  the  evil 
could  give  us  the  right  to  apply  any  of  our  powers  to  remedy  it,  regardless  of 
the  Constitution,  the  taxing  power  would  be  far  more  simple,  efficient,  and  less 
mischievous  in  its  application.     It  would  be  applied  to  the  specific  evil.     That 
which  has  deranged  the  currency,  and  defeated  the  object  of  the  Constitution  in 
relation  to  it,  is  the  circulation  of  bank-notes.     There  lies  the  evil,  and  to  divest 
f  the  banks  of  the  right  of  circulation  is  to  eradicate  it.     For  that  purpose,  what 
remedy  could  be  more  simple,  safe,  and  efficacious  than  the  taxing  power,  were 
it  constitutional  ?     By  its  means,  bank-notes  might  be  gradually  and  quietly  sup 
pressed,  and  the  banks  left  in  full  possession  of  all  their  other  functions  unim 
paired.     There  is  but  one  objection  to  it,  but  that  a  decisive  one — its  unconsti 
tutionally.     It  would  be  a  perversion  of  the  taxing  power,  given  to  raise  reve 
nue.     To  apply  it  to  suppress  or  regulate  the  circulation  of  bank-notes  would  be 
to  CHANGE  ITS  NATURE  ENTIRELY,  from  a  TAXING  to  a  PENAL  power,  and  is 

E  E  E 


402  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

therefore  unconstitutional ;  but  not  more  so  than  to  include  banks  and  other  cor 
porations  in  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  as  proposed  by  the  amendment,  while  in  every 
other  respect  it  would  be  greatly  preferable. 

One  other  ground  still  remains  to  be  considered.     The  authority  of  influen 
tial  names  has  been  resorted  to,  in  order  to  supply  the  defect  of  argument.    The 
names  of  two  distinguished  individuals,  who  formerly  filled  the  treasury  de 
partment,  have  been  introduced — Mr.  Dallas  and  Mr.  Crawford — in  favour  of 
the  right  of  including  banks.     If  this  was  a  question  to  be  decided  by  authority, 
it  would  be  easy  to  show  that  their  opinions,  as  able  as  they  were,  would  be 
entitled  to  little  weight  in  this  case.     It  was  casually  and  incidentally  given  in 
a  report  on  another  subject,  and  that  calculated  to  lead  them  to  an  erroneous 
view  in  reference  to  this  power.     Such  an  opinion,  given  under  such  circum 
stances,  by  the  ablest  judge,  would  have  little  weight  in  a  private  case,  even  in 
a  court  of  justice,  and  ought  to  have  none  in  this  body  on  a  great  constitutional 
question.     Besides,  it  is  well  known  that  the  opinion  of  both  was  in  favour  of 
the  constitutionality  of  a  National  Bank,  and  that,  too,  after  a  full  and  deliberate 
consideration  of  the  subject.     Now,  sir,  I  put  the  question  to  the  senators  who 
have  quoted  their  casual  opinion  in  favour  of -the  constitutionality  of  including 
banks  in  a  bankrupt  law,  Are  they  willing  to  adopt  their  well-considered  and 
solemnly  delivered  opinion  in  favour  of  the  right  to  incorporate  a  bank  ?     And 
if  not,  how,  on  the  ground  of  precedent,  can  they  adopt  the  one  and  reject  the 
other  1     The  names  of  other  distinguished  individuals  have  been  quoted — Ran 
dolph,  Macon,  White,  Smith,  and  others — but,  in  my  opinion,  unfairly  quoted. 
It  is  true,  they  voted  in  1827,  when  the  Bankrupt  Bill  was  then  before  the  Sen 
ate,  in  favour  of  an  amendment  to  include  the  banks ;  but  it  is  equally  so,  that 
the  amendment  was  moved  at  the  end  of  a  loug  debate,  when  the  Senate  was 
exhausted,  and  that  it  was  but  slightly  discussed.     But,  what  is  of  more  im 
portance,  they  were  opposed  to  the  bill ;  and,  as  the  amendment  came  from  a 
hostile  quarter,  and  was  clearly  intended  to  embarrass-  the  bill,  it  is  not  improb 
able  that  it  received  tht  votes  of  many  with  the  view  of  destroying  the  bill, 
without  thinking  whether  *.  was  constitutional  or  hot ;  just  as  some,  no  doubt, 
will  vote  against  the  opposite  amendment,  to  strike  the  banks  out,  now  under 
consideration,  from  the  belief  v^at  it  is  the  most  effectual  means  of  destroying 
this  bill.     But.if  the  question  is  to  be  decided  by  weight  of  names,  and  the  vote 
on  the  occasion  to  be  the  test,  the  weight  is  clearly  on  the  opposite  side.    The 
vote  stood  12  to  include  the  banks,  and  35  against ;  and  among  the  latter  will  be 
found  names  not  less  influential— that  of  Tazewell,  Rowan,  Hayne,  Berrien,the 
present  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and,  finally,  that  of  the  present  chief  magis 
trate.     But  why  attempt  to  decide  this  question  by  the  weight  of  names,  how 
ever  distinguished  ?     Do  we  not  know  that  ail  those  referred  to  belonged  to  the 
political  school  which  utterly  repudiates  the  authority  of  precedents  in  constru 
ing  the  Constitution,  and  who,  if  they  were  now  all  alive,  and  here  present  as 
members  of  the  Senate,  would  not  regard  the  name  of  any  man  in  deciding  this 
important  constitutional  question  ? 

I  have  now  presented  the  result  of  my  reflections  on  this  important  measure. 
To  sum  up  the  whole  in  a  few  words,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  whole  proj 
ect,  including  the  bill  and  the  amendment,  is  unconstitutional,  except  the 
provisions  embracing  compulsory  bankruptcy,  as  it  is  called,  as  far  as  it  relates 
to  individuals  ;  and  that,  under  existing  circumstances,  to  be  highly  inexpedient. 
Thus  thinking,  I  shall  vote,  in  the  first  instance,  against  striking  out  the  bill 
aud  inserting  the  amendment ;  and,  if  that  succeeds,  against  the  bill  itself. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  403 

XXVII. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    PROSPECTIVE    PRE-EMPTION   BILL,    JANUARY    12,    1841. 

THE  bill  to  establish  a  permanent  prospective  pre-emption  system  in 
favour  of  settlers  on  the  public  lands,  who  shall  inhabit  and  cultivate  the 
same,  and  raise  a  log  cabin  thereon,  being  the  special  order  of  the  day, 
was  taken  up,  the  question  being  on  the  proposition  by  Mr.  Crittenden  to 
recommit  the  bill,  with  instructions  to  report  a  bill  to  distribute  the  pro 
ceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  among  the  states  j  which  Mr.  Cal- 
houn  offered  to  amend,  by  substituting  a  bill  to  cede  the  public  lands  to 
the  states  in  which  they  lie,  upon  certain  conditions. 

Mr.  Calhoun  said  :  I  regard  the  question  of  the  public  lands,  next  to 
that  of  the  currency,  the  most  dangerous  and  difficult  of  all  which  de 
mand  the  attention  of  the  country  and  the  government  at  this  important 
juncture  of  our  affairs.  I  do  not  except  a  protective  tariff,  for  I  cannot 
believe,  after  what  we  have  experienced,  that  a  measure  can  again  be 
adopted  which  has  done  more  to  corrupt  the  morals  of  the  country,  pub 
lic  and  private,  to  disorder  its  currency,  derange  its  business,  and  to 
weaken  and  endanger  its  free  institutions,  than  any  other  except  the  pa 
per  system,  with  which  it  is  so  intimately  allied. 

In  offering  the  amendment  1  propose,  I  do  not  intend  to  controvert  the 
justice  of  the  eulogium  which  has  been  so  often  pronounced  on  our  land 
system  in  the  course  of  this  discussion.  On  the  contrary,  I  believe  that 
it  was  admirably  adjusted  to  effect  its  object,  when  first  adopted  ;  but  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  measure,  to  be  perfect,  must  be  adapted  to 
circumstances,  and  that  great  changes  have  taken  place,  in  the  lapse  of 
fifty  years,  since  the  adoption  of  our  land  system.  At  that  time,  the  vast 
region  now  covered  by  the  new  states,  which  have  grown  up  on  the  pub 
lic  domain,  belonged  to  foreign  powers,  or  was  occupied  by  numerous 
Indian  tribes,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  sparse  settlements  on  the  in 
considerable  tracts  to  which  the  title  of  the  Indians  was  at  that  time  ex 
tinguished.  Since  then  a  mighty  change  has  taken  place.  Nine  states 
have  sprung  up  as  if  by  magic,  with  a  population  not  less,  probably,  than 
two  fifths  of  the  old  states,  and  destined  to  surpass  them  in  a  few  years 
in  numbers,  power,  and  influence.  That  a  change  so  mighty  should  so 
derange  a  system  intended  tor:  an  entirely  different  condition  of  things  as 
to  render  important  changes  necessary  to  adapt  it  to  present  circum 
stances,  is  no  more  than  might  have  been  anticipated.  It  would,  indeed, 
have  been  a  miracle  had  it  been  otherwise  ;  and  we  ought  not,  therefore, 
to  be  surprised  that  the  operation  of  the  system  should  afford  daily  evi 
dence  that  it  not  only  deranged,  but  deeply  deranged,  and  that  its  derange 
ment  is  followed  by  a  train  of  evils  that  threaten  disaster,  unless  a  timely 
ancl  efficient  remedy  should  be  applied.  I  would  ask  those  who  think 
differently,  and  who  believe  the  system  still  continues  to  work  well,  Was 
it  no  evil,  that  session  after  session,  for  the  last  ten  or  twelve  years, 
Congress  should  be  engaged  in  angry  and  deeply  agitating  discussions, 
growing  out  of  the  public  lands,  in  which  one  side  should  be  denounced 
as  the  friends,  and  the  other  as  the  enemies,  of  the  new  states  1  Was  the 
increasing  violence  of  this  agitation  from  year  to  year,  and  threatening 
ultimately,  not  only  the  loss  of  the  public  domain,  but  the  tranquillity  and 
peace  of  the  country,  no  evil  1  Is  it  well  that  one  third  of  the  time  of  Coiv 
gress  should  be  consumed  in  legislating  on  subjects  directly  or  indirectly 
connected  with  the  public  lands,  thereby  prolonging  the  sessions  proper 
tionally,  and  adding  to  the  expense  upward  of  $200,000  annually  1.  Is  ' 


404  .   SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

no  evil  that  the  government  should  own  half  the  lands  within  the  limits 
of  nine  members  of  this  Union,  and  over  which  they  can  exercise  no  au 
thority  or  control  1  Is  it  nothing  that  the  domain  of  so  many  states 
should  be  under  the  exclusive  legislation  and  guardianship  of  this  govern 
ment,  contrary  to  the  genius  of  the  Constitution,  which,  intending  to 
leave  to  each  state  the  regulation  of  its  local  and  peculiar  concerns,  dele 
gated  to  the  Union  those  only  in  which  all  had  a  common  interest  1  If  to 
all  these  be  added  the  vast  amount  of  patronage  exercised  by  this  govern 
ment  through  the  medium  of  the  public  lands  over  the  new  states,  and 
through  them  over  the  whole  Union,  and  the  pernicious  influence  there 
by  brought  to  bear  on  all  other  subjects  of  le'gislation,  can  it  be  denied 
that  many  and  great  evils  result  from  the  system  as  it  now  operates, 
which  call  aloud  for  some  speedy  and  efficient  remedy  1 

But  why  should  I  look  beyond  the  question  before  us  to  prove,  by  the 
confession  of  all,  that  there  is  some  deep  disorder  in  the  system  1  There 
are  now  three  measures  before  the  Senate,  each  proposing  important 
changes,  and  the  one  or  the  other  receiving  the  support  of  every  mem 
ber  of  the  body ;  even  of  those  who  cry  out  against  changes.  It  is  too 
late,  then,  to  deny  the  disordered  state  of  the  system.  The  disease  is 
admitted,  and  the  only  question  is,  What  remedy  shall  be  applied  1 

I  object  both  to  the  bill  and  the  amendment  proposed  by  the  senator  from 
Kentucky  (Mr.  Crittenden),  because,  regarded  as  remedial  measures,  they 
are  both  inappropriate  and  inadequate.  Neither  pre-emption,  nor  distri 
bution  of  the  revenue  received  from  the  public  lands,  can  have  any  pos 
sible  effect  in  correcting  the  disordered  action  of  the  system.  I  put  the 
question,  Would  one  or  the  other  contribute  in  the  smallest  degree  to  di 
minish  the  patronage  of  the  government,  dr  the  time  consumed  on  ques 
tions  growing  out  of  the  public  lands,  or  shorten  the  duration  of  the  ses 
sions,  or  withdraw  the  action  of  the  government  over  so  large  a  part  of 
the  domain  of  the  new  states,  and  place  them  and  their  representatives 
here  on  the  same  independent  footing  with  the  old  states  and  their  rep 
resentatives,  or  arrest  the  angry  and  agitating  discussions  which  year 
after  year  distract  our  councils,  and  threaten  so  much  mischief  to  the 
country  1  Far  otherwise  would  be  the  effect.  It  would  but  increase  the 
evil,  by  bringing  into  more  decided  conflict  the  interests  of  the  new  and  old 
states.  Of  all  the  ills  that  could  befall  them,  the  former  would  regard  the 
distribution  as  the  greatest,  while  the  latter  vould  look  on  the  pre-emp 
tion  system,  proposed  by  the  bill,  as  little  short  of  an  open  system  of 
plunder,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  declarations  w^ich  we  have  heard  in 
the  course  of  the  debate. 

As,  then,  neither  can  correct  the  disease,  the  question  is,  What  remedy 
can  1  I  have  given  to  this  question  the  most  deliberate  and  careful  ex 
amination,  and  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is,  and  can  be,  no 
remedy  short  of  cession — cession  to  the  states  respectively  within  which 
the  lands  are  situated.  The  disease  lies  in  ownership  and  administration, 
and  nothing  short  of  parting  with  both  can  reach  it.  Part  with  them,  and 
you  will  at  once  take  away  one  third  of  the  business  of  Congress  ;  shorten 
its  sessions  in  the  same  proportion,  with  a  corresponding  saving  of  ex 
pense  ;  lop  off  a  large  and  most  dangerous  portion  of  the  patronage  of 
the  government  5  arrest  these  angry  and  agitating  discussions,  which  do 
so  much  to  alienate  the  good  feelings  of  the  different  portions  of  the 
Union,  and  disturb  the  general  course  of  legislation,  and  endanger,  ulti 
mately,  the  loss  of  the  public  domain.  Retain  them,  and  they  must  con 
tinue,  almost  without  mitigation,  apply  what  palliatives  you  may.  It  is 
the  all-sufficient  and  only  remedy. 

Thus  far  would  seem  clear.     I  do  not  see  how  it  is  possible  for  any 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  405 

one  to  doubt  that  cession  would  reach  the  evil,  and  that  it  is  the  only 
remedy  that  would.  If,  then,  there  should  be  any  objection,  it  can  only 
be  to  the  terms  or  conditions  of  the  cession.  If  these  can  be  so  adjusted 
as  to  give  assurance  that  the  lands  shall  be  as  faithfully  managed  by  the 
states  as  by  this  government,  and  that  all  the  interests  involved  shall  be 
as  well,  or  better  secured  than  under  the  existing  system,  all  that  could 
be  desired  would  be  effected,  and  all  objections  removed  to  the  final  and 
quiet  settlement  of  this  great,  vexed,  and  dangerous  question.  In  saying 
all  objections,  I  hold  that  the  right  of  disposing  of  them  as  proposed, 
especially  when  demanded  by  high  considerations  of  policy,  and  when  it 
can  be  done  without  pecuniary  loss  to  the  government,  as  I  shall  here 
after  show,  cannot  be  fairly  denied.  The  Constitution  gives  to  Congress 
the  unlimited  right  of  disposing  of  the  public  domain,  and,  of  course, 
without  any  other  restrictions  than  what  the  nature  of  that  trust  and  terms 
of  cession  may  impose  j  neither  of  which  forbids  their  cession  in  the  man 
ner  proposed. 

That  the  conditions  can  be  so  adjusted,  I  cannot  doubt.  I  have  care 
fully  examined  the  whole  ground,  and  can  perceive  no  difficulty  that  can 
not  be  surmounted.  I  feel  assured  that  all  which  is  wanting  is  to  attract 
the  attention  of  the  Senate  to  the  vast  importance  of  doing  something 
that  will  effectually  arrest  the  great  and  growing  evil,  resulting  from  the 
application  of  the  system,  as  it  exists,  to  that  portion  of  the  public  do 
main  lying  in  the  new  states.  That  done,  the  intelligence  and  wisdom 
of  the  body  will  be  at  no  loss  to  adjust  the  details  in  such  manner  as  will 
effectually  guard  every  interest,  and  secure  its  steady  and  faithful  man 
agement. 

In  the  mean  time,  I  have  adopted  the  provisions  of  the  bill  introduced 
originally  by  myself,  and  twice  reported  on  favourably  by  the  Committee 
on  Public  Lands,  as  the  amendment  I  intend  to  offer  to  the  amendment 
of  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Crittenden),  as  containing  the  general 
outlines  of  the  conditions  and  provisions  on  which  the  lands  may  be  dis 
posed  of  to  the  states  with  safety  and  advantage  to  the  interest  of  the 
government  and  the  Union,  and  great  benefit  to  those  states.  The  details 
may,  no  doubt,  be  greatly  improved ;  for  which  I  rely  on  the  intelligence 
of  the  body  and  critical  examination  of  the  committee,  should  the  amend 
ment  be  adopted  and  referred.  At  the  present  stage,  I  regard  nothing 
but  the  great  principles  on  which  it  rests,  and  its  outlines,  to  be  at  issue ; 
and  I  do  hope  that  all  who  may  concur  with  me  on  principle  will  give 
the  amendment  their  support,  whatever  imperfection  they  may  suppose  to 
exist  in  its  modifications.  A  measure  relating  to  a  question  so  vast  and 
complicated  can  be  perfected  in  its  details,  however  sound  the  principles 
on  which  it  rests,  or  correct  its  general  outlines,  only  by  the  joint  con 
sultation  and  counsel.  With  these  remarks,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for 
me,  at  this  stage,  to  give  more  than  a  general  summary  of  the  provisions 
of  the  proposed  amendment. 

Its  object  is  to  instruct  the  committee  so  to  amend  the  bill  as  to  dis 
pose  of  all  the  public  lands  lying  in  the  states  of  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Mis 
sissippi,  Arkansas,  Missouri,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Ohio,  and  Indiana,  with 
the  exception  of  sites  for  forts,  navy  and  dock  yards,  arsenals,  magazines, 
and  other  public  buildings ;  the  cession  not  to  take  place  till  after  the 
30th  of  June,  1842,  and  then  only  on  the  states  respectively  agreeing  to 
the  conditions  prescribed  in  the  amendment ;  that  is,  to  pass  acts  irrev 
ocably  to  adhere  to  those  conditions,  the  most  prominent  of  which  is  to 
pay  annually,  on  a  day  fixed,  to  the  United  States  sixty-five  per  cent,  of 
the  gross  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  lands;  that  the  land  laws,  as  they 
BLOW  stand,  and  as  proposed  to  be  modified  by  the  amendment,  shall  re- 


406  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

main  unchanged,  except  with  the  consent  of  Congress ;  that  the  cession 
shall  be  in  full  of  the  five  per  cent,  fund  thereafter  to  accrue  to  those  states ; 
that  they  shall  be  exclusively  liable  for  the  cost  of  surveys,  sales,  extinc 
tion  of  Indian  titles,  and  management  generally ;  that  the  states  may, 
within  certain  prescribed  limits,  gradually  reduce  the  price  of  the  lands 
that  may  remain  unsold  after  having  been  offered  for  sale  ten  years  or 
upward ;  may  grant,  for  a  limited  period,  the  right  of  pre-emption  for 
ninety  days  to  the  actual  settlers,  at  each  step  in  the  reduction  of  price  j 
and,  finally,  that  if  the  conditions  of  cession  be  violated  by  a  state  in  any 
particular,  all  titles  or  grants  to  land  thereafter  sold  by  the  state  to  be 
null  and  void  :  thus  giving  the  measure  the  force  and  solemnity  of  a  com 
pact,  and  placing  the  whole  under  the  protection  of  the  courts,  which 
would  pronounce  the  titles  to  be  void  if  made  after  an  infraction  of  the 
conditions  of  the  cession. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  go  into  an  investigation  of  these  various  con 
ditions  at  this  time.  On  a  question  of  reference,  where  the  principle 
only  is  at  issue,  it  is  not  necessary.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  lead 
ing  object  is  to  make  as  little  change  in  the  land  system,  as  it  now  ex 
ists,  as  is  consistent  with  the  object  in  view,  and  to  adopt  such  provisions 
as  will  enforce  the  faithful  performance  of  the  terms  of  cession  on  the 
part  of  the  states,  with  the  least  compensation  for  their  expense  and 
trouble,  and  loss  to  the  government,  in  a  pecuniary  point  of  view,  con 
sistent  with  the  arrangement.  If  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that  there  are 
reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  states  will  faithfully  comply  with 
these  conditions,  and  that  there  will  be  no  pecuniary  loss  to  the  govern 
ment,  compared  with  the  system  as  it  now  stands,  in  consequence  of  the 
proposed  disposition,  it  would  seem  difficult  to  conceive  what  substantial 
objection  there  can  be  to  the  measure. 

I  am  thus  brought  to  the  great,  I  might  say  the  only  question  admitting 
a  doubt  as  to  the  expediency  of  the  measure.  Will  the  states  adhere  to 
their  contract  1  or,  to  express  it  differently,  would  there  be  danger  that 
the  government  would  lose  the  land,  in  consequence  of  the  states  refusing 
to  comply  with  the  conditions  of  the  cession'?  And  if  not,  will  the  pe 
cuniary  loss  to  the  government  be  such  as  to  make  it  inexpedient,  even 
if  there  be  full  assurance  that  the  terms  of  cession  will  not  be  violated! 

Before  I  enter  on  the  discussion  of  these  important  points,  it  will  be 
proper  to  make  a  few  remarks  on  the  extent  of  the  interest  that  would  be 
embraced  in  the  cession.  Without  it,  there  would  be  but  an  imperfect 
conception  of  the  subject. 

The  quantity  of  public  lands  lying  in  the  new  states,  and  embraced  in 
the  amendment,  was  estimated  to  be,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1840,  about 
160,000,000  of  acres.  It  has  been  reduced  since  by  sales,  the  exact 
quantity  not  known;  but  it  will  not  materially  vary  gthe  amount.  The 
Indian  title  has  been  extinguished  to  nearly  the  whole,  and  about  three 
fourths  have  been  surveyed  and  platted,  of  which  a  larger  part  has  been 
long  in  the  market  (much  more  than  twenty  years),  and  has  been  picked 
and  culled,  over  and  over  again,  with  the  view  of  taking  all  worth  having, 
at  the  present  price,  even  during  the  great  expansion  of  currency,  and 
consequent  rise  in  price,  and  speculation  in  public  lands,  in  1835,  1836, 
and  1837.  If  compared  in  quantity  to  the  remainder  of  the  public  do 
main,  it  will  be  found  to  be  not  equal  to  one  sixth  part  of  the  whole.  In 
this  respect,  it  is  a  far  more  limited  measure  than  that  proposed  by  the 
senator  from  Kentucky,  to  which  mine  is  an  amendment.  That  embraces 
not  only  the  proceeds  of  the  whole  public  domain,  exceeding  1,000,000,000 
acres,  but  includes,  in  addition,  the  large  sums  drawn  from  the  duties  on 
imports,  which  are  annually  expended  on  its  sales  and  management,  all 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  407 

of  which  he  proposes  permanently  to  distribute.  It  is  also  more  limited 
in  its  application  than  the  original  bill,  which  embraces  all  the  lands  to 
which  the  Indian  title  is  extinguished,  as  well  territories  as  states,  which 
greatly  exceeds  the  quantity  lying  in  the  latter. 

Having  now  shown  the  object  and  the  character,  with  the  scope  of  this 
measure,  I  shall  next  proceed  to  the  great,  and  I  must  say,  in  my  opinion, 
the  only  question  that  admits  of  controversy,  Will  the  states  adhere  faith 
fully  to  the  terms  of  the  cession  !  Or,  on  the  contrary,  will  they  violate 
a  compact  solemnly  entered  into,  on  just  and  liberal  principles,  mutually 
beneficial  to  both,  and  which  will  place  them,  as  to  their  domain,  on  the 
same  independent  footing  on  which  the  other  states  stand  1 

I  would  ask,  at  the  outset,  Is  there  anything  in  their  history  to  justify 
a  suspicion  of  a  want  of  good  faith  1  Have  they  been  in  the  habit  of  vio 
lating  contracts!  If  so,  point  out  a  single  instance1?  Instead  of  giving 
ground  to  excite  suspicion,  I  rejoice  to  say  their  history  affords  many 
and  striking  examples  of  exact  and  faithful  compliance  with  their  engage 
ments.  They  all  have  standing  compacts  with  the  government,  entered 
into  on  their  admission  into  the  Union,  which  impose  important  limita 
tions  on  what  otherwise  would  be  their  unquestioned  right  as  independ 
ent  members  of  the  Union ;  and,  among  others,  the  important  one,  not 
only  of  not  taxing  the  vast  portion  of  their  domain  held  by  the  United 
States  within  their  limits,  but  also,  for  the  period  of  five  years  after  sale, 
the  portion  held  by  purchasers.  To  their  honour  be  it  said,  that,  in  the 
long  period  which  has  elapsed  from  the  admission  of  the  oldest  of  these 
states,  there  has  not  been  a  single  instance  of  a  violation  on  their  part  of 
their  plighted  faith.  With  so  striking  an  example  of  fidelity  to  engage 
ments,  with  what  justice  can  it  be  objected  that  the  states  will  violate 
their  plighted  faith  to  a  contract  every  way  advantageous  to  them,  as  well 
as  to  the  rest  of  the  Union  1 

But  I  take  higher  ground,  and  put  the  question,  With  what  propriety 
can  we  object  to  the  want  of  faith  on  the  part  of  the  states  to  their  en 
gagements  1  What  is  our  Constitution  but  a  compact  between  the  states  1 
and  how  do  we  hold  seats  here  but  in  virtue  of  that  compact!  And  is  it 
for  us  to  turn  round  and  question  the  faith  on  which  our  system  stands, 
and  through  which  we  have  our  political  existence;  and  this,  too,  when  it 
is  notorious  that  the  state  governments  have  adhered  with  far  more  fidelity 
than  this  to  the  constitutional  compact  !  Many  and  great  violations  are 
charged,  and  truly  charged  to  us,  while  few,  very  few,  can  be  justly  at 
tributed  to  them. 

But,  admitting  there  might  be  danger  of  losing  the  lands,  should  they 
be  disposed  of  as  proposed,  from  the  want  of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the 
states,  I  boldly  assert  that  the  danger  of  their  being  lost  is  far  greater  if 
the  present  system  should,  unfortunately,  be  continued,  and  that,  too, 
under  circumstances  vastly  more  disastrous  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the 
Union.  What  I  have  asserted  comes  from  deep  and  solemn  conviction, 
resulting  from  a  long  and  careful  examination  of  this  vast  and  complicated 
subject. 

Those  who  have  not  given  special  attention  to  it,  and  the  progress  of 
our  land  system,  can  form  no  just  conception  of  the  danger  to  which  the 
public  lands  are  exposed.  The  danger  is  twofold :  that  they  will  be  lost 
by  the  mere  progress  of  settlement,  without  payment,  in  consequence  of 
the  vast  quantity  beyond  the  wants  of  the  country,  to  which  the  Indian 
title  is  extinguished ;  and  if  that  should  not  be  the  case,  they  will  be  from 
the  growing  conflict  between  the  old  and  new  states,  in  consequence  of 
the  rapid  increase  of  the  latter,  and  the  great  difference  in  their  respect 
ive  views  of  the  policy  proper  to  be  adopted  in  reference  to  them.  Both 


408  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

causes  are  operating  with  powerful  effect ;  and  if  they  do  not  speedily 
attract  the  attention  of  the  government  and  the  country,  they  will  cer 
tainly  terminate  before  long,  either  by  their  separate  or  joint  action,  in 
the  loss  of  the  public  domain.  Nothing  but  a  full  understanding  of  the 
causes  of  danger,  and  the  application  of  a  prompt  and  efficient  remedy,  can 
prevent  it ;  and  what  I  propose  is  to  present  a  brief  sketch  of  my  views 
in  reference  to  both. 

As  important  as  it  is,  few  have  turned  the  attention  it  deserves  to  the 
almost  miraculous  extension  of  our  land  system.  In  the  comparatively 
short  time  in  which  it  has  been  in  operation,  the  Indian  title  has  been  ex 
tinguished,  in  round  numbers,  to  320,000,000  of  acres  ;  of  which  there  has 
been  sold  81,000,000,  and  granted  away,  for  various  purposes,  12,600,000  ; 
leaving  in  the  possession  of  the  government,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1840, 
226,000,000,  a  larger  portion  of  which  is  surveyed,  platted,  and  in  the 
market :  showing  that  the  progress  of  extinguishing  the  titles  of  the  In 
dians  has  far  outrun  the  demands  of  the  country  for  government  lands,  as 
great  as  it  has  been.  In  fact,  the  reality  far  exceeds  the  statement,  as 
strong  as  that  is  j  for,  of  the  eighty-one  millions  of  acres  sold,  upward  of 
thirty-eight  millions  were  sold  in  the  years  1835,  1836,  and  1837,  during 
the  great  expansion  of  the  currency  and  rage  for  speculation  in  lands,  of 
which  but  a  small  portion,  perhaps  not  a  third,  was  for  settlement ;  and 
of  the  residue,  a  greater  part,  say  twenty  millions,  is  still  for  sale  in  the 
hands  of  large  purchasers.  Making  proper  allowance  for  the  speculative 
operations  of  those  years,  the  actual  sale  of  the  public  lands  for  settle 
ment,  during  the  period  of  fifty  years  which  has  elapsed  from  the  begin 
ning  of  the  government,  would  not  probably  exceed  sixty  millions  of 
acres,  about  one  fourth  as  much  as  that  to  which  the  Indian  title  is  now 
extinguished. 

But  numbers  can  give  but  a  very  imperfect  conception  of  the  vast  ex 
tent  of  the  region  to  which  the  Indian  title  is  extinguished,  and  of  which 
the  government  is  the  sole  and  exclusive  proprietor.  To  form  a  correct 
idea  of  its  great  magnitude,  it  will  be  necessary  to  compare  it  to  portions 
of  the  Union,  the  extent  of  which  is  familiar  to  all.  To  enable  me  to  do 
that,  a  friend  has  furnished  me  with  a  statement,  from  which  it  appears 
that,  if  all  the  land  now  unsold,  and  to  which  the  Indian  title  is  extinguish 
ed,  was  grouped  together,  it  would  be  equal  in  extent  to  all  New-Eng 
land,  New-York,  New-Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia, 
and  a  third  of  North  Carolina.  But  this  falls  far  short  of  the  vast  extent 
of  the  region  throughout  which  it  lies  dispersed — a  region  equalling  all 
the  old  Atlantic  States,  taking  in  all  Florida,  the  states  of  Alabama  and 
Mississippi,  and  half  of  Tennessee.  Into  this  vast  and  unoccupied  domain, 
our  people,  with  a  multitude  of  foreigners,  are  pouring  yearly  in  one  in 
cessant  tide,  by  thousands  on  thousands,  seeking  new  homes :  some  with 
the  means  of  purchasing,  who  select  the  best  lands  ;  others  with  insuffi 
cient  means,  who  select  their  place,  and  settle,  with  the  hope  of  pur 
chasing  in  a  short  time ;  and  a  large  class  without  means,  who  settle  on 
spots,  without  any  fixed  intention  but  to  remain  so  long  as  they  are  un 
disturbed,  generally  on  tracts  of  inferior  quality,  having  the  advantage  of 
a  spring,  with  a  small  portion  of  more  fertile  land,  sufficient  for  their 
limited  cultivation,  but  not  sufficient  to  induce  a  purchaser  to  take  it  at 
the  government  price.  This  class  of  settlers  has  greatly  increased,  if  I 
am  correctly  informed,  within  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years,  and  is  still 
rapidly  increasing,  especially  in  the  West  and  Southwestern  States, 
where  the  proportion  of  good  to  inferior  land  is  comparatively  small,  and 
must  continue  to  increase  with  accelerated  rapidity,  so  long  as  the  pres 
ent  land  system  remains  as  it  is. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C-  CALHOCN.  409 

Those  who  have  had  an  opportunity  of  witnessing  the  effect  of  such 
occupancy  on  the  minds  of  the  settlers,  will  not  be  at  a  loss  to  anticipate 
the  consequences  which  must  follow,  unless  arrested.     Occupation  long 
and  undisturbed,  accompanied  by  improvement,  however  limited,  cannot 
fail  to  be  associated  with  the  idea  of  property  in  the  soil.     It  is  that,  in 
fact,  which  constitutes  the  primitive  right  in  land.     This  will  be  felt  in 
common  by  all  the  occupants  similarly  situated — will  be  sure  to  create  an 
esprit  de  corps,  accompanied  by  mutual  respect  for   each  other's  rights, 
which  would  not  fail  to  make  it  dangerous  for  any  one  to  disturb  the 
rights  of  another.     This  feeling  will  not  be  long  in  showing  itself  towards 
the  emigrant  intruder,  as  he  would  be  considered,  coming  in  with  the 
view   of  purchase.     He  would   find   it  not   a  little   hazardous    to   enter 
and  purchase  a  spot  held  by  a  mere  occupant,  or  squatter,  if  you  will, 
and  oust  him  of  his  possession.     In  a  short  time,  no  one  who  regards 
his  peace  and  safety  will  attempt  it ;   and  then,  the  feeling,  which  began 
with  the  poorer  class,  will  extend  rapidly  upward  to  the  more  wealthy, 
until,  finally,  none  will  look  to   any  other  title  but  occupancy  and  im 
provement  ;  and  all,  the  rich  and  poor,  will  become  squatters,  with  a  com 
mon  interest  to  maintain  and  defend  each  other,  when  the  public  lands 
will  be  lost,  and  cease  to  be  any  longer  a  source  of  revenue,  if  nothing 
be  done  to  stop  it.     For  the  truth  of  the  picture,  I  appeal  to  the  senators 
from  the  new  states,  especially  from  the  Western  and  Southwestern.     We 
have  thus  presented  the  difficult  question,  What  is  to  be  done  to  remedy  it  1 
It  is  perfectly  natural  that  the  first  impression  should  be,  to  keep  out 
intruders  on  the  public  lands.     The  lands  belong  to  the  people  of  the 
Union  as  common  property,  and  it  would  seem  contrary  to  reason  and 
justice  that  any  one  should  be  permitted  to  enter  on  and  appropriate  the 
use  of  that  to  himself,  without  paying  for  it,  which  belongs  to  all ;  and 
we  accordingly  find  not  a  small  portion  of  the  Senate  who  insist  on  keep 
ing  out  and  expelling  all  intruders  as  the  proper  remedy.     But  in  this 
case,  like  many  others,  we  must  look  beyond  mere  abstract  right.     What 
seems  so  plausible  would,  when  tried,  prove  impracticable.     We  need  no 
other  proof  than  the  fact  that  no  administration  has  ever  undertaken  it, 
even  when  it  would  have  been  an  easy  task,  comparatively  to  what  it  now 
would  be.     How  is  it  to  be  done  1     By  the  marshals  and  their  deputies  1 
Can  they  expel  from  their  homes  the  vast  host  of  occupants  on  the  pub 
lic  lands,  all  hardy  and  bold  men,  familiar  with  the  use  of  the  most  deadly 
of  weapons'?     Would  you  employ  the  army  1     It  would  be  found  almost 
as  impotent  as  the  civil  authority.     If  the  whole  military  was  employed 
in  this,  to  the  neglect  of  all  other  service,  there  would  be  more  than  five 
hundred  and  fifty  square  miles  for  each  officer  and  soldier,  supposing 
your  establishment  to  be  full.     No :  were  it  possible  to  employ  the  mili 
tary  in  so  odious  a  service  in  this  free  country,  you  would  have  to  double 
your  force,  at  a  cost  greater  than  the  annual  income  from  the  land  ;  and 
the  work  would  be  ever  beginning,  and  never  ending.     If  you  drive  them 
away  and  destroy  their  improvements,  as  soon  as  the  force  was  with 
drawn  they  would  return  to  their  possession.     I  had  some  experience, 
while  secretary  at  war,  of  the  difficulty  of  expelling  and  keeping  off  in 
truders  ;  and  I  found  that  the  message  which  brought  intelligence  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  force  was  immediately  followed  by  that  which  brought 
information  that  the  intruders  had  returned. 

But  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  deems  all  this  as  merely 
imaginary,  and  asserts  that  intruders  may  readily  be  kept  off  the  public 
lands.  I  will  not  attempt  to  reply  to  his  reason  for  this  opinion.  He 
and  his  political  friends  will  soon  be  in  power  with  a  chief  of  their  own 
selection,  and  in  whose  firmness  and  energy  they  express  high  confidence. 

FFF 


410  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

In  six  weeks  the  time  will  come  round  which  brings  him  into  power,  and 
we  shall  see  what  will  follow.  Without  pretending  to  the  spirit  of  proph 
ecy,  I  feel  I  hazard  nothing  in  predicting  that  what  is  deemed  so  easy  to 
be  done  when  out  of  power  will  be  pronounced  impracticable  when  in. 
The  senator  would  have  too  much  prudence  to  give  the  advice ;  but,  if 
not,  the  President  elect  will,  I  conjecture,  have  too  much  discretion  to  act 
on  it. 

If,  however,  I  should  be  mistaken,  and  the  attempt  should  be  made  to 
expel  the  occupants  from  the  public  lands,  I  hazard  nothing  in  predicting 
that  the  administration  will  go  out  of  power  with  ten  times  the  majority 
with  which  it  came  in,  as  great  as  that  was.  The  bitterest  enemy  could 
not  give  more  fatal  advice. 

If,  then,  this  powerful  tide  of  emigration,  which  is  flowing  in  on  the 
public  lands,  cannot  be  arrested,  what  ought,  or  can  be  done,  to  prevent 
the  loss  of  the  public  domain  by  the  action  of  the  causes  already  explain 
ed  "?  This  is  the  difficult  question.  In  answer,  I  say,  we  must  do  as  we 
are  often  compelled  to  do  in  our  progress  through  life — accommodate 
ourselves  to  circumstances;  to  mitigate  evils  we  cannot  overcome,  and 
retard  or  lessen  those  we  cannot  prevent.  Such  are  the  laws  to  which 
beings  of  our  limited  powers  and  control  over  events  must  necessarily 
yield. 

Without,  then,  undertaking  the  impossible  task  of  arresting  the  tide  of 
emigration  or  expelling  the  settlers,  I  would  advise  the  adoption  of  the 
most  judicious  and  efficient  measures  of  converting  them  into  freeholders, 
with  the  least  sacrifice  consistent  with  effecting  that  object.  The  first 
step  towards  this  should  be  to  unite  the  interests  of  this  government 
with  that  of  the  states  within  which  the  lands  lie,  so  as  to  combine  the 
power  and  influence  of  the  two  for  their  preservation.  Without  it  no 
thing  can  be  done.  If  they  should  not  be  united,  the  necessary  conse 
quence  would  be,  that  the  interest  of  the  states  would  be  invariably  found 
to  be  opposed'  to  that  of  the  government,  and  its  weight  thrown  on  the 
side  of  the  settlers  on  all  questions  between  them,  of  which  we  have  daily 
proof  in  our  proceedings.  In  the  end,  their  united  power  and  influence 
would  prevail.  If  this  indispensable  step  be  not  taken  in  a  short  time, 
instead  of  graduation  and  pre-emption,  we  shall  have  a  demand,  not  to  be 
resisted,  for  donations  and  grants  to  the  settlers.  A  leading  inducement 
with  him  to  dispose  of  the  lands  to  the  states  was  to  effect  this  important 
union  of  interest.  It  is  the  only  way  by  which  it  can  be  accomplished  ; 
and,  to  render  it  sufficiently  strong  to  effect  the  object  intended,  I  am  in 
favour  of  a  liberal  compensation  to  the  states  for  the  expense  and  trouble 
of  their  management. 

But  something  more  is  indispensable  to  prevent  the  loss  of^the  lands  ; 
and  that  is,  to  hold  out  adequate  inducements  to  the  settlers  to  become 
freeholders  by  purchasing  the  land.  This  can  be  effected  with  the  least 
loss  to  the  government,  and  the  greatest  advantage  to  the  settlers,  by  a 
judicious  system  of  graduation  and  pre-emption,  and  it  is  with  that  view 
that  provisions  are  made  for  both  in  the  amendment  which  I  intend  to 
offer.  It  provides  that  the  states  may,  at  their  discretion,  reduce  the 
price  of  all  lands  which  have  been  offered  at  sale  ten  years  and  upward, 
to  one  dollar  per  acre,  after  the  30th  of  June,  1842;  and  all  that  may  be 
in  market  for  fifteen  years  and  upward,  to  seventy-five  cents  per  acre, 
after  the  30th  of  June,  1847;  and  all  that  may  have  been  twenty  years 
and  upward,  to  fifty  cents  per  acre,  after  the  30th  of  June,  1852;  and  all 
that  have  been  twenty-five  years  and  upward,  to  twenty-five  cents,  after 
the  30th  of  June,  1857 ;  and  all  that  have  been  thirty  years  and  upward, 
to  twelve  cents,  after  the  30th  of  June,  1862 ;  and  all  that  should  remain 


9 

SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  411 

unsold  five  years  thereafter  to  be  surrendered  to  the  states;  with  the  right, 
also,  at  their  discretion,  to  allow  pre-emption  for  ninety  days  to  settlers, 
at  each  step  in  the  reduction  of  the  price.  It  also  provides  that  all  lands, 
after  having  been  offered  for  sale  in  those  states,  shall,  at  the  expiration 
of  ten  years  from  the  time  of  being  offered,  become  subject,  in  like  man 
ner,  to  graduation  and  pre-emption. 

The  object  of  these  provisions  is  to  hold  out  inducements  to  the  settlers 
to  purchase,  by  bringing  the  lands,  within  a  reasonable  period,  to  a  price 
which  would  not  only  justify,  but  hold  out  strong  inducement  to  them  to 
purchase.  One  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  purchasing,  as  the  system 
now  stands,  is,  that  the  great  body  of  the  lands  are  not  worth,  in  reality, 
the  price  of  $1  25,  at  which  they  are  sold  by  the  government.  There  ap 
pears  to  be  a  great  mistake  on  this  point,  which  it  is  important  to  correct. 
Instead  of  almost  every  acre,  as  is  supposed  by  some  gentlemen  in  de 
bate,  to  be  worth  that  sum,  the  reverse  position  is  true,  that  none  was 
worth  it  but  that  which  was,  at  the  time,  coming  in  demand  by  purchasers. 
I  rest  the  assertion  on  the  well-established  principle  that  demand  and 
supply  regulate  price,  and  the  fact  that  an  article  which  is  in  the  market 
at  a  fixed  price,  open  to  the  demand  of  all,  and  is  not  taken,  is  the  best 
proof  that  the  price  is  above  the  market  value  at  the  time.  It  is  in  vain 
to  talk  of  intrinsic  value — a  thing  wholly  different  from  price.  There  are 
many  things  of  the  highest  intrinsic  value  that  have  no  price,  as  air  and 
water,  while  many  of  but  small  value  would,  from  their  great  scarcity, 
command  a  very  high  one.  In  the  language  of  business,  a  thing  is  worth 
what  it  will  sell  for,  and  no  one  is  willing  to  give  more,  unless  compelled 
by  some  particular  reason.  The  occupants  of  the  public  lands  partake 
of  this  feeling.  They  are  unwilling  to  give  for  the  inferior  lands,  which 
for  the  most  part  they  occupy,  $1  25,  when  a  small  part  only  of  the  best 
lands  offered  for  sale  would  command  that,  and  feel  that  they  have  some 
thing  like  justice  on  their  side  in  not  giving  so  high  a  price  for  their  pos 
sessions. 

This  feeling  must  be  met,  and  it  is  proposed  to  meet  it  by  the  provis 
ions  for  graduation  and  pre-emption  which  I  have  just  stated ;  a  policy 
so  liberal  towards  a  large,  though  poor  class,  not  less  honest  and  patriotic 
than  the  rest  of  the  community,  could  not  fail  to  have  a  happy  effect,  not 
only  in  reference  to  them,  but  in  a  more  enlarged  point  of  view.  One  of 
the  most  important  would  be  the  great  increase  of  the  number  of  small 
freeholders,  which,  in  the  hour  of  danger,  would  prove  of  vast  importance, 
especially  in  the  weakest  portion  of  the  Union — in  the  Southwestern 
States — where  the  provision  would  have  the  greatest  effect.  It  would  be 
the  class  that  would  furnish  the  hardiest  and  best  soldiers,  with  the  ad 
vantage  of  being  inured  to  the  climate.  Combined  and  modified  as  they 
would  be,  they  cannot  but  have  a  powerful  weight  in  inducing  the  occu 
pants  to  purchase.  It  will  work  a  revolution  in  his  character.  He  will 
regard  himself,  on  his  little  domain,  more  a  freeholder  than  a  squatter ; 
and,  as  the  price  in  the  descending  scale  of  graduation  approaches  the 
price  that  lands  such  as  he  occupies  would  sell  for,  his  industry  and  econ 
omy  would  be  exerted  to  be  prepared  with  the  requisite  means  to  make  the 
purchase.  The  liberal  character  of  the  policy  would  impress  him  with  deep 
feelings  of  respect  for  the  justice  and  care  of  the  government  j  and  the 
security  it  would  afford  would  put  an  end  to  the  esprit  de  corps,  which 
otherwise  would  be  so  strong  j  and  all,  combined  with  the  influence  of 
the  states  on  the  side  of  the  government,  would,  I  feel  confident,  guard 
effectually  against  the  danger  of  losing  the  lands,  as  far  as  the  occupants 
are  concerned,  in  the  only  way  that  would  be  practicable. 

The  amendment  proposes  to  leave  it  to  the  states  fro  graduate  and  grant 


412  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

pre-emptions  or  not,  at  their  discretion,  within  the  limits  prescribed.  The 
conditions  of  the  several  states  are  very  different  in  reference  to  the  ex 
pediency  of  exercising  the  right.  In  the  uniformly  fertile  region  in  the 
upper  portion  of  the  great  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  it  may  not  be  neces 
sary  to  resort  to  either,  or,  if  so,  to  a  very  limited  extent;  while  in  the 
Southwestern  States,  including  Arkansas,  it  would  be  indispensable ;  and 
hence  the  propriety  of  giving  the  right,  but  leaving  the  exercise  to  the 
discretion  of  the  states.  Each  state  would  be  the  most  competent  judge 
whether  it  should  be  exercised  or  not,  and  to  what  extent. 

Having  considered  the  provisions  intended  to  guard  against  the  danger 
of  losing  the  lands  from  mere  occupancy  without  payment,  I  next  pro 
pose  to  make  some  remarks  on  that  of  their  being  lost,  in  consequence 
of  the  conflicting  policy  between  the  new  and  old  states  in  reference  to 
them,  should  the  present  system  be  continued.  To  understand  this  dan 
ger,  we  must  have  a  just  conception  of  the  cause  in  which  it  originates, 
which  I  will  endeavour  first  to  explain. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  it  is  impossible  that  the  new  and  old  states  can 
take  the  same  view  of  the  policy  proper  to  be  adopted  in  reference  to 
the  public  domain.  Their  respective  position,  interest,  and  extent  of 
knowledge  in  reference  to  it,  are  wholly  different,  which  cannot  but  have 
a  correspondent  effect  on  their  views.  The  old  states  stand  in  reference 
to  the  new  somewhat  in  the  light  of  an  absent  owner  of  a  large  estate,  and 
not  without  some  degree  of  his  feelings,  while  the  new  stand,  in  some 
degree,  in  the  situation  of  those  who  occupy  and  work  his  estate,  with 
feelings  not  a  little  akin  to  those  which  belong  to  that  relation.  That 
such  is  the  case,  and  that  it  leads  to  diverse  views  of  the  policy  that 
ought  to  be  adopted,  and  that,  again,  to  conflict  between  them,  the  ques 
tions  now  before  us,  the  discussion  now  going  on,  the  feelings  it  excites, 
and  the  yearly  and  violent  agitation  of  those  questions  for  the  last  eight 
or  ten  years,  abundantly  prove.  Nor  is  it  less  clear  that  they  have  in 
creased,  and  must  increase  with  the  growth  and  influence  of  the  new 
states  over  the  action  of  the  government,  till  their  rapid  growth  will  give 
them  the  ascendency,  when  they  will  decide  it  in  their  own  way,  under 
the  high  pretensions  and  excited  feeling  of  real  or  supposed  injustice, 
which  must  necessarily  grow  out  of  a  long-continued  and  violent  conflict. 
It  is,  in  like  manner,  clear  that  the  evil  originates  in  the  ownership  and 
administration  by  the  government  of  the  lands  lying  in  the  new  states, 
and  constituting  a  large  portion  of  their  territory.  If  to  these  considera 
tions  it  be  added,  that  the  questions  growing  out  of  this  great  subject 
must  extend  to  and  embrace,  and  influence  in  their  bearings,  every  other 
question  of  public  policy,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  amendment  for  distribu 
ting  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  lands  among  the  states,  which,  in  its 
consequences,  takes  in  the  whole  circle  of  our  legislation,  and  that  it 
must  enter  into  and  influence  all  our  political  struggles,  especially  that  in 
which  all  others  are  concentrated — the  presidential  election — some  con 
ception  may  be  formed  of  the  distracting  influence,  the  agitation  and  dan 
ger  which  must  grow  out  of  this  great  question  if  not  speedily  settled. 

If  something  be  not  done,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  danger  from 
these  causes  and  that  from  occupancy  must  run  together,  and  that  their 
combined  forces  will  be  altogether  irresistible.  The  occupants  on  the 
public  lands  lying  within  the  states  are  voters,  with  a  weight  at  the  polls 
equal  to  the  most  wealthy,  and,  of  course,  an  equal  influence  over  the 
election  of  President  and  Vice-president,  members  of  Congress,  and 
state  governments.  I  hazard  little  in  asserting  that,  if  they  have  not  al 
ready,  from  their  numbers,  a  decided  influence  over  all  the  elections  in 
many  of  the  new  states,  they  will  in  a  very  short  period,  from  their  rapid 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  413 

increase,  if  nothing  should  be  done  to  arrest  the  evil.  That  influence 
would  be  felt  here,  and  movements  would  be  made  to  satisfy  the  demands 
of  so  numerous  and  powerful  a  class,  till,  with  their  growing  influence, 
the  proposition  will  be  boldly  made  to  give,  as  has  been  stated,  the  land 
without  purchase  ;  to  which,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  the  govern 
ment  will  be  compelled  to  yield,  in  order  to  avoid  the  danger  of  being 
seized  and  kept  in  < ,\ en  defiance  of  its  authority. 

Against  this,  the  only  ground  that  can  be  devised,  as  far  as  I  can  see, 
is  the  one  I  have  proposed — to  dispose  of  the  land  to  the  states — to 
part  with  ownership  and  administration,  the  root  of  the  evil — on  fair  and 
equitable  conditions,  with  the  best  possible  provisions  that  can  be  devised 
to  ensure  the  faithful  performance  of  the  compact.  If  that,  with  the  pro 
visions  against  the  danger  from  occupancy,  cannot  prevent  the  loss  of  the 
public  lands,  I  know  not  what  can.  I  have  as  strong  confidence  as  the 
nature  of  the  subject  will  admit,  that  it  will,  when  perfected  in  its  details 
by  the  wisdom  of  the  Senate,  prove  all-sufficient,  not  only  to  prevent  the 
loss  of  the  public  domain,  but  to  arrest  the  many  and  growing  evils  to 
which  I  have  alluded  as  incident  to  the  system  as  it  now  exists.  But  if  in 
that  it  is  possible  I  should  err,  with  all  the  caution  I  have  taken  to  come 
to  a  correct  conclusion,  I  feel  assured  I  cannot  in  asserting  that  the  dan 
ger  would  be  far  less,  under  the  amendment  I  intend  to  propose,  than  it 
would  be  should  the  system  continue  as  it  now  stands  ;  and  that  if  the 
public  domain  is  to  be  lost,  it  is  far  better  it  should  be  under  the  former 
than  the  latter.  It  would  be  with  far  less  intermediate  hazard,  and,  in 
the  end,  with  less  violence  and  shock  to  our  political  fabric.  In  the  one 
case  we  could  lose  nothing  but  the  value  of  the  land,  which  I  shall  pres 
ently  show  is  far  less  than  usually  estimated,  while,  in  the  other,  no  one 
can  estimate  what  the  loss  may  not  be. 

Having  now,  I  trust,  shown,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Senate,  that  no 
thing  short  of  disposing  of  the  public  lands  on  just,  equitable,  and  liberal 
terms,  can  remedy  the  evils,  and  guard  against  the  dangers  incident  to 
the  system  under  existing  circumstances,  it  only  remains  to  consider 
what  would  be  the  effects  of  the  measure  on  the  revenue  compared  with 
the  present  system.  Should  I  be  able  to  prove,  as  I  hope  to  do,  that 
even  in  that  respect  it  will  bear  a  highly  advantageous  comparison,  it 
would  yield  more,  and  that  when  most  needed,  now,  when  the  treasury 
will  require  replenishing,  every  solid  objection  to  its  adoption  would,  I 
trust,  be  removed. 

There  was  a  great  and  prevalent  mistake  as  to  the  true  value  of  the 
public  lands,  as  I  have  just  intimated.  They  are  estimated  as  if  every* 
acre  was  worth  $1  25  paid  down,  without  taking  into  account  that  only  a 
small  quantity  could  be  sold  annually  at  that  price,  and  that  by  far  the 
greater  portion  of  the  income  from  the  sales  can  only  be  received  through 
a  long  series  of  years,  extending  to  a  very  remote  period.  In  estimating 
what  is  their  true  value,  we  must  not  forget  that  time  has  the  same  effect 
on  value  which  distance  has  on  magnitude,  and  that,  as  the  largest  ob 
jects  in  the  universe  dwindle  to  a  point,  when  removed  to  the  distance  of 
the  stars,  so  the  greatest  value,  when'  it  can  only  be  realized  at  remote 
periods,  diminishes  almost  to  nothing.  It  is  in  consequence  of  this  dif 
ference  between  present  and  future  value,  that  a  sum  paid  down  is  worth 
twice  as  much  as  an  equal  sum  to  be  paid  sixteen  years  hence,  estimated 
at  6  per  cent,  simple  interest,  and  four  times  as  much  as  a  like  sum  to  be 
paid  at  the  end  of  thirty-two  years.  I  do  not  take  fractions  of  years  into 
the  estimate.  The  principle  is  familiar  to  all  who  are  in  the  habit  of  cal 
culating  the  present  value  of  annuities  for  a  given  number  of  years,  and 
is  as  applicable  to  regular  annual  incomes  from  land,  or  any  other  source, 


414  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

as  it  is  from  what  is  usually  called  an  annuity.  On  the  same  principle, 
discounts  are  made  on  payments  in  advance.  But  we  are  in  the  daily 
halbit  of  overlooking  this  plain  and  familiar  principle,  known  to  every 
business  man  in  the  management  of  his  own  affairs,  in  estimating  the 
value  of  the  public  domain.  In  consequence  of  such  oversight,  the 
160,000,000  of  acres  lying  in  the  new  states  have  been  estimated  to  be 
worth  $200,000,000,  at  $1  25  per  acre — a  sum  nearly  eight  times  greater 
than  iit-s  real  value,  supposing  that  it  would  give  an  annual  income  averaging 
$2,500,000,  and  admitting  every  acre  will  be  sold  at  $1  25 — a  supposition 
far  greater  than  will  ever  be  realized.  The  Committee  on  Public  Lands, 
at  the  last  session,  assuming  these  data,  proved  incontestably  that  the 
true  present  value  did  not  exceed  twenty-six  millions  and  a  half  of  dol 
lars.  They  showed,  in  the  first  place,  that  a  permanent  income  forever 
of  $2,500,000  would  be  worth  but  a  fraction  more  than  forty-one  millions 
of  dollars  in  hand,  as  that  sum,  at  six  per  cent.,  would  give  an  equal  in 
come.  They  next  showed,  that  to  derive  an  income  of  $2,500,000  from 
the  one  hundred  and  sixty  millions  of  acres  in  the  new  states,  would  ex 
haust  every  acre  in  eighty  years  j  and  that,  of  course,  instead  of  being  a 
permanent  income,  it  would  be  one  only  for  that  period,  which  would  re 
duce  its  value  to  about  thirty-four  millions  of  dollars,  which  would  be  its 
present  value,  if  there  was  no  expense  attending  its  sales  and  manage 
ment.  That  is,  however,  far  from  being  the  case.  Applying  the  same 
rule  of  calculation  to  the  annual  expense  incident  to  their  management, 
including  what  would  be  saved  by  the  government  if  the  cession  should 
be  made,  ascertained  to  be  about  $550,000  annually,  they  find  the  present 
value  of  the  land  to  be  the  sum  stated  ($26,500,000).  The  result,  assuming 
the  data  to  be  correct,  is  incontrovertible;  and  that  sum  would  constitute 
the  entire  amount  of  the  loss  under  the  present  system,  if  the  lands  were 
really  to  be  given  away  by  the  proposed  cession,  as  has  been  most  un 
fairly  charged  on  the  other  side  of  the  chamber. 

I  propose  to  apply  the  same  principle  to  the  same  lands,  to  show  its 
present  value  under  the  operation  of  the  measure  I  intend  to  propose. 
Should  it  be  adopted,  the  whole  of  the  lands  in  question  would  be  sold,  I 
assume,  in  twenty-five  years  from  the  time  they  become  subject  to  the 
graduating  process — which  is  much  more  probable  than  that  the  whole 
would  be  sold  in  eighty  years  at  the  present  price  of  $1  25  per  acre.  I 
next  assume  that  equal  quantities  would  be  sold  during  each  period  of 
graduation.  I  next  assume  that  the  portion  not  yet  offered  for  sale,  and 
which,  according  to  the  amendment,  would  not  be  subject  to  graduation, 
and  which  is  estimated,  in  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands, 
to  amount  to  a  little  more  than  62,000,000  of  acres,  would  yield  an  average 
revenue  during  the  ten  years  equal  in  proportion  to  what  the  160,000,000 
of  acres  are  estimated  to  yield.  It  is,  probably,  much  less  than  what  they 
would,  as  they  will,  for  the  first  time,  be  offered  for  sale.  I  also  estimate 
that  the  lands  that  have  been  offered,  and  which  have  not  yet  run  ten 
years,  and  will,  of  course,  be  held  till  then  at  $1  25,  will,  with  that  which 
will  be  sold  on  the  first  reduction  to  $1,  average  $1  12|.  I  have  also 
estimated  the  whole  period,  including  that  which  is  now  in  progress  to 
wards  ten  years,  and  the  first  period  of  reduction,  as  one  period  of  fifteen 
years,  and  that  the  entire  amount  sold  during  the  entire  period  will  only 
equal  the  average  of  the  other  periods  of  graduation  (five  years) :  an  esti 
mate  greatly  under  the  truth. 

On  these  data  I  have  based  the  calculations,  which  have  been  made 
with  great  care,  and  I  find  the  present  value  of  the  lands  would  be  more 
than  a  third  more,  under  my  proposed  amendment,  than  under  the  exist 
ing  system ;  and  that  the  excess  would  be  sufficient  to  pay  the  35  per 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  415 

cent,  proposed  to  be  allowed  to  the  new  states  for  their  expense  and 
trouble,  leaving  the  65  to  be  received  by  the  government,  equal  to  the 
entire  present  value  of  the  lands  under  the  existing  system.  Such  is  the 
vast  difference  between  receiving  a  smaller  amount  by  annual  payments, 
during  half  of  a  long  period,  and  a  much  larger  one,  in  like  manner,  during 
double  of  the  time. 

There  are  but  two  of  the  data  on  which  the  calculation  is  based  which 
can  be  supposed  to  have  any  material  effect  on  the  result,  which  can 
possibly  prove  to  be  over-estimated :  the  one,  that  all  the  lands  will  be 
sold  during  the  period  of  graduation,  which,  however,  is  quite  as  proba 
ble,  to  say  the  least,  as  that  all  will  be  sold  in  eighty  years  at  $1  25  ;  and 
the  other,  that  equal  quantities  would  be  sold  during  each  step  of  the  re 
duction.  It  is  not  improbable  this  may  not  prove  to  be  the  case,  and  that 
larger  quantities  would  be  sold  towards  the  latter  stages  of  the  gradua 
tion,  at  low  prices,  than  during  the  earlier  stages,  at  higher  prices,  which 
affect  the  result.  The  other  supposition,  that  equal  sums  would  be  re 
ceived  at  each  period,  would  probably  be  much  too  low;  and  the  truth 
may  probably  prove  to  be  between  them ;  but,  even  on  that  assumption, 
the  present  value,  under  the  measure  I  propose,  would  greatly  exceed 
that  under  the  present  system,  so  much  so  as  to  be  quite  sufficient  to 
cover  the  13  per  cent,  proposed  to  be  allowed  to  the  states  for  their 
trouble,  above  the  expense  of  managing  the  lands,  including  the  saving 
to  the  government  by  the  cession.  I  have  assumed  that  additional  allow 
ance,  because  it  nearly  corresponds  to  that  proposed  to  be  given  in  the  bill 
for  distribution  (introduced  by  the  author  of  the  scheme)  to  the  new 
states  above  that  allowed  to  the  old.  I  refer  to  the  bill  that  passed  both 
houses,  and  was  vetoed  by  the  President.  That  allowed  12£  per  cent., 
which,  for  the  sake  of  facility  in  calculating,  I  have  enlarged  to  13  per 
cent. 

I  have,  I  trust,  now  successfully  met  the  only  two  objections  which 
can,  in  my  opinion,  be  urged  with  any  plausibility  against  the  measure  I 
intend  to  propose,  by  proving,  not  only  that  there  would  be  reasonable 
assurance  that  the  states  would  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  cession,  but 
that  it  is  the  only  measure  which  can  be  devised  to  prevent  the  almost 
certain  loss  of  the  public  domain  under  the  operation  of  the  system  as  it 
now  stands ;  and  that,  instead  of  a  loss,  there  would  be  a  clear  pecuniary 
gain.  If  I  have  succeeded  in  doing  so,  I  have  done  all  that  ought,  accord 
ing  to  my  conception,  to  be  necessary  to  obtain  the  support  of  the  body. 
But  I  cannot  be  ignorant  that  there  are  members  from  the  new  states 
who  prefer  supporting  this  bill  to  the  measure  I  intend  to  propose  ;  not 
that  they  think  it  better,  but  because  they  believe  it  has  the  best  prospect 
of  passing.  In  this  I  think  they  are  mistaken.  It  is  not  probable  that 
either  can  pass  the  present  session.  It  is  now  but  a  few  weeks  to  its  ter 
mination,  and  it  is  impossible,  in  the  midst  of  the  crowd  of  other  business, 
that  any  important  measure,  not  indispensable,  can  get  through,  especially 
a  system  of  pre-emption  and  graduation  which  has  been  so  long  strug 
gling,  unsuccessfully,  to  pass  both  houses.  But  if  it  cannot  pass  now,  there 
is  little  prospect  that  it  can  the  next  four  years,  against  the  opposition  of 
the  coming,  when  it  could  not  with  the  aid  of  the  present  and  late 
administrations. 

With  this  prospect,  I  put  it  to  my  friends  from  the  new  states,  Is  there 
not  danger  in  pressing  these  isolated  measures,  which  cannot  settle  the 
vexed  and  dangerous  questions  of  the  public  lands,  and  which,  at  best, 
can  be  pressed  on  grounds  only  interesting  to  those  states,  that  they  will 
lose  not  only  a  favourite  measure,  but  cause  the  passage  of  the  most  ob 
noxious  to  them  of  all  measures,  that  of  distribution  ]  I  ask  them,  Can 


416  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

they  hope  to  oppose  successfully  a  measure  so  seductive  to  so  many 
members  of  the  Union,  by  a  measure  so  partial  in  its  operation,  and 
which,  so  far  from  appealing  to  the  reason  or  sympathy  of  two  thirds  of 
the  states,  secures  but  a  reluctant  vote  from  any  of  them ;  more  from 
party  feelings  and  associations  than  any  conviction  of  its  justice  or  expe 
diency  1  Let  me  tell  my  friends,  that  if  the  struggle  is  to  continue  between 
this  bill  and  the  scheme  for  distribution,  it  is,  on  their  part,  a  desperate 
one.  Defeat  is  certain  ;  and  there  is  no  way  to  avoid  it  (if  it  be  not  already 
too  late)  but  to  enlarge  the  issue — to  raise  it  above  mere  local  or  pecuni 
ary  considerations  to  the  broad  and  elevated  ground  of  a  final  settlement 
of  this  deep  and  agitating  question,  on  just  and  satisfactory  principles, 
and  thereby  arrest  the  countless  evils  rushing  through  that  channel  on  the 
country.  It  is  only  thus  that  an  antagonist  of  sufficient  strength  can  be 
reared  up  against  the  dangerous  and  corrupting  scheme  of  distribution. 
A  measure  seductive  to  many  of  the  states,  unfortunately  overwhelmed 
by  debt,  could  only  be  successfully  opposed  by  one  which  would  make  a 
powerful  appeal  to  truth,  justice,  and  patriotism.  As  strong  as  may  be 
the  appeal  to  the  necessity  of  embarrassed,  states,  a  still  stronger  may 
be  made  to  the  higher  and  more  commanding  considerations  of  duty 
and  patriotism.  Such  an  issue,  I  believe,  the  measure  I  propose  would 
tender  to  the  country.  I  solemnly  believe  it  to  be  founded  on  truth,  and 
sustained  by  justice  and  high  considerations  of  policy  ;  and  all  it  needs 
to  ensure  it  success,  if  I  mistake  not,  is  the  earnest  and  determined  sup 
port  of  the  states  which  not  only  have  the  deepest  stake,  but  whose  inde 
pendence  and  equality,  honour  and  pride,  as  members  of  this  proud  re 
public  of  states,  are  involved. 

Having  now  presented  my  views  of  the  amendment  I  intend  to  offer, 
with  a  motion  to  strike  out  the  amendment  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky 
and  insert  mine,  I  shall  conclude  with  a  few  remarks  in  reference  to  the 
leading  feature  of  his  amendment,  the  distribution  of  the  proceeds  of  the 
public  lands  among  the  states. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  on  the  discussion  of  a  measure  which 
I  cannot  but  regard  as  palpably  unconstitutional,  as  well  as  dangerous 
and  corrupting  in  its  tendency.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary,  as  I  ex 
pressed  my  opinion  fully  on  the  subject  at  the  last  session.  I  intend,  at  this 
time,  to  make  a  few  remarks,  in  order  to  show  that,  viewed  under  every 
possible  aspect,  it  must  be  regarded  as  either  foolish,  idle,  or  unjust. 

It  is  admitted,  on  all  sides,  that  the  treasury  is  embarrassed,  and  that 
no  part  of  the  revenue  can  be  withdrawn  without  making  a  corresponding 
deficit,  which  must  be  supplied  by  taxes  on  the  people  in  one  form  or 
another,  and  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  revenue  from  the  land  would 
cause  a  deficit,  so  to  be  supplied,  of  not  less,  probably,  than  $5,000,000 
annually.  The  whole  process,  then,  would  consist  in  giving  to  the  peo 
ple  of  the  several  states  their  proportional  share  of  the  five  millions  of 
the  revenue  from  the  lands,  to  be  collected  back  from  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  in  the  shape  of  a  tax  on  imports,  or  some  other  subject,  to 
the  same  amount.  Now,  sir,  I  ask,  Is  it  not  clear,  if  a  state  should  re 
ceive  by  its  distributive  share  a  less  sum  than  the  people  of  that  state 
would  have  to  pay  in  taxes  to  supply  the  deficit,  it  would  be,  on  their  part, 
foolish  to  support  the  distribution  1  So,  again,  if  they  should  receive  the 
same  amount  they  paid  instead  of  a  less,  would  it  not  be  idle  1  And  if 
more,  would  it  not  be  unjust  1  Can  any  one  deny  these  conclusions  * 
How,  then,  can  a  scheme,  which  implies  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
alternatives  (laying  aside  all  other  weighty  objections),  have  any  chance  to 
be  adopted  1  But  two  answers  can  be  given.  The  one,  that  the  states 
which  would  receive  more  from  the  distribution  than  their  people  would 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN,  417 

have  to  pay  to  make  up  the  deficit,  can  outvote  the  others,  and  are  pre 
pared  to  act  on  the  principle  of  the  strong  plundering-  the  weak ;  and  the 
other,  that  a  majority  of  the  states  want  the  money  to  pay  their  debts  or 
to  spend  in  favourite  schemes,  and  prefer  shifting  the  responsibility  of 
taxing  to  the  General  Government  to  assuming  it  themselves,  without  re 
garding  whether  their  people  would  contribute  more  or  less  than  they 
may  receive.  They  are  afraid  to  lay  taxes,  lest  the  people  should  see 
the  sums  extracted  from  their  pockets,  and  turn  them  out ;  and,  to  avoid 
this,  would  transfer  the  task  to  the  General  Government,  because  they 
can  take  from  the  people,  through  the  tax  on  imports,  without  \>eing  de 
tected  as  to  the  amount. 

I  take  the  opportunity,  before  I  sit  down,  to  tender  my  thanks  for  the 
honourable,  and  high-minded  suggestion  of  the  senator  from  Missouri 
(Mr.  Linn),  considering  the  interior  quarter  of  the  Union  from  which  he 
comes,  to  set  apart  the  proceeds  of  the  lands  as  a  permanent  fund  for  the 
navy. 

[Mr.  Linn,  in  an  audible  voice  :  "  The  navy  and  the  defences  of  the 
country."] 

I  would  rejoice  to  see  such  a  disposition  of  it,  and  do  hope  that  he  will 
move  an  amendment  to  that  effect.  I  wo«M  gladly  receive  it  as  a  modi 
fication  of  my  amendment,  and  would  regard  it  as  a  great  improvement. 
The  navy,  sir,  is  the  right  arm  of  oar  defence,  and  is  equally  important 
to  every  section — the  North  and  South,  the  East  and  West,  inland  and 
seaboard.  When  I  look  at  the  condition  of  our  country,  and  the  world, 
I  feel  that  too  earnest  and  too  early  attention  cannot  be  bestowed  on  the 
arm  of  defence  on  which  the  country  must  mainly  rely,  not  only  for  sus 
taining  its  just  weight  and  influence  in  the  scale  of  nations,  but  also  for 
protection. 


XXVIII. 

SPEECH   ON    THE    BILL    TO   DISTRIBUTE    THE    PROCEEDS   OF   THE    PUBLIC    LANDS, 
JANUARY    23,    1841. 

ON  the  amendment  proposed  by  Mr.  Crittenden  to  the  Pre-emption  Bill,  to 
distribute  the  proceeds  of  the  public  lands  among  the  states, 

Mr.  Calhoun  said  that  the  proposition  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr. 
Crittenden)  to  distribute  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  public  lands  among 
the  several  states,  was  no  stranger  in  this  chamber.  His  colleague  (Mr.  Clay) 
had  introduced  it  many  years  since,  when  he  was  in  the  opposition,  and  had 
often  pressed  its  passage  as  an  opposition  measure,  and  once  with  success, 
while  the  treasury  was  groaning  under  the  weight  of  a  surplus  revenue,  of 
which  Congress  was  willing  to  free  it  on  almost  any  terms.  It  was  then 
vetoed  by  General  Jackson,  and  has  had  to  contend  ever  since  against  the 
resistance  of  his  and  the  present  administration. 

But  it  is  now,  for  the  first  time,  introduced  under  different  auspices,  not  as  • 
f  an  opposition,  but  an  administration  measure — a  measure  of  the  coming  ad 
ministration,  if  we  may  judge  from  indications  that  can  scarcely  deceive.  It  is 
brought  in  by  a  senator  who,  if  rumour  is  to  be  credited,  is  selected  as  a  mem 
ber  of  the  new  cabinet  (Mr.  Crittenden),  backed  by  another  in  the  same  condi 
tion  (Mr.  Webster),  supported  by  a  third  (Mr.  Clay),  who,  all  know,  must  ex 
ercise  a  controlling  influence  over  that  administration.  It  is,  then,  fair  to  pre 
sume  that  it  is  not  only  a  measure,  but  a  leading  measure  of  General  Harrison's 
administration,  pushed  forward  in  advance  of  his  inauguration  by  those  who . 

Go  G 


418  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

have  the  right  of  considering  themselves  his  organs  on  this  floor.  Regarded  in 
this  light,  it  acquires  a  vastly  increased  importance — so  much  so  as  to  demand 
the  most  serious  and  deliberate  consideration.  Under  this  impression,  I  have 
carefully  re-examined  the  measure,  and  have  been  confirmed  in  the  opinion  pre 
viously  entertained,  that  it  is  perfectly  unconstitutional,  and  pregnant  with  the 
most  disastrous  consequences  ;  and  what  I  now  propose  is  to  present  the  re 
sult  of  my  reflection  under  each  of  these  views,  beginning  with  the  former. 

Whether  the  government  can  constitutionally  distribute  the  revenue  from  the 
public  lands  among  the  states,  must  depend  on  the  fact  whether  they  belong 
to  them  in  their  united  Federal  character,  or  individually  and  separately.  If 
in  the  former,  it,  is  manifest  that  the  government,  as  their  common  agent  or 
trustee,  can  have  no  right  to  distribute  among  them  for  their  individual,  separ 
ate  use,  a  fund  derived  from  property  held  in  their  united  and  Federal  charac 
ter,  without  a  special  power  for  that  purpose,  which  is  not  pretended.  A  posi 
tion  so  clear  of  itself,  and  resting  on  the  established  principles  of  law,  when 
applied  to  individuals  holding  property  in  like  manner,  needs  no  illustration. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  they  belong  to  the  states  in  their  individual  and  separate 
character,  then  the  government  would  not  only  have  the  right,  but  would  be 
bound  to  apply  the  revenue  to  the  separate  use  of  the  states.  So  far  is  incon 
trovertible  ;  which  presents  the  question,  In  which  of  the  two  characters  are 
the  lands  held  by  the  states  ? 

To  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  tins  question,  it  will  be  necessary  to  dis 
tinguish  between  the  lands  that  have  been  ceded  by  the  states,  and  those  that 
have  been  purchased  by  the  government  ou\  of  the  common  funds  of  the 
Union. 

The  principal  cessions  were  made  by  Virginia  and  Georgia :  the  former,  of 
all  the  tract  of  country  between  the  Ohio,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  lakes,  in 
cluding  the  states  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Michigan,  and  the  Territory 
of  Wisconsin  ;  and  the  latter,  of  the  tract  included  in  Alabama  and  Mississippi. 
I  shall  begin  with  the  cession  of  Virginia,  as  it  is  on  that  the  advocates  for  dis 
tribution  mainly  rely  to  establish  the  right. 

I  hold  in  my  hand  an  extract  of  all  that  portion  of  the  Virginia  deed  of  ces 
sion  which  has  any  bearing  on  the  point  at  issue,  taken  from  the  volume  lying 
on  the  table  before  me,  with  the  place  marked,  and  to  which  any  one  desirous 
of  examining  the  deed  may  refer.  The  cession  is  "  to  the  United  States  in 
Congress  assembled,  for  the  benefit  of  said  states."  Every  word  implies  the 
states  in  their  united  Federal  character.  That  is  the  meaning  of  the  phrase 
United  States.  It  stands  in  contradistinction  to  the  states,  taken  separately 
and  individually;  and  if  there  could  be,  by  possibility,  any  doubt  on  that  point, 
it  would  be  removed  by  the  expression  "  in  Congress  assembled" — an  assem 
blage  which  constituted  the  very  knot  that  united  them.  I  regard  the  execu 
tion  of  such  a  deed,  in  such  an  assemblage,  to  the  United  States  so  assembled, 
so  conclusive  that  the  cession  was  to  them  in  their  united  and  aggregate  char 
acter,  in  contradistinction  to  their  individual  and  separate  character,  and,  by 
necessary  consequence,  the  lands  so  ceded  belonged  to  them  in  their  former, 
and  not  in  their  latter  character,  that  I  am  at  a  loss  for  words  to  make  it  clear 
er.  To  deny  it,  would  be  to  deny  that  there  is  any  truth  in  language. 

But,  as  strong  as  this  is,  it  is  not  all.  The  deed  proceeds,  and  says  that  all  the 
lands  so  ceded  "  shall  be  considered  a  common  fund  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  such 
of  the  United  States  as  have  become  members  of  the  Confederation,  or  Federal 
alliance  of  said  states,  Virginia  inclusive  ;"  and  concludes  by  saying.  "  And  shall 
be  faithfully  and  bonajide  disposed  of  for  that  purpose,  and  for  no  other  use  and 
purpose  whatever."  If  it  were  possible  to  raise  a  doubt  before,  these  full,  clear, 
and  explicit  terms  would  dispel  it.  It  is  impossible  for  language  to  be  clearer. 
To  be  "  considered  a  common  fund,"  an  expression  directly  in  contradistinction 
%  to  separate  or  individual,  and  is,  by  necessary  implication,  as  clear  a  negative  of 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  419 

the  latter,  as  if  it  had  been  positively  expressed.  This  common  fund  to  "  be  for 
the  use  and  benefit  of  such  of  the  United  States  as  have  become,  or  shall  be 
come,  members  of  the  Confederation  or  Federal  alliance  ;"  that  is,  as  clear  as 
language  can  express  it,  for  their  common  use  in  their  united  Federal  charac 
ter,  Virginia  being  included  as  the  grantor,  out  of  abundant  caution. 

[Here  Mr.  Clay  said,  in  an  audible  voice,  there  were  other  words  not  cited. 
To  which  Mr.  Calhoun  replied :] 

I  am  glad  to  hear  the  senator  say  so,  as  it  shows,  not  only  that  he  regards 
the  expressions  cited  standing  alone,  as  clearly,  establishing  what  I  contend 
for,  but  on  what  he  relies  to  rebut  my  conclusion,  I  shall  presently  show  that 
the  expression  to  which  he  refers  will  utterly  fail  him.  The  concluding  words 
are,  "  Shall  be  faithfully  and  bonafde  disposed  of  for  that  use,  and  no  other  use 
and  purpose  whatever."  For  that  use — that  is,  the  common  use  of  the  states, 
in  their  capacity  of  members  of  the  Confederation  or  Federal  alliance — and  no 
other  ;  as  positively  forbidding  to  use  the  fund  to  be  derived  from  the  lands  for  the 
separate  use  of  the  states,  or  to  be  distributed  among  them  for  their  separate  or 
individual  use,  as  proposed  by  this  amendment,  as  it  is  possible  for  words  to  do. 
So  far,  all  doubt  would  seem  to  be  excluded. 

But  there  are  other  words  to  which  the  senator  refers,  and  on  which  the  ad 
vocates  of  the  measure  vainly  rely  to  establish  the  right.  After  asserting  that 
it  shall  be  considered  a  common  fund  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  states  that 
are,  or  shall  become,  members  of  the  Confederation  or  Federal  alliance,  Virginia 
inclusive,  it  adds,  "  according  to  their  usual  respective  proportions  in  the  general 
charge  and  expenditure."  Now,  I  assert,  if  these  words  were  susceptible  of  a 
construction  that  the  fund  was  intended  for  the  separate  and  individual  use  and 
benefit  of  the  states,  which  I  utterly  deny,  yet  it  would  be  contrary  to  one  of 
the  fundamental  rules  of  construction  to  give  them  that  meaning.  I  refer  to  the 
well-known  rule,  that  doubtful  expressions,  in  a  grant  or  other  instrument,  are 
not  to  be  so  construed  as  to  contradict  what  is  clearly  and  plainly  expressed,  as 
would  be  the  case  in  this  instance,  if  they  should  be  so  construed  as  to  mean 
the  separate  and  individual  use  and  benefit  of  the  states  severally.  But  they 
are  not  susceptible  of  such  construction.  Whatever  ambiguity  may  be  supposed 
to  attach  to  them,  will  be  readily  explained  by  reference  to  the  history  of  the 
times.  The  cession  was  made  under  the  old  Articles  of  Confederation,  accord 
ing  to  which  the  general  or  common  fund  of  the  Union  was  raised,  not  by  tax 
ation  on  individuals,  as  at  present,  but  by  requisition  on  the  states,  proportioned 
among  them  according  to  the  assessed  value  of  their  improved  lands.  An  ac 
count  had,  of  course,  to  be  kept  between  each  state  and  the  common  treasury ;  * 
and  these  words  were  inserted  simply  to  direct  that  the  funds  from  the  ceded 
lands  were  to  be  credited  to  states  according  to  the  proportion  they  had  to  con 
tribute  to  the  general  or  common  fund  respectively,  in  order,  if  not  enough 
should  be  received  from  the  lands  to  meet  their  contribution,  they  should  be 
debited  with  the  deficit ;  and,  if  more  than  sufficient,  credited  with  the  excess 
in  making  the  next  requisition.  The  expression  can  have  no  other  meaning ; 
and,  so  far  from  countenancing  the  construction  that  the  common  fund  from  the 
lands  should  be  applied  to  the  separate  use  of  the  states,  it  expressly  provides 
how  it  shall  be  credited  to  the  confederated  or  allied  states,  in  their  account 
current  with  the  general  or  common  fund  of  that  confederacy.  The  opposite 
interpretation  would  imply  the  most  palpable  contradiction  and  absurdity. 

But  it  is  asked,  What  would  have  to  be  done  if  there  had  been  a  permanent 
surplus  ?  Such  a  case  was  scarcely  supposable,  with  the  heavy  debt  of  the 
Revolution,  and  the  small  yield  from  the  land  at  the  time  ;  but  if  it  had  occurred, 
it  would  have  been  an  unforeseen  contingency,  to  be  provided  for  by  the  United 
States,  to  whom  the  fund  belonged,  and  not  by  Congress,  as  its  agent  or  trus 
tee  for  its  management. 

That  this  expression  was  intended  merely  to  direct  how  the  account  should 


420  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

be  kept,  and  not  to  make  that  the  separate  property  of  the  states  individually 
which  had  been  declared,  in  the  most  emphatic  manner,  to  belong  to  them,  and 
to  be  used  by  them  as  a  common  fund,  in  their  united  Federal  character,  we 
would  have  the  most  conclusive  proof,  if  what  has  been  stated  already  was  not 
so,  in  the  fact  that,  in  the  deeds  of  cession  from  all  the  other  states,  Massachu 
setts,  Connecticut,  New-York,  North  Carolina,  and  South  Carolina,  these  words 
are  omitted. 

As  to  the  cession  from  Georgia,  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  two 
opinions  about  it.  It  was  made  under  the  present  government,  and  in  the  very 
words  of  the  Virginia  cession,  excepting  the  words  "  according  to  their  usual 
respective  proportion  in  the  general  charge  and  expenditure."  The  omission, 
while  the  other  portion  was  exactly  copied,  is  significant.  The  old  system  of 
requisition  on  the  states  to  supply  the  common  treasury,  under  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  had  been  superseded  by  taxes  laid  directly  on  the  people,  under 
the  present  government,  and  it  was  no  longer  necessary  to  provide  for  the  mode 
of  keeping  the  account,  and  for  that  reason  was  omitted.  But  the  cession  by 
Georgia  was,  in  reality,  a  purchase.  The  United  States  has  paid  full  consider 
ation  for  the  land,  including  the  expense  of  extinguishing  the  Indian  titles,  and 
other  charges ;  and,  of  course,  the  portion  of  the  public  domain  acquired  from 
that  state  may  be  fairly  considered  as  standing  on  the  same  principle,  as  far  as 
the  present  question  is  concerned,  as  that  purchased  from  foreign  powers. 

So  undeniable  is  the  conclusion  that  the  lands  ceded  by  the  states  were  ce 
ded  to  them  in  their  united  and  aggregate  character  as  a  Federal  community,  and 
not  in  their  separate  and  individual,  that  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  was 
forced  to  admit,  if  I  understood  him  correctly  (and  if  not,  I  wish  to  be  correct 
ed),  that  they  were  so  ceded  in  the  first  instance,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of 
paying  the  public  debt ;  and  that,  on  its  final  discharge,  the  lands  became  the 
separate  property  of  the  states.  This,  sir,  is  a  perfectly  gratuitous  assumption 
on  the  part  of  the  senator,  and  is  directly  opposed  by  the  deeds  of  cession, 
which  expressly  provide  that  it  shall  be  a  common  fund  for  the  use  and  benefit 
of  the  states  in  their  united  and  Federal  character,  without  restriction  to  the  pub 
lic  debt,  or  limitation  in  point  of  time,  or  any  other  respect.  This  bold  and  un 
warranted  assertion  may  be  regarded  as  an  implied  acknowledgment,  on  his 
part,  of  the  truth  of  the  construction  for  which  I  contend,  and  on  which  the  gov 
ernment  has  ever  acted,  but  now  attempted  to  be  changed  on  a  false  assumption. 
The  residue  of  the  public  lands,  including  Florida  and  all  the  region  beyond 
the  Mississippi,  extending  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  constituting  by  far  the 
'greater  part,  stands  on  a  different  footing.  They  were  purchased  out  of  the 
common  funds  of  the  Union,  collected  by  taxes,  and  belong,  beyond  all  ques 
tion,  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  their  Federal  and  aggregate  capacity. 
This  has  not  been,  and  cannot  be  denied  ;  and  yet  it  is  proposed  to  distribute 
the  common  fund  derived  from  the  sales  of  these,  as  well  as  from  the  ceded 
lands,  in  direct  violation  of  the  admitted  principle  that  the  agfcnt  or  trustee  of  a 
common  concern  has  no  right,  without  express  authority,  to  apply  the  joint  funds 
to  the  separate  use  and  benefit  of  its  individual  members. 

But,  setting  aside  the  constitutional  objection,  as  conclusive  as  it  is,  I  ask, 
What  consideration  of  expediency — what  urgent  necessity  is  there  for  the  adop 
tion,  at  this  time,  of  a  measure  so  extraordinary  as  a  surrender  to  the  states,  for 
their  individual  use,  of  the  important  portion  of  the  revenue  derived  from  the  pub 
lic  domain,  which  it  is  probable  will  not  fall  short,  on  an  average  of  the  next 
ten  years,  of  five  millions  of  dollars  ?  Is  the  treasury  now  burdened  with  a  sur 
plus  far  beyond  the  wants  of  the  government,  for  which  all  are  anxious  to  de 
vise  some  measure  of  relief,  as  was  the  case  when  the  senator  introduced  and 
passed  his  scheme  of  distribution  formerly?  On  the  contrary,  is  it  not  in  the 
very  opposite  condition — one  of  exhaustion,  with  a  deficit,  according  to  the 
statement  of  that  senator,  and  those  who  act  with  him,  of  many  millions  of 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  421 

dollars  1  And  is  not  the  revenue  still  declining,  so  that  in  a  short  time  the  pres 
ent  deficit  will  be  doubled  ?  To  take  a  broader  view,  I  would  ask,  Is  the  con 
dition  of  the  country  less  unfavourable  to  the  adoption  of  the  measure  than  the 
state  of  th£  treasury  ?  Is  there  an  individual  capable  of  taking  a  comprehen 
sive  view  of  our  foreign  relations  at  this  moment,  who  does  not  see  the  impe 
rious  necessity  of  applying  every  dollar  that  can  be  spared  to  guard  against 
coming  dangers,  more  especially  on  that  element  where  a  revolution  so  extra 
ordinary  is  going  on,  by  the  all-powerful  agency  of  steam,  both  as  to  the  means 
of  attack  and  defence  ? 

If,  then,  the  state  of  the  treasury  and  the  condition  of  the  country  so  urgent 
ly  demard  the  retention  of  this  important  branch  of  revenue  for  the  common 
use  and  objects  for  which  the  government  was  created,  what  possible  motives 
can  impel  those  who  are  shortly  to  be  charged  with  its  administration  to  bring 
forward,  at  such  a  period,  the  extraordinary  proposition  to  take  from  the  neces 
sities  of  the  treasury  and  the  country  so  large  a  sum,  to  be  distributed  among 
the  states  for  their  separate  and  individual  use  ?  To  this  question  but  one  an 
swer  has  been,  or  can  be  given — that  many  of  the  states  want  the  money.  They 
have  contracted  debts  for  their  own  individual  and  local  purposes  beyond  their 
ordinary  means,  and  which  the  dominant  party  in  those  states  are  unwilling  to 
meet  by  raising  taxes  on  their  own  people,  for  fear  of  being  turned  out  of  pow 
er.  The  result  has  been  a  loss  of  credit,  followed  by  a  depreciation  of  their 
bonds,  held  by  rich  capitalists  at  home  and  abroad.  The  immediate  object  of 
this  scheme  is  to  raise  the  credit  of  the  indebted  states  by  distributing  the  rev 
enue  from  the  lands  ;  that  is,  to  surrender  about  one  fourth  of  the  permanent  rev 
enue  of  the  Union,  and  that  the  most  certain,  to  enhance  the  value  of  the  state 
bonds,  now  greatly  depressed,  because  some  of  the  indebted  states  do  not  choose 
to  raise,  by  taxes  on  their  own  people,  the  means  of  paying  their  own  debts. 
To  have  a  true  conception  of  the  whole  case,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
these  bonds  were  taken  by  the  capitalists  on  this  arid  the  other  side  of  the  At 
lantic  on  speculation,  in  the  regular  course  of  business,  as  a  profitable  invest 
ment,  and  many  of  them  at  great  depreciation ;  and  that  the  demand  on  the 
common  treasury  is  substantially  to  make  good,  not  only  their  losses,  but  to  ena 
ble  them  to  realize  their  anticipated  profits.  Such  is  the  object. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  question,  In  what  manner  is  this  deficit  of  at  least 
five  millions  to  be  supplied  ?  By  taxes— additional  taxes  on  the  commerce  of 
the  country"  preparing  the  way  for  still  higher  by  combining  the  indebted  states 
with  the  tariff  interest,  to  impose  neavier  burdens  on  that  important  but  oppress 
ed  branch  of  industry.  Wines  and  silks  are  to  be  selected,  under  the  plea 
of  taxing  luxury  ;  and  much  manoeuvring  has  been  resorted  to  in  order  to  enlist 
the  tobacco  interest  in  favour  of  the  tax,  with,  I  fear,  too  much  success.  They 
are,  I  admit,  fair  objects  of  taxation,  and  ought  to  bear  their  due  proportion  of 
the  public  burden.  I  am  prepared  to  act  on  that  opinion  when  the  tariff  comes 
up  for  revision,  as  it  must  at  the  next  session.  I  go  farther :  Fix  the  amount 
which  the  just  and  necessary  wants  of  government  may  require,  including 
the  revenue  from  the  lands,  and  I  will  cheerfully  agree  to  lay  as  much  on  lux 
uries  as  gentlemen  will  agree  to  reduce  on  necessaries.  It  is  my  favourite  sys 
tem,  and  I  am  prepared  to  go  as  far  as  any  one  in  that  direction.  But  I  shall 
not  agree  to  impose  a  cent  on  luxuries  or  necessaries,  on  the  rich  or  poor,  to 
pay  the  debts  for  which  this  government  is  in  no  way  responsible,  and  which 
we  cannot  pay  without  a  palpable  violation  of  the  Constitution,  and  gross  injus 
tice  to  the  great  body  of  the  community.  I  was  struck  with  the  fact  that,  while 
the  senator  (Mr.  Webster)  held  out  at  one  moment  that  the  duties  on  wines  and 
silks  would  fall  on  the  consumers,  and,  by  consequence,  on  the  rich,  in  the  very 
next  he  informed  us  that  they  would  not  rise  in  price  in  consequence  of  the  du 
ties,  and,  of  course,  they  would  entirely  escape  from  them.  To  prove  that  they 
would  not  increase  in  price  in  consequence  of  the  duties,  he  assumed  as&prin- 


422  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ciple,  that  where  one  country  is  the  principal  producer  of  certain  articles,  as 
France  was  of  wines  and  silks,  and  another  a  principal  consumer  of  them,  as 
the  United  States  were,  a  duty  imposed  on  them  by  the  latter  would  have  the 
effect,  not  of  raising  the  price  in  the  country  where  it  was  laid,  byt  to  reduce 
it  where  they  were  produced;  that  is,  to  reduce  it  in  France,  and  not  to  raise 
it  in  the  United  States. 

Now,  I  put  it  to  the  senator  whether  the  loss,  taking  his  own  conclusion, 
could  fall  on  the  French  producers  of  wines  and  silks,  without,  in  its  reac 
tion,  falling  also  on  the  American  producers  of  the  products  given  in  exchange 
for  them — that  is,  the  growers  of  tobacco,  rice,  and  cotton,  which  furnish  al 
most  exclusively  the  means  of  payment  ?  Is  it  not  clear,  if  they  cannot  sell  as 
high  or  as  much  to  us,  in  consequence  of  the  duties,  that  we,  in  turn,  cannot 
sell  as  high  or  as  much  to  them,  in  consequence  of  the  fall  of  price  on  their  prod 
ucts  ?  Their  loss  must  be  followed  by  ours  ;  and  it  follows,  according  to  the 
senator's  own  reasoning,  that  the  five  millions  which  is  proposed  to  be  raised 
by  duties,  to  make  good  the  deficit  caused  by  the  distribution,  would  be  filched 
from  the  pockets  of  the  honest  and  industrious  producers  of  our  great  staples, 
and  not,  as  alleged  by  the  senator,  from  the  wealthy  consumers  of  wines  and 
silks.  It  is  out  of  their  hard  earnings  that  the  means  must  be  raised  to  enhance 
the  value  of  the  bonds  of  the  states  in  the  hands  of  foreign  capitalists.  The  sen 
ator  must  surely  hold  in  low  estimation  the  intelligence  and  spirit  of  the  South 
ern  planter,  in  supporting  such  a  proposition. 

But  I  take  still  stronger  grounds.  The  necessary  effect  of  all  duties  is  to 
diminish  the  imports  ;  and  the  consequence  of  diminishing  the  imports  is  to  dim 
inish,  in  the  same  proportion,  the  exports.  Imports  and  exports  are  dependant 
each  on  the  other.  If  there  can  be  no  imports,  there  can  be  no  exports ;  and 
if  there  be  no  exports,  there  can  be  no  imports.  The  exports  pay  for  the  im 
ports,  and  the  imports  pay  for  the  exports — the  one  always  implies  the  other.  So, 
if  the  imports  are  limited  in  amount,  the  exports  must  be  limited,  when  fairly 
estimated,  to  the  same  amount,  and  vice  versa.  But  the  effects  of  all  duties, 
whether  they  fall  on  the  consumers  of  the  articles  on  which  they  are  laid,  or  on 
the  producers,  must  be  to  diminish  the  amount  of  the  imports,  and,  by  conse 
quence,  of  the  exports.  In  a  word,  duties  on  imports  affect  the  amount  of  t^e 
exports  to  the  same  extent  that  they  do  the  imports  ;  and  it  would  have  just  the 
same  effect  in  the  end,  whether  the  deficit  of  five  millions  which  would  be  caus 
ed  by  the  distribution,  be  raised  by  a  duty  on  tobacco,  rice,  and  cotton,  or  on 
the  wines  and  silks  for  which  they  might  be  exchanged.  The  loss  would  foil 
in  either  case  on  the  same  interest,  and  to  the  same  amount,  and  those  immedi 
ately  connected  with  it. 

But  I  rise  to  higher  grounds.  As  bad  as  the  scheme  is  in  a  financial  view, 
it  is  far  worse  in  a  political.  The  most  deadly  enemy  of  our  system  could 
not,  in  my  opinion,  propose  a  measure  better  calculated  to  subvert  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  government.  It  would  necessarily  place  the  state  govern 
ments  in  direct  antagonist  relations  with  this  on  all  questions  except  that  of  col 
lecting  and  distributing  the  revenue,  which  would  end  in  defeating  all  the  ob 
jects  for  which  it  was  instituted,  and  reduce  it,  ultimately,  to  the  odious  capacity 
of  a  mere  tax-collector  for  the  state  governments.  In  this  there  can  be  no 
mistake. 

The  money  to  be  distributed  would  go,  not  to  the  people  of  the  states  indi 
vidually,  but  to  the  state  legislatures ;  or,  to  be  more  specific,  to  the  majority, 
or,  rather,  to  the  dominant  portion  of  the  majority,  which  for  the  time  might  have 
the  control.  Trny,  and  their  friends  and  supporters,  would  profit  by  the  scheme. 
The  money  distributed  would  be  applied  in  the  moit  effective  way  to  secure 
their  ascendensy,  and  to  give  them  the  lion's  share  of  the  profit.  The  domi 
nant  party  in  the  states  would  thus  be  enlisted  to  continue  "and  enlarge  the  dis 
tribution  ;  and  when  it  is  added,  that  the  sums  expended  in  the  states  would 


«     SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  423 

embrace  powerful  local  interests,  which  would  be  seen  and  felt  in  its  effects  by 
large  portions  of  the  people,  while  the  expenditures  of  the  government  would 
be  on  objects  of  a  general  character,  connected,  for  the  most  part,  with  the  de 
fence  of  the  country  against  foreign  danger,  which  would  be  little  felt  or  regard 
ed  by  the  great  body  of  the  community,  except  in  war,  or  on  the  eve  of  hostil 
ities,  I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting,  that  the  interests  in  favour  of  distributing 
the  revenue  would  overpower  that  of  expenditures  by  the  General  Government, 
even  on  the  most  necessary  objects,  the  consequence  of  which  would  be  such 
as  has  been  stated.  Be  assured  that  the  system,  once  fairly  commenced,  would 
go  on  ancJ  enlarge  itself,  till  every  branch  of  revenue  would  be  absorbed,  when 
the  government,  divested  of  all  its  constitutional  functions,  would  expire,  under 
universal  scorn  and  contempt.  Such  must  be  the  end  of  this  most  dangerous 
and  unconstitutional  measure,  should  it  ever  be  adopted. 

But  the  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster),  and  others,  allege  that 
the  cession  of  the  lands  to  the  new  states  is  itself  but  a  mode  of  distribution, 
with  a  view,  doubtless,  to  weaken  the  force  of  my  objections  to  this  amendment. 
If  it  be  so,  I  can  only  say  that  it  is  not  intended  ;  and  if  I  can  be  satisfied  that 
it  is,  I  would  be  the  first  to  denounce  it.  Its  object  is  to  remedy  what  I  believe 
to  be  great  and  growing  disorders  in  the  operation  of  our  land  system,  as  it  now 
exists  ;  but  as  dangerous  as  I  regard  them,  I  would  never  consent  to  remedy 
them  by  a  measure  which  I  regard  as  vastly  more  dangerous.  But  the  senator 
will,  if  I  mistake  not,  find  it  far  more  easy  to  call  it  a  scheme  of  distribution 
than  to  prove  it  to  be  so,  or  even  that  it  is  in  the  slightest  degree  analogous  to 
it  in  any  particular,  as  I  hope  to  prove  in  some  subsequent  stage  of  this  discus 
sion. 

I  have  heard,  Mr.  President,  with  pleasure,  the  deep  denunciations  levelled 
against  the  whole  scheme  of  distribution,  whether  applied  to  the  revenue  from 
lands  or  taxes.  It  strengthens  my  confidence  in  the  force  of  truth,  and  the 
conviction  that,  if  one  has  the  courage  to  do  his  duty,  regardless  of  defeat  for 
the  time,  he  may  hope  to  outlive  error  and  misrepresentation.  Let  me  add,  if 
any  of  the  denunciations  were  aimed  at  me,  they  passed  harmless  over  me, 
and  fell  on  another,  against  whom  I  would  be  the  last  to  utter  a  censure  in  his 
retirement  and  declining  years,  however  opposed  to  him  while  in  power.  The 
Senate  will  understand  that  I  refer  to  General  Jackson.  It  is  far  from  agree 
able  to  me  to  introduce  his  name  here,  or  to  speak  of  myself;  but  I  am  com 
pelled,  from  the  remarks  made  in  a  certain  quarter,  to  do  so,  not  from  any  feel 
ing  of  egotism  (for  I  am  too  inconsiderable  to  involve  what  concerns  me  indi 
vidually  in  the  discussion  of  so  grave  a  subject),  but  that  I  may  not  be  weaken 
ed,  as  the  opponent  of  this  most  dangerous  measure,  by  any  misconception  of 
my  past  course  in  relation  to  the  scheme  of  distribution. 

It  has,  sir,  been  my  fortune  to  be  opposed  to  the  scheme  from  the  beginning. 
It  originated  with  a  former  member  of  this  body,  Mr.  Dickerson,  of  New- Jersey, 
and  recently  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  as  far  back  as  the  year  1827.  His  pro 
posed  object  was  to  strengthen 'the  protective  tariff  interest,  by  distributing  part 
of  its  proceeds  (if  I  remember  correctly,  five  millions  of  dollars)  annually 
among  the  states,  in  the  manner  proposed  by  this  amendment.  I  took  my 
stand  against  it,  promptly  and  decidedly,  on  its  first  agitation,  as  a  measure 
dangerous  and  unconstitutional,  and  well  calculated  to  fix  the  protective  system 
permanently  on  the  country.  The  next  year,  the  oppressive  tariff  of  1828  was 
passed,  and  the  year  afterward  General  Jackson  was  electe'd  President,  with 
the  expectation,  as  far  as  South  Carolina  supported  him,  that  he  would  use  his 
patronage  and  influence  to  repeal  that  obnoxious  act,  or  at  least  greatly  reduce 
the  burden  it  imposed. 

But  it  was  the  misfortune  of  General  Jackson  and  the  country,  that  when  he 
arrived  here  to  assume  the  reins  of  government,  he  was  strongly  prepossessed 
in  favour  of  the  plan  of  distributing  the  surplus  revenue,  after  the  final  payment 


424  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.   « 

of  the  public  debt,  under  the  impression  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  repeal 
that  act,  or  reduce  the  duties  it  imposed.  How  he  received  so  dangerous  an 
impression,  I  have  never  understood  ;  but  so  it  was.  I  speak  not  from  my  own 
knowledge,  but  from  information  that  is  unquestionable,  that  his  inaugural  ad 
dress  contained  a  passage  in  favour  of  the  distribution,  when  it  was  laid  before 
those  whom  he  had  selected  for  his  first  cabinet ;  and  that  it  was  with  difficul 
ty  he  assented  to  omit  it,  so  strongly  was  he  impressed  in  its  favour — no  doubt 
honestly  and  sincerely  impressed.  His  first  message  to  Congress,  in  Decem 
ber,  1829,  contained  a  strong  recommendation  of  that  scheme,  which  was  re 
peated,  with  additional  arguments  in  its  favour,  in  his  second  messagfe  the  suc 
ceeding  year.  A  recommendation  from  so  high  and  influential  a  quarter  could 
not  but  have  a  powerful  effect  on  public  opinion.  The  governors  of  two  great 
states,  Pennsylvania  and  New- York,  recommended  it  to  their  legislatures,  who 
adopted  resolutions  in  its  favour.  That  the  views  which  he  then  entertained 
may  be  fully  understood,  I  ask  the  secretary  to  read  the  portions  of  the  two 
messages,  which  he  will  find  marked  in  the  volumes  on  his  table,  in  the  order 
of  their  respective  dates. 

[The  secretary  read  the  following  extracts  from  President  Jackson's  mes 
sages,  1st  and  2d  sessions,  26th  Congress  : 

"  First  Session,  Twenty-sixth  Congress. 

"  After  the  extinction  of  the  public  debt,  it  is  not  probable  that  any  adjust 
ment  of  the  tariff,  upon  principles  satisfactory  to  the  people  of  the  Union,  will, 
until  a  remote  period,  if  ever,  leave  the  government  without  a  considerable  sur 
plus  in  the  treasury  beyond  what  may  be  required  for  its  current  service.  As 
then  the  period  approaches  when  the  application  of  the  revenue  to  the  payment 
of  debt  will  cease,  the  disposition  of  the  surplus  will  present  a  subject  for  the 
serious  deliberation  of  Congress,  and  it  may  be  fortunate  for  the  country  that 
it  is  yet  to  be  decided.  Considered  in  connexion  with  the  difficulties  which 
have  heretofore  attended  appropriations  for  purposes  of  internal  improvement, 
and  with  those  which  this  experience  tells  us  will  certainly  arise  whenever 
power  over  such  subjects  may  be  exercised  by  the  General  Government,  it  is 
hoped  that  it  may  lead  to  the  adoption  of  some  plan  which  will  reconcile  the 
diversified  interests  of  the  states,  and  strengthen  the  bonds  which  unite  them. 
Every  member  of  the  Union,  in  peace  and  in  war,  will  be  benefited  by  the  im 
provement  of  inland  navigation  and  the  construction  of  highways  in  the  several 
states.  Let  us,  then,  endeavour  to  attain  this  benefit  in  a  mode  which  will  be 
satisfactory  to  all.  That  hitherto  adopted  has,  by  many  of  our  fellow-citizens, 
been  deprecated  as  an  infraction  of  the  Constitution,  while  by  others  it  has 
been  viewed  as  inexpedient.  All  feel  that  it  has  been  employed  at  the  expense 
of  harmony  in  the  legislative  councils. 

"  To  avoid  these  evils,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  most  safe,  just,  and  federal 
disposition  which  could  be  made  of  the  surplus  revenue,  would  be  its  apportion 
ment  among  the  several  states,  according  to  their  ratio  of  representation  ;  and, 
should  this  measure  not  be  found  warranted  by  the  Constitution,  that  it  would 
be  expedient  to  propose  to  the  states  an  amendment  authorizing  it.  I  regard 
an  appeal  to  the  source  of  power,  in  cases  of  real  doubt,  and  where  its  exercise 
is  deemed  indispensable  to  the  general  welfare,  as  among  the  most  sacred  of 
all  our  obligations. 

"  Second  Session,  Twenty-sixth  Congress. 

"  1  have  heretofore  felt  it  my  duty  to  recommend  the  adoption  of  some  plan 
for  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  funds  which  may  at  any  time  remain  in  the 
treasury  after  the  national  debt  shall  have  been  paid,  among  the  states,  in  pro 
portion  to  the  number  of  their  representatives,  to  be  applied  by  them  to  objects 
of  internal  improvement. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  425 

"  Although  this  plan  has  met  with  favour  in  some  portions  of  the  Union,  it  has 
also  elicited  objections  which  merit  deliberate  consideration.  A  brief  notice  of 
these  objections  here  will  not,  therefore,  I  trust,  be  regarded  as  out  of  place. 

"  They  rest,  as  far  as  they  have  come  to  my  knowledge,  on  the  following 
grounds:  1st.  An  objection  to  the  ratio  of  distribution;  2d.  An  apprehension 
that  the  existence  of  such  a  regulation  would  produce  improvident  and  oppres 
sive  taxation  to  raise  the  funds  for  distribution  ;  3d.  That  the  mode  proposed 
would  lead  to  the  construction  of  works  of  a  local  nature,  to  the  exclusion  of 
such  as  are  general,  and  as  would,  consequently,  be  of  a  more  useful  character ; 
and,  last,  that  it  would  create  a  discreditable  and  injurious  dependance  on  the 
part  of  the  state  governments  upon  the  Federal  power.  Of  those  who  object  to 
the  ratio  of  representation  as  the  basis  of  distribution,  some  insist  that  the  im 
portations  of  the  respective  states  would  constitute  one  that  would  be  more  equi 
table  ;  and  others,  again,  that  the  extent  of  their  respective  territories  would 
furnish  a  standard  which  would  be  more  expedient,  and  sufficiently  equitable. 
The  ratio  of  representation  presented  itself  to  my  mind,  and  it  still  does,  as  one 
of  obvious  equity,  because  of  its  being  the  ratio  of  contribution,  whether  the 
funds  to  be  distributed  be  derived  from  the  customs  or  from  direct  taxation.  •  It 
does  not  follow,  however,  that  its  adoption  is  indispensable  to  the  establishment 
of  the  system  proposed.  There  may  be  considerations  appertaining  to  the  sub 
ject  which  would  render  a  departure,  to  some  extent,  from  the  rule  of  contribu 
tion  proper.  Nor  is  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  basis  of  distribution  be 
confined  to  one  ground.  It  may,  if,  in  the  judgment  of  those  whose  right  it  is 
to  fix  it,  it  be  deemed  politic  and  just  to  give  it  their  character,  have  regard 
to  several. 

"  In  my  first  message,  I  stated  it  to  be  my  opinion,  that  *  it  is  not  probable  that 
any  adjustment  of  the  tariff,  upon  principles  satisfactory  to  the  people  of  the 
Union,  will,  until  a  remote  period,  if  ever,  leave  the  government  without  a  con 
siderable  surplus  in  the  treasury  beyond  what  may  be  required  for  its  current 
service.'  I  have  had  no  cause  to  change  that  opinion,  but  much  to  confirm  it. 
Should  these  expectations  be  realized,  a  suitable  fund  would  thus  be  produced 
for  the  plan  under  consideration  to  operate  upon  ;  and  if  there  be  no  such  fund, 
its  adoption  will,  in  my  opinion,  work  no  injury  to  any  interest ;  for  I  cannot 
assent  to  the  justness  of  the  apprehension  that  the  establishment  of  the  propo 
sed  system  would  tend  to  the  encouragement  of  improvident  legislation  of  the 
character  supposed.  Whatever  the  proper  authority,  in  the  exercise  of  constitu 
tional  power,  shall,  at  any  time  hereafter,  decide  to  be  for  the  general  good, 
will  in  that,  as  in  other  respects,  deserve  and  receive  the  acquiescence  and 
support  of  the  whole  country ;  and  we  have  ample  security  that  every  abuse  of 
power  in  that  regard,  by  agents  of  the  people,  will  receive  a  speedy  and  effect 
ual  corrective  at  their  hands.  The  views  which  I  take  of  the  future,  founded 
on  the  obvious  and  increasing  improvement  of  all  classes  of  our  fellow-citizens, 
in  intelligence,  and  in  public  and  private  virtue,  leave  me  without  much  appre 
hension  on  that  head. 

"  1  do  not  doubt  that  those  who  come  after  us  will  be  as  much  alive  as  we  are 
to  the  obligation  upon  all  the  trustees  of  political  power  to  exempt  those  for  whom 
they  a$t  from  all  unnecessary  burdens  ;  and  as  sensible  of  the  great  truth,  that 
the  resources  of  the  nation  beyond  those  required  for  immediate  and  necessary 
purposes  of  government,  can  nowhere  be  so  well  deposited  as  in  the  pockets  of 
the  people."] 

Such,  I  repeat,  were,  unfortunately,  the  opinions  which  General  Jackson  en 
tertained  on  this  all-important  question  when  he  came  into  power.  I  saw  the 
danger  in  its  full  extent,  and  did  not  hesitate  to  take  an  open  and  decided  stand 
against  the  measure  which  he  so  earnestly  recommended ;  and  that  was  the 
first  question  on  which  we  separated.  In  placing  myself  in  opposition  to  him 

H  H  H 


426  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

on  a  measure  so  vital,  I  \yas  not  ignorant  of  the  hazard  to  which  I  exposed  my 
self,  but  the  sense  of  duty  outweighed  all  other  considerations.  I  clearly  saw 
that  there  would  be  an  increased  surplus  revenue  after  the  final  payment  'of  the 
public  debt,  a  period  then  rapidly  approaching ;  and  that,  if  it  was  once  distribu 
ted  to  the  states,  it  would  rivet  on  the  country  the  tariff  of  1828,  to  be  followed 
by  countless  disasters  from  the  combined  effects  of  the  two  measures.  Had  it 
been  adopted,  the  last  ray  of  hope  of  repealing  or  reducing  that  oppressive  and 
ruinous  nleasure  would  have  vanished.  It  would,  by  its  seductive  influence, 
have  drawn  over  to  its  support  the  very  states  whose  prosperity  it  was  crushing, 
not  excepting  South  Carolina  itself.  The  process  is  not  difficult  to  explain. 

For  that  purpose,  I  will  take  the  case  of  South  Carolina,  and  will  assume 
that  her  citizens  paid,  under  the  tariff  of  1828,  four  millions  of  dollars  into  the 
treasury  of  the  Union,  which  is  probably  not  far  from  the  truth,  and  would  have 
received  back  under  the  proposed  distribution  of  the  surplus  but  one  fourth,  ma 
king  one  million.  The  sum  to  be  distributed,  as  has  already  been  stated,  would 
not  have  been  returned  to  the  people,  but  to  the  treasury  of  the  state,  to  be 
disposed  of  by  the  Legislature  ;  or,  to  speak  more  specifically,  by  the  small 
portion  which,  for  the  time,  would  have  had  control  over  the  dominant  majori 
ty  of  the  Legislature.  All  who  have  experience  in  the  affairs  of  government, 
will  readily  understand  that  no  disposition  would  have  been  made  of  it  but  what 
they,  and  their  friends  and  supporters,  would  have  had  a  full  share  of  the  profits 
and  political  advantages  to  be  derived  from  its  administration  and  expenditure. 
Thus  an  interest  would  be  created  on  the  part  of  the  controlling  influence  in 
the  state  for  the  time,  adverse  to  it — an  interest  to  sustain  the  tariff,  as  the  means 
of  sustaining  the  distribution  ;  and  that  for  the  plain  reason,  that  they  would  re 
ceive  more  from  the  former  than  they  would  pay,  as  citizens,  under  the  duties. 

Now,  sir,  when  we  reflect  that  the  amount  taken  by  the  duties  out  of  the 
pockets  of  the  people  was  extracted  in  so  round-about  and  concealed  a  manner, 
that  no  one — no,  not  the  best  informed  and  shrewdest  calculator,  could  ascertain 
with  precision  what  he  paid,  while  that  received  back  from  distribution  would 
have  been  seen  and  felt  by  those  into  whose  hands  it  would  have  passed,  it  will 
be  readily  understood,  not  only  how  those  who  participated  directly  in  its  ad 
vantages,  but  the  people  themselves,  would  have  been  so  deluded  as  to  believe 
that  they  gained  more  by  the  distribution  than  what  they  lost  by  the  tariff,  es 
pecially  when  the  dominant  influence  in  the  state  would  have  been  interested 
in  creating  and  keeping  up  the  delusion. 

It  is  thus  that  the  result  of  the  scheme  would  have  been  to  combine  and  unite 
into  one  compact  mass  the  dominant  interests  of  all  the  states,  with  the  great 
dominant  interest  of  the  Union,  to  perpetuate  a  system  of  plundering  the  people 
of  the  products  of  their  labour,  especially  the  South,  to  be  divided  among  those, 
with  their  partisans,  who  could  control  the  politics  of  the  country.  It  was 
against  this  daring  and  profligate  scheme  that  South  Carolina  interposed  her  sov 
ereign  authority,  and  by  that  interposition,  as  I  solemnly  believe,  saved  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  liberty  of  the  country. 

But  that  step,  as  bold  and  decisive  as  it  was,  could  not  accomplish  all.  To 
save  the  manufacturing  interest,  and  avoid  the  hazard  of  reaction,  it  was  neces 
sary  to  reduce  the  duties  on  the  protected  articles  gradually  and  slowly.  The 
consequence  was  a  continued  overflow  of  the  treasury,  notwithstanding  the  duty 
on  every  article  not  produced  in  the  country  was  repealed,  amounting  in  val 
ue  to  one  half  of  the  whole,  to  such  an  enormous  extent  had  the  protective  du 
ties  been  raised.  A  remedy  had  to  be  applied  to  meet  the  corrupting  and  dan 
gerous  influence  of  this  temporary  surplus,  till  the  gradual  reduction  of  the  pro 
tective  duties  under  the  Compromise  Act  would  bring  them  to  the  ordinary  wants 
of  the  government.  There  was  but  one  remedy,  and  that  was  to  take  it  from 
the  treasury.  The  flow  was  too  great  for  the  most  lavish  expenditures  to  keep 
down.  I  saw,  in  advance,  that  such  would  be  the  case ;  and,  with  the  design 


SPEECHES  OP  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  devising  a  remedy  beforehand,  moved  for  a  special  committee,  with  the  view 
mainly  of  freeing  the  treasury  of  its  surplus,  as  the  great  source  of  executive 
influence  and  power.  The  committee,  concurring  in  that  opinion,  recommend 
ed  that  the  Constitution  should  be  so  amended  as  to  enable  Congress  to  make 
a  temporary  distribution.  The  report  fully  explains  the  reasons  for  believing 
there  would  be  a  large  and  corrupting  surplus,  and  why,  under  the  peculiar  cir 
cumstances  of  the  case,  the  distribution  as  proposed  was  the  only  remedy.  I 
have  marked  a  portion  of  it  that  will  show  the  opinion  I  then  entertained  in  ref 
erence  to  distribution,  and  which  I  ask  the  secretary  to  read. 

["  Second  Session,  Twenty-third  Congress. 

"  Your  committee  are  fully  aware  of  the  many  and  fatal  objections  to  the  dis 
tribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  among  the  states,  considered  as  a  part  of  the 
ordinary  and  regular  system  of  this  government.  They  admit  them  to  be  as 
great  as  can  be  well  imagined.  The  proposition  itself,  that  the  government 
should  collect  money  for  the  purpose  of  such  distribution,  or  should  distribute  a 
surplus  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  taxes,  is  too  absurd  to  require  refutation  ; 
and  yet  what  would  be  when  applied,  as  supposed,  so  absurd  and  pernicious, 
is,  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  in  the  present  extraordinary  and  deeply 
disordered  state  of  our  affairs,  not  only  useful  and  salutary,  but  indispensable  to 
the  restoration  of  the  body  politic  to  a  sound  condition ;  just  as  some  potent 
medicine,  which  it  would  be  dangerous  and  absurd  to  prescribe  to  the  healthy, 
may,  to  the  diseased,  be  the  only  means  of  arresting  the  hand  of  death.  Dis 
tribution,  as  proposed,  is  not  for  the  preposterous  and  dangerous  purpose  of  rais 
ing  a  revenue  for  distribution,  or  of  distributing  the  surplus  as  a  means  of  per 
petuating  a  system  of  duties  or  taxes,  but  a  temporary  measure  to  dispose  of  an 
unavoidable  surplus  while  the  revenue  is  in  the  course  of  reduction,  and  which 
cannot  be  otherwise  disposed  of  without  greatly  aggravating  a  disease  that 
threatens  the  most  dangerous  consequences,  and  which  holds  out  the  hope,  not 
only  of  arresting  its  farther  progress,  but  also  of  restoring  the  body  politic  to  a 
state  of  health  and  vigour.  The  truth  of  this  assertion  a  few  observations  will 

suffice  to  illustrate. 

****** 

"  It  may,  perhaps,  be  thought  by  some  that  the  power  which  the  distribution 
among  the  states  would  bring  to  bear  against  the  expenditure,  and  its  consequent 
tendency  to  retrench  the  disbursements  of  the  government,  would  be  so  strong 
as  not  only  to  curtail  useless  or  improper  expenditure,  but  also  the  useful  and 
necessary.  Such,  undoubtedly,  would  be  the  consequence,  if  the  process  were 
too  long  continued  ;  but,  in  the  present  irregular  and  excessive  action  of  the 
system,  when  its  centripetal  force  threatens  to  concentrate  all  its  powers  in  a 
single  department,  the  fear  that  the  action  of  this  government  will  be  too  much 
reduced  by  the  measure  under  consideration,  in  the  short  period  to  which  it  is 
proposed  to  limit  its  operation,  is  without  just  foundation.  On  the  contrary,  if 
the  proposed  measure  should  be  applied  in  the  present  diseased  state  of  the  gov 
ernment,  its  effect  would  be  like  that  of  some  powerful  alterative  medicine,  op 
erating  just  long  enough  to  change  the  present  morbid  action,  but  not  sufficient 
ly  long  to  superinduce  another  of  an  opposite  character."] 

The  measure  recommended  was  not  adopted.  It  was  denied,  and  violently 
denied,  that  there  would  be  a  surplus,  and  I  left  it  to  time  to  decide  which  opin 
ion  was  correct.  A  year  rolled  round,  and  conclusively  decided  the  point.  In 
stead  of  overrating,  experience  proved  I  had  greatly  under-estimated  the  surplus, 
as  I  felt  confident  at  the  time  I  had.  It  more  than  doubled  even  my  calcula 
tion.  I  again  revived  the  measure  ;  but  before  it  could  be  acted  on,  instructions 
from  state  legislatures,  with  intervening  elections,  turned  the  majority  in  the 
Senate,  which  had  been  opposed  to  the  administration,  into  a  minority.  I  ac- 


423  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

quiesced,  and  gave  notice  that  I  would  not  press  the  measure  I  had  introduced, 
and  would  leave  the  responsibility  with  the  majority,  to  devise  a  remedy  for 
what  was  at  last  acknowledged  to  be  a  great  and  dangerous  evil.  All  felt  that 
something  must  be  done,  and  that  promptly.  In  the  greatly  expande'd  state  of 
the  currency,  the  enormous  surplus  had  flowed  off  in  the  direction  of  the  pub 
lic  lands,  and,  by  a  sort  of  rotary  motion,  from  the  deposite  banks  to  the  spec 
ulators,  and  from  them  to  the  receivers,  and  back  again  to  the  banks,  to  per 
form  the  same  round  again,  rapidly  absorbing  every  acre  of  the  public  lands. 
No  one  saw  more  clearly  than  the  senator  from  New- York  (Mr.  Wright),  that 
an  effectual  and  speedy  remedy  was  indispensable  to  prevent  an  overwhelming 
catastrophe  ;  and  he  promptly  proposed  to  vest  the  surplus  in  the  stocks  of  the 
states,  to  which  I  moved  an  amendment  to  deposite  it  in  their  treasuries,  as  be 
ing  more  equal  and  appropriate.  These  were  acknowledged  to  be  the  only  al 
ternatives  to  leaving  it  in  the  deposite  banks.  Mine  succeeded,  and  the  pas 
sage  of  the  Deposite  Act,  which  is  now  unjustly  denounced  in  a  certain  quarter 
as  distribution,  and  not  as  deposite,  as  it  really  is,  followed. 

As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  the  denunciation  is  utterly  unfounded.  I  regard 
ed  it  then,  and  still  do,  as  simply  a  deposite — a  deposite,  to  say  the  least,  as 
constitutional  as  that  in  state  banks,  or  state  stocks  held  by  speculators  and 
stock-jobbers  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  and  far  more  just  and  appropriate 
than  either.  But  while  I  regard  it  as  a  deposite,  I  did  then,  and  now  do,  believe 
that  it  should  never  be  withdrawn  but  in  the  event  of  war,  when  it  would  be 
found  a  valuable  resource. 

But  had  it  been  in  reality  a  distribution,  it  would  be,  in  my  opinion,  if  not  al 
together,  in  a  great  measure  justified,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the 
case.  The  surplus  was  not  lawfully  collected.  Congress  has  no  right  to  take  a 
cent  from  the  people  but  for  the  just  and  constitutional  wants  of  the  country. 
To  take  more,  or  for  other  purposes,  as  in  this  case,  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  robbery — more  criminal  for  being  perpetrated  by  a  trustee  appointed  to 
guard  their  interest.  It  in  fact  belonged  to  those  from  whom  it  was  unjustly 
plundered  ;  and  if  the  individuals,  and  the  share  of  each,  could  have  been  as 
certained,  it  ought,  on  every  principle  of  justice,  to  have  been  returned  to  them. 
But  as  that  was  impossible,  the  nearest  practicable  approach  to  justice  was  to 
return  it  proportionably,  as  it  was,  to  the  states,  as  a  deposite,  till  wanted  for  the 
use  of  the  people  from  whom  it  was  unjustly  taken,  instead  of  leaving  it  with 
the  banks,  for  their  use,  which  had  no  claims  whatever  to  it,  or  vesting  it  in 
state  stocks,  for  the  benefit  of  speculators  and  stock-jobbers. 

As  brief  as  this  narrative  is,  I  trust  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  advocates 
of  this  amendment  can  find  nothing  in  my  former  opinion  or  course  to  weaken 
my  resistance  to  it.  or  to  form  the  show  of  a  precedent  for  the  extraordinary 
measure  which  it  proposes.  So  far  from  it,  the  Deposite  Act,  whether  viewed 
in  the  causes  which  led  to  it.  or  its  object  and  effect,  stands  in  direct  contrast 
with  it. 

We  stand,  sir,  in  the  midst  of  a  remarkable  juncture  in  our  affairs  ;  the  most 
remarkable,  in  many  respects,  that  has  occurred  since  the  foundation  of  the  gov 
ernment  ;  nor  is  it  probable  that  a  similar  one  will  ever  again  occur.  This  gov 
ernment  is  now  left  as  free  to  shape  its  policy,  unembarrassed  by  existing  engage 
ments  or  past  legislation,  as  it  was  when  it  first  went  into  operation,  and  even  more 
so.  The  entire  system  of  policy  originating  in  the  Federal  consolidation  school 
has  fallen  prostrate.  We  have  now  no  funded  debt,  no  National  Bank,  no  con 
nexion  with  the  banking  system,  no  protective  tariff.  In  a  word,  the  paper  sys 
tern,  with  all  its  corrupt  and  corrupting  progeny,  has,  as  far  as  this  government 
is  concerned,  vanished,  leaving  nothing  but  its  bitter  fruits  behind.  The  great 
and  solemn  question  now  to  be  decided  is,  Shall  we  again  return  and  repeat  the 
same  system  of  policy,  with  all  its  disastrous  effects  before  us,  and  under  which 
the  country  is  now  suffering,  to  be  again  followed  with  tenfold  aggravation ; 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  429 

or,  profiting  by  past  experience,  seize  the  precious  opportunity  to  take  the  only 
course  which  can  save  the  Constitution  and  liberty  of  the  country — that  of  the 
old  State  Rights  Republican  policy  of  1798  ?  Such  is  the  question  submitted 
for  our  decision  at  this  deeply  important  juncture  ;  and  on  that  decision  hangs 
the  destiny  of  our  country.  A  few  years  must  determine.  Much,  very  much 
will  depend  on  the  President  elect.  If  he  should  rest  his  policy  on  the  broad 
and  solid  principles  maintained  by  his  native  state,  in  her  purest  and  proudest 
days,  his  name  will  go  down  to  posterity  as  one  of  the  distinguished  benefactors 
of  the  country ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  if  he  should  adopt  the  policy  indicated  by 
the  amendment,  and  advocated  by  his  prominent  supporters  in  this  chamber,  and 
attempt  to  erect  anew  the  fallen  temple  of  consolidation,  his  overthrow,  or  that 
of  his  country,  must  be  the  inevitable  consequence. 


XXIX. 

SPEECH  IN  REPLY  TO  THE  SPEECHES  OF  MR.  WEBSTER  AND  MR.  CLAY,  ON  MR. 
CRITTENDEN'S  AMENDMENT  TO  THE  PRE-EMPTION  BILL,  JTANUARY  30,  1841. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said :  No  one  who  had  attended  to  this  debate  could  doubt 
that  the  cession  of  Virginia,  on  which  the  right  to  distribute  the  revenue  from 
the  public  lands  had  heretofore  been  placed,  was  altogether  too  narrow  to  sup 
port  that  measure.  The  portion  of  the  public  domain  ceded  by  her  is  small  in 
amount  when  compared  with  the  whole,  and  by  far  the  better  portion  of  it  had 
already  been  disposed  of,  leaving  a  residue  altogether  too  inconsiderable  to  ef 
fect  the  object  intended  by  the  distribution.  The  other,  and  much  the  larger 
portion  of  the  public  domain,  consisting  of  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Florida,  and 
the  entire  region  west  of  the  Mississippi  River,  was  purchased  out  of  the  com 
mon  fund  of  the  Union,  and  no  construction  which  could  be  put  on  the  deed  of 
cession  from  Virginia  could  possibly  apply  to  it.  This  was  seen  and  felt  by 
the  two  leading  advocates  of  this  amendment  on  the  other  side  of  the  chamber 
(Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Webtfer),  and  they,  accordingly,  endeavoured  to  find  some 
other  ground  on  which  to  jslace  the  right,  broad  enough  to  support  the  whole  ; 
and  found  it,  as  they  supposfed,  in  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  gives 
to  Congress  the  power  to  dispose  of  the  territories  and  other  property  belonging 
to  the  United  States.  In  this  they  both  concurred,  so  far  as  the  revenue  deri 
ved  from  the  lands  was  concerned.  But  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,  with 
bolder  views  than  his  associate,  extended  the  right  of  distributing,  as  I  under 
stood  him,  to  the  entire  revenue — comprehending  as  well  that  received  from 
taxes  as  from  lands. 

[Mr.  Webster  interposed,  and  denied  that  he  had  said  so.] 
I  stand  corrected,  and  am  happy  to  hear  the  denial  of  the  gentleman.  I  had 
so  understood  him,  and  am  gratified  that  he  had  so  restricted  the  right  as  to  ex 
clude  the  revenue  from  taxes.  But  I  cannot  be  mistaken  in  asserting  that  both 
of  the  senators  concur  in  regarding  the  power  conferred,  in  the  provision  refer 
red  to,  as  having  no  limitation  whatever  but  the  discretion  of  Congress.  If  such 
be  the  true  construction,  it  would,  of  course,  give  the  right  of  making  the  pro 
posed  distribution  ;  which  presents  the  question,  Has  Congress  the  right  of  dis 
posing  of  the  public  domain,  and  all  the  other  property  belonging  to  the  Union, 
and  the  revenue  derived  therefrom,  as  it  pleases,  without  any  constitutional  re 
strictions  whatever  1 

Before  I  proceed  to  discuss  that  question,  it  will  be  well  to  ascertain  what 
is  the  extent  and  value  of  the  property  embraced.  The  public  domain,  as  has 
been  frequently  stated  in  the  course  of  the  debate,  embraces  more  than  one 
thousand  millions  of  acres ;  and  the  other  property  includes  the  public  build- 


430  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ings,  dock  and  navy  yards,  forts,  arsenals,  magazines,  ships  of  war,  cannon, 
arms  of  all  descriptions,  naval  stores,  and  munitions  of  war.  It  is  difficult  to 
estimate  the  value  of  the  whole.  The  public  domain  alone,  according  to  the 
estimate  of  the  gentlemen  (not  mine),  at  $1  25  per  acre,  is  worth  upward  of 
$1,200,000,000;  and,  including  the  value  of  the  other  property,  the  whole,  at 
the  lowest  estimate,  must  far  exceed  $1,500,000,000,  and  probably  would  equal 
not  less  than  $2,000,000,000.  Such  is  the  extent  and  value  of  the  property- 
over  which  the  two  senators  claim  for  Congress  unlimited  and  absolute  right  to 
dispose  of  at  its  good-will  and  pleasure.  And  the  question  recurs,  Have  they 
such  right  ?  A  graver  question  has  never  been  presented  for  our  consideration, 
whether  we  regard  the  principles,  the  amount  of  property,  or  the  consequences 
involved. 

Now,  sir,  in  order  to  test  the  right,  it  is  my  intention  to  propound  a  few  questions 
to  the  senators,  to  which  I  hope  they  will  give  explicit  answers.  Suppose,  then, 
in  the  progress  of  time,  an  administration  should  come  in  (I  make  no  allusion 
to  the  next)  which  should  think  an  established  church  indispensable  to  uphold 
the  morals,  the  religion,  and  the  political  institutions  of  the  country :  would  it 
have  the  right  to  select  some  one  of  the  religious  sects — say  the  Methodist,, 
Baptist,  Presbyterian^  Episcopalian,  or  Catholic — and  erect  it  into  a  splendid 
hierarchy,  by  endowing  it  out  of  this  ample  fund  ? 

[Mr.  Webster :  "  The  Constitution  expressly  prohibits  it."] 

I  hear  the  answer  with  pleasure.  It  assigns  the  true  reason.  Here,  then, 
we  have  a  limitation  in  the  Constitution,  by  the  confession  of  the  senator ;  and., 
of  course,  there  is  one  restriction,  at  least,  on  the  unlimited  right  which  he  arid 
his  friend  claimed  for  Congress  over  this  vast  fund.  Having  made  good  this 
step,  I  proceed  to  take  another. 

Suppose,  then,  that  such  an  administration  should  undertake  to  colonize 
Africa,  with  the  view  of  Christianizing  and  civilizing  it,  and,  for  that  pur 
pose,  should  propose  to  vest  this  vast  fund,  or  a  portion  of  it,  in  the  Coloni 
zation  Society :  would  Congress  have  the  right  of  doing  so  ?  Or,  to  take  a 
still  stronger  case,  suppose  a  majority  of  Congress  should  become  abolition 
ists  :  would  it  have  the  right  to  distribute  this  vast  sum  among  the  various  abo 
lition  societies,  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  their  fanatical  schemes  1  The  sena 
tor  is  silent.  I  did  not  anticipate  an  answer.  He  cannot  say  yes  ;  and  to  say 
no  would  be  to  surrender  the  whole  ground.  Nor  can  he  say,  as  he  did,  that 
it  is  prohibited  by  the  Constitution.  I  will  relieve  the  senator.  I  answer  for 
him  :  Congress  has  no  such  right,  and  cannot  exercise  it  without  violation  of 
the  Constitution.  But  why  not  ?  The  answer  is  simple,  but  decisive  :  because 
Congress  has  not  the  right  to  exercise  any  power  except  what  is  expressly 
granted  by  the  Constitution,  or  may  be  necessary  to  execute  the  granted  pow 
ers  ;  and  that  in  question  is  neither  granted,  nor  necessary  to  execute  a  granted 
power. 

Having  gained  this  important  point,!  next  ask  the  senators,  Would  Congress 
have  the  right  to  appropriate  the  whole,  or  part,  of  this  vast  fund  to  be  drawn 
directly  from  the  treasury,  in  payment  of  the  principal  or  interest  of  the  state 
bonds  ?  And  if  not  (as  they  certainly  would  not,  for  the  reason  already  assign 
ed),  has  it  the  right  to  give  it  to  the  states  to  be  so  applied  ?  Can  it  do  that  in 
directly  by  an  agent,  which  it  cannot  constitutionally  do  directly  by  itself  ?  If 
so,  I  would  be  glad  to  hear  the  reason.  I  might  proceed  and  propound  ques 
tion  after  question,  equally  embarrassing ;  but  abstain,  lest  I  should  exhaust  the 
patience  of  the  Senate. 

But  there  is  one  question  of  a  different  character  which  I  must  propound,  and 
to  which  I  would  be  glad  to  have  the  answers  of  the  two  ingenious  and  learned 
senators.  They  are  both  agreed,  as  I  now  understand  the  senator  from  Massa 
chusetts,  that  the  revenue  from  taxes  can  be  applied  only  to  the  objects  specif 
ically  enumerated  in  the  Constitution,  and  in  repudiating  the  general  welfare 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  431 

principle,  as  applied  to  the  money  power,  as  far  as  the  revenue  may  be  derived 
from  that  source.  To  this  extent,  they  profess  to  be  good  State  Rights  Jeffer- 
sonian  Republicans.  Now,  sir,  I  would  be  happy  to  be  informed  by  either  of 
the  able  senators — I  regret  that  one  (Mr.  Clay)  is  not  in  his  seat — by  what  po 
litical  alchymy  the  revenue  from  taxes,  by  being  vested  in  land  or  other  proper 
ty,  can,  when  again  turned  into  revenue  by  sales,  be  entirely  freed  from  all  the 
constitutional  restrictions  to  which  they  were  liable  before  the  investment,  ac 
cording  to  their  own  confessions  ?  A  satisfactory  explanation  of  so  curious  and 
apparently  incomprehensible  a  process  would  be  a  treat. 

The  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  failing  to  find  any  argument  to  sus 
tain  the  broad  and  unqualified  right  of  distributing  the  revenue  from  the  public 
lands  as  Congress  might  think  proper,  sought  to  establish  it  by  precedent.  For 
that  purpose  he  cited,  as  a  precedent,  the  distribution  of  arms  among  the  stites  ; 
which,  he  contended,  sanctioned  also  the  distribution  of  the  revenue  from  the 
lands  among  them.  The  senator  forgot  that  it  is  made  the  duty  of  Congress, 
under  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  "  to  provide  for  arming  the  mili 
tia  ;"  and  that  the  militia  force  belongs  to  the  states,  and  not  to  the  Union  ;  and, 
of  course,  that,  in  distributing  arms  among  the  states  with  the  view  of  arming 
them,  Congress  but  fulfil  a  duty  enjoined  on  them  by  the  Constitution. 

The  palpable  misconception,  as  I  must  consider  it,  into  which  the  two  sena 
tors  have  fallen  in  reference  to  this  important  question,  originates,  as  I  con 
ceive,  in  overlooking  other  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  They  seem  not  to 
advert  to  the  fact  that  the  lands  belong  to  the  United  States — that  is,  to  the  states 
in  their  united  and  Federal  character  ;  and  that  the  government,  instead  of  being 
the  absolute  proprietor,  is  but  an  agent  appointed  to  manage  the  joint  concern. 
They  overlook  a  still  more  important  consideration — that  the  United  States,  in 
their  united  and  Federal  character,  are  restricted  to  the  express  grants  of  pow 
ers  contained  in  the  Constitution,  which  says  "  that  the  powers  not  delegated 
to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  states,  are 
reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  or-  to  the  people ;"  and,  also,  that  the  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States,  as  the  common  agent,  is  restricted  expressly,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  powers,  to  the  objects  specified  in  the  instrument,  and  passing 
such  laws  only  as  may  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  them  into  execu 
tion.  It  follows  that  Congress  can  have  no  right  to  make  the  proposed  distri 
bution,  or  use  its  powers  to  effect  any  other  object,  except  such  as  are  express 
ly  authorized,  without  violating  and  transcending  the  limits  prescribed  by  the 
Constitution. 

It  is  thus  the  whole  fabric  erected  by  the  arguments  of  the  two  senators  falls 
to  the  ground  by  the  giving  way  of  the  foundation  on  which  they  rest,  except 
the  small  portion  of  lands  embraced  in  the  Virginia  cession  ;  which  I  will  next 
proceed  to  show  stands  on  ground  not  more  solid.  It  will  not  be  necessary, 
for  that  purpose,  to  travel  over  the  arguments  which  I  offered,  when  last  up, 
against  the  right  to  make  the  distribution,  attempted  to  be  deduced  from  that 
cession,  and  which  have  been  so  much  enlarged  and  strengthened  by  the  able 
and  lucid  speech  of  the  senator  from  New-York  (Mr.  Wright).  I  propose  sim 
ply  to  reply,  in  this  connexion,  to  the  arguments  of  the  senator  from  Kentucky 
(Mr.  Clay),  who  I  again  have  to  regret  is  not  in  his  place. 

His  first  position  was,  that  the  resolution  of  the  old  Congress,  which  recom 
mended  to  the  states  to  cede  the  land  to  the  Union,  held  out,  as  motives,  the 
payment  of  the  debt  contracted  in  the  Revolution,  and  the  inducement  it  offer 
ed  to  the  states  to  adopt  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  From  this  he  inferred 
that  these  constituted  the  sole  objects  of  the  cession.  I  admit  that,  if  there  was 
any  ambiguity  in  the  deeds  of  cession  as  it  respects  the  objects  of  the  cession, 
a  reference  to  the  resolution  which  proposed  it  might  be  fairly  made,  in  order 
to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  parties  ;  but  that  is  not  the  case.  The  deeds 
are  couched  in  the  broadest  and  most  comprehensive  terms,  and  make  an  abso- 


432  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

lute  cession  of  the  lands  to  the  United  States,  as  a  common  fund,  without  lim 
itation  as  to  the  objects. 

But  the  argument  on  which  he  mainly  relied  was,  that,  although  the  cession 
is  to  the  United  States  in  their  united  and  Federal  character,  to  be  administered 
by  Congress  as  a  common  agent,  the  use  is  for  the  states  in  their  separate  and 
individual  character.  If  the  fact  were  so,  the  argument  would  be  strong ;  but 
it  happens  to  be  the  very  reverse.  It  is  expressly  provided  in  the  Virginia  ces 
sion,  that  the  land  should  be  considered  a  common  fund,  for  the  use  and  benefit 
of  the  states,  as  members  of  the  Confederation  or  Federal  alliance,  and  for  no  other 
Use  or  purpose  whatever.  The  senator  will  not  venture  to  deny  that  common  is 
the  very  opposite  of  separate ;  and,  of  course,  the  distinction  on  which  he  so 
much  relied,  that  the  use  was  separate,  falls  to  the  ground. 

His  next  position  rested  on  the  expression  in  the  deed  of  cession,  "  according 
to  their  usual  respective  proportion  in  the  general  charge  and  expenditure," 
which  has  been  bandied  about  so  often  in  this  and  former  discussions  on  this  sub 
ject,  that  I  will  not  go  over  the  argument  again,  as  conclusive  as  I  consider  it,  as 
*I  am  sure  the  Senate  must  be  surfeited  to  nausea  with  those  words.  I  take 
higher  ground,  which  I  regard  as  conclusive,  be  their  meaning  what  they  may. 

It  will  not  be  denied  that  the  Constitution  must  override  the  deeds  of  cession, 
and  that  of  Virginia  among  the  rest,  whenever  they  come  in  conflict ;  and  that, 
for  the  plain  reason  that  the  parties  to  both  were  the  same,  and  had,  of  course, 
a  right,  in  adopting  the  Constitution,  to  change  or  modify  the  previous  acts  of 
cession  as  they  pleased.  Now,  sir,  I  repeat,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that 
the  Constitution,  in  superseding  the  old  system  of  requisition  on  the  states,  as 
the  mode  of  raising  the  common  supplies  of  the  Union,  by  the  system  of  taxing 
the  people  directly,  superseded  this  particular  provision,  which  all  admit  had 
reference  to  the  former  system  of  requisition.  The  senator  himself  in  reality 
admits  such  to  be  the  fact,  by  proposing  to  distribute  the  revenue  from  the  lands 
according  to  federal  numbers — the  rule  of  imposing  direct  taxes  under  the  Con 
stitution — instead  of  the  assessed  value  of  improved  lands — the  rule  of  making 
requisitions  under  the  old  confederation.  This  provision,  then,  being  thus  su 
perseded,  the  lands  are  left  as  the  property  of  the  Union,  for  the  common  use 
of  the  states  which  compose  it,  freed  from  these  disputed  words,  and  without 
the  semblance  of  a  doubt ;  and  the  Constitution,  accordingly,  speaks  of  the  pub 
lic  lands,  in  broad  and  unqualified  terms,  as  belonging  to  the  United  States. 

The  last  ground  assumed  by  the  senator  was,  that,  as  the  lands  are  common 
property,  it  is  competent  for  Congress,  as  the  common  agent,  to  divide  their 
proceeds  among  the  United  States,  as  joint-owners.  It  might  be  true  in  the 
case  of  individuals  owning  a  joint-farm,  to  be  worked  in  common,  as  supposed 
by  the  senator ;  but  that  is  not  analogous  to  the  case  of  the  United  States, 
where  there  is  a  joint  concern,  for  specific  objects,  with  a  common  agent  to 
carry  it  into  effect,  for  the  joint  interest  of  the  concern,  without  any  authority  to 
distribute  the  profits.  In  such  a  case,  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  plainest  dic 
tates  of  reason,  and  the  established  principles  of  law,  for  the  j.gent  to  undertake 
to  apply  to  the  separate  and  individual  use  of  the  partners  what  was  intended 
by  them  for  the  joint  concern.  It  would  be  to  make  that  separate  which  his 
principals  intended  to  be  common. 

When  I  look,  Mr.  President,  to  what  induced  the  states,  and  especially  Vir 
ginia,  to  make  this  magnificent  cession  to  the  Union,  and  the  high  and  patriotic 
motives  urged  by  the  old  Congress  to  induce  them  to  do  it,  and  turn  to  what  is 
now  proposed,  I  am  struck  with  the  contrast,  and  the  great  mutation  to  which 
human  affairs  are  subject.  The  great  and  patriotic  men  of  former  times  re 
garded  it  as  essential  to  the  consummation  of  the  Union,  and  the  preservation 
of  the  public  faith,  that  the  lands  should  be  ceded  as  a  common  fund ;  but  now, 
men  distinguished  for  their  ability  and  influence,  and  who  are  about  to  assume 
the  high  trust  of  administering  the  government,  are  striving  with  all  their  might 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  433 

(and  that,  too,  when  this  fund  is  most  needed)  to  undo  their  holy  work.  Yes, 
sir :  distribution  and  cession  are  the  very  reverse  in  character  and  effect ;  the 
tendency  of  one  is  to  union,  and  the  other  to  disunion.  The  wisest  of  modern 
statesmen,  and  who  had  the  keenest  and  deepest  glance  into  futurity  (Edmund 
Burke),  truly  said  that  the  revenue  is  the  state  ;  to  which  I  add,  that  to  dis 
tribute  the  revenue  in  a  confederated  community  among  its  members  is  to  dis 
solve  the  community — that  is,  with  us,  the  Union  ;  as  time  will  prove,  if  ever 
this  fatal  measure  should  be  adopted. 

There  is  another  contrast,  not  less  striking.  The  states  composing  the  old 
confederation,  in  their  extreme  jealousy  of  power,  adopted  the  system  of  requi 
sition  as  the  means  of  supplying  the  common  treasury ;  but  that  proving  insuf 
ficient,  it  was  changed,  with  the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitution,  into  the 
system  of  laying  taxes  directly  on  individuals.  But  now,  it  is  proposed  to  re 
store  virtually  the  exploded  system  of  requisition,  but  in  the  reverse  order — 
requisitions  of  the  states  on  the  Union,  instead  of  the  Union  on  the  states  ;  and 
thereby  reversing  the  relation  which  the  wise  and  patriotic  founders  of  our  po 
litical  institutions  regarded  as  essential  to  liberty.  They  regarded  it  as  a 
fundamental  principle,  that  the  people  should  grant  the  supplies  to  the  govern 
ment,  in  order  to  keep  it  dependant  on  them.  But  now  this  is  to  be  reversed ; 
and  the  government,  in  the  shape  of  distribution,  is  to  grant  supplies  to  the  peo 
ple.  How  is  this  to  be  done  ?  How  can  the  government,  which,  with  all  its 
legislation,  does  not  produce  a  cent,  grant  supplies  to  those  who  are  the  pro 
ducers  of  all  ?  I  will  tell  you  :  the  supplies  to  be  distributed  to  the  states  are 
to  be  collected  in  a  roundabout,  concealed  manner,  under  the  plausible  pretext 
of  taxing  luxuries  (wines  and  silks),  to  be  paid  by  the  rich,  or  nobody,  as  we 
are  told,  to  meet  the  requisitions  of  the  governments  of  the  states,  lest  their 
constituents  should  turn  them  out  for  taxing  them  directly  and  openly.  Yes : 
$e  are  plainly  told  that  the  states  have  surrendered  the  right  of  taxing  imports, 
the  most  easy  and  convenient  mode  of  raising  a  revenue — that  is,  the  most  con 
cealed  and  ingenious  way  to  the  pockets  of  the  people ;  and  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  this  government,  to  which  this  convenient  contrivance  is  intrusted,  to  raise 
supplies  by  its  use,  not  only  to  meet  its  own  wants,  but  also  to  meet  those  of 
the  states.  What  monstrous  and  dangerous  perversion  ! 

If  (continued  Mr.  Calhoun)  I  have  been  successful  in  demonstrating  the 
utter  unconstitutionally  of  this  dangerous  scheme,  as  I  trust  I  have,  the  Sen 
ate  will  not  expect  me  to  follow  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  in  his 
excursive  flights  in  favour  of  the  expediency  of  this,  his  favourite  and  cherished 
scheme.  If  Congress  has  no  right  to  adopt  it,  there  is  an  end  of  the  whole 
affair ;  but  there  is  one  of  the  good  effects  he  imputes  to  it  that  I  cannot  pass 
in  silence.  He  asserted  that  it  would  finally  settle  the  disputes  and  agitations 
growing  out  of  questions  connected  with  the  public  lands,  by  reconciling  and 
harmonizing  all  conflicting  interests,  and  restoring  kind  feelings  in  relation  to 
them  between  the  old  and  new  states.  Such  are  his  anticipations ;  but  will 
they  be  realized  ?  Let  the  tone  with  which  the  senators  from  Missouri  (Mr. 
Linn)  and  Arkansas  (Mr.  Sevier)  denounced  his  scheme,  answer.  Does  he 
not  know  that  every  senator  from  the  new  states,  with  the  exception  of  those 
from  Indiana,  are  opposed  to  his  measure  1  Can  he,  in  the  face  of  such  facts, 
really  hope  for  a  final  settlement  of  the  vexed  question  of  the  public  lands,  or  a 
?  restoration  of  harmony  between  the  old  and  new  states  in  relation  to  them? 
On  the  contrary,  will  it  not  imbitter  the  feelings  on  both  sides  ?  Can  he  ex 
pect  that  the  new  states  would  see  with  favour  a  mortgage  laid  on  that  portion 
of  the  public  domain  lying  within  their  limits,  for  the  security  of  the  holders  of 
state  bonds  ?  Such,  virtually,  would  be  the  case  should  the  distribution  be 
made.  The  holders  would  regard  it  as  a  pledge  ;  and  to  withhold  it,  when 
once  made,  as  a  violation  of  faith. 

Would  it  conciliate  the  staple   states — the   growers  of  rice,  cotton,  and 

III 


434  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tobacco — on  which  the  tax  to  make  good  the  deficiency  caused  by  the  distribu 
tion  must  principally  fall  ?  It  is  in  vain  you  tell  them  that  the  duties  on  wines 
and  silks  would  fall  on  the  consumers,  or  on  the  producers  of  those  articles 
abroad.  They  know,  by  woful  experience,  that  it  matters  little  to  them 
whether  the  duty  be  laid  on  the  export  of  the  staples  they  produce,  or  the  im 
portation  of  products  received  in  exchange  ;  whether  the  duties  be  paid  on 
their  products  going  out  of  port,  or  the  return  cargo  coming  in.  Viewing  it  in 
that  light,  the  people  of  those  states  will  regard  the  measure  as  a  cunningly- 
devised  scheme  to  pay  the  debts  of  others  at  their  expense. 

Would  it,  I  again  ask,  reconcile  the  states  free  from  debt  ?  Will  they  be 
satisfied  to  be  taxed  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  states  which  have  been  less  cau 
tious  in  their  engagements  than  themselves  1  I  ask  the  senators  from  New- 
Hampshire,  Would  their  state,  happily  free  from  all  debt,  be  satisfied  ? 

Instead  of  the  final  settlement  of  the  question,  or  the  restoration  of  harmony, 
it  would  unsettle  the  whole  subject  of  the  public  lands,  and  throw  the  apple  of 
discord  among  the  states. 

Having  now  said  what  I  intended  on  the  immediate  question  under  consider 
ation,  I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  to  reply  to  the  objections  which  have 
been  made  to  the  proposition  I  offered  in  an  earlier  stage  of  this  discussion, 
to  cede  to  the  new  states  the  lands  lying  within  their  respective  limits,  on  just 
and  equitable  conditions.  The  Senate  will  recollect  that  the  debate  on  that 
measure  terminated  unexpectedly,  and  without  affording  me  an  opportunity  of 
answering  the  objections  against  it.  As  there  will  probably  be  no  other  oppor 
tunity  of  meeting  them,  I  trust  it  will  be  a  sufficient  apology  for  doing  so  on. 
this  occasion. 

I  begin  with  what,  to  me,  would  be  the  most  formidable  objection — that,  un 
der  the  garb  of  a  cession,  the  measure  is,  in  fact,  but  a  mode  of  distribution.  I 
reply,  as  on  a  former  occasion,  Prove  it,  and  I  shall  renounce  it  at  once,  ana 
forever.  But  I  cannot  take  assertion  for  proof,  however  boldly  made.  Until  it 
is  proved,  I  shall  regard  the  charge  of  distribution,  coming  as  it  does  from  the 
open  advocates  of  that  measure,  as  originating  in  a  conscious  feeling  that,  so  far 
from  being  popular,  the  scheme  has  no  hold  on  the  affections  of  the  people. 
If  they  believed  it  to  be  popular,  those  who  so  warmly  oppose  cession  would 
be  the  last  to  call  it  distribution. 

It  is  next  objected  that  it  is  a  gift  of  the  lands  to  the  new  states.  Be  it  so. 
I  would  infinitely  rather  make  a  gift  of  the  whole  than  to  adopt  the  fatal  policy 
of  distribution ;  and,  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  defeat  it,  I  would  regard  a  sur 
render  of  the  whole  as  a  cheap  sacrifice.  I  go  farther,  and  hold  that  if  the 
lands,  instead  of  being  regarded  as  the  property  of  the  Union,  should  be  regard 
ed  as  the  property  of  the  states  separately,  the  new  states  would  have  the  best 
right  to  the  portion  within  their  limits.  They  possess,  unquestionably,  the 
eminent  domain,  which  would  have  carried  with  it  the  property  in  the  public 
lands  within  their  borders  respectively,  had  they  not  surrendered  it  by  special 
agreement  on  their  admission  into  the  Union.  But  that  agreement  was  with 
the  United  States,  and  the  surrender  of  the  property  in  the  lands  was  to  them  ; 
and  it  may  be  fairly  questioned  how  far  the  agreement,  on  their  admission, 
would  be  binding  on  them,  should  the  revenue  from  the  lands  be  perverted  from 
the  use  of  the  United  States  to  that  of  the  states  separately,  as  is  proposed  by 
this  scheme  of  distribution. 

But  is  the  cession  a  gift  ?  Does  it  propose  a  surrender  of  the  land  for  no 
thing  ?  Is  65  per  cent,  of  the  gross  proceeds  to  be  paid  into  the  treasury  no 
thing  ?  Is  it  nothing  to  put  an  end  to  the  angry  and  agitating  debates  which 
we  witness  session  after  session,  constantly  increasing  in  violence  ?  Nothing 
to  «s,ve  the  time,  and  labour,  and  expense  of  Congress  ?  Nothing  to  curtail 
one  fourth  of  the  patronage  of  the  government,  and  that  of  the  most  dangerous 
character  ?  Nothing  to  raise  the  new  states  to  a  level  with  the  old  ?  Nothing 


• 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  435 

to 'remove  this  great  disturbing  cause,  which  so  injuriously  influences  our  legis 
lation  ?  Is  it  nothing,  finally,  to  substitute  a  system  in  lieu  of  the  present,  as 
far  as  the  lands  lying  within  the  new  states  are  concerned,  which,  in  addition 
to  all  these  considerations,  proposes  the  only  practical  method  of  preventing  the 
loss  of  the  lands,  and  which,  so  far  from  a  pecuniary  loss,  will  bring  more  into 
the  treasury  than  the  present  system  ?  I  boldly  assert  that  such  would  be  the 
case  ;  as  I  may  well  do  now,  as  no  one  opposed  to  the  measure  has  ventured 
to  question  the  correctness  of  the  calculation,  or  the  data  on  which  it  rests. 

But  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  says  it  is  a  gift,  because  35  per 
cent,  is  too  high  a  compensation  to  the  states  for  their  expense  and  trouble  in 
managing  the  land.  He  estimates  the  actual  expense,  all  things  included,  at 
2i  per  cent,  on  the  gross  receipts,  and  says  that  all  beyond  that  is  a  gift  to  the 
states.  He  has  ventured  this  assertion  with  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Public  Lands  at  the  last  session  before  him,  containing  in  detail,  from  the 
proper  departments,  an  estimate  of  the  expense  which,  on  a  supposition  that 
the  average  annual  sale  of  the  portion  of  the  land  in  question  would  average  two 
and  a  half  millions,  would  amount  to  22  per  cent.  The  senator  has  omitted  all 
the  expenses  except  that  of  selling  the  lands,  when,  by  turning  to  the  tables, 
he  will  find  that  nearly  one  third  is  yet  to  be  surveyed  and  platted  ;  that  a  large 
amount  must  be  paid  for  extinguishing  Indian  titles,  and  removing  Indians  to 
the  West.  He  also  overlooks  that  the  5  per  cent,  fund  is  to  be  surrendered  by 
those  states  :  a  sum  of  itself  equal  to  double  the  amount  which  he  has  estima 
ted  as  the  entire  expense  to  which  the  states  would  be  subject. 

To  these  large  items  must  be  added  donations,  which,  instead  of  being  made, 
as  they  have  heretofore  been,  by  Congress,  are,  if  made  by  the  states,  to  be  paid 
for  by  them  at  the  selling  price  of  the  land  at  the  time,  allowing  them  35  per 
cent. ;  and  also  the  sums  spent  on  internal  improvement,  which,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  the  portion  spent  on  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio,  are  to  terminate  ;  and,  final 
ly,  the  saving  of  expense  in  our  legislation,  and  in  the  General  Land  Office,  in 
consequence  of  the  cession.  All  of  which  the  senator  has  omitted — omitted, 
notwithstanding  they  are  to  be  found  in  the  report  before  him,  and  to  which  he 
has  referred  in  the  debate.  These,  as  I  have  stated,  amount  to  22  per  cent,  on 
the  gross  amount  of  the  sales  ;  to  which  the  committee  has  added  13  per  cent., 
making  the  35 — not  as  a  gratuity,  but  on  the  ground  of  liberal  compensation  be 
yond  mere  expense  and  saving  to  this  government,  as  being  right  of  itself,  and 
necessary  to  ensure  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  states  in  carrying  out  a 
measure  that  would  be  highly  beneficial  to  the  whole  Union,  arid  which  could 
not  be  successfully  carried  out  without  such  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the 
states.  Not  a  cent  has  been  proposed  to  be  allowed  which  could  be  avoided, 
with  just  regard  to  sound  policy. 

But  the  senator  was  not  content  with  holding  out  the  difference  of  what  he 
was  pleased  to  regard  the  actual  expense,  and  the  35  per  cent,  as  a  gift.  He 
took  stronger  grounds,  and  pronounced  it  to  be  a  gift  of  all  the  public  lands,  on 
the  assumption  that  the  cession  would  be  extended  to  the  states  hereafter  to 
come  in,  on  their  admission ;  and,  next,  to  the  territories  ;  and,  finally,  to  tire 
whole  of  the  public  domain.  I  will  not  undertake  to  reply  to  a  mere  assump 
tion  without  proof,  farther  than  to  say,  that  every  measure  of  sound  policy  may 
be  in  like  manner  condemned,  if  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  what  we  have  wisely 
done,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  may  form  a  precedent  for  others 
to  do  under  dissimilar  circumstances,  and  without  regard  to  the  principle  on 
which  we  acted.  In  proposing  the  measure  I  have,  I  yield  to  the  necessity  of 
remedying  a  great  and  growing  evil,  originating  in  the  fact  that  this  govern 
ment  is  the  owner  and  administrator  of  a  large  portion  of  the  territories  of  nine 
states  of  this  Union,  and  which  cannot  be  remedied  so  long  as  their  ownership 
and  administratorship  continue.  It  is  the  number  and  influence  of  the  states  in 
which  they  exist  that  give  such  magnitude  and  danger  to  the  evil ;  and  what 


436  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Ave  may  do  now,  under  such  circumstances,  cannot  constitute  a  precedent,  to  be 
extended  in  the  manner  which  the  senator  supposes  it  will  be.  On  the  con 
trary,  by  adopting  the  measure,  we  would  enlist  .the  new  states,  now  opposed  to 
the  old  on  almost  all  questions  growing  out  of  the  public  lands,  to  aid  in  vigi 
lantly  guarding  the  residue  of  the  public  domain. 

The  senator  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Webster)  took  different  grounds.  He 
insisted  that  cession  necessarily  implies  gift ;  and  therefore,  as  I  suppose, 
the  one  I  have  proposed  is  a  gift,  in  spite  of  the  many  valuable  considerations 
inducing  to  it.  I  do  not  attach  the  same  meaning  to  the  word  which  he  does ; 
but,  as  I  have  no  taste  for  verbal  criticism,  I  have  assented  to  the  request  of  a 
friend  to  change  "cession"  to  "dispose  of" — the  words  used  in  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  which,  on  the  authority  of  the  two  senators,  are  of  such  comprehen 
sive  meaning  as  to  confer  on  Congress  unlimited  power  to  do  as  they  please 
with  the  public  lands. 

But  it  seems  that,  so  soon  as  I  had  availed  myself  of  this  comprehensive 
term,  it  forthwith  contracted  to  the  narrowest  limits.  1  was  told  the  lands  could 
not  be  disposed  of  to  the  states.  Why  not  ?  They  can  be  disposed  of  to  indi 
viduals,  and  to  companies  of  individuals  ;  and  why  not  to  that  company  or  com 
munity  of  individuals  which  constitutes  a  state  ?  Can  any  good  reason  be  as 
signed  ? 

I  am  next  told  that  we  may  dispose  of  them  absolutely,  but  not  conditionally. 
I  again  repeat  the  question,  Why  not  ?  What  is  it  that  limits  our  power  ?  We 
can  dispose  of  the  lands  to  individuals  on  condition,  of  which  there  are  striking 
instances  in  lands  containing  lead  mines.  They  are  leased  for  a  term  of  years, 
on  condition  that  one  tenth  of  the  lead  be  paid  to  the  government  in  kind.  If 
this  can  be  done  for  a  term  of  years,  what  is  to  prevent  it  from  being  done  for 
ever,  on  the  same  condition  ?  And,  if  so,  why  may  we  not  prescribe  the  rules 
on  which  the  mines  shall  be  worked  ?  If  all  this  can  be  done  in  the  case  of 
individuals,  what  is  to  prevent  it  from  disposing  of  the  public  lands  to  the  states 
on  the  conditions  proposed,  and  to  prescribe  the  rules  to  be  observed  by  them 
in  the  sales  and  management ;  that  is,  to  adopt  the  measure  I  have  proposed  ? 

It  is  next  objected,  that  it  is  not  a  disposition  of  the  lands,  but  merely  a  trans 
fer  of  the  administration  of  them  to  the  states.  I  deny  the  fact.  It  is  intended, 
and  is,  in  reality,  a  conditional  disposition  or  sale  to  the  states.  But  if  it  were 
otherwise,  and  as  supposed,  I  ask,  What  is  there  to  prevent  Congress  from  dis 
posing  of  the  lands  by  an  agency,  or  to  employ  the  states  as  the  agent,  and  pre 
scribe  the  rules  by  which  they  shall  be  disposed  of?  I  can  see  no  solid  objec 
tion  to  such  arrangement,  but  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  point, 
because  the  fact  is  not  as  is  supposed. 

Then  follows  the  objection,  that  it  would  create  the  relation  of  creditor  and 
debtor  between  this  government  and  the  states.  Admit  it  to  be  the  fact :  I  ask, 
Is  that  relation  more  objectionable,  or  as  much  so,  as  that  which  now  exists  of 
landlord  and  tenant,  growing  out  of  ownership  and  administration  in  this  gov 
ernment  of  so  large  a  part  of  the  domain  of  these  states — a  relation  which  is  the 
par-ent  of  so  many  evils,  both  to  them  and  us  ?  But,  to  put  an  end  to  the  objec 
tion,  I  have,  on  the  suggestion  of  some  of  the  members  from  the  new  states,  so 
modified  my  proposition  as  to  provide  that  the  65  per  cent,  of  the  proceeds  of 
the  sales  coming  to  the  government  shall  be  paid  directly  to  its  own  officers — 
say  the  marshals  in  each  of  the  states.  Now  I  ask  the  opponents  of  the  meas 
ure  to  join  me,  and,  by  the  cession,  to  put  an  end,  in  the  only  way  it  can  be 
done,  to  the  still  more  objectionable  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  between  this 
government  and  the  states. 

It  is  farther  objected,  that  it  would  not  settle  the  question.  It  is  said,  if  we 
cede  the  lands,  the  next  demand  would  be  to  relinquish  that  portion  of  the  pro 
ceeds  of  their  sales  which  is  to  be  paid  to  the  government ;  that  concession 
would  have  to  follow  concession,  till  the  whole  would  be  lost.  This,  sir,  is  the 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  437 

old  answer  which  the  advocates  of  existing  abuses  are  ever  ready  to  give  those 
who  complain.  It  is  the  answer  of  Lord  North  in  the  controversy  which  led 
to  our  Revolution.  He  refused  to  yield  the  disputed  right  of  taxing  the  colo 
nies,  on  the  ground  that  to  yield  would  not  satisfy  them.  If  taxation  was  sur 
rendered,  he  said  it  would  not  settle  the  question ;  that  their  next  demand 
would  be  to  surrender  the  right  of  regulating  their  commerce.  The  result  of 
'such  blind  obstinacy  was  the  dismemberment  of  the  British  Empire. 

There  is  not  a  feature  which  more  strongly  distinguishes  the  firm  and  en 
lightened  statesman  from  the  obstinate  or  weak  than  that  of  knowing  when  it 
is  proper  to  make  concessions,  as  the  means  of  avoiding,  in  the  end,  the  humil 
iation  of  submission  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  modification  of  defeat  on  the  other  ; 
and  never  was  there  an  occasion  or  a  question  when  it  was  more  politic  than 
at  this  time,  and  on  this  question.  It  may  now  be  made  with  dignity.  The 
question  may  now  be  adjusted  on  just  and  honourable  terms ;  but,  if  it  be  de 
layed,  the  new  states  will  decide  it,  in  a  few  years,  in  their  own  way,  without  ask 
ing  our  leave,  by  their  rapid  relative  increase  in  population  and  political  weight. 

They  are  now  anxious  for  a  fair  adjustment,  and  we  may  satisfy  them  with 
out  making  any  real  sacrifice  on  our  part ;  and  it  is  doing  injustice  to  them  to 
suppose  that,  after  soliciting  a  measure  so  liberal,  and  from  which  they  would 
derive  such  advantages,  they  would  suddenly  turn  round  and  condemn  what 
they  had  solicited,  and  make  the  palpably  unjust  demand,  that  we  should  sur 
render  the  portion  of  the  proceeds  coming  to  the  government.  There  is  no 
thing  in  their  past  history  that  would  warrant  such  an  imputation  on  their  char 
acter. 

It  was  next  objected,  that  the  measure  was  unequal;  and,  to  prove  it  so,  the 
case  of  Ohio,  which  has  but  a  small  amount  of  public  lands  within  its  limits  to 
be  disposed  of,  was  contrasted  with  that  of  Illinois,  which  has  a  large  amount ; 
and,  because  the  portion  of  the  proceeds  to  be  allowed  to  the  states  (35  per 
cent,  of  the  gross  amount)  would  be  small  in  the  case  of  the  former  when  com 
pared  with  that  of  the  latter,  the  measure  is  pronounced  unequal  and  unjust.  If 
it  were  a  scheme  of  distribution,  as  has  been  erroneously  alleged,  such  might 
be  the  fact ;  but  as,  instead  of  that,  it  is  a  mere  compensation  or  commission 
for  trouble,  expense,  responsibilities  to  be  incurred,  and  services  rendered,  so 
far  from  being  unequal,  because  the  amount  to  be  received  in  the  one  case  was 
not  equal  to  that  in  the  other,  it  is  precisely  the  reverse.  Equality  of  compen 
sation  for  equal  expense  and  service  is  equal,  but  equality  for  unequal  expense 
and  service  would  be  glaringly  unequal ;  and,  had  I  proposed  to  allow  Ohio 
the  same  amount  of  compensation  for  the  expense  and  trouble  of  managing  the 
small  portion  of  the  public  domain  in  her  limits  as  that  to  be  allowed  to  Illinois 
for  the  management  of  the  large  portion  within  hers,  instead  of  allowing  a  com 
pensation  to  each  proportioned  to  their  respective  expenses  and  services,  it 
would,  so  far  from  being  equal,  have  been  grossly  unequal,  and  would  have 
been  so  pronounced  by  those  who  now  make  this  objection. 

In  this  connexion,  I  must  say  that  I  cannot  but  regret  that  the  senator  from 
Ohio  (Mr.  Allen),  in  answer  to  the  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr.  Clay)  on  this 
alleged  inequality  between  Ohio  and  Illinois,  did  not  meet  him  by  denying  the 
truth  of  his  allegation,  instead  of  the  manner  he  did  ;  which  had,  to  say  the  least, 
the  appearance  of  sustaining  the  side  to  which  he  is  most  opposed,  against  that 
to  which  he  is  less. 

(Mr.  Allen  rose  to  explain.  Mr.  Calhoun  said  he  did  not  doubt  that  the  sen 
ator  gave  the  true  explanation  of  his  vote,  but  did  not  think  it  was  called  for  at 
the  time,  and  that  the  effect  was  as  he  had  stated.) 

Another  objection  was,  that  it  did  not  extend  to  the  territories.  This  objec 
tion  had  the  advantage  (what  few  others  had)  of  being  founded  in  fact,  but  was 
unfounded  in  reason.  Had  it  been  extended  to  them,  it  would  have  gone  be 
yond  the  mischief,  and  would  have  been  wholly  improper.  The  evil,  I  repeat, 


438  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

originates  in  the  fact  of  the  government  being  the  owner  and  administrator  of 
so  large  a  portion  of  the  domain  of  nine  states  of  the  Union  (being  more  than 
one  third  of  the  whole) ;  and  must  increase,  so  long  as  it  remains,  with  the  in 
creased  number  and  relative  weight  of  the  new  states.  They  will  soon  be  in 
creased  to  twelve,  by  the  admission  of  the  three  territories,  with  a  correspond 
ing  increase  of  weight  in  the  government.  The  territories,  on  the  contrary, 
are  without  political  weight ;  and,  of  course,  with  the  object  in  view,  it  would 
have  been  preposterous  to  have  included  them. 

As  little  force  is  there  in  the  objection,  that  some  of  the  states  would  not  ac 
cept  of  the  cession.  It  is  possible  that  Ohio  and  Indiana  might  not,  but  not 
probable,  as  the  amount  of  public  land  within  their  borders  is  inconsiderable. 
But  what  of  that  ?  Should  it  prove  to  be  the  case,  what  possible  injury  could 
result  ?  The  fact  of  not  accepting  would  be  proof  conclusive  that  the  evil  to  be 
removed  acted  with  but  little  relative  force  in  either,  and  that  the  old  system 
might  be  left  to  go  on  quietly  in  both,  until  the  land  within  their  limits  was  all 
disposed  of.  But  the  case  is  very  different  in  the  other  seven.  In  them  it  is 
in  active  operation ;  and  they  would  gladly  accept  of  the  cession,  as  the  only 
remedy  that  can  reach  the  disease,  consistently  with  the  interests  of  all  con 
cerned. 

I  come  now  to  the  final  objection — that  the  land  system  is  working  well,  and 
that  we  ought  to  adhere  to  the  old  maxim,  "  Let  well  enough  alone."  I  say 
the  final,  as  it  is  the  last  I  recollect.  If  (as  is  possible — I  took  no  notes)  I 
have  omitted  to  notice  any  objection  made  by  the  opponents  of  the  measure,  I 
call  on  them  to  name  it  now,  that  I  may  answer  it  before  I  proceed  to  notice 
the  one  just  stated. 

When  I  first  addressed  the  Senate  on  this  subject,  at  the  opening  of  the  dis 
cussion,  I  admitted  that  the  system  worked  well  at  first ;  but  I  must  limit  the 
admission  to  its  earliest  stages.  From  the  beginning  it  contained  within  itself 
the  seeds  of  mighty  disorders,  and  of  great  evils  to  the  country,  if  nothing 
should  be  done  to  avert  them.  If  I  do  not  greatly  mistake  the  tendency  of  the 
system  as  it  stands,  it  is  to  extinguish  the  Indian  titles  far  more  rapidly  than  the 
demands  of  our  increasing  population  require,  and  to  disperse  our  population 
over  a  larger  space  than  is  desirable  for  the  good  of  the  country.  That  the  for 
mer  of  these  evils  exists  in  reality,  the  proof  is  conclusive  ;  and  that  it  is  al 
ready  the  cause  of  much  difficulty  and  danger,  and  that  both  are  rapidly  on  th'e 
increase,  so  as  to  threaten  the  loss  of  the  lands  themselves,  I  have,  I  trust,  con 
clusively  shown  in  my  former  remarks.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  repeat,  in  order 
to  show  that  the  Indian  title  has  been  too  rapidly  extinguished,  that  the  govern 
ment  has  sold,  from  the  beginning  of  the  system  (now  almost  half  a  century), 
but  little  more  than  eighty  millions  of  acres  ;  and  that  not  less  than  twenty  mill 
ions,  probably,  are  held  by  large  holders,  who  purchased  on  speculation  to  sell 
again ;  making  the  actual  demand  for  land  for  settlement  not  exceeding,  prob 
ably,  sixty  millions  in  that  long  period  of  time.  But  during  the  same  period 
the  Indian  litle  has  been  extinguished  to  about  three  hundred  and  twenty  mill 
ions  of  acres,  of  which  about  two  hundred  and  twenty-six  millions  remain  un 
sold — exceeding  fourfold  the  demand  for  lands  in  consequence  of  the  increase 
of  our  population.  Such  is  the  fact.  To  what  cause  is  it  to  be  attributed  ?  I 
feel  confident  it  will  be  principally  found  in  the  land  system  itself,  which  has 
been  so  indiscriminately  praised  during  the  discussion. 

But,  before  I  proceed  to  assign  my  reasons,  it  will  be  proper  to  pause  and  re 
flect  on  the  influence  that  the  occupation  of  the  aborigines  whom  we  are  so  ra 
pidly  expelling  has  had,  through  the  mysterious  dispensation  of  Providence,  on 
the  prosperity  and  greatness  of  our  country.  They  were  precisely  in  the  con 
dition  most  favourable  to  that  mode  of  settlement  which  was  best  calculated  to 
secure  liberty,  civilization,  and  prosperity.  Had  they  been  more  numerous  or 
powerful,  the  settlement  of  our  country  would  either  not  have  been  made  at  all, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  439 

or  would  have  been  by  the  immediate  agency  and  superintendence  of  the  gov 
ernment,  with  a  force  not  only  sufficient  to  expel  or  subjugate  the  aborigines 
(as  in  Mexico  by  the  Spaniards,  and  Hindostan  by  the  English),  but  also  suffi 
cient  to  keep  the  colonies  in  subjection.  How  great  a  change  such  a  mode  of 
settlement  would  have  made  in  the  destiny  of  our  country  is  not  necessary  to 
be  explained  on  this  occasion.  But  as  it  was,  they  were  not  too  strong  to  pre 
vent  settlement  by  hardy  and  enterprising  emigrants,  inspired,  in  some  instances, 
with  a  holy  zeal  to  preserve  their  religious  faith  in  its  purity ;  in  others,  by  the 
love  of  adventure  and  gain  ;  and  in  all,  with  a  devotion  to  liberty.  It  is  to  set 
tlements  formed  by  individuals  so  influenced,  and  thrown,  from  the  beginning,  on 
their  own  resources  almost  exclusively,  that  we  owe  our  enterprise,  energy,  love 
of  liberty,  and  capacity  for  self-government. 

But  there  is  another  consideration  not  less  important  connected  with  the  oc 
cupancy  and  condition  of  the  aborigines.  Had  they  not  existed  at  all,  or  been 
too  weak  to  prevent  our  people  from  spreading  out  over  the  vast  extent  of  the 
continent  without  resistance,  or  resistance  too  feeble  to  keep  them  within  mod 
erate  limits,  in  the  rapid  and  wide  outspread  after  game,  pasturage,  or  choice 
spots  on  which  to  settle  down,  the  far  larger  portion  would  have  lost  all  the  arts 
of  civilized  life,  and  become  fierce  herdsmen  and  barbarians,  like  our  ancestors  ; 
and  like  them,  in  their  frequent  inundations  over  Southern  Asia  and  Europe, 
would  have  overflowed  and  desolated  the  civilized  agricultural  and  commercial 
settlements  along  the  coast,  excepting  such  as  might  be  protected  by  walls  and 
fortifications. 

It  is  to  this  fortunate  combination  of  facts  connected  with  the  aboriginal  pop 
ulation — that  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  prevent  settlements  in  the  manner 
they  were  actually  formed,  while  they  were  sufficiently  strong  to  prevent  the 
too  rapid  spread  of  our  population  over  the  continent — that  we  owe,  in  a  great 
measure,  our  wonderful  success.  A  change  in  either  the  one  or  the  other  would 
have  changed  entirely,  in  all  probability,  the  destiny  of  our  country. 

The  bearing  of  this  digression  on  the  point  under  consideration  will  be 
readily  perceived.  We  have  grown,  indeed,  to  be  so  powerful,  that  the  abo 
rigines  can  no  longer  resist  us  by  force,  and  when  there  is  no  danger  that  the 
arts  of  civilized  life  would  be  lost  by  the  spreading  out  of  our  population  ;  but 
the  aboriginal  population  would  not,  therefore,  cease  to  perform  an  important 
function  in  our  future  growth  and  prosperity,  if  properly  treated.  They  are  the 
land-wardens  or  keepers  of  our  public  domain,  until  our  growth  and  increase 
of  population  require  it,  as  the  means  of  new  settlements.  But  till  then,  our 
interests,  no  less  than  justice  to  them,  require  that  their  occupancy  should  con 
tinue  ;  and  if  the  extinguishment  of  'their  title  should  continue  to  outrun  the 
regular  demand  of  our  population  for  settlement  as  rapidly  in  proportion  here 
after  as  it  has  heretofore,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  the  confusion  and  difficulty 
which  must  follow.  Those  we  now  experience  are  nothing  to  those  which 
would  come.  That  such  must,  however,  prove  to  be  the  case  to  a  great  ex 
tent,  if  our  land  system  continue  as  it  is,  I  hold  to  be  certain.  The  cause,  as 
I  have  said,  is  inherent  in  the  system  as  it  exists ;  and,  if  not  corrected,  will 
impel  our  population,  by  its  necessary  operation,  from  the  states  to  the  terri 
tories,  and  from  them  to  the  Indian  possessions ;  which  I  shall  now  proceed 
to  explain. 

The  system,  as  it  now  stands,  embraces  three  powerful  causes,  all  of  which 
conspire  to  produce  these  results  :  pre-emption,  as  proposed  by  this  bill,  before 
survey  and  sale  ;  the  auction  system,  under  its  actual  operation  ;  and  a  fixed 
minimum  for  all  the  lands,  be  the  quality  or  the  time  which  they  have  been 
offered  for  sale  what  they  may.  They  act  together,  and  jointly  contribute  to 
the  results  I  have  attributed  to  them. 

My  friends  from  the  new  states,  who  are  so  much  attached  to  pre-emption 
as  proposed  by  this  bill,  must  excuse  me  for  speaking  my  opinion  freely  of 


440  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

their  favourite  measure.  The  consequences  involved  are  too  important  to 
keep  silence. 

What,  then,  is  this  pre-emption  principle  ?  and  how  does  it  operate  as  a  part 
of  the  existing  land  system  ?  It  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  to  say  to  every 
one,  when  the  Indian  title  is  extinguished  to  a  new  portion  of  the  public  do 
main,  that  you  may  go,  and  search,  and  take  all  the  choice  parts,  the  fertile 
spots,  the  favourable  localities,  the  town  sites,  or  whatever  other  advantages 
any  portion  may  possess,  at  $1  25  per  acre ;  and  that  not  to  be  paid  till  the 
lands  are  offered  at  auction,  which  may  be  many  years  thereafter.  What, 
then,  is  its  operation,  but  to  give  pick  and  choice  of  the  public  domain  to  the 
active  and  enterprising,  who  are  best  acquainted  with  the  tract  of  country  to 
which  the  Indian  title  is  extinguished,  with  the  speculating  capitalists,  who 
may  choose  to  associate  with  them  ?  It  is  like  spreading  out  a  large  table, 
having  a  few  choice  and  costly  dishes  intermixed  with  ordinary  fare,  and  open 
ing  the  door  to  the  strong,  and  the  few  that  may  be  nearest,  to  rush  in  and  select 
the  best  dishes  for  themselves,  before  the  others  at  a  distance  can  enter  and 
participate.  And  can  we  wonder,  with  such  advantages,  that  there  should  be 
an  active  and  powerful  interest  constantly  at  work  to  extinguish  the  titles  of 
the  Indians  in  rapid  succession,  without  regard  to  the  demand  of  our  increasing 
population  ;  to  spread  out  table  after  table,  that  they  may  gorge  their  appetites 
on  the  choicest  dishes,  and  slake  their  thirst  with  the  most  costly  wines ;  leav 
ing  the  ordinary  fare,  with  the  crumbs  and  bones,  to  the  rest  of  the  commu 
nity? 

But  this  is  not  all.  After  this  picking  and  choosing,  under  the  pre-emption, 
as  it  has  heretofore  operated,  and  which  it  is  now  proposed  to  make  prospective 
and  perpetual,  comes  the  auction  system  ;  that  is,  the  sales  of  the  lands  at  ven- 
due  to  the  highest  bidder.  Nothing  could  be  more  just  and  equal,  if  fairly  car 
ried  out ;  but  it  is  notorious  that  the  very  opposite  is  the  case  under  its  actual 
operation.  Instead  of  leaving  the  lands  to  be  disposed  of  to  the  bids  of  indi 
viduals,  according  to  their  conception  of  the  value  of  each  tract,  the  whole  is 
arranged  beforehand,  by  combinations  of  powerful  and  wealthy  individuals,  to 
take  the  choice  of  the  lands  left  by  the  pre-emptioners,  and  to  nm  down  all 
individual  competition,  so  that  no  one  can  obtain  what  he  wants  without  join 
ing  them ;  and  thus  another  powerful  interest  is  united  with  the  former,  to  ex 
tinguish  the  Indian  title — to  spread  out  another  table. 

The  next  feature  of  the  system  so  much  lauded  operates  the  same  way — I 
refer  to  what  is  called  the  minimum  price  ;  that  is,  of  fixing  one  invariable 
price  of  $1  25  an  acre  for  all  lands  not  sold  at  auction,  without  regard,  as  has 
been  said,  to  quality,  or  the  time  it  has  been  in  market.  The  effect  of  this, 
with  a  quantity  on  hand  to  which  the  Indian  title  is  extinguished,  so  far  ex 
ceeding  the  demand  of  the  community,  is  to  sink  the  value  of  all  the  unsold 
land  which  has  not  been  offered  at  auction  to  a  price  below  the  minimum,  ex 
cept  a  small  portion  of  the  best,  which  is  annually  purchased.  Taking  the  ag 
gregate  of  the  whole  of  the  lands  in  the  new  states,  it  would,  according  to  its 
estimated  present  value  by  the  Committee  on  the  Public  Lands,  not  be  worth, 
on  an  average,  more  than  16i  cents  per  acre.  The  result  is,  that  no  one  is 
willing  to  give  the  minimum  for  the  inferior  or  less  valuable  portion.  Hence 
comes  that  great  and  growing  evil,  of  occupancy  without  purchasing ;  which 
threatens  the  loss  of  the  public  domain,  unless  'arrested  by  some  speedy  and 
decisive  remedy.  It  has  already  extended  far  beyond  what  is  thought  of  by 
those  who  have  not  looked  into  the  subject,  and  is  still  rapidly  progressing.  I 
have  taken  some  pains  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  it  has  extended  in  two  of  the 
states — Illinois  and  Alabama.  It  is  probable  that  there  are  not  less  than  thirty 
thousand  voters  in  those  states,  residing  on  public  lands  as  mere  occupants, 
without  title.  In  a  single  congressional  district  in  Alabama,  there  are,  by  esti 
mate,  six  thousand  voters.  But,  as  great  as  this  evil  is,  it  is  not  all.  The  fixed 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  441 

minimum  price  co-operates  with  the  pre-emption  and  auction  systems  to  impel 
emigrants,  especially  of  the  more  wealthy  class,  to  turn  from  the  states  to  the 
territories,  where  the  land  has  been  less  culled  over ;  and  from  the  territories 
to  the  Indian  lands,  for  the  same  reason ;  thus  urging  forward  our  population 
farther  and  farther,  and  driving  before  them  the  Indian  tribes,  unmindful  of  the 
dispensation  of  a  kind  Providence,  which  placed  them  as  a  restraint  on  the  too 
rapid  dispersion  of  our  population. 

There  is  another  and  powerful  cause  co-operating  to  the  same  result,  which 
must  not  be  passed  unnoticed.  I  refer  to  the  vast  expenditures  in  the  last 
twelve  or  fifteen  years,  in  holding  treaties  with  the  Indians,  and  in  extinguish 
ing  their  titles,  including  reservations,  and  removing  them  to  the  West ;  equal 
ling,  in  some  instances,  the  fee-simple  value  of  the  lands,  and  in  many  others 
not  much  less.  These  immense  expenditures,  amounting,  in  the  period  speci 
fied,  I  know  not  to  how  many  millions  (not  less,  certainly,  than  forty  or  fifty), 
have  made  such  treaties  a  great  money-making  affair,  the  profits  of  which  have 
been  divided  between  influential  Indian  chieftains  and  their  white  associates, 
and  have  greatly  contributed  not  only  to  increase  the  force  of  the  other  causes 
in  the  too  rapid  extinguishment  of  Indian  titles,  but  to  diffuse  widely  the  bane 
ful  spirit  of  speculation. 

Such  are  the  inherent  defects  of  the  system,  and  the  results  to  which  they 
have  led,  and  must  continue  to  lead,  so  long  as  it  can  find  subjects  on  which  to 
operate,  if  not  remedied.  The  measure  I  have  proposed  would  apply  an  effi 
cient  remedy,  as  far  as  the  public  lands  in  the  new  states  are  concerned.  The 
combined  action  of  graduation  and  pre-emption  applied  to  lands  which  have 
been  offered  for  sale,  as  provided  for  by  the  amendment  I  offered,  would,  in  a 
few  years,  convert  the  occupants  without  title  into  freeholders ;  while,  at  the 
same  time,  it  would  tend  powerfully  to  prevent  the  population  of  the  new  states 
from  emigrating,  and  turn  towards  those  the  tide  of  emigration  from  the  old 
states,  and,  to  the  same  extent,  counteract  the  too  rapid  spreading  out  of  our 
population,  and  extinguishment  of  the  titles  of  the  Indians.  But  nothing  can 
effectually  remedy  the  defects  of  the  system  but  a  radical  change.  What  that 
ought  to  be,  would  require  much  reflection  to  determine  satisfactorily ;  but  it 
seems  to  me,  on  the  best  reflection  I  can  give  it,  that  if,  in  lieu  of  public  sales 
at  auction,  a  system  of  graduation  and  pre-emption  had  been  introduced  from 
the  first,  fixing  a  maximum  price  sufficiently  high  when  the  lands  are  first  of 
fered  for  sale,  and  descending  gradually,  at  short  intervals  of  one  or  two  years, 
to  the  present  minimum  price,  and  then,  in  the  manner  proposed  in  the  measure 
which  I  have  brought  forward,  giving  the  right  of  pre-emption  at  every  stage, 
from  first  to  last,  to  the  settlers,  it  would  have  averted  most  of  the  evils  incident 
to  the  present  system,  and,  at  the  same  time,  have  increased  the  revenue  from 
the  lands.  It  would  have  checked  the  spirit  of  speculation,  concentrated  our 
population  within  the  proper  limits,  prevented  the  too  rapid  extinguishment  of 
Indian  titles,  and  terminated  our  ownership  and  administration  of  the  lands  in 
the  new  states,  by  disposing  of  them  within  a  moderate  period  of  time,  and 
prevented  most  of  the  mischievous  consequences  which  have  been  experienced. 
The  introduction  of  such  a  change,  or  some  such,  founded  on  the  same  prin 
ciples,  in  reference  to  lands  not  yet  offered  for  sale  in  the  territories,  and  the 
portion  of  the  public  domain  lying  beyond,  and  to  which  the  Indian  title  is  not 
yet  extinguished,  would,  in  combination  with  the  measure  I  have  proposed,  go 
far  to  restore  the  system  to  a  healthy  action,  and  put  a  stop  to  the  farther  prog 
ress  of  the  evil,  and  remedy,  in  a  great  measure,  those  already  caused.  I 
throw  out  these  suggestions  for  reflection,  without  intending  to  propose  any 
other  measure,  except  the  one  I  have  already. 

K  K  K 


412  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

XXX. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    CASE   OF   MeLEOD,   JUNE    11,    1841. 

THE  business  before  the  Senate  being  the  motion  of  Mr.  Rives  to  refer 
so  much  of  the  President's  Message  as  relates  to  our  foreign  affairs  to 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 

Mr.  Calhoun  said  :  I  rise  with  the  intention  of  stating,  very  briefly,  the 
conclusion  to  which  my  reflections  have  brought  me  on  the  question 
before  us. 

Permit  me,  at  the  outset,  to  premise,  that  I  heartily  approve  of  the 
principle  so  often  repeated  in  this  discussion,  that  our  true  policy,  in 
connexion  with  our  foreign  relations,  is  neither  to  do  nor  to  suffer  wrong, 
not  only  because  the  principle  is  right  of  itself,  but  because  it  is,  in  its 
application  to  us,  wise  and  politic,  as  well  as  right.  Peace  is  pre-emi 
nently  our  policy.  Our  road  to  greatness  lies  not  over  the  ruins  of  others, 
but  in  the  quiet  and  peaceful  development  of  our  immeasurably  great  in 
ternal  resources — in  subduing  our  vast  forests,  perfecting  the  means  of 
internal  intercourse  throughout  our  widely-extended  country,  and  in 
drawing  forth  its  unbounded  agricultural,  manufacturing,  mineral,  and 
commercial  resources.  In  this  ample  field  all  the  industry,  ingenuity,  enter 
prise,  and  energy  of  our  people  may  find  full  employment  for  centuries  to 
come  ;  and  through  its  successful  cultivation  we  may  hope  to  rise,  not  only 
to  a  state  of  prosperity,  but  to  that  of  greatness  and  influence  over  the 
destiny  of  the  human  race,  higher  than  has  ever  been  attained  by  arms  by 
the  most  renowned  nations  of  ancient  or  modern  times.  War,  so  far 
from  accelerating,  can  but  retard  our  march  to  greatness.  It  is,  then,  not 
only  our  duty,  but  our  policy  to  avoid  it,  as  long  as  it  can  be,  with  honour 
and  a  just  regard  to  our  right ;  and,  as  one  cf  the  most  certain  means  of  avoid 
ing  war,  we  ought  to  observe  strict  justice  in  our  intercourse  with  others. 
But  that  is  not  of  itself  sufficient.  We  must  exact  justice  as  well  as  ren 
der  justice,  and  be  prepared  to  do  so;  for  where  is  there  an  example  to 
be  found  of  either  individual  or  nation  that  has  preserved  peace  by 
yielding  to  unjust  demands  ! 

It  is  in  the  spirit  of  these  remarks  that  I  have  investigated  the  subject 
before  us,  without  the  slightest  party  feelings,  but  with  an  anxious  desire 
not  to  embarrass  existing  negotiations  between  the  two  governments,  or 
influence,  in  any  degree,  pending  judicial  proceedings.  My  sole  object 
is  to  ascertain  whether  the  principle  already  stated,  and  which  all  ac 
knowledge  to  be  fundamental  in  our  foreign  policy,  has,  in  fact,  been  re 
spected  in  the  present  case.  I  regret  to  state  that  the  result  of  my  inves 
tigation  is  a  conviction  that  it  has  not.  I  have  been  forced  to  the  con 
clusion  that  the  Secretary  of  State  has  not  met  the  peremptory  demand  of 
the  British  government  for  the  immediate  release  of  M'Leod  as  he  ought ; 
the  reasons  for  which,  without  farther  remark,  I  will  now  proceed  to 
state. 

That  demand,  as  stated  in  the  letter,  rests  on  the  alleged  facts,  that  the 
transaction  for  which  M'Leod  was  arrested  is  a  public  one  ;  that  it  was 
undertaken  by  the  order  of  the  colonial  authorities,  who  were  invested 
with  unlimited  power  to  defend  the  colony  ;  and  that  the  government  at 
home  has  sanctioned  both  the  order  and  its  execution.  On  this  allega 
tion  the  British  minister,  acting  directly  under  the  orders  of  his  govern 
ment,  demanded  his  immediate  release,  on  the  broad  ground  that  he,  as 
well  as  others  engaged  with  him,  was  "  performing  an  act  of  public  duty, 
for  which  he  cannot  be  made  personally  and  individually  responsible  to 


or.uECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  44> 

the  laws  and  tribunals  of  any  foreign  country ;"  thus  assuming,  as  a  uni 
versal  principle  of  international  law,  that  where  a  government  authorizes 
or  approves  of  an  act  of  an  individual,  it  makes  it  the  act  of  the  govern 
ment,  and  thereby  exempts  the  individual  from  all  responsibility  to  the 
injured  country.  To  this  demand,  resting  on  this  broad  and  universal 
principle,  our  Secretary  of  State  assented,  and,  in  conformity,  gave  the 
instruction  to  the  attorney-general  which  is  attached  to  the  correspond 
ence  ;  and  we  have  thus  presented  for  our  consideration  the  grave  question, 
Do  the  laws  of  nations  recognise  any  such  principle  1 

I  feel  that  I  hazard  nothing  in  saying  they  do  not.  No  authority  has 
been  cited  to  sanction  it,  nor  do  I  believe  that  any  can  be.  It  would  be 
no  less  vain  to  look  to  reason  than  to  authority  for  a  sanction.  The  laws 
of  nations  are  but  the  laws  and  morals,  as  applicable  to  individuals,  so  far 
modified,  and  no  farther,  as  reason  may  make  necessary  in  their  applica 
tion  to  nations.  Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  analogous  rule,  when 
applied  to  individuals,  is,  that  both  principal  and  agents,  or,  if  you  will, 
instruments,  are  responsible  in  criminal  cases ;  directly  the  reverse  of  the 
rule  on  which  the  demand  for  the  release  of  M'Leod  is  made.  Why,  I 
ask,  should  the  rule  in  this  case  be  reversed  when  applied  to  nations, 
which  is  universally  admitted  to  be  true  in  the  case  of  individuals  1  Can 
any  good  reason  be  assigned!  To  reverse  it  when  applied  to  individ 
uals,  all  must  see,  would  lead  to  the  worst  of  consequences,  and,  if  I  do 
not  greatly  mistake,  must  in  like  manner,  if  reversed  when  applied  to 
nations.  Let  us  see  how  it  would  act  when  brought  to  the  test  of  par 
ticular  cases. 

Suppose,  then,  that  the  British,  or  any  other  government,  in  contempla 
tion  of  war,  should  send  out  emissaries  to  blow  up  the  fortifications 
erected  at  such  vast  expense  for  the  defence  of  our  great  commercial 
marts — New-York  and  others — and  that  the  band  employed  to  blow  up 
Fort  Hamilton,  or  any  other  of  the  fortresses  for  the  defence  of  New- 
York,  should  be  detected  in  the  very  act  of  firing  the  train  :  would  the 
production  of  the  most  authentic  papers,  signed  by  all  the  authorities  of 
the  British  government,  make  it  a  public  transaction,  and  exempt  the  vil 
lains  from  all  responsibility  to  our  laws  and  tribunals  !  Or  would  that 
government  dare  make  a  demand  for  their  immediate  release  1  Or,  if 
made,  would  ours  dare  yield  to  it,  and  release  them  1  The  supposition, 
I  know,  is  altogether  improbable,  but  it  is  not  the  less,  on  that  account, 
calculated  to  test  the  principle. 

But  I  shall  next  select  one  that  may  possibly  occur.  Suppose,  then,  in 
contemplation  of  the  same  event,  black  emissaries  should  be  sent  from 
Jamaica  to  tamper  with  our  slaves  in  the  South,  and  that  they  should  be 
detected  at  midnight  in  an  assembly  of  slaves,  where  they  were  urging 
them  to  rise  in  rebellion  against  their  masters,  and  that  they  should 
produce  the  authority  of  the  home  government,  in  the  most  solemn  form, 
authorizing  them  in  what  they  did:  ought  that  to  exempt  the  cut-throats 
from  all  responsibility  to  our  laws  and  tribunals  1  Or,  if  arrested,  ought 
our  government  to  release  them  on  a  peremptory  demand  to  do  so] 
And  if  that  could  not  be  done  forthwith,  from  the  embarrassment  of  state 
laws  and  state  authorities,  ought  this  government  to  employ  counsel  and 
to  use  its  authority  and  influence  to  effect  it!  And  if  that  could  not  ac 
complish  its  object,  would  it  be  justified  in  taking  the  case  into  their  own 
tribunals,  with  the  view  of  entering  a  nolle  prosequi  '< 

But,  setting  aside  all  suppositions  cases,  I  shall  take  one  that  actually 
occurred — that  of  the  notorious  Henry,  employed  by  the  colonial  author 
ity  of  Canada  to  tamper  with  a  portion  of  our  people,  prior  to  the  late 
war5  with  the  intention  of  alienating  them  from  the  government,  and  ef- 


444  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

fecting  a  disunion  in  the  event  of  hostilities.  Suppose  he  had  been  de 
tected  and  arrested  for  his  treasonable  conduct,  and  that  the  British  gov 
ernment  had  made  the  like  demand  for  his  release,  on  the  ground  that  he 
was  executing  the  orders  of  his  government,  and  was  not,  therefore,  lia 
ble,  personally  or  individually,  to  our  laws  and  tribunals:  I  ask,  Would 
our  government  be  bound  to  comply  with  the  demand  1 

To  all  these  questions,  and  thousands  of  others  that  might  be  asked, 
no  right-minded  man  can  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  answer  in  the  nega 
tive.  The  rule,  then,  if  it  does  exist,  must  be  far  from  universal.  But 
does  it  exist  at  all !  Does  it  even  in  a  state  of  war,  when,  if  ever,  if  we 
may  judge  from  the  remarks  of  gentlemen  on  the  opposite  side,  it  must! 
They  seemed  to  consider  nothing  more  was  necessary  to  establish  the 
principle  for  which  they  contend  but  to  show  that  this,  and  all  other  cases 
of  armed  violence  on  the  part  of  one  nation  or  its  citizens  against  another, 
is,  in  fact,  war ;  informal  war,  as  they  call  it,  in  contradistinction  from  one 
preceded  by  a  declaration  in  due  form. 

Well,  then,  let  us  inquire  if  the  principle  for  which  they  contend,  that 
the  authority  or  the  sanction  of  his  government  exempts  an  individual 
from  all  responsibility  to  the  injured  government,  exists  even  in  case 
of  war. 

Turning,  then,  from  a  state  of  peace  to  that  of  war,  we  find,  at  the  very 
threshold,  a  very  important  exception  to  the  rule,  if  it  exists  at  all,  in  the 
case  of  spies.  None  can  doubt  that,  if  a  spy  is  detected  and  arrested,  he 
is  individually  and  personally  responsible,  though  his  pockets  should  be 
filled  with  all  the  authority  the  country  which  employed  him  could  give. 

But  is  the  case  of  spies  the  only  exception  1  Are  they  alone  person 
ally  and  individually  responsible  1  Far  otherwise.  The  war  may  be  de 
clared  in  the  most  solemn  manner  ;  the  invaders  may  carry  with  them  the 
highest  authority  of  their  government ;  and  yet,  so  far  from  exempting 
them  individually,  officers,  men,  and  all,  maybe  slaughtered  and  destroyed 
in  almost  every  possible  manner,  not  only  without  the  violation  of  inter 
national  laws,  but  with  rich  honour  and  glory  to  their  destroyers.  Talk 
of  the  responsibility  of  the  government  exempting  their  instruments  from 
responsibility!  How,  let  me  ask,  can  the  government  be  made  responsi 
ble  but  through  its  agents  or  instruments  ]  Separate  the  government 
from  them,  and  what  is  it  but  an  ideal,  intangible  thing  1  True  it  is, 
when  an  invading  enemy  is  captured  or  surrenders,  his  life  is  protected 
by  the  laws  of  nations  as  they  now  stand  j  but  not  because  the  authority 
of  his  government  protects  it,  or  that  he  is  not  responsible  to  the  invaded 
country.  It  is  to  be  traced  to  a  different  and  higher  source — the  prog 
ress  of  civilization,  which  has  mitigated  the  laws  of  war.  Originally  it 
was  different.  The  life  of  an  invader  might  be  taken,  whether  armed  or 
disarmed.  He  who  captured  an  enemy  had  a  right  to  take  his  life.  The 
older  writers  on  the  laws  of  nations  traced  the  lawfulness  of  making  a 
slave  of  a  prisoner  to  the  fact  that  he  who  captured  him  had  a  right  to 
take  his  life ;  and,  if  he  spared  it,  a  right  to  his  service.  To  commute 
death  unto  servitude  was  the  first  step  in  mitigating  the  horrors  of  war. 
That  has  been  followed  by  a  farther  mitigation,  which  spares  the  life  of  a 
prisoner,  excepting  the  cases  of  spies,  to  whom  the  laws  of  war,  as  they 
stood  originally,  are  still  in  force.  But,  because  their  lives  are  spared, 
prisoners  do  not  cease  to  be  individually  responsible  to  the  invaded  coun 
try.  Their  liberty,  for  the  time,  is  forfeited  to  it.  Should  they  attempt 
to  escape,  or  if  there  be  danger  of  their  being  released  by  superior  force, 
their  lives  may  be  still  taken,  without  regard  to  the  fact  that  they  acted 
under  the  authority  of  their  country.  A  demand  on  the  part  of  their  gov 
ernment  for  an  immediate  release,  on  the  ground  assumed  in  this  case, 
would  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  insanity. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  445 

Now,  sir,  if  the  senators  from  Virginia  and  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Rives 
and  Mr.  Choate)  could  succeed  in  making  the  case  of  the  attack  on  the 
Caroline  to  be  an  act  of  war,  it  would  avail  them  nothing  in  their  attempt 
to  defend  the  demand  of  Mr.  Fox  or  the  concession  of  Mr.  Webster. 
M'Leod,  if  it  be  war,  would  be  a  prisoner  of  war,  which,  if  it  protected  his 
life,  would  forfeit  his  liberty.  In  that  character,  so  far  from  his  government 
having  a  right  to  demand  his  immediate  release  under  a  threat  of  war,  our 
government  would  have  the  unquestionable  right  to  detain  him  till  there  was 
a  satisfactory  termination  of  the  war  by  the  adjustment  of  the  question. 

To  place  this  result  in  a  stronger  view,  suppose,  after  the  destruction 
of  the  Caroline,  the  armed  band  which  perpetrated  the  act  had  been  cap 
tured,  on  their  retreat,  by  an  armed  force  of  our  citizens,  would  they  not, 
if  the  transaction  is  to  be  regarded  as  war,  justly  have  been  considered 
as  prisoners  of  war,  to  be  held  as  such  in  actual  confinement,  if  our  gov 
ernment  thought  proper,  till  the  question  was  amicably  settled'?  And 
would  not  the  demand  for  their  immediate  release,  in  such  a  case,  be  re 
garded  as  one  of  the  most  insolent  ever  made  by  one  independent  coun 
try  on  another  1  And  can  the  fact  that  one  of  tae  band  has  come  into  our 
possession  as  M'Leod  has,  if  it  is  to  be  considered  as  war,  vary  the  case 
in  the  least  1  Viewed  in  this  light,  the  authority  or  sanction  of  the  British 
government  would  be  a  good  defence  against  th?  charge  of  murder  or 
arson,  but  it  would  be  no  less  so  against  his  release. 

But  this  is  not  a  case  of  war,  formal  or  informal,  taking  the  latter  in  the 
broadest  sense.  It  has  not  been  thought  so,  nor  so  treated,  by  either 
government ;  and  Mr.  Webster  himself,  in  his  reply  to  Mr.  Fox,  which  has 
been  so  lauded  by  the  two  senators,  speaks  of  ft  as  "a  hostile  intrusion 
into  the  territory  of  a  power  at  peace."  The  transaction  comes  under  a 
class  of  cases  fully  recognised  by  writers  on  international  law  as  distinct 
from  war — that  of  belligerants  entering  with  force  the  territories  of  neu 
trals  ;  and  it  only  remains  to  determine  whether,  when  viewed  in  this,  its 
true  light,  our  secretary  has  taken  the  grounds  which  our  rights  and  honour 
required  against  the  demand  of  the  British  minister. 

Thus  regarded,  the  first  point  presented  for  consideration  is,  whether 
Great  Britain,  as  a  belligerant,  was  justified  in  entering  our  territory 
under  the  circumstances  she  did.  And  here  let  me  remark,  that  it  is  a 
fundamental  principle  in  the  laws  of  nations,  that  every  state  or  nation 
has  full  and  complete  jurisdiction  over  its  own  territory,  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  others — a  principle  essential  to  independence,  and,  therefore,  held 
most  sacred.  It  is  accordingly  laid  down  by  all  writers  on  those  laws 
who  treat  of  the  subject,  that  nothing  short  of  extreme  necessity  can  justify 
a  belligerant  in  entering,  with  an  armed  force,  on  the  territory  of  a  neu 
tral  power,  and,  when  entered,  in  doing  any  act  which  is  not  forced 
on  them  by  the  like  necessity  which  justified  the  entering.  In  both  of 
the  positions  I  am  held  out  by  the  secretary  himself.  The  next  point  to 
be  considered  is,  Did  Great  Britain  enter  our  territory  in  this  case  under 
any  such  necessity  I  and,  if  she  did,  were  her  acts  limited  by  such  neces 
sity  1  Here,  again,  I  may  rely  on  the  authority  of  the  secretary,  and,  if  it 
had  not  already  been  quoted  by  both  of  the  senators  on  the  other  side 
who  preceded  me,  I  would  read  the  eloquent  passage  towards  the  close 
of  his  letter  to  Mr.  Fox,  which  they  did  with  so  much  applause.  With 
this  high  authority,  I  may  then  assume  that  the  government  of  Great 
Britain,  in  this  case,  had  no  authority  under  the  laws  of  nations,  either  to 
enter  our  territory,  or  to  do  what  was  done  in  the  destruction  of  the  Car 
oline,  after  it  was  entered. 

Now,  sir,  I  ask,  under  this  statement  of  the  case,  What  ought  to  have 
been  our  reply  when  the  peremptory  demand  was  made  for  the  immediate 


446  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

release  of  M'Leod  1  Ought  not  our  Secretary  of  State  to  have  told 
Mr.  Fox  that  we  regarded  the  hostile  entry  into  our  territory,  and  what 
was  perpetrated  after  the  entry,  as  without  warrant  under  the  laws  of 
nations]  That  the  fact  had  been  made  known  to  his  government  Ion"" 
since,  immediately  after  the  transaction  1  That  we  had  received  no 
explanation  or  answer  1  That  we  had  no  reason  for  believing  that  his 
government  had  sanctioned  the  act  1  That  M'Leod  had  been  arrested 
and  indicted  under  the  local  authority  of  New- York,  without  possibility 
of  knowing  that  the  transaction  had  been  sanctioned  by  it  1  That  we 
still  regarded  the  transaction  in  the  light  we  originally  did,  and  could  not 
even  consider  the  demand  till  the  conduct  of  which  we  had  complained  was 
explained  1  But,  in  the  mean  time,  that  M'Leod  might  have  the  benefit 
of  the  fact  on  his  trial,  that  the  transaction  was  sanctioned  by  his  govern 
ment,  it  would  be  transmitted,  in  due  form,  to  those  who  had  charge  of 
his  defence  1 

Here  let  me  say  that  I  entirely  concur  with  Mr.  Forsyth,  that  the  ap 
proval  of  the  British  government  of  the  transaction  in  question  was  an 
important  fact  in  the  trial  of  M'Leod,  without,  however,  pretending  to 
offer  an  opinion  whether  it  would  be  a  valid  reason  against  a  charge  of 
murder,  of  which  the  essence  was  killing  with  malice  prepense.  It  is  a 
point  for  the  court  and  jury,  and  not  for  us,  to  decide.  Nor  do  I  intend 
to  venture  an  opinion  whether,  if  found  guilty,  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
fact  that  his  government  approved  of  his  conduct,  it  ought  not  to  be  good 
cause  for  his  pardon,  on  high  considerations  of  humanity  and  policy.  I 
leave  both  questions,  without  remark,  to  those  to  whom  the  decision 
properly  belongs,  except  fco  express  my  conviction  that  there  is  not,. and 
has  not  been,  the  least  danger  that  any  step  would  be  taken  towards  him 
not*  fully  sustained  by  justice,  humanity,  and  sound  policy.  Any  step 
which  did  not  strictly  comport  with  these  would  shock  the  whole  com 
munity. 

Having  taken  the  ground,  I  have  indicated  that  we  ought  to  have  re 
ceived  explanation  before  we  responded  to  a  peremptory  demand  ;  there 
we  ought  to  have  rested  till  we  had  first  received  explanation.  It  is  a 
maxim,  that  he  who  seeks  equity  must  do  equity  ;  and,  on  the  same 
principle,  a  government  that  seeks  to  enforce  the  laws  of  nations  in  a 
particular  case  against  another,  ought  to  show  that  it  has  first  observed 
them,  on  its  own  part,  in  the  same  transaction,  or  at  least  show  plausible 
reasons  fop  thinking  that  it  had.  None  but  a  proud  and  haughty  nation 
like  England  would  think  of  making  the  demand  she  has  without  even 
deigning  1o  notice  our  complaints  against  her  conduct  in  connexion  with 
the  same  (transaction  ;  and  I  cannot  but  think  that,  in  yielding  to  her  de 
mand  uncjer  such  circumstances,  the  secretary  has  not  only  failed  to  ex 
act  what  is  due  to  our  rights  and  honour  as  an  independent  people,  but 
has,  as  far  as  the  influence  of  the  example  may  effect  it,  made  a  danger 
ous  innovation  on  the  code  of  international  laws.  I  cannot  but  think  the 
principle  in  which  the  demand  to  which  he  yielded  was  made  is  highly 
adverse  to  the  weaker  power,  which  we  must  admit  ourselves  yet  to  be 
when  compared  to  Great  Britain.  Aggressions  are  rarely  by  the  weak 
against  the  stronger  power,  but  the  reverse ;  and  the  practical  effect  of 
the  principle,  if  admitted,  would  be  to  change  the  responsibility  of  de 
claring  war  from  the  aggressor,  the  stronger  power,  to  the  aggrieved, 
the  weaker  ;  a  disadvantage  so  great,  that  the  alternative  of  abandoning 
the  demand  of  redress  for  the  aggression  would  almost  invariably  be 
forced  on  the  weaker,  rather  than  to  appeal  to  arms.  This  case  itself  will 
furnish  an  illustration.  We  have  been  told  again  and  again,  in  this  dis 
cussion,  that,  in  yielding  to  the  demand  to  release  M'Leod,  we  do  not  sur- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  447 

tender  our  right  to  hold  Great  Britain  responsible  ;  that  we  have  the 
power  and  will  to  exact  justice  by  arms.  This  may  be  so  ;  but  is  it  not 
felt  on  all  sides  that  this  is,  I  will  not  say  empty  boasting,  but  that  it  is 
all  talk!  After  yielding  to  the  peremptory  demand  for  his  immediate  re 
lease  ;  after  sending  the  attorney-general  to  look  after  his  safety,  and 
employing  able  counsel  to  defend  him  against  the  laws  of  the  state,  the 
public  feeling  must  be  too  much  let  down  to  think  of  taking  so  bold  and 
responsible  a  measure  as  that  of  declaring  war.  The  only  hope  we  could 
ever  have  had  for  redress  for  the  aggression  would  have  been  to  demand 
justice  of  the  British  government  before  we  answered  her  demand  on  us  ; 
and  I  accordingly  regard  the  acquiescence  in  the  demand  for  release, 
without  making  a  demand  of  redress  on  our  part,  as  settling  all  questions 
connected  with  the  transaction.  Thus  regarding  it,  I  must  say  that, 
though  I  am  ready  to  concede  to  Mr.  Webster's  letter  in  reply  to  Mr. 
Fox  all  the  excellences  which  his  friends  claim  for  it,  the  feeling  that  it 
was  out  of  place  destroyed  all  its  beauties  in  my  eyes.  Its  lofty  senti 
ments  and  strong  condemnation  of  the  act  would  have  shown  to  advan 
tage  in  a  letter  claiming  redress  on  our  part  before  yielding  to  a  per 
emptory  demand  ;  but,  afterward,  it  looked  too  much  like  putting  on 
uirs  when  it  was  too  late,  after  having  made  an  apology,  and  virtually  con 
ceded  the  point  at  issue.  In  truth,  the  letter  indicates  that  Mr.  Webster 
was  not  entirely  satisfied  with  his  ready  compliance  with  Mr.  Fox's  de 
mand,  of  which  the  part  where  he  says  he  is  not  certain  that  he  correctly 
understood  him  'in  demanding  an  immediate  release  furnishes  «a  striking 
instance. 

There  could  be  but  little  doubt  as  to  what  was  meant ;  but  the  assump 
tion  of  one  afforded  a  convenient  opportunity  of  modifying  the  ground 
he  first  took. 


XXXI. 

SPEECH   ON    THE    DISTRIBUTION    BILL,  AUGUST    24,    1841. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said :  If  this  bill  should  become  a  law,  it  would  make  a  wi 
der  breach  in  the  Constitution,  and  be  followed  by  changes  more  disastrous, 
than  any  one  measure  which  has  ever  been  Adopted.  It  would,  in  its  violation 
of  the  Constitution,  go  far  beyond  the  general-welfare  doctrine  of  former  days, 
which  stretched  the  power  of  the  government  as  far  as  it  was  then  supposed 
was  possible  by  construction,  however  bold.  But,  as  wide  as  were  the  limits 
which  it  assigned  to  the  powers  of  the  government,  it  admitted  by  implication 
that  there  were  limits  ;  while  this  bill,  as  I  shall  show,  rests  on  principles  which, 
if  admitted,  would  supersede  all  limits. 

According  to  the  general-welfare  doctrine,  Congress  had  power  to  raise 
money,  and  appropriate  it  to  all  objects  which  it  might  deem  calculated  to  pro 
mote  th^e  general  welfare — that  is,  the  prosperity  of  the  states,  regarded  in  their 
aggregate  character  as  members  of  the  Union,  or,  to  express  it  more  briefly, 
and  in  language  once  so  common,  to  national  objects  ;  thus  excluding,  by  ne 
cessary  implication,  all  that  were  not  national,  as  falling  within  the  spheres  of 
the  separate  states.  As  wide  as  are  these  limits,  they  are  too  narrow  for  this 
bill.  It  takes  in  what  is  excluded  under  the  general-welfare  doctrine,  and  as 
sumes  for  Congress  the  right  to  raise  money  to  give,  by  distribution,  to  the 
states ;  that  is,  to  be  applied  by  them  to  those  very  local  state  objects  to  which 
that  doctrine,  by  necessary  implication,  denied  that  Congress  had  a  right  to  ap 
propriate  money  ;  and  thus  superseding  all  the  limits  of  the  "Constitution,  as  far. 


448  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALI10UN. 

at  least,  as  the  money  power  is  concerned.  The  advocates  of  this  extraordi 
nary  doctrine  have,  indeed,  attempted  to  restrict  it,  in  their  argument,  to  revenue 
derived  from  the  public  lands  ;  but  facts  speak  louder  than  words.  To  test  the 
sincerity  of  their  argument,  amendments  after  amendments  have  been  offered  to 
limit  the  operation  of  the  bill  exclusively  to  the  revenue  derived  from  that 
source,  but  which,  as  often  as  offered,  have  been  steadily  voted  down  by  their 
united  votes.  But  I  take  higher  ground.  The  aid  of  those  test  votes,  as'strong- 
as  they  are,  is  not  needed  to  make  good  the  assumption  that  Congress  has  the 
right  to  lay  and  collect  taxes  for  the  separate  use  of  the  states.  The  circum 
stances  under  which  it  is  attempted  to  force  this  bill  through  speak,  of  them 
selves,  a  language  too  distinct  to  be  misunderstood. 

The  treasury  is  exhausted ;  the  revenues  from  the  public  lands  cannot  be 
spared ;  they  are  needed*for  the  pressing  and  necessary  wants  of  the  govern 
ment.  For  every  dollar  withdrawn  from  the  treasury  and  given  to  the  states, 
a  dollar  must  be  raised  from  the  customs  to  supply  its  place  :  that  is  admitted. 
Now,  I  put  it  to  the  advocates  of  this  bill,  Is  there,  can  there  be,  any  real  dif 
ference,  either  in  principle  or  effect,  between  raising  money  from  custom?  to 
be  divided  among  the  states,  and  raising  the  same  amount  from  them  to  supply 
the  place  of  an  equal  sum  withdrawn  from  the  treasury  to  be  divided  among  the 
states  1  If  there  be  a  difference,  my  faculties  are  not  acute  enough  to  perceive 
it,  and  I  would  thank  any  one  who  can  to  point  it  out.  But,  if  this  difficulty  could 
be  surmounted,  it  would  avail  nothing,  unless  another,  not  inferior,  can  also  be 
got  over.  The  land  from  which  the  revenue  proposed  to  be  divided  is  derived 
was  purchased  (with  the  exception  of  the  small  portion,  comparatively,  lying 
between  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers)  out  of  the  common  funds  of  the  Union, 
and  with  money  derived,  for  the  most  part,  from  customs.  I  do  not  exempt  the 
portion  acquired  from  Georgia,  which  was  purchased  at  its  full  value,  and  cost 
as  much,  in  proportion,  as  Florida  purchased  from  Spain,  or  Louisiana  from 
France. 

If  money  cannot  be  raised  from  customs  or  other  sources  for  distribution,  I 
ask,  How  can  money,  derived  from  the  sales  of  land  purchased  with  money  rais 
ed  from  the  customs  or  other  sources,  be  distributed  among  the  states  1  If  the 
money  could  not  be  distributed  before  it  was  rested  in  land,  on  what  principle 
can  it  be  Avhen  it  is  converted  back  again  into  money  by  the  sales  of  the  land  1 
If,  prior  to  the  purchase,  it  was  subject,  in  making  appropriations,  to  the  limits 
prescribed  by  the  Constitution,  how  can  it,  after  having  been  converted  back 
again  into  money  by  the  sale  of  the  lane?,  be  freed  from  those  limits  1  By  what 
art,  what  political  alchymy,  could  the  ciere  passage  of  the  money  through  the 
lands  free  it  from  the  constitutional  fliackles  to  which  it  was  previously  subject  ? 

But  if  this  difficulty,  also,  could  be  surmounted,  there  is  another,  not  less 
formidable  and  more  comprehensive,  still  to  be  overcome.  If  the  lands  belong 
to  the  states  at  all,  they  must  belong  to  them  in  one  of  two  capacities — either 
in  their  federative  character,  as  members  of  a  common  Union,  or  in  their  separ 
ate,  as  distinct  and  independent  communities.  If  the  former,  this  government, 
which  was  created  as  a  common  agent  to  carry  into  effect  the  objects  for  which 
the  Union  was  formed,  holds  the  lands,  as  it  does  all  its  other  delegated  pow 
ers,  as  a  trustee  for  the  states  in  their  Federal  character,  for  the  execution  of 
those  objects,  and  no  other  purpose  whatever ;  and  can,  of  course,  under  the 
grant  of  the  Constitution  "  to  dispose  of  the  territories  or  other  property  belong 
ing  to  the  United  States,"  dispose  of  the  lands  only  under  its  trust  powers,  and 
in  execution  of  the  objects  for  which  they  were  granted  by  the  Constitution. 
When,  then,  the  lands,  or  other  property  of  the  United  States,  are  disposed  of 
by  sale — that  is,  converted  into  money — the  trust,  with  all  its  limitations,  at 
taches  as  fully  to  the  money  as  it  did  to  the  lands  or  property  of  which  it  is 
the  proceeds.  Nor  would  the  government  have  any  more  right  to  divide  the 
land  or  the  money  among  the  states — that  is,  to  surrender  it  to  them— than  it 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  449 

would  have  to  surrender  any  other  of  its  delegated  powers.  If  it  may  surren 
der  either  to  the  states,  it  may  also  surrender  the  power  of  declaring  war,  lay 
ing  duties,  or  coining  money.  They  are  all  delegated  by  the  same  parties,  held 
under  the  same  instrument,  and  in  trust,  for  the  execution  of  the  same  objects. 
The  assumption  of  such  a  right  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  assumption  of 
a  right  paramount  to  the  Constitution  itself — the  right  on  the  part  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  destroy  the  instrument  and  dissolve  the  Union,  from  which  it  derives 
its  existence.  To  such  monstrous  results  must  the  principle  on  which  this  bill 
rests  lead,  on  the  supposition  that  the  lands — that  is,  the  territories — belong  to 
the  United  States,  as  they  are  expressly  declared  to  do  by  the  Constitution. 

But  the  difficulty  would  not  be  less  if  they  should  be  considered  as  belong 
ing  to  the  states  in  their  individual  and  separate  character.  So  considered, 
what  right  can  this  government  possibly  have  over  them  ?  It  is  the  agent  or 
trustee  for  the  United  States  ;  the  states  as  members  of  a  common  Union,  and 
not  of  the  states  individually,  each  of  which  has  a  separate  government  of  its 
own  to  represent  it  in  that  capacity.  For  this  government  to  assume  to  repre 
sent  them  in  both  capacities  would  be  to  assume  all  power — to  centralize  the 
whole  system  in  itself.  But,  admitting  this  bold  assumption,  on  what  princi 
ple  of  right  or  justice,  if  the  lands  really  belong  to  the  states — or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  if  the  revenue  from  the  lands  belong  to  them — can  this  government 
impose  the  various  limitations  prescribed  in  the  bill  ?  What  right  has  it,  on  that 
supposition,  to  appropriate  funds  belonging  to  the  states  separately  to  the  use 
of  the  Union,  in  the  event  of  war,  or  in  case  the  price  of  the  lands  should  be 
increased  above  a  dollar  and  a  quarter  an  acre,  or  any  article  of  the  tariff.above 
twenty  per  centum  ad  valorem  ? 

Such,  and  so  overwhelming,  are  the  constitutional  difficulties  which  beset 
this  measure.  No  one  who  can  overcome  them — who  can  bring  himself  to 
vote  for  this  bill — need  trouble  himself  about  constitutional  scruples  hereafter. 
He  may  swallow  without  hesitation,  bank,  tariff,  and  every  other  unconstitu 
tional  measure  which  has  ever  been  adopted  or  proposed.  Yes :  it  would  be 
easier  to  make  a  plausible  argument  for  the  constitutionality  of  the  most  mon 
strous  of  the  measures  proposed  by  the  Abolitionists — for  abolition  itself — than 
for  this  detestable  bill ;  -and  yet  we  find  senators  from  slaveholding  states,  the 
very  safety  of  whose  constituents  depends  on  a  strict  construction  of  the  Con 
stitution,  recording  their  names  in  favour  of  a  measure  from  which  they  have 
nothing  to  hope  and  everything  to  fear.  To  what  is  a  course  so  blind  to  be  at 
tributed,  but  to  that  fanaticism  of  party  zeal,  openly  avowed  on  this  floor,  which 
regards  the  preservation  of  the  power  of  the  Whig  party  as  the  paramount  con 
sideration  ?  It  has  staked  its  existence  on  the  passage  of  this  and  the  other  meas 
ures  for  which  this  extraordinary  session  was  called  ;  and  when  it  is  brought  to 
the  alternative  of  their  defeat  or  success,  in  the  anxiety  to  avoid  the  one  and 
secure  the  other,  constituents,  Constitution,  duty,  arid  country — all  are  forgotten. 
A  measure  which  would  make  so  wide  and  fatal  a  breach  in  the  Constitu 
tion  could  not  but  involve  in  its  consequences  many  and  disastrous  changes  in 
our  political  system,  too  numerous  to  be  traced  in  a  speech.  It  would  require 
a  volume  to  do  them  justice.  As  many  as  may  fall  within  the  scope  of  my  re 
marks,  I  shall  touch  in  their  proper  place.  Suffice  it  for  the  present  to  say, 
that  such  and  so  great  would  they  be,  as  to  disturb  and  confound  the  relations  of 
fall  the  constituent  parts  of  our  beautiful  but  complex  system — of  that  between 
this  and  the  co-ordinate  governments  of  the  states,  and  between  them  and  their 
respective  constituency.  Let  the  principle  of  the  distribution  of  the  revenue, 
on  which  this  bill  rests,  be  established,  and  it  would  follow,  as  certainly  as  it  is 
now  before  us,  that  this  government  and  those  of  the  states  would  be  placed  in 
antagonist  relations  on  all  subjects  except  the  collection  and  distribution  of  rev 
enue  ;  which  would  end,  in  time,  in  converting  this  into  a  mere  machine  of 
collection  and  distribution  for  those  of  the  states,  to  the  utter  neglect  of  all  the 

L  L  L 


450  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

functions  for  which  it  was  created.  Then  the^  proper  responsibility  of  each  to 
their  respective  constituency  would  be  destroyed ;  then  would  succeed  a  scene 
of  plunder  and  corruption  without  parallel,  to  be  followed  by  dissolution,  or  an 
entire  change  of  system.  Yes :  if  any  one  measure  can  dissolve  this  Union, 
this  is  that  measure.  The  revenue  is  the  state,  said  the  great  British  states 
man,  Burke.  With  us,  to  divide  the  revenue  among  its  members  is  to  divide 
the  Union.  This  bill  proposes  to  divide  that  from  the  lands.  Take  one  step 
more,  to  which  this  will  lead  if  not  arrested — divide  the  revenue  from  the  cus 
toms,  and  what  of  union  would  be  left?  I  touched  more  fully  on  this,  and 
other  important  points  connected  with  this  detestable  measure,  during  the  dis 
cussions  of  the  last  session,  and  shall  not  now  repeat  what  I  then  said. 

What  I  now  propose  is,  to  trace  the  change  it  would  make  in  our  financial 
system,  with  its  bearings  on  what  ought  to  be  the  policy  of  the  government.  I 
have  selected  it,  not  because  it  is  the  most  important,  but  because  it  is  that 
which  has  heretofore  received  the  least  attention. 

This  government  has  heretofore  been  supported  almost  exclusively  from  two 
sources  of  revenue — the  lands  and  the  customs  ;  excepting  a  short  period  at  its 
commencement,  and  during  the  late  war,  when  it  drew  a  great  portion  of  its 
means  from  internal  taxes.  The  revenue  from  lands  has  been  constantly  and 
steadily  increasing  with  the  increase  of  population,  and  may,  for  the  next  ten 
years,  be  safely  estimated  to  yield  an  annual  average  income  of  $5,000,000,  if 
they  should  be  properly  administered :  a  sum  equal  to  more  than  a  fourth  of 
what  the  entire  expenditures  of  the  government  ought  to  be  with  due  economy, 
and  restricted  to  the  objects  for  which  it  was  instituted. 

This  bill  proposes  to  withdraw  this  large,  permanent,  and  growing  source  of 
revenue  from  the  treasury  of  the  Union,  and  to  distribute  it  among  the  several 
states ;  and  the  question  is,  Would  it  be  wise  to  do  so,,  viewed  as  a  financial 
measure,  in  reference  to  what  ought  to  be  the  policy  of  the  government  ?  which 
brings  up  the  previous  question.  WThat  ought  that  policy  to  be  ?  In  the  order  of 
things,  the  question  of  policy  precedes  that  of  finance.  The  latter  has  refer 
ence  to,  and  is  dependant  on,  the  former.  It  must  first  be  determined  what 
ought  to  be  done,  before  it  can  be  ascertained  how  much  revenue  will  be  re 
quired,  and  on  what  it  ought  to  be  raised. 

To  the  question,  then,.  What  ought  to  V>e  the  policy  of  the  government  ?  the 
shortest  and  most  comprehensive  answer  whicK  I  can  give  is,  that  it  ought  to 
be  the  very  opposite  of  that  for  which  this  extraordinary  session  was  called,  and 
of  which  this  measure  forms  so  prominent  a  part.  The  effect  of  these  measuros 
is  to  divide  and  distract  the  country  within,  and  to  weaken  it  without ;  the  very 
reverse  of  the  objects  for  which  the  government  was  instituted — which  was  to 
give  peace,  tranquillity,  and  harmony  within,  and  power,  security,  and  respect 
ability  without.  We  find,  accordingly,  that  without,  where  strength  was  re 
quired,  its  powers  are  undivided.  In  its  exterior  relations — abroad,  this  gov 
ernment  is  the  sole  and  exclusive  representative  of  the  united  majesty,  sover 
eignty,  and  power  of  the  states  constituting  this  great  and  glorious  Union.  To 
the  rest  of  the  world  we  are  one.  Neither  state  nor  state  government  is 
known  beyond  our  borders.  Within  it  is  different.  There  we  form  twenty- 
six  distinct,  independent,  and  sovereign  communities,  each  with  its  separate 
government,  whose  powers  are  as  exclusive  within  as  that  of  this  government 
is  without,  with  the  exception  of  three  classes  of  powers  which  are  delegated 
to  it.  The  first  is,  those  that  were  necessary  to  the  discharge  of  its  exterior 
functions — such  as  declaring  war,  raising  armies,  providing  a  navy,  and  raising 
revenue.  The  reason  for  delegating  these  requires  no  explanation.  The  next 
class  consists  of  those  powers  that  were  necessary  to  regulate  the  exterior  or 
international  relations  of  the  states  among  themselves,  considered  as  distinct 
communities — powers  that  could  not  be  exercised  by  the  states  separately,  and 
the  regulation  of  which  was  necessary  to  their  peace,  tranquillity,  and  that  free 


451 

intercourse,  social  and  commercial,  which  ought  to  exist  between  confederated 
states.  Such  are  those  of  regulating  commerce  between  the  states,  coming 
money,  and  fixing  the  value  thereof,  and  the  standard  of  weights  and  measures. 
The  remaining  class  consists  of  those  powers  which,  though  not  belonging  to 
the  exterior  relations  of  the  states,  are  of  such  nature  that  they  could  not  be  ex 
ercised  by  states  separately  without  one  injuring  the  other — such  as  imposing 
duties  on  imports ;  in  exercising  which,  the  maritime  states,  having  the  ad 
vantage  of  good  ports,  would  tax  those  who  would  have  to  draw  their  supply 
through  them.  In  asserting  that,  with  these  exceptions,  the  powers  of  the  states 
are  exclusive  within,  I  speak  in  general  terms.  There  are,  indeed,  others  not 
reducible  to  either  of  these  classes,  but  they  are  too  few  and  inconsiderable  to 
be  regarded  as  exceptions. 

On  the  moderate  and  prudent  exercise  of  these,  its  interior  powers,  the  suc 
cess  of  the  government,  and  with  it  our  entire  political  system,  mainly  depend. 
If  the  government  should  be  restricted  in  their  exercise  to  the  objects  for  which 
they  are  delegated,  peace,  harmony,  and  tranquillity  would  reign  within ;  and 
the  attention  of  the  government,  unabsorbed  by  distracting  questions  within,  and 
its  entire  resources  unwasted  by  expenditures  on  objects  foreign  to  its  duties, 
would  be  directed  with  all  its  energy  to  guard  against  danger  from  without,  to 
give  security  to  our  vast  commercial  and  navigating  interest,  and  to  acquire  that 
weight  and  respectability  for  our  name  in  the  family  of  nations  which  ought  to 
belong  to  the  freest,  most  enterprising,  arid  most  growing  people  on  the  globe. 
If  thus  restricted  in  the  exercise  of  these,  the  most  delicate  of  its  powers,  and 
in  the  exercise  of  which  only  it  can  come  in  conflict  with  the  governments  of 
the  states,  or  interfere  with  their  interior  policy  and  interest,  this  government, 
with  our  whole  political  system,  would  work  like  a  charm,  and  become  the  ad 
miration  of  the  world.  The  states,  left  undisturbed  within  their  separate  spheres, 
and  each  in  the  full  possession  of  its  resources,  would,  with  that  generous  ri 
valry  which  always  takes  place  between  clusters  of  free  states  of  the  same  or 
igin  and  language,  and  which  gives  the  greatest  possible  impulse  to  improve 
ment,  carry  excellence  in  all  that  is  desirable  beyond  any  former  example. 

But  if,  instead  of  restricting  these  powers  to  their  proper  objects,  they  should 
be  perverted  to  those  never  intended  ;  if,  for  example,  that  of  raising  revenue 
should  be  perverted  into  that  of  protecting  one  branch  of  industry  at  the  expense 
of  others  ;  that  of  collecting  and  disbursing  the  revenue  into  that  of  incorpora 
ting  a  great  central  bank,  to  be  located  at  some  favoured  point,  and  placed  under 
local  control ;  and  that  of  making  appropriations  for  specified  objects,  into  that 
of  expending  money  on  whatever  Congress  should  think  proper — all  this  would 
be  reversed.  Instead  of  harmony  and  tranquillity  within,  there  would  be  dis 
cord,  distraction,  and  conflict,  followed  by  the  absorption  of  the  attention  of  the 
government,  and  exhaustion  of  its  means  and  energy  on  objects  never  intended 
to  be  placed  under  its  control,  to  the  utter  neglect  of  the  duties  belonging  to  the 
exterior  relations  of  the  government,  and  which  are  exclusively  confided  to  its 
charge.  Such  has  been,  and  ever  must  be,  the  effect  of  perverting  these  pow 
ers  to  objects  foreign  to  the  Constitution.  When  thus  perverted,  they  become 
unequal  in  their  action,  operating  to  the  benefit  of  one  part  or  class  to  the  inju 
ry  of  another  part  or  class — to  the  benefit  of  the  manufacturing  against  the  ag 
ricultural  and  commercial  portions,  or  of  the  non-productive  against  the  produ 
cing  class.  The  more  extensive  the  country,  the  greater  would  be  the  inequali 
ty  and  oppression.  In  ours,  stretching  over  two  thousand  square  mile%  they 
become  intolerable  when  pushed  beyond  moderate  limits.  It  is  then  conflicts 
take  place,  from  the  struggle  on  the  part  of  those  who  are  benefited  by  the  op 
eration  of  an  unequal  system  of  legislation  to  retain  their  advantage,  and  on  the 
part  of  the  oppressed  to  resist  it.  When  this  state  of  things  occurs,  it  is  nei 
ther  more  nor  less  than  a  state  of  hostility  between  the  oppressor  and  oppressed 
— war  waged  not  by  armies,  but  by  laws  ;  acts  and  sections  of  acts  are  sent  by 


452  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOTJN. 

the  stronger  party  on  a  plundering  expedition,  instead  of  divisions  and  brigades, 
which  often  return  more  richly  laden  with  spoils  than  a  plundering  expedition 
after  the  most  successful  foray. 

That  such  must  be  the  effect  of  the  system  of  measures  now  attempted  to  be 
forced  on  the  government  by  the  perversion  of  its  interior  powers,  I  appeal  to 
the  voice  of  experience  in  aid  of  the  dictates  of  reason.  I  go  back  to  the  be 
ginning  of  the  government,  and  ask,  What,  at  its  outset,  but  this  very  system  of 
measures  caused  the  great  struggle  which  continued  down  to  1828,  when  the 
system  reached  its  full  growth  in  the  tariff  of  that  year  ?  And  what,  from  that 
period  to  the  termination  of  the  late  election  which  brought  the  present  party 
into  power,  has  disturbed  the  harmony  and  tranquillity  of  the  country,  deranged 
its  currency,  interrupted  its  business,  endangered  its  liberty  and  institutions,  but 
a  struggle  on  one  side  to  overthrow,  and  on  the  other  to  uphold  the  system  ? 
In  that  struggle  it  fell  prostrate  :  and  what  now  agitates  the  country,  what  caus 
es  this  extraordinary  session,  with  all  its  excitement,  but  the  struggle  on  the 
part  of  those  in  power  to  restore  the  system  ;  to  incorporate  a  bank ;  to  re-enact 
a  protective  tariff';  to  distribute  the  revenue  from  the  lands  ;  to  originate  anoth 
er  debt,  and  renew  the  system  of  wasteful  expenditures  ;  and  the  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  opposition  to  prevent  it  ?  Gentlemen  talk  of  settling  these  ques 
tions  :  they  deceive  themselves.  They  cry  peace,  peace,  when  there  is  no 
peace.  There  never  can  be  peace  till  they  are  abandoned,  or  till  our  free  and 
popular  institutions  are  succeeded  by  the  calm  of  despotism  ;  and  that  not  till 
the  spirit  of  our  patriotic  and  immortal  ancestors,  who  achieved  our  independ 
ence  and  established  our  glorious  political  system,  shall  become  extinct,  and  their 
descendants  a  base  and  sordid  rabble.  Till  then,  or  till  our  opponents  shall  be 
expelled  from  power,  and  their  hope  of  restoring  and  maintaining  their  system 
of  measures  is  blasted,  the  struggle  will  be  continued,  the  tranquillity  and  har 
mony  of  the  country  be  disturbed,  and  the  strength  and  resources  of  the  govern 
ment  be  wasted  within,  and  its  duties  neglected  without. 

But,  of  all  the  measures  which  constitute  this  pernicious  system,  there  is  not 
one  more  subversive  of  the  objects  for  which  the  government  was  instituted, 
none  more  destructive  of  harmony  within  and  security  without,  than  that  now 
under  consideration.  Its  direct  tendency  is  to  universal  discord  and  distraction  ; 
to  array  the  new  states  against  the  old,  the  non-indebted  against  the  indebted, 
the  staple  against  the  manufacturing ;  one  class  against  another ;  and,  finally, 
the  people  against  the  government.  But  I  pass  these.  My  object  is  not  to 
trace  political  consequences,  but  to  discuss  the  financial  bearings  of  this  meas 
ure,  regarded  in  reference  to  what  ought  to  be  the  policy  of  the  government ; 
which,  I  trust,  I  have  satisfactorily  shown  ought  to  be,  to  turn  its  attention,  en 
ergy,  and  resources  from  within  to  without,  to  its  appropriate  and  exclusive 
sphere,  that  of  guarding  against  danger  from  abroad  ;  giving  free  scope  and  pro 
tection  to  our  commerce  and  navigation,  and  that  elevated  standing  to  the  coun 
try  to  which  it  is  so  fairly  entitled  in  the  family  of  nations.  It  becomes  neces 
sary  to  repeat,  preparatory  to  what  I  propose,  that  the  object  of  this  measure  is 
to  Avithdraw  the  revenue  from  the  public  lands  from  the  treasury  of  the  Union, 
to  be  divided  among  the  states  ;  that  the  probable  annual  amount  that  would  be 
so  drawn  would  average  the  next  ten  years  not  less  than  five  millions  of  dol 
lars  ;  and  that,  to  make  up  the  deficit,  an  equal  sum  must  be  laid  on  the  imports. 
Such  is  the  measure,  regarded  as  one  of  finance  ;  and  the  question  is,  Would 
it  be  jiist,  wise,  expedient,  considered  in  its  bearings  on  what  ought  to  be  the 
policy  of  the  government  ? 

The  measure,  on  its  face,  is  but  a  surrender  of  one  of  the  two  sources  of  rev 
enue  to  the  states,  to  be  divided  among  them  in  proportion  to  their  joint  delega 
tion  in  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  and  to  impose  a  burden  to  an  equal  amount 
on  the  imports  ;  that  is,  on  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  country.  In  every  view 
I  cnn  t?Jie,  it  is  preposterous,  unequal,  and  unjust.  Regarded  in  its  most  fa- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  453 

vourable  aspect — that  is,  on  the  supposition  that  the  people  of  each  state  would 
pay  back  to  the  treasury  of  the  Union,  through  the  tax  on  the  imports,  in  order 
to  make  up  the  deficit,  a  sum  equal  to  that  received  by  the  state  as  its  distribu 
tive  share  ;  and  that  each  individual  would  receive  of  that  sum  an  amount  equal 
in  proportion  to  what  he  paid  of  the  taxes — what  would  that  be  but  the  folly  of 
giving  with  one  hand  and  taking  back  with  the  other  ?  It  would,  in  fact,  be 
worse.  Giving  and  taking  back  must  be  paid  for,  which,  in  this  case,  would 
be  not  a  little  expensive  and  troublesome.  The  expense  of  collecting  the 
duties  on  imports  is  known  to  be  about  ten  per  cent. ;  to  which  must  be 
added  the  expense  and  trouble  of  distribution,  with  the  loss  of  the  use  of  the 
money  while  the  process  is  going  on,  which  may  be  fairly  estimated  at  two 
per  cent,  additional ;  making,  in  all,  twelve  per  cent,  for  the  cost  of  the  pro 
cess.  It  follows  that  the  people  of  the  state,  in  order  to  return  back  to  the 
treasury  of  the  Union  an  amount  equal  to  the  sum  received  by  distribution,  would 
have  each  to  pay,  by  the  supposition,  twelve  per  cent,  more  of  taxes  than  his 
share  of  the  sum  distributed.  That  sum  (equal  to  six  hundred  thousand  dollars 
on  five  millions)  would  go  to  the  collectors  of  the  taxes — the  custom-house  of 
ficers — for  their  share  of  the  public  spoils. 

But  it  is  still  worse.  It  is  unequal  and  unjust,  as  well  as  foolish  and  absurd. 
The  case  supposed  would  not  be  the  real  state  of  the  facts.  It  would  be  scarce 
ly  possible  so  to  arrange  a  system  of  taxes  under  which  the  people  of  each  state 
would  pay  back  a  sum  just  equal  to  that  received ;  much  less  that  the  taxes 
should  fall  on  each  individual  in  the  state  in  the  same  proportion  that  he  would 
receive  of  the  sum  distributed  to  the  state.  But,  if  this  be  possible,  it  is  certain 
that  no  system  of  taxes  on  imports — especially  the  bill  sent  from  the  other  house 
— can  make  such  equalization.  So  far  from  that,  I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting 
that  the  staple  states  would  pay  into  the  treasury,  under  its  operation,  three 
times  as  much  as  they  would  receive  on  an  average  by  the  distribution,  and 
some  of  them  far  more  ;  while  to  the  manufacturing  states,  if  we  are  to  judge 
from  their  zeal  in  favour  of  the  bill,  the  duties  it  proposes  to  impose  would  be 
bounties,  not  taxes.  If  judged  by  their  acts,  both  measures — the  distribution 
and  the  duties — would  favour  their  pockets.  They  would  be  gainers,  let  who 
may  be  losers  in  this  financial  game. 

But  be  the  inequality  greater  or  less  than  my  estimate,  what  could  be  more 
unjust  than  to  distribute  a  common  fund  in  a  certain  proportion  among  the  states, 
and  to  compel  the  people  of  the  states  to  make  up  the  deficit  in  a  different  pro 
portion  ;  so  that  some  shall  pay  more,  and  others  less,  than  what  they  respect 
ively  received  ?  What  is  it  but  a  cunningly-devised  scheme  to  take  from  one 
state  and  to  give  to  another — to  replenish  the  treasuries  of  some  of  the  states 
from  the  pockets  of  the  people  of  the  others ;  in  reality,  to  make  them  support 
the  governments  and  pay  the  debts  of  other  states,  as  well  as  their  own  1  Such 
must  be  the  necessary  result,  as  between  the  states  which  may  pay  more  than 
they  receive,  and  those  which  may  receive  more  than  they  pay ;  the  injustice 
and  inequality  will  increase  or  decrease,  just  in  proportion  to  the  respective  ex 
cess  or  deficit  between  receipts  and  payments,  under  this  flagitious  contrivance 
for  plunder. 

But  I  have  not  yet  reached  the  reality  of  this  profligate  and  wicked  scheme. 
As  unequal  and  unjust  as  it  would  be  between  state  and  state,  it  is  still  more  so 
regarded  in  its  operation  between  individuals.  It  is  between  them  its  true 
character  and  hideous  features  fully  disclose  themselves.  The  money  to  be 
distributed  would  riot  go  to  the  people,  but  to  the  legislatures  of  the  states ; 
while  that  to  be  paid  in  taxes  to  make  up  the  deficiency  would  be  taken  from 
them  individually.  A  small  portion  of  that  which  would  go  to  the  legislatures 
would  ever  reach  the  pockets  of  the  people.  It  would  be  under  the  control  and 
management  of  the  dominant  party  of  the  Legislature,  and  they  under  the  con 
trol  and  management  of  the  leaders  of  the  party.  That  it  would  be  administer- 


454  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ed  to  the  advantage  of  themselves,  and  their  friends  and  partisans  ;  and  that  they 
would  profit  more  by  their  use  and  management  of  an  irresponsible  fund,  taken 
from  nobody  knows  who,  than  they  would  lose  as  payers  of  the  taxes  to  supply 
its  place,  will  not  be  doubted  by  any  one  who  knows  how  such  things  are  man 
aged.  What  would  be  the  result  ?  The  whole  of  the  revenue  from  the  im 
mense  public  domain  would,  if  this  wicked  measure  should  become  the  settled 
policy,  go  to  the  profit  and  aggrandizement  of  the  leaders,  for  the  time,  of  the 
dominant  party  in  the  twenty-six  state  legislatures,  and  their  partisans  and  sup 
porters  ;  that  is,  to  the  most  influential,  if  not  the  most  wealthy  clique,  for  the 
time,  in  the  respective  states  ;  while  the  deficiency  would  be  supplied  from  the 
pockets  of  the  great  mass  of  the  community,  by  taxes  on  tea,  coffee,  salt,  iron, 
coarse  woollens,  and,  for  the  most  part,  other  necessaries  of  life.  And  what  is 
that  but  taking  from  the  many  and  giving  to  the  few — from  those  who  look  to 
their  own  means  and  industry  for  the  support  of  themselves  and  families,  and 
giving  to  those  who  look  to  the  government  for  support,  to  increase  the  profit 
and  influence  of  political  managers  and  their  partisans,  and  diminish  that  of  the 
people?  When  it  is  added  that  the  dominant  party  in  each  state  for  the  time 
would  have  a  direct  interest  in  keeping  up  and  enlarging  this  pernicious  fund, 
and  that  their  combined  influence  must  for  the  time  be  irresistible,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  by  what  means  the  country  can  ever  extricate  itself  from  this  measure, 
should  it  be  once  established,  or  what  limits  can  be  prescribed  to  its  growth, 
or  the  extent  of  the  disasters  which  must  follow.  It  contains  the  germe  of 
mighty  and  fearful  changes,  if  it  be  once  permitted  to  shoot  its  roots  into  our 
political  fabric,  unless,  indeed,  it  should  be  speedily  eradicated. 

In  what  manner  the  share  that  would  fall  to  the  states  would,  in  the  first  in 
stance,  be  applied,  may,  for  the  most  part,  be  anticipated.  The  indebted  states 
would  probably  pledge  it  to  the  payment  of  their  debts ;  the  effect  of  which 
would  be  to  enhance  their  value  in  the  hands  of  the  holders — the  Rothschilds, 
the  Barings,  the  Hopes,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  with  wealthy  brokers 
and  stock-jobbers  on  this.  Were  this  done  at  the  expense  of  the  indebted  states, 
none  could  object.  But  far  different  is  the  case  when  at  the  expense  of  the 
Union,  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  noble  inheritance  left  by  our  ancestors,  and  when 
the  loss  of  this  great  and  permanent  fund  must  be  supplied  from  the  industry 
and  property  of  a  large  portion  of  the  community,  who  had  no  agency  or  respon 
sibility  in  contracting  the  debts,  or  benefit  from  the  objects  on  which  the  funds 
were  expended.  On  what  principle  of  justice,  honour,  or  Constitution,  can  this 
government  interfere,  and  take  from  their  pockets  to  increase  the  profit  of  the 
most  wealthy  individuals  in  the  world  ? 

The  portion  that  might  fall  to  the  states  not  indebted,  or  those  not  deeply  so, 
would  probably,  for  the  most  part,  be  pledged  as  a  fund  on  which  to  make  new- 
loans  for  new  schemes  similar  to  those  for  which  the  existing  state  debts  were 
contracted.  It  may  not  be  applied  so  at  first ;  but  such  would  most  likely  be 
the  application  on  the  first  swell  of  the  tide  of  expansion.  Supposing  one 
half  of  the  whole  sum  to  be  derived  from  the  lands  should  be  so  applied  :  esti 
mating  the  income  from  that  source  at  five  millions,  the  half  would  furnish  the 
basis  of  a  new  debt  of  forty  or  fifty  millions.  Stock  to  that  amount  would  be 
created — would  find  its  way  to  foreign  markets,  and  would  return,  as  other 
stocks  of  like  kind  have,  in  swelling  the  tide  of  imports  in  the  first  instance, 
but  in  the  end  by  diminishing  them  to  an  amount  equal  to  the  interest  on  the 
sum  borrowed,  and  cutting  off  in  the  same  proportion  the  permanent  revenue 
from  the  customs  ;  and  this,  when  the  whole  support  of  the  government  is  about 
to  be  thrown  exclusively  on  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  country.  So  much 
for  the  permanent  effects,  in  a  firancial  view,  of  this  measure. 

The  swelling  of  the  tide  of  imports,  in  the  first  instance,  from  the  loans, 
would  lead  to  a  corresponding  flush  of  revenue,  and  that  to  extravagant  ex 
penditures,  to  be  followed  by  embarrassment  of  the  treasury,  and  a  glut  of 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  455 

goods,  which  would  bring  on  a  corresponding  pressure  on  the  manufacturers ; 
when  my  friend  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Bates),  and  other  senators  from  that 
quarter,  would  cry  out  for  additional  protection,  to  guard  against  the  necessary 
consequences  of  the  very  measure  they  are  now  so  urgently  pressing  through 
the  Senate.  Such  would  be  the  consequences  of  this  measure,  regarded  as  one 
of  finance,  and  in  reference  to  its  internal  operation.  It  is  not  possible  but  that 
such  a  measure,  so  unequal  and  unjust  between  state  and  state,  section  and 
section — between  those  who  live  by  their  own  means  and  industry,  and  those 
who  live  or  expect  to  live  on  the  public  crib — would  add  greatly  to  that  discord 
and  strife  within,  and  weakness  without,  which  are  necessarily  consequent  on 
the  Entire  system  of  measures  of  which  it  forms  a  part. 

But  its  mischievous  effects  on  the  exterior  relations  of  the  country  would  not 
be  limited  to  its  indirect  consequences.  There  it  would  strike  a  direct  and 
deadly  blow,  by  withdrawing  entirely  from  the  defences  of  the  country  one  of 
the  only  two  sources  of  our  revenue,  and  that  much  the  most  permanent  and 
growing.  It  is  now  in  the  power  of  Congress  to  pledge  permanently  this  great 
and  increasing  fund  to  that  important  object — to  completing  the  system  of  forti 
fications,  and  building,  equipping,  and  maintaining  a  gallant  navy.  It  was  pro 
posed  to  strike  out  the  whole  bill ;  to  expunge  the  detestable  project  of  distri 
bution,  and  to  substitute  in  its  place  the  revenue  from  the  public  lands,  as  a 
permanent  fund,  sacred  to  the  defences  of  the  country.  And  from  what  quar 
ter  did  this  patriotic  and  truly  statesmanlike  proposition  come  ?  From  the  far 
and  gallant  West ;  from  a  senator  (Mr.  Linn)  of  a  state  the  most  remote  from 
the  ocean,  and  secure  from  danger.  And  by  whom  was  it  voted  down  ?  Strange 
to  tell,  by  senators  from  maritime  states — states  most  exposed,  and  having  the 
deepest  interest  in  the  measure  defeated  by  their  representatives  on  this  floor. 
Wonderful  as  it  may  seem,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Georgia,  and  South  Caro 
lina,  each  gave  a  vote  against  it.  North  Carolina,  Virginia,  Maryland,  Dela 
ware,  and  New- Jersey,  gave  each  two  votes  against  it.  New-York  gave  one  ; 
and  every  vote^rom  New-England,  but  two  from  New-Hampshire  and  one  from 
Maine,  was  cast  against  it.  Be  it  remembered  in  all  after  times,  that  these 
votes  from  states  so  exposed,  and  having  so  deep  a  stake  in  the  defence  of  the 
country,  were  cast  in  favour  of  distribution — of  giving  gratuitously  a  large  por 
tion  of  the  fund  from  the  public  domain  to  wealthy  British  capitalists,  and 
against  the  proposition  for  applying  it  permanently  to  the  sacred  purpose  of  de 
fending  their  own  shores  from  insult  and  danger.  How  strange  that  New- 
York  and  New-England,  with  their  hundreds  of  millions  of  property,  and  so 
many  thousands  of  hardy  and  enterprising  sailors  annually  afloat,  should  give 
so  large  a  vote  for  a  measure  above  all  others  best  calculated  to  withdraw  pro 
tection  from  both,  and  so  small  a  vote  against  one  best  calculated  to  afford  them 
protection  !  But,  strange  as  that  may  be,  it  is  still  more  strange  that  the  staple 
states — the  states  that  will  receive  so  little  from  distribution,  and  which  must 
pay  so  much  to  make  up  the  deficiency  it  will  cause — states  so  defenceless  on 
their  maritime  frontier — should  cast  so  large  a  vote  for  their  own  oppression, 
and  against  their  own  defence !  Can  folly,  can  party  infatuation,  be  the  cause 
one  or  both,  go  farther  ? 

Let  me  say  to  the  senators  from  the  commercial  and  navigating  states,  in  all 
soberness,  that  there  is  now  a  warm  and  generous  feeling  diffused  throughout 
the  entire  Union  in  favour  of  the  arm  of  defence  with  which  your  interest  and 
glory  are  so  closely  identified.  Is  it  wise,  by  any  act  of  yours,  to  weaken  or 
alienate  such  feelings  ?  And  could  you  do  an  act  more  directly  calculated  to 
do  so  ?  Remember,  it  is  a  deep  principle  of  our  nature  not  to  regard  the  safety 
of  those  who  do  not  regard  their  own.  If  you  are  indifferent  to  your  own 
safety,  you  must  not  be  surprised  if  those  less  interested  should  become  still 
more  so. 

But  as  much  as  the  defences  of  the  country  would  be  weakened  directly  by 


456  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

the  withdrawal  of  so  large  a  fund,  the  blow  would  be  by  no  means  so  heavy  as 
that  which,  in  its  consequences,  would  fall  on  them.  That -would  paralyze  the 
right  arm  of  our  power.  To  understand  fully  how  it  would  have  that  effect,  we 
must  look  not  only  to  the  amount  of  the  sum  to  be  withdrawn,  but  also  on  what 
the  burden  would  fall  to  make  up  the  deficiency.  It  would  fall  on  the  com 
merce  of  the  country,  exactly  where  it  would  do  most  to  cripple  the  means  of 
defence.  To  illustrate  the  truth  of  what  I  state,  it  will  be  necessary  to  inquire 
what  would  be  our  best  system  of  defence.  And  that  would  involve  the  prior 
question,  From  what  quarter  are  we  most  exposed  to  danger  ?  With  that  I  shall 
accordingly  begin. 

There  is  but  one  nation  on  the  globe  from  which  we  have  anything  serious 
to  apprehend,  but  that  is  the  most  powerful  that  now  exists  or  ever  did  exist. 
I  refer  to  Great  Britain.  She  is,  in  effect,  our  near  neighbour,  though  the  wide 
Atlantic  divides  us.  Her  colonial  possessions  stretch  along  the  whole  extent 
of  our  Eastern  and  Northern  borders,  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
Her  power  and  influence  extend  over  the  numerous  Indian  tribes  scattered 
along  our  Western  border,  from  our  Northern  boundary  to  the  infant  Republic 
of  Texas.  But  it  is  on  our  maritime  frontier,  extending  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Sabine  to  that  of  St.  Croix — a  distance,  with  the  undulations  of  the  coast,  of 
thousands  of  miles,  deeply  indented  with  bays  and  navigable  rivers,  and  studded 
with  our  great  commercial  emporiums  ;  it  is  there,  on  that  long  line  of  frontier, 
that  she  is  the  most  powerful,  and  we  the  weakest  and  most  vulnerable.  It  is 
there  she  stands  ready,  with  her  powerful  navy,  sheltered  in  the  commanding 
positions  of  Halifax,  Bermuda,  and  the  Bahamas,  to  strike  a  blow  at  any  point 
she  may  select  on  this  long  line  of  coast.  Such  is  the  quarter  from  which  only 
we  have  danger  to  apprehend  ;  and  the  important  inquiry  which  next  presents 
itself  is,  How  can  we  best  defend  ourselves  against  a  power  so  formidable,  thus 
touching  us  on  all  points,  excepting  the  small  portion  of  our  boundary  along 
which  Texas  joins  us  ? 

Every  portion  of  our  extended  frontier  demands  attention,  mland  as  well  as 
maritime ;  but  with  this  striking  difference  :  that  on  the  former,  our  power  is 
as  much  greater  than  hers  as  hers  is  greater  than  ours  on  the  maritime.  There 
we  would  be  the  assailant,  and  whatever  works  may  be  erected  there  ought  to 
have  reference  to  that  fact,  and  look  mainly  to  protecting  important  points  from 
sudden  seizure  and  devastation,  rather  than  to  guard  against  any  permanent 
lodgment  of  a  force  within  our  borders. 

The  difficult  problem  is  the  defence  of  our  maritime  frontier.  That,  of  course, 
must  consist  of  fortifications  and  a  navy  -,  but  the  question  is,  Which  ought  to 
be  mainly  relied  on,  and  to  what  extent  may  the  one  be  considered  as  superse 
ding  the  other  ?  On  both  points  I  propose  to  make  a  few  remarks. 

Fortifications,  as  the  means  of  defence,  are  liable  to  two  formidable  objec 
tions,  either  of  which  is  decisive  against  them  as  an  exclusive  system  of  de 
fence.  The  first  is,  that  they  are  purely  defensive.  Let  the  system  be  ever 
so  perfect,  the  works  located  to  the  greatest  advantage,  and  planned  and  con 
structed  in  the  best  manner,  and  all  they  can  do  is  to  repel  attack.  They  can- 
riot  assail.  They  are  like  a  shield  without  a  sword.  If  they  should  be  regard 
ed  as  sufficient  to  defend  o*ur  maritime  cities,  still  they  cannot  command  re 
spect,  or  give  security  to  our  widely-spread  and  important  commercial  and  nav 
igating  interests. 

But  regarded  simply  as  the  means  of  defence,  they  are  defective.  Fortifica 
tions  are  nothing  without  men  to  garrison  them  ;  and  if  we  should  have  no  oth 
er  means  of  defence,  Great  Britain  could  compel  us.  with  a  moderate  fleet  sta 
tioned  at  the  points  mentioned,  and  with  but  a  small  portion  of  her  large  milita 
ry  establishment,  to  keep  up  on  our  part,  to  guard  our  coast,  ten  times  the  force, 
at  many  times  the  cost,  to  garrison  our  numerous  forts.  Aided  by  the  swiftness 
of  steam,  she  could  menace  at  the  same  time  every  point  of  our  coast ;  while 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALlIOUtf.  457 

we,  ignorant  of  the  time  or  point  where  the  blow  might  fall,  would  have  to  stand 
prepared,  at  every  moment  and  at  every  point,  to  repel  her  attack.  A  hundred 
thousand  men  constantly  under  arms  would  be  insufficient  for  the  purpose  ;  and 
we  would  be  compelled  to  yield,  in  the  end,  ingloriously,  without  striking  a 
blow,  simply  from  the  exhaustion  of  our  means. 

Some  other  mode  of  defence,  then,  must  be  sought.  There  is  none  other  but 
a  navy.  I,  of  course,  include  steam  as  well  as  sails.  If  we  want  to  defend 
our  coast  and  protect  our  rights  abroad,  it  is  absolutely  necessary.  The  only 
questions  are,  How  far  ought  our  naval  force  to  be  carried  ?  and  to  what  extent 
would  it  supersede  the  system  of  fortification  ? 

Before  I  enter  on  the  consideration  of  this  important  point,  I  owe  it  to  my 
self  and  the  subject  to  premise  that  my  policy  is  peace,  and  that  I  look  to  the 
navy  but  as  the  right  arm  of  defence,  not  as  an  instrument  of  conquest  or  aggran 
dizement.  Our  road  to  greatness,  as  I  said  on  a  late  occasion,  lies  not  over  the 
ruins  of  others.  Providence  has  bestowed  on  us  a  new  and  vast  region,  abound 
ing  in  resources  beyond  any  country  of  the  same  extent  on  the  globe.  Ours 
is  a  peaceful  task — to  improve  this  rich  inheritance  ;  to  level  its  forests ;  cul 
tivate  its  fertile  soil ;  develop  its  vast  mineral  resources ;  give  the  greatest  r£- 
pidity  and  facility  of  intercourse  between  its  widely-extended  parts  ;  stud  its 
wide  surface  with  flourishing  cities,  towns,  and  villages  ;  and  spread  over  it 
richly-cultivated  fields.  So  vast  is  our  country,  that  generations  after  genera 
tions  may  pass  away  in  executing  this  task,  during  the  whole  of  which  time  we 
would  be  rising  more  surely  and  rapidly  in  numbers,  wealth,  greatness,  and  in 
fluence,  than  any  other  people  have  ever  done  by  arras.  But,  to  carry  out  suc 
cessfully  this,  our  true  plan  of  acquiring  greatness  and  happiness,  it  is  not  of 
itself  sufficient  to  have  peace  and  tranquillity  within.  These  are,  indeed,  neces 
sary,  in  order  to  leave  the  states  and  their  citizens  in  the  full  and  undisturbed 
possession  of  their  resources  and  energy,  by  which  to  work  out,  in  generous 
rivalry,  the  high  destiny  which  certainly  awaits  our  country  if  we  should  be  but 
true  to  ourselves.  But,  as  important  as  they  may  be,  it  is  not  much  less  so  to 
have  safety  against  external  danger,  and  the  influence  and  respectability  abroad 
necessary  to  secure  our  exterior  interests  and  rights  (so  important  to  our  pros 
perity)  against  aggression.  I  look  to  a  navy  for  these  objects,  and  it  is  within 
the  limits  they  assign  I  would  confine  its  growth.  To  what  extent,  then,  with 
these  views,  ought  our  navy  to  be  carried  ?  In  my  opinion,  any  navy  less  than 
that  which  would  give  us  the  habitual  command  of  our  own  coast  and  seas, 
would  be  little  short  of  useless.  One  that  could  be  driven  from  sea  and  kept 
in  harbour  by  the  force  which  Great  Britain  could  safely  and  constantly  allot 
to  our  coast,  would  be  of  little  more  service  than  an  auxiliary  aid  to  our  fortifi 
cations  in  defending  our  harbours  and  maritime  cities.  It  would  be  almost  as 
passive  as  they  are,  and  would  do  nothing  to  diminish  the  expense,  which  I  have 
shown  would  be  so  exhausting,  to  defend  the  coast  exclusively  by  fortifications. 

But  the  difficult  question  still  remains  to  be  solved :  What  naval  force  would 
be  sufficient  for  that  purpose  ?  It  will  not  be  expected  that  I  should  give  more 
than  a  conjectural  answer  to  such  a  question.  I  have  neither  the  data  nor  the 
knowledge  of  naval  warfare  to  speak  with  anything  like  precision,  but  I  feel 
assured  that  the  force  required  would  be  far  less  than  what  would  be  thought 
when  the  question  is  first  propounded.  The  very  idea  of  defending  ourselves 
on  the  ocean  against  the  immense  power  of  Great  Britain  on  that  element  has 
something  startling  at  the  first  blush.  But,  as  greatly  as  she  outnumbers  us  in 
ships  and  naval  resources,  we  have  advantages  that  countervail  that,  in  refer 
ence  to  the  subject  hi  hand.  If  she  has  many  ships,  she  has  also  many  points 
to  guard,  and  these  as  widely  separated  as  are  the  parts  of  her  widely-extended 
empire.  She  is  forced  to  keep  a  home  fleet  in  the  Channel,  another  in  the  Bal 
tic,  another  in  the  Mediterranean,  one  beyond  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to  guard 
her  important  possessions  in  the  East,  and  another  in  the  Pacific.  Our  situa- 

MM  M 


458  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  c.  CALHOUN. 

tion  is  the  reverse.  We  have  no  foreign  possessions,  and  not  a  point  to  guard 
beyond  our  own  maritime  frontier.  There  our  whole  force  may  be  concentra 
ted,  ready  to  strike  whenever  a  vulnerable  point  is  exposed.  If  to  these  advan 
tages  be  added,  that  both  France  and  Russia  have  large  naval  forces  ;  that  be 
tween  us  and  them  there  is  no  point  of  conflict ;  that  they  both  watch  the  naval 
supremacy  of  Great  Britain  with  jealousy  ;  and  that  nothing  is  more  easy  than 
for  us  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  both  powers,  especially  with  a  respectable 
naval  force  at  our  command,  it  will  be  readily  perceived  that  a  force  far  short 
of  that  of  Great  Britain  would  effect  what  I  contemplate.  I  would  say  a  force 
equal  to  one  third  of  hers  would  suffice  ;  but  if  not,  certainly  less  than  half  would. 
And  if  so,  a  naval  force  of  that  size  would  enable  us  to  dispense  with  all  forti 
fications,  except  at  important  points,  and  such  as  might  be  necessary  in  refer 
ence  to  the  navy  itself,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  treasury,  and  saving  of  means 
to  be  applied  to  the  navy,  where  it  would  be  far  more  efficient.  The  less  con 
siderable  points  might  be  safely  left  to  the  defence  of  cheap  works,  sufficient  to 
repel  plundering  attacks ;  as  no  large  fleet,  such  as  would  be  able  to  meet  us, 
with  such  a  naval  force  as  that  proposed,  would  ever  think  of  disgracing  itself 
by  attacking  places  so  inconsiderable. 

Assuming,  then,  that  a  navy  is  indispensable  to  our  defence,  and  that  one  less 
than  that  supposed  would  be  in  a  great  measure  useless,  we  are  naturally  led  to 
look  into  the  sources  of  our  naval  power  preparatory  to  the  consideration  of  the 
question  how  they  will  be  affected  by  imposing  on  commerce  the  additional 
burden  this  bill  would  make  necessary. 

Two  elements  are  necessary  to  naval  power — sailors  and  money.  A  navy 
is  an  expensive  force,  and  is  only  formidable  when  manned  with  regularly-bred 
sailors.  In  our  case,  both  of  these  depend  on  commerce.  Commerce  is  indis 
pensable  to  form  a  commercial  marine,  arid  that  to  form  a  naval  marine  ;  while 
commerce  is  with  us,  if  this  bill  should  pass,  the  only  source  of  revenue.  A 
flourishing  commerce  is,  then,  in  every  respect,  the  basis  of  our  naval  power ; 
and  to  cripple  commerce  is  to  cripple  that  power — to  paralyze  the  right  arm  of 
our  defence.  But  the  imposition  of  onerous  duties  on  commerce  is  the  most 
certain  way  to  cripple  it.  Hence  this  detestable  and  mischievous  measure, 
which  surrenders  the  only  other  source  of  revenue,  and  throws  the  whole  bur 
den  of  supporting  the  government  exclusively  on  commerce,  aims  a  deadly  blow 
at  the  vitals  of  our  power. 

The  fatal  effect  of  high  duties  on  commerce  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  specula 
tion.  The  country  has  passed  recently  through  two  periods — one  of  protective 
tariffs  and  high  duties,  and  the  other  of  a  reduction  of  duties  ;  and  we  have  the 
effects  of  each  in  our  official  tables,  both  as  it  regards  our  tonnage  and  com 
merce.  They  speak  a  language  not  to  be  mistaken,  and  far  stronger  than  any 
one  could  anticipate  who  has  not  looked  into  the  tables,  or  made  himself  well 
acquainted  with  the  powerful  operation  of  low  duties  in  extending  navigation 
and  commerce.  As  much  as  I  had  anticipated  from  their  effects,  the  reduction 
of  the  duties — the  lightening  of  the  burdens  of  commerce — have  greatly  ex 
ceeded  my  most  sanguine  expectation. 

I  shall  begin  with  the  'tonnage,  as  more  immediately  connected  with  naval 
power ;  and,  in  order  to  show  the  relative  effects  of  high  duties  and  low  on  our 
navigation,  I  shall  compare  the  period  from  1824,  when  the  first  great  increase 
..  of  protective  duties  took  place,  to  1830  inclusive,  when  the  first  reduction  of 
duties  commenced.  During  these  seven  years,  which  include  the  operation  of 
the  two  protective  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828  — that  is,  the  reign  of  the  high  pro 
tective  tariff  system — our  foreign  tonnage  fell  off  from  639,972  tons  to  576,475, 
equal  to  61,497;  our  coasting  tonnage  from  719,190  to  615,310,  equal  to 
103,880  tons — making  the  falling  off  in  both  equal  to  165,370  tons.  Yes  ;  to 
that  extent  (103,880)  did  our  coasting  tonnage  decline — the  very  tonnage,  the 
increase  of  which,  it  was  confidently  predicted  by  the  protective  party,  would 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  459 

make  up  for  every  possible  loss  in  our  foreign  tonnage  from  their  miserable 
quack  system.  Instead  of  that,  the  falling  oft*  in  the  coasting  trade  is  even 
greater  than  in  the  foreign ;  proving  clearly  that  high  duties  are  not  less  inju 
rious  to  the  home  than  to  the  foreign  trade. 

I  pass  now  to  the  period  (I  will  not  say  of  free  trade — it  is  far  short  of  that) 
of  reduction  of  high  protective  duties  ;  and  now  mark  the  contrast  between  the 
two.  I  begin  with  the  year  1831,  the  first  after  the  reduction  was  made  on  a  few 
articles  (principally  coffee  and  tea),  and  will  take  in  the  entire  period  down  to 
the  last  returns — that  of  1840 — making  a  period  of  ten  years.  This  period  in 
cludes  the  great  reduction  under  the  Compromise  Act,  which  is  not  yet  com 
pleted,  and  which,  in  its  farther  progress,  would  add  greatly  to  the  increase,  if 
permitted  to  go  through  undisturbed.  The  tonnage  in  the  foreign  trade  increas 
ed  during  that  period  from  576,475  tons  to  899,764,  equal  to  323,288  tons— not 
much  less  than  two  thirds  of  the  whole  amount  at  the  commencement  of  the  pe 
riod  ;  and  the  coasting  for  the  same  period  increased  from  615,310  to  1,280,999, 
equal  to  665,699  tons — more  than  double  ;  and  this,  too,  when,  according  to  the 
high  tariff  doctrine,  our  coasting  trade  ought  to  have  fallen  off  instead  of  in 
creasing  (in  consequence  of  the  reduction  of  the  duties),  and  thus  incontestably 
proving  that  low  duties  are  not  less  favourable  to  our  domestic  than  to  our  for 
eign  trade.  The  aggregate  tonnage  for  the  period  has  increased  from  1,191,776 
to  2,180,763 — nearly  doubled.  Such,  and  so  favourable  to  low  duties  in  refer 
ence  to  tonnage,  is  the  result  of  the  comparison  between  the  two  periods. 

The  comparison  in  reference  to  commerce  will  prove  not  less  so.  In  ma 
king  the  comparison,  I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  export  trade,  not  because  it 
gives  results  more  favourable — for  the  reverse  is  the  fact — but  because  the 
heavy  loans  contracted  by  the  states  during  the  latter  period  (between  1830 
and  1841)  gave  a  factitious  increase  to  the  imports,  which  would  make  the 
comparison  appear  more  favourable  than  it  ought  in  reality  to  be.  Their  effects 
were  different  on  the  exports.  They  tended  to  decrease  rather  than  increase ' 
their  amount.  Of  the  exports,  I  shall  select  domestic  articles  only,  because 
they  only  are  affected  by  the  rate  of  the  duties,  as  the  duties  on  foreign  articles, 
paid  or  secured  by  bond  on  their  importation,  are  returned  on  reshipment. 
With  these  explanatory  remarks,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  the  comparison. 

The  amount  in  value  of  domestic  articles  exported  for  1825  was  $66,944,745, 
and  in  the  year  1830,  $59,462,029  ;  making  a  falling  off,  under  the  high  tariff 
system,  during  that  period,  of  $7,482,718.  Divide  the  period  into  two  equal 
parts  of  three  years  each,  and  it  will  be  found  that  the  falling  off  in  the  aggre 
gate  of  the  latter  part,  compared  to  the  former,  is  $13,090,255  ;  showing  an 
average  annual  decrease  of  84, 963,418  during  the  latter  part,  compared  with 
the  former. 

The  result  will  be  found  very  different  on  turning  to  the  period  from  1830, 
when  the  reduction  of  the  duties  commenced,  to  1840,  during  the  whole  of 
which  the  reduction  has  been  going  on.  The  value  of  domestic  exports  for 
1831  was  $61,277,057,  and  for  1840,  $113,895,634;  making  a  difference  of 
$52,618,577,  equal  to  eighty-three  per  cent,  (omitting  fractions)  for  the  ten 
years.  If  the  period  be  divided  into  two  equal  parts  of  five  years  each,  the 
increase  of  the  latter,  compared  to  the  former,  will  be  found  to  be  $139,089,371  ; 
making  an  average  annual  increase  for  the  latter  period  (from  1835  to  1840)  of 
$27,817,654.  This  rapid  increase  began  with  the  great  reduction  under  the 
Compromise  Act  of  1833.  The  very  next  year  after  it  passed,  the  domestic 
exports  rose  from  $81,034,162  to  $101,189,082— just  like  the  recoil  which 
takes  place  when  the  weight  is  removed  from  the  spring. 

But  my  friends  from  the  manufacturing  states  will  doubtless  say  that 'this 
vast  increase  of  exports  from  reduction  of  duties  was  confined  to  the  great  ag 
ricultural  staples,  and  that  the  effects  were  the  reverse  as  to  the  export  of  do 
mestic  manufactures.  With  their  notion  of  protection,  they  cannot  be  prepared 


460  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

to  believe  that  low  duties  are  favourable  to  them.  I  ask  them  to  give  me  their 
attention  while  I  show  how  great  their  error  is.  So  far  from  not  partaking  of 
this  mighty  impulse  from  reduction,  they  felt  it  more  powerfully  than  other  ar 
ticles  of  domestic  exports,  as  I  shall  now  proceed  to  show  from  the  tables. 

The  exports  of  domestic  manufactures  during  the  period  from  1824  to  1832 
inclusive — that  is,  the  period  of  the  high  protective  duties  under  the  tariffs  of 
1824  and  1828— fell  from  $5,729,797  to  $5,050,633,  making  a  decline  of 
$679,133  during  that  period.  This  decline  was  progressive,  and  nearly  uni 
form,  from  year  to  year,  through  the  whole  period.  In  1833  the  Compromise 
Act  was  passed,  which  reduced  the  duties  at  once  nearly  half,  and  has  since 
made  very  considerable  progressive  reduction.  The  exports  of  domestic  man 
ufactures  suddenly,  as  if  by  magic,  sprung  forward,  and  have  been  rapidly  and 
uniformly  increasing  ever  since  ;  having  risen,  in  the  eight  years,  from  1832  to 
1840,  from  $505,633  to  $12,108,538,  a  third  more  than  double  in  that  short 
period,  and  that  immediately  following  a  great  decline  in  the  preceding  period 
of  eight  years,  under  high  duties. 

Such  were  the  blighting  effects  of  high  duties  on  the  tonnage  and  the  com 
merce  of  the  country,  and  such  the  invigorating  effects  of  their  reduction. 
There  can  be  no  mistake.  The  documents  from  which  the  statements  are 
taken  are  among  the  public  records,  and  open  to  the  inspection  of  all.  The  re 
sults  are  based  on  the  operations  of  a  series  of  years,  showing  them  to  be  the 
consequence  of  fixed  and  steady  causes,  and  not  accidental  circumstances  ; 
while  the  immediate  and  progressive  decrease  and  increase  of  tonnage,  both 
coastwise  and  foreign,  and  of  exports,  including  manufactured  as  well  as  other 
articles,  with  the  laying  on  of  high  duties,  and  the  commencement  and  progress 
of  their  reduction,  point  out,  beyond  all  controversy,  high  duties  jo  be  the  cause 
of  one,  and  reduction — low  duties — that  of  the  other. 

It  will  be  in  vain  for  the  advocates  of  high  duties  to  seek  for  a  different  ex 
planation  of  the  cause  of  these  striking  and  convincing  facts  in  the  history  of 
the  two  periods.  The  first  of  these,  from  1824  to  1832,  is  the  very  period  when 
the  late  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  in  the  fullest  and  most  successful  oper 
ation  ;  when  exchanges,  according  to  their  own  showing,  were  the  lowest  and 
most  steady,  and  the  currency  the  most  uniform  and  sound ;  and  yet,  with  all 
these  favourable  circumstances,  which  they  estimate  so  highly,  and  with  no 
hostile  cause  operating  from  abroad,  our  tonnage  and  commerce,  in  every  branch 
on  which  the  duties  could  operate,  fell  off:  on  the  contrary,  during  the  latter 
period,  when  all  the  hostile  causes  which  they  are  in  the  habit  of  daily  denoun 
cing  on  this  floor,  and  of  whose  disastrous  consequences  we  have  heard  so  many 
eloquent  lamentations  ;  yes,  in  spite  of  contractions  and  expansions  ;  in  spite  of 
tampering  with  the  currency,  and  the  removal  of  the  deposites  ;  in  spite  of  the 
disordered  state  of  the  whole  machinery  of  commerce  ;  the  deranged  state  of  the 
currency,  both  at  home  and  abroad  ;  in  spite  of  the  state  of  the  exchanges,  and 
of  what  we  are  constantly  told  of  the  agony  of  the  country,  both  have  increas 
ed* — rapidly  increased — increased  beyond  all  former  example  !  Such  is  the 
overpowering  effect  of  removing  weights  from  the  springs  of  industry,  and  stri 
king  off  shackles  from  the  free  exchange  of  products,  as  to  overcome  all  adverse 
causes. 

Let  me  add,  Mr.  President,  that  of  this  highly  prosperous  period  to  industry 
(however  disastrous  to  those  who  have  over-speculated,  or  invested  their  funds 
in  rotten  and  swindling  institutions),  the  most  prosperous  of  the  whole,  as  the 
tables  will  show,  is  that  during  the  operation  of  the  Sub-treasury — a  period 
when  some  progress  was  made  towards  the  restoration  of  the  currency  of  the 
Constitution.  In  spite  of  the  many  difficulties  and  embarrassments  of  that  try 
ing  period,  the  progressive  reduction  of  the  duties,  and  the  gradual  introduction 
of  a  sounder  currency,  gave  so  vigorous  a  spring  to  our  industry  as  to  overcome 
them  all ;  showing  clearly,  if  the  country  was  blessed  with  the  full  and  stead- 


SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C.    C.ALHOUN.  461 

operation  of  the  two,  under  favourable  circumstances,  that  it  would  enjoy  a  de 
gree  of  prosperity  exceeding  what  even  the  friends  of  that  measure  anticipated. 

Having  now  shown  that  the  navy  is  the  right  arm  of  our  defence  ;  that  it  de 
pends  on  commerce  for  its  resources,  both  as  to  men  and  means  ;  and  that  high 
duties  destroy  the  growth  of  our  commerce,  including  navigation  and  tonnage, 
I  have,  I  trust,  satisfactorily  established  the  position  which  I  laid  down — that 
this  measure,  which  would  place  the  entire  burden  of  supporting  the  govern 
ment  on  commerce,  would  paralyze  the  right  arm  of  our  power.  Vote  it  down, 
and  leave  commerce  as  free  as  possible,  and  it  will  furnish  ample  resources, 
skilful  and  gallant  sailors,  and  an  overflowing  treasury,  to  repel  danger  far  from 
our  shores,  and  maintain  our  rights  and  dignity  in  our  external  relations.  With 
the  aid  of  the  revenue  from  land,  and  proper  economy,  we  might  soon  have 
ample  means  to  enlarge  our  navy  to  that  of  a  third  of  the  British,  with  duties 
far  below  the  limits  of  20  per  cent,  prescribed  by  the  Compromise  Act.  The 
annual  appropriation,  or  cost  of  the  British  navy,  is  about  $30,000,000.  Ours, 
with  the  addition  of  the  appropriation  for  the  home  squadron  made  this  session, 
is  (say)  $6,000,000 ;  requiring  only  the  addition  of  four  millions  to  make  it 
equal  to  a  third  of  that  of  Great  Britain,  provided  that  we  can  build,  equip,  man, 
and  maintain  ours  as  cheaply  as  she  can  hers.  That  we  can,  with  proper 
management,  can  scarcely  be  doubted,  when  we  reflect  that  our  navigation, 
which  involves  almost  all  the  elements  of  expense  that  a  navy  does,  success 
fully  competes  with  hers  over  the  world.  Nor  are  we  deficient  in  men — gal 
lant  and  hardy  sailors — to  man  a  navy  on  as  large  a  scale  as  is  suggested.  Al 
ready  our  tonnage  is  two  thirds  of  that  of  Great  Britain,  and  will,  in  a  short 
time,  approach  an  equality  with  hers,  if  our  commerce  should  be  fairly  treated. 
Leave,  then,  in  the  treasury  the  funds  proposed  to  be  withdrawn  by  this  de 
testable  bill ;  apply  it  to  the  navy  and  defences  of  the  country ;  and  even  at  its 
present  amount,  with  small  additional  aid  from  the  impost,  it  will  give  the 
means  of  raising  it,  with  the  existing  appropriation,  to  the  point  suggested ; 
and,  with  the  steady  increase  of  the  fund  from  the  increased  sales  of  lands, 
keeping  pace  with  the  increase  of  our  population,  and  the  like  increase  of  com 
merce  under  a  system  of  light  and  equal  duties,  we  may,  with  proper  economy 
in  the  collection  and  disbursements  of  the  revenue,  raise  our  navy  steadily, 
without  feeling  the  burden,  to  half  the  size  of  the  British,  or  more,  if  more  be 
needed  for  defence  and  the  maintenance  of  our  rights.  Beyond  that  we  ought 
never  to  aim. 

I  have  (said  Mr.  C.)  concluded  what  I  proposed  to  say.  I  have  passed  over 
many  and  weighty  objections  to  this  measure,  which  I  could  not  bring  within 
the  scope  of  my  remarks  without  exhausting  the  patience  of  the  body.  And 
now,  senators,  in  conclusion,  let  me  entreat  you  in  the  name  of  all  that  is  good 
and  patriotic — in  the  name  of  our  common  country,  and  the  immortal  fathers  of 
our  Revolution  and  founders  of  our  government — to  reject  this  dangerous  bill. 
I  implore  you  to  pause,  and  ponder  before  you  give  your  final  vote  for  a  meas 
ure  which,  if  it  should  pass  and  become  a  permanent  law,  would  do  more  to 
defeat  the  ends  for  which  this  government  was  instituted,  and  to  subvert  the 
Constitution,  and  destroy  the  liberty  of  the  country,  than  any  which  has  ever 
been  proposed. 


462  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

XXXII. 

SPEECH    ON    THE    TREASURY  ~NOTE  BILL,    JANUARY    25,    1842. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said:  There  is  no  measure  that  requires  greater  caution, 
or  more  severe  scrutiny,  than  one  to  impose  taxes  or  raise  a  loan,  be  the 
form  what  it  may.  I  hold  that  government  has  no  right  to  do  either  ex 
cept  when  the  public  service  makes  it  imperiously  necessary,  and  then 
only  to  the  extent  that  it  requires.  I  also  hold  that  the  expenditures  can 
only  be  limited  by  limiting  the  supplies.  If  money  is  granted,  it  is  sure 
to  be  expended.  Thus  thinking,  it  is  a  fundamental  rule  with  me  not  to 
vote  for  a  loan  or  tax  bill  till  I  am  satisfied  it  is  necessary  for  the  public 
service,  and  then  not,  if  the  deficiency  can  be  avoided  by  lopping  off  un 
necessary  objects  of  expenditure,  or  the  enforcement  of  an  exact  and  ju 
dicious  economy  in  the  public  disbursements.  Entertaining  these  opin 
ions,  it  was  in  vain  that  the  chairman  of  the  Finance  Committee  pointed 
to  the  estimates  of  the  year  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  passage  of  this 
bill  as  amended.  Estimates  are  too  much  a  matter  of  course  to  satisfy 
me  in  a  case  like  this.  I  have  some  practical  knowledge  of  the  subject, 
and  know  too  well  how  readily  old  items  are  put  down,  from  year  to  year, 
without  much  inquiry  whether  they  can  be  dispensed  with  or  reduced, 
and  new  ones  inserted,  without  much  more  reflection,  to  put  much  reli 
ance  on  them.  To  satisfy  me,  the  chairman  must  do  what  he  has  not 
even  attempted:  he  must  state  satisfactorily  the  reasons  for  every  new 
item,  and  the  increase  of  every  old  one,  and  show  that  the  deficiency  to 
meet  the  revenue  cannot  be  avoided  by  retrenchment  and  economy. 
Until  he  does  that,  he  has  no  right  to  call  on  us  to  vote  this  heavy  addi 
tional  charge  of  five  millions  of  dollars  on  the  people,  especially  at  a 
period 'of  such  unexampled  pecuniary  embarrassment.  Having  omitted 
to  perform  this  duty,  I  have  been  constrained  to  examine  for  myself  the 
estimates  in  a  very  hasty  manner,  with  imperfect  documents,  and  no  op 
portunity  of  deriving  information  from  the  respective  departments.  But, 
with  all  these  disadvantages,  I  have  satisfied  myself  that  this  loan  is  un 
necessary  5  that  its  place  may  be  supplied,  and  more  than  supplied,  by 
retrenchment  and  economy,  and  the  command  of  resources  in  the  power 
of  the  government,  without  materially  impairing  the  efficiency  of  the 
public  service  $  my  reasons  for  which  I  shall  now  proceed  to  state. 

The  estimates  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  the  expenditures  of 
the  year  are  $32,997,258,  or,  in  round  numbers,  thirty-three  millions,  em 
braced  under  the  following  heads :  the  civil  list,  including  foreign  inter 
course  and  miscellaneous,  amounting  to  $4,000,987  37  j  military,  in  all 
its  branches,  $11,717,791  83  ;  navy,  $8,705,579  83  ;  permanent  appropri 
ations,  applicable  to  the  service  of  the  year,  $1,572,906;  and  treasury 
notes  to  be  redeemed,  $7,000,000. 

Among  the  objects  of  retrenchment,  I  place  at  the  head  the  great  in 
crease  that  is  proposed  to  be  made  to  the  expenditures  of  the  navy,  com 
pared  with  that  of  last  year.  It  is  no  less  than  $2,508,032  13,  taking 
the  expenditure  of  last  year  from  the  annual  report  of  the  secretary.  I 
see  no  sufficient  reason,  at  this  time,  and  in  the  present  embarrassed 
condition  of  the  treasury,  for  this  great  increase.  I  have  looked  over 
the  report  of  the  secretary  hastily,  and  find  none  assigned,  except  general 
reasons  for  an  increased  navy,  which  I  am  not  disposed  to  controvert. 
But  I  am  decidedly  of  the  opinion  that  the  commencement  ought  to  be 
postponed  till  some  systematic  plan  is  matured,  both  as  to  the  ratio  of  in- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  463 

crease  and  the  description  of  force  of  which  the  addition  should  consist, 
and  till  the  department  is  properly  organized  and  in  a  condition  to  enforce 
exact  responsibility  and  economy  in  its  disbursements.  That  the  depart 
ment  is  not  now  properly  organized  and  in  that  condition,  we  have  the 
authority  of  the  secretary  himself,  in  which  I  concur.  I  am  satisfied  that 
its  administration  cannot  be  made  effective  under  the  present  organiza 
tion,  particularly  as  it  regards  its  expenditures.  I  have  very  great  respect 
for  the  head  of  the  department,  and  confidence  in  his  ability  and  integ 
rity.  If  he  would  hear  the  voice  of  one  who  wishes  him  well,  and  who 
takes  the  deepest  interest  in  the  branch  of  service  of  which  he  is  the 
chief,  my  advice  would  be,  to  take  time  ;  to  look  about ;  to  reorganize 
the  department  in  the  most  efficient  manner,  on  the  staff  principle  ;  and  to 
establish  the  most  rigid  accountability  and  economy  in  the  disbursements 
before  the  great  work  of  a  systematic  increase  is  commenced.  Till  that 
is  done,  add  not  a  dollar  to  the  expenditure.  Make  sure  of  the  foundation 
before  you  begin  to  rear  the  superstructure.  I  am  aware  that  there  will 
be  a  considerable  increase  this  year  in  the  navy,  compared  to  the  expen 
diture  of  last  year,  in  consequence  of  the  acts  of  the  extraordinary  ses 
sion.  This  may  deduct  several  hundred  thousand  dollars  from  the  amount 
I  propose  to  retrench  ;  but  I  cannot  doubt  that  an  improved  administra 
tion  of  the  moneyed  affairs  of  the  department,  with  the  very  great  reduc 
tion  in  prices  and  wages,  at  saving  may  be  made  more  than  sufficient  to 
make  up  for  that  deduction.  In  speaking  of  improved  administration,  I 
comprehend  the  marine  corps.  And  here  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  remark, 
that  the  estimates  for  that  branch  of  the  service  appear  to  me  to  be  very 
large.  The  corps  is  estimated  at  one  thousand  privates,  and  its  aggre 
gate  expense  at  $502,292.  This  strikes  me  to  be  far  too  large  for  so 
small  a  corps,  of  long  standing,  stationed  at  convenient  and  cheap  points, 
and  at  a  period  when  the  price  of  provisions,  clothing,  and  all  other  arti 
cles  of  supply  is  low.  A  large  portion,  I  observe,  is  for  barracks,  which, 
if  proper  at  all,  surely  may  be  postponed  till  the  finances  are  placed  in 
better  condition. 

I  shall  now  pass  from  the  naval  to  the  military  department ;  and  here  I 
find  an  estimate  of  $1,508,032  13  for  harbours,  creeks,  and  the  like.  I 
must  say  that  I  am  surprised  at  this  estimate.  All  who  have  been  members 
of  the  Senate  for  the  last  eight  or  ten  years  must  be  familiar  with  the 
history  of  this  item  of  expenditure.  It  is  one  of  the  branches  of  the  old, 
exploded  American  System,  and  almost  the  only  one  which  remains.  It 
has  never  been  acquiesced  in,  and  was  scarcely  tolerated  when  the  treas 
ury  was  full  to  overflowing  with  the  surplus  revenue.  Of  all  the  extrav 
agant  and  lawless  appropriations  of  the  worst  of  times,  I  have  ever  re 
garded  it  as  the  most  objectionable — unconstitutional,  local  in  its  charac 
ter,  and  unequal  and  unjust  in  its  operation.  Little  did  I  anticipate  that 
such  an  item,  and  of  so  large  an  amount,  would  at  this  time  be  found  in 
the  estimates,  when  the  treasury  is  deeply  embarrassed,  the  credit  of 
the  government  impaired,  and  the  revenue  from  the  lands  surrendered  to 
the  states  and  territories.  Such  an  item,  at  such  a  period,  looks  like  in 
fatuation  ;  and  I  hope  the  Committee  on  Finance,  when  it  comes  to  take 
up  the  estimates,  will  strike  it  out.  It  certainly  ought  to  be  expunged, 
and  I  shall,  accordingly,  place  it  among  the  items  that  ought  to  be 
retrenched. 

Passing  to  the  treasury  department,  I  observe  an  estimate  of  $43,932 
for  surveys  of  public  lands ;  and,  under  the  head  of  "  balances  of  appro 
priations  on  the  31st  of  December,  1841,  required  to  be  expended  in  1842," 
$200,000  for  the  same  object:  making  together  $243,932,  which  ought 
either  not  to  be  in  the  estimajf  s,  or,  if  put  there,  ought  to  be  credited  in  the 


464  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOT7N. 

receipts  of  the  year.  The  reason  will  be  apparent  when  it  is  stated  that 
the  Distribution  Act  deducts  the  expenses  incident  to  the  administration 
of  the  public  lands,  and,  among  others,  that  for  surveying ;  and,  of  course, 
it  must  be  deducted  from  the  revenue  from  the  lands,  before  it  is  distrib 
uted  among  the  states,  and  brought  to  the  credit  of  the  treasury.  It  is, 
in  fact,  but  an  advance  out  of  the  land  fund,  to  be  deducted  from  it  before 
it  is  distributed.  There  are  several  other  items  in  the  estimates  con 
nected  with  the  expenses  incident  to  the  administration  of  the  public 
lands  to  which  the  same  remarks  are  applicable,  and  which  would  make 
an  additional  deduction  of  many  thousand  dollars,  but  the  exact  amount 
of  which  I  have  not  had  time  to  ascertain.  These  several  items,  taken 
together,  make  the  sum  of  $4,317,322  25,  that  may  fairly  be  struck  from 
the  estimates.  To  these  there  are,  doubtless,  many  others  of  consider 
able  amount  that  might  be  added,  had  I  the  time  and  means  for  full  in 
vestigation.  Among  them,  I  would  call  the  attention  of  the  chairman  to 
an  item  of  $158,627  17,  under  the  name  of  "  patent  fund,"  and  comprised 
among  the  balances  of  appropriations  on  the  31st  of  December  last,  and 
which  will  be  required  for  this  year.  I  have  not  had  time  to  investigate 
it,  and  am  uninformed  of  its  nature.  I  must  ask  the  chairmain  to  explain. 
Does  it  mean  receipts  of  money  derived  from  payments  for  patents  1  If 
so,  it  ought  to  be  passed  to  the  treasury,  and  classed  under  the  receipts 
of  the  year,  and  not  the  appropriations,  unless,  indeed,  there  be  some  act 
of  Congress  which  has  ordered  otherwise.  If  it  be  an  appropriation,  I 
would  ask,  To  what  is  it  appropriated,  and  to  what  particular  objects  is  it 
to  be  applied  this  year  1  The  chairman  will  find  it  in  page  40  of  the  docu 
ment  containing  the  estimates. 

I  would  ask  the  chairman,  also,  whether  the  interest  on  the  trust  funds, 
including  both  the  Smithsonian  and  Indian,  which  may  not  be  applied  to 
the  object  of  the  trusts  during  the  year,  have  been  comprehended  in  the 
receipts  of  the  year  1  We  pay  interest  on  them,  and  have  the  right,  of 
course,  to  their  use  till  required  to  be  paid  over.  The  interest  must  be 
considerable.  That  of  the  former  alone  is  about  $30,000  annually. 

I  would  also  call  his  attention  to  the  pension  list.  I  observe  the  dimi 
nution  of  the  number  of  pensioners  for  the  last  year  is  very  considerable, 
and,  from  the  extreme  age  of  the  revolutionary  portion,  there  must  be  a 
rapid  diminution  till  the  list  is  finally  closed.  I  have  not  had  time  to  in 
vestigate  the  subject  sufficiently  to  say  to  what  amount  the  treasury  may 
be  relieved  from  that  source,  but  I  am  informed,  by  a  friend  who  is  fa 
miliar  with  the  subject,  that  a  very  great  reduction  of  expenditure,  say 
$300,000  annually,  for  some  years,  may  be  expected  under  that  head. 
Under  these  various  heads,  and  others,  which  a  careful  examination  might 
designate,  I  feel  confident  that  a  reduction  might  be  made  by  retrench 
ment  in  the  estimates  to  the  amount  of  the  sum  proposed  to  be  borrowed 
by  this  bill,  as  amended,  without  materially  impairing  the  efficiency  of 
the  government. 

I  shall  next  proceed  to  examine  what  reduction  may  be  made  by  strict 
economy  in  the  public  disbursements ;  by  which  I  mean,  not  parsimony, 
but  that  careful  and  efficient  administration  of  the  moneyed  affairs  of  the 
government  which  guards  against  all  abuse  and  waste,  and  applies  every 
dollar  to  the  object  of  appropriations,  and  that  in  the  manner  best  calcu 
lated  to  produce  the  greatest  result.  This  high  duty  properly  appertains 
to  the  functions  of  the  executive,  and  Congress  can  do  but  little  more  than 
to  urge  on  and  sustain  that  department  of  the  government  to  which  it  be- 
^ongs  in  discharging  it,  and  which  must  take  the  lead  in  the  work  of 
economy  and  reform.  My  object  is  to  show  that  there  is  ample  room  for 
the  work,  and  that  great  reduction  may  be  mfde  in  the  expenditures  by 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  465 

such  an  administration  of  the  moneyed  affairs  of  the  government  as  I  have 
described.  But  ho\v  is  this  to  be  made  apparent  1  Can  it  be  done  by 
minute  examination  of  the  various  items  of  the  estimates  and  expendi 
tures  1  Can  a  general  state  of  looseness,  of  abuses,  or  extravagance  in 
the  disbursements,  be  detected  and  exposed  by  such  examination  1  All 
attempts  of  the  kind  have  failed,  and  must  continue  to  do  so.  It  would 
be  impracticable  to  extend  such  an  inquiry  through  the  various  heads  of 
expenditures.  A  single  account  might  be  selected,  that  would  occupy  a 
committee  a  large  portion  of  a  session ;  and,  after  all  their  labour,  it 
would  be  more  than  an  even  chance  that  they  would  fail  to  detect  abuses 
and  mismanagement,  if  they  abounded  ever  so  much.  They  lie  beyond 
the  accounts,  and  can  only  be  reached  by  the  searching  and  scrutinizing 
eyes  of  faithful  and  vigilant  officers  charged  with  the  administrative 
supervision. 

There  is  but  one  way  in  which  Congress  can  act  with  effect  in  testing 
whether  the  public  funds  have  been  judiciously  and  economically  applied 
to  the  objects  for  which  they  were  appropriated,  and,  if  not,  of  holding 
those  charged  with  their  administration  responsible ;  and  that  is,  by  com 
paring  the  present  expenditures  with  those  of  past  periods  of  acknowl 
edged  economy,  or  foreign  contemporaneous  service  of  like  kind.  If,  on 
such  comparison,  the  differences  should  be  much  greater  than  they  should 
be,  after  making  due  allowance,  those  who  have  the  control  should  be 
held  responsible  to  reduce  them  to  a  proper  level,  or  to  give  satisfactory 
reasons  for  not  doing  it ;  and  that  is  the  course  which  I  intend  to  pursue. 
They  who  now  have  the  control,  both  of  Congress  and  the  executive  de 
partment,  came  into  power  on  a  solemn  pledge  of  reform ;  and  it  is  but 
fair  that  they  should  be  held  responsible  for  the  reformation  of  the  abuses 
and  mismanagement  which  they  declared  to  exist,  and  the  great  reduction 
of  expenses  which  they  pledged  themselves  to  make  if  the  people  should 
raise  them  to  power. 

But  I  am  not  so  unreasonable  as  to  expect  that  reform  can  be  the  work 
of  a  day.  I  know  too  well  the  labour  and  the  time  it  requires  to  entertain 
any  such  opinion.  All  I  ask  is,  that  the  work  shall  be  early,  seriously,  and 
systematically  commenced.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  it  has  not  already 
commenced,  and  that  there  is  so  little  apparent  inclination  to  begin.  We 
had  a  right  to  expect  that  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Finance,  in 
bringing  forward  a  new  loan  of  $5,000,000,  would  have  at  least  under 
taken  to  inform  us,  after  a  full  survey  of  the  estimates  and  expenditures, 
whether  any  reduction  could  be  made,  and,  if  any,  to  what  amount,  before 
he  asked  for  a  vote  making  so  great  an  addition  to  the  public  debt.  I  can 
not  but  regard  the  omission  as  a  bad  omen.  It  looks  like  repudiation  of 
solemn  pledges.  But  what  he  has  failed  to  do  I  shall  attempt,  but  in  a 
much  less  full  and  satisfactory  manner  than  he  might  have  done,  with  all 
his  advantages  as  the  head  of  the  committee.  For  the  purpose  of  com 
paring,  I  shall  select  the  years  1823  and  1840.  I  select  the  former  be 
cause  it  is  one  of  the  years  of  the  second  term  of  Mr.  Monroe's  adminis 
tration,  and  which,  it  is  admitted  now,  administered  the  moneyed  affairs 
of  the  government  with  a  reasonable  regard  to  economy  ;  but  at  that  time 
it  was  thought  by  all  to  be  liberal  in  its  expenditures,  and  by  some  even 
profuse,  as  several  senators  whom  I  now  see,  and  who  were  then  members  of 
Congress,  will  bear  witness.  But  I  select  it  for  a  still  stronger  reason. 
It  is  the  year  which  immediately  preceded  the  first  act  professedly  passed 
on  the  principles  of  the  protective  policy.  The  intervening  time  between 
the  two  periods  comprehends  the  two  acts  of  1824  and  1828,  by  which  that 
policy  was  carried  to  such  great  extremes.  To  those  acts,  connected  with 
the  banking  system,  and  the  connexion  of  the  banks  with  the  government,  is 

N  N  N 


466  SPEECHES    OP    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

to  be  attributed  that  train  of  events  which  has  involved  the  country  and 
the  government  in  so  many  difficulties  j  and,  among  others  that  vast  in 
crease  of  expenditures  which  has  taken  place  since  1823,  as  will  be  shown 
by  the  comparison  I  am  about  to  make. 

The  disbursements  of  the  government  are  comprised  under  three  great 
heads:  the  civil  list,  including  foreign  intercourse  and  miscellaneous  j  the 
military ;  and  the  navy.  I  propose  to  begin  with  the  first,  and  take  them 
in  the  order  in  which  they  stand. 

The  expenditures  under  the  first  head  have  increased  since  1823,  when 
they  were  $2,022,093,  to  $5,492,030  98,  the  amount  in  1840;  showing  an 
increase,  in  seventeen  years,  of  2^  to  1,  while  the  population  has  increas 
ed  only  about  -£  to  1,  that  is,  about  75  per  cent. ;  making  the  increase  of  ex 
penditures,  compared  to  the  increase  of  population,  about  3^  to  1.  This 
enormous  increase  has  taken  place  although  a  large  portion  of  the  expendi 
tures  under  this  head,  consisting  of  salaries  to  officers  and  the  pay  of  mem 
bers  of  Congress,  have  remained  unchanged.  The  next  year,  in  1841,  the 
expenditure  rose  to  $6,196,560.  I  am,  however,  happy  to  perceive  a  con 
siderable  reduction  in  the  estimates  for  this  year  compared  with  the  last 
and  several  preceding  years;  but  still  leaving  room  for  great  additional 
reduction  to  bring  the  increase  of  expenditures  to  the  same  ratio  with  the 
increase  of  population,  as  liberal  as  that  standard  of  increase  would  be. 

That  the  Senate  may  form  some  conception,  in  detail,  of  this  enormous 
increase,  I  propose  to  go  more  into  particulars  in  reference  to  two  items — 
the  contingent  expenses  of  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  and  that  of  col 
lecting  the  duties  on  imports.  The  latter,  though  of  a  character  belong 
ing  to  the  civil  list,  is  not  included  in  it,  or  either  of  the  other  heads,  as 
the  expenses  incident  to  collecting  the  customs  are  deducted  from  the 
receipts  before  the  money  is  paid  into  the  treasury. 

The  contingent  expenses  (they  exclude  the  pay  and  mileage  of  mem 
bers)  of  the  Senate,  in  1823,  were  $12,841  07,  of  which  the  printing  cost 
$6349  56,  and  stationary  $1631  51  ;  and  that  of  the  House  $37,848  95, 
of  which  the  printing  cost  $22,314  41,  and  the  stationary  $3877  71.  In 
1840,  the  contingent  expenses  of  the  Senate  were  $77,447  22,  of  which 
the  printing  cost  $31,285  32,  and  the  stationary  $7061  77;  and  that  of 
the  House  $199,219  57,  of  which  the  printing  cost  $65,086  46,  and  the 
stationary  $36,352  99.  The  aggregate  expenses  of  the  two  houses  to 
gether  rose  from  $50,690  02  to  $276,666,  being  an  actual  increase  of 
5r4^  to  1,  and  an  increase,  in  proportion  to  population,  of  about  7T2ir  to  1. 
But,  as  enormous  as  this  increase  is,  the  fact  that  the  number  of  mem 
bers  had  increased  not  more  than  about  ten  per  cent,  from  1823  to  1840, 
is  calculated  to  make  it  still  more  strikingly  so.  Had  the  increase  kept 
pace  with  the  increase  of  members  (and  there  is  no  good  reason  why  it 
should  greatly  exceed  it),  the  expenditures  would  have  risen  from  $50,690 
to  $55,759  only,  making  an  increase  of  but  $5069 ;  bitf,  instead  of  that, 
it  rose  to  $276,666,  making  an  increase  of  $225,970.  To  place  the  subject 
in  a  still  more  striking  view,  the  contingent  expenses  in  1823  were  at  the 
rate  of  $144  per  member,  which  one  would  suppose  was  ample,  and  in 
1840,  $942.  This  vast  increase  took  place  under  the  immediate  eyes  of 
Congress  ;  and  yet  we  were  told  at  the  extra  session,  by  the  present  chair 
man  of  the  Finance  Committee,  that  there  was  no  room  for  economy,  and 
that  no  reduction  could  be  made ;  and  even  in  this  discussion  he  has  in 
timated  that  little  can  be  done.  As  enormous  as  are  the  contingent  ex 
penses  of  the  two  houses,  I  infer,  from  the  very  great  increase  of  expen 
ditures  under  the  head  of  civil  list  generally,  when  so  large  a  portion  is 
for  fixed  salaries,  which  have  not  been  materially  increased  for  the  last 
seventeen  years,  that  they  are  not  much  less  so  throughout  the  whole 
range  of  this  branch  of  the  public  service. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  467 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  the  other  item,  which  I  have  selected  for  more 
particular  examination,  the  increased  expenses  of  collecting  the  duties  on 
imports.  In  1823  it  was  $766,699,  equal  to  3T3^.  per  cent,  on  the  amount 
collected,  and  T9/ff  on  the  aggregate  amount  of  imports ;  and  in  1840  it 
had  increased  to  $1,542,319  24,  equal  to  14rVg-  per  cent,  on  the  amount 
collected,  and  to  l/^-  on  the  aggregate  amount  of  the  imports,  being  an 
actual  increase  of  nearly  a  million,  and  considerably  more  than  double 
the  amount  of  1823.  In  1839  it  rose  to  $1,714,515. 

From  these  facts,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  more  than  a  million 
annually  may  be  saved  under  the  two  items  of  contingent  expenses  of 
Congress  and  the  collection  of  the  customs,  without  touching  the  other 
great  items  comprised  under  the  civil  list,  the  executive  and  judicial  de 
partments,  the  foreign  intercourse,  lighthouses,  and  miscellaneous.  It 
would  be  safe  to  put  down  a  saving  of  at  least  half  a  million  for  them. 

I  shall  now  pass  to  the  military,  with  which  I  am  more  familiar.  I  pro 
pose  to  confine  my  remarks  almost  entirely  to  the  army  proper,  including 
the  Military  Academy,  in  reference  to  which  the  information  is  more  full 
and  minute.  I  exclude  the  expenses  incident  to  the  Florida  war,  and  the 
expenditures  for  the  ordnance,  the  engineer,  the  topographical,  the  In 
dian,  and  the  pension  bureaus.  Instead  of  1823,  for  which  there  is  no 
official  and  exact  statement  of  the  expenses  of  the  army,  I  shall  take  1821, 
for  which  there  is  one  made  by  myself,  as  secretary  of  war,  and  for  the 
minute  correctness  of  which  I  can  vouch.  It  is  contained  in  a  report 
made  under  a  call  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  comprises  a  com 
parative  statement  of  the  expenses  of  the  army  proper  for  the  years 
1818,  1819,  1820,  1821,  respectively,  and  an  estimate  of  the  expense  of 
1822.  It  may  be  proper  to  add,  which  I  can  with  confidence,  that  the 
comparative  expense  of  1823,  if  it  could  be  ascertained,  would  be  found 
to  be  not  less  favourable  than  1821.  It  would,  probably,  be  something 
more  so. 

With  these  remarks,  I  shall  begin  with  a  comparison,  in  the  first  place, 
between  1821  and  the.  estimate  for  the  army  proper  for  this  year.     The 
average  aggregate  strength  of  the  army  in  the  year  1821,  including  offi 
cers,  professors,  cadets,  and  soldiers,  was  8109,  and  the  proportion  of 
officers,  including  the  professors  of  the  Military  Academy,  to  the  sol 
diers,  including  cadets,  was  1  to  12TV8oi  and  the  expenditure  $2,180,093 
53,*  equal  to  $263  91  for  each  individual.     The  estimate  for  the  army 
proper,  for  the  year  1842,  including-  the  Military  Academy,  is  $4,453,370 
16.     The  actual  strength  of  the  army,  according  to  the  return  accompa 
nying  the  message  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  was  $11,169.    Assuming 
this  to  be  the  average  strength  for  this  year,  and  adding  for  the  average 
number  of  the  academy,  professors  and  cadets,  300,  it  will  give,  within  a 
very  small  fraction,  $390   for  each  individual,  making  a   difference  of 
$136  in  favour  of  JS21.     How  far  the  increase  of  pay,  and  the  additional 
expense  of  two  regiments  of  dragoons,  compared  to  other  descriptions  of 
troops,  would  justify  this  increase,  I  am  not  prepared  to  say.     In  other 
respects,  I  should  suppose,  there  ought  to  be  a  decrease  rather  than  an 
increase,  as  the  price  of  clothing,  provisions,  forage,  and  other  articles  of 
supply,  as  well  as  transportation,  is,  I  presume,  cheaper  than  in  1821. 
The  proportion  of  officers  to  soldiers  I  would  suppose  to  be  less  in  1842 
than  1821,  and,  of  course,  as  far  as  that  has  influence,  the  expense  of  the 
former  ought  to  be  less  per  man  than  the  latter.     With  this  brief  and  im 
perfect  comparison  between  the  expense   of  1821  and  the  estimates  for 
this  year,  I  shall  proceed  to  a  more  minute  and  full  comparison  between  the 
former  and  the  year  1837.    I  select  that  year,  because  the  strength  of  the 
*  See  Document  33  (H.  R.),  1st  Session,  17th  Congress. 

E 


468  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

army,  and  the  proportion  of  officers  to  men  (a  very  material  point  as  it 
relates  to  the  expenditure),  are  almost  exactly  the  same. 

On  turning  to  document  165  (H.  R.,  2d  sess.,  26th  Con.),  a  letter  will  be 
found  from  the  then  secretary  of  war  (Mr.  Poinsett),  giving  a  comparative 
statement,  in  detail,  of  the  expense  of  the  army  proper,  including  the  Mil 
itary  Academy,  for  the  years  1837,  1838,  1839,  and  1840.  The  strength 
of  the  army  for  the  first  of  these  years,  including  officers,  professors, 
cadets,  and  soldiers,  was  8107,  being  two  less  than  in  1821.  The  pro 
portion  of  officers  and  professors  to  the  cadets  and  soldiers  ll^/¥,  be 
ing  _7_&_  more  than  1821.  The  expenditure  for  1837,  $3,308,011,  being 
$1,127,918  more  than  1821.  The  cost  per  man,  including  officers,  pro 
fessors,  cadets,  and  soldiers,  was,  in  1837,  $408  03,  exceeding  that  of 
1821  $144  12  per  man.  It  appears,  by  the  letter  of  the  secretary,  that 
the  expense  per  man  rose,  in  1838,  to  $464  35 ;  but  it  is  due  to  the  head 
of  the  department  at  the  time  to  say,  that  it  declined  under  his  adminis 
tration,  the  next  year,  to  $381  65,  and,  in  the  subsequent,  to  $380  63. 
There  is  no  statement  for  the  year  1841,  but,  as  there  has  been  a  falling 
off  in  prices,  there  ought  to  be  a  proportionate  reduction  in  the  cost,  es 
pecially  during  the  present  year,  when  there  is  a  prospect  of  so  great  a 
decline  in  almost  every  article  which  enters  into  the  consumption  of  the 
army.  Assuming  that  the  average  strength  of  the  army  will  be  kept  equal 
to  the  return  accompanying  the  President's  message,  and  that  the  expen 
diture  of  the  year  should  be  reduced  to  the  standard  of  1821,  the  expense 
of  the  army  would  not  exceed  $2,895,686,  making  a  difference,  compared 
with  the  estimates,  of  $1,557,684  j  but  that,  from  the  increase  of  pay,  and 
the  greater  expense  of  the  dragoons,  cannot  be  expected.  Having  no 
certain  information  how  much  the  expenses  are  necessarily  increased 
from  those  causes,  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  what  ought  to  be  the  actual 
reductions,  but,  unless  the  increase  of  pay,  and  the  increased  cost,  because 
of  the  dragoons,  are  very  great,  it  ought  to  be  very  considerable. 

I  found  the  expense  of  the  army  in  1818  including  the  Military  Acad 
emy,  to  be  $3,702,495,  at  a  cost  of  $451  57  per  man,  including  officers, 
professors,  cadets,  and  soldiers,  and  reduced  it,  in  1821,  to  $2,180,098,  at 
a  cost  of  $263  91,  and  making  a  difference  between  the  two  years,  in 
the  aggregate  expenses  of  the  army,  of  $1,522,397,  and  $185  66  per  man. 
There  was,  it  is  true,  a  great  fall  of  prices  in  the  interval ;  but  allowing 
for  that,  by  adding  to  the  price  of  every  article  entering  into  the  supplies 
of  the  army  a  sum  sufficient  to  raise  it  to  the  price  of  1818,  there  was 
still  a  difference  in  the  cost  per  man  of  $163  95.  This  great  reduc 
tion  was  effected  without  stinting  the  service  or  diminishing  the  supplies, 
either  in  quantity  or  quality.  They  were,  on  the  contrary,  increased  in 
both,  especially  the  latter.  It  was  effected  through  an  efficient  organiza 
tion  of  the  staff,  and  the  co-operation  of  the  able  officers  placed  at  the 
head  of  each  of  its  divisions.  The  cause  of  the  great  expense  at  the 
former  period  was  found  to  be  principally  in  the  neglect  of  public  prop 
erty,  and  the  application  of  it  to  uses  not  warranted  by  law.  There  is 
less  scope,  doubtless,  for  reformation  in  the  army  now.  I  cannot  doubt, 
however,  but  that  the  universal  extravagance  which  pervaded  the  country 
for  so  many  years,  and  which  increased  so  greatly  the  expenses  both  of 
government  and  individuals,  has  left  much  room  for  reform  in  this  as  well 
as  other  branches  of  the  service. 

In  addition  to  the  army,  there  are  many  other  and  heavy  branches  of 
expenditure  embraced  under  the  military  head — fortifications,  ordnance, 
Indians,  and  pensions — the  expenditures  of  which,  taken  in  the  aggregate, 
greatly  exceed  the  army  ;  the  expenses  of  all  of  which,  for  the  reason  to 
which  I  have  alluded,  may,  doubtless,  be  much  reduced. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  469 

In  turning  to  the  navy,  I  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  information 
which  would  enable  me  to  make  a  similar  comparison  between  the  two 
periods  in  reference  to  that  important  arm  ;  but  I  hope,  when  the  infor 
mation  is  received  which  has  been  called  for  by  the  senator  from  Maine 
(Mr.  Williams),  ample  data  will  be  obtained  to  enable  me  to  do  so  on 
some  future  occasion.  In  place  of  it,  I  propose  to  give  a  comparative 
statement  of  the  expense  of  the  British  navy  and  ours  for  the  year  1840. 
The  information  in  reference  to  the  former  is  taken  from  a  work  of 
authority,  the  Penny  Cyclopaedia,  under  the  head  of  "  Navy." 

The  aggregate  expense  of  the  British  navy  in  the  year  1840  amounted 
to  4,980,353  pounds  sterling,  deducting  the  expense  of  transport  for  troops 
and  convicts,  which  does  not  properly  belong  to  the  navy.  That  sum,  at 
$4  80  to  the  pound  sterling,  is  equal  to  $23,905,694  46.  The  navy  was 
composed  of  392  vessels  of  war  of  all  descriptions,  leaving  out  36  steam- 
vessels  in  tHte  packet-service,  and  23  sloops  fitted  for  foreign  packets. 
Of  the  392,  98  were  line-of-battle  ships,  of  which  19  were  building;  116 
frigates,  of  which  14  were  building  ;  68  sloops,  of  which  13  were  build 
ing  ;  44  steam-vessels,  of  which  16  were  building ;  and  66  gun-brigs, 
schooners,  and  cutters,  of  which  12  were  building. 

The  effective  force  of  the  year,  that  which  was  in  actual  service,  con 
sisted  of  3400  officers,  3998  petty  officers,  12,846  seamen,  and  9000  ma 
rines,  making  an  aggregate  of  29,244.  The  number  of  vessels  in  actual 
service  was  175,  of  which  24  were  line-of-battle  ships,  31  frigates,  30 
steam-vessels,  and  45  gun-brigs,  schooners,  and  cutters,  not  including  the 
30  steamers  and  24  sloops  in  the  packet-service,  at  an  average  expendi 
ture  of  $573  for  each  individual,  including  officers,  petty  officers,  seamen, 
and  marines. 

Our  navy  is  composed  at  present,  according  to  the  report  of  the  secre 
tary  accompanying  the  President's  message,  of  67  vessels,  of  which  11  are 
line-of-battle  ships,  17  frigates,  18  sloops  of  war,  2  brigs,  4  schooners,  4 
steamers,  3  store  ships,  3  receiving  vessels,  and  5  small  schooners.  The 
estimates  for  the  year  are  made  on  the  assumption  that  there  will  be  in 
service,  during  the  year,  2  ships  of  the  line,  1  razee,  6  frigates,  20  sloops, 
11  brigs  and  schooners,  3  steamers,  3  store  ships,  and  8  small  vessels, 
making  in  the  aggregate  53  vessels.  The  estimates  for  the  year,  for  the 
navy  and  marine  corps,  as  has  been  stated,  is  $8,705,579  83,  considerably 
exceeding  one  third  of  the  entire  expenditures  of  the  British  navy  for 
1840.  I  am  aware  that  there  is  probably  a  much  larger  expenditure  ap 
plied  to  the  increase  of  the  navy  in  our  service  than  in  the  British,  in  pro 
portion  to  the  respective  forces  ;  and  I  greatly  regret  that  I  have  not  the 
materials  to  ascertain  the  difference,  or  to  compare  the  expenses  of  the 
two  navies  in  the  various  items  of  building,  outfit,  and  pay,  and  the  rela 
tive  expenses  of  the  two  per  man,  per  gun,  and  per  ton.  The  comparison 
would  be  highly  interesting,  and  would  throw  much  light  on  the  subject 
of  these  remarks.  We  know  our  commercial  marine  meets  successfully 
the  British  in  fair  competition ;  and,  as  the  elements  of  the  expenses  of 
the  commercial  and  naval  marine  are  substantially  the  same  in  time  of 
peace,  when  impressment  is  disused  in  the  British  service,  our  navy  ought 
not  to  bear  an  unfavourable  comparison  with  theirs  on  the  score  of  ex 
pense.  Whether  it  does,  in  fact,  I  am  not  prepared  to  say,  with  the  ma 
terials  I  have  been  able  to  collect;  but  it  does  seem  to  me,  when  I  com 
pare  the  great  magnitude  of  their  naval  establishment  with  the  small- 
ness  of  ours,  and  the  aggregate  expense  of  the  two,  that  ours,  on  a  full 
comparison,  will  be  found  to  exceed  theirs  by  far  in  expense,  however 
viewed. 

I  hope  what  I  have  stated  will  excite  inquiry.     It  is  a  point  of  vast  im* 

A.  X 


470  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

portance.  If  we  can  bring  our  expenditures  to  an  equality,  or  nearly  so, 
with  hers,  we  may  then  look  forward  with  confidence  to  the  time,  as  not 
far  distant,  when,  with  our  vast  commercial  marine  (more  than  two  thirds 
of  the  British),  we  may,  with  proper  economy  in  our  disbursement,  and 
by  limiting  the  objects  of  our  expenditures  to  those  which  properly  be- 
loncr  to  this  government  under  the  Constitution,  place  a  navy  on  the 
ocean,  without  increase  of  burden  on  the  people,  that  will  give  complete 
protection  to  our  coast  and  command  the  respect  of  the  world.  But  if 
that  cannot  be  done  — if  our  expenses  must  necessarily  greatly  exceed  in 
proportion  that  of  the  first  maritime  power  in  the  world,  it  is  well  it  should 
be  known  at  once,  that  we  may  look  to  other  means  of  defence,  and  give 
up  what,  in  that  case,  would  be  a  hopeless  struggle.  I  do  not  believe  that  it 
will  be  found  to  be  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  I  am  impressed  with  the 
belief  that  our  naval  force  ought  riot  to  cost  more  in  proportion  than  the 
British.  In  some  things  they  may  have  the  advantage,  tfut  we  shall  be 
found  to  have  equally  great  in  others. 

From  these  statements  it  may  be  fairly  inferred  that  there  is  great  room 
for  economy,  under  every  head  of  expenditure.  I  am  by  no  means  pre 
pared  to  say  what  reduction  may  be  effected  by  it.  It  would  require 
much  more  time  and  minute  examination  to  determine  with  precision 
anything  like  the  exact  amount ;  but  it  is  certain  that  millions  may  be 
saved,  simply  by  a  judicious  and  strict  system  of  economy,  without  im 
pairing  in  any  degree  the  efficiency  of  the  government.  But  in  order  to 
form  a  more  definite  conception  as  to  the  amount  of  that  reduction,  I  pro 
pose  to  add  to  the  aggregate  expense  of  1823  seventy-five  per  cent. — the 
estimated  increase  of  the  population  of  the  United  States  since  then, 
which  will  give  the  amount  that  ought  to  have  been  the  estimated  ex 
penditures  for  this  year,  on  the  supposition  that  the  expense  of  the  gov 
ernment  ought  not,  in  ordinary  times,  to  increase  faster  than  the  popula 
tion  ;  and  which,  deducted  from  the  actual  estimates  of  the  year,  will 
show,  on  that  supposition,  to  what  amount  they  ought  to  have  been  re 
duced.  But  in  making  this  supposition,  I  wish  it  to  be  understood  I  do 
not  admit  that  the  expenditures  of  the  government  ought  to  keep  pace 
with  our  rapidly  increasing  population.  There  are  many  branches  of  the 
public  service  which  ought  not  to  be,  and  have  not,  in  fact,  been  much 
increased  with  the  increase  of  population,  and  are  now,  in  point  of  ex 
pansion,  very  nearly  what  they  were  in  1823.  Others  are  more  enlarged, 
but  it  is  believed  that  there  are  but  few  whose  growth  have  been  greater, 
or  as  great,  as  that  of  our  population.  It  would,  in  truth,  not  be  difficult  to 
show  that  an  increase  of  revenue  and  expenditures,  and,  consequently,  of 
patronage  and  influence,  equal  to  our  rapidly  growing  population,  must 
almost  necessarily  end  in  making  the  government  despotic.  It  is  known 
that  it  takes  a  much  less  military  force  in  proportion  to  subject  a  large 
country  with  a  numerous  population,  than  a  small  one  with  an  inconsider 
able  one  ;  and  in  like  manner,  and  for  similar  reasons,  it  takes  much  less 
patronage  and  influence  in  proportion  to  control  the  former  than  the  lat 
ter.  So  true  is  it,  that  I  regard  it  as  an  axiom,  that  the  purity  and  dura 
tion  of  our  free  and  popular  institutions,  looking  to  the  vast  extent  of 
country  and  its  great  and  growing  population,  depend  on  restricting  its 
revenues  and  expenditures,  and  thereby  its  patronage  and  influence,  to  the 
smallest  amount  consistent  with  the  proper  discharge  of  the  few  great 
duties  for  which  it  was  instituted.  To  a  departure  from  it  may  be  attrib 
uted,  in  a  great  measure,  the  existing  disorders.  With  these  remarks,  I 
shall  now  proceed  to  give  the  result  of  the  proposed  calculation. 

The  actual  expenditures  of  1823,  all  included,  except  payments  on  ac 
count  of  the  public  debt,  amounted  to  $9,827,832.     That  sum  multv^lied 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  471 

by  75  per  cent.,  the  estimated  ratio  of  increase  of  population  from  1823 
to  1840,  gives  $17,198,681,  which,  on  the  assumption  that  the  expendi 
tures  should  not  increase  more  rapidly  than  the  population,  ought  to  be 
the  extreme  limits  of  the  expenditures  of  this  year.  But  the  estimates 
for  the  year,  deducting  payment  on  account  of  the  debt,  are,  as  has  been 
stated,  $25,997,258,  being  an  excess  of  $8,498,577  beyond  what  the  ex 
penditures  ought  to  be  on  the  liberal  scale  assumed.  The  increase,  in 
stead  of  being  at  the  rate  of  the  population,  is  equal  to  2T\8g-  to  1,  com 
pared  with  the  expenditures  of  1823,  and  3|  nearly,  compared  with  the 
ratio  of  the  increase  of  population.  Had  the  ratio  of  increase  not  ex 
ceeded  that  of  the  population,  the  whole  expenditure  of  the  year,  inclu- 
dino-the  sum  of  $7,000,000  for  the  debt,  would  have  been  but  $24,198,681, 
instead  of  $32,997,258. 

But  as  great  as  this  reduction  is,  it  by  no  means  represents  the  saving 
that  would  be  made  on  the  data  assumed.  The  expense  of  collecting  the 
revenue  (of  which  a  statement  has  already  been  made  as  it  relates  to 
the  customs),  as  well  as  several  other  items,  less  important,  are  not  in 
cluded  in  the  expenditures,  and  must  Ve  added,  to  get  the  true  amount 
that  would  be  saved.  The  addition,  at  the  lowest  calculation,  would  be 
a  million  of  dollars  j  which,  added  to  the  $8,498,577,  would  make  the  sum 
of  $9,498,577,  and  would  reduce  what  ought  to  be  the  estimates  of  the 
year,  on  the  ground  assumed,  to  $16,198,681.  The  saving  is  great  j  but, 
I  feel  confident,  not  greater  than  what,  with  a  judicious  and  efficient  sys 
tem  of  administration,  might  be  effected,  and  that  not  only  without  im 
pairing,  but  actually  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  government.  To 
make  so  great  a  reduction,  would  take  much  time  and  labour  ;  but  if  those 
who  have  the  power,  and  stand  pledged,  would  begin  the  good  work, 
much,  very  much,  might  be  done  during  the  present  session.  But  if  this 
bill,  as  it  now  stands,  should  become  a  law,  I  should  despair  for  the  pres 
ent.  I  see  in  the  amendment  a  deliberate  and  fixed  determination  to 
keep  up  the  expenditures,  regardless  of  pledges  and  consequences. 

Having  now  shown  how  greatly  the  public  expenditures  have  increased 
since  1823,  I  next  propose  to  make  some  remarks  on  the  causes  that  have 
produced  it.  In  the  front  rank  I  place  the  protective  tariff.  I  selected 
the  year  1823,  as  I  stated  in  the  early  stages  of  my  remarks,  in  part  to 
illustrate  the  effects  of  that  pernicious  system  in  this  connexion.  It  is 
curious  to  look  over  the  columns  of  expenditures,  under  their  various 
heads,  in  the  table  I  hold  in  my  hand,  and  note  how  suddenly  they  rose 
under  every  head,  after  each  of  the  tariff  acts  of  182*4  and  1828,  until  they 
reached  the  present  point.  [Here  Mr.  C.  read  from  the  table  of  the  ex 
penditures  under  each  head,  year  by  year,  from  1823  to  1840,  in  illustra 
tion  of  his  remarks].  Nor  is  it  wonderful  that  such  should  be  the  effect 
of  the  protective  policy.  How  could  it  be  otherwise  1  Duties  were  laid, 
not  for  revenue,  but  for  protection.  Money  was  not  the  object.  It  was 
but  an  incident,  and  the  party  in  favour  of  the  system  (a  majority  in  both 
houses  during  the  whole  period)  cared  not  how  it  was  wasted.  During 
that  wasteful  period,  I  have  heard  members  of  Congress  of  high  intelli 
gence  declare  that  it  was  better  that  the  money  should  be  burned  or 
thrown  into  the  ocean  than  not  collected  5  and  they*  spoke  in  the  true 
genius  of  that  corrupting  and  oppressive  system.  In  fact,  after  it  was 
collected,  there  was  a  sort  of  necessity  that  it  should  be  spent.  The  col 
lection  was  in  bank-notes  ;  and  of  all  absurdities,  one  of  the  greatest  is,  an 
accumulation  of  such  an  article  in  the  public  treasury,  whether  we  regard 
the  thing  itself,  or  its  effects  on  the  community  and  the  banks.  When 
pushed  to  a  great  extent,  it  must  prove  ruinous  to  all ;  and  to  such  an  ac 
cumulation,  in  spite  of  the  most  wasteful  extravagance  in  the  expendi- 


472  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tures,  may  be  attributed,  in  a  great  degree,  the  overthrow  of  the  banks, 
and  the  embarrassments  of  the  government  and  country.  But  so  blind 
were  the  banks,  for  the  most  part,  to  their  fate,  that  they  were  among  the 
foremost  to  urge  on  the  course  of  policy  destined  to  hasten  so  greatly 
their  overthrow.  All  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  minority  in  Congress 
opposed  to  the  system  was  in  vain.  If  the  money  was  saved  from  one 
objectionable  object,  it  was  sure  to  be  applied  to  some  other,  and  perhaps 
even  more  objectionable  ;  if  the  sluice  of  expenditures  was  stopped  in  one 
place,  it  was  certain  to  burst  through  another.  Under  the  conviction 
that  the  struggle  was  in  vain  so  long  as  the  cause  remained,  I  ceased  in 
a  great  measure  resistance  to  appropriations,  and  turned  my  efforts  against 
the  cause — a  treasury  overflowing  with  bank-notes — to  exhaust  which  was 
the  only  means  left  of  staying  the  evil.  It  is  not  my  intention  to  cast 
the  blame  on  either  party.  The  fault  lay  in  the  system — the  policy  of 
imposing  duties  when  the  money  was  not  needed,  and  collecting  it  in  a 
currency,  which,  to  keep,  would  have  been  more  wasteful  and  ruinous,  if 
possible,  than  to  spend,  however  extravagantly.  It  is  due,  in  justice  to  the 
late  administration,  to  say,  that 'they  had  commenced,  in  good  earnest, 
the  work  of  reform,  and  that  with  so  much  success,  as  to  have  made  a 
very  considerable  reduction  in  the  expenditures,  towards  which  no  one 
exerted  himself  with  more  zeal  or  greater  effect  than  the  senator  behind 
me  (Mr.  Woodbury),  then  at  the  head  of  the  treasury  department.  It  is 
to  be  deeply  regretted  that  what  was  then  so  well  begun  has  not  been 
continued  by  those  who  have  succeeded. 

It  is  admitted  on  all  sides  that  we  must  equalize  the  revenue  and  ex 
penditures.  The  scheme  of  borrowing  to  make  up  an  increasing  deficit 
must  in  the  end,  if  continued,  prove  ruinous.  Already  is  our  credit 
greatly  impaired.  It  is  impossible  to  borrow  at  home,  in  the  present  state 
of  things,  at  the  usual  rate  of  interest.  The  six  per  cent,  stock  authorized 
at  the  late  session  is  now  several  per  cent,  below  par ;  and,  if  we  would 
borrow  in  the  home  market,  it  would  endanger  the  solvent  banks.  It  is 
admitted  that  a  loan  of  two  millions  in  Boston  has  caused  the  present 
intense  pressure  there  in  the  money  market.  Nor  can  the  foreign  market 
be  relied  on  till  our  finances  are  put  in  a  better  condition.  Who,  in  their 
present  condition,  would  think  of  jeoparding  our  credit  by  appearing  in 
the  European  market  with  United  States  stocks'?  It  is  certain  that  no 
negotiation  could  be  effected  there  but  at  usurious  interest,  and  on  a  con 
siderable  extension  of  the  time  for  redemption  j  the  tendency  of  which 
would  be  to  depress  the  state  stocks,  and  lay  the  foundation  of  a  perma 
nent  funded  debt.  There  remains  another  objection,  which  should  not  be 
overlooked:  the  loan  would  be  returned  in  merchandise,  with  the  usual 
injurious  and  embarrassing  effects  of  stimulating  the  consumption  of  the 
country,  for  the  time,  beyond  what  its  exports  would  permanently  sustain. 

Nor  is  the  prospect  much  better  for  the  additional  issue  of  treasury- 
notes  proposed  by  the  bill  as  amended  in  the  Senate.  They  are  now  be 
low  par,  and  this  must  still  add  to  their  depression ;  perhaps  to  the  same 
extent  to  which  the  six  per  cents,  are  now  depressed.  The  reason  is  ob 
vious.  The  only  advantage  which  they  have  over  stocks  in  raising  a  loan 
is,  that  they  are  receivable  in  the  dues  of  the  government,  which  gives 
them,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  character  of  currency ;  but  that  advantage 
is  not  peculiar  to  them.  As  the  law  now  stands,  notes  of  solvent  banks 
are  also  receivable  in  the  public  dues.  They  are,  in  fact,  treasury-notes, 
as  far  as  it  depends  on  receivability ;  as  much  so  as  if  each  one  was  en^ 
dorsed  to  be  received  in  the  dues  of  the  government  by  an  authorized 
agent.  Now,  so  long  as  the  government  receives  bank-notes  at  par  with 
their  own,  and  the  banks  (as  is  now  the  case)  refuse  to  receive  them  at  par 


-•  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  473 

with  bank-notes,  treasury-notes  will  be  depressed  compared  with  bank-notes  ; 
for  the  plain  reason  that  the  latter  can  pay  the  debts  both  of  the  banks  and  the 
government,  while  the  former  can  pay  only  the  debts  of  the  government. 

In  such  a  state  of  things,  only  a  very  small  amount  of  treasury-notes  can  be 
used  for  currency  without  depressing  them  below  par ;  and  when  that  amount 
is  much  exceeded,  they  witl  sink  rapidly  to  the  depression  of  stock  bearing  the 
same  rate  of  interest.  Very  different  would  be  the  fact  if  the  sub-treasury  had 
not  been  repealed.  Under  its  operation,  the  government  could  at  any  time  hav£ 
issued  what  amount  it  pleased  to  meet  a  temporary  deficit  of  the  treasury,  at  a 
mere  nominal  rate  of  interest,  or  none  at  all.  The  provision  that  nothing  but 
gold  and  silver,  and  the  paper  issued  on  the  credit  of  the  government,  should 
be  received  in  the  public  dues,  would  have  kept  them  at  par.  But  as  things 
now  are,  it  must  be  obvious  that  neither  loans  in  the  usual  way,  nor  treasury- 
notes,  can  be  relied  on  to  make  up  the  deficit,  without  ruinous  consequences. 
And  here  let  me  inform  the  senators  on  the  other  side  that  they  are  labouring 
under  a  great  mistake  in  supposing  that  we,  who  prefer  treasury-notes  to  loans 
to  meet  the  temporary  wants  of  the  treasury,  are  anxious  to  force  the  use  of 
them  on  you.  The  fact  is  far  otherwise.  We  deeply  regret  to  see  you  re 
duced  to  the  necessity  of  using  them.  We  believe  them  to  be  very  useful  and 
convenient,  much  cheaper,  and  more  safe,  than  loans,  to  meet  the  occasional 
wants  of  the  government,  and  see,  with  regret,  a  resort  to  them  under  circum 
stances  so  well  calculated  to  discredit  them  in  the  public  estimation,  and  when 
they  cannot  be  used  but  at  the  expense  of  the  public  creditors. 

We  have,  then,  arrived  at  the  point  thai  we  must  increase  the  duties  or  cur 
tail  expenditures  ;  and  the  question  is,  Which  shall  we  choose  ?  That  question 
will  be  decided  by  the  vote  we  are  about  to  give.  There  is  no  mistake.  Those 
who  have  changed  this  bill  into  a  loan  bill  of  $5,000,000  tell  us,  in  language 
too  intelligible  to  be  mistaken,  that  they  intend  to  fix  the  permanent  expenses 
of  the  government  at  about  $25,000,000 ;  for  it  will  take  that  sum,  at  least,  to 
meet  what  they  tell  us  is  the  lowest  amount  to  which  the  expenditures  can  be 
reduced,  and  to  discharge  the  interest  and  principal  of  the  debt  already  con 
tracted  or  authorized.  Now,  sir,  it  is  clear  that  so  large  a  sum  cannot  be  de 
rived  from  the  present  tariff,  as  high  as  it  has  been  raised.  I  agree  with  the 
chairman  that,  with  our  present  export  trade,  the  heavy  interest  to  be  paid  on 
debts  abroad,  and  the  large  list  of  free  articles,  that  it  is  not  safe  to  estimate 
the  consumption  of  the  country  of  dutiable  articles  at  more  than  $85,000,000, 
which,  at  20  per  cent,  round,  would  give  but  $17,000,000  gross,  and  a  nett 
revenue,  according  to  the  present  expense  of  collectten,  of  not  more  than 
$15,000,000  at  the  outside  ;  leaving  $10,000,000  annually  to  be  raised  by  ad 
ditional  duties  on  imports,  or  a  corresponding  reduction  in  the  expenses  of  the 
government.  Which  shall  we  choose  ?  That  the  reduction  may  be  made,  and 
the  deficit  met,  aided  by  the  repeal  of  the  Distribution  Bill,  without  impairing 
the  efficiency  of  the  government,  I  trust  I  have  satisfactorily  shown  ;  not  all  at 
once,  but  enough  and  more,  this  year,  to  avoid  this  loan,  and  gradually,  by  a  vig 
orous  system  of  economy,  to  arrest  all  farther  loans,  and  to  discharge  those 
that  have  been  contracted  or  authorized.  Why  not,  then,  adopt  the  alternative 
of  curtailing  expenses  ?  I  put  the  question  in  all  soberness  to  those  who  are 
in  power  and  responsible.  You  stand  pledged,  solemnly  pledged  to  reform — 
you  told  the  people  that  the  expenses  of  the  government  were  extravagant ;  that 
they  could  be  reduced  to  a  point  lower  than  I  have  assigned ;  and  why  not  re 
deem  your  pledge,  when  I  have  proved  that  there  is  such  ample  room  to  do  so  ? 
We,  on  this  side,  are  anxious  to  co-operate  with  you,  and  to  carry  out  with 
vigour  the  good  work  which  had  been  commenced  before  you  came  into  powder. 
Why,  instead  of  carrying  on  with  still  greater  vigour  what  had  been  commenced, 
do  you  halt  ?  No  :  it  is  not  strong  enough.  Why  do  you  now  go  for  increase, 
instead  of  reduction  ?  Why  falsify  all  your  solemn  promises,  and  prove,  now 

0  o  o 


474  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.* 

that  you  are  in  power,  that  you  are  as  zealous  for  debts,  duties,  and  increase 
of  expenditures,  as  you  exhibited  zeal  for  reform  while  you  were  seeking 
power  ? 

But  one  answer  can  be  given — from  deep  solicitude  for  another  protective 
tariff.  Yes,  that  same  pernicious  system,  which  Dwelled  the  expenditures  to 
their  present  vast  amount,  is  the  real  impediment  to  their  reduction.  It  is  that 
which  has  made  you  forget  all  your  promises,  and  which  now  seeks  to  keep  up 
the  expenditures  as  a  pretext  for  imposing  duties,  not  for  revenue,  but,  in  reality, 
for  protection.  It  is  that  which  is  striving  to  force  government  to  return  to  the 
old  and  disastrous  policy  which  has  brought  such  calamity  on  the  country,  and 
done  so  much  to  corrupt  its  morals  and  politics  ;  and  which  is  now  forcing  it  to 
resort  to  loans  and  treasury-notes,  at  the  hazard  of  its  credit,  when  it  is  so 
necessary,  in  the  midst  of  the  wrecks  of  that  of  so  many  of  the  -states,  that  the 
credit  of  the  Union  should  stand  above  suspicion.  It  is  that  which  passed  the 
Distribution  Bill,  and  now  resists  its  repeal,  when  it  is  clear  that  the  revenue 
from  the  lands  is  indispensable  to  meet  the  demands  on  the  government,  and  to 
preserve  its  credit.  Put  that  corrupt  and  corrupting  system  out  of  the  way,  and 
every  difficulty  connected  with  our  finances  would  vanish ;  the  Distribution 
Act  would  be  repealed,  the  revenue  from  the  public  domain  restored  to  the 
Union,  and  economy  and  retrenchment  would  save  their  millions.  Every 
voice  would  be  raised  in  their  favour,  and  the  expenditure  would  be  speedily 
equalized  with  the  revenue.  Were  this  done,  we  would  hear  no  more  of  an 
empty  treasury — of  loans,  of  treasury-notes  and  prostrated  credit ;  no  more  of 
additional  duties.  Instead  of  increase,  we  should  hear  the  cheerful  note  of  re 
duction — repeal  of  taxes — striking  shackles  from  commerce  and  navigation — 
and  lightening  the  burden  of  labour.  I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting  that,  with 
a  thorough  reform  in  the  fiscal  action  of  the  government,  and  a  repeal  of  the 
Distribution  Act,  that  a  revenue  of  thirteen  millions  from  the  customs  would  be 
sufficient — amply  sufficient  for  carrying  on  the  government  efficiently.  Such 
would  be  the  happy  effects  of  equalizing  the  revenue  and  expenditures  by  a 
judicious  system  of  economy  and  retrenchment,  aided  by  the  restoration  of  the 
revenue  from  the  lands. 

Let  me  now  ask  gentlemen  if  they  have  reflected  on  the  consequences  which 
must  result  from  the  other  alternative,  that  of  raising  the  revenue  to  the  standard 
of  the  expenditures.  What  has  already  been  the  effects  of  that  policy  ?  What 
is  the  immediate  cause  of  the  present  embarrassment  ?  What  has  emptied  the 
treasury,  prostrated  the  credit  of  the  government,  and  imposed  high  additional 
taxes  on  the  commerce  and  labour  of  the  country  ?  What  but  the  policy  com 
menced  at  the  extra  session,  of  keeping  up  the  expenditures  to  the  present  high 
standard,  and  which,  if  we  may  judge  by  this  measure,  and  the  declaration  of 
the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Finance,  it  is  determined  to  adhere  to?  Can 
any  one  doubt  that  if  there  had  been  no  change  of  policy — if  that  so  earnestly 
pressed  by  my  friend  behind  me,  of  reducing  the  expenditures,  had  been  con 
tinued,  but  that  the  existing  embarrassments  would  have  been  avoided  ?  On 
you,  who  have  reversed  the  wise  and  judicious  course  then  commenced,  rests 
the  responsibility.  It  is  you  who  have  emptied  the  treasury ;  you  who  have 
destroyed  the  credit  of  the  government,  and  caused  the  present  embarrassments. 

But  you  are  only  at  the  beginning  of  your  difficulties.  Those  that  are  to 
come,  unless  you  change  your  course,  are  still  more  formidable.  The  power 
of  borrowing,  in  every  form,  short  of  usurious  and  ruinous  interest,  is  gone,  and 
can  you  expect  to  raise  from  commerce  alone  the  means  of  meeting  the  expen 
ditures  at  the  present  high  standard  ?  I  pronounce  it  to  be  beyond  your  power 
to  raise  twenty-five  millions  annaally  from  the  customs.  So  large  a  sum  can 
not  be  extorted  from  commerce  in  the  present  state  of  things.  A  nett  revenue 
to  that  amount  would  require  a  gross  revenue,  at  the  present  extravagant  rate 
of  collection,  of  at  least  twenty-seven  millions  of  dollars.  Our  present  exports 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  475 

will  not  pay  for  an  importation  of  more  than  $125,000,000,  allowing  for  the  or 
dinary  profits  of  trade.  From  this  must  be  deducted  $10,000,000  for  the  inter 
est  of  debt  abroad,  which  would  reduce  the  imports  to  $115,000,000.  Deduct 
$10,000,000  more  for  free  articles,  immediately  connected  with  the  manufac 
turing  operations  of  the  country,  and  it  would  reduce  the  dutiable  articles  con 
sumed  in  the  country  annually  to  $105,000,000.  In  the  free  articles  I  do  not 
include  tea  and  coffee,  which  are  now  so.  It  would  take  an  average  duty  of 
26  per  cent,  to  raise  $27,000,000  on  $105,000,000.  Can  you,  in  the  present 
state  of  things,  raise  your  duties  to  that  high  standard  ? 

I  pass  over  the  effects  of  such  a  duty  in  repressing  the  export  trade,  on 
which  the  import  depends.  Between  them  there  is  the  most  intimate  relation. 
Each  limits  the  amount  of  the  other.  •.  In  the  long  run,  it  is  acknowledged  that 
the  imports  cannot,  on  a  fair  valuation,  exceed  the  exports.  It  is  not  less  cer 
tain  that  the  same  rule  applies  to  the  exports,  which,  in  the  long  run,  cannot  ex 
ceed  the  imports.  And  hence,  duties  on  imports  as  effectually  restrict  arid  limit 
the  amount  of  the  exports  as  if  directly  imposed  on  the  latter.  To  repress  the 
one  is  to  repress  the  other.  But,  setting  aside  all  considerations  of  the  kind,  I 
directly  meet  the  question,  and  say  that  you  cannot  extort  from  commerce  the 
amount  you  propose. 

He  who  would  reason  from  the  past  on  this  subject  will  be  greatly  deceived. 
High  duties  now  will  not  give  the  revenue  they  once  did.  The  smuggler  for 
bids.  The  standard  of  morals  is  greatly  lowered.  The  paper  system  and  the 
protective  policy  have  worked  a  great  and  melancholy  change  in  that  respect. 
The  country  is  filled  with  energetic  and  enterprising  men,  rendered  desperate 
by  being  reduced  from  affluence  to  poverty  through  the  vicissitudes  of  the  times. 
They  will  give  an  impulse  to  smuggling  unknown  to  the  country  heretofore.  The 
profits  of  regular  business,  in  the  new  state  of  things  in  which  the  country  is 
placed,  must  be  low  and  slow.  Fortunes  can  no  longer  be  made  by  a  single 
bold  stroke  ;  and  the  impatience  and  necessities  of  the  large  class  to  which  1 
have  alluded,  and  whose  debts  will  be  sponged  by  the  Bankrupt  Act,  will  not 
submit  to  recovering  their  former  condition  by  so  slow  a  process.  With  high 
duties,  smuggling,  then,  will  open  too  tempting  a  field  to  restore  their  broken 
fortunes,  not  to  be  entered  by  many  of  the  large  class  to  which  I  refer,  to  which 
many  will  be  added  from  the  lowered  standard  of  morals,  who  cannot  plead  the 
same  necessity.  If  to  this  be  added  the  great  increased  facility  for  smuggling, 
both  on  our  Northern,  and  Eastern,  and  Southwestern  frontiers,  it  will  be  in  vain 
to  expect  to  raise  the  sum  proposed  from  commerce.  Not  only  has  the  line  of 
frontier  along  the  lakes  been  greatly  lengthened,  but  the  facility  of  intercourse 
with  them,  both  by  canals  and  roads,  have  been  increased  in  a  still  greater  de 
gree.  How  is  smuggling  to  be  prevented  along  so  extended  a  frontier,  with 
such  unlimited  facility  for  practising  it  ?  Nor  will  the  supply  of  smuggled  goods 
be  confined  to  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  frontier.  They  will  pene 
trate  through  the  numerous  roads  and  canals  leading  to  the  lakes,  far  inland,  and 
compete  successfully  with  the  regular  trade  in  the  heart  of  the  country.  Nor 
is  it  to  be  doubted  but  that  the  British  authorities  will  connive  at  this  illicit  trade. 
Look  at  the  immense  interest  which  they  have  to  turn  the  trade  of  our  country, 
as  far  as  possible,  through  the  channel  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  It  will  give  to 
Great  Britain  the  entire  tonnage  to  whatever  portion  of  our  trade  may  be  turned 
through  that  channel — a  point  so  important  to  her  naval  supremacy,  to  which 
she  is  ever  so  attentive.  Already  great  facility  is  afforded  for  turning  the  pro 
vision  trade,  both  for  the  home  market  and  the  supply  of  the  West  Indies,  through 
it,  and  with  much  success. 

I  was  surprised  to  learn,  since  the  commencement  of  the  session,  as  I  have 
no  doubt  most  of  those  who  hear  me  will  be,  that  a  place  on  the  St.  Lawrence, 
almost  unknown,  is  already  the  fourth  town  in  the  Union,  as  to  the  number  of 
vessels  that  enter  and  depart  in  the  year.  I  refer  to  St.  Vincent,  at  the  outlet 


476  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

of  Lake  Ontario.  It  is  the  depot  for  the  British  trade  which  descends  the  St. 
Lawrence  from  our  side.  To  give  life  and  vigour  to  a  vast  trade,  which  gives 
her  the  entire  tonnage  of  the  outward  and  inward  voyage,  is  too  important  to 
be  neglected,  particularly  as  it  would  so  powerfully  counteract  our  high  duties, 
and  so  greatly  widen  the  field  of  consumption  for  her  manufactures.  Turning 
to  the  frontier  at  the  other  end  of  the  Union,  we  shall  find  a  great  increase  of 
facility  for  smuggling  in  that  quarter  ;  but  I  abstain  from  enlarging  on  it  for  the 
present. 

Taking  all  these  causes  together,  it  cannot  be  doubted  but  that  smuggling 
will  commence  at  a  much  more  lower  point  of  duties  than  it  ever  has  heretofore, 
and  that  all  calculations  of  increase  of  revenue  from  increase  of  duties  founded 
on  trfe  past  will  fail.  It  is  the  opinion  pf  good  judges  that  it  would  commence 
with  duties  as  low  as  12  per  cent,  on  such  articles  as  linen  and  silks  ;  but  be  that 
as  it  may,  it  may  be  safely  predicted  that  the  scheme  of  raising  the  standard  of 
revenue  to  the  present  expenditures  will  fail.  I  pass  over  the  violation  of  the 
compromise,  which  such  a  policy  necessarily  involves,  its  ruinous  effects  on  the 
great  staples  of  the  country,  now  suffering  under  the  greatest  depression,  and  that 
deep  discontent  which  must  follow  in  the  quarter  that  produces  them.  I  shall 
confine  myself  simply  to  the  financial  question.  Regarded  in  that  light,  I  tell  gen 
tlemen  that  the  line  of  policy  they  propose  will  fail.  They  will  have  io  aban 
don  it,  or  resort  to  internal  taxes  to  supply  the  deficit  from  commerce.  Yes, 
you  must  restore  the  revenue  from  the  lands,  economize  and  retrench,  or  be  for 
ced  to  resort  to  internal  taxes  in  the  end.  Are  you  prepared  for  that?  I  ask 
those  who  represent  the  great  sections  to  the  North  and  East  of  this,  if  they  have 
reflected  how  that  portion  of  the  Union  would  be  affected  by  internal  taxes.  I 
refer  not  to  direct  taxes,  for  that,  according  to  the  mode  prescribed  in  the  Con 
stitution,  can  never  be  pushed  to  any  oppressive  extreme,  but  to  excises.  If 
you  have  not,  it  is  time  you  should  ;  for  in  the  way  you  are  now  going,  you  will 
soon  have  to  learn  experimentally  how  it  will  operate. 

There  never  has  been  a  civilized  country  within  my  knowledge  whose  mon 
eyed  affairs  have  been  worse  managed  than  ours  for  the  last  dozen  of  years. 
In  1828  we  raised  the  duties,  on  an  average,  to  nearly  fifty  per  cent,  when  the 
debt  was  on  the  eve  of  being  discharged,  and  thereby  flooded  the  country  with 
a  revenue,  when  discharged,  which  could  not  be  absorbed  by  the  most  lavish 
expenditures.  Hence  the  double  affliction  of  an  accumulating  surplus  of  mill 
ions  on  millions,  and  of  the  most  wasteful  expenditures  at  the  same  time.  Then 
came  the  Compromise  Act,  which  entirely  exempted  one  half  of  the  imports 
from  duties,  in  order  to  escape  the  growing  evil  of  such  a  surplus,  and  reduced 
the  one  tenth,  every  two  years,  on  all  the  duties  above  twenty  per  cent.,  in  or 
der  to  get  clear  of  the  protective  policy.  Under  their  operation,  aided  by  the 
Deposite  Act,  the  surplus  was  absorbed,  arid  the  revenue  gradually  brought  down 
to  the  proper  level ;  to  meet  the  descending  revenue,  a  reduction  of  expendi 
tures  was  commenced,  with  the  intention  of  equalizing  the  revenue  and  expen 
ditures.  Then  a  change  of  party  took  place,  the  one  coming  in  professing  a 
greater  love  for  economy  and  retrenchment  than  the  one  going  out ;  but,  instead 
of  fulfilling  their  promises,  the  public  expenditures  have  been  increased  by  mill 
ions — debts  contracted — revenue  from  the  lands  squandered — and  all  this  when 
the  income  was  reduced  to  the  least  possible  depression.  Take  all  in  all,  can 
folly,  can  inmtuation,  go  farther  ? 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  477 

XXXIII. 

SPEECH   IN   SUPPOPvT   OF   THE   VETO   POWER,   FEB.   28,    1842. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said :  The  senator  from  Kentucky,  in  support  of  his  amend 
ment,  maintained  that  the  people  of  these  states  constitute  a  nation ;  that  the 
nation  has  a  will  of  its  own ;  that  the  numerical  majority  of  the  whole  was  the 
appropriate  organ  of  its  voice  ;  and  that  whatever  derogated  from  it,  to  that  ex 
tent  departed  from  the  genius  of  the  government,  and  set  up  the  will  of  the  mi 
nority  against  the  majority.  We  have  thus  presented,  at  the  very  threshold  of 
the  discussion,  a  question  of  the  deepest  import,  not  only  as  it  regards  the  sub 
ject  under  consideration,  but  the  nature  and  character  of  our  government ;  and 
that  question  is,  Are  these  propositions  of  the  senator  true  ?*  If  they  be,  then 
he  admitted  the  argument  against  the  veto  would  be  conclusive  ;  not,  however, 
for  the  reason  assigned  by  him,  that  it  would  make  the  voice  of  a  single  func 
tionary  of  the  government  (the  President)  equivalent  to  that  of  some  six  sen 
ators  and  forty  members  of  the  other  house ;  but  for  the  far  more  decisive 
reason,  according  to  his  theory,  that  the  President  is  not  chosen  by  the  voice 
of  the  numerical  majority,  and  does  not,  therefore,  according  to  his  principle, 
represent  truly  the  will  of  the  nation. 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  he  is  elected  simply  on  the  principle  of 
numbers.  They  constitute,  it  is  true,  the  principal  element  in  his  election,  but 
not  the  exclusive.  Each  state  is,  indeed,  entitled  to  as  many  votes  in  his  elec 
tion  as  it  is  to  representatives  in  the  other  house — that  is,  to  its  federal  popu 
lation  ;  but  to  these,  two  others  are  added,  having  no  regard  to  numbers  for 
their  representation  in  the  Senate,  which  greatly  increases  the  relative  influ 
ence  of  the  small  states,  compared  to  the  large,  in  the  presidential  election. 
What  effect  this  latter  element  may  have  on  the  numbers  necessary  to  elect  a 
president,  may  be  made  apparent  by  a  very  short  and  simple  calculation. 

The  population  of  the  United  States,  in  federal  numbers,  by  the  late  census, 
is  15,908,376.  Assuming  that  sixty-eight  thousand,  the  number  reported  by 
the  committee  of  the  other  house,  will  be  fixed  on  for  the  ratio  of  representation 
there,  it  will  give,  according  to  the  calculation  of  the  committee,  two  hundred 
and  twenty-four  members  to  the  other  house.  Add  fifty-two,  the  number  of  the 
senators,  and  the  electoral  college  will  be  found  to  consist  of  two  hundred  and 
seventy-six,  of  which  one  hundred  and  thirty-nine  is  a  majority.  If  nineteen 
of  the  smaller  states,  excluding  Maryland,  be  taken,  beginning  with  Delaware 
and  ending  with  Kentucky  inclusive,  they  will  be  found  to  be  entitled  to  one 
hundred  and  forty  votes,  one  more  than  a  majority,  *with  a  federal  population 
of  only  7,227,869  ;  while  the  seven  other  states,  with  a  population  of  8,680,507, 
would  be  entitled  to  but  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  votes,  three  less  than  a  ma 
jority,  with  a  population  of  almost  a  million  and  a  half  greater  than  the  others. 
Of  the  one  hundred  and  forty  electoral  votes  of  the  smaller  states,  thirty-eight 
would  be  on  account  of  the  addition  of  two  to  each  state,  for  their  representa 
tion  in  this  body,  while  of  the  larger  there  would  be  but  fourteen  on  that  ac 
count  ;  making  a  difference  of  twenty-four  votes  on  that  account,  being  two 
more  than  the  entire  electoral  votes  of  Ohio,  the  third  state  in  point  of  numbers 
in  the  Union. 

*  Mr.  Clay  here  interrupted  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  said  that  he  meant  a  majority  according  to  the 
forms  of  the  Constitution. 

Mr.  Calhoun,  in  return,  said  he  had  taken  down  the  words  of  the  senator  at  the  time,  and  would 
vouch  for  the  correctness  of  his  statement.  The  senator  not  only  laid  down  the  propositions  as 
stated,  but  he  drew  conclusions  from  them  against  the  President's  veto,  which  could  only  be  sus 
tained  on  the  principle  of  the  numerical  majority.  In  fact,  his  course  at  the  extra  session,  and  the 
grounds  assumed  both  by  him  and  his  colleague,  in  this  discussion,  had  their  origin  in  the  doctrines 
embraced  in  that  proposition. 


478  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

The  senator  from  Kentucky,  with  these  facts,  but  acts  in  strict  conformity  to 
his  theory  of  the  government,  in  proposing  the  limitation  he  has  on  the  veto 
power ;  but  as  much  cannot  be  said  in  favour  cf  the  substitute  he  has  offered. 
The  argument  is  as  conclusive  against  the  one  as  the  other,  or  any  other  modi 
fication  of  the  veto  that  could  possibly  be  devised.  It  goes  farther,  and  is  con 
clusive  against  the  executive  department  itself,  as  elected ;  for  there  can  be  no 
good  reason  offered  why  the  will  of  the  nation,  if  there  be  one,  should  not  be 
as  fully  and  perfectly  represented  in  that  department  as  in  the  legislative. 

But  it  does  not  stop  there.  It  would  be  still  more  conclusive,  if  possible, 
against  this  branch  of  the  government.  In  constituting  the  Senate,  numbers 
are  totally  disregarded.  The  smallest  state  stands  on  a  perfect  equality  with 
the  largest — Delaware,  with  her  seventy-seven  thousand,  with  New- York,  with 
her  two  millions  and  a  half.  Here  a  majority  of  states  control,  without  regard 
to  population ;  and  fourteen  of  the  smallest  states,  with  a  federal  population  of 
but  4,064,457,  little  less  than  a  fourth  of  the  whole,  can,  if  they  unite,  overrule 
the  twelve  others,  with  a  population  of  11,844,919.  Nay,  more:  they  could 
virtually  destroy  the  government,  and  put  a  veto  on  the  whole  system,  by  re 
fusing  to  elect  senators  ;  and  yet  this  equality  among  states,  without  regard  to 
numbers,  including  the  branch  where  it  prevails,  would  seem  to  be  the  favour 
ite  with  the  Constitution.  It  cannot  be  altered  without  the  consent  of  every 
state  ;  arid  this  branch  of  the  government,  where  it  prevails,  is  the  only  one 
that  participates  in  the  powers  of  all  the  others.  As  a  part  of  the  legislative 
department,  it  has  full  participation  with  the  other  in  all  matters  of  legislation, 
except  originating  money  bills  ;  while  it  participates  with  the  executive  in  two  of 
its  highest  functions,  that  of  appointing  to  office  and  making  treaties  ;  and  in  that 
of  the  judiciary,  in  being  the  high  court  before  which  all  impeachments  are  tried. 
But  we  have  not  yet  got  to  the  end  of  the  consequences.  The  argument 
would  be  as  conclusive  against  the  judiciary  as  against  the  Senate,  or  the  ex 
ecutive  and  his  veto.  The  judges  receive  their  appointments  from  the  execu 
tive  and  the  Senate ;  the  one  nominating,  and  the  other  consenting  to  and  ad 
vising  the  appointment;  neither  of  which  departments,  as  has  been  shown,  is 
chosen  by  the  numerical  majority.  In  addition,  they  hold  their  office  during 
good  behaviour,  and  can  only  be  turned  out  by  impeachment ;  and  yet  they 
have  the  power,  in  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  brought  before  them,  in  which 
an  act  of  Congress  is  involved,  to  decide  on  its  constitutionality — that  is,  in 
effect,  to  pronounce  an  absolute  veto. 

If,  then,  the  senator's  theory  be  correct,  its  clear  and  certain  result,  if  carried 
out  in  practice,  would  be  to  sweep  away,  not  only  the  veto,  but  the  executive, 
the  Senate,  and  the  judiciary,  as  now  constituted ;  and  to  leave  nothing  stand 
ing  in  the  midst  of  the  ruins  but  the  House  of  Representatives,  where  only,  in 
the  whole  range  of  the  government,  numbers  exclusively  prevail.  But,  as  deso 
lating  as  would  be  its  sweep  in  passing  over  the  government,  it  would  be  far 
more  destructive  in  its  whirl  over  the  Constitution.  There  it  would  not  leave 
a  fragment  standing  amid  the  ruin  in  its  rear. 

In  approaching  this  topic,  let  me  premise  (what  all  will  readily  admit),  that 
if  the  voice  of  the  people  may  be  sought  for  anywhere  with  confidence,  it  may 
be  in  the  Constitution,  which  is  conceded  by  all  to  be  the  fundamental  and  para 
mount  law  of  the  land.  If,  then,  the  people  of  these  states  do  really  constitute 
a  nation,  as  the  senator  supposes  ;  if  the  nation  has  a  will  of  its  own,  and  if  the 
numerical  majority  of  the  whole  is  the  only  appropriate  and  true  organ  of  that 
will,  we  may  fairly  expect  to  find  that  will,  pronounced  through  the  absolute 
majority,  pervading  every  part  of  that  instrument,  and  stamping  its  authority  on 
the  whole.  Is  such  the  fact?  The  very  reverse.  Throughout  the  whole — 
from  first  to  last — from  beginning  to  end—  in  its  formation,  adoption,  and  amend 
ment,  there  is  not  the  slightest  evidence,  trace,  or  vestige  of  the  existence  of 
the  facts  on  which  the  senator's  theory  rests  ;  neither  of  the  nation,  nor  its  will, 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  479 

nor  of  the  numerical  majority  of  the  whole,  as  its  organ,  as  I  shall  next  proceed 
to  show. 

The  Convention  which  formed  it  was  called  by  a  portion  of  the  states  ;  its 
members  were  all  appointed  by  the  states ;  received  their  authority  from  their 
separate  states  ;  voted  by  states  in  forming  the  Constitution ;  agreed  to  it,  when 
formed,  by  states ;  transmitted  it  to  Congress  to  be  submitted  to  the  states  for 
their  ratification  ;  it  was  ratified  by  the  people  of  each  state  in  convention,  each 
ratifying  by  itself,  for  itself,  and  bound  exclusively  by  its  own  ratification  ;  and 
by  express  provision  it  was  not  to  go  into  operation  unless  nine  out  of  the 
twelve  states  should  ratify,  and  then  to  be  binding  only  between  the  states  rati 
fying.  It  was  thus  put  in  the  power  of  any  four  states,  large  or  small,  without 
regard  to  numbers,  to  defeat  its  adoption ;  which  might  have  been  done  by  a 
very  small  proportion  of  the  whole,  as  will  appear  by  reference  to  the  first  cen 
sus  That  census  was  taken  very  shortly  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
at  which  time  the  federal  population  of  the  then  twelve  states  was  3,462,279 ; 
of  which  the  four  smallest,  Delaware,  Rhode  Island,  Georgia,  and  New- 
Hampshire,  with  a  population  of  only  241,490  (something  more  than  the  four 
teenth  part  of  th<a  whole),  could  have  defeated  the  ratification.  Such  was  the 
total  disregard  of  peculation  in  the  adoption  and  formation  of  the  Constitution. 

It  may,  however,  bt,  said,  it  is  true,  that  the  Constitution  is  the  work  of  the 
states,  and  that  there  wan  no  nation  prior  to  its  adoption  ;  but  that  its  adoption 
fused  the  people  of  the  states  into  one,  so  as  to  make  a  nation  of  what  before 
constituted  separate  and  independent  sovereignties.  Such  an  assertion  would 
be  directly  in  the  teeth  of  the  Constitution,  which  says  that,  when  ratified,  "  it 
should  be  binding"  (not  over  the  states  ratifying,  for  that  would  imply  that  it 
was  imposed  by  some  higher  authority  ;  nor  between  the  individuals  composing 
the  states,  for  that  would  imply  that  they  were  all  merged  in  one ;  but)  "  be 
tween  the  states  ratifying  the  same ;"  and  thus,  by  the  strongest  implication, 
recognising  them  as  the  parties  to  the  instrument,  and  as  maintaining  their 
separate  and  independent  existence  H.S  states  after  its  adoption.  But  let  that 
pass.  I  need  it  not  to  rebut  the  senator's  theory — to  test  the  truth  of  the  asser 
tion,  that  the  Constitution  has  formed  a  nation  of  the  people  of  these  states.  I 
go  back  to  the  grounds  already  taken  :  tha\  if  such  be  the  fact — if  they  really 
form  a  nation  since  the  adoption  of  the  Consiitwion,  and  the  nation  has  a  will, 
and  the  numerical  majority  is  its  only  proper  organ,  in  that  case  the  mode  pre 
scribed  for  the  amendment  of  the  Constitution  would  furnish  abundant  and  con 
clusive  evidence  of  the  fact.  But  here  again,  as  in  its  formation  and  adoption, 
there  is  not  the  slightest  trace  or  evidence  that  such  is  the  fact ;  on  the  con 
trary,  most  conclusive  to  sustain  the  very  opposite  opinion. 

There  are  two  modes  in  which  amendments  to  the  Constitution  may  be  pro 
posed.  The  one,  such  as  that  now  proposed,  by  a  resolution  to  be  passed  by 
two  thirds  of  both  houses ;  and  the  other,  by  a  call  of  a  convention  by  Con 
gress,  to  propose  amendments,  on  the  application  of  two  thirds  of  the  states, 
neither  of  which  gives  the  least  countenance  to  the  theory  of  the  senator.  In 
both  cases,  the  mode  of  ratification,  which  is  the  material  point,  is  the  same, 
and  requires  the  concurring  assent  of  three  fourths  of  the  states,  regardless  of 
population,  to  ratify  an  amendment.  Let  us  now  pause  for  a  moment  to  trace 
the  effects  of  this  provision. 

There  are  now  twenty-six  states,  and  the  concurring  assent,  of  course,  Of 
twenty  states  is  sufficient  to  ratify  an  amendment.  It  then  results  that  twenty 
of  the  smaller  states,  of  which  Kentucky  would  be  the  largest,  are  sufficient  for 
that  purpose,  with  a  population,  in  federal  numbers,  of  only  7,652,097,  less  by 
several  hundred  thousand  than  the  numerical  majority  of  the  whole,  against  the 
united  voice  of  the  other  six,  with  a  population  of  8,216,279,  exceeding  the 
former  by  more  than  half  a  million.  And  yet  this  minority,  under  the  amend 
ing  power,  may  change,  alter,  modify,  or  destroy  every  part  of  the  Constitution, 


480  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

except  that  which  provides  for  an  equality  of  representation  of  the  states  in  the 
Senate  ;  while,  as  if  in  mockery  and  derision  of  the  senator's  theory,  nineteen 
of  the  larger  states,  with  a  population,  in  federal  numbers,  of  14,526,073,  can 
not,  even  if  united  to  a  man,  alter  a  letter  in  the  Constitution,  against  the  seven 
others,  with  a  population  of  only  1,382,303;  and  this,  too,  under  the  existing 
Constitution,  which  is  supposed  to  form  the  people  of  these  states  into  a  nation. 
Finally,  Delaware,  with  a  population  of  little  more  than  77,000,  can  put  her 
veto  on  all  the  other  states,  on  a  proposition  to  destroy  the  equality  of  the  states 
in  the  Senate.  Can  facts  more  clearly  illustrate  the  total  disregard  of  the  nu 
merical  majority,  as  well  in  the  process  of  amending,  as  in  that  of  forming  and 
adopting  the  Constitution  ? 

All  this  must  appear  anomalous,  strange,  and  unaccountable,  on  the  theory  of 
the  senator,  but  harmonious  and  easily  explained  on  the  opposite  ;  that  ours  is 
a  union,  not  of  individuals,  united  by  what  is  called  a  social  compact,  for  'flat 
would  make  it  a  nation  ;  nor  of  governments,  for  that  would  have  formed  *  mere 
confederacy,  like  the  one  superseded  by  the  present  Constitution  ;  bu*  a  union 
of  states,  founded  on  a  written,  positive  compact,  forming  a  Federal  Republic, 
with  the  same  equality  of  rights  among  the  states  composing"  tne  union  as 
among  the  citizens  composing  the  states  themselves.  Inst-ad  of  a  nation  we 
are,  in  reality,  an  assemblage  of  nations,  or  peoples  (if  t^e  plural  noun  may  be 
used  where  the  language  affords  none),  united  in  thei»  sovereign  character  im 
mediately  and  directly  by  their  own  act,  but  without  losing  their  separate  and 
independent  existence. 

It  results  from  all  that  has  been  stated,  that  either  the  theory  of  the  senator 
is  wrong,  or  that  our  political  system  is  throughout  a  profound  and  radical  error. 
If  the  latter  be  the  case,  then  that  complex  system  of  ours,  consisting  of  so  many 
parts,  but  blended,  as  was  supposed,  into  one  harmonious  and  sublime  whole, 
raising  its  front  on  high  and  challenging  the  admiration  of  the  world,  is  but  a 
misshapen  and  disproportionate  structure,  that  ought  to  be  demolished  to  the 
ground,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  apartment  allotted  to  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives.  Is  the  senator  prepared  t<?  commence  the  work  of  demolition  ? 
Does  he  believe  that  all  other  parts  of  'his  complex  structure  are  irregular  and 
deformed  appendages  ;  and  that  if  they  were  taken  down,  and  the  government 
erected  exclusively  on  the  will  o^the  numercial  majority,  it  would  effect  as  well, 
or  better,  the  great  objects  for  which  it  was  instituted  :  "  to  establish  justice  ; 
ensure  domestic  tranquillity ;  provide  for  the  common  defence ;  promote  the 
general  welfare  ;  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  pos 
terity  ?"  Will  the  .senator — will  any  one — can  any  one — venture  to  assert  that  ? 
And  if  not,  whv  not  ?  There  is  the  question,  on  the  proper  solution  of  which 
hangs  not  only  the  explanation  of  the  veto,  but  that  of  the  real  nature  and  char 
acter  of  our  complex,  but  beautiful  and  harmonious  system  of  government.  To 
give  a  full  and  systematic  solution,  it  would  be  necessary  to  descend  to  the  ele 
ments  of  political  science,  and  discuss  principles  little  suited  to  a  discussion  in 
a  deliberative  assembly.  I  waive  the  attempt,  and  shall  content  myself  with 
giving  a  much  more  matter-of-fact  solution. 

It  is  sufficient,  for  that  purpose,  to  point  to  the  actual  operation  of  the  gov 
ernment  through  all  the  stages  of  its  existence,  and  the  many  and  important 
measures  which  have  agitated  it  from  the  beginning ;  the  success  of  which  one 
portion  of  the  people  regarded  as  essential  to  their  prosperity  and  happiness, 
while  other  portions  have  viewed  them  as  destructive  of  both.  What  does  this 
imply  but  a  deep  conflict  of  interests,  real  or  supposed,  between  the  different 
portions  of  the  community,  on  subjects  of  the  first  magnitude — the  currency,  the 
finances,  including  taxation  and  disbursements  ;  the  Bank,  the  protective  tariff, 
distribution,  and  many  others  ;  on  all  of  which  the  most  opposite  and  conflict 
ing  views  have  prevailed  ?  And  what  would  be  the  effect  of  placing  the  pow 
ers  of  the  government  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  numercial  majority — 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  481 

of  8,000,000  over  7,900,000  ;  of  six  states  over  all  the  rest— but  to  give  the 
dominant  interest,  or  combination  of  interests,  an  unlimited  and  despotic  con 
trol  over  all  others  ?  What,  but  to  vest  it  with  the  power  to  administer  the  gov 
ernment  for  its  exclusive  benefit,  regardless  of  all  others,  and  indifferent  to  their 
oppression  and  wretchedness  ?  And  what,  in  a  country  of  such  vast  extent  and 
diversity  of  condition,  institutions,  industry,  and  productions,  would  that  be  but 
to  subject  the  rest  to  the  most  grinding  despotism  and  oppression  ?  But  what  is 
the  remedy  ?  It  would  be  but  to  increase  the  evil  to  transfer  the  power  to  a  mi 
nority,  to  abolish  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  place  the  control  exclusive 
ly  in  the  hands  of  the  Senate — in  that  of  the  four  millions  instead  of  the  eight. 
If  one  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  other,  it  is  better  that  the  few  should  be  to  the 
many,  than  the  many  to  the  few. 

What,  then,  is  to  be  done,  if  neither  the  majority  nor  the  minority,  the  greater 
nor  less  part,  can  be  safely  trusted  with  the  exclusive  control  ?  What  but  to 
vest  the  powers  of  the  government  in  the  whole — the  entire  people;  to  make 
it  in  truth  and  reality  the  government  of  the  people,  instead  of  the  government 
of  a  dominant  over  a  subject  part,  be  it  the  greater  or  less — of  the  whole  peo 
ple — self-government ;  and  if  this  should  prove  impossible  in  practice,  then  to 
make  the  nearest  approach  to  it,  by  requiring  the  concurrence,  in  the  action  of 
the  government,  of  the  greatest  possible  number  consistent  with  the  great  ends 
for  which  government  was  instituted — justice  and  security,  within  and  without. 
But  how  is  that  to  be  effected  ?  Not,  certainly,  by  considering  the  whole  com 
munity  as  one,  and  taking  its  sense  as  a  whole  by  a  single  process,  which,  in 
stead  of  giving  the  voice  of  all,  can  but  give  that  of  a  part.  There  is  but  one 
way  by  which  it  can  possibly  be  accomplished ;  and  that  is  by  a  judicious  and 
wise  division  and  organization  of  the  government  and  community,  with  refer 
ence  to  its  different  conflicting  interests,  and  by  taking  the  sense  of  each  part 
separately,  and  the  concurrence  of  all  as  the  voice  of  the  whole.  Each  may 
be  imperfect  of  itself;  but  if  the  construction  be  good,  and  all  the  keys  skilfully 
touched,  there  will  be  given  out,  in  one  blended  and  harmonious  whole,  the  true 
and  perfect  voice  of  the  people. 

But  on  what  principle  is  such  a  division  and  organization  to  be  made  to  effect 
this  great  object,  without  which  it  is  impossible  to  preserve  free  and  popular  in 
stitutions  ?  To  this  no  general  answer  can  be  given.  It  is  the  work  of  the 
wise  and  experienced,  having  full  and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  country  and 
the  people  in  every  particular  for  whom  the  government  is  intended.  It  must 
be  made  to  fit ;  and  when  it  does,  it  will  fit  no  other,  and  will  be  incapable  of 
being  imitated  or  borrowed.  Without,  then,  attempting  to  do  what  cannot  be 
done,  I  propose  to  point  out  how  that  which  I  have  stated  has  been  accomplish 
ed  in  our  system  of  government,  and  the  agency  the  veto  is  intended  to  have  in 
effecting  it. 

I  begin  with  the  House  of  Representatives.  There  each  state  has  a  repre 
sentation  according  to  its  federal  numbers,  and,  when  met,  a  majority  of  die 
whole  number  of  members  controls  its  proceedings  ;  thus  giving  to  the  numeri 
cal  majority  the  exclusive  control  throughout.  The  effect  is  to  place  its  pro 
ceedings  in  the  power  of  eight  millions  of  people  over  all  the  rest,  and  six  of 
the  largest  states,  if  united,  over  the  other  twenty  ;  and  the  consequence,  if  the 
house  was  the  exclusive  organ  of  the  voice  of  the  people,  would  be  the  domi- 
nation  of  the  stronger  over  the  weaker  interests  of  the  community,  and  the  es 
tablishment  of  an  intolerable  and  oppressive  despotism.  To  find  the  remedy 
against  what  would  be  so  great  an  evil,  we  must  turn  to  this  body.  Here  an 
entirely  different  process  is  adopted  to  take  the  sense  of  the  community.  Pop 
ulation  is  entirely  disregarded,  and  states,  without  reference  to  the  number  of 
people,  are  made  the  basis  of  representation  ;  the  effect  of  which  is  to  place  the 
control  here  in  a  majority  of  the  states,  which,  had  they  the  exclusive  power, 

PPP 


4S2  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

would  exercise  it  as  despotically  and  oppressively  as  would  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives. 

Regarded,  then,  separately,  neither  truly  represents  the  sense  of  the  commu 
nity,  and  each  is  imperfect  of  itself;  but,  when  united,  and  the  concurring  voice 
of  each  is  made  necessary  to  enact  laws,  the  one  corrects  the  defects  of  the  oth 
er  ;  and,  instead  of  the  less  popular  derogating  from  the  more  popular,  as  is  sup 
posed  by  the  senator,  the  two  together  give  a  more  full  and  perfect  utterance  to 
the  voice  of  the  people  than  either  could  separately.  Taken  separately,  six 
states  might  control  the  house,  and  a  little  upward  of  four  millions  might  con 
trol  the  Senate,  by  a  combination  of  the  fourteen  smaller  states ;  but,  by  requi 
ring  the  concurrent  votes  of  the  two,  the  six  largest  states  must  add  eight  others 
to  have  the  control  in  both  bodies.  Suppose,  for  illustration,  they  should  unite 
with  the  eight  smallest,  which  would  give  the  least  number  by  which  an  act 
could  pass  both,  houses  :  it  will  be  found,  by  adding  the  population,  in  federal 
numbers,  of  the  six  largest  to  the  eight  smallest  states,  that  the  least  number  by 
which  an  act  can  pass  both  houses,  if  the  members  should  be  true  to  those 
they  represent,  would  be  9,788,570  against  a  minority  of  6,119,797,  instead  of 
8,000,000  against  7,900,000,  if  the  assent  of  the  most  popular  branch  alone  were 
required. 

This  more  full  and  perfect  expression  of  the  voice  of  the  people  by  the  con 
currence  of  the  two,  compared  to  either  separately,  is  a  great  advance  towards 
a  full  and  perfect  expression  of  their  voice  ;  but  great  as  it  is,  it  falls  far  short, 
and  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  were,  accordingly,  not  satisfied  with  it.  To 
render  it  still  more  perfect,  their  next  step  was  to  require  the  assent  of  the  Pres 
ident  before  an  act  of  Congress  could  become  a  law  ;  and,  if  he  disapproved, 
to  require  two  thirds  of  both  houses  to  overrule  his  veto.  We  are  thus  brought 
to  the  point  immediately  under  discussion,  and  which,  on  that  account,  claims 
a  full  and  careful  examination. 

One  of  the  leading  motives  for  vesting  the  President  with  this  high  power 
was,  undoubtedly,  to  give  him  the  means  of  protecting  the  portion  of  the  powers 
allotted  to  him  by  the  Constitution  against  the  encroachment  of  Congress.  To 
make  a  division  of  power  effectual,  a  veto  in  one  form  or  another  is  indipensa- 
ble.  The  right  of  each  to  judge  for  itself  of  the  extent  of  the  power  allotted  to 
its  share,  and  to  protect  itself  in  its  exercise,  is  what  in  reality  is  meant  by  a 
division  of  power.  Without  it,  the  allotment  to  each  department  would  be  a 
mere  partition,  and  no  division  at  all.  Acting  under  this  impression,  the  fra 
mers  of  the  Constitution  have  carefully  provided  that  his  approval  shall  be  ne 
cessary,  not  only  to  the  acts  of  Congress,  but  to  every  resolution,  vote,  or  order 
requiring  the  consent  of  the  two  houses,  so  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  elude 
it  by  any  conceivable  device.  This  of  itself  was  an  adequate  motive  for  the 
provision  ;  and,  were  there  no  other,  ought  to  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  re 
jection  of  this  resolution.  Without  it,  the  division  of  power  between  the  legis 
lative  und  executive  departments  would  have  been  merely  nominal. 

But  it  is  not  the  only  motive.  There  is  another  and  deeper,  to  which  the  di 
vision  itself  of  the  government  into  departments  is  subordinate — to  enlarge  the 
'popular  basis,  by  increasing  the  number  of  voices  necessary  to  its  action.  As 
numerous  as  are  the  voices  required  to  obtain  the  assent  of  the  people  through 
the  Senate  and  the  house  to  an  act,  it  was  not  thought  by  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  sufficient  for  the  action  of  the  government  in  all  cases.  Nine  thou 
sand  eight  hundred,  as  large  as  is  the  number,  were  regarded  as  still  too  few, 
and  six  thousand  one  hundred  too  many,  to  remove  all  motives  for  oppression ; 
the  latter  being  not  too  few  to  be  plundered,  and  the  former  not  too  large  to  di 
vide  the  spoils  of  plunder  among.  Till  the  increase  of  numbers  on  one  side, 
and  the  decrease  on  the  other,  reaches  that  point,  there  is  no  security  for  the 
weaker  against  the  stronger,  especially  in  so  extensive  a  country  as  ours.  Act 
ing  in  the  spirit  of  these  remarks,  the  authors  of  the  Constitution,  although  they 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  483 

deemed  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  and  the  house  as  sufficient,  with  the  ap 
proval  of  the  President,  to  the  enactment  of  laws  in  ordinary  cases ;  yet,  when 
he  dissented,  they  deemed  it  a  sufficient  presumption  against  the  measure  to  re 
quire  a  still  greater  enlargement  of  the  popular  basis  for  its  enactment.  With 
this  view,  the  assent  of  two  thirds  of  both  houses  was  required  to  overrule  his 
veto — that  is,  eighteen  states  in  the  Senate,  and  a  constituency  of  ten  million 
six  hundred  thousand  in  the  other  house. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  nothing  is  gained  towards  enlarging  the  popular  basis 
of  the  government  by  the  veto  power,  because  the  number  necessary  to  elect  a 
majority  to  the  two  houses,  without  which  the  act  could,  not  pass,  would  be  suf 
ficient  to  elect  him.  That  is  true.  But  he  may  have  been  elected  by  a  differ 
ent  portion  of  the  people,  or,  if  not,  great  changes  may  take  place  during  his 
four  years,  both  in  the  Senate  and  the  house,  which  may  change  the  majority 
that  brought  him  into  power,  and  with  it  the  measures  and  policy  to  be  pursued. 
In  either  case,  he  might  find  it  necessary  to  interpose  his  veto,  to  maintain  his 
views  of  the  Constitution,  or  the  policy  of  the  party  of  which  he  is  at  the  head, 
and  which  elevated  him  to  power. 

But  a  still  stronger  consideration  for  vesting  him  with  the  power  may  be  found 
in  the  difference  of  the  manner  of  his  election,  compared  with  that  of  the  mem 
bers  of  either  house.  The  senators  are  elected  by  the  vote  of  the  legislatures 
of  the  respective  states  ;  and  the  members  of  the  house  by  the  people,  who,  in 
almost  all  the  states,  elect  by  districts.  In  neither  is  there  the  least  responsi 
bility  of  the  members  of  any  one  state  to  the  Legislature  or  people  of  any  other 
state.  They  are,  as  far  as  their  responsibility  may  be  concerned,  solely  and 
exclusively  under  the  influence  of  the  states  and  people  who  respectively  elect 
them.  Not  so  the  President.  The  votes  of  the  whole  are  counted  in  his  elec 
tion,  which  makes  him  more  or  less  responsible  to  every  part — to  thoss  who 
voted  against  him,  as  well  as  those  to  whom  he  owes  his  election ;  which  he 
must  feel  sensibly.  If  he  should  be  an  aspirant  for  a  re-election,  he  will  de 
sire  to  gain  the  favourable  opinion  of  states  that  opposed  him,  as  well  as  to  re 
tain  that  of  those  which  voted  for  him.  Even  if  he  should  not  be  a  candidate 
for  re-election,  the  desire  of  having  a  favourite  elected,  or  maintaining  the  as 
cendency  of  his  party,  may  have,  to  a  considerable  extent,  the  same  influence 
over  him.  The  effect,  in  either  case,  would  be  to  make  him  look  more  to  the 
interest  of  the  whole — to  soften  sectional  feelings  and  asperity — to  be  more  of  a 
patriot,  than  the  partisan  of  any  particular  interest ;  and,  through  the  influence 
of  these  causes,  to  give  a  more  general  character  to  the  politics  of  the  country, 
and  thereby  render  the  collision  between  sectional  interests  less  fierce  than  it 
would  be  if  legislation  depended  solely  on  the  members  of  the  two  houses,  who 
owe  no  responsibility  but  to  those  who  elected  therq.  The  same  influence  acts 
even  on  the  aspirants  for  the  presidency,  and  is  followed  to  a  very  considerable 
extent  by  the  same  softening  and  generalizing  effects.  In  the  case  of  the  Pres 
ident,  it  may  lead  to  the  interposing  of  his  veto  against  oppressive  and  danger 
ous  sectional  measures,  even  when  supported  by  those  to  whom  he  owes  his 
election.  But,  be  the  cause  of  interposing  his  veto  what  it  may,  its  effect,  in 
all  cases,  is  to  require  a  greater  body  of  constituency,  through  the  legislative 
organs,  to  put  the  government  in  action  against  it — to  require  another  key  to  be 
struck,  and  to  bring  out  a  more  full  and  perfect  response  from  the  voice  of  the 
people. 

There  is  still  another  impediment,  if  not  to  the  enactment  of  laws,  to  their 
execution,  to  be  found  in  the  judiciary  department.  I  refer  to  the  right  of  the 
courts,  in  all  cases  coming  before  them  in  law  or  equity,  where  an  act  of  Con 
gress  comes  in  question,  to  decide  on  its  unconstitutionality ;  which,  if  decided 
against  the  law  in  the  Supreme  Court,  is,  in  effect,  a  permanent  veto.  But  here 
a  difference  must  be  made  between  a  decision  against  the  constitutionality  of 


484  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

a  law  of  Congress  and  that  of  states.     The  former  acts  as  a  restriction  on  the 
powers  of  this  government,  but  the  latter  as  an  enlargement. 

Such  are  the  various  processes  of  taking  the  sense  of  the  people  through  the 
divisions  and  organization  of  the  different  departments  of  the  government ;  all 
of  which,  acting  through  their  appropriate  organs,  are  intended  to  widen  its  basis, 
and  render  it  more  popular,  instead  of  less,  by  increasing  the  number  necessary 
to  put  it  in  action,  and  having  for  their  object  to  prevent  one  portion  of  the  com 
munity  from  aggrandizing  or  enriching  itself  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  and  to 
restrict  the  whole  to  the  sphere  intended  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution. 
Has  it  effected  these  objects  ?  Has  it  prevented  oppression  and  usurpation  on 
the  part  of  the  government  ?  Has  it  accomplished  the  objects  for  which  the 
government  was  ordained,  as  enumerated  in  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution  ? 
Much,  very  much,  certainly,  has  been  done,  but  not  all.  Many  instances  might 
be  enumerated,  in  the  history  of  the  government,  of  the  violation  of  the  Consti 
tution — of  the  assumption  of  powers  not  delegated  to  it — of  the  perversion  of 
those  delegated  to  uses  never  intended — and  of  their  being  wielded  by  the 
dominant  interest,  for  the  time,  for  its  aggrandizement,  at  the  expense  of  the 
rest  of  the  community — instances  that  may  be  found  in  every  period  of  its  ex 
istence,  from  the  earliest  to  the  latest,  beginning  with  the  bank  and  bank  con 
nexion  at  its  outset,  and  ending  with  the  Distribution  Act,  at  its  late  extraordi 
nary  session.  How  is  this  to  be  accounted  for  ?  What  is  the  cause  ? 

The  explanation  and  cause  will  be  found  in  the  fact  that,  as  fully  as  the  sense 
of  the  people  is  taken  in  the  action  of  the  government,  it  is  not  taken  fully 
enough.  For,  after  all  that  has  been  accomplished  in  that  respect,  there  are 
but  two  organs  through  which  the  voice  of  the  community  acts  directly  on  the 
government,  and  which,  taken  separately,  or  in  combination,  constitute  the  ele 
ments  of  which  it  is  composed :  the  one  is  the  majority  of  the  states  regarded 
in  their  corporate  character  as  bodies  politic,  which,  in  its  simple  form,  consti 
tutes  the  Senate  ;  and  the  other  is  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  states,  of 
which,  in  its  simple  form,  the  House  of  Representatives  is  composed.  These, 
combined  in  the  proportions  already  stated,  constitute  the  executive  department ; 
and  that  department  and  the  Senate  appoint  the  judges  who  constitute  the  judi 
ciary.  But  it  is  only  in  their  simple  form  in  the  Senate  and  the  other  house 
that  they  have  a  steady  and  habitual  control  over  the  legislative  acts  of  the 
government.  The  veto  of  the  executive  is  rarely  interposed — not  more  than 
about  twenty  times  during  the  period  of  more  than  fifty  years  that  the  govern 
ment  has  existed.  Their  effects  have  been  beneficially  felt,  but  only  casualty, 
at  long  intervals,  and  without  steady  and  habitual  influence  over  the  action  of 
the  government.  The  same  remarks  are  substantially  applicable  to  what,  for 
the  sake  of  brevity,  may  be  Called  the  veto  of  the  judiciary  ;  the  right  of  nega 
tiving  a  law  for  the  want  of  constitutionality,  when  it  comes  in  question,  in  a 
case  before  the  courts. 

The  government,  then,  of  the  Union  being  under  no  other  habitual  and  steady 
control  but  these  two  majorities,  acting  through  this  and  the  other  house,  is,  in 
fact,  placed  substantially  under  the  control  of  the  portion  of  the  community 
which  the  united  majorities  of  the  two  houses  represent  for  the  time,  and  which 
may  consist  of  but  fourteen  states,  with  a  federal  population  of  less  than  ten 
millions  against  a  little  more  than  six,  as  has  been  already  explained.  But,  as 
large  as  is  the  former,  and  as  small  as  is  the  latter,  the  one  is  not  large  enough, 
in  proportion,  to  prevent  it  from  plundering,  under  the  forms  of  law,  and  the 
other  small  enough  from  being  plundered ;  and  hence  the  many  instances  ol 
violation  of  the  Constitution,  of  usurpation,  of  powers  perverted  and  wielded  for 
selfish  purposes,  which  the  history  of  the  government  affords.  They  furnish 
proof  conclusive  that  the  principle  of  plunder,  so  deeply  implanted  in  all  gov 
ernments,  has  not  been  eradicated  in  ours  by  all  the  precaution  taken  by  its 
framers  against  it. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  485 

But  in  estimating  the  number  of  the  constituency  necessary  to  control  the  ma 
jority  in  the  two  houses  of  Congress  at  something  less  than  ten  millions,  I  have 
estimated  it  altogether  too  high,  regarding  the  practical  operation  of  the  govern 
ment.  To  form  a  correct  conception  of  its  practical  operation  in  this  respect, 
another  element,  which  has  in  practice  an  important  influence,  must  be  taken 
into  the  estimate,  and  which  I  shall  next  proceed  to  explain. 

Of  the  two  majorities,  which,  acting  either  separately  or  in  combination,  con 
trol  the  government,  the  numerical  majority  is  by  far  the  most  influential.  It 
has  the  exclusive  control  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  preponderates 
more  than  five  to  one  in  the  choice  of  the  President,  assuming  that  the  ratio  of 
representation  will  be  fixed  at  sixty-eight  thousand  under  the  late  census.  It 
also  greatly  preponderates  in  appointment  of  the  judges,  the  right  of  nominating 
having  much  greater  influence  in  making  appointments  than  that  of  advising 
and  consenting.  From  these  facts,  it  must  be  apparent  that  the  leaning  of  the 
President  will  be  to  that  element  of  power  to  which  he  mainly  owes  his  eleva 
tion,  and  on  which  he  must  principally  rely  to  secure  his  re-election,  or  main 
tain  the  ascendency  of  the  party  and  its  policy,  the  head  of  which  he  usually  is. 
This  leaning  of  his  must  have  a  powerful  effect  on  the  inclination  and  tendency 
of  the  whole  government.  In  his  hands  are  placed,  substantially,  all  the  hon 
ours  and  emoluments  of  the  government ;  and  these,  when  greatly  increased,  as 
they  are,  and  ever  must  be  when  the  powers  of  the  government  are  greatly 
stretched  and  increased,  must  give  the  President  a  corresponding  influence  over 
not  only  the  members  of  both  houses,  but  also  public  opinion,  and,  through 
that,  a  still  more  powerful  indirect  influence  over  them ;  and  thus  they  may  be 
brought  to  sustain  or  oppose,  through  his  influence,  measures  which  otherwise 
they  would  have  opposed  or  sustained,  and  the  whole  government  be  made  to 
lean  in  the  same  direction  with  the  executive. 

From  these  causes,  the  government,  in  all  of  its  departments,  gravitates  steadi 
ly  towards  the  numerical  majority,  and  has  been  moving  slowly  towards  it  from 
the  beginning ;  sometimes,  indeed,  retarded,  or  even  stopped  or  thrown  back, 
but,  taking  any  considerable  period  of  time,  always  advancing  towards  it.  That 
it  begins  to  make  near  approach  to  that  fatal  point,  ample  proof  may  be  found 
in  the  oft-repeated  declaration  of  the  mover  of  this  resolution,  and  of  many  of 
his  supporters  at  the  extraordinary  session — that  the  late  pesidential  election 
decided  all  the  great  measures  which  he  so  ardently  pressed  through  the  Sen 
ate.  Yes,  even  here,  in  this  chamber,  in  the  Senate,  which  is  composed  of  the 
opposing  element,  and  on  which  the  only  effectual  resistance  to  this  fatal  ten 
dency  exists  that  is  to  be  found  in  the  government,  we  are  told  that  the  popular 
will,  as  expressed  in  the  presidential  election,  is  to  decide  not  only  the  elec 
tion,  but  every  measure  which  may  be  agitated  in  the  canvass  in  order  to  influ 
ence  the  result.  When  what  was  thus  boldly  insisted  on  comes  to  be  an  es 
tablished  principle  of  action,  the  end  will  be  near. 

As  the  government  approaches  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  one  absolute  and  single 
power,  the  will  of  the  greater  number,  its  action  will  become  more  and  more 
disturbed  and  irregular ;  faction,  corruption,  and  anarchy  will  more  and  more 
abound ;  patriotism  will  daily  decay,  and  affection  and  reverence  for  the  gov 
ernment  grow  weaker  and  weaker,  until  the  final  shock  occurs,  when  the  system 
will  rush  to  ruin,  and  the  sword  take  the  place  of  law  and  Constitution. 

Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  I  object  not  to  that  structure  of  the  govern 
ment  which  makes  the  numerical  majority  the  predominant  element :  it  is,  per 
haps,  necessary  that  it  should  be  so  in  all  popular  constitutional  governments 
like  ours,  which  excludes  classes.  It  is  necessarily  the  exponent  of  the  strong 
est  interest,  or  combination  of  interests,  in  the  community  ;  and  it  would  seem 
to  be  necessary  to  give  it  the  preponderance,  in  order  to  infuse  into  the  govern 
ment  the  necessary  energy  to  accomplish  the  ends  for  which  it  was  instituted. 
The  great  question  is,  How  is  due  preponderance  to  be  given  to  it,  without  sub- 


486  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

jecting  the  whole,  in  time,  to  its  unlimited  sway  ?  Which  brings  up  the  ques 
tion,  Is  there  anywhere  in  our  complex  system  of  government,  a  guard,  check, 
or  contrivance,  sufficiently  strong  to  arrest  so  fearful  a  tendency  of  the  govern 
ment  ?  Or,  to  express  it  in  more  direct  and  intelligible  language,  Is  there  any 
where  in  the  system  a  more  full  and  perfect  expression  of  the  voice  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  states  calculated  to  counteract  this  tendency  to  the  concentration  of 
all  the  powers  of  the  government  in  the  will  of  the  numerical  majority,  resulting 
from  the  partial  and  imperfect  expression  of  their  voice  through  its  organs  ? 

Yes,  fortunately,  doubly  fortunately,  there  is  ;  not  only  a  more  full  and  per 
fect,  but  a  full  and  perfect  expression  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution,  acknowl 
edged  by  all  to  be  the  fundamental  and  supreme  law  of  the  land.  It  is  full 
arid  perfect,  because  it  is  the  expression  of  the  voice  of  each  state,  adopted  by 
the  separate  assent  of  each,  by  itself,  and  for  itself;  and  is  the  voice  of  all,  by 
being  that  of  each  component  part,  united  and  blended  into  one  harmonious 
whole.  But  it  is  not  only  full  and  perfect,  but  as  just  as  it  is  full  and  perfect ; 
for,  combining  the  sense  of  each,  and  therefore  all,  there  is  nothing  left  on 
which  injustice,  or  oppression,  or  usurpation  can  operate.  And,  finally,  it  is  as 
supreme  as  it  is  just ;  because,  comprehending  the  will  of  all,  by  uniting  that 
of  each  of  the  parts,  there  is  nothing  within  or  above  to  control  it.  It  is,  in 
deed,  the  vox  populi  iwx  Dei — the  creating  voice  that  called  the  system  into 
existence,  and  of  which  the  government  itself  is  but  a  creature,  clothed  with 
delegated  powers  to  execute  its  high  behests. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  a  question  of  the  deepest  import,  and  on  which  the 
fate  of  the  system  depends.  How  can  this  full,  perfect,  just,  and  supreme 
voice  of  the  people,  imbodied  in  the  Constitution,  be  brought  to  bear  habitually 
and  steadily  in  counteracting  the  fatal  tendency  of  the  government  to  the  abso 
lute  and  despotic  control  of  the  numerical  majority  ?  Or — if  I  may  be  permit 
ted  to  use  so  bold  an  expression — How  is  this,  the  deity  of  our  political  system, 
to  be  successfully  invoked,  to  interpose  its  all-powerful  creating  voice  to  save 
from  perdition  the  creature  of  its  will  and  the  work  of  its  hand  ?  If  it  cannot 
be  done,  ours,  like  all  free  governments  preceding  it,  must  go  the  way  of  all 
flesh  ;  but  if  it  can  be,  its  duration  may  be  from  generation  to  generation,  to  the 
latest  posterity.  To  this  all-important  question  I  will  not  attempt  a  reply  at  this 
time.  It  would  lead  me  far  beyond  the  limits  properly  belonging  to  this  discus 
sion.  I  descend  from  the  digression  nearer  to  the  subject  immediately  at  is 
sue,  in  order  to  reply  to  an  objection  to  the  veto  power  taken  by  the  senator 
from  Virginia  on  this  side  the  chamber  (Mr.  Archer). 

He  rests  his  support  of  this  resolution  on  the  ground  that  the  object  intended 
to  be  effected  by  the  veto  has  failed  ;  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  regarded 
the  legislative  department  of  the  government  as  the  one  most  to  be  dreaded  ;  and 
that  their  motive  for  vesting  the  executive  with  the  veto  was  to  check  its  en 
croachments  on  the  other  departments;  but  that  the  executive,  and  not  the 
Legislature,  had  proved  to  be  the  most  dangerous  ;  and  that  the  veto  had  become 
either  useless  or  mischievous,  by  being  converted  into  a  sword  to  attack,  instead 
of  a  shield  to  defend,  as  was  originally  intended. 

I  make  no  issue  with  the  senator  as  to  the  correctness  of  his  statement.  I 
assume  the  facts  to  be  as  he  supposes ;  not  because  I  agree  with  him,  but  sim 
ply  with  the  view  of  making  my  reply  more  brief. 

Assuming,  then,  that  the  executive  department  has  proved  to  be  the  more 
formidable,  and  that  it  requires  to  be  checked  rather  than  to  have  the  power  of 
checking  others,  the  first  inquiry,  on  that  assumption,  should  be  into  the  cause 
of  its  increase  of  power,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  seat  and  the  nature  of  the  dan 
ger  ;  and  the  next,  whether  the  measure  proposed — that  of  divesting  it  of  the 
veto,  or  modifying  it  as  proposed — would  guard  against  the  danger  apprehended. 

1  begin  with  the  first ;  and  in  entering  on  it,  assert  with  confidence,  that  if 
the  executive  has  become  formidable  to  the  liberty  or  safety  of  the  country,  or 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  487 

other  departments  of  the  government,  the  cause  is  not  in  the  Constitution,  but 
in  the  acts  and  omissions  of  Congress  itself.  . 

According  to  my  conception,  the  powers  vested  in  the  President  by  the  Con 
stitution  are  few  and  effectually  guarded,  and  are  not  of  themselves  at  all  formi 
dable.  In  order  to  have  a  just  conception  of  the  extent  of  his  powers,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  there  are  but  two  classes  of  power  known  to  the  Consti 
tution  ;  and  they  are  powers  that  are  expressly  granted,  and  those  that  are  ne 
cessary  to  carry  the  granted  powers  into  execution.  Now,  by  a  positive  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution,  all  powers  necessary  to  the  execution  of  the  granted 
powers  are  expressly  delegated  to  Congress,  be  they  powers  granted  to  the 
legislative,  executive,  or  judicial  department ;  and  can  only  be  exercised  by  the 
authority  of  Congress,  and^in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law.  This  provision 
will  be  found  in  what  is  called  the  residuary  clause,  which  declares  that  Con 
gress  shall  have  power  "  to  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper 
to  carry  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers"  (those  granted  to  Congress), 
"  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  officer  thereof."  A  more  comprehensive 
provision  cannot  be  imagined.  It  carries  with  it  all  powers  necessary  and 
proper  to  the  execution  of  the  granted  powers,  be  they  lodged  where  they  may, 
and  vests  the  whole,  in  terms  not  less  explicit,  in  Congress ;  and  here  let  me 
add,  in  passing,  that  the  provision  is  as  wise  as  it  is  comprehensive.  It  depos- 
ites  the  right  of  deciding  what  powers  are  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the 
granted  powers  where,  and  where  only,  it  can  be  lodged  with  safety — in  the 
hands  of  the  law-making  power ;  and  forbids  any  department  or  officer  of  the 
government  from  exercising  any  power  not  expressly  authorized  by  the  Con 
stitution  or  the  laws,  thus  making  ours  emphatically  a  government  of  law  and 
Constitution. 

Having  now  shown  that  the  President  is  restricted  by  the  Constitution  to 
powers  expressly  granted  to  him,  and  that  if  any  of  his  granted  powers  be  such 
that  they  require  other  powers  to  execute  them,  he  cannot  exercise  them  with 
out  the  authority  of  Congress,  I  shall  now  show  that  there  is  not  one  power 
vested  in  him  that  is  any  way  dangerous,  unless  made  so  by  the  acts  or  per 
mission  of  Congress.  I  shall  take  them  in  the  order  they  stand  in  the  Consti 
tution. 

He  is,  in  the  first  place,  made  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  militia  when  called  into  actual  service.  Large  and 
expensive  military  and  naval  establishments,  and  numerous  corps  of  militia, 
called  into  service,  would,  no  doubt,  increase  very  dangerously  the  power  and 
patronage  of  the  President ;  but  neither  can  take  place  but  by  the  action  of 
Congress.  Not  a  soldier  can  be  enlisted,  a  ship  of  war  built,  nor  a  militiaman 
called  into  service,  without  its  authority ;  ar.d,  very  fortunately,  our  situation  is 
such  that  there  is  no  necessity,  and  probably  will  be  none,  why  his  power  and 
patronage  should  be  dangerously  increased  by  either  of  those  means. 

He  is  next  vested  with  the  power  to  make  treaties  and  to  appoint  officers, 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  ;  and  here,  again,  his  power  can  only 
be  made  dangerous  by  the  action  of  one  or  both  houses  of  Congress.  In  the 
formation  of  treaties,  two  thirds  of  the  Senate  must  concur ;  and  it  is  difficult 
to  conceive  of  a  treaty  that  could  materially  enlarge  his  powers,  that  would  not 
require  an  act  of  Congress  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  appointing  power  may, 
indeed,  dangerously  increase  his  patronage,  if  officers  be  uselessly  multiplied 
and  too  highly  paid  ;  but  if  such  should  be  the  case,  the  fault  would  be  in  Con 
gress,  by  whose  authority  exclusively  they  can  be  created  or  their  compensa 
tion  regulated. 

But  much  is  said  in  this  connexion  of  the  power  of  removal,  justly  accompa 
nied  by  severe  condemnation  of  the  many  and  abusive  instances  of  the  use  of 
the  power,  and  the  dangerous  influence  it  gives  the  President ;  in  all  of  which 


468  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN. 

I  fully  concur.  It  is,  indeed,  a  corrupting  and  dangerous  power,  when  officers 
are  greatly  multiplied  and  highly  paid,  and  when  it  is  perverted  from  its  legiti 
mate  object  to  the  advancement  of  personal  or  party  purposes.  But  1  find  no 
such  power  in  the  list  of  powers  granted  to  the  executive,  which  is  proof  con 
clusive  that  it  belongs  to  the  class  necessary  and  proper  to  execute  some  other 
power,  if  it  exists  at  all,  which  none  can  doubt ;  and,  for  reasons  already  as 
signed,  cannot  be  exercised  without  authority  of  law.  If,  then,  it  has  been 
abused,  it  must  be  because  Congress  has  not  done  its  duty  in  permitting  it  to 
be  exercised  by  the  President  without  the  sanction  of  law  authorizing  its  exer 
cise,  and  guarding  against  the  abuses  to  which  it  is  so  liable. 

The  residue  of  the  list  are  rather  duties  than  rights — that  of  recommending 
to  Congress  such  measures  as  he  may  deem  expedient ;  of  convening  both 
houses  on  extraordinary  occasions  ;  of  adjourning  them  when  they  cannot  agree 
on  the  time  ;  of  receiving  ambassadors  and  other  ministers  ;  of  taking  care  that 
the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  and  commissioning  the  officers  of  the  United 
States.  Of  all  these,  there  is  but  one  which  claims  particular  notice,  in  connex 
ion  with  the  point  immediately  under  consideration ;  and  that  is,  his  power  as 
the  administrator  of  the  laws.  But  whatever  power  he  may  have  in  that  capa 
city  depends  on  the  action  of  Congress.  If  Congress  should  limit  its  legisla 
tion  to  the  few  great  subjects  confided  to  it ;  so  frame  its  laws  as  to  leave  as 
little  as  possible  to  discretion,  and  take  care  to  see  that  they  are  duly  and  faith 
fully  executed,  the  administrative  powers  of  the  President  would  be  proportion 
ally  limited,  and  divested  of  all  danger.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  should  ex 
tend  its  legislation  in  every  direction  ;  draw  within  its  action  subjects  never 
contemplated  by  the  Constitution ;  multiply  its  acts,  create  numerous  offices, 
and  increase  the  revenue  and  expenditures  proportionally,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  frame  its  laws  vaguely  and  loosely,  and  withdraw,  in  a  great  measure,  its 
supervising  care  over  their  execution,  his  power  would  indeed  become  truly 
formidable  and  alarming.  Now  I  appeal  to  the  senator  and  his  friend,  the  au 
thor  of  this  resolution,  whether  the  growth  of  executive  power  has  not  been  the 
result  of  such  a  course  on  the  part  of  Congress.  I  ask  them  whether  his  pow 
er  has  not,  in  fact,  increased  or  decreased  just  in  proportion  to  the  increase 
and  decrease  of  the  system  of  legislation,  such  as  has  been  described  ?  What 
was  the  period  of  its  maximum  increase,  but  the  very  period  which  they  have 
so  frequently  and  loudly  denounced  as  the  one  most  distinguished  for  the  prev 
alence  of  executive  power  and  usurpation  ?  Much  of  that  power  certainly  de 
pended  on  the  remarkable  man  then  at  the  head  of  that  department ;  but  much 
— far  more — on  the  system  of  legislation  which  the  author  of  this  resolution 
had  built  up  with  so  much  zeal  and  labour,  and  which  carried  the  powers  of 
the  government  to  a  point  beyond  that  to  which  it  had  ever  before  attained, 
drawing  many  and  important  powers  into  its  vortex,  of  which  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  never  dreamed.  And  here  let  me  say  to  both  of  the  senators,  and 
the  party  of  which  they  are  prominent  members,  that  they  labour  in  vain  to 
bring  down  executive  power,  while  they  support  the  system  they  so  zealously 
advocate.  The  power  they  complain  of  is  but  its  necessary  fruit.  Be  assured 
that,  as  certain  as  Congress  transcends  its  assigned  limits,  and  usurps  powers 
never  conferred,  or  stretches  those  conferred  beyond  the  proper  limits,  so  sure 
ly  will  the  fruits  of  its  usurpation  pass  into  the  hands  of  the  executive.  In 
seeking  to  become  master,  it  but  makes  a  master  in  the  person  of  the  President. 
It  is  only  by  confining  itself  to  its  allotted  sphere,  and  a  discreet  use  of  its  ac 
knowledged  powers,  that  it  can  retain  that  ascendency  in  the  government  which 
the  Constitution  intended  to  confer  on  it. 

Having  now  pointed  out  the  cause  of  the  great  increase  of  the  executive 
power  on  which  the  senator  rested  his  objection  to  the  veto  power,  and  having 
satisfactorily  shown,  as  I  trust  I  have,  that,  if  it  has  proved  dangerous  in  fact, 
the  fault  is  not  in  the  Constitution,  but  in  Congress,  I  would  next  ask  him,  In 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  489 

what  possible  way  could  the  divesting  the  President  of  his  veto,  or  modifying 
it  as  he  proposes,  limit  his  power  ?  Is  it  not  clear  that,  so  far  from  the  veto 
being  the  cause  of  the  increase  of  his  power,  it  would  have  acted  as  a  limita 
tion  on  it  if  it  had  been  more  freely  and  frequently  used  ?  If  the  President  had 
vetoed  the  original  Bank — the  connexion  with  the  banking  system — the  tariffs 
of  1824  and  1828,  and  the  numerous  acts  appropriating  money  for  roads, 
canals,  harbours,  and  a  long  list  of  other  measures  not  less  unconstitutional, 
would  his  power  have  been  half  as  great  as  it  now  is  ?  He  has  grown  great 
and  powerful,  not  because  he  used  his  veto,  but  because  he  abstained  from  using 
it.  In  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  case  in  which  its  application  can  tend  to 
enlarge  his  power,  except  it  be  the  case  of  an  act  intended  to  repeal  a  law 
calculated  to  increase  his  power,  or  to  restore  the  authority  of  one  which,  by  an 
arbitrary  construction  of  his  power,  he  has  set  aside. 

Now  let  me  add,  in  conclusion,  that  this  is  a  question,  in  its  bearings,  of  vital 
importance  to  that  wonderful  and  sublime  system  of  government  which  our 
patriotic  ancestors  established,  not  so  much  by  their  wisdom,  wise  and  experi 
enced  as  they  were,  as  by  the  guidance  of  a  kind  Providence,  who,  in  his  di 
vine  dispensations,  so  disposed  events  as  to  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  system 
of  government  wiser  than  those  who  framed  it.  The  veto  of  itself,  as  important 
as  it  is,  sinks  into  nothing  compared  to  the  principle  involved.  It  is  but  one,  and 
that  by  no  means  the  most  considerable,  of  those  many  devices  which  I  have  at 
tempted  to  explain,  and  which  were  intended  to  strengthen  the  popular  basis 
of  our  government,  and  resist  its  tendency  to  fall  under  the  control  of  the  domi 
nant  interest,  acting  through  the  mere  numerical  majority.  The  introduction  of 
this  resolution  may  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  many  symptoms  of  that  fatal  ten 
dency,  and  of  which  we  had  such  fearful  indications  in  the  bold  attempt  at  the 
late  extraordinary  session,  of  forcing  through  a  whole  system  of  measures  of  the 
most  threatening  and  alarming  character,  in  the  space  of  a  few  weeks,  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  all  decided  in  the  election  of  the  late  President ;  thus 
attempting  to  substitute  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  people,  in  the  choice  of  a 
chief  magistrate,  as  the  legislative  authority  of  the  Union,  in  lieu  of  the  beauti 
ful  and  profound  system  established  by  the  Constitution. 


XXXIV. 


AND  EXPENDITURES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT,  MARCH  16,  1842. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said  :  These  resolutions  are  of  a  very  mixed  and  contradictory 
character.  They  contain  much  that  I  approve,  and  much  that  I  condemn.  I 
approve  of  them,  in  the  first  place,  because  they  recognise  the  Compromise  Act, 
and  profess  to  respect  its  provisions.  I  still  more  heartily  approve  of  them  be- 
$ause  they  assert  that  no  duty  ought  to  be  laid  but  for  revenue,  and  no  revenue 
raised  but  what  may  be  necessary  for  the  economical  administration  of  the  gov 
ernment,  and,  by  consequence,  abandon  the  protective  policy.  I  very  decided 
ly  approve  of  the  prefe-rence  which  they  give  to  the  ad  valorem  over  specific 
duties,  and  the  effective  argument  of  the  senator  (Mr.  Clay)  in  support  of  that 
preference.  And,  finally,  I  approve  of  the  principle  that  the  government  ought 
not  to  rely  on  loans  or  treasury-notes  as  a  part  of  their  ways  and  means  in  time 
of  peace,  except  to  meet  a  temporary  deficit. 

Having  approved  of  so  much,  it  may  be  asked,  For  what  do  I  condemn  them  ? 
1  do  it  for  this  :  that  they  do  not  propose  to  carry  out  in  practice  what  they  pro 
fess  in  principle  ;  that,  while  they  profess  to  respect  the  Compromise  Act,  they 
violate  it  in  every  essential  particular  but  one^the  ad  valorem  principle;  and 

QQQ 


490  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

even  that,  I  fear,  it  is  intended  to  set  aside  by  the  juggle  of  home  valuation.  If 
there  be  any  part  of  that  act  more  sacred  than  another,  it  is  that  which  provides 
that  there  shall  be  no  duty  imposed  after  the  30th  of  June  next  except  for  rev 
enue,  and  no  revenue  raised  but  what  may  be  necessary  to  the  economical  ad 
ministration  of  the  government.  It  was  for  that  the  act  was  passed,  and  with 
out  which  it  would  not  have  existed.  If  that  was  not  apparent  on  the  face  of 
the  act  itself,  the  causes  which  led  to  its  adoption  would  clearly  prove  it.  It 
is  sufficient,  in  this  connexion,  to  remind  the  Senate  that  the  object  of  the  act 
was  to  terminate  the  controversy  between  the  State  of  South  Carolina  and  this 
government,  growing  out  of  the  tariff  of  1828.  The  object  of  the  state,  as  far 
as  it  was  individually  concerned,  was  twofold — to  put  down  the  protective  pol 
icy,  and  to  protect  herself  against  high  duties,  even  for  revenue,  when  it  could 
be  avoided  by  due  regard  to  economy.  To  secure  the  former,  the  provision 
was  inserted  that  no  duty  should  be  laid  but  for  revenue  ;  and  the  latter,  that  no 
revenue  should  be  raised  but  what  was  necessary  for  the  economical  adminis 
tration  of  the  government.  Without  these  provisions,  I,  as  her  representative 
on  this  floor,  would  never  have  given  my  assent  to  the  act ;  and,  if  I  had,  the 
state  would  never  have  acquiesced  in  it.  I  speak  with  perfect  confidence,  for 
even  with  these  important  provisions,  she  reluctantly  assented  to  the  compromise. 

Besides  these,  there  was  another  object,  in  which  the  whole  Union  was  deep 
ly  concerned,  which  influenced  her  in  the  step  she  then  took ;  and  that  was  to 
guard  against  the  dangerous  consequences  of  an  accumulation  of  a  large  surplus 
revenue  in  the  treasury  after  the  payment  of  the  public  debt.  While  defending  her 
self,  and  the  portion  of  the  Union  in  which  her  lot  is  cast,  against  an  unconstitu 
tional  and  oppressive  measure,  she  was  not  unmindful  of  her  Federal  duties  and 
obligations,  nor  did  she  permit  her  fidelity  to  the  Union  and  the  government  to  be 
impaired  in  her  resistance  to  oppression.  She  had  the  sagacity  to  see,  long  in 
advance,  the  corrupting  and  dangerous  consequences  of  a  large  and  permanent 
surplus,  of  which  experience  has  since  given  such  calamitous  evidence  ;  and  has 
the  merit  of  taking  the  most  intrepid  stand  against  it,  while  others  were  unheed 
ing,  or  indifferent  to  consequences.  To  guard  against  this  danger,  every  article 
imported  that  did  not  come  in  conflict  with  the  protective  policy  was  made,  by  the 
Compromise  Act,  duty  free  to  the  30th  of  June  next,  which,  in  the  aggregate, 
equalled  in  value  those  on  which  the  duties  were  retained ;  that  is,  one  half 
the  duties  were  forthwith  repealed  ;  but  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  abuse,  and 
to  guard  in  the  most  effectual  manner  the  two  leading  provisions  of  the  act,  it 
was  expressly  provided  that,  after  that  time,  all  articles  of  imports,  except  a 
small  list  contained  in  the  5th  section,  should  be  subject  to  duty,  and  that  no 
duty  should  thereafter  exceed  20  per  cent,  ad  valorem.  The  intention  of  the 
former  provision  was  to  prevent  the  enlargement  of  the  free  list,  and  thereby 
raising  the  duties  proportionally  higher  on  the  dutied  articles  ;  and  of  the  latter, 
that,  under  no  pretext  whatever,  for  protection  or  revenue,  should  duties  be  rais 
ed  above  20  per  cent.,  which  was  regarded  as  the  extreme  limits  to  which  they 
ought  ever  to  be  carried  for  revenue.  These  were  the  guards  on  which  I  re 
lied  to  prevent  a  return  to  the  protective  policy,  or  the  raising  of  the  revenue 
beyond  what  the  necessary  and  economical  wants  of  the  government  might  re 
quire  ;  and  which,  if  they  should  be  respected,  will  prove  all-sufficient  for  the 
purpose  intended. 

Having  secured  these  essential  points,  as  far  as  the  state  and  the  Union  at 
large  were  concerned,  the  next  object  was  so  to  reduce  the  duties  on  the  pro 
tected  articles  as  to  prevent  any  shock  to  the  manufacturing  interests.  The 
'state  waged  no  war  against  them.  Her  opposition  was  to  the  unconstitutional 
and  oppressive  means  by  which  it  was  sought  to  promote  them  at  the  expense 
of  the  other  great  interests  of  the  community.  She  wished  the  manufacturers 
well ;  and,  in  proposing  to  bring  down  the  duties  gradually,  through  a  slow  pro 
cess  of  many  years,  to  the  revenue  point,  I  but  faithfully  represented  her  feel- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  491 

ings.  My  first  proposition  was  to  allow  seven  years,  and  to  take  one  seventh 
annually  off;  but,  finally,  I  acquiesced  in  extending  the  time  two  years  more, 
and  to  reduce  the  duties  as  provided  for  by  the  act.  So  far  from  being  an  op 
ponent  to  manufacturing  industry,  there  is  not  one  within  the  reach  of  my  voice 
who  puts  a  higher  estimate  on  those  arts,  mechanical  and  chemical,  by  which 
matter  is  subjected  to  the  dominion  of  mind.  I  regard  them  as  the  very  basis 
of  civilization,  and  the  principal  means  designed  by  Providence  for  the  future 
progress  and  improvement  of  our  race.  They  will  be  found  in  progress  to  re 
act  on  the  moral  and  political  world,  and  thereby  producing  greater  and  more 
salutary  changes  in  both  than  all  other  causes  combined. 

Such  are  the  leading  objects  of  the  Compromise  Act.  It  is  admitted,  on  all 
hands,  that  the  provisions  in  favour  of  the  manufacturing  interests  have  been 
faithfully  observed  on  our  part.  We  have  patiently  waited  the  nine  years  of 
slow  reduction,  and  resisted  every  attempt  to  make  changes  against  the  manu 
facturing  interest,  even  when  they  would  have  operated  in  our  favour,  and  for 
which  we  have  received  the  thanks  of  those  who  represented  it  on  this  floor. 
And  now,  when  the  time  has  arrived  when  it  is  our  turn  to  enjoy  its  benefits, 
they  who  called  on  us  to  adhere  to  the  act  when  the  interest  of  the  manufac 
turers  was  at  stake,  and  commended  us  for  our  fidelity  to  the  compromise,  turn 
round,  when  it  suits  their  interest,  and  coolly  and  openly  violate  every  provis 
ion  in  our  favour,  with  the  single  exception  already  noticed,  as  I  shall  next  pro 
ceed  to  show. 

For  that  purpose  it  will  be  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  extraordinary  session, 
for  then  the  violation  commenced.  Going,  then,  back,  and  passing  over  minor 
points,  I  charge  upon  the  senator  and  his  friends,  in  the  first  place,  a  palpable 
infraction  of  the  compromise,  in  raising  the  duties  without  making  the  least  ef 
fort  to  reduce  the  expenditures  of  the  government  to  what  was  necessary  to  its 
economical  administration.  The  act  is  positive,  that  no  more^re venue  should 
be  raised  than  what  such  administration  might  require :  a  provreion  just  as  es 
sential  as  that  which  requires  that  no  duty  should  be  imposed  but  for  revenue. 
Acting,  then,  in  the  spirit  of  the  act,  the  first  step  towards  a  revision  of  the  du 
ties  should  have  been  to  ascertain  what  amount  of  revenue  would  be  required 
for  the  economical  administration  of  the  government.  Was  that  done  ?  No 
thing  like  it ;  but  the  very  reverse.  Not  an  effort  was  made  to  ascertain  what 
the  wants  of  the  treasury  required — not  one  to  reduce  the  expenditures,  although 
the  senator  and  his  party  had  come  in  on  a  solemn  pledge  to  make  a  great  re 
duction.  Instead  of  that,  every  effort  was  made  to  increase  the  expenditures 
and  add  to  the  loans,  forgetful  alike  of  the  compromise  and  pledges  to  the  peo 
ple,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  reduce  the  revenue  by  giving  away  the  income  from 
the  lands,  with  the  intention  of  increasing  the  duties  on  the  imports. 

The  next  charge  I  make  is,  a  great  enlargement  of  the  list  of  free  articles  by 
the  act  increasing  the  duties,  passed  at  the  same  session,  in  direct  violation  of 
the  fifth  section  of  the  Compromise  Act.  Foreseeing  that  the  protective  system 
might  again  be  renewed,  and  high  duties  imposed,  simply  by  extending  the  list 
of  free  articles,  and  throwing  the  whole  burden  of  supporting  the  government 
on  the  articles  selected  for  protection,  that  section  enumerates  a  short  list  of 
articles  which  should  be  duty  free  after  the  30th  of  June  next,  and  provided  that 
all  which  were  not  enumerated  should  be  subject  to  duties  after  that  period,  in 
order  to  guard  against  such  abuses.  In  the  face  of  this  provision,  the  act  al 
luded  to  increased  the  list  of  free  articles  manifold,  taking  the  amount  stated  by 
the  senator,  as  contained  in  that  list,  to  be  correct. 

Such  were  the  infractions  of  the  act  during  that  session ;  and  it  is  now  pro 
posed  by  these  resolutions  to  give  the  finishing  blow  by  raising  the  duties,  on 
an  average,  to  30  per  centum  on  all  articles  not  made  free,  in  express  violation 
of  the  main  provision  in  the  compromise,  that  no  duty  should  be  laid  above  20 
per  cent,  after  the  30th  of  June  next.  The  senator  admits  this  to  be  an  infrac- 


492  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

tion,  but  pleads  necessity.  Now,  sir,  I  admit,  if  there  be  indeed  a  necessity — 
if,  after  reducing  the  expenditures  of  the  government  to  its  just  and  economical 
warits,  and  the  list  of  free  articles  to  that  provided  for  in  the  act,  and  returning 
the  revenue  from  the  lands  to  the  treasury,  there  should  be  a  deficit  which  could 
not  be  met  without  going  beyond  the  20  per  cent.,  a  case  would  be  made  that 
might  justify  it.  But  I  utterly  deny,  in  the  first  place,  that,  if  all  had  been  done 
that  ought  to  have  been,  there  would  be  any  such  necessity ;  and,  in  the  next, 
the  right  to  plead  a  necessity  of  his  own  creating.  I  go  farther,  and  call  on 
him  to  explain  how  he  can,  in  fairness  or  honour,  after  what  occurred  at  the  ex 
traordinary  session,  propose,  as  he  has  in  these  resolutions,  to  repeal  the  pro 
vision  in  the  Distribution  Act  which  makes  it  void  if  the  duties  should  be  raised 
above  20  per  cent.  It  is  well  known  to  all  that  it  could  not  have  passed  with 
out  the  insertion  of  that  provision,  and  that  on  its  passage  depended  that  of  the 
Bankrupt  Bill.  Now  I  ask  him  how,  after  having  secured  the  passage  of  two 
such  important  measures,  can  he  reconcile  it  with  what  is  fair  or  honourable,  to 
turn  round  and  propose  to  repeal  the  very  provision  by  which  their  passage  was 
effected  ? 

But  the  senator  denies  that  the  necessity  is  of  his  creating,  and  insists  that, 
if  the  revenue  from  the  land  were  restored,  rigid  economy  enforced,  and  all  the 
provisions  of  the  compromise  respected,  there  would  not  be  sufficient  income  to 
meet  the  necessary  and  economical  wants  of  the  government.  I  take  issue  with 
him  on  the  fact,  and  shall  now  proceed  to  show  that,  even  on  his  own  data, 
there  would  be  ample  revenue  without  raising  the  duties  above  20  per  cent. 

According  to  the  estimates  of  the  senator,  the  whole  amount  of  appropriations, 
excluding  public  debt,  required  for  the  service  of  the  year,  permanent  and  cur 
rent,  under  the  various  heads  of  civil  list  and  miscellaneous,  army  and  navy  in 
all  their  branches,  is  twenty  millions  five  hundred  thousand  dollars.  To  which 
he  adds  for  other  appropriations,  not  included  in  these,  one  million  five  hundred 
thousand  doll^s,  which  can  mean  nothing  but  contingent,  unforeseen  expendi 
tures,  and  for  the  debt,  two  millions  of  dollars  ;  making,  in  the  aggregate,  twenty- 
four  millions  of  dollars.  To  this  he  proposes  to  add  two  millions  more  annual 
ly,  as  a  reserved  fund  to  meet  contingencies ;  to  which  I  object,  on  the  ground 
that  the  object  is  already  provided  for  by  the  one  million  five  hundred  thousand  dol 
lars  for  appropriations  riot  included  in  the  twenty  millions  five  hundred  thousand. 
There  can  be  no  demand  on  the  treasury  but  through  appropriations,  and  there 
caft  be  no  meaning  attached  to  contingent  appropriations  but  such  unforeseen  ex 
penditures  as  are  not  usually  included  under  the  various  heads  of  civil  list,  mis 
cellaneous,  army,  and  navy.  The  senator  has  clearly  attempted  to  make  a  dis 
tinction  that  does  not  exist,  and,  in  consequence,  made  a  double  provision  for 
the  same  object.  Of  the  two,  I  take  the  less  sum,  as  I  regard  it  ample  as  a 
permanent  contingent  fund,  which  will  make  his  estimate  for  the  year,  thus  cor 
rected,  to  be  twenty-four  millions  of  dollars — a  sum  surely  amply  large. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  ways  and  means  to  meet  this  large  demand  on  the 
treasury.  The  first  item  is  the  revenue  from  the  land,  which  ought  to  yield, 
under  proper  management,  an  average  of  at  least  three  millions  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars  for  the  next  five  years,  and  which  would  reduce  the  amount  to 
be  provided  for  from  the  imposts  to  twenty  millions  five  hundred  thousand  dollars. 
From  this  there  ought  to  be  deducted  at  least  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  from 
the  saving  that  may  be  made  in  the  collection  of  the  customs,  which  the  sen 
ator  estimates  at  one  million  six  hundred  thousand.  I  find,  taking  a  series  of 
years,  under  the  tariff  of  1828,  with  its  exorbitant  duties,  and  the  consequent 
great  increase  of  expenditures  to  guard  against  smuggling  and  frauds,  that  the 
collection  of  about  an  equal  sum  cost  4|  per  cent.  Allowing  the  same  rate  un 
der  the  more  simple  and  moderate  system  of  duties,  according  even  to  the 
scheme  of  the  senator,  and  the  cost  of  collection,  instead  of  the  sum  proposed, 
would  be  about  eight  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars,  making  a  difference 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  493 

of  seven  hundred  and  fifty  thousand ;  but,  for  the  facility  of  counting,  and  to  be 
liberal,  I  allow  but  half  a  million  for  saving.  That  would  reduce  the  sum  to 
be  provided  for  by  duties  to  twenty  millions  of  dollars  ;  and  the  next  question 
is,  What  rate  of  duty  will  be  necessary  to  meet  that  amount  ? 

Here,  again,  I  take  the  estimate  of  the  senator  as  the  basis  of  my  calcu 
lation.  He  bases  his  estimates  of  the  imports  on  the  probable  amount  of  the 
exports,  adding  fifteen  per  cent,  to  the  former  for  the  profits  of  freight  and  trade. 
On  this  basis  he  estimates  the  probable  amount  of  imports  at  one  hundred  and 
nineteen  millions  of  dollars,  a  sum  probably  too  low,  taking  the  average  of  die 
next  five  years,  provided  the  duties  shall  be  moderate,  and  no  adverse  unfore 
seen  cause  should  intervene.  From  this  sum  he  deducted  ten  millions  to  meet 
the  interest  abroad,  on  account  of  the  debts  of  the  states :  a  sum,  for  the  reason 
assigned  by  the  senator  from  New-Hampshire  behind  me,  too  large,  at  least  by 
three  millions  of  dollars.  Deduct  seven  millions  on  that,  account,  and  there 
would  be  left  one  hundred  and  twelve  millions.  The  senator  next  deducted 
eighteen  millions  for  articles  made  free  by  the  act  of  the  extra  session,  not  in 
cluding  coffee  and  tea,  which  he  estimates  at  twelve  millions.  I  cannot  assent 
to  the  deduction  to  the  extent  stated,  as  it  is  clearly  against  the  provisions  of 
the  Compromise  Act,  as  beyond  the  permanent  free  list  provided  for  by  that  act. 
What  would  be  the  amount  within  its  limits  I  have  not  been  able  to  ascertain ; 
but  on  the  best  data  I  have  been  able  to  obtain,  I  would  not  suppose  that  it 
would  much,  if  any,  exceed  three  millions  five  hundred  thousand  dollars,  not  in 
cluding  gold  and  silver.  I  exclude  them  because  they  are  constantly  flowing 
in  and  out,  according  to  the  demands  of  trade,  the  imports  of  one  year  becoming 
the  exports  of  the  next,  and  the  reverse,  except  the  small  amount  that  may  be 
permanently  added  to  the  circulation  or  be  used  in  the  country.  The  sum  of 
three  millions  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  deducted  from  the  hundred  and 
twelve  millions  would  leave,  on  the  data  assumed,  a  hundred  and  eight  millions 
five  hundred  thousand  as  the  probable  annual  amount  of  dutiable  articles  that 
would  be  imported  for  home  consumption.  Twenty  per  cent,  on  that  sum 
would  give  twenty-one  millions  seven  hundred  thousand  dollars,  a  sum  ample  to 
meet  the  amount  estimated,  and  cover  the  necessary  expenses  of  collection,  and 
pay  the  bounties  and  premiums  properly  chargeable  on  the  treasury. 

But,  in  making  these  calculations,  I  by  no  means  wish  to  be  understood  as 
acquiescing  in  the  estimates  which  the  senator  has  made  of  what  ought  to  be 
the  expenditures  of  the  government.  I  hold  them  much  too  high.  With  an 
efficient  system  of  administration,  actuated  by  a  true  spirit  of  economy,  seven 
teen  millions  would  be  ample  to  meet  all  expenses,  without  impairing  the  effi 
ciency  of  the  government,  as  I  have  shown  on  a  former  occasion ;  to  raise 
which,  an  average  duty  of  twelve  or  fifteen  per  cent.,  instead  of  twenty,  would, 
•with  the  aid  of  the  revenue  from  the  lands,  be  abundantly  sufficient. 

Having  now  shown  that,  while  the  senator  professes  to  respect  the  compro 
mise,  he  has  in  fact  violated,  or  proposes  to  violate,  all  the  essential  provisions 
of  the  act,  and  that  his  plea  of  necessity  for  the  proposing  to  raise  the  duties 
above  the  twenty  per  cent,  utterly  fails  him,  it  may  be  asked,  How  is  this  con 
tradiction  in  his  course  to  be  explained  ?  Is  he  deluded,  or  does  he  intend  to 
delude  others  ?  To  suppose  the  latter  would  impeach  his  sincerity,  which  I 
do  not  intend  to  question.  But  how  is  his  delusion  to  be  accounted  for  ?  It  re 
sults  from  his  position. 

He  is  a  tariff  man,  decidedly  opposed  to  free  trade.  We  have  his  own  au 
thority  for  the  assertion.  According  to  his  views,  free  trade  is  among  the 
greatest  curses  that  could  befall  the  country,  and  a  high  protective  tariff  among 
the  greatest  blessings.  While  he  thus  thinks  and  feels,  circumstances,  not  ne 
cessary  to  be  explained,  have  placed  him  in  such  relation  to  the  Compromise 
Act,  that  he  is  sincerely  desirous  of  respecting  its  provisions ;  but  the  misfor 
tune  is,  that  his  respect  for  it  is  not  compatible  with  his  strong  attachment  to 


494  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

his  long-cherished  system  of  policy.  There  is  no  estimating  the  force  of  self- 
delusion  in  a  position  so  contradictory,  of  which  the  course  of  the  senator  on 
this  occasion  furnishes  a  striking  illustration.  Entertaining  the  opinion  he 
does,  it  is  natural  that  he  should  desire  to  carry  out  in  practice  his  high  restrict 
ive  notions  on  one  side  and  opposition  to  free  trade  on  the  other ;  nor  is  it  to 
be  wondered  at  that  his  respect  for  the  Compromise  Act  should  have  to  yield  as 
far  as  they  stand  in  the  way  of  his  favourite  system  ;  especially  as  he  has  persua 
ded  himself  that  the  experiment,  as  he  chooses  to  call  it,  of  free  trade  has  utterly 
failed  on  trial.  Under  that  impression,  he  boldly  asserted  that  the  reduction  of 
the)*duties  had  impaired  the  productive  energy  of  the  country,  and  has  proved  a 
curse  not  only  to  the  portion  of  the  country  which  so  strongly  advocated  it,  but 
to  the  very  state  by  whose  efforts  the  protective  policy  was  overthrown. 

Here,  again,  I  take  issue  on  the  fact  with  the  senator.  I  deny,  in  the  first 
place,  that  we  hare  had  free  trade,  or  anything  that  comes  near  to  it.  It  is 
true  that  about  one  half  of  the  articles  were  made  duty  free,  but  on  the  resi 
due,  and  they  the  most  important,  but  a  small  reduction  of  duties,  comparatively 
speaking,  was  made  prior  to  the  1st  of  January  last.  Till  then,  the  duty  on 
most  of  the  articles  was  at  a  high  protective  rate.  But  while  I  deny  that  we 
have  had  free  trade,  I  equally  deny  that  the  reduction  which  has  taken  place 
has  in  any  degree  impaired  the  productive  energies  of  the  country,  or  proved  a 
curse  to  the  staple  states.  On  the  contrary,  I  assert,  and  shall  prove,  that  its 
effects  has  equalled  the  most  sanguine  expectation  of  the  friends  of  free  trade, 
notwithstanding  the  highly  adverse  circumstances  under  which  it  has  taken 
place  ;  that  of  a  currency  fluctuating  and  deranged,  credit  universally  impaired, 
the  machinery  of  commerce  broken,  and  our  principal  customer,  on  whom  we 
mainly  depend  for  the  sales  of  our  produce  abroad,  and  the  purchase  of  our 
supplies,  in  a  state  of  the  greatest  commercial  embarrassment.  In  the  midst 
of  all  these  opposing  and  formidable  difficulties,  the  productive  energies  of  the 
country  have  advanced  beyond  all  former  example,  under  the  wholesome  stimu 
lus  of  reduction  of  duties,  as  I  shall  next  proceed  to  show. 

I  shall  draw  my  facts  principally  from  the  annual  commercial  document  from 
the  treasury  department,  which  gives  full  and  authentic  information  of  the  com 
merce  and  navigation  of  the  year,  in  all  their  relations,  and  shall  begin  with  that 
portion  of  our  domestic  products  which  is  shipped  abroad,  and  which  constitutes 
the  basis  of  our  commerce  and  navigation.  I  shall  not  include  the  imports,  not 
because  they  would  give  a  less  favourable  view  of  our  industrial  pursuits,  but 
because  they  would  give  one  that  was  apparently  too  favourable  during  the  last 
four  years,  owing  to  the  vast  extent  of  loans  contracted  abroad  by  many  of  the 
states,  and  which  were  principally  returned  in  merchandise  of  various  descrip 
tions.  Nor  shall  I  include  the  carrying  trade,  because  it  is  little  affected  by 
the  rate  of  the  duties,  as  they  are  returned  in  the  shape  of  drawbacks  on  reship- 
ment  of  the  imported  articles. 

In  order  to  have  a  full  and  satisfactory  view  of  the  relative  effects  of  increas 
ing  and  reducing  the  duties  on  our  export  trade,  I  have  arranged  in  table  A  the 
aggregate  amount  of  all  our  domestic  exports,  including  manufactures,  for  six 
teen  years,  beginning  with  1825,  the  first  year  under  the  first  tariff  laid  pro 
fessedly  for  protection,  and  ending  with  1840,  divided  into  two  equal  periods 
of  eight  years  each  ;  the  first  ending  with  1832,  and  comprehending  the  period 
of  the  two  protective  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828,  and  the  last  extending  from  the 
termination  of  the  first  to  1840  inclusive.  I  have  not  included  1841,  because  it 
would  impede  the  facility  of  comparing  the  two  periods,  by  making  one  longer 
than  the  other,  and  not  because  it  would  be  less  favourable  than  the  other  years, 
since  the  commencement  of  the  rsduction.  I  have  extended  the  first  to  1833, 
notwithstanding  the  reduction  'of  the  duties  on  coffee,  tea,  and  some  other  arti 
cles  began  in  1830,  and  which,  as  a  reference  to  the  table  will  show,  gave  a 
considerable  impulse  to  our  export  trade  in  1831  and  1832,  and  a  corresponding 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  495 

increase  of  the  exports  to  the  period  of  high  protective  duties,  which  fairly  be 
longs  to  that  of  reduction.  The  great  reduction  took  place  in  March,  1833,  un 
der  the  Compromise  Act,  and  with  that  year,  accordingly,  I  commence  the  pe 
riod  of  reduction,  to  the  effects  of  which  the  senator  attributes  such  disastrous 
results  to  the  industry  of  the  country.  With  these  remarks  I  shall  now  pro 
ceed  to  compare  the  two  periods,  in  order  to  ascertain  how  far  facts  will  sus 
tain  or  refute  his  bold  declamatory  assertions. 

The  aggregate  amount  of  the  value  of  the  exports,  in  the  first  series  of  years, 
from  1824  to  1833,  the  period  when  the  protective  policy  was  in  its  greatest 
vigour,  was  $469,198,564,  making  an  average  of  $57,399,945  per  annum, 
throughout  the  period ;  while  the  aggregate  amount  bf  value  in  the  last,  the 
period  of  reduction  under  the  compromise,  was  $768,352,365,  giving  an  aver 
age  of  $96,442,795,  and  making  an  aggregate  gain,  in  the  period  of  reduc 
tion,  over  that  of  protection,  of  $299,174,791,  and  an  average  annual  gain  of 
$38,646,855,  being  rather  more  than  65  per  cent,  on  the  average  of  the  former 
period :  an  increase  without  example  in  any  former  period  of  the  history  of  our 
commerce.  This  vast  increase  has  had  a  corresponding  effect  on  our  tonnage 
in  the  foreign  and  coasting  trade,  as  will  appear  by  reference  to  table  B,  which 
contains  a  statement  of  our  tonnage  for  the  two  periods.  The  aggregate 
amount  of  the  foreign  tonnage  at  the  close  of  the  first  period  was,  in  the  foreign, 
686,989,  and  the  coasting,  752,456  tons,  making  the  aggregate  1,439,450  tons, 
against  the  last,  in  the  foreign  trade,  of  896,646,  and  the  coasting,  1,280,999 ; 
making,  in  the  aggregate,  2,180,763,  and  an  increase  during  the  period  of  re 
duction  of  duties,  over  that  of  protection,  of  741,303  tons;  while,  during  the 
first,  there  was  an  actual  falling  off  in  the  tonnage,  as  the  table  will  show. 

But  it  will  no  doubt  be  objected,  that  this  mighty  impulse  from  reduction, 
which  has  so  vastly  increased  our  exports  and  tonnage,  was  confined  to  the 
great  agricultural  staples  ;  and  that  the  effects  will  be  found  to  be  the  reverse 
on  the  manufacturing  industry  of  the  country.  The  very  opposite  is  the  fact ; 
so  far  from  falling  off,  it  is  the  very  branch  of  our  exports  that  has  received  the 
greatest  impulse,  as  will  be  apparent  by  reference  to  table  C,  in  which  the  ex 
ports  in  value  of  domestic  manufactures  are  arranged  in  tabular  form,  divided 
into  the  same  periods.  It  will  appear,  by  reference  to  it,  tl^it  the  whole  value 
of  the  exports  of  domestic  manufactures,  during  the  period  of  high  protective 
duties,  was  but  $43,180,755.  So  farjrom  increasing,  there  was  an  actual  fall 
ing  off,  comparing  the  last  with  the  first  year  of  the  series,  of  $505,633.  Now 
turn  to  the  period  of  reduction  of  duties,  and  mark  the  contrast.  Instead  of 
falling  off,  the  exports  increased  to  $65,917,018  during  the  period ;  and,  com 
paring  the  last  year  of  the  series  with  the  last  of  that  of  high  protective  duties, 
the  increase  will  be  found  to  be  $7,798,207,  greater  than  the  former  year  by 
nearly  three  millions  of  dollars.  This  vast  increase  of  the  exports  of  domestic 
manufactures,  even  beyond  the  other  branches  of  exports,  is  attributable  mainly 
to  the  fact  that  a  large  portion  of  the  articles  for  which  they  were  exchanged 
were  made  duty  free  during  the  period  under  the  compromise,  while  the  greater 
part  of  those  for  which  the  great  agricultural  staples  were  exchanged  were  still 
subject  to  high  duties. 

But  it  has  been  said  that  this  vast  increase  has  resulted  from  the  embarrassed 
state  of  the  home  market,  which  forced  the  manufacturers  to  go  abroad  to  find 
purchasers,  and  that  it  is  rather  an  evidence  of  their  depression  than  their 
prosperity.  To  test  the  truth  of  this  objection,  I  propose  to  select  the  manufac 
ture  of  cotton,  which  furnishes  the  largest  item  in  the  exports  of  domestic  manu 
factures,  and  shall  show  conclusively  that  the  increase  of  exports  under  the  re 
duction  of  duties,  so  far  from  being  produced  by  the  cause  assigned,  is  but  the 
natural  result  of  the  healthy  and  flourishing  condition  of  that  important  branch 
of  our  industry.  I  shall  go  to  its  headquarters,  Lowell  and  Boston,  for  my 
r  roof,  as  affording  the  best  possible  evidence  of  its  actual  condition  throughout 


496  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALI1OUX. 

the  manufacturing  region.  I  shall  begin  at  the  former  place,  and,  in  the  absence 
of  all  official  documents,  shall  draw  from  a  highly  respectable  source,  the  writer 
of  the  money  articles  in  the  New-York  Herald,  who  appears  to  have  drawn 
from  some  authentic  source,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  minuteness  of  his  state 
ment. 

According  to  his  statement,  the  entire  amount  of  cotton  goods  made  at  Low 
ell,  in  1839,  was  58,263,400  yards  ;  and  in  1840,  73,853,400  yards  ;  making  an 
increase,  in  a  single  year,  of  15,590,000  yards,  more  than  25  per  cent,  on  the 
entire  growth  in  that  branch  in  that  flourishing  town,  from  its  foundation  to  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1840  !  But  as  great  as  that  is,  it  is  not  equal,  in  propor 
tion,  to  the  quantity  of  the  raw  article  consumed,  which  in  the  former  year  was 
19,258,600  pounds,  and  the  latter  28,764,000 — increase  9,509,600 — more  than 
50  per  cent,  in  one  year,  on  the  entire  increase  of  the  consumption,  up  to  the 
commencement  of  the  year !  What  makes  it  the  more  striking,  is  the  fact  that 
this  great  increase  took  place  under  a  very  great  fall  of  price,  averaging  fully 
22  per  cent. ;  but,  notwithstanding  this  great  fall,  the  aggregate  gain  from  the 
fall  in  the  price  of  the  raw  material  and  extension  of  the  operations  exceeded 
that  of  1839  by  $195,922 ;  affording  conclusive  proof  that  low  prices  and  in 
creased  gain  may  be  reconciled  in  manufacturing  industry. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  the  gain  is  not  in  proportion  to  the  extension  of  the 
operation,  and  that,  so  far  from  indicating  a  prosperous  condition,  it  is  indicative 
of  the  reverse.  To  this  I  reply,  that  if  the  fact  be  as  supposed — if  the  year 
1840  wa?  really  a  bad  instead  of  a  good  year  for  the  manufacture  of  cotton  in 
Massachusetts  and  the  adjacent  region — the  proof  will  be  found  in  the  falling 
off  of  their  operations  the  next  year.  But,  so  far  from  that  being  the  case,  I 
shall  show,  by  conclusive  evidence,  that  their  increase  in  1841  exceeded  all 
preceding  years,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  quantity  of  the  raw  material  requi 
red,  than  which  there  can  be  nothing  safer  by  which  to  judge. 

I  hold  in  my  hand  a  statement  of  the  amount  of  cotton  imported  into  Boston 
from  1835  to  1840  inclusive  ;  and  from  the  1st  of  January,  1841,  to  the  25th  of 
May,  of  the  same  year,  being  rather  less  than  five  months,  taken  from  the  Bos 
ton  Atlas,  which  may  be  regarded  as  good  authority  on  the  subject.  Now  as 
suming,  as  I  safely  may,  that  the  cotton  imported  into  Boston  is  almost  exclu 
sively  for  domestic  use,  and. is  consumed  by  that  large  portion  of  our  cotton  man 
ufacturers  which  draw  their  supply  from  there,  we  will  have  in  the  quantity 
imported  very  nearly  the  quantity  consumed ;  and  in  that  consumed  the  extent 
of  the  manufacturing  operations  in  the  entire  circle  which  draws  its  supplies 
from  Boston.  Now,  what  says  the  statement?  In  1835  there  were  imported, 
in  round  numbers,  into  Boston,  80,000  bales  ;  in  1836,  82,000  ;  in  1837,  82,000  ; 
in  1838,96,000;  in  1839,  94,000;  in  1840,  136,000;  and  from  the  1st  of  Jan 
uary  to  the  26th  of  May,  1841,  93,000 ;  and  for  the  year,  as  estimated  by  the 
editor  of  the  Atlas,  150,000 ;  almost  double  the  consumption,  as  compared  to 
1835,  in  the  short  space  of  eight  years,  and  increasing  more  and  more  rapidly 
with  the  reduction  of  duties,  and  the  most  rapidly  just  as  the  period  of  the  final 
great  reduction  is  about  to  take  place.  I  rejoice  at  all  this.  I  rejoice,  because 
it  is  proof  conclusive  of  the  great  prosperity,  up  to  that  period,  of  this  important 
branch  of  our  industry  ;  because  it  is  proof  of  the  beneficial  and  stimulating  ef 
fect  of  decreasing  duties ;  because  I  see  in  such  results  that  the  great  staple 
interest  of  the  South,  and  the  great  manufacturing  interest  of  the  North,  may  be 
reconciled,  and  that  each  will  find,  on  fair  trial,  their  mutual  interest  in  low  du 
ties  and  a  sound  currency,  as  the  only  safe  and  solid  protection.  This  great 
and  striking  result  is  not,  be  assured,  accidental.  It  comes  from  fixed  laws, 
which  only  require  to  be  known  and  to  be  acted  on  to  give  unbounded  prosper 
ity  to  the  country.  But  I  had  almost  forgotten  to  ask,  How  can  this  vast  in 
crease  of  1841,  compared  with  that  of  1840,  be  reconciled  with  the  supposed 
unproductive  condition  of  the  manufacture  of  cotton  in  the  latter  year  ?  Have 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  497 

our  New-England  brethren  forgotten  their  sagacity  and  prudence,  and  gone  on 
rapidly  extending  their  operations,  in  spite  of  a  decaying  business  ? 

But  I  have  not  yet  exhausted  the  proof  of  the  great  and  beneficial  effects  re 
sulting  from  the  reduction  of  the  duties.  It  has  been  alleged,  as  a  conclusive 
objection  against  the  reduction  of  duties,  that  it  would  inundate  the  country  with 
imports  of  foreign  production,  the  belief  of  which  has  spread  great  alarm  among 
the  manufacturing  interest  of  the  country.  I  admit  that  the  injudicious  and  sud 
den  reduction  at  the  beginning  of  this  year,  and  which  is  to  take  place  on  the 
30th  of  June  next,  may,  to  a  considerable  extent,  have  the  temporary  effect  ap 
prehended.  I  was  opposed  to  throwing  so  great  a  reduction  on  the  termination 
of  the  series  of  years  of  reduction  fixed  by  the  compromise,  and  that  for  the 
reason  that  it  would  have  that  effect.  Had  the  reduction  been  equally  distribu 
ted  over  the  whole  period,  as  I  proposed,  or  had  the  offer  I  made  at  the  extra 
ordinary  session  been  accepted,  of  bringing  down  the  duties  above  20  per  cent, 
on  the  protected  articles  gradually,  and  raising  those  0:1  the  free  in  the  same 
way,  the  evil  would  have  been  wholly  avoided ;  but  other  counsel  prevailed. 
The  mischief  is  now  done,  and  must'be  endured.  It  is,  however,  some  conso 
lation  to  think  it  will  be  but  temporary.  Low  duties  and  a  sound  currency  will 
prove  the  most  effective  preventive  to  over-importation,  and  the  alarm,  in  the 
end,  will  prove  unfounded.  That  reduction  of  duties  has  not  been  followed  by 
the  evil  apprehended,  we  have  strong  proof  in  the  fact  that  it  has  not  been  the 
case  under  the  regular  and  gradual  reduction  provided  by  the  compromise,  quite 
down  to  the  last  great  reduction.  In  1939,  the  importation  of  cotton  goods, 
of  all  descriptions,  amounted  in  value  to  $13,913,393,  and  in  1840  to  but 
$6,594,484 ;  making  a  reduction  in  one  year,  under  the  increasing  reduction 
of  duties,  of  $7,408,909 ;  more  than  eqi*il  to  the  whole  amount  of  the  importa 
tion  of  the  year ;  and  yet,  with  all  the*e  decisive  proofs  of  their  great  and  grow 
ing  prosperity,  the  cotton  and  other  manufacturing  interests  are  pouring  in  pe 
titions  day  after  day  by  thousand  crying  out  for  relief,  and  asking  for  high 
and  oppressive  duties  on  almos'  every  article  of  consumption,  for  their  benefit, 
at  the  expense  of  the  rest  of  *le  community ;  and  that,  too,  when  the  great  sta 
ple  exporting  interest,  if  w  are  to  believe  the  members  representing  these  pe 
titioners  on  this  floor,  is  ^  tne  same  time  in  the  most  depressed  and  embarrass 
ed  condition. 

But  it  is  attempt  to  explain  these  striking  proofs  of  prosperity,  which 
cannot  be  denied  oy  stating  that  they  occurred  under  high  protective  duties, 
as  only  four  te«ths  of  the  duties  above  20  per  cent,  on  protected  articles 
had  been  take-i  off  prior  to  the  1st  of  January  last,  and  that  what  remained  was 
ample  for  protection ;  and  that  it  is  to  that,  not  the  reduction  of  the  duties,  that 
this  g-reat  increase  of  the  manufacture  of  cotton  is  to  be  attributed.  In  reply,  I 
ask.  if  protection,  and  not  reduction  of  duties,  be  in  fact  the  cause,  how  is  it  to 
be  explained  that  so  little  progress  was  made  by  the  cotton  manufactories  du 
ring  the  high  protective  duties  of  the  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828  ?  And  how,  that 
the  progress  has  been  more  and  more  rapid,  just  in  proportion  as  the  duties  have 
been  reduced  under  the  compromise,  as  the  vast  increase  of  the  importation  of 
the  raw  material  into  the  port  of  Boston  clearly  indicates  ?  These  facts  prove, 
beyond  controversy,  that  the  great  increase  in  question  did  not  depend  on  the 
protective  policy,  but  the  reverse,  the  reduction  of  duties,  and  may  be  fairly 
attributed  to  the  effect  which  the  repeal  and  the  reduction  of  duties  under  that 
act  have  had  in  cheapening  the  cost  of  production  at  home,  and  enlarging  the  mar 
ket  for  the  product  of  our  labour  abroad,  by  removing  so  many  and  such  oppressive 
burdens  from  our  foreign  exchanges. 

Having  now  shown  the  relative  effects  of  protection  and  reduction  of  duties 
on  the  export  trade  generally,  and  on  the  tonnage,  foreign  and  coasting,  and  the 
manufacture  and  consumption  of  cotton,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  trace  their  com 
parative  effects  on  the  three  great  agricultural  staples,  cotton,  rice,  and  tobacco, 

RRR 


498  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

all  of  which  are  the  product  of  that  portion  of  the  Union  which  the  senator  and 
his  friends  would  persuade  us  has  suffered  so  much  from  the  reduction  of  the 
duties.  I  shall  begin  with  1820  and  conclude  with  1840,  making  twenty-one 
years,  which  I  shall  divide  into  three  equal  periods  of  seven  years  each;  the 
first  to  extend  to  1826  inclusive,  the  second  to  1833  inclusive,  and  the  last  to 
1841.  The  first  will  conclude  with  the  period  which  fairly  represents  the  ef 
fects  of  the  high  duties  under  the  act  of  1816,  with  one  or  two  supplemental  acts 
passed  at  the  close  of  the  late  war ;  the  second,  that  under  the  protective  tariffs 
of  1824  and  1828  ;  and  the  last,  that  under  the  compromise  or  reduction  of  du 
ties.  I  have  commenced  the  periods  of  protection  and  reduction  at  a  little  later 
period  than  in  making  out  the  table  of  exports  generally,  because  the  agricultu 
ral  staples  are  sol\and  shipped  in  the  fiscal  year  subsequent  to  their  produc 
tion,  and  are  not  ma\erially  affected  by  a  change  of  duty  till  the  succeeding 
year.  It  has  also  the  advantage  of  being  divisible  into  three  equal  parts,  nearly 
coinciding  with  thoso  marked  and  dissimilar  periods  of  legislation  in  reference 
to  the  duties  on  impoirts.  The  disturbing  effects  of  the  late  war  on  the  com 
merce  of  the  country  h*d  in  a  great  measure  ceased  at  the  date  of  the  com 
mencement  of  the  first  penod.  With  these  explanatory  remarks,  I  shall  begin 
with  cotton,  the  leading  article,  and  shall  draw  my  facts  from  official  documents, 
unless  otherwise  stated. 

The  table  marked  D  contains  a  statement  of  the  value  of  the  exports  of  cotton 
for  each  year  during  this  long  period,  divided,  as  already  stated,  into  periods  of 
seven  years  ;  by  reference  to  which  it  will  be  seen  that  the  aggregate  value  of 
the  exports  for  the  first  period  of  seven  years,  from  1819  to  1826  inclusive,  was 
$170,765,993.  That  period  was  one  of  severe  contraction  of  the  currency,  fol 
lowing  the  great  expansion  in  consequerce  of  the  universal  suspension  of  all  the 
banks  south  of  New-England,  from  1 81 J.  to  1817,  and  was  marked  by  great 
commercial  and  pecuniary  embarrassment. 

The  aggregate  exports  in  value  for  the  nexir>erioa  of  seven  years,  from  the 
termination  of  the  first  to  1833  inclusive,  was  $*H  ,302,247  (see  same  table)— 
a  period  throughout  of  high  protective  duties,  with-»ut  relaxation,  excepting  the 
last  two  years,  when  the  duties  on  coffee,  tea,  and  SOme  other  articles  were 
greatly  reduced,  and  which,  as  will  be  seen  by  refer^ce  to  the  table,  had  a 
very  sensible  effect  in  increasing  the  exports  of  those  yea*,.  The  increase  of 
the  exports  in  the  whole  of  this  period,  compared  with  t«e  former,  was  but 
$31,536,254,  about  1  *.  per  cent.,  being  a  rate  per  cent,  compart/I  to  the  increase 
of  population  of  about  Tlj  only.  But  even  this  inconsiderable  in«Tease,  in  a  pe 
riod  marked  by  no  extraordinary  vicissitude  or  embarrassment  in  tVe  commerce 
or  currency  of  the  country,  over  one  of  severe  contraction  and  embarrassment, 
occurred  principally  during  the  last  two  years  of  the  series,  after  the  reduction 
of  the  duties  already  alluded  to,  and  to  which  it  may  be  fairly  attributed. 

The  aggregate  increase  for  the  last  period  of  seven  years,  from  1833,  the 
year  of  the  compromise,  to  1841,  was  $435,300,830  (see  same  table) — a  period 
throughout  of  reduction,  making  an  increase  of  $233,998,583  ;  equal  to  about  115 
per  cent,  compared  to  the  aggregate  value  of  the  period  of  high  protective  tariff, 
and  four  times  greater  than  the  average  increase  of  our  population  for  the  same 
period,  and  this  for  a  large  portion  of  the  time  of  unexampled  derangement  of 
the  currency  and  pecuniary  and  commercial  embarrassment. 

1  shall  now  pass  to  the  next  most  important  of  our  great  agricultural  staples, 
tobacco,  referring  for  a  detailed  view  to  table  marked  E,  and  for  explanation  as 
to  each  period,  the  remarks  made  in  reference  to  cotton. 

The  aggregate  export  in  value  of  tobacco  for  the  first  period  was  $43,441,569  ; 
and  of  the  second,  $39,983,570;  being  an  actual  falling  off  under  the  high,  in 
creased  protective  duties  of  the  acts  of  1824  and  1828,  compared  to  the  lower, 
but  still  high  duties  of  the  former  period,  of  $3,557,899,  and  that,  too,  in  the 
absence  of  all  adverse  causes  except  the  high,  oppressive  duties  during  the  pe 
riod. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  499 

Turn  now  to  the  period  of  reduction,  and  witness  the  result,  notwithstanding 
all  its  embarrassments.  The  aggregate  export  of  tobacco  during  that  period 
increased  to  $57,809,098 — an  increase,  compared  to  the  period  of  protection, 
of  $17,945,528,  equal  to  about  43  per  cent,  on  the  former,  and  nearly  double 
compared  to  the  increase  of  population.  And  yet,  with  this  striking  fact,  taken 
from  official  documents,  there  are  those  residing  in  the  tobacco  region  who,  not 
content  with  this  vast  and  rapid  increase,  would  resort  to  retaliatory  duties  on 
silks,  linens,  wines,  and  the  other  articles  made  free  of  duty  by  the  Compromise 
Act,  in  order  to  increase  still  more  the  tobacco  trade  ;  that  is,  they  would  lay 
heavy  duties  on  the  very  articles,  the  exception  of  which  from  duties  has  given 
it  this  mighty  increase,  in  the  hopeless  struggle  of  compelling  a  change  in  the 
long-established  system  of  finance  by  which  tobacco  has  been  subject  to  high 
duties  in  the  old  nations  of  Europe.  If  what  is  aimed  at  could  be  accomplish 
ed,  it  would  be  well,  though  I  doubt  whether  it  would  be  to  the  advantage  of 
our  tobacco  trade,  even  if  it  could  be  done ;  but  if  it  should  fail,  the  loss  would 
be  certain  and  incalculable  to  the  tobacco  growers.  The  trade  would  be  sacri 
ficed  in  the  attempt.  The  duty  already  imposed,  at  the  extra  session,  of  20 
per  cent.,  will  do  much  to  cripple  the  trade. 

I  shall  next  proceed  to  the  least  considerable  of  the  three  staples,  rice,  refer 
ring  for  detailed  information  to  the  table  F  ;  and  here  we  have  tie  only  unfa 
vourable  result  which  any  of  the  items  of  exports  I  have  exam^ed  give.  The 
aggregate  exports  of  rice,  in  value,  during  the  first  period,  v^re  $12,334,369  , 
and  in  the  second,  $16,308,842.  showing  a  gain  of  $3,974^/3  5  and  in  the  third, 
of  $15,314,739,  showing  a  falling  off  of  $994,103  in  tne  exports,  probably 
caused  by  the  greater  consumption  at  home,  in  consec^61106  °f  opening  the  in 
terior  to  its  use  by  means  of  railroads  and  canals,  ar1  tne  drawing  off  of  hands 
engaged  in  the  culture  of  rice  to  be  employed  in  tlat  °f  cotton. 

By  combining  the  whole,  it  will  appear  that tle  aggregate  gain  on  the  three 
staples  in  the  second  period,  that  of  high  proactive  duties,  compared  with  the 
first,  that  of  lower,  but  still  high  duties  ar1  great  commercial  and  pecuniary 
embarrassment,  deducting  the  falling  offon  tobacco,  and  adding  the  gain  on 
rice,  is  only  $31.953,828  in  seven  ye^rs,  on  an  aggregate  export,  during  the 
first  period,  of  $226,538,201,  less  tb*n  If  per  cent,  for  the  whole  period,  being 
an  increase,  compared  to  that  of  tie  prpulation  for  the  time,  of  about  one  six 
teenth  only ;  while  the  aggreg^e  gain  of  the  last  period  (that  of  reduction  of 
duties)  on  the  three  staples  combined,  deducting  the  loss  on  rice,  and  adding 
the  gain  on  tobacco,  is,  compared  to  the  second,  that  of  high  protective  duties, 
$250,950,958  in  the  sev^n  ye?rs ;  being  an  increase  greater  than  the  whole 
amount  of  the  aggregate  exports  of  the  preceding  period,  and  greater  than  the 
ratio  of  the  increase  °f  population  for  the  time,  by  more  than  3£  to  one. 

Such  is  the  mighty  impulse  which  (I  will  not  say  free  trade,  for  we  are 
still  far  from  it)  <*  reduction  of  duties  has  given  to  the  export  trade  of  our  great 
agricultural  supl^j  fr°m  which  the  commerce  and  navigation  of  the  country 
derive  their  ma^n  support.  There  can  be  no  mistake.  The  facts  are  drawn 
from  official  sources,  and  do  not  admit  of  any  error  which  can  materially  vary  the 
result. 

But  I  admit  that  there  is  great  pecuniary  embarrassment  and  distress  through 
out  the  whole  staple  region,  notwithstanding  this  vast  increase  of  the  produc- 
f  tion  anJ  value  of  their  great  staples.  The  fact  being  admitted,  the  question  is, 
What  is  the  cause  1  The  senator  and  his  friends  attribute  it  to  the  reduction 
of  the  duties.  I  deny  it.  The  official  documents  deny  it ;  for  nothing  is  more 
certain  than  that  the  income  of  the  staple  states,  taken  as  a  whole,  never  has 
been  so  great ;  no,  nothing  like  it  in  proportion  to  its  population,  as  it  has  been 
during  the  period  since  the  adoption  of  the  compromise.  Be,  then,  the  cause 
what  it  may,  it  is  certain  that  it  is  not  the  reduction  of  duties ;  and  th%f,  so  far 
from  that,  it  has  taken  place  in  spite  of,  and  not  in  consequence  of  reduction. 


500  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

What,  then,  is  it  ?  I  will  tell  you  :  indebtedness — universal,  deep  indebtedness 
of  states,  corporations,  and  individuals,  followed  by  a  forced  and  sudden  liqui 
dation.  That  is  the  obvious  and  unquestionable  cause.  And  what  has  caused 
that  ?  What  but  a  vast  and  long-continued  expansion  of  the  currency,  which 
raised  prices  beyond  all  former  rates,  and  which*,  by  its  delusive  effects,  turned 
the  whole  community  into  a  body  of  speculators,  in  the  eager  expectation  of 
amassing  sudden  fortunes  ?  And  what  caused  this  great  and  disastrous  expan 
sion  ?  The  banks,  combined  with  the  high  and  oppressive  duties  imposed  by 
the  tariff  of  1828.  It  was  that  measure,  which,  by  its  necessary  operation, 
turned  exchanges  in  favour  of  this  country,  and,  by  necessary  consequence,  as 
I  have  proved  on  a  former  occasion,*  caused  the  great  expansion  which  follow 
ed  the  passage  of  that  act,  and  which,  by  a  series  of  causes,  explained  on  the 
same  occasion,  continued  to  keep  exchanges  either  in  our  favour,  or  about  par, 
to  the  suspension  in  1837.  Another  powerful  cause  for  this  expansion,  result 
ing  from  high  duties  and  springing  from  the  same  act,  was  the  vast  surplus 
revenue  which  it  accumulated  in  the  treasury,  or  rather  in  the  banks,  as  its  de 
positories,  and  which  became,  in  fact,  bank  capital  in  its  worst  and  most  cor 
rupting  form,  and  did  more  to  overthrow  them,  and  cause  the  present  embar 
rassed  state  of  the  government  and  the  country,  than  all  other  causes  combined. 
It  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  then  suspension  ;  and,  in  turn,  of  their  present 
ruined  condition  an(j  tnat  of  tne  forced  liquidation  under  which  the  country  is 
suffering.  These  causes,  with  the  bankrupt  law  and  the  return  of  stocks  from 
abroad,  followed  by  >  drain  of  specie,  have  produced  that  universal  and  intense 
pecuniary  embarrassrr*nt  an(j  distress  of  which  we  hear  such  complaint.  They 
belong  to  the  banking  .n(j  tariff  system,  and  not  to  the  reduction  of  duties, 
which,  so  far  from  being  ue  cause,  has  done  much  to  mitigate  the  evil,  by  the 
vast  addition  it  has  made  totne  income  of  the  country,  as  has  been  shown. 
But,  in  addition  to  these,  the  ^eai  staple  region,  especially  the  cotton  region 
of  the  Southwest,  have  had  great  ana  peculiar  difficulties  of  their  own.  The 
rapid  extinction  of  the  Indian  title  v,  a  vast  and  fertile  territory  in  that  quarter, 
with  a  climate  and  soil  more  congenial  to  the  growth  of  cotton  than  any  of  the 
Atlantic  states,  which,  in  combination  vtfth  the  expanded  state  of  the  currency, 
led  to  bold  and  reckless  speculation,  on  aareat  scale,  at  the  highest  prices  in 
land  arid  negroes,  and  which  have  ovei whelmed  the  Southwestern  States  with 
debt,  and,  notwithstanding  the  vast  increase  ol  their  income,  have  left  them  in 
their  present  embarrassed  condition. 

These,  I  repeat,  are  the  great  causes  of  the  distils  and  embarrassments  of 
the  staple  states,  and,  I  may  add,  through  them,  of  tht  Union.  They  come  not 
from  free  trade,  as  the  senator  would  have  us  befteve,  bat  from  his  own  favour 
ite  system  of  banks  and  tariffs,  to  which  he  so  earnestly  invites  the  country 
again  to  return.  His  is  the  stimulating  treatment.  The  Buffering  patient  is 
trembling  in  every  joint,  and  almost  ready  to  sink  from  h\s  la*e  debaucheries ; 
his  prescription  is  to  return  again  to  the  bottle — to  drink  fon,  the  same  de 
ceitful  bowl,  instead  of  honestly  prescribing  total  abstinence  at  the  only  effect 
ual  remedy. 

But  to  return  to  the  documents,  which  I  have  not  exhausted.  The  senator 
asserted  'that  the  price  of  cotton  has  been  lower  during  the  period  of  reduction 
than  under  his  old  and  cherished  system  of  protection  ;  and  here,  again,  I  meet 
him  on  the  fact.  In  order  to  test  the  truth  of  his  assertion,  I  have  formed  a  tab 
ular  statement  of  the  quantity  and  price  of  cotton  for  each  year,  from  18 1Q  to 
1841,  divided,  as  in  the  case  of  the  exports,  into  three  parts,  of  seven  years 
each,  corresponding  with  the  fcrmer.  The  table  will  be  found  in  the  appendix, 
marked  G.  The  statement  from  1819  to  1836  is  taken  from  a  laborious  and 
carefully-compiled  report  of  the  senator  from  New-Hampshire  (Mr.  Woodbury), 
made  while  he  was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  which  contains  a  great  deal 
*  Speech  on  the  Assumption  of  State  Debts. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  501 

of  valuable  information  in  relation  to  that  important  staple.  The  price  for  the 
remaining  portions  of  the  period  is  from  a  monthly  statement  of  the  prices  of 
cotton  at  New-Orleans,  taking  the  average  between  the  highest  and  lowest 
price  each  month,  and  the  quantity  from  several  sources,  but  principally  from  a 
careiuily-drawn  statement,  apparently  oy  one  well  informed,  and  published  in 
the  Southern  Banner. 

By  reference  to  the  table,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  aggregate  quantity  produced 
in  the  first  part  of  the  period,  from  1819  to  1826  inclusive,  was  1555  millions 
of  pounds  ;  that  the  average  price  was  15^  cents  per  pound,  and  the  value 
$234,675,000;  and  that  in  the  second,  from  1826  to  1834,  the  quantity  was 
2530  millions  of  pounds,  the  average  price  10  cents,  arid  the  value  $263,387,500  ; 
showing  a  falling  off  in  the  average  price  of  rather  more  than  one  third,  and  an 
aggregate  increase  of  value  of  only  $28,712,500  in  the  whole  seven  years. 
Now  note  the  difference  under  the  influence  of  the  reduction  of  the  duties. 
The  aggregate  quantity  increased  to  3777  millions  of  pounds,  the  price  in 
creased  to  an  average  of  13*-  cents  per  pound,  and  the  aggregate  value  to 
$496,516,500,  making  an  increase  for  the  seven  years  of  $223,730,000.  But 
as  great  and  striking  as  this  result  is,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  it  is  below 
the  reality.  Having  the  average  price  for  the  respective  periods,  and  the  value 
of  the  exports  for  the  same,  it  is  easy  to  ascertain  the  quantity  shipped  to  for 
eign  countries  on  those  data,  which,  if  deducted  from  the  whole  quantity  pro 
duced,  will  give  what  would  be  left  for  home  consumption.  By  applying  this 
calculation  to  the  respective  periods,  it  will  be  found  that  in  the  two  former  pe 
riods  a  considerably  greater  amount  is  left  for  home  consumption  than  what 
the  home  market  is  usually  estimated  to  require  during  those  periods,  and  in 
the  last  considerably  less.  That  would  indicate  a  corresponding  error  either 
in  the  price  or  the  quantity,  in  favour  of  the  first  two,  against  the  last  period ; 
which  may  in  part  be  accounted  for  from  the  fact  that,  in  making  up  the  esti 
mate  of  the  price  prior  to  1835,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  took  the  aggregate 
value,  including  Sea  Island  as  well  as  the  short  staple,  and  which,  of  course, 
would  considerably  increase  the  average  price  of  the  whole,  at  a  period  when 
the  former  bore  a  larger  proportion  to  the  whole  than  at  present.  The  prices  in 
the  table,  since  1835,  are  taken  exclusively  from  the  short  staple.  But,  be  the 
cause  what  it  may,  it  is  probable,  on  the  data  already  stated,  the  value  during 
the  last  period,  that  of  reduction,  ought  to  be  raised  not  less  than  twenty  mill 
ions,  or  those  of  the  preceding  reduced  that  amount. 

And  here  I  deem  it  proper  to  notice  the  triumphant  air  with  which  the  sena 
tor  noticed  the  present  low  price  of  cotton,  which  he  asserted  to  be  lower  than 
it  has  been  since  the  late  war.  It  is  indeed  low,  very  low — too  much  so  to 
bear  the  burden  of  high  protective  duties ;  but  as  low  as  it  is,  it  is  not  lower 
than  it  was  in  1831,  under  the  operation  of  his  favourite  system,  and  to  which 
he  invites  us  to  return.  But  the  senator  seems  to  forget  that  price  is  not  the 
only  element  by  which  the  prosperity  of  cotton,  or  any  other  product,  is  to  be 
estimated.  Quantity  is  fully  as  important  as  price  itself  in  estimating  the  in 
come  of  those  engaged  in  the  production.  Now,  sir,  let  us  take  into  the  calcu 
lation  both  these  elements,  in  estimating  the  income  of  the  cotton  planters  from 
the  crop  of  1830,  sold  in  1831,  and  that  of  1841,  sold  this  year,  estimated  at 
the  same  price,  say  an  average  of  9  cents,  or  any  other  amount.  The  crop  of 
1830  is  put  down  at  350  millions  of  pounds,  which,  at  9  cents,  would  gire 
$31,500,000;  and  that  of  1841  estimated  at  one  million  seven  hundred  thou 
sand  bales,  say  four  hundred  pounds  to  the  bale,  would  give  680  millions  of 
pounds,  which,  at  nine  cents,  would  give  $61,200,000;  making  a  difference  of 
$29,700,000  in  favour  of  the  latter,  nearly  double  the  former.  It  is  this  great 
increase  in  quantity,  produced  under  the  stimulus  of  low  duties,  which,  if  we 
were  permitted  to  enjoy  its  advantages,  would  add  so  greatly  to  the  prosperity 
of  the  cotton  interest. 


502  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Such  are  the  facts,  drawn  almost  exclusively  from  official  documents,  and 
such  the  results,  proving  beyond  all  doubt  the  deadening  effects  of  high  pro 
tective  duties  on  the  productive  energy  of  the  country,  anti  the  vivifying  effects 
of  a  reduction  from  duties.  Proof  more  conclusive  of  the  one  and  the  other 
cannot  be  offered  ;  but  it  would  be  vain  to  expect  it  to  make  the  slighest  im 
pression  on  the  party  which  now  controls  the  government.  The  leading  inter 
ests—those  which  control  all  their  actions — are  banks,  tariffs,  stocks,  paper,  mo 
nopolies,  and,  above  all,  that  misletoe  interest  which  lives  on  the  government 
itself,  and  flourishes  most  when  its  exactions  are  the  greatest,  and  its  expendi 
tures  the  most  profuse.  High  duties  are  the  life-blood  of  this  powerful  combina 
tion  ;  and  be  the  proof  of  its  pernicious  effects  on  the  community  at  large  ever 
so  clear— as  clear  as  the  sun  at  noon,  it  would  make  no  impression  on  them. 
It  is  to  politics,  and  not  to  political  economy,  they  look  ;  and  they  would  readily 
sacrifice  the  manufactures  themselves  to  save  their  party  and  its  political  ascen 
dency.  But  I  say  to  them,  that  it  is  in  vain  you  resist  light  and  reason.  The 
freedom  of  trade  has  its  foundation  in  the  deep  and  durable  foundation  of  truth, 
and  will  vindicate  itself.  It  draws  its  origin  from  on  high.  It  emanates  from 
the  Divine  will,  and  is  designed  in  its  dispensation  to  perform  an  important  part 
in  binding  together  in  concord  and  peace  the  nations  of  the  earth,  and  in  ex 
tending  far  and  wide  the  blessings  of  civilization.  In  fulfilment  of  this  high  de 
sign,  severe  penalties  are  annexed  to  a  departure  from  its  laws.  But  this  is 
not  the  proper  occasion  to  enter  on  these  higher  considerations.  I  hope  an  op 
portunity  will  be  afforded  when  the  bill  comes  up  for  the  revision  of  the  duties 
for  which  these  resolutions  are,  I  suppose,  intended  to  prepare  the  way.  When 
it  comes  to  be  acted  on,  I  intend  to  embrace  the  opportunity  to  trace  the  laws 
of  which  the  facts  and  results,  which  I  have  stated  from  official  sources,  are  but 
consequences — laws  as  fixed  and  immutable  as  those  which  govern  the  mate 
rial  world. 

As  great  and  striking  as  these  results  are,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  they 
are  but  the  effects  of  the  reduction  of  duties,  and  that,  too,  under  the  greatest 
embarrassment  and  disadvantages,  growing  out  of  the  protective  system,  and  not 
the  full  and  mature  fruit  of  free  trade.  What  has  as  yet  been  experienced  af 
fords  but  a  faint  conception  of  the  wide  and  general  prosperity  which  would  be 
diffused  throughout  the  whole  community  by  low  duties,  sound  currency,  and 
exemption  from  the  debts  and  embarrassments  of  a  false  and  pernicious  system. 
If  gentlemen  could  be  persuaded  to  abstain  from  their  prescriptions — leave  off 
their  nostrums — restore  the  revenue  from  the  lands — economize  and  retrench 
expenditures — the  youthful  vigour  of  the  patient  would  soon  do  the  rest.  Full 
and  robust  health  would  soon  be  restored,  and  a  few  years'  experience  under  the 
benign  effects  of  a  truer  and  better  system  would  in  a  short  time  obliterate  the 
recollection  of  present  suffering. 

Before  I  conclude,  I  feel  called  on  to  notice  the  frequent  allusion  made  to 
South  Carolina  during  the  course  of  this  discussion.  Every  one  who  has  lis 
tened  to  what  has  been  said  must  have  been  struck  with  the  bold  assertions  of 
the  senator,  and  others  who  have  taken  the  same  side,  in  reference  to  her  de 
pression  and  difficulties.  It  has  been  solemnly  asserted  that  no  one  could  ven 
ture  to  say  that  she  has  realized  any  of  the  anticipated  advantages  from  reduc 
tion  of  the  duties.  I  propose  to  answer  these  bold  and  declamatory  assertions, 
as  I  have  others  of  like  kind,  by  appealing  to  facts,  resting  on  official  docu 
ments.  For  this  purpose,  I  have  selected  the  same  period  of  twenty-one  years, 
from  1819  to  1841,  divided  into  the  same  divisions  of  seven  years  each,  and 
have  formed  a  table  marked  H,  giving  the  exports  from  the  state  for  each  year, 
and  the  aggregate  exports  for  each  division.  Reference  to  it  will  show  that 
the  aggregate  exports  in  value  from  the  state  during  the  first  period,  from  1819 
to  1826  inclusive,  was  $55,545,572  ;  and  that  from  the  next,  terminating  with 
1833,  under  the  operation  of  the  two  high  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828,  the  aggre- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  503 

gate  exports  decreased  to  $52,965,513,  showing  a  falling  off  of  a  million  and 
a  half,  under  high  duties.  Turning,  then,  to  the  period  of  reduction,  the  period 
depicted  by  gentlemen  as  so  disastrous  to  the  state,  we  shall  find,  instead  of  a 
decrease,  the  aggregate  exports  of  the  period  swelled  to  $78,338,594,  being  an 
increase  of  $25,375,081,  compared  to  the  preceding  period  of  high  duties.  The 
effect  on  the  imports  is  still  more  striking,  both  in  the  falling  off'  during  the  pe 
riod  of  high  duties  and  recovering  under  that  of  reduction. 

But  it  has  been  attempted  to  explain  this  rapid  increase  of  exports  on  the 
ground  that  a  large  portion  are  the  products  of  Georgia,  drawn  to  the  port  of 
Charleston  by  the  railroad  to  Hamburg,  opposite  to  Augusta.  It  is  probable 
that  there  was  a  greater  amount  from  Georgia  during  the  last  period,  compared 
with  the  preceding,  from  that  cause,  but  nothing  like  sufficient  to  account  for 
the  increase,  as  would  be  manifest  by  turning  to  the  exports  and  imports  of 
Georgia  for  the  same  period.  I  find,  on  examining  them,  that  they  have  fol 
lowed  the  same  laws  in  the  two*  periods,  the  exports  remaining  about  stationary 
during  the  period  of  high  duties,  and  the  imports  regularly  falling  off,  and  both 
immediately  and  regularly  increasing  throughout  that  of  the  reduction ;  with 
this  difference,  that  Georgia  has  increased  in  both  even  more  rapidly  than  Car 
olina,  probably  because  of  her  increased  population.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  it 
clearly  shows  that  the  great  increase  of  Carolina  is  not  owing  to  the  cause  to 
which  it  is  attempted  to  attribute  it. 

But  as  great  as  the  impulse  is  which  has  been  given  to  her  export  trade,  I 
do  not  deny  that  South  Carolina,  like  all  the  other  states,  is  suffering  under 
great  pecuniary  and  commercial  embarrassments  ;  not,  however,  in  consequence 
of  reduction  of  duties,  but  in  spite  of  it.  Her  suffering  is  from  the  same  gen 
eral  causes  already  explained,  with  the  addition  of  several  peculiar  to  herself. 
Short  crops  from  bad  seasons  for  the  last  two  years ;  a  destructive  fire  in  the 
heart  of  her  commercial  capital,  which  destroyed  a  large  portion  of  that  city  ; 
a  heavy  loss,  estimated  at  about  three  millions  of  dollars,  from  the  insolvency 
of  the  United  States  Bank  of  Pennsylvania  ;  a  large  expenditure  on  a  railroad 
project,  which  has  been  found  impracticable  ;  and  the  deranged  state  of  the 
currency  in  the  surrounding  states,  which  has  done  much  to  embarrass  her  com 
merce.  But,  in  the  midst  of  all  difficulties,  she  stands  erect,  with  a  sound  cur 
rency  and  unimpeached  credit,  and  as  likely  to  ride  out  the  storm  as  any  other 
state.  Gentlemen  greatly  mistake  if  they  suppose  she  is  so  ignorant  and  stupid 
as  to  confound  the  cause  of  her  difficulties  with  what  has  done  so  much  to  aug 
ment  her  means,  and  to  enable  her  to  bear  up  successfully  under  her  difficulties. 
Having  finished  my  remarks  as  far  as  they  relate  to  these  resolutions,  1  pro 
pose  to  advert,  in  conclusion,  to  a  topic  which  has  been  drawn  into  this  discus 
sion  by  almost  every  one  who  has  spoken  on  the  opposite  side.  It  would  seem 
that  there  has  sprung  up,  all  at  once,  among  our  manufacturing  friends,  a  great 
solicitude  about  us  of  the  South,  and  our  great  staple.  They  look  on  our  ruin 
as  certain,  unless  something  should  be  done  to  prevent  it,  and  are  ready  to  shed 
tears  at  the  distress  about  to  overwhelm  us.  They  see  in  Hindostan  a  great 
and  successful  rival,  about  to  drive  us  entirely  out  of  the  cotton  market  of  the 
world  ;  against  which,  according  to  their  opinion,  there  is  but  one  refuge,  the 
home  market,  to  be  secured  by  high  protective  duties.  To  this  panacea  they 
resort  for  every  disease  that  can  afflict  the  body  politic.  But  admit  the  danger  : 
I  ask,  Of  what  service  would  the  home  market  be  to  us  if  we  lose  the  foreign  ? 
We  have  already  possession,  substantially,  of  the  home  market.  The  whole 
amount  of  cotton  goods  imported  for  consumption  in  1840  was  but  little  more 
than  six  millions  of  dollars,  about  one  eighth  in  value  compared  with  that  man 
ufactured  at  home.  Of  the  imported,  by  far  the  larger  proportion  are  fine  arid 
light  articles,  which  would  require  but  a  small  quantity  of  the  raw  material  to 
manufacture  them ;  not  more  at  the  outside,  I  should  suppose,  than  thirty  thou 
sand  bales  ;  so  that,  if  every  yard  of  cotton  goods  consumed  in  the  country  was 


504  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

made  at  home,  it  would  only  make  that  addition  to  the  quantity  of  cotton  al 
ready  consumed  by  our  own  manufactures.  What,  I  ask,  is  to  be  done  with 
the  residue,  which  is  five  or  six  times  greater,  and  now  finds  its  market  abroad  ? 
Do  you  suppose  that  we  are  such  simpletons  as  to  assent  to  high  duties  on  all 
we  consume — to  be  highly  taxed  in  all  that  we  eat,  drink,  or  wear,  for  such  pal 
try  consideration  ?  But  suppose  we  should  be  simple  enough  to  be  gulled  by 
so  shallow  a  device,  what  security  have  we,  if  the  East  India  cotton  should 
prove  to  be  cheaper  than  ours,  as  you  allege  it  will,  that  the  duty  which  would 
be  laid  on  it  might  riot  be  repealed,  just  as  you  have  repealed  that  on  indigo, 
raw  hides,  and  many  other  articles,  which  might  be  supplied  from  our  own  soil  I 
You  must  pardon  me.  I  cannot  take  your  word,  after  the  ingenuity  you  have 
shown  in  construing  away  the  Compromise  Act.  You  must  excuse  me  if  1  am 
a  little  suspicious  and  jealous  after  what  I  have  witnessed.  You  must  redeem 
the  existing  pledges  before  you  ask  me  to  accept  of  another. 

But  is  the  danger  really  so  great  as  gentlemen  represent  ?  Are  we  in  reali 
ty  about  to  find  a  successful  rival  in  the  cultivation  of  cotton  ?  If  such  be  the 
fact — ^  the  cultivation  of  cotton  is  to  be  lost,  we  shall  have  at  least  the  poor 
consolation  that  we  will  not  be  the  only  sufferer.  It  would  work  a  revolution 
in  all  our  industrial  pursuits.  What  would  become  of  our  foreign  and  domestic 
commerce  ?  What  of  our  tonnage  and  navigation  ?  What  of  our  finances  ? 
What  of  the  great  internal  exchanges  of  the  country  ?  I  will  not  undertake  to 
offer  an  opinion  on  the  capacity  of  Hindostan  to  produce  cotton.  The  region  is 
large,  and  the  soil  and  climate  various.  The  population  great,  and  wages  low  ; 
but  I  must  be  permitted  to  doubt  the  success  of  the  experiment  of  driving  us  out 
of  the  market,  though  backed  and  patronised  by  English  capital  and  energy. 
Nor  am  I  alone  in  doubting.  I  have  taken  from  a  late  English  paper  (The 
Manchester  Guardian)  an  article  which  'speaks  with  great  confidence  that  the 
experiment  has  proved  a  failure.  I  will  thank  the  secretary  to  read  it : 

"  CULTIVATION  OF  COTTON  IN  INDIA. — Since  the  publication1  of  the  letter  on 
this  subject,  addressed  by  the  Bombay  Chamber  of  Commerce  to  the  Indian 
government,  we  have  learned,  through  the  medium  of  letters  received  by  the 
last  overland  mail,  that  the  efforts  of  the  American  planters  who  went  to  the 
westerly  side  of  India  have  so  far  entirely  failed.     Indeed,  so  far  as  we  can 
learn,  there  has  been  very  great  neglect  and  mismanagement  on  almost  every 
point  connected  with  their  operations.     It  would  seem  as  if  the  directors  of  the 
East  India  Company  had  thought  it  was  quite  enough  to  send  them  to  India, 
and  that  all  farther  care  about  them  was  quite  unnecessary ;  for,  on  their  arri 
val  in  that  country,  they  found  that  no  direction  respecting  them  had  been  giv 
en  ;  and  they  were  absolutely  losing  their  time  for  two  or  three  months,  until 
instructions  could  be  received  from  the  government.     Then,  instead  of  letting 
them  survey  the  country,  and  choose  the  situation  and  soil  which  appeared  best 
adapted  for  the  culture  of  cotton,  when  instructions  were  received,  they  were 
taken  at  once  to  Broach,  and  there  placed  under  the  direction  of  a  gentleman 
who  felt  no  interest  in  the  matter,  but  who  took  upon  him  to  choose  soil  and 
situation  for  them.     He  allotted  them  what  was  considered  very  good  cotton 
land — that  is,  land  of  a  strong  and  tenacious  quality,  exceedingly  well  adapted 
for  the  growth  of  the  native  cotton,  but  which  former  experiments  had  shown 
to  be  very  unfavourable  to  the  American  plant,  which  has  a  large  tap  root,  and 
thrives  as  badly  in  the  stiff  black  soil  in  which  the  native  cotton  is  grown,  as 
carrots  would  thrive  in  a  stiff  clay  in  this  country.     As  a  matter  of  course,  their 
crop  of  upland  cotton  has  failed,  with  the  exception  of  a  very  small  patch  which 
they  had  planted  on  a  piece  of  light  sandy  soil,  which  the  tap  roots  of  the  cot 
ton  were  able  to  penetrate,  and  on  which  the  plants  were  exceedingly  luxu 
riant,  and  covered  with  large  pods  of  cotton.     From  the  strong  black  soil,  it  was 
not  supposed  that  they  would  be  able  to  pick  a  pound  per  acre  of  good  cotton.     So 
far,  therefore,  the  cultivation  of  American  cotton  in  Upper  India  has  made  no 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  505 

progress ;  nor  do  we  imagine  that  it  is  very  likely  to  do  so  hereafter.  Fron« 
all  we  have  read  upon  the  subject  of  Indian  cotton  cultivation,  it  seems  to  us 
that  the  best  chance  of  success  is  to  be  found  in  a  careful  and  discriminating 
growth  of  native  varieties,  and  a  careful  gathering  and  cleaning  of  the  produce. 
This  was  one  of  the  objects  towards  which  the  attention  of  the  American  plant 
ers  was  to  be  directed,  but  hitherto  we  find  very  little  has  been  done.  At  the 
date  of  the  latest  advices  from  Broach  (the  24th  of  November),  they  were  put 
ting  up  a  ginhouse  for  ginning  native  cotton ;  but,  owing  to  the  great  number 
of  obstacles  necessarily  experienced  in  such  a  country  as  India,  they  made  very 
slow  progress  with  their  work,  and  it  was  feared  that  the  growing  crop  would 
be  entirely  over  before  their  gins  were  ready.  Up  to  the  date  mentioned,  no 
satisfactory  experiments  had  been  made  as  to  the  capability  of  the  native  cotton 
to  stand  ginning.  Some  trials  were  about  to  be  made  with  a  hand-gin,  which, 
one  would  suppose,  ought  to  have  been  the  first  step  taken,  before  incurring  a 
large  expense  in  erecting  machinery,  which  may  prove  useless.  On  the  whole, 
we  fear  the  prospect  of  receiving  any  large  supply  of  superior  cotton  from  In 
dia  is  not  at  present  very  flattering.  In  order  to  overcome  the  difficulties  pre 
sented  by  the  habits  of  the  people,  and  by  other  causes,  great  energy  and  per 
severance  on  the  part  of  the  agents  of  the  Indian  government  intrusted  with 
the  control  of  the  experiments  are  absolutely  necessary  ;  and  those  qualities  can 
not  be  expected  from  parties  who  do  not  feel  a  strong  interest  in  their  success. 
Hitherto,  we  believe,  the  government  agents  have  lent  but  a  cold  and  indiffer 
ent  aid  to  the  experiments ;  and  it  is,  therefore,  to  be  feared  that,  unless  the 
matter  should  be  put  into  other  hands,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  much  chance 
of  any  good  result  from  experiments  from  which  so  much  was  expected." — Man 
chester  Guardian. 

In  confirmation  of  the  opinion  of  the  writer  of  the  article,  that  of  intelligent 
individuals,  well  acquainted  with  the  country,  might  be  added,  who  speak  with 
confidence  that,  taking  price  and  quality  into  consideration,  we  have  nothing  se 
rious  to  apprehend.  We  might,  indeed,  have  something  to  fear  during  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  Chinese  war.  That  country  is  the  principal  market  for  the  cot 
ton  of  Hindostan,  and  while  it  remains  closed,  the  cotton  intended  for  its  mar 
ket  may  be  thrown  in  such  quantities  on  the  European  as  may  materially  de 
press  the  price.  But  the  present  relation  between  Great  Britain  and  China  can 
not  long  continue.  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  the  former  will  at  last  suc 
ceed  in  opening  the  market  of  China  to  the  commerce  of  the  world  to  a  much 
greater  extent  than  it  has  ever  been  heretofore ;  when,  so  far  from  competing 
with  us,  the  totton  of  Hindostan  will  not  be  sufficient  to  supply  the  demands 
of  that  great  market. 

But  1  am  not  ignorant  that  we  must  rely  for  holding  the  cotton  market  on 
our  superior  skill,  industry,  and  capacity  for  producing  the  article.  Nearly,  if 
not  altogether,  one  half  of  the  solid  contents  of  the  globe  is  capable  of  producing 
cotton  ;  and  that,  too,  in  the  portion  the  most  populous,  and  where  labour  is  the 
cheapest.  We  may  have  rivals  everywhere  in  a  belt  of  70  degrees  at  least, 
lying  on  each  side  of  the  equator,  and  extending  around  the  globe.  Not  only 
the  far  East,  but  all  Western  Asia,  quite  to  the  35th,  or  even  the  40th  degree 
of  latitude,  a  large  portion  of  Europe,  almost  all  Africa,  and  a  large  portion  of 
this  continent,  may  be  said  to  be  a  cotton-producing  region.  When  the  price 
of  cotton  rises  high,  a  large  portion  of  that  immense  region  becomes  our  com 
petitors  in  its  production,  which  invariably  results  in  a  great  fall  of  price,  when 
a  struggle  follows  for  the  market.  In  that  struggle  we  have  ever,  heretofore, 
succeeded,  and  I  have  no  fear,  with  fair  play  on  the  part  of  our  own  govern 
ment,  we  will  continue  to  be  successful  against  the  world.  We  have  the  ele 
ments  of  success  within  us.  A  favourable  soil  and  climate,  a  plenty  of  cheap 
land,  held  in  fee  simple,  without  rent,  tithes,  or  poor  rates.  But,  above  all,  we 
have  a  cheap  and  efficient  body  of  labourers,  the  best  fed,  clothed,  trained,  and 

S  s  s 


506  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

provided  for  of  any  in  the  whole  cotton-growing  region,  for  whose  labour  we 
have  paid  in  advance.     I  say  paid  for  in  advance,  for  our  property  in  our  slaves 
is  but  wages  purchased  in  advance,  including  the  support  and  supplies  of  the  la 
bourers,  which  is  usually  very  liberal.     With  these  advantages,  we  may  bid  de 
fiance  to  Hindu  or  Egyptian  labour,  at  its  two  or  three  cents  a  day.     Ours  be 
ing  already  paid  for,  is,  as  far  as  the  question  of  competition  is  concerned,  still 
cheaper,  to  say  nothing  of  its  superior  efficiency,  its  better  and  more  skilful  di 
rection,  under  the  immediate  eye  of  intelligent  proprietors,  of  cheap,  unencum 
bered  land,  favourable  soil  and  climate,  and  greater  facility  and  cheapness  of 
transportation  to  the  great  markets  of  the  world.     But  this  is  not  all.     We  have 
another  and  great  advantage.     There  is  not  a  people  on  earth  who  can  so  well 
bear  the  curtailing  of  profits  as  the  Southern  planters,  when  out  of  debt.     A 
plantation  is  a  little  community  of  itself,  which,  when  hard  pressed,  can  furnish 
within  itself  almost  all  of  its  supplies.     Ours  is  a  fine  provision  country,  and, 
when  needs  be,  can  furnish  most  of  its  supplies  of  food  and  clothing  from  its 
own  resources.     In  prosperous  times,  when  the  price  of  our  staples  is  high,  our 
labour  is  almost  exclusively  directed  to  their  production  ;  and  then  we  freely  and 
liberally  part  with  their  proceeds  in  exchange  for  horses,  mules,  cattle,  hogs, 
and  provisions  of  all  description  from  the  West,  and  clothing  and  all  the  products 
of  the  arts  with  the  North  and  East ;  but  when  prices  fall  and  pressure  comes, 
we  gradually  retire  on  our  own  means,  and  draw  our  own  supplies  from  within. 
With  these  great  advantages,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  in  all  the  great  strug 
gles  that  we  have  had  for  the  cotton  market  (they  have  been  many  and  great), 
we  have  ever  come  off  successful.     It  is  incident  to  that  great  staple  article, 
cotton,  the  first  in  the  whole  circle  of  commerce,  to  be  subject  to  extraordinary 
vibrations  of  price  from  the  causes  to  which  I  have  alluded.     At  one  time  prices 
are  high  and  profits  great,  and  at  another  low  and  the  profits  small.     It  can  be 
permanently  cultivated  only  by  those  who  can  best  go  through  these  great  vi 
brations.     We  are  willing  to  hold  it  on  that  condition,  and  feel  confident  we 
can,  with  justice  from  this  government.     We  dread  not  the  competition  of  Hin- 
dostan  ;  but  your  unequal,  unconstitutional,  and  oppressive  legislation — that  le 
gislation  which  pushes  the  expenditures  of  the  government  to  the  most  extrav 
agant  extent,  and  which  places  the  burden  of  supporting  the  government  almost 
exclusively  on  the  exchanges  of  our  products  with  the  rest  of  the  world.     Every 
dollar  of  tax,  imposed  on  our  exchanges  in  the  shape  of  duties,  impairs  to  that 
extent  our  capacity  to  meet  the  severe  competition  to  which  we  are  exposed ; 
and  nothing  but  a  system  of  high  protective  duties,  long  continued,  can  prevent 
us  from  meeting  it  successfully.     It  is  that  which  we  have  to  fear.     Let  the 
planters  avoid  banks,  keep  out  of  debt,  and  have  a  sound  currency  and  low  du 
ties,  and  they  may  bid  defiance  to  competition,  come  from  what  quarter  it  may, 
and  look  forward  with  confidence  to  a  prosperity  greater  than  they  have  ever 
yet  experienced. 

APPENDIX. 

TABLE  A.— DOMESTIC  EXPORTS. 


Years. 

Domestic  Exports. 

4» 

Years. 

Domestic  Exports. 

1825 

$66,  94  1,74-5 

1833 

$70,317,698 

1826 

53,055,710 

1834 

81,034,162 

1827 

58,921,691 

1835 

101,189,082 

1828 

50,669,669 

1836 

106,916,680 

1829 

55,700,193 

1837 

95,564,414 

1830 

59,462,029 

1838 

96,033,821 

1831 

6-1,277,057 

1839 

103,533,891 

1832 

63,137,4-70 

1840 

113,762,617 

$469,198,564 

$768,352,365 

SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    C  \LIIOUN. 


507 


TABLE  B -AMERICAN  TONNAGE. 


Years. 

Registered 

Enrolled 
and 

Total. 

Years. 

Registered 

Enrolled 
and 

Total. 

Licensed. 

Licensed. 

1825 

700,787 

722,323  1423,111 

1833 

750,026 

856,122 

1,606,149 

1826 

737,9781796,212  1,534,190 

1834  857,438 

901,4681,758,906 

1827 

747,170873,4371,620,607 

1835 

885,821 

939,118^1,824,939 

1828 

812,619 

928,772    ,741,391 

1836 

897,774 

984,328  1,892,202 

1829 

650,142 

610,654 

,260,977 

1837 

810,447 

1,086,238 

1,896,685 

1830 

576,475 

615,301 

,191,776 

1838 

822,591 

1,173,0471,995,638 

1831 

620,451 

647,394    ,267,846 

1839 

834,244  1,262,234  2,096,478 

1832 

686,989 

752,459 

,439,450 

1840 

899,764 

1,280,999 

2,180,763 

TABLE  C.— MANUFACTURES. 


Years. 

Amount  in  each  year.  , 

Years. 

Arnjnnt  in  each  year. 

1825 

$5,729,797 

1833 

$6,557,080 

1826 

5,495,130 

1834 

6,247,893 

1827 

5,536,651 

1835 

7,694,073 

1828 

5,548,354 

1836 

6,107,528 

1829 

5,412,320 

1837 

7,136,997 

1830 

5.320,980 

1838 

8,397,078 

1831 

5,086,890 

1839 

10.927,529 

1332 

5,050,633 

1840 

12,848,840 

$43,180,755 

$65,917,018 

TABLE  D.— EXPORTS. 


Years 

Cotton. 

Years. 

Cotton. 

•  Years. 

Cotton. 

1820 

22,308,667 

1827 

29,359,545 

1834 

49,448,402 

1821 

20,157,484 

1828 

22,487,229 

1835 

64,661,302 

1822 

24,035,058 

1829 

26,575,311 

1836 

71,284,925 

1823 

20,445,520 

1830 

29,674,883 

1837 

63,240,102 

1824 

21,947,401 

1831 

25,289,492 

1838 

61,556,811 

1825 

36,846,649 

1832 

31,724,682 

1839 

61,238,982 

1826 

25,025,214 

1833 

36,191,105 

1840 

63,870,307 

170,765,993 

201,302,247 

435,300,831 

TABLE  E.— EXPORTS. 


Years. 

Tobacco. 

\  ears. 

Tobacco. 

Years. 

T.  bare... 

1820 

1821 

1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 

1826 

7,968,600 
5,648,962 
6,222,838 
6,282,672 
4,855,566 
6,115,623 
5,347,208 

1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 

6,816,146 

5,840,707 
5,185,370 
5,833,112 
4,892,388 
5,999,769 
5,755,968 

1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
1840 

6,595,305 

8,250,577 
10,058,640 
5,795,647 
7,392,029 
9,832,943 
9,883,957 

43,441,469 

39,963,460 

57,809,098 

TABLE  F.— EXPORTS. 


Years. 

Rice.                 1  1        Years. 

Biice. 

Years. 

Rice. 

1820 

1821 

1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 

1826 

1,714,923 
1,494,307 
1,563,482 
1,820,985 
1,882,982 
1,925,245 
1,917,445 

1827 

1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 

2,343,908 
2,620,696 
2,514,370 
1,986,824 
2,016,267 
2,152,361 
2,774,418 

1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 

1838 
1839 
1840 

2,122,292 
2,210,331 
2,548,750 
2,309,279 
1,721,819 
2,460,198 
1,942,076 

12,319,369 

16,408^44 

15,314,745 

508 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 


TABLE  G. 

Statement  showing  the  quantity,  price,  and  value  of  the  Cotton  grown  in  the 
United  States  from  1819  to  1840. 


Year. 

Ibs.  millions. 

Price  }icr  ib. 
cents. 

Value. 

Increase. 

1820 

160 

17 

$27,200,000 

1821 

180 

16 

28,800,000 

1822 

210 

16} 

34,650,000 

1823 

185 

11 

20,350,000 

1824 

215 

15 

32,250,000 

1825 

255 

21 

53,550,000 

1826 

350 

11 

38,500,000 

1555 

15! 

$234,675,000 

1827 

270 

9J 

27,700,000 

1828 

325 

ioj 

40,625,000 

1829 

365 

10 

36,500,000 

1830 

350 

10 

35,000,000 

1831 

385 

9* 

35,612,500 

1832 

390 

10 

39,000,000 

1833 

445 

11 

48,950,000 

2530 

10 

$263,387,500 

$28,712,500 

1834 

460 

13 

59,800,000 

1835 

416 

i*f 

68,640,000 

1836 

445  ' 

151 

67,862,500 

1837 

485 

151 

73,962,500 

1838 

525 

101 

53,812,500 

1839 

566 

14 

79,240,000 

1840 

880 

9* 

83,600,000 

3777 

131 

$487,117,500 

$223,730,000 

The  quantity  of  cotton  received  at  the  port  of  Boston  from  October, 
1839,  to  October,  1840,  was : 


Receipts  in  1835 


do. 
do. 
do. 
do. 
do. 


1836 
1837 

1838 
1839 
1840 


Estimate  for  1841 


-  80,709  bales. 

-  82,885  « 

-  82,664  " 

-  96,636  " 

-  94,350  " 

-  136,357  " 
150,000 


Since  January  1st,  1841,  there  was  received  to  this,  the  26th  of  May, 
less  than  five  months,  93,057  bales,  and  the  quantity  received  this  year 
will  probably  be  150,000  bales. — Boston  Atlas. 

TABLE  H.— DOMESTIC  EXPORTS  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  FROM  1819  TO  1841. 


Years. 

Exports. 

Years. 

Exports. 

Years. 

Exports. 

1820 
1821 
1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 
1826 

8,690,539 
6,867,515 
7,136,366 
6,671,998 
7,833,713 
10,876,475 
7,468,966 

1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 

8,189,496 
6,508,570 
8,134,676 
7,580,821 
6,528,605 
7,685,833 
8,337,512 
52,965,513 

1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 

1838 
1839 
1840 

11,119,565 
11,224,298 
13,482,757 
11,138,992 
11,017,391 
10,318,822 
10,036,769 

55,545,572 

78,338,594 

Gain  in  last  seven  years,  25,373,081. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  509 

XXXV. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    LOAN    BILL,   APRIL    12,   1842. 

THE  question  being  put  on  the  passage  of  the  bill,  and  the  yeas  and 
nays  having  been  ordered, 

Mr.  Calhoun  said,  that  it  was  not  his  object,  in  rising  at  this  late  stage 
of  the  question,  to  discuss  the  provisions  of  this  bill.  That  had  been 
done  so  fully  and  ably  by  those  who  had  preceded  in  the  debate  on  the 
same  side,  that  he  had  nothing  to  add.  But,  in  order  to  have  a  full  and  clear 
understanding  of  the  bearing  of  this  measure  on  the  finances  of  the  gov 
ernment,  we  must  look  beyond  the  provisions  of  the  bill.  It  was  not  a 
lone  measure,  unconnected  with  those  which  preceded  it,  or  would  suc 
ceed  it,  but  quite  the  reverse.  It  was  a  link  in  the  sytem  of  policy  com 
menced  at  the  special  session,  and  which  had  hitherto  been  perseveringly 
followed  up,  and,  if  he  was  not  greatly  deceived,  would  be  persisted  in  so 
long  as  those  who  now  have  the  control  held  power.  Already  has  the 
system  contributed  greatly  to  depress  the  credit  of  the  government,  and 
it  is  to  be  feared,  if  it  be  not  arrested,  that  it  will  sink  it  far  below  its 
present  level.  What  he  proposed,  in  the  remarks  which  he  was  about 
to  offer,  was  to  trace  the  consequences  of  the  system  in  its  bearings  on 
the  finances  and  credit  of  the  government. 

That  the  credit  of  the  government  is  greatly  impaired  of  late,  will  not 
be  denied.  It  is  but  a  short  time  since  the  very  committee  which  re 
ported  this  loan  bill  reported  another  for  about  the  same  amount,  which 
became  a  law.  At  that  time,  so  high  did  the  credit  of  the  government 
stand,  that  it  was  expressly  provided  that  not  more  than  six  per  cent,  in 
terest  should  be  allowed,  and  that  the  loan  shoul.d  be  redeemable  in  three 
years.  As  short  as  was  the  period,  it  was  confidently  predicted  that  it 
would  be  taken  at  five  per  cent. ;  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
commenced  his  negotiation  for  the  loan  with  that  expectation,  and  actu 
ally  obtained  a  considerable  portion  of  it  under  six  per  cent.  The  bill 
passed  late  in  July  last ;  and,  in  the  period  of  nine  short  months,  the  very 
same  committee  reported  this  bill,  which  proposes  to  send  the  public 
credit  into  the  market  to  be  sold  for  what  it  will  bring  ;  and  that,  too,  for 
twenty  years,  a  period  nearly  seven  times  longer  than  the  term  prescribed 
in  the  former  bill. 

The  conditions  offered  for  a  loan  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  indicating 
the  value  which  the  government  stamps  on  its  own  credit ;  and  we  may 
be  assured  that  the  keensighted  race  who  have  money  to  lend  will  rarely 
affix  a  higher  value  than  what  that  stamp  indicates.  Judged  by  that  stand 
ard,  the  credit  of  the  government  has  never  before  been  as  low  j  no,  not  in 
the  late  war  with  England—a  war  with  one  of  the  greatest,  if  not  the 
greatest  power  on  earth — commenced  with  a  remnant  of  an  old  debt  of 
more  than  forty  millions  of  dollars,  and  at  the  very  beginning  of  which 
there  was  a  universal  suspension  of  payments  by  all  the  banks  south  of 
New-England.  Even  in  that  great  struggle,  under  all  its  embarrassments, 
no  secretary  of  the  treasury  or  committee  ever  dared  to  put  the  credit  of 
the  government  into  market  under  such  disadvantageous  terms  as  is  pro 
posed  in  this  bill.  The  longest  period  for  the  redemption  of  any  loan 
contracted  during  the  war,  if  his  memory  served  him,  was  but  twelve 
years  —  a  period  not  much  exceeding  half  the  time  allowed  by  this 
bill.  Such  and  so  great  has  been  the  decay  of  the  public  credit  in  the 
short  space  of  a  few  months!  And  here  the  question  is  presented,  What 


510  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

has  caused  this  unexampled  and  rapid  decay  of  the  credit  of  the  govern 
ment  in  a  period  of  peace,  when  the  resources  of  the  country  are  more 
than  doubled,  and  with  a  public  debt  comparatively  so  small  1 

The  chairman  of  the  Finance  Committee  felt  the  force  of  this  question  j 
and,  if  we  are  to  believe  him,  the  extraordinary  offer  which  the  Secretary 
of  the  ireasury  is  authorized  to  make  for  this  loan  is  to  be  explained,  not 
on  the  ground  that  the  credit  of  the  government  is  impaired,  but  from  the 
scarcity  of  money.  He  says  that  there  is  an  extraordinary  demand  for 
money,  and  that  a  higher  interest,  in  consequence,  must  be  paid  for 
its  use  j  and  that  the  government,  like  individuals,  can  get  it  only  by 
giving  its  market  value.  Unfortunately  for  him,  the  fact  does  not  accord 
with  liis  explanation.  Interest  is  now  lower  in  the  general  market  of  the 
world  than  when  the  former  loan  bill  passed.  The  best  index  of  that 
market  is  the  rate  of  interest  at  which  the  Bank  of  England  discounts. 
Judging  by  that,  there  has  been  a  very  great  reduction  of  interest  within 
the  last  few  months — from  tive  to  four  per  cent.  Even  in  our  own  country, 
where  confidence  is  imperfect,  interest  is  far  from  being  high.  It  was  but 
the  other  day  stated,  in  a  debate  on  this  bill,  that  the  stocks  of  the  State  of 
Maine  and  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  bearing  six  per  cent,  interest,  are  at 
par  j  and  that  of  his  own  state,  in  its  own  market,  is,  he  is  informed,  some 
thing  above  par.  But  the  senator  himself  may  be  quoted  against  his  own 
explanation.  Forgetful  of  the  ground  that  he  had  taken,  he  mentioned  it 
as  a  remarkable  fact,  that  exchange  with  England  at  this  time  is  very 
low — several  per  cent,  below  par.  From  this  he  inferred  that  money  was 
plenty — not,  indeed,  from  increase  of  quantity,  but  from  the  diminution 
of  business.  Like  everything  else,  its  price  (if  he  might  use  the  expres 
sion  as  applied  to  money)  followed  the  great  law  of  demand  and  supply  j 
and  it  might  be  lowered,  as  well  by  diminishing  the  demand  as  by  increas 
ing  the  supply  ;  and,  in  either  case,  a  favourable  state  of  the  market  would 
exist  for  the  negotiation  of  loans  on  good  terms,  where  the  credit  of  the 
borrower  was  above  suspicion. 

The  senator  from  Rhode  Island  (Mr.  Simmons),  taking  a  more  correct 
view  of  the  fact,  admitted  that  the  difficulty  of  negotiating  a  loan  on  fa 
vourable  terms  was  the  loss  of  credit ;  but  he  attributed  the  loss  of  credit 
on  the  part  of  this  government  to  the  loss  of  credit  by  so  many  of  the  states 
of  the  Union.  He  said  that  there  was  a  mutual  sympathy  between  the 
credit  of  this  government  and  that  of  the  states,  and  that  when  the  one 
was  impaired  it  necessarily  impaired  the  other.  He  (Mr.  C.)  did  riot  ad 
mit  that  there  was  any  such  dependance  j  and,  for  proof,  he  referred  to 
the  fact  that  a  few  months  since,  when  the  former  loan  bill  passed,  the 
credit  of  this  government  stood  high — never  higher,  although  that  of 
many  of  the  states  was  then  greatly  depressed.'  But,  while  he  denied  the 
dependance,  he  readily  admitted  that  there  was  so  much  connexion  be 
tween  the  two,  that,  when  the  credit  of  the  states  was  greatly  impaired, 
great  prudence,  much  caution,  and  careful  management  were  necessary 
to  prevent  that  of  this  government  from  being  depressed.  It  was  the  mo 
ment  when  the  money-lenders  would  view  the  conduct  of  this  government 
with  the  keenest  jealousy,  and  when  any  mismanagement  of  its  finances 
would  be  sure  to  be  followed  with  the  worst  effect  on  its  credit ;  but,  with 
proper  management,  its  credit  would  not  be  affected  by  the  discredit  of 
the  states. 

If,  then,  neither  the  state  of  the  money  market,  nor  the  discredit  of  so 
many  of  the  states,  can  explain  the  necessity  for  the  extraordinary  terms 
to  be  offered  for  this  loan,  to  what  is  it  to  be  attributed'?  It  was  no  time 
for  vague  or  gentle  language.  He  intended  to  express  himself  plainly  and 
strongly,  but  without  the  least  intention  of  offending.  It  is,  then,  to  be 


SPEECHES    OF   JOHN    C.    CALHOUN.  511 

attributed  to  the  loss  of  credit  on  the  part  of  the  government — a  rapid 
and  great  loss — and  which,  he  feared,  was  still  in  progress.  And  to  what 
is  that  to  be  attributed  (  To  your  conduct,  gentlemen.  It  is  you  who 
have  impaired  the  public  credit.  You  are  the  responsible  party.  You 
have  destroyed  the  equilibrium  between  income  and  expenditure,  on  which 
the  credit  of  governments,  as  well  as  individuals,  must  ultimately  depend. 
You  have  reduced  the  income  of  the  government  below  its  expenditures: 
in  the  first  place,  by  giving  away  a  portion  of  the  revenue  from  the  pub 
lic  lands — a  portion  by  far  the  most  permanent  and  growing  ;  and,  in  the 
next,  by  greatly  increasing  its  expenditures.  To  this  you  added  a  heavy  loan 
of  $  12,000,000,  making  an  annual  charge  for  interest  of  upward  of  seven 
hundred  thousand  dollars.  And,  to  cap  the  climax,  you  proposed,  in  the 
face  of  all  this,  to  raise  the  permanent  expenditures  to  nearly  thirty  mill 
ions  of  dollars,  without  making  any  adequate  provision  to  meet  it.  It 
was  thus  that  the  equilibrium  between  the  income  and  expenditure  of  the 
government  was  destroyed  ;  and  the  want  of  menns  to  meet  its  engage 
ments  followed  as  a  matter  of  course. 

But  what  you  did  was  not  so  fatal  to  the  public  credit,  as  bad  as  it  was, 
as  the  circumstances  under  which  you  did  it.  What  were  they  1  You 
did  it  when  you  knew  that  the  credit  of  many  states  was  deeply  impaired, 
and  threatened  to  be  still  more  so.  You  knew  that  there  was  hazard  that 
their  discredit  might  react  and  cast  suspicion  on  the  credit  of  the  Union, 
and  impair  that  of  this  government,  as  well  as  that  of  the  states  which  still 
preserved  theirs,  without  great  prudence  and  caution  in  the  management 
of  our  finances.  Nor  were  you  ignorant  that  the  financial  condition  of 
the  government  was  in  other  respects  highly  critical.  That  you  were 
fully  apprized  of  the  fact,  I  will  prove  from  your  own  words.  How  often 
have  you  declared  that  there  was  a  heavy  deficit  when  you  came  into 
power ;  that  the  revenue  was  rapidly  declining  under  the  Compromise 
Act  j  and  that  those  who  preceded  you  had  neglected  to  make  provision 
to  meet  the  growing  deficit  j  and,  finally,  that  there  was  great  waste  in 
the  collection  and  disbursement  of  the  revenue  1  You  stated  all  this  to 
prove  that  the  blame  lay  not  at  your  door.  Admitting  all  you  said,  can 
you  exempt  yourselves  from  blame  1  Power  was  not  forced  on  you.  You 
sought  it — eagerly  sought  it — and  that  by  the  most  objectionable  means. 
You  got  it  under  the  promise  of  reform,  and  thus  placed  yourselves  un 
der  the  most  solemn  obligation  to  administer  the  finances  with  the  utmost 
care  and  skill.  And  yet  it  was  under  these  circumstances,  and  in  the 
extremely  critical  condition,  according  to  your  own  admission,  of  the 
finances  of  the  government,  that  you  reduced  the  income,  increased  the 
expenditures,  added  a  large  amount  of  debt,  and  proclaimed  your  inten 
tion  to  raise  the  permanent  expenditures  far  above  the  then  existing  scale, 
Avithout  providing  anything  like  adequate  means  to  meet  such  increase. 
Can  it,  then,  be  a  matter  of  surprise  that  such  conduct  should  be  followed 
by  that  rapid  and  deep  decay  of  credit  by  which  it  has  been  sunk,  in  the 
short  space  of  a  few  months  (if  we  may  judge  by  the  terms  of  this  bill), 
to  a  point  of  depression  far  below  what  it  ever  has  been  at  any  other  pe 
riod,  in  peace  or  war  1  Be  assured  that  the  keen  and  vigilant  class  who 
have  money  to  lend  watch  your  course  with  ceaseless  attention  ;  and  that 
not  a  false  step  has  been  taken  in  the  management  of  the  finances,  nor  an 
act  been  done  that  may  indicate  a  want  of  due  care  or  regard  to  the  pub 
lic  faith  on  your  part,  that  has  not  contributed  to  impair  the  credit  of  the 
government,  especially  at  so  critical  a  period  as  that  through  which  we 
are  now  passing. 

Having  now  shown  that  it  is  the  course  you  have  pursued  which  has 
prostrated  the  credit  of  the  government,  the  question  next  presented  is, 


512  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

What  impelled  you  to  pursue  a  course  so  disastrous  to  the  public  credit'? 
Why  did  you  surrender  the  revenue  from  the  land  1  Why  so  greatly  in 
crease  the  expenditures  at  the  same  time  1  Why  propose  to  raise  the 
permanent  expenses  to  so  high  a  standard!  Were  you  ignorant  of  con 
sequences  1  Did  you  not  see  that  it  would  destroy  the  equilibrium  be 
tween  income  and  expenditures'?  You  cannot  plead  ignorance  ;  you  did 
it  with  your  eyes  open.  The  loan  bill  of  the  special  session  proves  that 
your  measures  had  created  a  deficit ;  and  the  declaration  of  your  distin 
guished  leader,  whose  authority  is  so  high  with  you,  at  the  close  of  the 
extra  session,  that  there  would  be  a  deficit  in  the  revenue  for  this  year  of 
at  least  ten  millions  of  dollars,  conclusively  shows  that  the  deficit  then 
created  was  known  to  be  not  of  a  temporary  character.  And  here  we 
have  a  still  more  important  and  searching  question  presented :  What  im 
pelled  you,  at  so  critical  a  moment,  when  the  credit  of  the  government 
required  the  most  careful  and  vigilant  nursing,  knowingly  to  destroy — 
not  for  the  moment  only,  but  for  the  future— the  equilibrium  between  its  in 
come  and  its  expenditures]  To  this  there  can  be  but  one  answer  :  it  was 
your  system  of  policy  that  impelled  you — a  system  deliberately  adopted 
at  the  special  session,  steadily  pursued  since,  and,  it  is  to  be  feared,  will 
be  pursued,  regardless  of  consequences  to  government  and  country,  as 
long  as  you  can  retain  power. 

What  that  policy  is,  is  not  a  matter  of  inference  or  conjecture.  You 
have  openly,  boldly,  and  manfully  avowed,  that  the  great  and  leading  ob 
jects  of  your  policy  were  bank  and  tariff — a  National  Bank  and  high  pro 
tective  tariff  5  that  without  the  one  there  never  could  be  a  sound  curren 
cy,  nor  prosperous  industry  without  the  other.  Your  great  leader  has, 
over  and  over  again,  proclaimed  them  to  be  the  great  objects  of  your  pol 
icy  j  and  the  report  of  the  minority  of  the  committee  on  the  exchequer 
in  the  other  house,  from  the  pen  of  a  distinguished  member  of  your  party, 
openly  asserts  that  the  one  is  indispensable  to  the  other,  and  that  without 
Loth  there  can  be  no  relief  for  the  currency  and  industry  of  the  country. 
There  is,  indeed,  a  mysterious  connexion  between  them  ;  and  he  (Mr.  C.) 
would  admit  that,  without  their  joint  action,  there  never  could  be  such  an 
inflation  of  the  currency,  and  fictitious  and  delusive  state  of  prosperity,  as 
that  through  which  we  have  recently  passed.  Their  united  action  might, 
indeed,  again  restore  a  like  state  ;  but  it  would  be  of  short  duration,  and 
would  be  suddenly  followed  by  disasters  still  greater  than  the  present; 
just  as  each  succeeding  debauch  of  the  drunkard  leaves  him  in  a  worse 
condition  than  that  which  preceded. 

In  pursuing  these,  the  acknowledged  great  and  leading  objects  of  your 
system  of  policy,  to  which  all  others  are  subordinate,  you  commenced  at 
the  extra  session  with  the  bank  ;  justly  believing  that,  once  established,  all 
others  would  follow  as  a  matter  course.  The  Bank  Bill  fell  under  the 
veto,  and  a  new  tack  became  necessary,  in  which  its  associated  measure, 
a  high  tariff,  became  the  primary  object,  in  the  hope  (not  badly  founded), 
if  it  could  be  adopted  and  be  made  permanent,  that  it  would,  in  the  end, 
carry  the  bank  as  certainly  as  the  bank  would  the  tariff.  Since  then,  your 
whole  energy  has  been  directed  to  establishing  a  high  tariff.  How  was 
that  to  be  done  1 

The  Compromise  Act  stood  in  the  way.  Under  its  provisions  a  pro 
tective  tariff,  by  name,  was  out  of  the  question.  Your  distinguished  leader 
stood  openly  pledged  against  it,  and  the  whole  Southern  wing  of  your 
party,  with  one  or  two  exceptions  (besides  being  pledged  against  it),  repre 
sented  constituents  who  were  utterly  opposed  to  the  system.  In  this  di 
lemma  there  was  but  one  expedient  left — to  bring  about  such  a  condition 
of  the  treasury  as  would  compel  a  resort  to  high  duties  for  revenue,  and 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  513 

thereby  accomplish  indirectly  what  could  not  be  effected  directly.  This 
is  the  key  of  your  whole  policy.  It  explains  everything.  For  this  the 
revenue  from  the  land  was  surrendered  \  the  expenses  increased  ;  loans 
contracted  ;  a  high  and  permanent  rate  of  expenditures  proposed ;  the 
pledge  to  reform,  to  economize,  and  retrench,  left  unredeemed  j  and,  finally, 
the  credit  of  the  government  prostrated  at  a  moment  so  hazardous.  That 
very  prostration,  this  very  bill,  with  all  the  enormity  of  its  provisions,  is 
part  of  the  ways  and  means  by  which  you  hope  to  accomplish  your  cher 
ished  object. 

Gentlemen  (said  Mr.  C.,  addressing  the  opposite  side  of  the  chamber), 
I  must  speak  freely.  The  critical  state  of  the  public  credit,  and  the  dan 
gerous  condition  of  the  government  and  country,  demand  it.  There  is 
one  fatal  principle  pervading  your  policy,  not  now  only,  but  at  all  times, 
which  has  wellnigh  brought  the  government  to  destruction.  You  lay 
duties,  not  for  revenue,  but  for  protection.  Revenue,  with  you,  in  laying 
duties,  is  a  mere  incident,  which  claims  but  little  of  your  care  or  atten 
tion.  Your  primary  object  is  protection ;  that  is,  so  to  impose  the  duties 
as  to  convert  them  into  actual  bounties  to  certain  portions  of  the  capital 
and  industry  of  the  country,  without  regard  to  their  effect  on  the  residue. 
It  is  the  bounty,  and  not  the  revenue,  that  you  regard;  and  hence  duties  are 
imposed,  either  as  to  time,  amount,  and  manner,  with  little  or  no  regard 
to  revenue. 

Of  the  truth  of  this,  we  have  a  remarkable  illustration  when  you  were 
last  in  power,  under  the  younger  Adams,  in  1828.  At  that  time  the  rev 
enue — as  was  acknowledged  on  all  sides — was  ample  to  meet  the  expen 
ditures  of  the  government,  including  the  payment  of  the  public  debt, 
which  was  then  nearly  discharged.  A  few  millions  only  remained  then 
to  be  paid  off,  when  a  large  portion  of  the  revenue — nearly  one  half — 
would  no  longer  be  required  for  the  use  of  the  government.  On  revenue 
principles,  it  was  clearly  the  time,  not  for  the  increase,  but  the  reduction  of 
duties.  And  yet  it  was  at  that  very  period,  when  you,  acting  under  (he  false 
and  dangerous  system  which  guides  you  in  all  your  acts,  regardless  of 
consequences,  passed  the  tariff  of  1828,  which  nearly  doubled  the  duties, 
and  so  increased  the  revenue  as  suddenly  to  pay  off  the  public  debt. 
Then  followed  the  surplus  revenue ;  expansion  of  the  currency ;  the  pet- 
bank  system,  and  all  the  corrupting  and  disastrous  consequences  which 
have  since  caused  such  calamity.  The  Compromise  Act  put  an  end  to  the 
tariff  of  1828.  Then  followed  an  opposite  train  of  consequences  :  a  grad 
ually  decreasing  revenue,  with  the  high  rate  of  expenditures  caused  by 
the  surplus  revenue.  Under  its  mischievous  influence,  the  expenditures 
had  nearly  trebled  in  a  few  years,  accompanied  by  a  looseness  and  waste 
unknown  before  in  the  collection  and  disbursements  of  the  government. 
It  required  but  little  sagacity  to  see  that,  if  something  decisive  was  not 
done  to  bring  down  the  expenditures  with  the  decrease  of  revenue,  a  crash 
must  follow.  I  was  not  silent.  I  saw  the  danger,  and  proclaimed  it;  and 
those  in  power  began  to  exert  themselves  with  effect  to  meet  it.  At  this 
critical  period,  you  succeeded  in  obtaining  power ;  but,  as  experience  has 
proved,  with  no  abatement  in  your  attachment  to  the  fatal  policy  which 
led  to  the  disastrous  act  of  1828. 

You  then  committed,  under  the  influence  of  that  policy,  the  monstrous 
folly  and  injustice  of  raising  the  revenue,  when  it  ought  to  have  been  re 
duced  ;  of  destroying  the  equilibrium  between  income  and  expenditures, 
by  raising  the  latter  far  beyond  the  former;  and  now,  under  the  same  per 
nicious  influence,  you  commit  the  reverse  error,  of  sinking  the  income 
below  the  expenditures,  by  throwing  away  the  revenue  from  the  lands, 
and  increasing  expenditures,  to  be  followed,  I  fear,  by  disasters  still  more 

TTT 


514  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

fatal.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  an  error  calculated  to  cause  greater  mis 
chief,  in  the  present  condition  of  things,  than  that  of  making  revenue  a 
subordinate  consideration  in  the  imposition  of  duties.  The  revenue  is, 
emphatically,  the  state  ;  and  the  imposition  of  burdens  on  the  people  to 
raise  what  may  be  necessary  for  the  wants  of  the  government  is  the  act, 
above  all  others,  which  requires  the  highest  caution  and  skill  so  to  be  per 
formed  as  to  extract  the  greatest  amount  of  revenue  with  the  least  burden, 
and  the  greatest  equality  and  justice  among  the  members  of  the  com 
munity.  But  when  the  great  and  primary  object  is  forgotten — when 
duties  are  imposed  as  to  time,  manner,  and  amount,  without  regard  to 
revenue,  or  equality,  or  justice,  the  result  must  be  such  as  we  have  wit 
nessed — the  treasury  overflowing,  and  exhausted  in  rapid  succession;  and 
distrust,  jealousy,  and  discord  pervading  the  whole  community.  Alter 
nation  of  income  and  expenditures,  as  rapid  as  the  government  has  ex 
perienced  under  the  influence  of  this  radical  and  pernicious  error,  would 
prove  ruinous  in  private  life.  Take,  for  illustration,  an  ordinary  family 
of  half  a  dozen  sons  and  daughters,  in  independent  but  moderate  circum 
stances,  having  (say)  an  annual  income  of  two  thousand  dollars,  and  living 
in  decent  frugality  within  their  income.  Few  conditions  of  life  would  be 
more  propitious  to  happiness  than  this.  Now,  suppose  that  their  income 
should  be  suddenly  raised  to  twenty  thousand  dollars  annually,  and  con 
tinue  so  for  eight  or  nine  years,  till  the  habit  of  the  family  should  become 
completely  changed — a  fine  mansion  to  rise  not  far  from  their  former 
snug  residence,  furnished  with  rich  furniture,  splendid  carriages  and 
horses  to  take  the  place  of  the  plain  gig  and  horse,  and  the  sons  and 
daughters  to  enter  into  all  the  fashionable  and  extravagant  amusements 
and  expenses  of  the  higher  circles.  And  then  suppose  the  income  of  the 
family  to  be  reduced  suddenly  to  its  former  standard  of  two  thousand  dol 
lars;  and  who  does  not  see  that  it  would  require  the  greatest  resolution 
and  prudence  on  the  part  of  its  head  to  save  the  family  from  ruin — the 
most  careful  nursing  of  income,  severest  lopping  off  of  expenditures,  and 
rigid  economy  in  all  things  1  But  if,  instead  of  that,  they  should  endeav 
our  to  keep  up  or  increase  expenses  and  their  style  of  living,  and  should 
ostentatiously  give  away  a  large  portion  of  their  reduced  revenue,  their 
discredit  would  be  certain,  and  the  ruin  of  the  family  inevitable.  And 
such  must  be  the  fate  of  the  government,  if  the  folly  of  your  course  be 
persisted  in. 

I  feel,  Mr.  President,  how  vain  it  is  to  urge  arguments  against  the  fixed 
determination  of  a  party  resolved  to  carry  through  their  favourite  system 
of  policy,  however  ruinous  it  may  prove  to  both  the  government  and  the 
country.  That  its  determination  is  fixed,  has  been  evinced  on  so  many 
and  striking  occasions,  that  I  am  forced  to  surrender  the  hope  of  over 
coming  it  so  long  as  the  party  can  retain  a  majority  in  either  house.  It 
is  true,  there  have  been  some  signs,  occasionally,  of  yielding  as  to  the 
revenue  from  the  lands.  We  have  been  told  by  a  member  on  that  side, 
in  this  discussion,  that  the  policy  of  giving  up  the  revenue  from  the  land 
was  a  great  mistake,  and  that  it  must  be  reversed ;  and  that  the  party 
would  be  forced  to  do  it,  whether  it  wished  or  not.  I  have  no  such  an 
ticipation  :  not  that  I  doubt  but  the  pressure  on  the  public  treasury  will 
be  great,  and  the  discredit  of  the  government  ruinous;  but  1  see  little 
hope  that  anything  of  the  kind  can  force  the  party  to  relax.  They  have 
staked  their  all  on  the  tariff  and  the  bank,  and  are  resolved  to  play  out 
the  game  to  the  last  cent.  When  the  question  of  repeal  comes  up,  we 
shall  find  that  the  Distribution  Act  will  be  clung  to,  should  credit  perish 
and  the  treasury  be  bankrupt,  because  the  policy  of  the  party  requires  it 
But  we  are  told  that  the  act  will  be  repealed  by  its  own  provisions ;  that 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  515 

the  duties  must  be  raised  above  20  per  cent.,  in  order  to  meet  the  wants 
of  the  government ;  and  that  the  fact  of  so  raising  them  will,  by  one  of  iis 
provisions,  repeal  the  act.  Such  is,  indeed,  the  provision  ;  and  it  is  ao 
less  true  that  its  insertion  was  necessary  to  secure  the  passage  of  the  act, 
and  its  passage  that  of  the  Bankrupt  Act.  Such  being  the  tact,  honour 
and  good  faith  forbid  the  repeal  of  the  proviso.  But  will  they  be  re 
spected]  I  would  be  happy  to  think  so,  but  am  incredulous,  because  the 
policy  of  the  party  stands  in  the  way.  Yes  ;  to  restore  the  land  fund 
would  raise  the  income  some  three  or  four  millions  of  dollars  annually. 
That  would  reduce  th'e  necessity  of  raising  the  duties  proportionally  ;  and 
that  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  policy  of  the  party,  to  which  every 
thing  must  yield. 

The  same  cogent  argument  will  prevent  all  serious  efforts  in  favour  of 
economy  and  retrenchment.  We  have  been  told  by  gentlemen  that  there 
was  great  waste,  extravagance,  and  fraud  in  the  public  disbursements  ; 
and  able  committees  have  been  appointed  in  both  houses  to  detect  abuses, 
and  reduce  the  expenditures  of  the  government.  Well :  I  am  one  of  those 
who  believe  that  there  are,  and  have  been,  great  abuses  in  the  disburse 
ments  j  who  never  doubted  that  the  surplus  revenue  would  lead,  and  has 
led,  to  frauds,  waste,  and  extravagance  j  but  I  have  little  hope  of  seeing 
them  corrected,  or  of  witnessing  any  considerable  reduction  in  the  ex 
penses  of  the  government,  while  you,  gentlemen,  shall  retain  power.  I 
doubt  not  the  committees  will  be  vigilant  in  hunting  out  fraud  and  mal 
administration :  that  is  something.  1  wish  every  instance  may  be  detect 
ed  and  brought  to  light,  fall  the  blame  where  it  may.  But  as  to  any  sub 
stantial  reform,  either  by  economy  or  retrenchment,  I  expect  none  ;  and 
that  for  the  all-powerful  reason — your  system  of  policy  forbids.  So  far 
from  looking  for  either,  I  anticipate  the  very  reverse  from  this  bill.  If 
the  negotiation  for  the  loan  should  be  successful,  it  will  but  replenish  the 
treasury,  to  be  wasted  in  extravagant  appropriations  j  raising  still  higher 
the  standard  of  expenditures,  and  creating  new  demands  on  the  treasury, 
to  be  supplied  by  what  is  so  desired  by  you — still  higher  duties.  The  re 
sult  must  be,  that  the  credit  of  the  government,.instead  of  improving,  will 
be  worse  a  year  hence  than  at  present. 

I  (said  Mr.  G.)  regard  this  bill,  not  only  as  the  offspring  of  the  fixed 
policy  of  gentlemen,  but  as  intended  as  one  of  means  of  perpetuating 
it.     The   great  length  of  time  which  the   proposed  loan  would  have  to 
run,  and  the  decisive  vote  against  the  amendment  offered  by  the  senator 
from  Mississippi  (Mr.  Walker),  to  pledge  the  revenue  from  the  Jauds  to 
pay  its  interest  and  redeem  the  principal,  leave  but  little  doubt  on  that 
point.     Thus  regarding  it,  I  cannot  look  forward  without  the  apprehen 
sion  of  the  most  disastrous  results  to  the  credit  and  finances  of  the  gov 
ernment.     If  persisted  in,  it  must  ultimately  prostrate  public  credit,  or 
force  the  government  to  an  entire  change  of  its  system  of  finance.     It 
will  not  only  throw  the  entire  burden  of  supporting  the  government  on 
duties  on  imports,  but  will  lead  to  an  imposition  of  them  the  most  u.  just 
and  unequal,  and,  at  the  same  time,  least  favourable,  it?  proportion  to  the 
burden  imposed,  to  a  productive  revenue.     The  rery  spirit  of  the  system, 
which  leads  to  the  imposition  of  the  whole  burden  ot  supporting  the  gov 
ernment  on  the  imports,  will  as  surely  lead  to  such  an  imposition  of  the 
duties  as  may  be  regarded  the  most  favourable  to  the  protective  policy, 
without  regard  either  to  revenue,  or  justice,  or  equality. 

Acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  system,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  those  who  have 
the  control  will  lay  the  highest  rate  of  duties  on  all  articles  which  can  be 
manufactured  at  home,  with  the  view  of  excluding  entirely  foreign  arti 
cles  of  a  similar  description.  That  is  the  professed  object  of  the  system. 


516  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

But  the  effect  of  such  duties  would  be,  to  a  vast  extent,  in  the  present 
state  of  things,  to  lop  off  almost  entirely  what  might  be  a  great  and  pro 
ductive  source  of  income  under  a  moderate  and  judicious  system  of  duties 
laid  expressly  for  revenue. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  same  policy,  there  will,  no  doubt,  be  a  large 
list  of  articles  entirely  exempt  from  duties.     The  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Finance  (if  I  did  not  mistake  him)  estimated  the  amount  of  the 
free  articles  under  the  tariff  to  be  established,  at  thirty  millions  of  dollars. 
[Mr.  Evans  said,  "  That  is  the  amount  now,  as  the  law  stands."] 
Yes  (replied  Mr.  C.),  and  is  intended  to  be  the  amount  after  it  is  modi 
fied  to  suit  the  wishes  of  the  party.     It  is  no  conjecture. 

I  hold  the  proof  in  my  hand — a  bill  reported  to  the  other  house  by  a 
member  from  Massachusetts  (Mr.  Saltonstall),  chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Manufactures,  and  a  gentleman  deep  in  the  confidence  of  his  party. 
It  proposes  a  free  list  of  at  least  thirty  millions,  and  a  system  of  duties 
not  much,  if  any,  less  odious  and  oppressive  than  the  tariff  of  1828.  This 
long  and  heavy  list  is  made  up  of  articles  of  a  description  not  produced 
in  the  country,  and  which,  for  the  most  part,  are  consumed  in  the  manu 
facturing  region,  or  for  which  manufactures  are  given  in  exchange  abroad. 
If  revenue  was  the  principal  object,  the  very  principle  on  which  they  are 
to  be  excepted  would  make  them  the  most  legitimate  objects  of  high 
duties.  They  are  the  very  articles  that  could  be  taxed  highest,  without 
danger  of  being  superseded  by  home  articles  of  a  similar  description,  and 
which,  for  the  same  reason,  would  throw  the  burden  equally  on  the  con. 
surners.  But  revenue  is  not  the  object;  and  they  must  be  exempted,  be 
the  inequality  or  the  effect  on  the  revenue  and  credit  of  the  government 
what  it  may.  If  to  the  probable  amount  of  free  articles  be  added  the 
amount  required  to  meet  the  interest  of  the  debt  abroad — say  seven 
millions;  and  if  to  that  be  added  the  very  great  reduction  which  the  high 
duties  to  be  laid  on  the  protected  articles  must  make  in  their  importa 
tion,  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the  narrow  basis  on  which  the 
revenue  of  the  government  must  stand,  if  the  system  of  policy  of  the 
party  should  be  carried  out  in  its  spirit,  as  it  is  intended  to  be.  The 
whole  weight  will  press  on  what  the  advocates  choose  to  call  luxuries — 
such  as  linen,  worsted  stuffs,  silks,  spirits,  wines;  most  of  which  may 
come,  indirectly,  into  competition  with  home-made  articles,  for  which 
they  may  be  substituted  ;  and  all  of  which,  or  nearly  so,  are  got  in  ex 
change,  not  for  manufactures,  but  the  productions  of  our  soil ;  and  are, 
therefore,  according  to  the  genius  of  the  system,  legitimately  objects  of 
high  taxation. 

Such,  gentlemen,  must  be  the  system  of  imposts,  if  the  influence  which 
has  heretofore  controlled  you  should  continue  to  do  so  ;  which,  I  fear, 
hardly  admits  of  a  doubt.  It  is  precisely  the  system  proposed  to  be 
established  ly  the  bill  of  the  other  house.  It  may,  indeed,  be  modified, 
to  catch  a  few  Southern  votes  ;  but  there  is  little  hazard  in  saying  that  it 
is  what  is  desirtd,  and  will  be  approached  as  near  as  may  be  practicable. 
It  is  on  such  a  tatiff  that  you  propose  to  rely  exclusively  for  revenue  to 
maintain  the  public  credit,  and  to  support  the  government,  at  a  rate  of  ex 
penditures  graduated  by  tV  highest  scale  ;  and  this  you  expect  to  do  in 
the  present  depressed  state  of  credit,  crippled  condition  of  commerce,  and 
deranged  state  of  the  currency.  I  shall  not  stop  to  discuss  the  influence 
which  these,  and  the  many  other  Causes  that  might  be  enumerated,  must 
have  in  diminishing,  far  below  ah  otdinary  calculation,  the  income  from 
such  a  tariff;  the  advanced  growth  of  our  manufactures  in  most  of  the 
important  branches  ;  the  effects  of  high  duties  on  the  articles  for  which 
our  great  agricultural  staples  are  for  the  most  part  exchanged  j  and  the 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  517 

great  extent  of  smuggling,  which  cannot  but  take  place  in  the  present 
condition  of  the  country  ;  but  1  will  venture  to  tell  you  that  you  will  be 
utterly  disappointed  in  your  expectation  of  an  adequate  revenue  from 
such  a  tariff.  The  income  will  fall  far  short,  and  the  credit  of  the  country 
will  receive  a  shock  from  which  it  will  be  hard  to  recover  it.  The  end 
will  be,  the  abandonment  of  your  system,  or  a  resort  to  internal  taxes  ; 
when  an  entire  change  of  our  financial  system  will  follow. 

Thus  thinking,  I  cannot  vote  for  this  bill.  I  would  rather  meet  the  dif 
ficulties  at  once,  than  to  contribute  by  my  vote  to  postpone  the  shock,  by 
sustaining  a  system  which  I  solemnly  believe  must  lead  to  such  danger 
ous  consequences.  I  would  rather  let  the  patient  take  his  chance,  than 
to  countenance  what  I  cannot  but  regard  as  the  most  dangerous  quackery. 
But  we  are  not  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  doing  nothing  or  taking  this 
bill.  There  are  other,  and  safe  and  speedy  measures  of  relief,  if  you  would 
but  agree  to  abandon  your  system  of  policy  and  adopt  them.  They  are 
so  obvious,  that  I  cannot  persuade  myself  that  they  have  been  overlooked  ; 
and  am  forced  to  believe  that  they  have  not  been  adopted  because  your 
policy  forbids  it.  If  you  could  be  persuaded  to  yield  that,  and  substitute 
for  this  bill  a  provision  to  fund  the  outstanding  treasury-notes  in  six  per 
cent,  stocks,  payable  in  four,  five,  or  six  years ;  to  surrender  the  public 
lands,  and  pledge  them  for  the  faithful  redemption  of  that  stock  ;  and  pass 
a  joint  resolution  refusing  to  receive  the  notes  of  banks  that  declined  to 
receive  your  treasury-notes  at  par,  the  market  would  speedily  be  freed 
from  that  excess  which  depresses  the  credit  of  treasury-notes,  and  the 
residue  would  rise  at  once  to  par  with  specie.  If  the  banks  agreed  to  re 
ceive  them,  their  interest  and  that  of  the  government  would  be  combined 
to  uphold  their  credit  at  par;  and,  if  not,  the  fact  that  they  would  be  ex 
clusively  received  with  specie  in  the  public  dues  would  give  a  greatly  in 
creased  demand  for  them,  which  would  have  the  same  effect. 

That  done,  follow  up  with  a  rigid  system  of  economy  and  retrench 
ment  ;  lop  off  all  expenses  not  necessary  for  the  defence  of  the  country 
and  the  frugal  administration  of  the  government ;  put  an  end  to  waste, 
extravagance,  and  fraud  ;  and,  after  you  have  made  your  appropriations, 
and  revised  the  duties  with  an  eye  mainly  to  revenue  and  equality  of 
burden — if  there  should  be  an  estimated  deficit  in  the  income,  before  the 
increased  duties  could  be  made  available,  it  may  be  met  by  the  use  of 
your  own  credit  directly,  or  the  negotiation  of  a  small  loan,  which  could 
then  be  had  on  fair  terms,  and  for  a  short  period.  It  is  by  this  simple 
process  that  you  may  relieve  the  government  from  its  present  embarrass 
ment,  restore  its  credit,  and  raise  what  supplies  may  be  necessary  at  home, 
without  going  abroad  at  present.  I  have  (said  Mr.  C.),  on  my  part,  in 
superable  objections  to  sending  our  credit  abroad  in  the  world  at  this 
time.  It  stands  low  at  present ;  and,  as  an  American  and  Republican,  I  am 
too  proud  to  have  it  exposed  to  the  contumely  of  the  rich  and  powerful 
bankers  of  Europe,  to  which  it  must  necessarily  be  at  such  a  period.  I 
would  adopt  any  expedient,  or  make  any  reasonable  sacrifice,  to  avoid 
such  disgrace.  Adopt  the  measures  I  have  suggested,  which,  instead  of 
sacrifice,  will  afford  relief  on  terms  more  favourable  than  the  most  san 
guine  can  anticipate  obtaining  supplies  from  abroad,  and  it  will  be  avoid 
ed.  I  can  imagine  but  one  objection,  and  that  the  oft-repeated  one — your 
system — forbids. 

Having  now  said  what  I  intended  in  reference  to  this  measure,  let  me 
add,  in  conclusion,  that  if  I  could  be  governed  by  party  feelings  and  views 
at  such  a  juncture  as  I  conceive  this  to  be  in  our  affairs,  instead  of  the 
solemn  and  earnest  desire  I  feel  to  see  the  credit  of  the  government  re 
stored,  and  the  country  extricated  from  its  present  difficulties,  I  would 


518  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  c.  CALHOUN. 

rejoice  to  see  the  party  opposed  to  me  pursuing  the  course  they  do.  ! 
feel  the  most  thorough  conviction  that,  under  their  system,  the  credit  of 
the  government,  instead  of  improving,  will  grow  worse  and  worse ;  and 
will  end,  if  persisted  in,  not  only  in  the  overthrow,  but  in  the  dissolution 
of  the  party,  and  affixing  permanent  odium  to  their  measures  and  policy, 
but,  in  the  mean  time,  with  no  small  hazard  to  the  country  and  its  institu 
tions. 


xxxvi. 

SPEECH   ON   THE    PASSAGE    OF    THE    TARIFF    BILL,   AUGUST    5,  1842. 

MR.  PRESIDENT — The  Tariff  Bill  of  1828  has,  by  common  consent,  been 
called  the  bill  of  abominations  ;  but,  as  bad  as  that  was,  this — all  things  consid 
ered — is  worse.  It  is,  in  the  first  place,  worse,  because  it  is  more  onerous ; 
not  that  the  duties  are  on  £n  average  higher — for  they  are  probably  less  by  about 
10  per  cent.  This,  it  is  estimated,  will  average  about  36  per  cent,  ad  valorem 
on  the  aggregate  of  the  imports  ;  and  that  averaged,  according  to  the  best  esti 
mate  that  1  have  been  able  to  make,  about  46.  But  this  difference  is  more  than 
made  up  by  other  considerations ;  and,  among  them,  that  allowed  long  credit 
for  the  payment  of  the  duties  ;  this  requires  them  to  be  paid  in  cash,  which 
will  add  to  their  burden  not  less  than  4  or  5  per  cent.  Again :  there  has  been 
a  great  falling  off  in  prices  on  almost  all  articles,  which  increases,  in  the  same 
proportion,  the  rate  per  cent,  on  the  cost  of  all  specific  duties — probably  not 
much  less  than  50  per  cent.  ;  which,  considering  the  number  and  the  importance 
of  the  articles  on  which  they  are  laid  in  this  bill,  will  much  more  than  make  up 
the  difference.  To  these  may  be  added  its  arbitrary  and  oppressive  provisions 
for  valuing  goods  and  collecting  duties,  with  the  fact  that  it  goes  into  operation, 
without  notice,  immediately  on  its  passage,  which  would  fall  heavily  on  the 
commercial  interest ;  and  the  undue  weight  it  would  impose  on  the  less  wealthy 
portions  of  the  community,  in  consequence  of  the  higher  duties  it  lays  on  coarse 
articles  of  general  consumption. 

It  is,  in  the  next  place,  worse,  because,  if  it  should  become  a  law,  it  would 
become  so  under  circumstances  still  more  objectionable  than  did  the  tariff  of 
1828.  I  shall  not  dwell  on  the  fact  that,  if  it  should,  it  would  entirely  super 
sede  the  Compromise  Act,  and  violate  pledges  openly  given  here  in  this  cham 
ber,  by  its  distinguished  author,  and  the  present  Governor  of  Massachusetts, 
then  a  member  of  this  body — that,  if  we  of  the  South  would  adhere  to  the  com 
promise  while  it  was  operating  favourably  to  the  manufacturing  interest,  they 
would  stand  by  it  when  it  came  to  operate  favourably  to  us.  I  pass,  also,  with 
out  dwelling  on  the  fact  that  it  proposes  to  repeal  the  provision  in  the  act  of 
distribution,  which  provides  that  the  act  shall  cease  to  operate  if  the  duties 
should  be  raised  above  ,20  per  cent. — a  provision,  without  which,  neither  that  nor 
the  Bankrupt  Bill  could  have  become  a  law,  and  which  was  inserted  under  cir 
cumstances  that  pledged  the  faith  of  the  majority  to  abide  by  it.  I  dwell  not  on 
these  double  breaches  of  plighted  faith,  should  this  bill  become  a  law  :  not  be 
cause  I  regard  them  as  slight  objections  ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  of  a  serious 
character,  and  likely  to  exercise  a  very  pernicious  influence  over  our  future  le 
gislation,  by  preventing  amicable  adjustments  of  questions  that  may  hereafter 
threaten  the  peace  of  the  country ;  but  because  I  have,  on  a  former  occasion, 
expressed  my  views  fully  in  relation  to  them.  I  pass  on  to  the  objection  that, 
if  this  bill  should  pass,  it  would  against  the  clear  light  of  experience.  When 
that  of  1 828  passed,  we  had  but  little  experience  as  to  the  effects  of  the  pro 
tective  policy.  It  is  true  that  the  act  of  1824  had  been  in  operation  a  few 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  GALHOUN.  519 

years,  which  may  be  regarded  the  first  which  avowed  the  policy  that  ever  pass 
ed  ;  but  it  had  been  in  operation  too  short  a  time  to  shed  much  light  on  the 
subject.  Since  then,  our  experience  has  been  greatly  enlarged.  We  have  had 
periods  of  considerable  duration  both  of  increase  and  reduction  of  duties,  and 
their  effects  respectively  on  the  industry  and  prosperity  of  the  country,  which 
enables  us  to  compare,  from  authentic  public  documents,  the  result.  It  is  most 
triumphantly  in  favour  of  reduction,  though  made  under  circumstances  most  ad 
verse  to  it,  and  most  favourable  to  increase.  I  have,  on  another  occasion  du 
ring  this  session,  shown^  from  the  commercial  tables  and  other  authentic  sources, 
that,  during  the  eight  years  of  high  duties,  the  increase  of  our  foreign  commerce* 
and  of  our  tonnage,  both  coastwise  and  foreign,  was  almost  entirely  arrested ; 
and  that  the  exports  of  domestic  manufactures  actually  fell  off,  although  it  was 
a  period  exempt  from  any  general  convulsion  in  trade  or  derangement  of  the  cur 
rency.  On  the  same  occasion,  I  also  showed  that  the  eight  years  of  the  reduc 
tion  of  duties,  which  followed,  were  marked  by  an  extraordinary  impulse  given 
to  every  branch  of  industry — agricultural,  commercial,  navigating,  and  manu 
facturing.  Our  exports  of  domestic  productions,  and  our  tonnage,  increased 
fully  a  third,  and  our  manufactures  still  more  ;  and  this,  too,  under  the  adverse 
circumstances  of  an  inflated,  unsteady  currency,  and  the  whole  machinery  of 
commerce  deranged  and  broken.  And  yet,  with  this  flood  of  light  from  authen 
tic  documents  before  us,  what  are  we  about  to  do  ?  To  pass  this  bill,  and  to  re 
store  the  old,  and,  as  was  hoped,  exploded  system  of  restrictions  and  prohibi 
tions,  under  the  false  guise  of  a  revenue  bill,  as  I  shall  next  proceed  to  show. 

Yes,  senators,  we  are  told  by  the  chairman  of  the  Finance  Committee,  and 
others  who  advocate  it,  that  this  bill  is  intended  for  revenue,  and  that  of  1828 
was  for  protection  ;  and  it  is  on  that  assumption  they  attempt  to  discriminate 
between  the  two,  and  hope  to  reconcile  the  people  to  this  measure.  It  is,  in 
deed,  true  that  the  bill  of  1828  was  for  protection.  The  treasury  was  then  well 
replenished,  and  not  an  additional  dftllar  was  needed  to  meet  the  demands  of 
the  government ;  and,  what  made  it  worse,  the  public  debt  was  then  reduced  to 
a  small  amount ;  and  what  remained  was  in  a  regular  and  rapid  course  of  re 
duction,  which  would  in  a  few  years  entirely  extinguish  the  whole,  when  more 
than  half  of  the  revenue  would  have  become  surplus.  It  was  under  these  cir 
cumstances  that  the  bill  of  1828,  which  so  greatly  increased  the  duties,  was  in 
troduced,  and  became  a  law — an  act  of  legislative  folly  and  wickedness  almost 
without  example.  Well  has  the  community  paid  the  penalty.  Yes,  much 
which  it  now  suffers,  and  has  suffered,  and  must  suffer,  are  but  its  bitter  fruitt. 
It  was  that  which  so  enormously  increased  the  surplus  revenue  after  the  extin 
guishment  of  the  debt  in  1832  ;  and  it  was  that  surplus  which  mainly  led  to 
the  vast  expansion  of  the  currency  that  followed,  and  from  which  have  suc 
ceeded  so  many  disasters.  It  was  that  which  wrecked  the  currency,  overthrew 
the  almost  entire  machinery  of  commerce,  precipitated  hundreds  of  thousands 
from  affluence  to  want,  and  which  has  done  so  much  to  taint  private  and  public 
morals. 

But  is  this  a  revenue  bill  ?  I  deny  it.  Wre  have,  indeed,  the  word  of  the 
chairman  for  it.  He  tells  us  it  is  necessary  to  meet  the  expenditures  of  the 
government ;  of  which,  however,  he  gave  us  but  little  proof,  except  his  word. 
But  I  must  inform  him  that  he  must  go  a  step  farther  before  he  can  satisfy  me. 
He  must  not  only  show  that  it  is  necessary  to  meet  the  expenditures  of  the  gov 
ernment,  but  also  that  those  expenditures  themselves  are  necessary.  He  must 
show  that  retrenchment  and  economy  have  done  their  full  work  ;  that  all  use 
less  expenditures  have  been  lopped  off;  that  exact  economy  has  been  enforced 
in  every  branch,  both  ia  the  collection  and  disbursement  of  the  revenue  ;  and, 
above  all,  that  none  of  the  resources  of  the  government  have  been  thrown  away 
or  surrendered.  Has  he  done  all  that?  Or  has  he  showed  that  it  has  been 
even  attempted  1  that  either  he  or  his  party  have  made  any  systematic  or  se- 


520  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C   CALHOUN. 

rious  effort  to  redeem  the  pledge,  so  often  and  solemnly  given  before  the  elec 
tion,  that  the  expenditures  should  be  greatly  reduced  below  what  they  then 
were,  and  be  brought  down  to  seventeen,  sixteen,  and  even  as  low  as  thirteen 
millions  of  dollars  annually  ?  Has  not  their  course  been  directly  the  reverse 
since  they  came  into  power  I  Have  they  not  surrendered  one  of  the  two  great 
sources  of  revenue — the  public  lands  ;  raised  the  expenditure  from  twenty-one 
or  two  millions,  to  twenty-seven  annually  ;  and  increased  the  public  debt  from 
five  and  a  half  to  more  than  twenty  millions?  And  has  not  ail  this  been  done 
under  circumstances  well  calculated  to  excite  suspicion  tjiat  the  real  design  was 
to  create  a  necessity  for  duties,  with  the  express  view  of  affording  protection 
to  manufactures  ?  Have  they  not,  indeed,  told  us,  again  and  again,  through 
their  great  head  and  organ,  that  the  two  great  and  indispensable  measures  to 
relieve  the  country  from  existing  embarrassments  were  a  protective  tariff  and  a 
National  Bank  ?  and  is  it,  then,  uncharitable  to  assert  that  the  expenditures,  so 
far  from  being  necessary  to  the  just  and  economical  wants  of  the  government, 
have  been  raised  to  what  they  are,  with  the  design  of  passing  this  bill  in  the 
only  way  it  could  be  passed — under  the  guise  of  revenue  ? 

But.  if  it  were  admitted  that  the  amount  i't  proposes  to  raise  is  necessary  to 
meet  the  expenditures  of  the  government,  and  that  the  expenditures  themselves 
were  necessary,  the  chairman  must  still  go  one  step  farther,  to  make  good  his 
assertion  that  this  is  a  bill  for  revenue,  and  not  for  protection.  He  must  show- 
that  the  duties  it  proposes  are  laid  on  revenue,  and  not  on  protective  principles. 

No  two  things,  senators,  are  more  different  than  duties  for  revenue  and  pro 
tection.  They  are  as  opposite  as  light  and  darkness.  The  one  is  friendly,  and 
the  other  hostile,  to  the  importation  of  the  article  on  which  they  may  be  im 
posed.  Revenue  seeks  not  to  exclude  or  diminish  the  amount  imported  ;  on  the 
contrary,  if  that  should  be  the  result,  it  neither  designed  nor  desired  it.  While 
it  takes,  it  patronises  ;  and  patronises,  that  it  may  take  more.  It  is  the  reverse, 
in  every  respect,  with  protection.  It  seeks,  directly,  exclusion  or  diminution. 
It  is  the  desired  result ;  and,  if  it  fails  in  that,  it  fails  in  its  object.  But,  al 
though  so  hostile  in  character,  they  are  intimately  blended  in  practice.  Every 
duty  imposed  on  an  article  manufactured  in  the  country,  if  it  be  not  raised  to 
the  point  of  prohibition,  will  give  some  revenue  ;  and  every  one  laid  for  rev 
enue,  be  it  ever  so  low,  must  afford  some  protection,  as  it  is  called.  But,  not 
withstanding  they  are  so  blended  in  practice,  plain  and  intelligible  rules  may 
be  laid  down,  by  which  the  one  may  be  so  distinguished  from  the  other  as 
never  to  be  confounded.  To  make  a  duty  a  revenue,  and  not  a  protective  duty, 
it  is  indispensable,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  should  be  necessary  to  meet  the  ex 
penditures  of  the  government ;  and,  in  the  next,  that  the  expenditures  them 
selves  should  be  necessary  for  the  support  of  the  government,  without  the  defi 
cit  being  caused  intentionally,  to  raise  the  duty,  either  by  a  surrender  of  other 
sources  of  revenue,  or  by  neglect  or  waste.  In  neither  case,  as  has  been  stated, 
would  the  duty  be  for  revenue.  It  must,  in  addition,  never  be  so  high  as  to 
prohibit  the  importation  of  the  article  :  that  would  be  utterly  incompatible  with 
the  object  of  revenue.  But  there  are  other  less  obvious,  though  not  less  im 
portant  rules,  by  which  they  may  be  discriminated  with  equal  certainty. 

On  all  articles  on  which  duties  can  be  imposed,  there  is  a  point  in  the  rate 
of  duties  which  may  be  called  the  maximum  point  of  revenue — that  is,  a  point 
at  which  the  greatest  amount  of  revenue  would  be  raised.  If  it  be  elevated 
above  that,  the  importation  of  the  article  would  fall  off  more  rapidly  than  the 
duty  would  be  raised ;  and,  if  depressed  below  it,  the  reverse  effect  would  fol 
low  :  that  is,  the  duty  would  decrease  more  rapidly  than  the  importation  would 
increase.  If  the  duty  be  raised  above  that  point,  it  is  manifest  that  all  the  in 
termediate  space  between  the  maximum  point  and  that  to  which  it  may  be 
raised  would  be  purely  protective,  and  not  at  all  for  revenue.  Another  rule 
remains  to  be  laid  down,  drawn  from  the  facts  just  stated,  still  more  important 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  521 

than  the  preceding,  as  far  as  the  point  under  consideration  is  involved.  It  re 
sults,  from  the  facts  stated,  that  any  given  amount  of  duty,  other  than  the  maxi 
mum,  may  be  collected  on  any  article,  by  two  distinct  rates  of  duty — the  one 
above  the  maximum  point,  and  the  other  below  it.  The  lower  is  the  revenue 
rate,  and  the  higher  the  protective  ;  and  all  the  intermediate  is  purely  prote'c- 
tive,  whatever  it  be  called,  and  involves,  to  that  extent,  the  principle  of  pro 
hibition,  as  perfectly  as  if  raised  so  high  as  to  exclude  importation  totally.  It 
follows  that  all  duties  not  laid  strictly  for  revenue  are  purely  protective, 
whether  called  incidental  or  not ;  and  hence  the  distinction  taken  by  the  sen 
ator  from  Arkansas  immediately  on  my  left  (Mr.  Sevier)  between  incidental 
and  accidental  protection  is  not  less  true  and  philosophical  than  striking.  The 
latter  is  the  only  protection  compatible  with  the  principles  on  which  duties  for 
revenue  are  laid. 

This  bill,  regarded  as  a  revenue  bill,  cannot  stand  the  test  of  any  one  of  these 
rules.  That  it  cannot  as  to  the  first  two,  has  already  been  shown.  That 
some  of  the  duties  amount  to  prohibition,  has  been  admitted  by  the  chairman. 
To  those,  he  admits,  a  long  list  of  others  might  be  added.  I  have  in  my 
drawer  an  enumeration  of  many  of  them,  furnished  by  an  intelligent  and  ex 
perienced  merchant ;  but  I  will  not  occupy  the  time  of  the  Senate  by  reading 
the  catalogue.  That  a  large  portion  of  the  duties  on  the  protected  articles  ex 
ceed  the  maximum  point  of  revenue,  will  not  be  denied ;  and  that  there  are 
few  or  none  imposed  on  protected  articles,  on  which  an  equal  revenue  might 
not  be  raised  at  a  lower  rate  of  duty,  will  be  admitted.  As,  then,  every  fea 
ture  of  this  bill  is  stamped  with  protection,  it  is  as  much  a  bill  for  protection  as 
that  of  1828.  Wherein,  then,  does  it  differ  ?  In  this  :  that  went  openly,  boldly, 
and  manfully  for  protection  ;  and  this  assumes  the  guise  of  revenue.  That  car 
ried  the  drawn  dagger  in  its  hand ;  and  this  conceals  it  in  its  bosom.  That 
imposed  the  burden  of  protection — a  burden  admitted  to  be  unjust,  unequal,  arid 
oppressive,  but  it  was  the  only  burden ;  but  this  superadds  the  weight  of  its 
false  guise — a  heavy  debt,  extravagant  expenditures,  the  loss  of  public  lands, 
and  the  prostration  of  public  credit,  with  the  intent  of  concealing  its  purpose. 
And  this,  too,  may  be  added  to  the  other  objections,  which  makes  it  worse  than 
its  predecessor  in  abomination. 

I  am,  senators,  now  brought  to  the  important  question,  Why  should  such  a 
bill  pass  1  Who  asks  for  it,  and  on  what  ground  ?  It  comes  ostensibly  from 
the  manufacturing  interest.  I  say  ostensibly ;  for  I  shall  show,  in  the  sequel, 
that  there  are  other  and  more  powerful  interests  among  its  advocates  and  sup 
porters.  And  on  what  grounds  do  they  ask  it?  It  is  on  that  of  protection. 
Protection  against  what  ?  Against  violence,  oppression,  or  fraud  1  If  so,  gov 
ernment  is  bound  to  afford  it,  if  it  comes  within  the  sphere  of  its  powers,  cost 
what  it  may.  It  is  the  object  for  which  government  is  instituted  ;  and  if  it  fails 
in  that,  it  fails  in  the  highest  point  of  duty.  No  :  it  is  against  neither  violence, 
oppression,  nor  fraud.  There  is  no  complaint  of  being  disturbed  in  property  or 
pursuits,  or  of  being  defrauded  out  of  the  proceeds  of  industry.  Against  what, 
then,  is  protection  asked  ?  It  is  against  low  prices.  The  manufacturers  com 
plain  that  they  cannot  afford  to  carry  on  their  pursuits  at  prices  as  low  as  at 
present ;  and  that,  unless  they  can  get  higher,  they  must  give  up  manufactu 
ring.  The  evil,  then,  is  low  prices ;  and  what  they  ask  of  government  is  to 
give  them  higher.  But  how  do  they  ask  it  to  be  done  ?  Do  they  ask  govern 
ment  to  compel  those  who  may  want  to  purchase  to  give  them  higher  ?  No : 
that  would  be  a  hard  task,  and  not  a  little  odious ;  difficult  to  be  defended  on 
the  principles  of  equity,  justice,  or  the  Constitution,  or  to  be  enforced,  if  it  could 
be.  Do  they  ask  that  a  tax  should  be  laid  on  the  rest  of  the  community,  and 
the  proceeds  divided  among  them,  to  make  up  for  low  prices  ?  or,  in  other 
words,  do  they  ask  for  a  bounty?  No:  that  would  be  rather  too  open,  op 
pressive,  and  indefensible.  How,  then,  do  they  ask  it  to  be  done  ?  By  put- 

U  u  u 


522  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ting  down  competition,  by  the  imposition  of  taxes  on  the  products  of  others,  so 
as  to  give  them  the  exclusion  of  the  market,  or  at  least  a  decided  advantage 
over  others  ;  and  thereby  enable  them  to  sell  at  higher  prices.  Stripped  of  all 
disguise,  this  is  their  request ;  and  this  they  call  protection.  Protection,  in 
deed  !  Call  it  tribute,  levy,  exaction,  monopoly,  plunder ;  or,  if  these  be  too 
harsh,  call  it  charity,  assistance,  aid — anything  rather  than  protection,  with 
which  it  has  not  a  feature  in  common. 

Considered  in  this  milder  light,  where,  senators,  will  you  find  the  power  to 
give  the  assistance  asked  ?  Or,  if  that  can  be  found,  how  can  you  reconcile  it 
to  the  principles  of  justice  or  equity  to  grant  it?  But  suppose  that  to  be  over 
come  :  I  ask,  Are  you  prepared  to  adopt  as  a  principle  that,  whenever  any 
branch  of  industry  is  suffering  from  depressed  prices,  it  is  your  duty  to  call  on 
all  others  to  assist  it  ?  Such  is  the  broad  principle  that  lies  at  the  bottom  of 
what  is  asked  ;  and  what  would  it  be,  if  carried  out,  but  equalization  of  income  ? 
And  what  that,  but  agrarianism  as  to  income  ?  And  in  what  would  that  differ, 
in  effect,  from  the  agrarianism  of  property,  which  you,  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  chamber,  profess  so  much  to  detest  ?  But,  if  you  are  not  ready  to  carry 
out  the  principle  in  its  full  extent,  are  you  prepared  to  restrict  it  to  a  single 
class — the  manufacturers  ?  Will  you  give  them  the  great  and  exclusive  ad 
vantage  of  having  the  right  of  demanding  assistance  from  the  rest  of  the  com 
munity  whenever  their  profits  are  depressed  below  the  point  of  remuneration 
by  vicissitudes  to  which  all  others  are  exposed  ? 

But  suppose  all  these  difficulties  surmounted:  there  is  one  rule,  where  as 
sistance  is  asked,  which,  on  no  principle  of  justice,  equity,  or  reason,  can  be 
violated — and  that  is,  to  ascertain,  from  careful  and  cautious  examination, 
whether,  in  fact,  it  be  needed  by  the  parly  asking  ;  and,  if  it  be,  whether  the 
one  of  whom  it  is  asked  can  afford  to  give  it  or  not.  Now  I  ask  whether  any 
such  examination  has  been  made.  Has  the  Finance  Committee,  which  report 
ed  this  bill,  or  the  Committee  on  Manufactures,  to  which  the  numerous  peti 
tions  have  been  referred,  or  any  member  of  the  majority  who  support  this  bill, 
made  an  impartial  or  careful  examination,  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  they 
who  ask  aid  can  carry  on  their  manufactures  without  higher  prices  ?  Or  have 
they  given  themselves  the  least  trouble  to  ascertain  whether  the  other  portions 
of  the  community  could  afford  to  give  them  higher?  Will  any  one  pretend  that 
he  has  ?  I  can  say,  as  to  the  interest  with  which  I  am  individually  connected, 
I  have  heard  of  no  such  inquiry ;  and  can  add  farther,  from  my  own  experi 
ence  (and  fearlessly  appeal  to  every  planter  in  the  chamber  to  confirm  my  state 
ment),  that  the  great  cotton-growing  interest  cannot  afford  to  give  higher  prices 
for  its  supplies.  As  much  as  the  manufacturing  interest  is  embarrassed,  it  is 
not  more  so  than  the  cotton-growing  interest ;  and  as  moderate  as  may  be  the 
profit  of  the  one,  it  cannot  be  more  moderate  than  that  of  the  other.  I  ask 
those  who  represent  the  other  great  agricultural  staples — I  ask  the  great  pro 
vision  interest  of  the  West,  the  navigating,  the  commercial,  and,  finally,  the 
great  mechanical  and  handicraft  interests — if  they  have  been  asked  whether 
they  can  afford  to  give  higher  prices  for  their  supplies  ?  And,  if  so,  what  was 
their  answer  ? 

If,  then,  no  such  examination  has  been  made,  what  has  been  done  ?  Those 
who  have  asked  for  aid  have  been  permitted  to  fix  the  amount  according  to 
their  own  cupidity ;  and  this  bill  has  fixed  the  assessment  on  the  other  in 
terests  of  the  community,  without  consulting  them,  with  all  the  provisions  ne 
cessary  for  extorting  the  amount  in  the  promptest  manner.  Government  is  to 
descend  from  its  high  appointed  duty,  and  become  the  agent  of  a  portion  of  the 
community  to  extort,  under  the  guise  of  protection,  tribute  from  the  rest  of  the 
community  ;  and  thus  defeat  the  end  of  its  institution,  by  perverting  powers,  in 
tended  for  the  protection  of  all,  into  the  means  of  oppressing  one  portion  for  the 
benefit  of  another. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  523 

But  there  never  yet  has  been  devised  a  scheme  of  emptying  the  pockets  of 
one  portion  of  the  community  into  those  of  the  other,  however  unjust  or  op 
pressive,  for  which  plausible  reasons  could  not  be  found  ;  and  few  have  been 
so  prolific  of  such  as  that  under  consideration,  Among  them,  one  of  the  most 
plausible  is,  that  the  competition  which  is  asked  to  be  excluded  is  that  of 
foreigners.  The  competition  is  represented  to  be  between  home  arid  foreign 
industry ;  arid  he  who  opposes  what  is  asked  is  held  up  as  a  friend  to  foreign, 
and  the  enemy  to  home  industry,  and  is  regarded  as  very  little  short  of  being  a 
traitor  to  his  country.  I  take  issue  on  the  fact.  1  deny  that  there  is,  or  can  be, 
any  competition  between  home  and  foreign  industry  but  through  the  latter ;  and 
assert  that  the  real  competition,  in  all  cases,  is,  and  must  be,  between  one 
branch  of  home  industry  and  another.  To  make  good  the  position  taken,  I 
rely  on  a  simple  fact,  which  none  will  deny — that  imports  are  received  in  ex 
change  for  exports.  From  that  it  follows,  if  there  be  no  export  trade,  there 
will  be  no  import  trade  ;  and  that  to  cut  off  the  exports,  is  to  cut  off  the  im 
ports.  It  is,  then,  not  the  imports,  but  the  exports  which  are  exchanged  for 
them,  and  without  which  they  would  not  be  introduced  at  all,  that  causes,  in 
reality,  the  competition.  It  matters  not  how  low  the  wages  of  other  countries 
may  be,  and  how  cheap  their  productions,  if  we  have  no  exports,  they  cannot 
compete  with  ours. 

The  real  competition,  then,  is  with  that  industry  which  produces  the  articles 
for  export,  and  which  purchases  them  and  carries  them  abroad,  and  brings 
back  the  imported  articles  in  exchange  for  them  ;  and  the  real  complaint  is,  that 
those  so  employed  can  furnish  the  market  cheaper  than  those  can  who  manu 
facture  articles  similar  with  the  imported  ;  and  what,  in  truth,  is  asked  is,  that 
this  cheaper  process  of  supplying  the  market  should  be  taxed,  by  imposing  high 
duties  on  the  importation  of  th/5  articles  received  in  exchange  for  those  exported, 
in  order  to  give  the  dearer  a  monopoly,  so  that  it  may  sell  its  products  for  high 
er  prices.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  warfare  on  the  part  of  the  manufacturing  industry, 
and  those  which  are  associated  with  it,  against  the  export  industry  of  the  com 
munity,  and  those  associated  with  it.  Now  I  ask,  What  is  that  export  indus 
try  ?  What  is  the  amount  produced  ?  by  whom  produced  ?  and  the  number  of 
persons  connected  with  it,  compared  with  those  who  ask  a  monopoly  against  it  ? 

The  annual  domestic  exports  of  the  country  may  be  put  down,  even  in  the 
present  embarrassed  condition  of  the  country,  at  $110,000,000,  valued  at  our 
own  ports.  It  is  drawn  from  the  forest,  the  ocean,  arid  the  soil,  except  about 
ten  millions  of  domestic  manufactures,  and  is  the  product  of  that  vast  mass  of 
industry  engaged  in  the  various  branches  of  the  lumber  business,  the  fisheries, 
in  raising  grain  and  stock,  producing  the  great  agricultural  staples,  rice,  cotton, 
and  tobacco ;  in  purchasing  and  shipping  abroad  these  various  products,  and 
exchanging  and  bringing  home,  in  return,  the  products  of  other  countries,  with 
all  the  associated  industry  necessary  to  keep  this  vast  machinery  in  motion — 
the  ship-builder,  the  sailor,  and  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  mechanics,  inclu 
ding  manufacturers  themselves,  and  others,  who  furnish  the  various  necessary 
supplies  for  that  purpose.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  with  precision  the  number 
employed,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  keeping  in  motion  this  vast  machinery,  of 
which  our  great  commercial  cities,  and  numerous  ships,  which  whiten  the  ocean, 
are  but  a  small  part.  A  careful  examination  of  the  returns  of  the  statistics  ac 
companying  the  census  would  afford  a  probable  estimate  ;  and  on  the  faith  of 
such  examination,  made  by  a  friend,  I  feel  myself  warranted  in  saying  that  it 
exceeds  those  employed  in  manufacturing,  with  the  associated  industry  necessa 
ry  to  furnish  them  with  supplies,  in  the  proportion  at  least  of  ten  to  one.  It  is 
probably  much  greater. 

Such  is  the  export  industry  of  the  country  ;  such  its  amount ;  such  the  sour 
ces  from  which  it  is  drawn  ;  such  the  variety  and  magnitude  of  its  branches  : 
and  such  the  proportion  in  numbers  which  those  who  are  employed  in  it,  directly 


524  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

and  indirectly,  bears  to  those  who  are,  in  like  manner,  employed  in  manufac 
turing  industry.  It  is  this  vast  and  various  amount  of  industry  employed  at 
home,  and  drawing  from  the  forest,  the  water,  and  the  soil,  as  it  were  by  crea 
tion,  this  immense  surplus  wealth,  to  be  sent  abroad,  and  exchanged  for  the  pro 
ductions  of  the  rest  of  the  globe,  that  is  stigmatized  as  foreign  industry !  And 
it  is  that,  senators,  which  you  are  now  called  on  to  tax,  by  imposing  the  high 
duties  proposed  in  this  bill  on  the  articles  imported  in  exchange,  in  order  to  ex 
clude  them,  in  whole  or  part,  for  the  supposed  benefit  of  a  very  minor  interest, 
which  chooses  to  regard  itself  as  exclusively  entitled  to  your  protection  and  fa 
vour.  Are  you  prepared  to  respond  favourably  to  the  call,  by  voting  for  this 
bill  ?  Waiving  the  high  questions  of  justice  and  constitutional  power,  I  propose 
to  examine,  in  the  next  place,  the  mere  question  of  expediency ;  and,  for  that 
purpose,  the  operation  of  these  high  protective  duties — tracing,  first,  their  effects 
on  the  manufacturing  interest  intended  be  to  benefited,  and  afterward  on  the  ex 
port  interest,  against  which  they  are  directed. 

And  here  let  me  say,  before  I  enter  on  this  part  of  my  subject,  that  I  am  no 
enemy  to  the  manufacturing  interest.  On  the  contrary,  few  regard  them  with 
greater  favour,  or  place  a  higher  estimate  on  their  importance,  than  myself. 
According  to  my  conception,  the  great  advance  made  in  the  arts  by  mechanical 
and  chemical  inventions  and  discoveries,  in  the  last  three  or  four  generations, 
has  done  more  for  civilization,  and  the  elevation  of  the  human  race,  than  all  oth 
er  causes  combined  in  the  same  period.  With  this  impression,  I  behold  with 
pleasure  the  progress  of  the  arts  in  every  department,  and  look  to  them  mainly 
as  the  great  means  of  bringing  about  a  higher  state  of  civilization,  with  all  the 
accompanying  blessings,  physical,  political,  and  moral.  It  is  not  to  them,  nor  to 
the  manufacturing  interest,  I  object,  but  to  what  I  believe  to  be  the  unjust,  the 
unconstitutional,  the  mistaken  and  pernicious  means  of  bettering  their  condition, 
by  what  is  called  the  protective  system. 

In  tracing  what  would  be  the  effects  of  the  high  protective  duties  proposed 
by  the  bill,  I  shall  suppose  all  the  grounds  assumed  by  its  advocates  to  be  true  ; 
that  the  low  prices  complained  of  are  caused  by  the  imports  received  in  ex 
change  for  exports  ;  that  the  imports  have,  to  a  great  extent,  taken  possession 
of  the  market ;  and  tha.t  the  imposition  of  high  duties  proposed  on  the  imports 
would  exclude  them  either  wholly,  or  to  a  great  extent ;  and  that  the  market,  in 
consequence,  would  be  relieved,  and  be  followed  by  the  rise  of  price  desired. 
I  assume  all  to  be  as  stated,  because  it  is  the  supposition  mo»t  favourable  to 
those  who  ask  for  high  duties,  and  the  one  on  which  they  rely  to  make  out  their 
case.  It  is  my  wish  to  treat  the  subject  with  the  utmost  fairness,  having  no 
other  object  in  view  but  truth. 

According,  then,  to  the  supposition,  the  first  leading  effect  of  these  high  pro 
tective  duties  would  be  to  exclude  the  imported  articles,  against  which  they  are 
asked,  either  entirely,  or  to  a  great  extent.  If  they  should  fail  in  that,  it  is  ob 
vious  that  they  would  fail  in  the  immediate  object  desired,  and  that  the  whole 
would  be  an  abortion.  What,  then,  I  ask,  must  be  the  necessary  consequence 
of  the  exclusion  of  the  articles  against  which  the  protective  duties  are  propo 
sed  to  be  laid  ?  The  answer  is  clear.  The  portion  of  the  exports,  which  would 
have  been  exchanged  for  them,  must  then  return  in  the  unprotected  and  free  ar 
ticles  ;  and  among  the  latter,  specie,  in  order  to  purchase  from  the  manufactu 
rers  at  home  the  supplies  which,  but  for  the  duties,  would  have  been  purchased 
abroad.  And  what  would  be  the  effect  of  that,  but  to  turn  the  exchange,  arti 
ficially,  in  our  favour,  as  against  other  countries,  and  in  favour  of  the  manufac 
turing  portion  of  the  country,  as  against  all  others  ?  And  what  would  that  be 
but  an  artificial  concentration  of  the  specie  of  the  country  in  the  manufacturing 
region,  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  expansion  of  the  currency  from  that 
cause,  and  still  more  from  the  discounts  of  the  banks  ?  I  next  ask,  What  must 
be  the  effects  of  such  expansion  but  that  of  raising  prices  there  ?  and  what  of 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOTJN.  525 

that,  but  of  increasing  the  expense  of  manufacturing,  and  that  continuing  till  the 
increased  expense  shall  raise  the  cost  of  producing  so  high  as  to  be  equal  to 
that  of  the  imported  article,  with  the  addition  of  the  duty,  when  the  importations 
will  again  commence,  and  an  additional  duty  be  demanded  ? 

This  inevitable  result  would  be  accelerated  by  two  causes.  The  effect  of 
the  duty  in  preventing  importation  would  cause  a  falling  off  of  the  demand  abroad, 
and  a  consequent  falling  off,  temporarily,  of  price  there.  The  extent  would  de 
pend  on  the  extent  of  the  falling  off  compared  with  the  general  demand  for  the 
article ;  and,  of  course,  would  be  greater  in  some  articles,  and  less  in  others. 
All  would  be  more  or  less  affected ;  but  none  to  an  extent  so  great  as  was  in 
sisted  on  by  the  chairman,  and  other  advocates  of  the  system,  the  other  day,  in 
the  discussion  of  the  duty  on  cotton  bagging;  but  still  sufficient,  in  most  cases, 
to  be  sensibly  felt.  I  say  temporarily,  for  the  great  laws  which  regulate  and 
equalize  prices  would  in  lime  cause,  in  turn,  a  corresponding  falling  off  in  the 
production  of  the  article  proportional  to  the  falling  off  of  the  demand. 

But  another  and  more  powerful  cause  would  be  put  in  operation  at  home, 
which  would  tend  still  more  to  shorten  the  periods  between  the  demand  for  pro 
tection.  The  stimulus  caused  by  the  expansion  of  the  currency,  and  increased 
demand  and  prices  consequent  on  the  exclusion  of  the  article  from  abroad,  would 
tempt  numerous  adventurers  to  rush  into  the  business,  often  without  experience 
or  capital ;  and  the  increased  production,  in  consequence,  thrown  into  the  mar 
ket  would  greatly  accelerate  the  period  of  renewed  distress  and  embarrassment, 
and  demand  for  additional  protection. 

Thre  history  of  the  system  fully  illustrates  the  operation  of  these  causes,  and 
the  truth  of  the  conclusion  drawn  from  them.  Every  protective  tariff  that  Con 
gress  has  ever  laid  has  disappointed  the  hopes  of  its  advocates  ;  and  has  been 
followed,  at  short  intervals,  by  a  demand  for  higher  duties,  as  I  have  shown  on 
a  former  occasion.*  The  cry  has  been  protection  after  protection  ;  one  bottle 
after  another,  and  each  succeeding  one  more  capacious  than  'the  preceding. 
Repetition  but  increases  the  demand,  till  the  whole  terminates  in  one  universal 
explosion,  such  as  that  from  which  the  country  is  now  struggling  to  escape. 

Such  are  the  effects  of  the  system  on  the  interest  in  favour  of  which  these 
high  protective  duties  are  laid ;  and  I  shall  now  proceed  to  trace  them  on  the 
great  export  interest,  against  which  they  are  laid.  I  start  at  the  same  pmnt — 
the  exclusion,  in  part  or  whole,  of  the  importation  of  the  articles  against  which 
they  are  laid — their  very  object,  as  I  have  stated,  and  which,  if  not  effected,  the 
whole  must  fail.  The  necessary  consequence  of  the  falling  off  of  the  imports 
must  be,  ultimately,  the  falling  off  of  the  exports.  They  are  mutually  depend 
ant  on  each  other.  It  is  admitted  that  the  amount  of  the  exports  limits  the  im 
ports  ;  and  that,  taking  a  series  of  years  together,  their  value,  fairly  estimated, 
will  be  equal,  or  nearly  so  ;  but  it  is  no  less  certain  that  the  imports  limit,  in 
like  manner,  the  exports.  If  all  imports  be  prohibited,  all  exports  must  cease  ; 
and  if  a  given  amount  of  imports  only  be  admitted,  the  exports  must  finally  sink 
down  to  the  same  amount.  For  like  reason,  if  such  high  duties  be  imposed 
that  only  a  limited  amount  can  be  imported  with  profit  (which  is  the  case  in 
question),  the  exports  must,  in  like  manner,  sink  down  to  the  same  amount.  In 
this  aspect,  it  is  proper  to  trace  the  effect  of  another  and  powerful  cause,  inti 
mately  connected  with  that  under  consideration. 

This  falling  off  of  the  imports  would  necessarily  cause  a  falling  off  of  the  de 
mand  in  the  market  abroad  for  our  exports.  The  capacity  of  our  customers 
there  to  buy  from  us  depends,  in  a  great  measure,  on  their  capacity  of  selling 
to  us.  To  impair  the  one  is  to  impair  the  other.  The  joint  operation  of  the 
two  causes  would  be  highly  adverse  to  the  export  industry  of  the  country.  If 
it  should  not  cause  an  actual  decrease  of  the  exports,  it  would  arrest,  or  greatly 

*  Mr.  Calhoun's  Speech  on  the  Assumption  of  the  Debts  of  the  States. 


526  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

retard,  their  increase,  and  with  it,  the  commerce,  the  navigation,  and  their  as 
sociate  interests  ;  which  explains  why  those  great  branches  of  business  were  ar 
rested  in  their  growth  under  the  protective  tariffs  of  1824  and  1828,  and  receiv 
ed  such  a  mighty  impulse  from  the  reduction  of  duties  under  the  Compromise 
Act,  as  shown  from  the  commercial  tables,  exhibited  on  a  former  occasion  du 
ring  the  present  session.* 

But  the  loss  would  not  be  limited  to  the  falling  off  of  the  quantity  of  the  ex 
ports.  There  would  be  a  falling  off  of  price  as  well  as  quantity.  The  effects 
of  these  high  protective  duties,  by  preventing  imports,  would  be,  to  cause  a 
drain  of  specie  from  abroad,  as  has  been  stated,  to  purchase  at  home  the  sup 
plies  which  before  had  been  obtained  abroad.  This,  together  with  the  di 
minished  capacity  of  our  foreign  customers  to  buy,  as  just  explained,  would 
tend  to  cause  a  fall  in  the  price  of  the  articles  exported,  which  would  be  more 
or  less  considerable  on  each,  according  to  circumstances.  Both  causes  com 
bined — the  falling  off  of  quantity  and  price — would  proportionably  diminish  the 
means  of  those  direc.tly  and  indirectly  engaged  in  the  great  export  business  of 
the  country  ;  which  would  be  followed  by  another  and  more  powerful  cause  of 
their  impoverishment — that  they  would  have  to  give  a  higher  price — more 
money,  out  of  their  diminished  means,  to  purchase  their  supplies,  whether  im 
ported  or  manufactured  at  home,  than  what  they  could  have  got  them  for 
abroad.  Say  that  the  effect  would  be  to  increase  prices  but  25  per  cent. : 
then  they  would  have  to  give  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents,  where  other 
wise  one  dollar  would  have  been  sufficient.  The  joint  effects  of  the  whole 
would  be  the  diminution  of  means,  and  a  contraction  of  the  currency  and  fall 
of  prices  in  the  portion  of  the  Union  where  the  export  interest  is  predominant 
and  an  expansion  of  the  currency  and  increase  of  price  in  that  where  the 
manufacturing  interest  is,  as  has  been  explained.  The  consequence  would  be, 
to  compel  the  suffering  interest  to  resort,  in  the  first  place,  to  economy  and  cur 
tailment  of  expenses  ;  and,  if  the  system  be  continued,  to  the  abandonment  of 
pursuits  that  no  longer  afford  remunerating  profits. 

I  next  propose  to  consider  what  must  be  the^  consequence  of  that  result  on 
the  business  and  trade  of  the  country.  For  that  purpose,  I  propose  to  select  a 
single  article,  as  it  will  be  much  easier  to  trace  the  effects  on  a  single  article 
with  precision  and  satisfaction,  than  it  would  be  on  so  great  a  number  and  va 
riety.  I  shall  select  cotton,  because  by  far  the  most  considerable  in  the  list  of 
domestic  exports,  and  the  one  with  which  I  am  the  best  acquainted. 

When  the  cultivation  of  cotton  is  profitable,  those  engaged  in  it  devote  their 
attention  almost  exclusively  to  it,  and  rely  on  the  proceeds  of  their  crop  to  pur 
chase  almost  every  article  of  supply  except  bread ;  and  many  even  that,  to  a 
great  extent.  But  when  it  ceases  to  be  profitable,  from  high  protective  duties, 
or  other  causes,  they  curtail  their  expenses,  and  fall  back  on  their  own  re 
sources,  with  which  they  abound,  to  supply  their  wants.  Household  industry 
revives  ;  and  strong,  substantial,  coarse  clothing  is  manufactured  from  cotton 
and  wool  for  their  families-  and  domestics.  In  addition  to  cotton,  corn  and 
other  grains  are  cultivated  in  sufficient  abundance,  not  only  for  bread,  but  for 
the  rearing  of  stock  of  various  descriptions — hogs,  horses,  mules,  cattle,  and 
sheep.  The  effect  of  all  t]lis  is  to  diminish  greatly  the  consumption  of  the 
manufactured  articles,  whether  imported  or  made  in  other  portions  of  the  Union  ; 
and  still,  in  a  greater  degree,  the  purchase  of  meat,  grain,  and  stock,  followed 
by  a  great  falling  off  in  the  trade  between  the  cotton  region  of  the  South  and 
the  manufacturing  region  of  the  North  on  one  side,  and,  on  the  other,  the  great 
provision  and  stock  region  of  the  West.  But  the  effects  do  not  end  there. 
The  West — the  great  and  fertile  valley  of  the  Mississippi — draws  its  means 
of  purchasing  from  the  manufacturing  region  almost  exclusively  from  the  cot- 

*  Mr.  Calhoun's  Speech  on  Mr.  Clay's  Resolutions  . 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  527 

ton  ;  and  the  falling  off  of  its  trade  with  that  region  is  followed  by  a  corre 
sponding  falling  off  in  that  with  the  manufacturing.  The  end  is,  that  this 
scheme  of  compelling  others  to  give  higher  prices  than  they  can  afford  termi 
nates,  as  it  regards  this  great  branch  of  industry,  in  the  impoverishment  of  cus 
tomers,  and  loss  of  the  trade  of  two  great  sections  of  the  Union.  It  is  thus, 
senators,  that  every  act  of  folly  or  vice  (through  the  principle  of  retributive  jus 
tice,  so  deeply  seated  by  an  all-wise  Providence  in  the  political  and  moral 
world)  is  sure  at  last  to  recoil  on  its  authors. 

What  is  said  of  cotton  is  equally  applicable  to  every  other  branch  of  indus 
try  connected  directly  or  indirectly  with  the  great  export  industry  of  the  coun 
try.  This  bill  would  affect  them  all  alike  ;  cause  them  to  sell  less,  get  less,, 
and  give  more  for  what  they  buy,  and  to  fall  back  on  their  own  resources  for 
supplies  ;  or  abandon  their  pursuits,  to  be  followed,  finally,  by  impoverishment 
and  loss  of  custom  to  those  with  whom  it  originates.  The  whole  tendency  of 
the  measure  is  to  isolate  country  from  country,  state  from  state,  neighbourhood 
from  neighbourhood,  arid  family  from  family,  with  diminished  means  and  in 
creasing  poverty  as  the  circle  contracts.  The  consummation  of  the  system,  to 
use  an  illustration  no  less  true  than  striking  of  a  deceased  friend,*  "  is  Robin 
son  Crusoe  in  goatskin." 

Such  would  be  the  effects  of  the  proposed  high  protective  duties,  both  on  the 
interest  in  favour  of  which,  and  that  against  which  they  are  intended ;  even  on 
the  supposition  that  the  evil  is  such  as  the  advocates  of  this  bill  suppose.  But 
such  is  not  the  case.  The  present  embarrassment  of  the  manufacturing  inter 
est  is  not  caused  by  the  fact,  as  supposed,  that  the  imported  articles  have  taken 
possession  of  the  market,  almost  to  the  exclusion  of  the  domestic.  It  is  far 
otherwise.  Of  the  whole  amount,  in  value,  of  the  articles  proposed  to  be  pro 
tected  by  this  bill,  the  imported  bear  but  a  small  proportion  to  the  domestic. 
The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Manufactures  (Mr.  Simmons)  estimates  the 
former  at  $45,000,000,  and  the  latter  at  $400,000,000  ;  that  is,  about  one  to 
nine.  This  estimate  is  based  on  the  census  of  1840.  It  is  probably  less  now 
than  then,  in  consequence  of  the  increase  of  the  manufactures  since,  and  the 
falling  off  of  the  imports.  I  venture  nothing  in  saying  that  at  no  former  period 
of  our  history  has  the  disproportion  been  so  great  between  them,  or  the  com 
petition  so  decidedly  against  the  imported  articles.  If  farther  and  even  more 
decided  proof  be  required,  it  will  be  found  in  the  state  of  the  exchange.  It  is 
now  about  3^  per  cent,  in  favour  of  New-York,  against  Liverpool ;  which  is 
proof  conclusive  that  our  exports,  after  meeting  our  engagements  abroad,  are 
more  than  sufficient  to  supply  the  demands  of  the  country  for  imported  articles, 
even  at  the  comparatively  low  rates  of  duty  for  the  last  year ;  so  much  so,  that 
it  is  more  profitable  to  import  money  than  goods.  As  proof  of  the  fact,  I  see 
it  stated  that  one  of  the  banks  of  New- York  has  given  orders  to  import  a  large 
amount  of  specie  on  speculation,  It  is  in  such  a  state  of  things,  and  not  such 
as  that  supposed,  that  it  is  proposed  to  lay  these  high  protective  duties  ;  and 
the  question  is,  How  will  they  work  under  it  ? 

That  they  will  still  more  effectually  exclude  the  imported  articles,  and  still 
more  strongly  turn  the  exchange  in  our  favour,  and  thereby  give  a  local  and 
artificial  expansion  to  the  currency  in  the  manufacturing  region,  and  a  tem 
porary  stimulus  to  that  branch  of  industry,  is  probable,  but  there  is  no  hazard 
in  saying  that  it  would  be  fleeting,  beyond  what  has  been  usual  from  the  same 
cause,  and  would  be  succeeded  more  speedily,  and  to  a  greater  extent,  by  the 
falling  off  of  the  home  market,  through  the  operation  of  causes  already  ex 
plained.  The  result,  in  a  few  words,  would  be  a  greater  and  more  sudden 
reaction,  to  be  followed  by  a  more  sudden  and  more  extensive  loss  of  the 
home  market ;  so  that,  whatever  might  be  gained  by  the  exclusion  of  foreign 

*  Hon.  Warren  R.  Davis. 


528  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

articles,  would  be  far  outweighed  by  the  loss  of  it.  What  else  would  follow, 
I  will  not  attempt  to  anticipate.  It  would  be  the  first  time  that  a  high  protect 
ive  tariff  has  ever  been  adopted  under  similar  circumstances  ;  and  it  would  be 
difficult,  without  the  aid  of  experience,-  in  a  case  so  unprecedented,  and  on  a 
subject  so  complicated,  to  trace  consequences  with  anything  like  precision  or 
certainty. 

The  advocates  of  the  protective,  or,  rather,  the  prohibitory  system  (for  that  is 
the  more  appropriate  name),  have  been  led  into  error,  from  not  distinguishing 
between  the  situation  of  our  country  and  that  of  England.  That  country  has 
risen  to  great  power  arid  wealth,  and  they  attribute  it  to  her  prohibitory  policy, 
overlooking  the  great  advantages  of  her  position  ;  her  greater  freedom  and 
security,  compared  to  the  rest  of  Europe  ;  and  forgetting  that  other  European 
countries,  and  Spain  in  particular,  pushed  the  system  even  farther,  with  the 
very  reverse  effect.  But,  admitting  that  the  greatness  of  England  may,  in  part, 
be  attributed  to  the  system,  still  jt  would  furnish  no  proof  that  its  effects  would 
be  the  same  with  us.  Our  situation  is,  in  many  respects,  strikingly  different 
from  hers  ;  and,  among  others,  in  the  important  particular,  as  it  affects  the  point 
under  consideration,  that  she  never  had  but  few  raw  materials  to  export,  and 
they  of  no  great  value  :  coal  and  salt  now,  and  wool  formerly  ;  while  our  coun 
try  has  numerous  such  products,  and  of  the  greatest  value  in  the  general  com 
merce  of  the  world.  England  had  to  create,  by  manufacturing,  the  products 
for  her  export  trade  ;  but,  with  us,  our  soil  and  climate  and  forests  are  the  great 
sources  from  which  they  are  drawn.  To  extract  them  from  these,  to  ship  them 
abroad,  and  exchange  them  for  the  products  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  forms  the 
basis  of  our  industry,  as  has  been  shown.  In  that  is  to  be  found  the  great 
counteracting  cause,  with  us,  to  the  system  of  prohibitory  duties,  the  operation 
of  which  I  have  endeavoured  rapidly  to  sketch.  It  has  heretofore  defeated, 
and  will  continue  to  defeat,  the  hopes  of  its  advocates.  In  England,  there 
neither  was  nor  is  any  such  counteracting  cause  ;  and  hence  the  comparative 
facility  and  safety  with  which  it  could  be  introduced  and  established  there. 

But  it  was  asked,  What  is  to  be  done  ?  What  course  does  true  policy  re 
quire,  to  give  the  highest  possible  impulse  to  the  industry  and  prosperity  of  the 
country,  including  manufactures  and  all  ?  I  answer,  the  very  reverse  of  that 
proposed  by  this  bill.  Instead  of  looking  to  the  home  market,  and  shaping  all 
our  policy  to  secure  that,  we  must  look  to  the  foreign,  and  shape  it  to  secure 
that. 

We  have,  senators,  reached  a  remarkable  point  in  the  progress  of  civiliza 
tion  and  the  mechanical  and  chemical  arts,  and  which  will  require  a  great 
change  in  the  policy  of  civilized  nations.  Within  the  last  three  or  four  gen 
erations,  they  have  received  an  impulse  far  beyond  all  former  example,  and 
have  now  obtained  a  perfection  before  unknown.  The  result  has  been  a  won 
derfully  increased  facility  of  producing  all  articles  of  supply  depending  on  those 
arts ;  that  is,  of  those  very  articles  which  we  call,  in  our  financial  language, 
protected  articles  ;  and  against  the  importation  of  which  these  high  duties  are 
for  the  most  part  intended.  In  consequence  of  this  increased  facility,  it  now 
requires  but  a  small  part,  comparatively,  of  the  labour  and  capital  of  a  country 
to  clothe  its  people,  and  supply  itself  with  most  of  the  products  of  the  useful 
arts ;  and  hence,  all  civilized  people,  with  little  exception,  are  producing  their 
own  supply,  and  even  overstocking  their  own  market.  It  results  that  no  peo 
ple  restricted  to  the  home  market  can,  in  the  present  advanced  state  of  the 
useful  arts,  rise  to  greatness  and  wealth  by  manufactures.  For  that  purpose, 
they  must  compete  successfully  for  the  foreign  market  in  the  younger,  less  ad 
vanced,  and  less  civilized  countries.  This  necessity  for  more  enlarged  and 
freer  intercourse  between  the  older,  more  advanced,  and  more  civilized  nations, 
and  the  younger,  less  advanced,  and  less  civilized,  at  a  time  when  the  whole 
globe  is  laid  open  to  our  knowledge,  and  a  rapidity  and  facility  of  intercourse 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  529 

established  between  all  its  parts  heretofore  unknown,  is  one  of  the  mighty  means 
ordained  by  Providence  to  spread  population,  light,  civilization,  and  prosperity- 
far  and  wide  over  its  entire  surface. 

The  great  problem,  then,  is,  How  is  the  foreign  market  to  be  commanded  ?  I 
answer,  by  the  reverse  means  proposed  in  order  to  command  the  home  market 
— low  instead  of  high  duties  ;  and  a  sound  currency,  fixed,  stable,  and  as  near 
ly  as  possible  on  the  level  with  the  general  currency  of  the  world,  instead  of  an 
inflated  and  fluctuating  one.  Nothing  can  be  more  hostile  to  the  command  of 
foreign  trade  than  high  prohibitory  duties,  even  as  it  regards  the  exports  of 
manufactures.  The  artificial  expansion  of  the  currency,  and  consequent  rise 
of  price  and  increased  expense  of  production,  which,  as  has  been  shown,  must 
follow,  would  be  of  themselves  fatal  ;  but  to  that  must  be  added  another  cause 
not  much  less  so.  I  refer  to  the  general  pressure  of  the  prohibitory  system  on 
the  export  industry  of  the  country,  as  already  explained,  and  which  would  fall 
with  as  much  severity  on  the  export  of  manufactures  as  on  that  of  cotton  or 
any  other  manufactured  article.  The  system  operates  with  like  effect  on  ex 
ports,  whether  of  raw  materials  or  manufactured  articles  in  the  last  and  highest 
state  of  finish.  The  reason  is  the  same  as  to  both.  This  begins  to  be  understood 
in  countries  the  most  advanced  in  the  arts,  and  whose  exports  consist  almost 
exclusively  of  manufactured  articles  ;  and  especially  England,  the  most  so  of 
any ;  and  hence  they  have  already  begun  the  process  of  reduction  of  duties, 
with  the  view  of  increasing  their  exports.  In  the  recent  adjustment  of  her  tar 
iff,  England,  with  that  avowed  view,  made  great  reduction  in  her  import  duties. 

But  can  we  hope  to  compete  successfully  in  the  market  of  the  world  by  means 
of  a  sound  currency  and  low  duties  ?  I  answer,  if  we  cannot,  we  may  give  up 
the  contest  as  desperate  ;  and  the  sooner  the  better.  It  is  idle,  and  worse  than 
idle,  to  attempt  to  add  to  the  growth  of  our  manufactures  by  the  prohibitory  sys 
tem.  They  have  already  reached,  under  its  influence,  their  full,  but  stunted 
growth.  To  attempt  to  push  them  farther,  must  react  and  retard  instead  of  ac 
celerating  their  growth.  The  home  market  cannot  consume  our  immense  sur 
plus  productions  of  provisions,  lumber,  cotton,  and  tobacco ;  nor  find  employ 
ment  in  manufacturing,  for  home  consumption,  the  vast  amount  of  labour  em 
ployed  in  raising  the  surplus  beyond  the  home  consumption,  and  which  can  only 
find  a  market  abroad.  Take  the  single  article  of  cotton.  It  takes,  at  me  least 
calculation,  700,000  labourers  to  produce  the  crop — more  than  twice  the  num 
ber,  on  a  fair  calculation,  employed  in  all  the  branches  of  manufactures  which 
can  expect  to  be  benefited  by  these  high  duties.  Less  than  the  si^th  part  would 
be  ample  to  raise  every  pound  of  cotton  necessary  for  the  home  market,  if  every 
yard  of  cotton  cloth  consumed  at  home  were  manufactured  at  home,  and  made 
from  home-raised  cotton.  What,  then,  I  ask,  is  to  becorr^  of  the  five  or  six 
hundred  thousand  labourers  now  employed  in  raising  the  article  for  the  foreign 
market?  How  can  they  find  employment  in  manufacturing,  when  91  parts  in 
100  of  all  the  protected  articles  consumed  in  the  country  are  now  made  at  home  ? 
And  if  not  in  manufacturing,  how  else  can  they  be  employed  ?  In  raiding  pro 
visions  ?  Those  engaged  in  that  already  supplv,  and  more  than  supply,  the 
home  market ;  and  how  shall  they  find  employrpent  in  that  quarter  ?  How  those 
employed  in  the  culture  of  tobacco,  and  the  libber  business,  and  foreign  tuade  ? 
The  alternative  is  inevitable — they  must  either  persist,  in  spite  of  these  high 
protective  duties,  with  all  the  consequent  loss  and  impoverishment  which  must 
follow  them,  in  their  present  employment,  or  be  forced  into  universal  competi 
tion  in  producing  the  protected  articles  for  the  home  market,  which  is  already 
nearly  fully  supplied  by  the  small  amount  of  labour  engaged  in  their  production. 

But  why  should  we  doubt  our  capacity  to  compete  successfully,  with  a  sound 
currency  and  low  duties,  in  the  general  market  of  the  world  ?  A  superabun 
dance  of  cheap  provisions,  and  of  the  raw  material,  as  far  as  cotton  is  concern 
ed,  gives  us  great  advantage  in  the  greatest  and  most  important  branch  of  man- 

X  x  x 


530  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOUN. 

nfactures  in  modern  times.  To  these  may  be  added,  a  favourable  situation  for 
trade  with  all  the  world  ;  the  most  abundant  and  cheap  supply  of  what  may  be 
called  natural  capital — water,  coal,  timber,  and  soil ;  and  a  peculiar  aptitude  for 
mechanical  and  chemical  improvements  on  the  part  of  our  citizens,  combined 

with  great  energy,  industry,  and  skill.     There  are  but  two  drawbacks high 

wages  and  high  interest.  In  other  respects,  no  country  has  superior  advanta 
ges  for  manufacturing. 

No  one  is  more  averse  to  the  reduction  of  wages  than  I  am,  or  entertains  a 
greater  respect  for  the  labouring  portion  of  the  community.  Nothing  could  in 
duce  me  to  adopt  a  course  of  policy  that  would  impair  their  comfort,  or  prosper 
ity.  But  when  we  speak  of  wages,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  the 
real  and  artificial ;  between  that  which  enables  a  labourer  to  exchange  the  fruits 
of  his  industry  for  the  greatest  amount  of  food,  clothing,  and  other  necessaries 
or  comforts,  without  regard  to  the  nominal  amount  in  money,  and  the  mere  nom 
inal  money  amount,  that  is  often  the  result  of  an  inflated  currency,  which,  in 
stead  of  increasing  wages  in  proportion  to  the  price  and  the  means  of  the  la 
bourer,  is  one  of  the  most  effective  means  of  defrauding  him  of  his  just  dues. 
But  it  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  low  prices  and  high  wages,  estimated 
in  money,  are  irreconcilable.  Wages  are  but  the  residuum  after  deducting  the 
profit  of  capital,  the  expense  of  production,  including  the  exactions  of  the  gov 
ernment  in  the  shape  of  taxes,  which  must  certainly  fall  on  production,  however 
laid.  The  less  that  is  paid  for  the  use  of  capital,  for  the  expense  of  produc 
tion,  and  the  exactions  of  the  government,  the  greater  is  the  amount  left  for  wa 
ges  ;  and  hence,  by  lessening  these,  prices  may  fall,  and  wages  rise  at  the  same 
time  :  and  that  is  the  combination  which  gives  to  labour  its  greatest  reward,  and 
places  the  prosperity  of  a  country  on  the  most  durable  basis.  It  is  not  my 
habit  to  stop  and  illustrate  by  example ;  but  the  importance  of  the  point  under 
consideration  is  such,  that  it  would  seem  to  justify  it. 

For  this  purpose,  I  shall  select  a  product  of  the  soil,  and  take  the  article  of 
wheat.  Suppose  twenty  bushels  of  wheat  to  be  produced  on  an  acre  of  land  in 
Virginia,  worth  ten  dollars  the  acre,  and  twenty  on  an  acre  in  England,  worth 
one  hundred  dollars,  and  the  wheat  to  be  worth  one  dollar  a  bushel ;  suppose, 
also,  that  the  interest,  or  cost  for  the  use  of  capital,  to  be  the  same  in  both 
countries — say  6  per  cent. — and  the  cost  of  cultivation  and  the  exactions  of  the 
government  the  same :  it  is  manifest,  on  the  supposition,  that  wages  could  not 
commence  in  England  till  $6  (the  interest  on  $100)  was  paid  ;  while  in  Vir 
ginia  it  would  commence  after  60  cents  (the  interest  on  $10)  was  paid.  And 
hence,  in  Engird,  setting  the  cost  of  cultivation  and  the  exactions  of  the  gov 
ernment  aside,  bir.  $14  would  be  left  for  wages,  while  $19  40  would  be  left  in 
Virginia  ;  and  henco,  the  product  of  labour  in  Virginia,  out  of  this  greater  re 
siduum,  might  sell  ai  a  lower  price,  and  leave  still  a  greater  fund  for  the  re 
ward  of  wages.  The  induction  of  the  cost  of  cultivation,  and  of  the  exactions 
of  the  government,  woula  have  the  same  effect  as  paying  less  for  the  capital, 
and  would  have  the  effect  of  making  a  still  greater  difference  in  the  fund  to 
pay  wages.  Taking  the  aggregate  of  the  whole,  and  comparing  all  the  ele 
ments  that  enter  into  the  compilation,  I  feel  assured  that,  with  a  sound  curren 
cy  and  low  duties — i.  e.,  light  ta^s  exacted  on  the  part  of  the  government — 
the  only  element  which  is  against  us  in  the  rate  of  interest,  but  that  our  advanta 
ges  in  other  respects  would  more  than  counterbalance  it ;  and  that  we  have  no 
thing  to  fear  in  open  competition  with  ot'aer  countries  in  the  general  market  of 
the  world.  We  would  have  our  full  share  with  the  most  successful ;  while,  at 
the  same  time,  the  exuberance  of  the  home  market,  relieved  from  oppressive 
burdens,  would  be  vastly  increased,  and  be  more  effectually  and  exclusively 
commanded  by  the  productions  of  our  own  manufacturers,  than  it  can  possibly 
be  by  the  unjust,  unconstitutional,  monopolizing,  and  oppressive  scheme  propo 
sed  by  this  bill. 


SPEECHES    OF  JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  531 

I  am  Yiot  ignorant,  senators,  that  it  is  the  work  of  time  and  of  great  delicacy 
to  pass  from  the  artificial  condition  in  which  the  country  has  long  been  placed, 
in  reference  to  its  industry,  by  a  mistaken  and  mischievous  system  of  policy. 
Sudden  transitions,  even  to  better  habits  or  better  conditions,  are  hazardous,  un 
less  slowly  effected.  With  this  impression,  I  have  ever  been  averse  to  all  sud 
den  steps,  both  as  to  the  currency  and  the  system  of  policy  which  is  now  the 
subject  of  our  deliberation,  bad  as  I  believe  them  both  to  be  ;  and  deep  as  my 
conviction  is  in  favour  of  a  sound  currency  and  low  duties,  I  am  by  no  means 
disposed  to  reach,  by  a  sudden  transition,  the  points  to  which  I  firmly  believe 
they  may  be  reduced,  consistently  with  the  necessary  wants  of  the  government, 
by  a  proper  management  of  our  finances. 

But,  as  pernicious  as  the  prohibitory  or  protective  system  may  be  on  the  in 
dustrial  pursuits  of  the  country,  it  is  still  more  so  on  its  politics  and  morals. 
That  they  have  greatly  degenerated  within  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years  ;  that 
there  are  less  patriotism  and  purity,  and  more  faction,  selfishness,  and  corrup 
tion  ;  that  our  public  affairs  are  conducted  with  less  dignity,  decorum,  and  re 
gard  to  economy,  accountability,  and  public  faith  ;  and.  finally,  that  the  taint  has 
extended  to  private  as  well  as  public  morals,  is,  unhappily,  out  too  manifest  to 
be  denied.  If  all  this  be  traced  back,  the  ultimate  cause  of  this  deplorable 
change  will  be  found  to  originate  mainly  in  the  fact,  that  the  duties  (or,  to  speak 
more  plainly,  the  taxes  on  imports),  from  which  *o^  the  whole  revenue  is  de 
rived,  are  so  laid,  that  the  most  powerful  porlioFofthe  community— not  in  num 
bers,  but  influence— are  not  only  exempted  ironi  the  burden,  but,  in  fact,  ac 
cording  to  their  own  conception,  receive  bounties  from  their  operation.  They 
crowd  our  tables  with  petitions,  imploring  Congress  to  impose  taxes— high  tax 
es  ;  arid  rejoice  at  their  imposition  as  Lhe  greatest  blessing,  and  deplore  their 
defeat  as  the  greatest  calamity  ;  wtl'le  other  portions  regard  them  in  the  oppo 
site  light,  as  oppressive  and  p*'evous  burdens.  Now,  senators,  I  appeal  to 
you— to  the  candour  and  gor^  sense  even  of  the  friends  of  this  bill — whether 
these  facts  do  not  furnish  roof  conclusive  that  these  high  protective  duties  are 
regarded  as  bounties,  an-' not  taxes,  by  these  petitioners,  and  those  who  support 
their  course,  and  urg^  ^e  passage  of  the  bill  ?  Can  stronger  proof  be  offered  ? 
Bounties  may  be  j«iplored,  but  it  is  not  in  human  nature  to  pray  for  taxes,  bur 
den,  and  oppress011'  believing  them  to  be  such.  I  again  appeal  to  you,  and  ask 
if  the  power  <V  taxation  can  be  perverted  into  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  gov- 
ern«ient  to  enrich  and  aggrandize  one  portion  of  the  community  at  the  expense 
Q(  the  oAetj  without  causing  all  of  the  disastrous  consequences,  political  and 
moral,  which  we  all  deplore  ?  Can  anything  be  imagined  more  destructive  of  pa 
triotism,  and  more  productive  of  faction,  selfishness,  and  violence  ;  or  more  hos- 
tiJe  to  all  economy  and  accountability  in  the  administration  of  the  fiscal  department 
of  the  government?  Can  those  who  regard  taxes  as  a  fruitful  source  of  gain, 
or  as  the  means  of  averting  ruin,  regard  extravagance,  waste,  neglect,  or  any 
other  means  by  which  the  expenditures  may  be  increased,  and  the  tax  on  the 
imports  raised,  with  the  deep  condemnation  which  their  corrupting  consequen 
ces  on  the  politics  and  morals  of  the  community  demand  ?  Let  the  history  of 
the  government  since  the  introduction  of  the  system,  and  its  present  wretched 
condition,  respond. 

But  it  would  be  doing  injustice  to  charge  the  evils  which  have  flowed  from 
f  the  system,  and  the  greater  which  still  threaten,  exclusively  on  the  manufactu 
ring  interest.  Although  it  ostensibly  originates  with  it,  yet,  in  fact,  it  is  the 
least  efficient,  and  the  most  divided,  of  all  that  combination  of  interests  from 
which  the  system  draws  its  support.  Among  them,  the  first  and  most  powerful 
is  that  active,  vigilant,  and  well-trained  corps,  which  lives  on  government,  or 
expects  to  live  on  it ;  which  prospers  most  when  the  revenue  is  the  greatest, 
the  treasury  the  fullest,  and  the  expenditures  the  most  profuse  ;  and,  of  course, 
is  ever  the  firm  and  faithful  support  of  whatever  system  shall  extract  most  from 


532  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  pockets  of  the  rest  of  the  community,  to  be  emptied  into  theirs.  The  next 
in  order — when  the  government  is  connected  with  the  banks — when  it  receives 
their  notes  in  its  dues,  and  pays  them  away  as  cash,  and  uses  them  as  its  de 
positories  and  fiscal  agents — are  the  banking  and  other  associated  interests, 
stock-jobbers,  brokers,  and  speculators  ;  and  which,  like  the  other,  profit  the 
more  in  consequence  of  the  connexion  ;  the  higher  the  revenue,  the  greater  its 
surplus  and  the  expenditures  of  the  government.  It  is  less  numerous,  but  still 
more  active  and  powerful,  in  proportion,  than  the  other.  These  form  the  basis  ; 
and  on  these,  political  aspirants,  who  hope  to  rise  to  power  and  control  through 
it,  rear  their  party  organization.  It  is  they  who  infuse  into  it  the  vital  princi 
ple,  and  give  life,  and  energy,  and  direction  to  the  whole.  This  formidable  com 
bination,  thus  vivified  and  directed,  rose  to  power  in  the  late  great  political 
struggle,  and  is  now  in  the  ascendant ;  and  it  is  to  its  death-like  efforts  to  main 
tain  and  consolidate  its  power,  that  this  and  the  late  session  owe  their  extra 
ordinary  proceedings.  Its  hope  now  is  centred  in  this  bill.  In  their  estima 
tion,  without  a  protective  tariff,  all  is  lost ;  and,  with  it,  that  which  is  now  lost 
may  be  regained. 

I  have  now,  senators,  said  what  I  intended.  It  may  be  asked,  Why  have  I 
spoken  at  all  ?  ^It  is  not  from  the  expectation  of  changing  a  single  vote  on  the 
opposite  side.  That  is  hopeless.  The  indications  during  this  discussion  show, 
beyond  doubt,  a  foregone  4eiermination  on  the  part  of  its  advocates  to  vote  for 
the  bill,  without  the  slightest  auendment,  be  its  defects  or  errors  ever  so  great. 
They  have  shut  their  eyes  and  cl^ed  their  ears.  The  voice  of  an  angel  from 
heaven  could  not  reach  their  understanding.  Why,  then,  have  I  raised  mine  ? 
Because  my  hope  is  in  truth.  "  Crushed  to  earth,  it  will  rise  again."  It  is 
rising,  and  I  have  added  my  voice  to  fasten  its  resurrection.  Great  already 
is  the  change  of  opinion  on  this  subject  sii.,e  1828.  Then  the  plantation  states, 
as  they  were  called,  stood  alone  against  this  ^}se  an(j  oppressive  system.  We 
had  scarcely  an  ally  beyond  their  limits,  and  w.  had  to  throw  off  the  crushing 
burden  it  imposed,  as  we  best  could,  within  the  hmts  of  the  Constitution.  Very 
different  is  the  case  now.  On  whatever  side  the  eyt;s  turned,  firm  and  faith 
ful  allies  are  to  be  seen.  The  great  popular  party  is  ai«,a(jy  rallied  almost  en 
masse  around  the  banner  which  is  leading  the  party  to  its  ,nai  triumph.  The 
few  that,  still  lag  will  soon  be  rallied  under  its  ample  folds,  in  that  banner  is 
inscribed,  FREE  TRADE;  LOW  DUTIES;  NO  DEBT;  SEPARATION 
FROM  BANKS;  ECONOMY;  RETRENCHMENT,  AND  S'lRICT  AD 
HERENCE  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION.  Victory  in  such  a  cas*  will  b* 
great  and  glorious  ;  and  if  its  principles  be  faithfully  and  firmly  adhered  to,  after 
it  is  achieved,  much  will  it  redound  to  the  honour  of  those  by  whom  it  will  have 
been  won  ;  and  long  will  it  perpetuate  the  liberty  and  prosperity  of  the  country. 


XXXVII. 

SPEECH   ON   THE   TREATY   OF   WASHINGTON,   AUGUST,    1842. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said  that  his  object  in  rising  was  not  to  advocate  or  oppose 
the  treaty,  but  simply  to  state  the  reasons  that  would  govern  him  in  voting  for 
its  ratification.  The  question,  according  to  his  conception,  was  not  whether  it 
was  all  we  could  desire,  or  whether  it  was  liable  to  this  or  that  objection,  but 
whether  it  was  such  a  one  that,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it 
would  be  most  advisable  to  adopt  or  reject.  Thus  regarded,  it  was  his  inten 
tion  to  state  fairly  the  reasons  in  favour  of  and  against  its  ratification,  and  to 
assign  to  each  its  proper  weight,  beginning  with  the  portion  relating  to  the 
Northeastern  boundary,  the  settlement  of  which  was  the  immediate  and  promi 
nent  object  of  the  negotiation. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  533 

lie  was  one  of  those  who  had  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  the  boundary  for 
which  the  State  of  Maine  contended  was  the  true  one,  as  established  by  the 
treaty  of  peace  in  1783  ;  and  had  accordingly  so  recorded  his  vote,  after  a  de 
liberate  investigation  of  the  subject.  But,  although  such  was  his  opinion,  he 
did  not  doubt,  at  the  time,  iuat  tiie  boundary  could  only  be  settled  by  a  compro 
mise  line.  We  had  admitted  it  to  be  doubtful  at  an  early  period  during  the 
administration  of  Washington,  and  more  recently  and  explicitly,  by  stipulating 
to  submit  it  to  the  arbitration  of  a  friendly  power,  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent.  The 
doubt  thus  admitted  on  our  part  to  exist  had  been  greatly  strengthened  by  the 
award  of  the  King  of  Holland,  who  had  been  mutually  selected  as  the  arbiter 
under  the  treaty.  So  strong,  indeed,  was  his  (Mr.  C.'s)  impression  that  the 
dispute  could  only  be  settled  by  a  compromise  or  conventional  line,  that  he  said 
to  a  friend  in  the  then  cabinet  (when  an  appropriation  was  made  a  few  years 
since  for  a  special  mission  to  be  sent  to  England  on  the  subject  of  the  boundary, 
and  his  name,  among  others,  was  mentioned  for  the  place),  that  the  question 
could  only  be  settled  by  compromise  ;  and  for  that  purpose  some  distinguished 
citizen  of  the  section  ought  to  be  selected  ;  and  neither  he,  nor  any  other 
Southern  man,  ought  to  be  thought  of.  With  these  previous  impressions,  he 
was  prepared,  when  the  negotiation  opened,  to  expect,  if  it  succeeded  in  adjust 
ing  the  difficulty,  it  would  be  (as  it  has  been)  on  a  compromise  line.  Notwith 
standing,  when  it  was  first  announced  that  the  line  agreed  on  included  a  con 
siderable  portion  of  the  territory  lying  to  the  west  of  the  line  awarded  by  the 
King  of  Holland,  he  was  incredulous,  and  expressed  himself  strongly  against 
it.  His  first  impression  was  perhaps  the  more  strongly  against  it,  from  the 
fact  that  he  had  fixed  on  the  River  St.  John,  from  the  mouth  of  Eel  River, 
taking  the  St.  Francis  branch  (the  one  selected  by  the  King  of  Holland)  as  the 
natural  and  proper  compromise  boundary,  including  in  our  limits  all  the  portion  of 
the  disputed  territory  lying  north  of  Eel  River,  and  west  and  south  of  the  St.  John, 
above  its  junction;  and  all  the  other  within  that  of  Great  Britain.  On  a  little 
reflection,  however,  he  resolved  not  to  form  his  opinion  of  the  merits  or  demer 
its  of  the  treaty  on  rumour  or  imperfect  information,  but  to  wait  until  the  whole 
subject  was  brought  before  the  Senate  officially,  and  then  to  make  it  up  on  full 
knowledge  of  all  the  facts  and  circumstances,  after  deliberate  and  mature  reflec 
tion  ;  and  that  he  had  done  with  the  utmost  care  and  impartiality.  What  he 
now  proposed  was  to  give  the  result,  with  the  reasons  on  which  it  rests,  and 
which  would  govern  his  vote  on  the  ratification. 

He  still  believed  that  the  boundary  which  he  had  fixed  in  his  own  mind  was 
the  natural  and  proper  one  ;  but,  as  that  could  not  be  obtained,  the  question  for 
them  to  decide  was,  Are  the  objections  to  the  boundary  as  actually  agreed  on, 
and  the  stipulations  connected  with  it,  such  as  ought  to  cause  its  rejection  ?  In 
deciding  it,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  as  far  as  this  portion  of  the  boundary 
is  concerned,  it  is  a  question  belonging  much  more  to  the  State  of  Maine  than 
to  the  Union.  It  is,  in  truth,  but  the  boundary  of  that  state  ;  and  it  makes  a 
part  of  the  boundary  of  the  United  States,  only  by  being  the  exterior  boundary 
of  one  of  the  states  of  our  Federal  Union.  It  is  her  sovereignty  and  soil  that 
are  in  dispute,  except  the  portion  of  the  latter  that  still  remains  in  Massachu 
setts  ;  and  it  belongs,  in  the  first  place,  to  her,  and  to  Massachusetts,  as  far  as  her 
right  of  soil  is  involved,  to  say  what  their  rights  and  interests  are,  and  what  is 
required  to  be  done.  The  rest  of  the  Union  is  bound  to  defend  them  in  then 
just  claim ;  and  to  assent  to  what  they  may  be  willing  to  assent,  in  settling  the 
claim  in  contest,  if  there  should  be  nothing  in  it  inconsistent  with  the  interest, 
honour,  or  safety  of  the  rest  of  the  Union.  It  is  so  that  the  controversy  has 
ever  been  regarded.  It  is  well  known  President  Jackson  would  readily  have 
agreed  to  the  award  of  the  King  of  Holland,  had  not  Maine  objected  ;  and  that, 
to  overcome  her  objection,  he  was  prepared  to  recommend  to  Congress  to  give 
her,  in  order  to  get  her  consent,  one  million  of  acres  of  the  public  domain,  worth. 


534  SPEECHES    OF    JOIIiN    C.    CALHOUtf. 

at  the  minimum  price,  a  million  and  a  quarter  of  dollars.  The  case  is  now  re 
versed.  Maine  and  Massachusetts  have  both  assented  to  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty,  as  far  as  the  question  of  the  boundary  affects  their  peculiar  interest, 
through  commissioners  vested  with  full  powers  to  represent  them ;  and  the 
question  for  us  to  decide  is,  Shall  we  reject  that  to  which  they  have  assented  ? 
Shall  the  government,  after  refusing  to  agree  to  the  award  of  the  King  of  Hol 
land,  because  Maine  objected,  now  reverse  its  course,  and  refuse  to  agree  to 
that  which  she  and  Massachusetts  have  both  assented  to?  There  may,  indeed,  be 
reasons  strong  enough  to  authorize  such  a  course  ;  but  they  must  be  such  as 
will  go  to  prove  that  we  cannot  give  our  assent  consistently  with  the  interests, 
the  honour,  or  the  safety  of  the  Union.  That  has  not  been  done  ;  and,  he 
would  add,  if  there  be  any  such,  he  has  not  been  able  to  detect  them. 

It  has,  indeed,  been  said  that  the  assent  of  Maine  was  coerced.  She  cer 
tainly  desired  to  obtain  a  more  favourable  boundary ;  but  when  the  alternative 
was  presented  of  another  reference  to  arbitration,  she  waived  her  objection,  as 
far  as  she  was  individually  concerned,  rather  than  incur  the  risk,  delay,  uncer 
tainty,  and  vexation  of  another  submission  of  her  claims  to  arbitration  ;  and  left 
it  to  the  Senate,  the  constituted  authority  appointed  for  the  purpose,  to  decide 
on  the  general  merits  of  the  treaty  as  it  relates  to  the  whole  Union.  In  so 
doing,  she  has,  in  his  opinion,  acted  wisely  and  patriotically — wisely  for  her 
self,  and  patriotically  in  reference  to  the  rest  of  the  Union.  She  has  not  got, 
indeed,  all  she  desired  ;  and  has  even  lost  territory,  if  the  treaty  be  compared 
to  the  award  of  the  King  of  Holland  ;  but,  as  an  offset,  that  which  she  has  lost 
is  of  little  value,  while  that  which  she  retains  has  been  greatly  increased  in 
value  by  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  treaty.  The  whole  amount  lost  is 
about  half  a  million  of  acres.  It  lies  along  the  eastern  slope  of  the  highlands, 
skirting  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  east,  and  is  acknowledged  to  be  of  little  value 
for  soil,  timber,  or  anything  else— a  steril  region,  in  a  severe,  inhospitable  clime. 
Against  that  loss,  she  has  acquired  the  right  to  navigate  the  River  St.  John  ; 
and  that,  not  only  to  float  down  the  timber  on  its  banks,  but  all  the  productions 
of  the  extensive,  well-timbered,  and,  taken  as  a  whole,  not  steril  portion  of 
the  state  that  lies  on  her  side  of  the  basin  of  that  river  and  its  tributaries.  But 
that  is  not  all.  She  also  gains  what  is  vastly  more  valuable — the  right  to  ship 
them,  on  the  same  terms  as  colonial  productions,  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colo 
nial  possessions. 

These  great  and  important  advantages  will  probably  double  the  value  of  that 
extensive  region,  and  make  it  one  of  the  most  populous  and  flourishing  portions 
of  the  state.  Estimated  by  a  mere  moneyed  standard,  these  advantages  are 
worth,  he  would  suppose,  all  the  rest  of  the  territory  claimed  by  Maine  without 
them.  If  to  this  be  added  the  sum  of  about  $200,000  to  be  paid  to  her  for  the 
expense  of  defending  her  territory,  and  $300,000  to  her  and  Massachusetts  in 
equal  moieties,  in  consequence  of  their  assent  to  the  boundary  and  the  equiva 
lents  received,  it  must  be  apparent  that  Maine  has  not  made  a  bad  exchange  in 
accepting  the  treaty,  as  compared  with  the  award,  as  far  as  her  separate  inter 
est  is  concerned.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  she  is  the  rightful  judge  of  her  own 
interests  ;  and  her  assent  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  our  assent,  provided  that  to 
which  she  has  assented  does  not  involve  too  great  a  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the 
rest  of  the  Union,  nor  their  honour  or  safety.  So  far  from  that,  as  far  as  the 
rest  of  the  Union  is  concerned,  the  sacrifice  is  small  and  the  gain  great.  They 
are  under  solemn  constitutional  obligations  to  defend  Maine,  as  one  of  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Union,  against  invasion,  and  to  protect  her  territory,  cost  what  it 
may,  at  every  hazard.  The  power  claiming  what  she  contended  to  be  hers, 
is  one  of  the  greatest,  if  not  the  greatest,  on  earth  ;  the  dispute  is  of  long  stand 
ing,  and  of  a  character  difficult  to  be  adjusted  ;  and,  however  clear  the  right  of 
Maine  may  be  regarded  in  the  abstract,  it  has  been  made  doubtful  in  conse 
quence  of  admissions,  for  which  the  government  of  the  Union  is  responsible. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  535 

To  terminate  such  a  controversy,  with  the  assent  of  the  party  immediately  in 
terested,  by  paying  the  small  sum  of  half  a  million  —  of  which  a  large  part 
(say  $200,000)  is  unquestionably  due  to  Maine,  and  would  have  to  be  paid  to 
her  without  the  treaty — is  indeed  a  small  sacrifice — a  fortunate  deliverance. 
President  Jackson  was  willing  to  allow  her,  as  has  been  stated,  more  than  twice 
as  much  for  her  assent  to  the  award ;  and  in  doing  so,  he  showed  his  wisdom, 
whatever  might  have  been  thought  of  it  at  the  time.  Those,  at  least,  who  op 
posed  the  treaty  will  not  charge  him  with  being  willing  to  sacrifice  the  inter 
est  and  honour  of  the  Union  in  making  the  offer  ;  and  yet  the  charge  which 
they  make  against  this  portion  of  the  treaty  does,  by  implication,  subject  what 
he  was  ready  to  do  to  a  similar  one. 

But  it  is  said  that  the  territory  which  England  would  acquire  beyond  the 
boundary  of  the  awarded  line  would  greatly  strengthen  her  frontier  and  weak 
en  ours,  and  would  thereby  endanger  the  safety  of  the  country  in  that  quarter. 
He  did  not  profess  to  be  deeply  versed  in  military  science,  but,  according  to 
his  conception,  there  was  no  foundation  for  the  objection.  It  was,  if  he  did  not 
mistake,  the  very  last  point  on  our  whole  frontier,  from  the  mouth  of  the  St. 
Croix  to  the  outlet  of  Lake  Superior,  on  which  an  expedition  would  be  organi 
zed  on  either  side  to  attack  the  possessions  of  the  other.  In  a  military  point 
of  view,  our  loss  is  as  nothing  in  that  quarter  ;  while  in  another,  and  a  much  more 
important  quarter,  our  gain  by  the  treaty  is  great,  in  the  same  point  of  view. 
He  referred  to  that  provision  by  which  we  acquire  Rouse's  Point,  at  the  nor 
thern  extremity  of  Lake  Champlain.  It  is  among  the  most  important  military 
positions  on  the  whole  line  of  our  Eastern  and  Northern  frontier,  whether  it  be 
regarded  in  reference  to  offensive  or  defensive  operations.  He  well  remem 
bered  the  deep  sensation  caused  among  military  men  in  consequence  of  its  loss  ; 
and  he  would  leave  the  question  of  loss  or  gain,  in  a  military  point  of  vievy 
(taking  the  two  together),  to  their  decision,  without  the  least  doubt  what  it 
would  be. 

But  if  it  should  be  thought  by  any  one  that  these  considerations,  as  conclu 
sive  as  they  seemed  to  be,  were  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  ratification  of  this 
portion  of  the  treaty,  there  were  others,  which  appeared  to  him  to  be  perfectly 
conclusive.  He  referred  to  the  condition  in  which  we  would  be  left  if  the 
treaty  should  be  rejected.  He  would  ask,  If,  after  having  agreed  at  Ghent  to 
refer  the  subject  to  arbitration,  and  after  having  refused  to  agree  to  the  award 
made  under  that  reference,  by  an  arbitrator  of  our  own  selection,  we  should 
now  reject  this  treaty,  negotiated  by  our  own  Secretary  of  State,  under  our  own 
eyes,  and  which  had  previously  received  the  assent  of  the  states  immediately 
interested,  whether  there  would  be  the  slightest  prospect  that  another  equally 
favourable  would  ever  be  obtained  ?  On  the  contrary,  would  we  not  stand  in  a 
far  worse  condition  than  ever  in  reference  to  our  claim  ?  Would  it  not,  indeed, 
be  almost  certain  that  we  should  lose  the  whole  of  the  basin  of  the  St.  John, 
and  Great  Britain  gain  all  for  which  she  ever  contended,  strengthened  as  she 
would  be  by  the  disclosures  made  during  this  discussion  ?*  He  was  far  from 

*  The  following  extract  from  the  speech  of  Mr.  Rives,  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  For 
eign  Relations,  will  show  what  the  disclosures  were : 

It  appears  to  the  committee,  therefore,  in  looking  back  to  the  public  and  solemn  acts  of  the  gov 
ernment,  and  of  successive  administrations,  that  the  time  has  passed,  if  it  ever  existed,  when  we 
could  be  justified  in  making  the  precise  line  of  boundary  claimed  by  us  the  subject  of  a  sine  qua 
non  of  negotiation,  or  of  the  ultimo  ratio — of  an  assertion  by  force.  Did  a  second  arbitration,  then, 
afford  the  prospect  of  a  more  satisfactory  result?  This  expedient  seemed  to  be  equally  rejected  by 
all  parties — by  the  United  States,  by  Great  Britain,  and  by  the  State  of  Maine.  If  such  an  alterna 
tive  should  be  contemplated  by  any  one  as  preferable  to  the  arrangement  which  had  been  made,  it 
is  tit  to  bear  in  mind  the  risk  and  uncertainty,  as  well  as  the  inevitable  delay  and  expense,  incident 
to  that  mode  of  decision  We  have  already  seen,  in  the  instance  of  the  arbitration  by  the  King  of 
the  Netherlands,  how  much  weight  a  tribunal  of  that  sort  is  inclined  to  give  to  the  argument  of  con 
venience,  and  a  supposed  intention  on  the  part  of  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  against  the 
literal  and  positive  terms  employed  t-y  the  instrument  in  its  description  of  limits.  Is  there  no  dan 
ger,  in  the  event  of  another  arbitration,  that  a  farther  research  into  the  public  archives  of  Europe 
might  bring  to  light  some  embarrassing  (even  though  apocryphal)  document,  to  throw  a  new  shade 


536  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

asserting  that  the  facts  disclosed  established  the  claim  of  Great  Britain,  or  that 
the  map  exhibited  is  the  one  to  which  Franklin  referred  in  his  note  to  the  Count 

of  plausible  doubt  on  the  clearness  of  our  title,  in  the  view  of  a  sovereign  arbiter?  Such  a  docu 
ment  has  already  been  communicated  to  the  committee ;  and  I  feel  it  (said  Mr.  R.)  to  be  my  duty  to 
lay  it  before  the  Senate,  that  they  may  fully  appreciate  its  bearings,  and  determine  for  themselves 
the  weight  and  importance  which  belong  to  it.  It  is  due  to  the  learned  and  distinguished  gentleman 
(Mr.  Jared  Sparks,  of  Boston)  by  whom  the  document  referred  to  was  discovered  in  the  archives  of 
France,  while  pursuing  his  laborious  and  intelligent  researches  connected  with  the  history  of  our 
own  country,  that  the  account  of  it  should  be  given  in  his  own  words,  as  contained  in  a  communi 
cation  addressed  by  him  to  the  department  of  state.  I  proceed,  therefore,  to  read  from  that  com 
munication  : 

"  While  pursuing  my  researches  among  the  voluminous  papers  relating  to  the  American  Revolu 
tion  in  the  Archives  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  in  Paris,  I  found  in  one  of  the  bound  volumes  an  ori 
ginal  letter  from  Dr.  Franklin  to  Count  de  Vergennes,  of  which  the  following  is  an  exact  transcript : 

"  '  Passy,  December  6,  1782. 

"  '  SIR — I  have  the  honour  of  returning  herewith  the  map  your  excellency  sent  me  yesterday.  1 
have  marked  with  a  strong  red  line,  according  to  your  desire,  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  as 
settled  in  the  preliminaries  between  the  British  and  American  plenipotentiaries. 

" '  With  great  respect,  I  am,  &c., 

" '  B.  FRANKLIN.' 

"  This  letter  was  written  six  days  after  the  preliminaries  were  signed  ;  and  if  we  could  procure 
the  identical  map  mentioned  by  Franklin,  it  would  seem  to  afford  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the 
meaning  affixed  by  the  commissioners  to  the  language  of  the  treaty  on  the  subject  of  the  boundaries. 
You  may  well  suppose  that  I  lost  no  time  in  making  inquiry  for  the  map,  not  doubting  that  it  would 
confirm  all  my  previous  opinions  respecting  the  validity  of  our  claim.  In  the  geographical  depart 
ment  of  the  Archives  are  sixty  thousand  maps  and  charts ;  but  so  well  arranged  with  catalogues 
and  indexes,  that  any  one  of  them  may  be  easily  found.  A  fter  a  little  research  in  the  American  di 
vision,  with  the  aid  of  the  keeper,  1  came  upon  a  map  of  North  America,  by  D'Anville,  dated  1746r 
in  size  about  eighteen  inches  square,  on  which  was  drawn  a  strong  red  line  throughout  the  entire 
boundary  of  the  United  States,  answering  precisely  to  Franklin's  description.  The  line  is  bold  and 
distinct  in  every  part,  made  with  red  ink,  and  apparently  drawn  with  a  hair-pencil,  or  a  pen  with  a 
blunt  point.  There  is  no  other  colouring  on  any  part  of  the  map. 

"  Imagine  my  surprise  on  discovering  that  this  line  runs  wholly  south  of  the  St.  John,  and  between 
the  head  waters  of  that  river  and  those  of  the  Penobscot  and  Kennebec.  In  short,  it  is  exactly  the 
line  now  contended  for  by  Great  Britain,  except  that  it  concedes  more  than  is  claimed.  The  north 
line,  after  departing  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix,  instead  of  proceeding  to  Mars  Hill,  stops  far 
short  of  that  point,  and  turns  off  fcp  the  west,  so  as  to  leave  on  the  British  side  all  the  streams 
which  flow  into  the  St.  John  between  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  and  Mars  Hill.  It  is  evident 
that  the  line,  from  the  St.  Croix  to  the  Canadian  highland,  is  intended  to  exclude  all  the  waters  run 
ning  into  the  St.  John. 

"  There  is  no  positive  proof  that  this  map  is  actually  the  one  marked  by  Franklin  ;  yet,  upon  any 
other  supposition,  it  would  be  difficult  to  explain  the  circumstances  of  its  agreeing  so  perfectly  with 
his  description,  and  of  its  being  preserved  in  the  place  where  it  would  naturally  be  deposited  by 
Count  de  Vergennes.  1  also  found  another  map  in  the  Archives,  on  which  the  same  boundary  was 
traced  in  a  dotted  red  line  with  a  pen,  apparently  copied  from  the  other. 

"  I  enclose  herewith  a  map  of  Maine,  on  which  I  have  drawn  a  strong  black  line,  corresponding 
with  the  red  one  above  mentioned." 

I  am  far  from  intimating  (said  Mr.  R.)  that  the  documents  discovered  by  Mr.  Sparks,  curious  and 
well  worthy  of  consideration  as  they  undoubtedly  are,  are  of  weight  sufficient  to  shake  the  title  of 
the  United  States,  founded  on  the  positive  language  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  But  they  could  not  fail, 
in  the  event  of  another  reference,  to  give  increased  confidence  and  emphasis  to  the  pretensions  of 
Great  Britain,  and  to  exert  a  corresponding  influence  upon  the  mind  of  the  arbiter.  It  is  worth 
while,  in  this  connexion,  to  turn  to  what  Lord  Ashburton  has  said,  in  one  of  his  communications  to 
Mr.  Webster,  when  explaining  his  views  of  the  position  of  the  highlands  described  in  the  treaty  : 

'•  My  inspection  of  the  maps,  and  my  examination  of  the  documents,"  says  his  lordship,  "  lead  me 
to  a  very  strong  conviction  that  the  highlands  contemplated  by  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  were 
the  only  highlands  then  known  to  them— at  the  head  of  the  Penobscot,  Kennebec,  and  the  rivers  west 
of  the  St.  Croix;  and  that  they  did  not  precisely  know  how  the  north  line  from  the  St.  Croix  would 
strike  them ;  and  if  it  were  not  my  wish  to  shorten  this  discussion,  I  believe  a  very  good  argument 
might  be  drawn  from  the  words  of  the  treaty  in  proof  of  this.  In  the  negotiations  with  Mr.  Living 
ston,  and  afterward  with  Mr.  M'Lane,  this  view  seemed  to  prevail;  and,  as  you  are  aware,  there 
were  proposals  to  search  for  these  highlands  to  the  west,  where  alone,  I  believe,  they  will  be  found 
to  answer  perfectly  the  description  of  the  treaty.  If  this  question  should,  unfortunately,  go  to  a  farther 
reference,  I  should  by  no  means  despair  of  finding  some  confirmation  of  this  view  of  the  cose." 

It  is  for  the  Senate  to  consider  (added  Mr.  R.)  whether  there  would  not  be  much  risk  of  intro 
ducing  new  complications  and  embarrassments  in  this  controversy,  by  leaving  it  open  for  another 
litigated  reference  ;  and  if  the  British  government — strongly  prepossessed,  as  its  minister  tells  us  it 
is,  with  the  justice  of  its  claims— would  not  find  what  it  would  naturally  consider  a  persuasive 
"  confirmation  of  its  view  of  the  case"  in  documents  such  as  those  encountered  by  Mr.  Sparks  in 
his  historical  researches  in  the  Archives  of  France. 

A  map  has  been  vauntingly  paraded  here  from  Mr.  Jefferson's  collection,  in  the  zeal  of  opposi 
tion  (without  taking  time  to  see  what  it  was),  to  confront  and  invalidate  the  map  found  by  Mr. 
Sparks  in  the  foreign  office  at  Paris  ;  but,  the  moment  it  is  examined,  it  is  found  to  sustain,  by  the 
most  precise  and  remarkable  correspondence  in  every  feature,  the  map  communicated  by  Mr.  Sparks. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  537 

de  Vergennes,  the  French  minister ;  but  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  conform 
ity  of  the  line  delineated  on  the  map  with  the  one  described  in  his  note, 
would  have  the  effect  of  strengthening  riot  a  little  the  claims  of  Great  Britain 
in  her  own  estimation  and  that  of  the  world.  But  the  facts  stated,  and  the  map 
exhibited  by  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  (Mr.  Rives), 
are  not  the  only  or  the  strongest  disclosures  made  during  the  discussion.  The 
French  map  introduced  by  the  senator  from  Missouri  (Mr.  Benton),  from  Mr. 
Jefferson's  collection  in  the  Congress  library,  in  order  to  rebut  the  inference 
from  the  former,  turned  out  to  be  still  more  so.  That  was  made  in  the  village 
of  Passy,  in  the  year  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  negotiated,  where  Franklin 
(who  was  one  of  the  negotiators)  resided,  and  was  dedicated  to  him  ;  and  that 
has  the  boundary  line  drawn  in  exact  conformity  to  the  other,  and  in  the  man 
ner  described  in  the  note  of  Doctor  Franklin — a  line  somewhat  more  adverse 
to  us  than  that  claimed  by  Great  Britain.  But,  as  striking  as  is  this  coincidence, 
he  was  far  from  regarding  it  as  sufficient  to  establish  the  claim  of  Great  Brit 
ain.  It  would,  however,  be  in  vain  to  deny  that  it  was  a  corroborating  circum 
stance,  calculated  to  add  no  small  weight  to  her  claim. 

It  would  be  still  farther  increased  by  the  fact  that  France  was  our  ally  at  the 
time,  and,  as  such,  must  have  been  consulted,  and  kept  constantly  advised  of 
all  that  occurred  during  the  progress  of  the  negotiation,  including  its  final  result. 
It  would  be  idle  to  suppose  that  these  disclosures  would  not  weigh  heavily 
against  us  in  any  future  negotiation.  They  would,  so  much  so — taken  in  con 
nexion  with  the  adverse  award  of  the  King  of  Holland,  and  this  treaty,  should 
it  be  rejected — as  to  render  hopeless  any  future  attempt  to  settle  the  question 
by  negotiation  or  arbitration.  No  alternative  would  be  left  us  but  to  yield  to 
the  full  extent  of  the  British  claim,  or  to  put  Maine  in  possession  by  force,  and 
that,  too,  with  the  opinion  and  sympathy  of  the  world  against  us  and  our  cause. 
In  his  opinion,  we  would  be  bound  to  attempt  it,  in  justice  to  Maine,  should  we 
refuse  to  agree  to  what  she  has  assented.  So  much  for  the  boundary  question, 
as  far  as  Maine  is  concerned. 

Having  now  shown — satisfactorily,  he  hoped — that  Maine  has  acted  wisely 
for  herself  in  assenting  to  the  treaty,  it  remained  to  be  considered  whether  we, 
the  representatives  of  the  Union  on  such  questions,  would  not  also  do  so  in  rat 
ifying  it,  so  far,  at  least,  as  the  boundary  question  is  involved.  He  would  add 
nothing  to  what  had  already  been  said  of  the  portion  in  which  Maine  was  im 
mediately  interested.  His  remarks  would  be  confined  to  the  remaining  portion 
of  the  boundary,  extending  from  the  northwestern  corner  of  that  state  to  the 
Rocky  Mountains. 

Throughout  this  long-extended  line  every  question  has  been  settled  to  our 
satisfaction.  Our  right  has  been  acknowledged  to  a  territory  of  about  one  hun 
dred  thousand  acres  of  land  in  New-Hampshire,  which  would  have  been  lost  by 
the  award  of  the  King  of  Holland.  A  long  gore  of  about  the  same  amount,  ly 
ing  in  Vermont  and  New- York,  and  which  was  lost  under  the  treaty  of  Ghent, 
would  be  regained  by  this.  It  includes  Rouse's  Point.  Sugar  Island,  lying  in 
the  water  connexion  between  Lakes  Huron  and  Superior,  and  heretofore  in  dis 
pute,  is  acknowledged  to  be  ours  ;  it  is  large,  and  valuable  for  soil  and  position. 
So,  also,  is  Isle  Royale,  near  the  northern  shore  of  Lake  Superior,  acknowledg- 

The  senator  who  produced  it  could  see  nothing  but  the  microscopic  dotted  line  running  off  in  a 
northeasterly  direction ;  hut  the  moment  other  eyes  were  applied  to  it,  there  was  found,  in  bold  re 
lief,  a  strong  red  line,  indicating  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  treaty  of  peace, 
and  coinciding,  minutely  and  exactly,  with  the  boundary  traced  on  the  map  of  Mr.  Sparks.  That 
this  red  line,  and  not  the  hardly  visible  dotted  line,  was  intended  to  represent  the  limits  of  the  United 
States,  according  to  the  treaty  of  peace,  is  conclusively  shown  by  the  circumstance  that  the  red  line 
is  drawn  on  the  map  all  around  the  exterior  boundary  of  the  United  States ;  through  the  middle  of 
the  Northren  Lakes,  thence  through  the  Long  Lake  and  the  Rainy  Lake  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods ; 
and  from  the  western  extremity  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  River  Mississippi ;  and  along  that 
river  to  the  point  where  the  boundary  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  treaty  of  peace,  leaves 
it ;  and  thence,  by  its  easterly  course  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Mary's  on  the  Atlantic. 

Y  y  y 


538  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ed  to  be  ours — a  large  island,  and  valuable  for  its  fisheries.  And  also  a  large 
tract  of  country  to  the  north  and  west  of  that  lake,  between  Fond  du  Lac  and 
the  River  St.  Louis  on  one  side,  and  Pigeon  River  on  the  other — containing  four 
millions  of  acres.  It  is  said  to  be  steril,  but  cannot  well  be  more  so  than  that 
acquired  by  Great  Britain  lying  west  of  the  boundary  awarded  by  the  King  of 
Holland.  In  addition,  all  the  islands  in  the  River  St.  Lawrence  and  the  lakes, 
which  were  divided  in  running  out  the  division  line  under  previous  treaties,  are 
acquired  by  us  under  this  ;  and  all  the  channels  and  passages  are  opened  to  the 
common  uses  of  our  citizens  and  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain. 

Such  are  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  in  reference  to  this  long  line  of  bounda 
ry.  Our  gain — regarded  in  the  most  contracted  point  of  view,  as  mere  equiva 
lents  for  the  sum  assumed  to  be  paid  by  us  to  Maine  and  Massachusetts  for  their 
assent  to  the  treaty — is  vastly  greater  than  what  we  have  contracted  to  pay. 
Taking  the  whole  boundary  question  together,  and  summing  up  the  loss  and 
gain  of  the  whole,  including  what  affects  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  and  he  could 
not  doubt  that,  regarded  merely  as  set-offs,  our  gain  greatly  exceeds  our  loss — 
vastly  so,  compared  to  what  it  would  have  been  under  the  award  of  the  King 
of  Holland,  including  the  equivalent  which  our  government  was  willing  to  al 
low  Maine  for  her  assent.  But  it  would  be,  indeed,  to  take  a  very  contracted 
view  to  regard  it  in  that  light.  It  would  be  to  overlook  the  vast  importance  of 
permanently  establishing,  between  two  such  powers,  a  line  of  boundary  of  sev 
eral  thousand  miles,  abounding  in  disputed  points  of  much  difficulty  and  long 
standing.  The  treaty,  he  trusted,  would  do  much  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  solid 
peace  between  the  countries — a  thing  so  much  to  be  desired. 

It  is  certainly  much  to  be  regretted,  after  settling  so  large  a  portion  of  the 
boundary,  that  the  part  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains  should  remain  unadjusted. 
Its  settlement  would  have  contributed  much  to  strengthen  the  foundation  of  a 
durable  peace.  ,  But  would  it  be  wise  to  reject  the  treaty  because  all  has  not 
been  done  that  could  be  desired  ?  He  placed  a  high  value  on  our  territory  on 
the  west  of  those  mountains,  and  held  our  title  to  it  to  be  clear ;  but  he  would 
regard  it  as  an  act  of  consummate  folly  to  stake  our  claim  on  a  trial  of  strength 
at  this  time.  The  territory  is  now  held  by  joint  occupancy,  under  the  treaty  of 
Ghent,  which  either  party  may  terminate  by  giving  to  the  other  six  months'  no 
tice.  If  we  were  to  attempt  to  assert  our  exclusive  right  of  occupancy  at  pres 
ent,  the  certain  loss  of  the  territory  must  be  the  result";  for  the  plain  reason  that 
Great  Britain  could  concentrate  there  a  much  larger  force,  naval  and  military, 
in  a  much  shorter  time,  and  at  far  less  expense,  than  we  could.  That  will  not 
be  denied ;  but  it  will  not  always  be  the  case.  Our  population  is  steadily — he 
might  say  rapidly — advancing  across  the  Continent,  to  the  borders  of  the  Pa 
cific  Ocean.  Judging  from  past  experience,  the  tide  of  population  will  sweep 
across  the  Rocky  Mountains,  with  resistless  force,  at  no  distant  period,  when 
what  we  claim  will  quietly  fall  into  our  hands,  without  expense  or  bloodshed. 
Time  is  acting  for  us.  Wait  patiently,  and  all  we  claim  will  be  ours  ;  but  if  we 
attempt  to  seize  it  by  force,  it  will  be  sure  to  elude  our  grasp. 

Having  now  stated  his  reasons  for  voting  to  ratify  the  articles  in  the  treaty 
relating  to  the  boundary,  he  would  next  proceed  to  assign  those  that  would  gov 
ern  his  vote  on  the  two  relating  to  the  African  slave-trade.  And  here  he  would 
premise,  that  there  are  several  circumstances  which  caused  no  small  repug 
nance  on  his  part  to  any  stipulations  whatever  with  Great  Britain  on  the  sub 
ject  of  those  articles ;  and  he  would  add,  that  he  would  have  been  gratified  if 
they,  and  all  other  stipulations  on  the  subject,  could  have  been  entirely  omitted  ; 
but  he  must,  at  the  same  time,  say  he  did  not  see  how  it  was  possible  to  avoid 
entering  into  some  arrangement  on  the  subject.  To  understand  our  difficulty, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  advert  to  the  course  heretofore  taken  by  the  government 
in  reference  to  the  subject,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  the  negotiations 
that  resulted  in  this  treaty  commenced. 


SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALIIOUN.  539 

Congress  at  an  early  day — as  soon,  in  fact,  as  it  could  legislate  on  the  sub 
ject  under  the  Constitution — passed  laws  enacting  severe  penalties  against  the 
African  slave-trade.     That  was  followed  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  which  declared 
it  to  be  irreconcilable  with  the  principles  of  humanity  and  justice,  arid  stipula 
ted  that  both  of  the  parties — the  United  States  and  Great  Britain — should  use 
their  best  endeavours  to  effect  its  abolition.     Shortly  after,  an  act  of  Congress 
was  passed  declaring  it  to  be  piracy  ;  and  a  resolution  was  adopted  by  Congress 
requesting  the  President  to  enter  into  arrangements  with  other  powers  for  its 
suppression.     Great  Britain,  actuated  by  the  same  feelings,  succeeded  in  ma 
king  treaties  with  the  European  maritime  powers  for  its  suppression  ;  and,  not 
long  before  the  commencement  of  this  negotiation,  had  entered  into  joint  stipu 
lations  with  the  five  great  powers  to  back  her  on  the  question  of  search.     She 
had  thus  acquired  a  general  supervision  of  the  trade  along  the  African  coast ; 
so  that  vessels  carrying  the  flag  of  every  other  country,  except  ours,  were  sub 
ject  on  that  coast  to  the  inspection  of  her  cruisers,  and  to  be  captured,  if  sus 
pected  of  being  engaged  in  the  slave-trade.     In  consequence,  ours  became  al 
most  the  only  flag  used  by  those  engaged  in  the  trade,  whether  our  own  peo 
ple  or  foreigners,  although  our  laws  inhibited  the  traffic  under  the  severest 
penalties.     In  this  state  of  things,  Great  Britain  put  forward  the  claim  of  the 
right  of  search  as  indispensable  to  suppress  a  trade  prohibited  by  the  laws  of 
the  civilized  world,  and  to  the  execution  of  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the  nations 
associated  with  her  by  mutual  engagements  for  its  suppression.     At  this  stage, 
a  correspondence  took  place  between  our  late  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James 
and  Lord  Palmerston  on  the   subject,  in  which  the  latter  openly  and  boldly 
claimed  the  right  of  search,  and  which  was  promptly  and  decidedly  repelled  on 
our  side.     We  had  long  since  taken  our  stand  against  it,  and  had  resisted  its 
abuse,  as  a  belligerant  right,  at  the  mouth  of  the  cannon.     Neither  honour  nor 
policy  on  our  part  could  tolerate  its  exercise  in  time  of  peace,  in  any  form — 
whether  in  that  of  search,  as  claimed  by  Lord  Palmerston,  or  the  less  offensive 
and  unreasonable  one  of  visitation,  as  proposed  by  his  successor.  Lord  Aber 
deen.     And  yet  we  were  placed  in  such  circumstances  as  to  require  that  some 
thing  should  be  done.     It  was  in  such  a  state  of  things  that  the  negotiation  com 
menced  ;  and  commenced,  in  part,  in  reference  to  this  subject,  which  was  tend 
ing  rapidly  to  bring  the  two  countries  into  collision.     On  our  side,  we  were 
deeply  committed  against  the  traffic,  both  by  legislation  and  treaty.     The  in 
fluence  and  the  efforts  of  the  civilized  world  were  directed  against  it;  and  that, 
too,  under  our  lead  at  the  commencement ;  and  with  such  success  as  to  compel 
vessels  engaged  in  it  to  take  shelter,  almost  exclusively,  under  the  fraudulent 
use  of  our  flag.     To  permit  such  a  state  of  things  to  continue  could  not  but 
deeply  impeach  our  honour,  and  turn  the  sympathy  of  the  world  against  us.      On 
the  other  side,  Great  Britain  had  acquired,  by  treaties,  the  right  of  supervision, 
including  that  of  search  and  capturing,  over  the  trade  on  the  coast  of  Africa, 
with  the  view  to  its  suppression,  from  all  the  maritime  powers  except  ourselves. 
Thus  situated,  he  must  say  that  he  saw  no  alternative  for  us  but  the  one  adopt 
ed — to  take  the  supervision  of  our  own  trade  on  that  coast  into  our  own  hands, 
and  to  prevent,  by  our  own  cruisers,  the  fraudulent  use  of  our  flag.     The  only 
question,  in  the  actual  state  of  things,  as  it  appeared  to  him,  was,  whether  it 
should  be  done  by  a  formal  or  informal  arrangement.     He  would  have  prefer 
red  the  latter  ;  but  the  difference  between  them  was  not,  in  his  opinion,  such 
as  would  justify,  on  that  account,  the  rejection  of  the  treaty.     They  would,  in 
substance,  be  the  same,  and  have  differed  but  little,  probably,  in  the  expense  of 
execution.     Either  was  better  than  the  other  alternatives — to  do  nothing ;  to 
leave  things  in  the  dangerous  state  they  stood,  or  to  yield  to  the  right  of  search 
or  visitation. 

It  is  objected  that  the  arrangement  entered  into  is  virtually  an  ticknowledg- 
ment  of  the  right  of  search.     He  did  not  so  regard  it.     On  the  contrary,  he 


540  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

considered  it,  under  all  the  circumstances,  as  a  surrender  of  that  claim  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  :  a  conclusion  which  a  review  of  the  whole  transaction, 
in  his  opinion,  would  justify.  Lord  Palmerston,  in  the  first  place,  claimed  the 
unqualified  right  of  search,  in  which  it  is  understood  he  was  backed  by  the  five 
great  powers.  Lord  Aberdeen,  with  more  wisdom  and  moderation,  explained 
it  to  mean  the  right  of  visitation  simply ;  and,  finally,  the  negotiation  is  closed 
without  reference  to  either,  simply  with  a  stipulation  between  the  parties  to  keep 
up  for  five  years  a  squadron  of  not  less  than  eighty  guns  on  the  coast  of  Alrica, 
to  enforce  separately  and  respectively  the  laws  and  obligations  of  each  of  the 
countries  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade.  It  is  carefully  worded,  to  make 
it  mutual,  but  at  the  same  time  separate  and  independent ;  each  looking  to  the 
execution  of  its  own  laws  and  obligations,  and  carefully  excluding  the  supervis 
ion  of  either  over  the  other,  and  thereby  directly  rebutting  the  object  of  search 
or  visitation. 

The  other  article,  in  reference  to  the  same  subject,  stipulates  that  the  parties 
will  unite  in  all  becoming  representation  and  remonstrance  with  any  powers 
within  whose  dominions  markets  are  permitted  for  imported  African  slaves.  If 
he  were  to  permit  his  feelings  to  govern  him  exclusively,  he  would  object  to 
this  more  strongly  than  any  other  provision  in  the  treaty  :  not  that  he  was  oppo 
sed  to  the  object  or  the  policy  of  closing  the  market  to  imported  negroes  ;  on  the 
contrary,  he  thought  it  both  right  and  expedient  in  every  view.  Brazil  and  the 
Spanish  colonies  were  the  only  markets,  he  believed,  still  remaining  open,  and 
to  which  this  provision  would  apply.  They  were  already  abundantly  supplied 
with  slaves,  and  he  had  no  doubt  that  sound  policy  on  their  part  required  that 
their  markets  should  be  finally  and  effectually  closed.  He  would  go  farther, 
and  say  that  it  was  our  interest  they  should  be.  It  would  free  us  from  the  ne 
cessity  of  keeping  cruisers  on  the  African  coast  to  prevent  the  illegal  and  fraud 
ulent  use  of  our  flag,  or  for  any  other  purpose  but  to  protect  our  commerce  in 
that  quarter — a  thing  of  itself  much  to  be  desired.  We  would  have  a  still  strong 
er  interest  if  we  were  governed  by  selfish  considerations.  We  are  rivals  in  the 
production  of  several  articles,  and  more  especially  the  greatest  of  all  the  agri 
cultural  staples — cotton.  Next  to  our  own  country,  Brazil  possesses  the  great 
est,  advantages  for  its  production,  and  is  already  a  large  grower  of  the  article  ; 
towards  the  production  of  which  the  continuance  of  the  market  for  imported 
slaves  from  Africa  would  contribute  much.  But  he  would  not  permit  such  con 
siderations  to  influence  him  in  voting  on  the  treaty.  He  had  no  objection  to  see 
Brazil  develop  her  resources  to  the  full ;  but  he  did  believe  that  higher  con 
siderations,  connected  with  her  safety,  and  that  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  made 
it  their  interest  that  their  market  should  be  closed  against  the  traffic. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  Why,  with  these  impressions,  should  he  have  any  ob 
jection  to  this  provision  of  the  treaty  ?  It  was  because  he  was  averse  to  inter 
fering  with  other  powers  when  it  could  be  avoided.  It  extends  even  to  cases 
like  the  present,  where  there  was  a  common  interest  in  reference  to  the  sub 
ject  of  advice  or  remonstrance  ;  but  it  would  be  carrying  his  aversion  to  fastid 
iousness,  were  he  to  permit  it  to  overrule  his  vote  in  the  adjustment  of  questions 
of  such  magnitude  as  are  involved  on  the  present  occasion. 

But  the  treaty  is  opposed,  not  only  for  what  it  contains,  but  also  for  what  it 
does  not ;  and,  among  other  objections  of  the  kind,  because  it  has  no  provision 
in  reference  to  the  case  of  the  Creole,  and  other  similar  ones.  He  admitted 
that  it  is  an  objection  ;  and  that  it  was  very  desirable  that  the  treaty  should  have 
guarded,  by  specific  and  efficient  provisions,  against  the  recurrence  of  such  out 
rages  on  the  rights  of  our  citizens,  and  indignity  to  our  honour  and  independ 
ence.  If  any  one  has  a  right  to  speak  warmly  on  this  subject,  he  was  the  in 
dividual  ;  but  he  could  not  forget  that  the  question  for  us  to  decide  is,  Shall  we 
ratify  or  reject  the  treaty  ?  it  is  not  whether  all  has  been  done  which  it  was 
desirable  should  be  done,  but  whether  we  shall  confirm  or  reject  what  has  ac- 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  541 

tually  been  done  ;  not  whether  we  have  gained  all  we  could  desire,  but  whether 
we  shall  retain  what  we  have  gained.  To  decide  that  as  it  ought  to  be,  it  is 
our  duty  to  weigh,  calmly  and  fairly,  the  reasons  for  and  against  the  ratification, 
and  to  decide  in  favour  of  the  side  which  preponderates. 

It  does  not  follow  that  nothing  has  been  done  in  relation  to  the  cases  under 
consideration  because  the  treaty  contains  no  provisions  in  reference  to  them. 
The  fact  is  otherwise.  Much,  very  much,  has  been  done  ;  in  his  opinion,  lit 
tle  short,  in  its  efiect,  of  a  positive  stipulation  by  the  treaty  to  guard  against  the 
recurrence  of  such  cases  hereafter.  To  understand  how  much  has  been  done, 
and  what  has  been  gained  by  us,  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  correct  conception 
of  the  state  of  the  case  in  reference  to  them  before  the  negotiation  commenced, 
and  since  it  terminated. 

These  cases  are  not  of  recent  origin.  The  first  of  the  kind  was  that  of  the 
brig  Comet,  which  was  stranded  on  the  false  keys  of  the  Bahamas,  as  far  back 
as  1830,  with  slaves  on  board.  She  was  taken  into  Nassau,  New-Providence, 
by  the  wreckers,  and  the  slaves  liberated  by  the  colonial  authorities.  The  next 
was  the  Encomium,  which  occurred  in  1834,  and  which,  in  all  the  material  cir 
cumstances,  was  every  way  similar  to  that  of  the  Comet.  The  case  of  the  En 
terprise  followed.  It  took  place  in  1835,  and  differed  in  no  material  circum 
stance  from  the  others,  as  was  acknowledged  by  the  British  government,  except 
that  it  occurred  after  the  act  of  Parliament  abolishing  slavery  in  the  colonies 
had  gone  into  operation,  and  the  others  prior  to  that  period. 

After  a  long  correspondence  of  nearly  ten  years,  the  British  government 
agreed  to  pay  for  the  slaves  on  board  of  the  first  two,  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  liberated  before  the  act  abolishing  slavery  had  gone  into  operation  ;  but 
refused  to  pay  for  those  belonging  to  the  Enterprise,  because  they  were  libera 
ted  after  it  had.  To  justify  this  distinction,  Lord  Palmerston  had  to  assume 
the  ground,  virtually,  that  the  law  of  nations  was  opposed  to  slavery — an  as 
sumption  that  placed  the  property  of  a  third  of  the  Union  without  the  pale  of 
its  protection.  On  that  ground,  he  peremptorily  refused  compensation  for  the 
slaves  on  board  the  Enterprise.  Our  executive,  under  this  refusal,  accepted 
the  compensation  for  those  on  board  the  Comet  and  Encomium,  and  closed  the 
correspondence,  without  even  bringing  the  subject  before  Congress.  With 
such  perfect  indifference  was  the  whole  affair  treated,  that,  during  the  long  pe 
riod  the  negotiation  was  pending,  the  subject  was  never  once  mentioned,  as  far 
as  he  recollected,  in  any  executive  message  ;  while  those  of  far  less  magnitude 
— the  debt  of  a  few  millions  due  from  France,  and  this  very  boundary  question 
— were  constantly  brought  before  Congress,  and  had  nearly  involved  the  coun 
try  in  war  with  two  of  the  leading  powers  of  Europe.  Those  who  are  now  so 
shocked  that  the  boundary  question  should  be  settled,  without  a  settlement  also 
of  this,  stood  by  in  silence,  year  after  year,  during  this  long  period,  not  only 
without  attempting  to  unite  the  settlement  of  this  with  that  of  the  boundary,  but 
without  ever  once  naming  or  alluding  to  it  as  an  item  in  the  list  of  the  dispute 
between  the  two  powers.  It  was  regarded  as  beneath  notice.  He  rejoiced  to 
witness  the  great  change  that  has  taken  place  in  relation  to  it,  and  to  find 
that,  those  who  were  then  silent  and  indifferent  now  exhibit  so  much  zeal  and 
vehemence  about  it.  He  took  credit  to  himself  for  having  contributed  to  bring 
this  change  about.  It  was  he  who  revived  our  claim  when  it  lay  dead  and 
buried  among  the  archives  of  the  state  department — who  called  for  the  corre 
spondence — who  moved  resolutions  affirming  the  principles  of  the  law  of  na 
tions  in  reference  to  these  cases,  and  repelling  the  presumptuous  and  insulting 
assumption  on  which  it  was  denied  by  the  British  negotiator.  Such  was  the 
force  of  truth,  and  so  solid  the  foundation  on  which  he  rested  our  claim,  that 
his  resolutions  received  the  unanimous  vote  of  this  body  ;  but  he  received  no 
support — no,  not  a  cheering  word — from  the  quarter  which  now  professes  so 
much  zeal  on  the  subject.  His  utmost  hope,  at  the  time,  was  to  keep  alive  our 


542  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

right  till  some  propitious  moment  should  arrive  to  assert  it  successfully.  In 
the  mean  lime,  the  case  of  the  Creole  occurred,  which,  as  shockino-  and  out 
rageous  as  it  is,  was  but  the  legitimate  consequence  of  the  principle  maintained 
by  Lord  Palmerston,  and  on  which  he  closed  the  correspondence  in  the  case 
of  the  Enterprise. 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  facts  when  the  negotiations  commenced  in  refer 
ence  to  these  cases  ;  and  it  remains  now  to  be  shown  in  what  state  it  has  left 
them.  In  the  first  place,  the  broad  principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  on  which 
he  placed  our  right  in  his  resolutions,  have  been  clearly  stated  and  conclusively 
vindicated  in  the  very  able  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  which  has  strength 
ened  our  cause  not  a  little,  as  well  from  its  intrinsic  merit  as  the  quarter  from 
which  it  comes.  In  the  next  place,  we  have  an  explicit  recognition  of  the 
principles  for  which  we  contend,  in  the  answer  of  Lord  Ashburton,  who  ex 
pressly  says  that,  "on  the  great  general  principles  affecting  this  case"  (the 
Creole),  "they  do  not  differ;"  and  that  is  followed  by  "  an  engagement  that  in 
structions  shall  be  given  to  the  governors  of  her  majesty's  colonies  on  the 
southern  borders  of  the  United  States  to  execute  their  own  laws  with  careful 
attention  to  the  wishes  of  their  government  to  maintain  good  neighbourhood  ; 
and  that  there  shall  be  no  officious  interference  with  American  vessels  driven 
by  accident  or  violence  into  their  ports.  The  laws  and  duties  of  hospitality 
shall  be  executed."  This  pledge  was  accepted  by  our  executive,  accompanied 
by  the  express  declaration  of  the  President,  through  the  Secretary  of  State, 
that  he  places  his  reliance  on  those  principles  of  public  law  which  had  been 
stated  in  the  note  of  the  Secretary  of  State.  To  all  this  it  may  be  added,  that 
strong  assurances  are  given  by  the  British  negotiator  of  his  belief  that  a  final 
arrangement  may  be  made  of  the  subject  by  positive  stipulations  in  London. 
Such  is  the  state  in  which  the  negotiation  has  left  the  subject. 

Here,  again,  he  would  repeat,  that  such  stipulations  in  the  treaty  itself  would 
have  been  preferable.  But  who  can  deny,  when  he  compares  the  state  of  the 
facts  as  they  stood  before  and  since  the  close  of  this  negotiation,  that  we  have 
gained — largely  gained — in  reference  to  this  important  subject  ?  Is  there 
no  difference,  he  would  ask,  between  a  stern  and  peremptory  denial  of  our  right 
on  the  broad  and  insulting  ground  assumed  by  Lord  Palmerston,  and  its  ex 
plicit  recognition  by  Lord  Ashburton  ?  none  in  the  pledge  that  instructions 
should  be  given  to  guard  against  the  recurrence  of  such  cases,  and  a  positive 
denial  that  we  had  suffered  wrong  or  insult,  or  had  any  right  to  complain  ? 
none  between  a  final  closing  of  all  negotiation,  and  a  strong  assurance  of  a 
final  adjustment  of  the  subject  by  satisfactory  arrangement  by  treaty?  And 
would  it  be  wise  or  prudent,  on  our  part,  to  reject  what  has  been  gained,  be 
cause  all  has  not  been  ?  As  to  himself,  he  must  say  that,  at  the  time  he  moved 
his  resolutions,  he  little  hoped,  in  the  short  space  of  two  years,  to  obtain  what 
has  already  been-  gained  ;  and  that  he  regarded  the  prospect  of  a  final  and  satis 
factory  adjustment,  at  no  distant  day,  of  this  subject,  so  vital  in  its  principles  to 
his  constituents  and  the  whole  South,  as  far  more  probable  than  he  then  did 
this  explicit  recognition  of  the  principles  for  which  he  contended.  In  the 
mean  time,  he  felt  assured  the  engagement  given  by  the  British  negotiator 
would  be  fulfilled  in  good  faith ;  and  that  the  hazard  of  collision  between  the 
countries,  and  the  disturbance  of  their  peace  and  friendship,  has  passed  away, 
as  far  as  it  depends  on  this  dangerous  subject.  But  if  in  this  he  should,  unfor 
tunately,  be  mistaken,  we  should  stand  on  much  more  solid  ground  in  defence 
of  our  rights,  in  consequence  of  what  has  been  gained  ;  as  there  would  then 
be  superadded  broken  faith  to  the  violation  of  the  laws  of  nations. 

Having  now  said  what  he  intenJsd  on  the  more  important  points,  he  would 
pass  over  without  dwelling  on  the  provision  of  the  treaty  for  delivering  up  to 
justice  persons  charged  with  certain  crimes  ;  the  affair  of  the  Caroline  ;  and 
the  correspondence  in  reference  to  impressment.  The  first  is  substantially 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  543 

the  same  as  that  contained  in  Jay's  treaty  on  the  same  subject.  On  the  next, 
he  had  nothing  to  add  to  what  has  already  been  said  by  others.  As  to  the  last, 
he  did  not  doubt  that  the  strong  ground  taken  in  the  correspondence  against  the 
impressment  of  seamen  on  board  of  our  merchant  vessels,  in  time  of  war, 
would  have  a  good  effect.  It  will  contribute  to  convince  Great  Britain  that  the 
practice  cannot  be  renewed,  in  the  event  of  another  European  war,  without  a 
certain  and  immediate  conflict  between  the  two  countries. 

I  (said  Mr.  Calhoun)  have  now  stated  my  opinion  fully  and  impartially  on 
the  treaty,  with  the  connected  subjects.  On  reviewing  the  whole,  and  weigh 
ing  the  reasons  for  and  against  its  ratification,  I  cannot  doubt  that  the  former 
greatly  preponderate.  If  we  have  not  gained  all  that  could  be  desired,  we 
have  gained  much  that  is  desirable  ;  and,  if  all  has  not  been  settled,  much  has 
been,  and  that  not  of  little  importance.  It  is  not  of  little  importance  to  have 
the  Northeastern  boundary  settled,  and  that,  too,  with  the  consent  of  the  states 
immediately  interested ;  a  subject  which  has  been  in  dispute  almost  from  the 
origin  of  the  government,  and  which  had  become  more  and  more  entangled,  and 
adverse  to  our  claim,  on  every  attempt  heretofore  made  to  settle  it.  Nor  is  it 
of  little  importance  to  have  the  whole  line  of  boundary  between  us  and  the 
British  dominions,  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  to  the  Rocky  Mountains, 
settled — a  line  of  more  than  three  thousand  miles,  with  many  disputed  points 
of  long  standing,  the  settlement  of  which  had  baffled  all  previous  attempts. 
Nor  is  it  of  little  importance  to  have  adjusted  the  embarrassments  relating  to 
the  African  slave-trade,  by  adopting  the  least  objectionable  of  the  alternatives. 
Nor  to  have  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations  for  which  we  contended,  in 
reference  to  the  Creole  and  other  cases  of  the  kind,  recognised  by  Great  Brit 
ain  ;  nor  to  have  a  solemn  pledge  against  their  recurrence,  with  a  reasonable 
assurance  of  satisfactory  stipulations  by  treaty.  Nor  is  it  of  little  importance 
to  have,  by  the  settlement  of  these  inveterate  and  difficult  questions,  the  relation 
of  the  two  countries  settled  down  in  amity  and  peace — permanent  amity  and 
peace,  as  it  may  be  hoped — in  the  place  of  that  doubtful,  unsettled  condition, 
between  peace  and  war,  which  has  for  so  many  years  characterized  it,  and 
which  is  so  hostile  to  the  interests  and  prosperity  of  both  countries. 

Peace  (said  Mr.  C.)  is  the  first  of  our  wants,  in  the  present  condition  of  our 
country.  We  wanted  peace,  to  reform  our  own  government,  and  to  relieve  the 
country  from  its  great  embarrassments.  Our  government  is  deeply  disordered  ; 
its  credit  is  impaired;  its  debt  increasing;  its  expenditures  extravagant  and 
wasteful;  its  disbursements  without  efficient  accountability;  and  its  taxes  (for 
duties  are  but  taxes)*  enormous,  unequal,  and  oppressive  to  the  great  producing 
classes  of  the  country.  Peace,  settled  and  undisturbed,  is  indispensable  to  a 
thorough  reform,  and  such  a  reform  to  the  duration  of  the  government.  But,  so 
long  as  the  relation  between  the  two  countries  continues  in  a  state  of  doubt  be 
tween  peace  and  war,  all  attempts  at  such  reform  will  prove  abortive.  The 
first  step  in  any  such,  to  be  successful,  must  be  to  reduce  the  expenditures  to 
the  legitimate  and  economical  wants  of  the  government.  Without  that,  there 
can  be  nothing  worthy  of  the  name ;  but  in  an  unsettled  state  of  the  relations 
of  the  two  countries,  all  attempts  at  reduction  will  be  baffled  by  the  cry  of  war, 
accompanied  by  insinuations  against  the  patriotism  of  those  who  may  be  so 
hardy  as  to  make  them.  Should  the  treaty  be  ratified,  an  end  will  be  put  to 
that,  and  no  excuse  or  pretext  be  left  to  delay  the  great  and  indispensable  work 
of  reform.  This  may  not  be  desirable  to  those  who  see,  or  fancy  they  see, 
benefits  in  high  duties  and  wasteful  expenditures  ;  but,  by  the  great  producing 
and  tax-paying  portions  of  the  community,  it  will  be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
greatest  of  blessings.  These  are  not  the  only  reasons  for  wanting  peace.  We 
want  it,  to  enable  the  people  and  the  states  to  extricate  themselves  from  their 
embarrassments.  They  are  both  borne  down  by  heavy  debts,  contracted  in  a 
period  of  fallacious  prosperity,  from  which  there  is  no  other  honest  and  hon- 


544  SPEECHES    OF    JOHN    C.    CALHOTJN. 

curable  extrication  but  the  payment  of  what  is  due.  To  enable  both  states  and 
individuals  to  pay  their  debts,  they  must  be  left  in  full  possession  of  all  their 
means,  with  as  little  exactions  or  restrictions  on  their  industry  as  possible  on 
the  part  of  this  government.  To  this,  a  settled  state  of  peace,  and  an  open 
and  free  commerce,  are  indispensable.  With  these,  and  the  increasing  habits 
of  economy  and  industry  now  everywhere  pervading  the  country,  the  period 
of  embarrassment  will  soon  pass  away,  to  be  succeeded  by  one  of  permanent 
and  healthy  prosperity. 

Peace  is,  indeed,  our  policy.  A  kind  Providence  has  cast  our  lot  on  a  por 
tion  of  the  globe  sufficiently  vast  to  satisfy  the  most  grasping  ambition,  and 
abounding  in  resources  beyond  all  others,  which  only  require  to  be  fully  de 
veloped  to  make  us  the  greatest  and  most  prosperous  people  on  earth.  To  the 
full  development  of  the  vast  resources  of  our  country  we  have  political  institu 
tions  most  happily  constituted.  Indeed,  it  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  sys 
tem  more  so  than  our  Federal  Republic — a  system  of  State  and  General  Gov 
ernments,  so  blended  as  to  constitute  one  sublime  whole  ;  the  latter  having 
charge  of  the  interests  common  to  all,  and  the  former  those  local  and  peculiar 
to  each  state.  With  a  system  so  happily  constituted,  let  a  durable  and  firm 
peace  be  established,  and  this  government  be  confined  rigidly  to  the  few  great 
objects  for  which  it  was  instituted  ;  leaving  the  states  to  contend  in  generous 
rivalry  to  develop,  by  the  arts  of  peace,  their  respective  resources  ;  and  a 
scene  of  prosperity  and  happiness  would  follow  heretofore  unequalled  on  the 
globe.  I  trust  (said  Mr.  C.)  that  this  treaty  may  prove  the  first  step  towards 
such  a  peace.  Once  established  with  Great  Britain,  it  would  not  be  difficult, 
with  moderation  and  prudence,  to  establish  permanent  peace  with  the  rest  of  ~ 
the  world,  when  our  most  sanguine  hopes  of  prosperity  may  be  realized. 


XXXVIII. 

SPEECH   ON   THE   OREGON   BILL,   JANUARY   24,    1843. 

MR.  CALHOUN  said  it  ought  to  be  borne  in  mind,  in  the  discussion  of 
this  measure,  that  there  is  a  conflict  between  our  claim  and  that  of  Great 
Britain  to  the  Oregon  territory;  and  that  it  extends  to  the  whale  terri 
tory  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  afid  from  the  north 
ern  limits  of  Mexico,  in  latitude  42°,  to  the  southern  J/'mits  of  the  Rus 
sian  possessions,  in  latitude  54°.  Nor  ought  it  to  be  forgotten  that  the  two 
governments  have  made  frequent  attempts  to  adjust  their  conflicting 
claims,  but,  as  yet,  without  success.  The  first  of  these  was  made  in 
1818.  It  proved  abortive  ;  but  a  convention  was  entered  into  which  pro 
vided  that  the  territory  should  be  left  free  and  open  to  our  citizens  and 
the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  for  ten  years ;  the  object  of  which  was  to 
prevent  collision  and  preserve  peace  till  their  respective  claims  could  be 
adjusted  by  negotiation.  The  next  was  made  in  1824,  when  we  offered 
to  limit  our  claim  to  the  territory  by  the  49th  degree  of  latitude,  which 
would  have  left  to  Great  Britain  all  north  of  that  latitude  to  the  southern 
boundary  of  Russia.  Her  negotiator  objected,  and  proposed  the  Colum 
bia  River  as  the  boundary  between  the  possessions  of  the  two  countries. 
It  enters  the  ocean  about  the  46th  degree  of  latitude.  It  follows  that  the 
portion  of  the  territory  really  in  dispute  between  the  two  countries  is 
about  three  degrees  of  latitude — that  is,  about  one  fourth  of  the  whole. 
The  attempt  to  adjust  boundaries  again  failed,  and  nothing  was  effected. 
I  learn  from  our  negotiator  (a  distinguished  citizen  of  Pennsylvania,  now 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  545 

in  this  city),  that  the  negotiation  was  conducted  with  much  earnestness, 
and  riot  a  little  feeling,  on  the  part  of  the  British  negotiators. 

In  1827,  just  before  the  termination  of  the  ten  years,  another  attempt 
was  made  at  an  adjustment.  The  negotiation  was  conducted  on  our  part 
by  Mr.  Gallatin.  The  whole  subject  was  discussed  fully,  and  with  great 
ability  and  clearness  on  both  sides,  but,  like  the  two  preceding,  failed  to 
adjust  the  conflicting  claims.  The  same  offers  were  made  respectively 
by  the  parties  that  were  made  in  1824,  and  again  rejected.  All  that  could 
be  done  was  to  renew  the  convention  of  1818,  but  with  the  provision  that 
each  party  might,  at  its  pleasure,  terminate  the  agreement  by  giving  a 
year's  notice.  The  object  of  the  renewal  was,  as  in  1818,  to  preserve 
peace  for  the  time,  by  preventing  either  party  from  asserting  its  exclusive 
claim  to  the  territory ;  and  that  of  the  insertion  of  the  provision  to  give 
either  party  the  right  of  doing  so  whenever  it  might  think  proper,  by  giv 
ing  the  stipulated  notice. 

Nor  ought  it  to  be  forgotten  that,  during  the  long  interval  from  1818 
to  this  time,  continued  efforts  have  been  made  in  this  and  the  other  house 
to  induce  Congress  to  assert,  by  some  act,  our  exclusive  right  to  the  ter 
ritory,  and  that  they  have  all  heretofore  failed.  It  now  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  this  bill,  which  covers  the  whole  territory,  as  well  north  as  south 
of  the  49th,  and  provides  for  granting  land,  and  commencing  systemati 
cally  the  work  of  colonization  and  settlement,  shall  share  the  fate  of  its 
predecessors. 

To  determine  whether  it  ought  or  ought  not  involves  the  decision  of 
two  preliminary  questions.  The  first  is,  whether  the  time  is  now  arrived 
when  it  would  be  expedient,  on  our  part,  to  attempt  to  assert  and  maintain 
our  exclusive  claim  to  the  territory,  against  the  adverse  claim  of  Great 
Britain ;  and  the  other,  if  it  has,  whether  the  mode  proposed  in  this  bill 
is  the  proper  one. 

In  discussing  them,  I  do  not  intend  to  consider  the  question  of  our  right 
to  the  territory,  nor  its  value,  nor  whether  Great  Britain  is  actuated  by 
that  keen1,1  jealous,  and  hostile  spirit  towards  us  which  has  been  attributed 
to  her  in  this  discussion.  I  shall,  on  the  contrary,  assume  our  title  to  be 
as  valid  as  the  warmest  advocate  of  this  bill  asserts  it  to  be ;  the  terri 
tory  to  be,  as  to  soil,  climate,  production,  and  commercial  advantages,  all 
that  the  ardent  imagination  of  the  author  of  the  measure  paints  it  to  be  ; 
and  Great  Britain  to  be  as  formidable  and  jealous  as  she  has  been  repre 
sented.  I  make  no  issue  on  either  of  these  points.  I  controvert  none  of 
them.  According  to  my  view  of  the  subject,  it  is  not  necessary.  On  the 
contrary,  the  clearer  the  title,  the  more  valuable  the  territory ;  and  the 
more  powerful  and  hostile  the  British  government,  the  stronger  will  be 
the  ground  on  which  I  rest  my  opposition  to  the  bill. 

With  these  preliminary  remarks,  I  repeat  the  question,  Has  the  time  ar 
rived  when  it  would  be  wise  and  prudent  for  us  to  attempt  to  assert  and 
maintain  our  exclusive  right  to  the  territory  against  the  adverse  and  con 
flicting  claim  of  Great  Britain  1  I  answer,  No,  it  has  not  ;  and  that  for 
the  decisive  reason,  because  the  attempt,  if  made,  must  prove  unsuccess 
ful  against  the  resistance  of  Great  Britain.  We  could  neither  take  nor 
hold  it  against  her ;  and  that  for  a  reason  not  less  decisive — that  she 
could  in  a  much  shorter  time,  and  at  far  less  expense,  concentrate  a  far 
greater  force  than  we  could  in  the  territory. 

We  seem  to  forget,  in  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  the  great  events 
which  have  occurred  in  the  eastern  portion  of  Asia  during  the  last  year, 
and  which  have  so  greatly  extended  the  power  of  Great  Britain  in  that 
quarter  of  the  globe.  She  has  there,  in  that  period,  terminated  success 
fully  two  wars  5  by  one  of  which  she  has  given  increased  quiet  and  sta- 

Z  z  z 


546  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

bility  to  her  possessions  in  India  ;  and,  by  the  other,  has  firmly  planted  her 
power  on  the  eastern  coast  of  China,  where  she  will  undoubtedly  keep  up, 
at  least  for  a  time,  a  strong  military  and  naval  force,  for  the  purpose  of 
intimidation  and  strengthening  her  newly-acquired  possession.  The  point 
she  occupies  there,  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Pacific,  is  almost  directly 
opposite  to  the  Oregon  Territory,  at  the  distance  of  about  five  thousand 
five  hundred  miles  from  the  mouth  of  Columbia  River,  with  a  tranquil 
ocean  between,  which  may  be  passed  over  in  six  weeks.  In  that  short 
time  she  might  place,  at  a  moderate  expense,  a  strong  naval  and  military 
force  at  the  mouth  of  that  river,  where  a  formidable  body  of  men,  as  hardy 
and  energetic  as  any  on  this  continent,  in  the  service  of  the  Hudson  Bay 
Company,  and  numerous  tribes  of  Indians  under  its  control,  could  be  pre 
pared  to  sustain  and  co-operate  with  it.  Such  is  the  facility  with  which 
she  could  concentrate  a  force  there  to  maintain  her  claim  to  the  territory 
against  ours,  should  they  be  brought  into  collision  by  this  bill. 

I  now  turn  to  examine  our  means  of  concentrating  an  opposing  force 
by  land  and  water,  should  it  become  necessary  to  maintain  our  claim. 
We  have  no  military  or  naval  position  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Our  fleet 
would  have  to  sail  from  our  own  shores,  and  would  have  to  cross  the  line 
arid  double  Cape  Horn  in  56  degrees  of  south  latitude,  and,  turning  north, 
recross  the  line  and  ascend  to  latitude  46  north,  in  order  to  reach  the 
mouth  of  Columbia  River — a  distance  from  NeW-York  (over  the  straight- 
est  and  shortest  line)  of  more  than  13,000  miles,  and  which  would  require 
a  run  of  more  than  18,000  of  actual  sailing  on  the  usual  route.  Instead 
of  six  weeks,  the  voyage  would  require  six  months.  I  speak  on  the  au 
thority  of  one  of  the  most  experienced  officers  attached  to  the  navy  de 
partment. 

These  facts  are  decisive.  We  could  do  nothing  by  water.  As  far  as  that 
element  is  concerned,  we  could  not  oppose  to  her  a  gun  or  a  soldier  in  the 
territory. 

But,  as  great  as  are  the  impediments  by  water,  they  are,  at  present,  not 
much  less  so  by  land.  If  we  assume  some  central  point  in  the  State  of  Mis 
souri  as  the  place  of  rendezvous  from  which  our  military  force  would 
commence  its  march  for  the  territory,  the  distance  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia  River  will  be  found  to  be  about  two  thousand  miles,  of  which 
much  more  than  a  thousand  miles  would  be  over  an  unsettled  country,  con 
sisting  of  naked  plains  or  mountainous  regions,  without  provisions,  ex 
cept  such  game  as  the  rifle  might  supply.  On  a  greater  portion  of  this 
long  march  the  force  would  be  liable  to  be  attacked  and  harassed  by  nu 
merous  and  warlike  tribes  of  Indians,  whose  hostilities  might  be  readily 
turned  against  us  by  the  British  traders.  To  march  such  a  distance  with 
out  opposition  would  take  upward  of  120  days,  assuming  the  march  to 
be  at  the  usual  rate  for  military  forces.  Should  it  be  impeded  by  the 
hostilities  of  Indians,  the  time  would  be  greatly  prolonged. 

I  now  ask,  How  could  any  considerable  force  sustain  itself  in  so  long  a 
march,  through  a  region  so  destitute  of  supplies!  A  small  detachment 
might  live  on  game,  but  that  resource  would  be  altogether  inadequate  to 
the  support  of  an  army.  But,  admitting  an  army  could  find  sufficient 
supplies  to  sustain  itself  on  its  march  to  the  territory,  how  could  it  sus 
tain  itself  in  an  uncultivated  territory,  too  remote  to  draw  supplies  from 
our  settlements  in  its  rear,  and  with  the  ocean  in  front  closed  against  it 
by  a  hostile  fleet !  And  how  could  supplies  be  found  to  return  if  a  re 
treat  should  become  necessary!  In  whatever  view  the  subject  maybe 
regarded,  I  hazard  nothing  in  asserting  that,  such  is  the  difficulty  at  present 
on  our  part  of  concentrating  and  maintaining  a  force  in  the  territory,  that 
a  few  thousand  regulars,  advantageously  fortified  on  the  Columbia  River, 


SPEECHES  OP  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  547 

with  a  small  naval  force  to  support  them,  could,  with  the  aid  of  the  em 
ployees  of  the  Hudson  Bay  Company,  and  the  co-operation  of  the  Indians 
under  its  influence,  bid  defiance  to  any  effort  we  could  make  to  dislodge 
them.  If  all  other  difficulties  could  be  surmounted,  that  of  transporting 
a  sufficient  battering-train,  with  all  of  its  appurtenances,  to  so  great  a  dis 
tance,  and  over  so  many  obstacles,  would  be  insuperable. 

Having  now  made  good  my  first  position,  that  the  attempt,  at  present, 
to  assert  and  maintain  our  exclusive  claim  to  the  territory  against  the 
adverse  claim  of  Great  Britain,  must  prove  unsuccessful  if  she  resisted, 
it  now  remains  to  inquire  whether  she  would  resist.  And  here  let  me 
say,  whatever  might  be  ihe  doubts  of  others,  surely  they  who  have  in  this 
discussion  insisted  so  strongly  on  her  power,  her  jealousy,  and  her  deter 
mination  to  hold  the  territory,  cannot  doubt  that  she  would  resist.  If, 
indeed,  provoking  language  can  excite  her  to  resistance,  or  if  half  which 
has  been  said  of  her  hostile  disposition  be  true,  she  not  only  would  resist, 
but  would  gladly  seize  so  favourable  an  occasion  to  do  so,  while  we  are 
comparatively  so  weak  and  she  so  strong  in  that  quarter.  However  un 
favourable  the  time  might  be  for  us,  for  her  it  would  be  the  most  propiti 
ous.  Her  vast  resources  and  military  power  in  the  East  are  liberated, 
and  at  her  disposal,  to  be  directed  to  assert  and  maintain  her  exclusive 
claim  to  the  territory  against  ours,  if  she  should  determine  to  follow  our 
example  in  case  this  bill  should  pass.  Even  I,  who  believe  that  the  pres 
ent  ministry  is  disposed  to  peace ;  that  the  recent  mission  to  this  coun 
try  originated  in  the  spirit  of  peace  ;  and  that  Sir  Robert  Peel  has  exhib 
ited  great  wisdom  and  moderation — moderation  in  the  midst  of  splendid 
success,  and  therefore  more  to  be  trusted — do  not  doubt  she  would  re 
sist,  if  we  should  adopt  this  measure.  We  must  not  forget,  as  clear  as 
we  believe  our  title  to  be,  that  the  right  to  the  territory  is  in  dispute  be 
tween  the  two  countries,  and  that,  as  certain  as  we  regard  our  right  to 
be,  she  regards  hers  as  not  less  so.  It  is  a  case  of  adverse  conflicting 
claims,  and  we  may  be  assured,  if  we  undertake  to  assert  our  exclusive 
right,  she  will  oppose  us  by  asserting  hers ;  and  if  the  appeal  should  be  to 
force,  to  decide  between  us  at  present,  the  result  would  be  inevitable — 
the  territory  would  be  lost  to  us.  Indeed,  this  is  so  incontestable  that  no 
one  has  ventured  to  deny  it,  and  there  is  no  hazard  in  asserting  that  no 
one  will  who  understands  the  subject,  and  does  not  choose  to  have  the 
soundness  of  his  judgment  questioned. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  What  then]  Shall  we  abandon  our  claim  to  the 
territory  1  I  answer,  No.  I  am  utterly  opposed  to  that  ;  but,  as  bad  as 
that  would  be,  it  would  not  be  as  much  so  as  to  adopt  a  rash  and  precip 
itate  measure,  which,  after  great  sacrifices,  would  finally  end  in  its  loss. 
But  I  am  opposed  to  both.  My  object  is  to  preserve,  and  not  to  lose  the 
territory.  I  do  not  agree  with  my  eloquent  and  able  colleague  that  it  is 
worthless.  He  has  underrated  it  both  as  to  soil  and  climate.  It  contains 
a  vast  deal  of  land,  it  is  true,  that  is  barren  and  worthless,  but  not  a  little 
that  is  highly  productive.  To  that  may  be  added  its  commercial  advan 
tages,  which  will,  in  time,  prove  to  be  great.  We  must  not  overlook  the 
important  events  to  which  I  have  alluded  as  having  recently  occurred  in 
the  eastern  portion  of  Asia.  As  great  as  they  are,  they  are  but  the  begin 
ning  of  a  series  of  a  smilar  character  which  must  follow  at  no  distant  day. 
What  has  taken  place  in  China  will,  in  a  few  years,  be  followed  in  Japan 
and  all  the  eastern  portions  of  that  continent.  Their  ports,  like  the  Chi 
nese,  will  be  opened,  and  the  whole  of  that  large  portion  of  Asia,  contain 
ing  nearly  half  of  the  population  and  wealth  of  the  globe,  will  be  thrown 
open  to  the  commerce  of  the  world,  and  be  placed  within  the  pale  of  Eu 
ropean  and  American  intercourse  and  civilization.  A  vast  market  will  be 


548  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

created,  and  a  mighty  impulse  will  be  given  to  commerce.  No  small 
portion  of  the  share  that  would  fall  to  us  with  this  populous  and  indus 
trious  portion  of  the  globe  is  destined  to  pass  through  the  ports  of  the 
Oregon  Territory  to  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  instead  of  takiiig  the 
circuitous  and  long  voyage  round  Cape  Horn,  or  the  still  longer  round 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  It  is  mainly  because  I  place  this  high  estimate 
on  its  prospective  value  that  I  am  so  solicitous  to  preserve  it,  and  so  ad 
verse  to  this  bill,  or  any  other  precipitate  measure  which  might  terminate 
in  its  loss.  If  I  thought  less  of  its  value,  or  if  I  regarded  our  title  less 
clear,  my  opposition  would  be  less  decided. 

Having  now,  I  trust,  satisfactorily  shown  that,  if  we  should  now  attempt 
to  assert  and  maintain  our  exclusive  right  to  the  territory  against  the  ad 
verse  claim  of  Great  Britain,  she  would  resist ;  and  that,  if  shere  sisted, 
our  attempt  would  be  unsuccessful,  and  the  territory  be  lost,  the  question 
presents  itself,  How  shall  we  preserve  it  1 

There  is  only  one  means  by  which  it  can  be  preserved,  but  that,  fortu 
nately,  is  the  most  powerful  of  all — time.  Time  is  acting  for  us  ;  and  if 
we  shall  have  the  wisdom  to  trust  its  operation,  it  will  assert  and  main 
tain  our  right  with  resistless  force,  without  costing  a  cent  of  money  or  a 
drop  of  blood.  There  is  often,  in  the  affairs  of  government,  more  effi 
ciency  and  wisdom  in  non-action  than  in  action.  All  we  want  to  effect 
our  object  in  this  case  is  "a  wise  and  masterly  inactivity."  Our  popula 
tion  is  rolling  towards  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  with  an  impetus  greater 
than  what  we  realize.  It  is  one  of  those  forward  movements  which  leaves 
anticipation  behind.  In  the  period  of  thirty-two  years  which  have  elapsed 
since  I  took  my  seat  in  the  other  house,  the  Indian  frontier  has  receded  a 
thousand  miles  to  the  West.  At  that  time  our  population  was  much  less 
than  half  what  it  is  now.  I,t  was  then  increasing  at  the  rate  of  about  a 
quarter  of  a  million  annually  ;  it  is  now  not  less  than  six  hundred  thou 
sand,  and  still  increasing  at  the  rate  of  something  more  than  three  per 
cent,  compound  annually.  At  that  rate,  it  will  soon  reach  the  yearly  in 
crease  of  a  million.  If  to  this  be  added  that  the  region  west  of  Arkansas 
and  the  State  of  Missouri,  and  south  of  the  Missouri  River,  is  occupied 
by  half-civilized  tribes,  who  have  their  lands  secured  to  them  by  treaty 
(and  which  will  prevent  the  spread  of  population  in  that  direction),  and 
that  this  great  and  increasing  tide  will  we  forced  to  take  the  comparative 
ly  narrow  channel  to  the  north  of  that  river  and  south  of  our  northern 
boundary,  some  conception  may  be  formed  of  the  strength  with  which  the 
current  will  run  in  that  direction,  and  how  soon  it  will  reach  the  eastern 
gorges  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  I  say  some  conception,  for  I  feel  as 
sured  that  the  reality  will  outrun  the  anticipation.  In  illustration,  I  will 
repeat  what  I  stated  when  I  first  addressed  the  Senate  on  this  subject.  As 
wise  and  experienced  as  was  President  Monroe — as  much  as  he  had  wit 
nessed  of  the  growth  of  our  country  in  his  time,  so  inadequate  was  his 
conception  of  its  rapidity,  that  near  the  close  of  his  administration,  in  the 
year  1824-,  he  proposed  to  colonize  the  Indians  of  New-York,  and  those 
north  of  the  Ohio  River  and  east  of  the  Mississippi,  in  what  is  now  called 
the  Wisconsin  Territory,  under  the  impression  that  it  was  a  portion  of 
our  territory  so  remote  that  they  would  not  be  disturbed  by  our  increas 
ing  population  for  a  long  time  to  come.  It  is  now  but  eighteen  years 
since  ;  and  already,  in  that  short  period,  it  is  a  great  and  flourishing  ter 
ritory,  ready  to  knock  at  our  door  for  admission  as  one  of  the  sovereign 
members  of  the  Union.  But  what  is  still  more  striking— what  is  really 
wonderful  and  almost  miraculous  is,  that  another  territory  (Iowa),  still 
farther  west  (beyond  the  Mississippi),  has  spru'ng  up,  as  if  by  magic,  and 
has  already  outstripped  Wisconsin,  and  may  knock  for  entrance  before 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  549 

she  is  prepared  to  do  so.  Such  is  the  wonderful  growth  of  a  popula 
tion  which  has  attained  the  number  ours  has,  and  is  still  yearly  increas 
ing  at  the  compound  rate  it  is,  and  such  the  impetus  with  which  it  is 
forcing  its  way,  resistlessly,  westward.  It  will  soon — far  sooner  than  an 
ticipated — reach  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  be  ready  to  pour  into  the  Ore 
gon  Territory,  when  it  will  come  into  our  possession  without  resistance 
or  struggle  ;  or,  if  there  should  be  resistance,  it  would  be  feeble  and  inef 
fectual.  We  should  then  be  as  much  stronger  there,  comparatively,  than 
Great  Britain,  as  she  is  now  stronger  than  we  are  ;  and  it  would  then  be  as 
idle  in  her  to  attempt  to  assert  and  maintain  her  exclusive  claim  to  the 
territory  against  us,  as  it  would  now  be  in  us  to  attempt  it  against  her.  Let 
us  be  wise  and  abide  our  time,  and  it  will  accomplish  all  that  we  desire 
with  more  certainty,  and  with  infinitely  less  sacrifice  than  we  can  with 
out  it. 

But  if  the  time  had  already  arrived  for  the  successful  assertion  of  our 
right  against  any  resistance  which  might  be  made,  it  would  not,  in  my 
opinion,  be  expedient  in  the  present  condition  of  the  government.  It  is 
weak — never  more  so  ;  weak  politically,  and  from  the  state  of  the  finances. 
The  former  was  so  ably  and  eloquently  described  by  my  colleague,  that  I 
have  nothing  to  add  but  a  single  remark  on  the  extraordinary  state  of 
parties  at  present.  There  are  now  three  parties  in  the  Union  ;  of  which 
one  is  in  possession  of  the  executive  department,  another  of  the  legisla 
tive,  and  the  other,  judging  by  the  recent  elections,  of  the  country,  which 
has  so  locked  and  impeded  the  operations  of  the  government,  that  it  is 
scarcely  able  to  take  measures  necessary  to  its  preservation. 

In  turning  from  this  imbecile  political  condition  of  the  government,  and 
casting  my  eyes  on  the  state  of  its  finances,  I  behold  nothing  but  disorder 
and  embarrassment  ;  credit  prostrated  ;  a  new  debt  contracted,  already 
of  considerable  amount,  and  daily  increasing;  expenditures  exceeding  in 
come  ;  and  the  prospect,  instead  of  brightening,  growing  still  more 
gloomy.  Already  the  debt  falls  not  much  short  of  thirty  millions  of  dol 
lars,  to  which  will  be  added,  from  present  appearances,  by  the  end  of  the 
year  (if  the  appropriations  are  not  greatly  curtailed  and  the  revenue  im 
proved),  not  less,  probably,  than  ten  millions,  when  the  interest  would  be 
upward  of  two  millions  of  dollars  annually — a  sum  more  than  equal  to  the 
nett  revenue  from  the  public  lands.  The  only  remaining  revenue  is  derived 
from  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  country,  and  on  that  such  heavy  duties 
are  imposed  that  it  is  sinking  under  the  burden.  The  imports  of  the  last 
quarter,  it  is  estimated,  will  be  less  than  nine  millions  of  dollars — a  fall 
ing  off  of  about  two  thirds,  compared  with  what  it  ought  to  be,  according 
to  the  estimate  made  at  the  last  session  by  those  who  imposed  the  burden. 
But  as  great  as  it  is,  the  falling  off  will,  I  understand,  be  still  greater,  from 
present  indications,  during  the  present  quarter;  and  yet,  in  the  face  of 
all  this,  we  are  appropriating  money  as  profusely,  and  projecting  schemes 
of  expenditure  as  thoughtlessly,  as  if  the  treasury  were  full  to  overflowing. 
So  great  is  the  indifference,  that  even  the  prostrated  condition  of  the 
treasury  attracts  no  attention.  It  is  scarcely  mentioned  or  alluded  to. 
No  one  seems  to  care  anything  about  it.  Not  an  inquiry  is  made  how 
the  means  of  supplying  the  acknowledged  deficit  to  meet  the  current  de 
mands  on  the  treasury,  or  to  cover  the  extraordinary  expenditures  which 
will  be  incurred  by  this  measure,  should  it  be  adopted,  are  to  be  raised.  I 
would  ask  its  advocates,  Do  you  propose  to  borrow  the  funds  necessary 
for  its  execution  1  Our  credit  is  already  greatly  impaired,  and  our  debt 
rapidly  increasing;  and  are  you  willing  still  farther  to  impair  the  one  and 
add  to  the  increase  of  the  other]  Do  you  propose  to  raise  them  by  in 
creasing  the  duties  ]  Can  you  hope  to  derive  additional  revenue  from 


550  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

such  increase,  when  the  duties  are  already  so  high  as  not  omy  to  paralyze 
the  commerce,  agriculture,  and  industry  of  the  country,  but  to  diminish, 
to  an  alarming  extent,  the  revenue  from  the  imports'?  Are  you  prepared 
to  lay  a  duty  on  tea  and  coffee,  and  other  free  articles  1  If  so,  speak  out, 
and  tell  your  constituents  plainly  that  such  is  your  intention;  that  money 
must  be  had  j  and  that  no  other  source  of  revenue  is  left  which  can  be 
relied  on  but  a  tax  on  them.  It  must  come  to  that ;  and,  before  we  incur 
the  expense,  it  is  but  fair  that  our  constituents  should  know  the  conse 
quence. 

But  we  are  told  the  expense  will  be  small — not  exceeding  one  or  two 
hundred  thousand  dollars.  Let  us  not  be  deceived.  What  this  bill  ap 
propriates  is  but  the  entering-wedge.  Let  it  pass,  and  no  one  can  tell 
what  it  will  cost.  It  will  depend  on  circumstances.  Under  the  most 
favourable,  on  the  supposition  that  there  will  be  no  resistance  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain,  it  would  amount  to  millions ;  but  if  she  should  resist, 
and  we  should  make  it  a  question  of  force,  I  hazard  nothing  in  saying  it 
would  subject  the  country  to  heavier  expenditures,  and  expose  it  to 
greater  danger,  than  any  measure  which  has  ever  received  the  sanction 
of  Congress. 

Many  and  great  are  the  acts  of  folly  which  we  have  committed  in  the 
management  of  our  finances  in  the  last  fourteen  or  fifteen  years.  We 
doubled  our  revenue  when  our  expenditures  were  on  the  eve  of  being  re 
duced  one  half  by  the  discharge  of  the  public  debt.  We  reversed  that 
act  of  folly,  arid  doubled  our  expenditures  when  the  revenue  was  in  the 
course  of  reduction  under  the  Compromise  Act.  When  the  joint  effects 
of  the  operation  of  the  two  had  exhausted  the  treasury,  and  left  the  gov 
ernment  without  adequate  means  to  meet  current  demands,  by  an  aptitude 
in  folly  unexampled,  we  selected  that  as  the  fit  moment  to  divest  the 
government  of  the  revenue  from  the  public  domain,  and  to  place  the  en 
tire  burden  of  supporting  it  on  the  commerce  of  the  country.  And  then, 
as  if  to  consummate  the  whole,  we  passed  an  act  at  the  close  of  the  last 
session  which  bids  fair  to  cripple  effectually  this  our  only  remaining 
source  of  revenue.  And  now  what  are  we  doing]  Profiting  by  the  dis 
astrous  consequences  of  past  mismanagement!  Quite  the  reverse:  com 
mitting,  if  possible,  greater  and  more  dangerous  acts  of  folly  than  ever. 
When  the  government  and  the  country  are  lying  prostrate  by  this  long 
series  of  errors  and  mismanagement ;  when  the  public  credit  is  deeply 
impaired ;  when  the  people  and  the  states  are  overwhelmed  by  debt,  and 
need  all  their  resources  to  extricate  themselves  from  their  embarrass 
ments,  that  is  the  moment  we  select  to  bring  forward  a  measure  which, 
on  the  most  favourable  supposition,  if  adopted,  cannot  fail  to  subject  the 
government  to  very  heavy  expenditures,  even  should  events  take  the  most 
favourable  turn  ;  and  may — no,  that  is  not  strong  enough — would,  prob 
ably,  subject  it  to  greater  than  it  ever  has  heretofore  been.  Where  would 
the  government  find  resources  to  meet  them  1  Not  in  its  credit,  for  that 
would  be  extinct.  Not  in  the  impost,  for  that  is  already  overburdened. 
Not  in  internal  taxes,  the  indebted  condition  of  the  states  forbids  that. 
More  than  half  the  states  of  the  Union  are  in  debt  j  many  deeply,  and 
several  even  beyond  their  means  of  payment.  They  require  every  cent 
of  the  surplus  means  of  their  citizens,  which  can  be  reached  by  taxes,  to 
meet  their  own  debts.  Under  such  a  state  of  things,  this  government 
could  not  impose  internal  taxes-,  to  any  considerable  amount,  without 
bankrupting  the  indebted  states  or  crushing  their  citizens.  What  would 
follow  should  the  government  be  compelled,  in  consequence  of  this  meas 
ure,  to  resort  to  such  taxes,  I  shall  not  undertake  to  trace.  Suffice  it  to 
gay,  that  all  preceding  disasters,  as  great  as  they  are,  which  followed  the 
preceding  acts  of  folly,  would  be  as  nothing  compared  to  the  overwhelm 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  551 

ing  calamities  which  would  follow  this.     Our  system  might  sink  under 
the  shock. 

If,  senators,  you  would  hearken  to  the  voice  of  one  who  has  some  ex 
perience,  and  no  other  desire  but  to  see  the  country  free  and  prosperous,  I 
would  say,  Direct  your  eyes  to  the  finances.  There,  at  present,  the  danger 
lies.  Restore,  without  delay,  the  equilibrium  between  revenue  and  expen 
ditures,  the  want  of  which  has  done  so  much  to  destroy  our  credit  and  de 
range  the  whole  fabric  of  the  government.  If  that  should  not  be  done,  the 
government  and  country  will  be  involved,  ere  long,  in  overwhelming  diffi 
culties.  Cherish  the  revenue  from  the  lands  and  the  imports.  They  are  our 
legitimate  sources  of  revenue.  When  the  period  arrives — come  when  it 
may — that  this  government  will  be  compelled  to  resort  to  internal  taxes 
for  its  support  in  time  of  peace,  it  will  mark  one  of  the  most  difficult  and 
dangerous  stages  through  which  it  is  destined  to  pass.  If  it  should  be  a 
period  like  the  present — when  the  states  are  deeply  in  debt,  and  need  all 
their  internal  resources  to  meet  their  own  engagements — it  may  prove 
fatal ;  and  yet  it  would  seem  as  if  systematic  efforts  are,  and  have  been 
making  for  some  time,  to  bring  it  about  at  this  critical  and  dangefous  pe 
riod.  To  this  all  our  financial  measures  tend — the  giving  away  the  pub 
lic  lands  ;  the  crushing  of  the  customs  by  high  protective,  and,  in  many 
instances,  prohibitory  duties  j  the  adoption  of  hazardous  and  expensive 
measures  of  policy,  like  the  present  ;  and  the  creation  of  a  public  debt, 
without  an  effort  to  reduce  the  expenditures.  How  it  is  all  to  end  time 
only  can  disclose. 

But  if  our  finances  were  in  ever  so  flourishing  a  state ;  if  the  political 
condition  of  the  country  were  as  strong  as  it  could  be  made  by  an  admin 
istration  standing  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  dominant  party  ;  and  if  our 
population  had  reached  the  point  where  we  could  successfully  assert  and 
maintain   our  claim   against  the   adverse   claim   of  Great  Britain,   there 
would  still  remain  a  decisive  objection  to  this  bill.     The  mode  in  which 
it  proposes  to  do  it  is  indefensible.     If  we  are  displeased  with  the  exist 
ing  arrangement,  which  leaves  the  territory  free  and  open  to  the  citizens 
and  subjects  of  the  two  countries;  if  we  are  of  opinion  it  operates  prac 
tically  to  our  disadvantage,  or  that  the  time  has  arrived  when  we  ought 
to  assert  and  carry  into  effect  our  claim  of  exclusive  sovereignty  over  the 
territory,  the  treaty  provides  expressly  for  the  case.     It  authorizes  either 
party,  by  giving  a  year's  notice,  to  terminate  its  existence  whenever  it 
pleases,  and  without  giving  reasons.     Why  has  not  this  bill  conformed 
to  this  express  and  plain  provision  1     Why  should  it  undertake  to  assert 
our  exclusive  ownership  to  the  whole  territory,  in  direct  violation  of  the 
treaty  1.     Why  should  it,  with  what  we  all  believe  to  be  a  good  title  on 
our  part,  involve  the  country  in  a  controversy  about  the  violation  of  the 
treaty,  in  which  a  large  portion  (if  not  a  majority)  of  the  body  believe 
that  we  would  be  in  the  wrong,  when  the  treaty  itself  might  so  easily,  and 
in  so  short  a  time,  be  terminated  by  our  own  act,  and  the  charge  of  its 
violation  be  avoided!     Can  any  satisfactory  reason  be  given  to  these 
questions  1     I  ask  the  author  of  the  measure,  and  its  warm  advocates,  for 
an  answer.     None  has  been  given  yet,  and  none,  I  venture  to  assert,  will 
be  attempted.     I  can  imagine  but  one  answer  that  can  be  given  — that 
there  are  those  who  will  vote  for  the  bill  that  would  not  vote  to  give  no 
tice,  under  the  delusive  hope  that  we  may  assert  our  exclusive  ownership, 
and  take  possession,  without  violating  the  treaty  or  endangering  the  peace 
of  the  country.     Their  aim  is,  to  have  all  the  benefit  of  the  treaty,  without 
being  subject  to  its  restrictions  ;  an  aim  in  direct  conflict  with  the  only 
object  of  the  treaty — to  prevent  conflict  between  the  two  countries,  by- 
keeping  the  question  of  ownership  or  sovereignty  in  abeyance  till  the 
question  of  boundary  can  be  settled.     That  such  is  the  object  appears 


552  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

to  be  admitted  by  all  except  the  senator  from  New-Hampshire  (Mr.  Wood- 
bury),  whose  argument,  I  must  say,  with  all  deference  for  him,  was  on 
that  point  very  unsatisfactory.  The  other  advocates  of  the  bill,  accord 
ingly,  admit  that  a  grant  of  lands  to  emigrants  settling  in  the  territory,  to 
take  effect  immediately,  would  be  a  violation  of  the  treaty  ;  but  contend 
that  a  promise  to  grant  hereafter  would  not  be.  The  distinction  is,  no 
•doubt,  satisfactory  to  those  who  make  it;  but  how  can  they  rationally  ex 
pect  it  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  British  government,  when  so  large  a 
portion  of  the  Senate  believe  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  a  grant 
and  a  promise  to  grant  lands,  as  it  relates  to  the  treaty,  and  hold  one  to  be 
as  much  a  violation  of  it  as  the  other  1  We  may  be  assured  that  the  British 
government  will  look  to  the  intention  of  the  bill,  and,  in  doing  so,  will  see 
that  its  object  is  to  assert  our  exclusive  claim  of  sovereignty  over  the  en 
tire  territory  against  their  adverse  claim,  and  will  shape  their  course  ac 
cordingly.  Our  nice  distinction  between  actual  grants  and  the  promise 
to  grant  will  not  be  noticed.  They  will  see  in  it  the  subversion  of  the 
objeci  for  which  the  treaty  was  formed,  and  take  their  measures  to  coun 
teract  it.  The  result  will  be  that,  instead  of  gaining  the  advantage  aimed 
at,  we  shall  not  only  lose  the  advantages  of  the  treaty,  but  be  involved  in 
the  serious  charge  of  having  violated  its  provisions. 

I  am  not,  however,  of  opinion  that  Great  Britain  would  declare  war 
against  us.  If  I  mistake  not,  she  is  under  the  direction,  at  this  time,  of 
those  who  are  too  sagacious  and  prudent  to  take  that  course.  She  would 
probably  consider  the  treaty  at  an  end,  and  take  possession  adverse  to  us, 
if  not  of  the  whole  territory,  at  least  to  the  Columbia  River.  She  would, 
at  the  same  time,  take  care  to  command  that  river  by  a  strong  fortifica 
tion,  manned  by  a  respectable  garrison,  and  leave  it  to  us  to  decide 
whether  we  shall  acquiesce,  or  negotiate,  or  attempt  to  dislodge  her. 
To  acquiesce,  under  such  circumstances,  would  be  a  virtual  surrender  of 
the  territory;  to  negotiate  with  adverse  and  forcible  possession  against 
us  would  be  almost  as  hopeless  ;  and  to  dislodge  her  at  present  would, 
as  has  been  shown,  be  impracticable. 

Such,  in  my  opinion,  would  be  the  probable  result,  should  this  bill  be 
passed.  It  would  place  us,  in  every  respect,  in  a  situation  far  less  eligible 
than  at  present.  The  occupation  of  British  subjects  in  the  territory,  as 
things  now  stand,  is  by  permission,  under  positive  treaty  stipulation,  and 
cannot  ripen  into  a  title,  as  it  was  supposed  it  would  by  the  senator  from 
Illinois  (Mr.  M'Roberts). 

But  if  their  occupancy  was  adverse  (as  it  would  be  should  this  measure 
be  adopted),  and  Great  Britain  should  resist,  then  his  argument  would  be 
sound,  and  have  great  force.  In  that  case,  the  necessity  of  taking  some 
decisive  step  on  our  part  to  secure  our  rights  would  be  imperious.  De 
lay  would  then,  indeed,  be  dangerous.  Bat  as  it  is,  no  length  of  time 
can  confer  a  title  against  us;  and  it  is  that,  considering  what  advantage 
Great  Britain  has  over  us  at  present,  either  to  take  or  hold  possession, 
which  ought  to  give  to  the  treaty  great  value  in  our  estimation.  It  is  a 
wise  maxim  to  let  well  enough  alone.  We  can  do  little  at  present  to  bet 
ter  our  condition.  Even  the  occupation  and  improvement  by  British  sub 
jects,  against  which  so  much  has  been  said,  will  in  the  end,  if  we  act 
wisely,  be  no  disadvantage.  Neither  can  give  any  claim  against  us,  when 
the  time  comes  to  assert  our  rights,  if  we  abide  faithfully  by  the  treaty. 
They  are  but  preparing  the  country  for  our  reception ;  and  should  their 
improvements  and  cultivation  be  extended,  it  would  only  enable  us  to  take 
possession  with  more  ease  if  it  should  ever  become  necessary  to  assert 
our  claims  by  force,  which  I  do  not  think  probable,  if  we  shall  have  the 
wisdom  to  avoid  hasty  and  precipitate  action,  and  leave  the  question  to 
the  certain  operation  of  time. 


SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  553 


I 


Jji  conclusion,  I  might  appeal  to  the  authority  of  all  preceding  admin 
istrations,  from  1818  to  the  present  time,  in  support  of  the  views  I  have 
taken.  On  what  other  supposition  can  it  be  explained  that  the  adminis 
tration  of  Mr.  Monroe  should  assent  to  the  treaty  of  that  year,  which  left 
the  territory  open  and  free  to  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  two  coun 
tries  for  the  period  of  ten  years  1  Or  that  Mr.  Adams  should  revive  it, 
with  the  provision  that  either  might  terminate  it  by  giving  one  year's  no 
tice  1  Or,  still  more  emphatically,  how  can  it  be  explained  that,  with  this 
right  of  terminating  the  treaty,  the  administration  of  General  Jackson, 
and  that  of  his  successor,  should,  for  the  period  of  twelve  years,  acquiesce 
in  it,  but  on  the  conviction  that  it  was  the  best  arrangement  which  could 
be  made,  and  that  any  change  or  movement  on  our  part  would  but  render 
our  situation  worse,  instead  of  better,  in  relation  to  the  territory  1  It  can 
not  be  said  that  the  present  is  a  more  favourable  period  to  assert  our  ex 
clusive  right  than  during  either  of  the  preceding  administrations.  The  re 
verse  is  the  fact.  It  is,  in  every  view,  far  less  favourable  than  either, 
and  especially  than  that  of  General  Jackson,  when  the  treasury  was  over 
flowing,  and  the  head  of  the  administration  possessed  greater  influence 
and  power  than  any  other  chief  magistrate  that  ever  presided  over  the 
country.  That,  if  ever,  was  the  time  to  assert  our  exclusive  ownership; 
particularly  as  those  who  are  so  earnestly  pressing  it  on  the  government 
were  then  in  power,  and  would  have  been  responsible  for  its  execution. 
How  is  it  to  be  explained  that  they  were  then  so  passive  and  are  now  so 
urgent  for  the  passage  of  this  bill! 

Entertaining  these  views,  I  hope  that  the  motion  of  the  senator  from 
Virginia  (Mr.  Archer)  will  prevail,  and  the  bill  be  referred  to  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations.  The  subject  is  one  of  great  importance 
and  delicacy,  and  ought  to  be  carefully  examined  by  the  appropriate  or 
gan  of  the  body.  Should  it  be  referred,  I  trust  the  committee  will  report 
amendments  to  strike  out  all  the  provisions  of  the  bill  which,  by  any 
reasonable  interpretation,  might  be  regarded  to  be  in  conflict  with  the 
stipulations  of  the  treaty  between  the  two  countries,  or  which  might  in 
cur  any  considerable  expense  in  the  present  exhausted  condition  of  the 
treasury.  As  at  present  advised,  I  am  not  indisposed  to  the  provision,  if 
properly  guarded,  which  proposes  to  extend  our  jurisdiction  over  our 
citizens  in  the  territory.  It  ought  not,  however,  to  be  carried  farther 
than  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Parliament  of  1821.  I  am  opposed  to 
holding  out  temptation  to  our  citizens  to  emigrate  to  a  region  where  we 
cannot  at  present  protect  them ;  but  if  there  be  any  who  may  choose  to 
emigrate,  I  would  be  far  from  opposing  them,  and  am  unwilling  that  they 
should  lose,  by  emigration,  personally  the  benefit  of  our  jurisdiction  and 
laws. 

I  have  now  said  what  I  intended  in  reference  to  this  bill,  and  shall  con 
clude  by  noticing  some  remarks  which  fell  from  the  senator  from  Mis 
souri  (Mr.  Linn)  who  introduced  it.  When  he  first  addressed  the  Senate, 
in  reply  to  my  former  remarks,  he  spoke  a  good  deal  about  opposition 
and  injustice  to  the  West,  and  referred  to  some  of  the  acts  of  the  govern 
ment  at  an  early  date,  which  he  supposed  partook  of  that  character.  I 
do  not  suppose  that  he  intended  it,  but  his  remarks  were  calculated  to 
make  the  impression  (taken  in  connexion  with  the  time  and  subject)  that 
he  regarded  the  opposition  to  the  passage  of  this  bill  as  originating  in 
unfriendly  feelings  to  the  West.  But  if  he  so  regards  it,  and  if  he  intended 
to  apply  his  remarks  tome,  I  would  appeal  to  my  acts  to  repel  the  unjust 
imputation. 

[Here  Mr.  Linn  disclaimed  any  intention  of  attributing  to  Mr.  Calhoun 
hostile  or  unkind  feelings  to  the  West.] 

4  A 


554  SPEECHES  OF  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Mr.  Calhoun :  I  am  happy  to  hear  the  disclaimer  of  the  senator.  I  felt 
assured  he  could  not  have  intended  to  do  me  so  much  injustice  as  to  at 
tribute  to  me  the  slightest  hostility  to  the  West.  No  one  knows  better 
than  he  does  that  my  opposition  to  the  bill  originates  in  public  consid 
erations,  free  from  all  local  feelings,  and  that  my  general  views  of  policy 
have  ever  been  friendly,  and  even  liberal,  towards  the  West;  but  as  there 
are  others  not  so  familiar  with  my  course  in  reference  to  that  great  and 
growing  section,  I  deem  it  proper  to  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  briefly 
to  allude  to  it,  in  order  to  repel  any  improper  imputation  which  may  be 
attempted  to  be  attributed  to  me,  from  any  quarter,  on  account  of  my 
course  on  the  present  occasion. 

I  go  back  to  the  time  when  I  was  at  the  head  of  the  war  department. 
At  that  early  period  I  turned  my  attention  particularly  to  the  interest  of 
the  West.  I  saw  that  it  required  increased  security  to  its  long  line  of 
frontier,  and  greater  facility  for  carrying  on  intercourse  with  the  Indian 
tribes  in  that  quarter,  and  to  enable  it  to  develop  its  resources,  especially 
that  of  its  fur-trade.  To  give  the  required  security,  I  ordered  a  much  larger 
portion  of  the  army  to  that  frontier ;  and  to  afford  facility  and  protection 
for  carrying  on  the  fur-trade,  the  military  posts  were  moved  much  higher 
up  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  Rivers.  Under  the  increased  security 
and  facility  which  these  measures  afforded,  the  fur-trade  received  a  great 
impulse.  It  extended  across  the  continent,  in  a  short  time,  to  the  Pacific, 
and  north  and  south  to  the  British  and  the  Mexican  frontiers  ;  yielding 
in  a  few  years,  as  stated  by  the  senator  from  Missouri  (Mr.  Linn),  half  a 
million  of  dollars  annually.  But  I  stopped  not  there.  I  saw  that  indi 
vidual  enterprise  on  our  part,  however  great,  could  not  successfully  com 
pete  with  the  powerful  incorporated  Canadian  and  Hudson  Bay  Compa 
nies,  and  that  additional  measures  were  necessary  to  secure,  permanently, 
our  fur-trade.  For  that  purpose,  1  proposed  to  establish  a  post  still  higher 
up  the  Missouri,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yellow  Stone  River,  and  to  give 
such  unity  and  efficiency  to  our  intercourse  and  trade  with  the  Indian 
tribes,  between  our  western  frontier  and  the  Pacific  Ocean,  as  would  en 
able  our  citizens  engaged  in  the  fur-trade  to  compete  successfully  with 
the  British  traders.  Had  the  measures  proposed  been  adopted,  we  would 
not  have  to  listen  to  the  complaint,  so  frequently  uttered  in  this  discus 
sion,  of  the  loss  of  that  trade. 

But  that  is  not  all.  I  might  appeal  to  a  measure  more  recent,  and  still 
more  strongly  illustrative  of  the  liberal  feelings  which  have  ever  influ 
enced  me  whenever  the  interest  of  the  West  was  concerned.  I  refer  to 
the  bill  relating  to  the  portion  of  public  domain  lying  within  the  new 
states,  which  1  introduced  some  time  since.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  I 
looked  to  the  interest  of  the  whole  Union  in  introducing  that  measure, 
but  it  is  not  the  less  so  that  it  would,  if  it  should  become  a  law,  more 
especially  benefit  the  West.  In  doing  that,  I  exposed  myself,  in  my  own 
section,  to  the  imputation  of  seeking  the  friendship  of  the  West— as  I  do, 
on  this  occasion,  to  that  of  hostility  towards  that  great  and  growing  sec 
tion.  As  the  hazard  of  the  former  could  not  deter  me  from  doing  my 
duty  then,  so  that  of  the  latter  cannot  from  doing  my  duty  now.  The 
same  sense  of  duty  which  on  that  occasion  impelled  me  to  support  a 
measure  in  which  the  West  was  peculiarly  interested,  at  the  hazard  of 
incurring  the  displeasure  of  my  own  section,  because  I  believed  it  calcu 
lated  to  promote  the  interest  of  the  whole,  impels  me  on  this  occasion  to 
oppose  this  measure,  at  the  hazard  of  displeasing  the  West,  because  I  be 
lieve,  in  so  doing,  I  not  only  promote  the  interest  of  the  Union  generally, 
but  that  of  the  West  especially. 

THE    END. 


9no  XV-  DEPARTMENT 

2(j2  Main  Librar 


ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

lonth   cans  may  be  renewed 


DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 

*     *"^*»— 


BEa  CIS.    APR  3  0  1Sfl2 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


CDDMB23SDS 


